jkti=] fgekpy izns'k

fgekpy izns'k jkT; 'kklu }kjk izdkf'kr

lkseokj] 11 tqykbZ] 2016@20 vk"kk<+ 1938

fgekpy izns'k ljdkj

HIGHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Shimla-171002, 24th June, 2016

No. EDN-B-B(16)-17/2011.—WHEREAS Smt. Sarita Sharma, Principal, O/O Director of

Elementary Education, H.P. Shimla-171001 has given three months notice for seeking pre-mature

retirement from service in accordance with sub Rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Himachal Pradesh Civil

Service (Pre-mature Retirement) Rules, 1976.

70&jkti=@2016&11&07&2016

¼2113½

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NOW THEREFORE, the Governor of Himachal Pradesh in exercise of powers vested in

him under the rules ibid is pleased to accept the notice given by Smt. Sarita Sharma and orders that

Smt. Sarita Sharma, Principal shall stand retired from Government service w.e.f. 31-07-2016.

By orders,

Sd/-

Addl. Chief Secretary (Education.

________

HIGHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Shimla-171002, 30th June, 2016

No. EDN-B-A(16)-1/2016-loose.—WHEREAS Sh. Ashok Kumar Gautam, Principal, Govt.

Sr. Sec. School, Rajiana Bandh, District Kangra has given three months notice for seeking pre-

mature retirement from service in accordance with sub Rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Himachal Pradesh

Civil Service (Pre-mature Retirement) Rules, 1976.

NOW THEREFORE, the Governor of Himachal Pradesh in exercise of powers vested in

him under the rules ibid is pleased to accept the notice given by Sh. Ashok Kumar and orders that

Sh. Ashok Kumar, Principal, GSSS Rajiana Bandh, District Kangra shall stand retired from

Government service w.e.f. 31-07-2016.

By orders,

Sd/-

Addl. Chief Secretary (Education).

_________

HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA

NOTIFICATION

Dated : 1st July, 2016

No. HHC/Rules.22(25)/83.—In exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 2(1)(g)(i) &

(ii) read with Rule 5 of the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004, the High Court of

Himachal Pradesh is pleased to make the following amendments in “The Himachal Pradesh

Judicial Service (Syllabus and Allocation of Marks) Regulations, 2005”, for the cadre of Civil

Judges(Junior Division):—

Short title

1

These Regulations shall be called “The Himachal Pradesh Judicial

Service (Syllabus and Allocation of Marks) (6th Amendment-2016),

Regulations 2005.

Commencement 2

These Regulations shall come into force with immediate effect.

Amendments

3(I)

In the existing Regulation No. 3 (ii), “Main

Examination”, the word “ten” shall stand deleted and substituted by

“twenty”.

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After amendment, the relevant part of this Regulation shall read as

under:—

“On the basis of merit obtained in the Preliminary examination, the

candidates equal to twenty times of the number of vacancies to be

filled in shall be called for taking the main examination.”

3(II)

In the existing Regulation No. 6(v), the following proviso shall be added

as under:—

“Further provided that a candidate shall also be required to

obtain at least 45% of the marks allocated for the interview, failing

which he will be deemed to have not qualified the competitive

examination.”

After amendment, this Regulation shall read as under:—

“6(v) That out of the candidates who qualify written examination

prescribed above, for each vacancy three candidates shall be called

for viva voce strictly in order of merit obtained in the written

examination. Category wise merit list shall be drawn up so that the

requisite number of candidates are called for each category as per the

vacancies, reserved for each category.

Further provided that a candidate shall also be required to

obtain at least 45% of the marks allocated for the interview, failing

which he will be deemed to have not qualified the competitive

examination.”

By order,

High Court of Himachal Pradesh

Registrar General.

____________

PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT

Appointment-II

CORRIGENDUM

Shimla, the 8th July, 2016

No. Per (AP-B)A(1)-1/2013.—In partial modification of this Department’s Notification No.

Per(AP-B)A(1)1/2013 dated 18th May, 2016, the classification in respect of the post of Daftri

appearing at serial number 20 in the SCHEDULE may be read as “Class-IV” instead of “Class-III”.

By order,

(RAM SINGH RANOT),

Under Secretary (Personnel).

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LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Dharamshala, the 08th June, 2016

No: Shram (A) 6-2/2014 (Awards).—In exercise of the powers vested under section 17(1)

of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order the

publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court

D/Shala on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment Government of Himachal

Pradesh:—

Sr.No.

Ref. No.

Petitioner

Respondent

Date

of

Award/Order

1.

120/15

Prem Singh

E.E.HPPWD, Killar

01-04-2016

2.

126/15

Dem Chand

E.E.HPPWD, Killar

01-04-2016

3.

96/15

Chippan Dev

E.E.HPPWD, Killar

01-04-2016

4.

204/15

Suni Lal

E.E.HPPWD, Killar

01-04-2016

5.

128/15

Sant Ram

E.E.HPPWD, Killar

01-04-2016

6.

160/15

Kishan Chand

E.E.HPPWD, Killar

01-04-2016

7.

163/15

Bhisham Singh

E.E.HPPWD, Killar

01-04-2016

8.

164/15

Dharam Chand

E.E.HPPWD, Killar

01-04-2016

9.

166/15

Des Raj

E.E.HPPWD, Killar

01-04-2016

10.

167/15

Ful Dei

E.E.HPPWD, Killar

01-04-2016

11.

172/15

Ram Lal

E.E.HPPWD, Killar

01-04-2016

12.

173/15

Shambhu Ram

E.E.HPPWD, Killar

01-04-2016

13.

84/15

Parma Ram

E.E.HPPWD, Joginder Nagar

07-04-2016

14.

317/15

Sushil Kumar

M/S Seagull Laboratories

09-04-2016

15.

102/14

Kamal Kumar

Factory

Manager

M/S

AK

Industries

09-04-2016

16.

81/15

Prem Kumar

M/s Causlight telecom Una

09-04-2016

17.

65/15

Devender Singh

E.E.Changar Area, Bilaspur

09-04-2016

18.

516/15

Papu Kumar

Member

Secy.Rogi

Kalyan,

Kullu

09-04-2016

19.

295/14

Swari Devi

E.E. HPPWD, Joginder Nagar

09-04-2016

20.

298/14

Kaushlya Devi

E.E. HPPWD, Joginder Nagar

09-04-2016

21.

47/14

Kahan Singh

E.E. HPPWD, Joginder Nagar

09-04-2016

22.

330/14

Mast Ram

E.E. HPPWD, Joginder Nagar

09-04-2016

23.

614/15

President

Nestle

Employees U

Factory

Manager

Nestle

Tahliwal

09-04-2016

24.

289/14

Shakuntla Devi

E.E. HPPWD, Joginder Nagar

22-04-2016

25.

324/14

Giru Ram

D.F.O. Shamshi

22-04-2016

26.

325/14

Tara Devi

D.F.O. Shamshi

22-04-2016

27.

115/15

Suresh Chand

Dist. Sericulture Officer

22-04-2016

28.

192/15

Seeta Devi

E.E.HPPWD, Joginder Nagar

23-04-2016

29.

56/14

Hem Singh

E.E.HPPWD, Joginder Nagar

23-04-2016

30.

373/15

Godda Devi

E.E. HPPWD, Dharampur

23-04-2016

31.

423/15

Satish Kumar

E.E. HPPWD, Dharampur

23-04-2016

32.

375/15

Daulat Ram

E.E. HPPWD, Dharampur

23-04-2016

33.

374/15

Hem Singh

E.E. HPPWD, Dharampur

23-04-2016

34.

140/11

Rajesh Kumar

E.E.HPSEB, Joginder Nagar

23-04-2016

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35.

12/13

Sidhu Ram

D.F.O. Sunder Nagar

26-04-2016

36.

369/15

Pratap Chand

HPSEB, Baijnath

29-04-2016

37.

229/15

Ravi Kumar

E.E.HPPWD, Joginder Nagar

30-04-2016

38.

227/15

Subhash Chand

E.E.HPPWD, Joginder Nagar

30-04-2016

39.

236/15

Mintu Ram

E.E.HPPWD, Joginder Nagar

30-04-2016

40.

222/15

Sarwan Kumar

E.E.HPPWD, Joginder Nagar

30-04-2016

41.

224/15

Meera Devi

E.E.HPPWD, Joginder Nagar

30-04-2016

By order,

Sd/-

Pr. Secretary ( Lab. & Emp.).

_________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 120/2015

Date of Institution : 13.03.2015

Date of Decision : 01.04.2016

Shri Prem Singh s/o Shri Tej Singh, r/o Village and P.O. Shahli, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Prem Singh S/O Shri Tej Singh,

R/O Village and Post Office Shahli, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice

dated 18.8.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service w.e.f. August, 2004

suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Prem

Singh S/O Shri Tej Singh, R/O Village and Post Office Shahli, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba,

H.P. w.e.f. August, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,

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1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service

benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above

employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of June, 1996 who continuously worked till August, 2004 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 2004 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 2004 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of August, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of September, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

August, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that

period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between June, 1996 to August, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of

the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2004 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of

HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of

H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

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and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at para no. 4 of the claim

petition that Shri Dev Raj s/o Shri Mehar Chand was senior to petitioner and other persons

mentioned in this para are continuously worked with the respondent/department. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at

his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand

respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons

mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum

Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been

terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten

years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is

also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,

question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was

no necessity for chargesheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended

that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other coworkers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 07.07.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

August, 2004 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

4. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

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Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,20,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1996 who continuously worked till 2004 at HPPWD Sub Division Sach

is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of

terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed

while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched

petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as

per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to

plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the

backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with

a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith

seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1996 to August, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no notice

under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the

same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination

was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and

all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2004 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2010 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

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13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2004. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required

for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of

any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 85 days in the year 1996, 145 days in 1997, 88 days in 1998, 25 days in 1999, 19 days

in 2001, 122.5 days in 2002, 116 days in 2003 and 44 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in

1996 to 2004 in 9 years he had worked for 663.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that

petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with

regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year

2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 106 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar

months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to

meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the

respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co-workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these coworkers having joined service in 1996

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

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16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in August, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter

as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

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erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

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cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

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Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 9

years and actually worked for 663.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker

and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e.

demand notice was given on 18.08.2010. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner

on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 38 years who has sufficient spell of life to

work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lumpsum would be appropriate relief in

view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized

Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law

that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches.

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Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also

does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex

Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment

in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board,

Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees

one lakh twenty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in

the facts and circumstances of the case as statedabove. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the

petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization.

Issues no. 1, 2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 1st day of April, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 126/2015

Date of Institution : 18.03.2015

Date of Decision : 01.04.2016

Shri Dem Chand s/o Shri Govind Ram, r/o Village Findroo, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Dem Chand S/O Shri Govind

Ram, R/O Village Findroo, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 23-10-2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during

September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services

of Shri Dem Chand S/O Shri Govind Ram, R/O Village Findroo, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D.

Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of

back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled

to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2004 in HPPWD Sub Division

Killar. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in

each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in

the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be

counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

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respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of

September, 2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were

junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department

was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers

working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner

and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been

followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to

petitioner and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of

September, 2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not

served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of

notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of

petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or

his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him

and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also

alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of

September, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere

gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to

have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner

prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of

September, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004

along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained

unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of

intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between May,

1994 to September, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service

of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt.

in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to

any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

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5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other coworkers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 07.07.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

September, 2004 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

2. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

5. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

6. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. :

Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.80,000/- per operative

part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2004 at HPPWD Sub Division

Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement

of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was

passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not

retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1994 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25- F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross

examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by

the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of

work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As

such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold

that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 74 days in the year 1994, 38 days in 1995, 57 days in 2001, 133 days in 2002, 40 days

in 2003 and 106 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2004 in 6 years he had

worked for 448 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for

more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the

point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal

termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had

merely worked for 106 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month

of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law

of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have

issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not

violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co-workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these coworkers having joined service in 1994

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

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17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

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industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District Manager,

Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

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the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act. 20. Relying

upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on

the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as

Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and

Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for

reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

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Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 6 years and actually worked for 448 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004

who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice

after about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on 23.10.2011. It is also pertinent to mention

here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 35 years who has sufficient spell

of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees

eighty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

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reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open

Court today this 1st day of April, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 96/2015

Date of Institution : 04.03.2015

Date of Decision : 01.04.2016

Shri Chhipan Dev s/o Shri Man Singh, r/o Village Ghissal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner :

Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

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AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Chhippan Dev S/O Shri Man

Singh, R/O Village Ghissal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice

dated 02.02.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service w.e.f. September, 2004

suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Chhippan

Dev S/O Shri Man Singh, R/O Village Ghissal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba, H.P. w.e.f.

September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is

legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of June, 2002 who continuously worked till September, 2004 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any

reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster

roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is

alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been

circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of

petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the

department/respondent. The petitioner has named 6 persons who were junior to petitioner and

joined service from 2003 to September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2004 when the

services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month

notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not

been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal

and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never

been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of

verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no

opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained

unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of September, 2004 till the date of

institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus

entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order

of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004. He further prayed

for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 alongwith back wages, seniority

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including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between June, 2002 to September, 2004 be counted

160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2010 having

completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 2004 who remained engaged till

September, 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at

his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically

pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as

required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at

para no. 4 of the claim petition that Shri Dev Raj s/o Shri Mehar Chand and Budhi Ram s/o Sh.

Ganga Ram were senior to petitioner and other persons mentioned in this para are continuously

worked with the respondent/department. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner,

respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of

notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that

petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated

to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as

harness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have

definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be

agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the

services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or

wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or

issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist

and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/C mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other coworkers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D7 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 07.07.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

September, 2004 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

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2. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

7. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

8. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. :

Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.25,000/- per operative

part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 2004 who continuously worked till September, 2004 at HPPWD Sub

Division Sach is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 2004 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

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the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross

examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by

the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of

work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As

such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold

that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 47 days in the year 2004 and thus a total of his service in 2004 to September, 2004 in 1

years he had worked for 47 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not

worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla

on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged

illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner

had merely worked for 106 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the

month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement

of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent

to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to

have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 2003 to 2007 and these

workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that

principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of

petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B is the year

wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year

2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/C is the mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co

workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar

were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than

200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex.

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RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than

160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of

evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time

after September, 2004 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the

respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers

mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co

workers having joined service in 2004 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to

afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of

Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon

judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex

Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no

necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section

25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D7. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D7 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

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retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

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pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

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several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

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date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 1 year and actually worked for 47 days as per mandays

chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked

as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about

seven years i.e. demand notice was given on 02.02.2012. It is also pertinent to mention here that

petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 32 years who has sufficient spell of life to

work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to

judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for

back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013

(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on

the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be

solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was

reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees

twenty five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

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Announced in the open Court today this 1st day of April, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 204/2015

Date of Institution : 04.05.2015

Date of Decision : 01.04.2016

Shri Suni Lal s/o Shri Krishan Lal, r/o Village Chasak, P.O. Sechu, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner :

Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Suni Lal S/O Shri Krishan Lal,

R/O Village Chasak, P.O. Sechu, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 26.01.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during

July, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of

Shri Suni Lal S/O Shri Krishan Lal, R/O Village Chasak, P.O. Sechu, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.during July, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved worker is entitled to from the above

employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

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3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of August, 1995 who continuously worked till July, 2004 in HPPWD Sub Division Killar.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of July, 2004 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of July, 2004 when the services of petitioner were

terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment and at

the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and for said

reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The

claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for

any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no

charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of July, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who

had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of July, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of July,

2004 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained

unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of

intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between

August, 1995 to July, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the

service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2004 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP

Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P.

and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1995 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

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thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum- Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/M mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other coworkers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28.08.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

July, 2004 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

9. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

10. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

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Relief. :

Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,00,000/- per operative

part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1995 who continuously worked till 2004 at HPPWD Sub Division

Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement

of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was

passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not

retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1995 to July, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no notice

under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the

same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination

was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and

all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in July, 2004 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after July, 2004. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

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not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required

for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of

any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 25 days in the year 1995, 137 days in 1996, 43 days in 1998, 98 days in 1999, 96 days

in 2000, 58 days in 2001, 20.5 days in 2002, 53 days in 2003 and 54 days in 2004 and thus a total

of his service in 1995 to 2004 in 09 years he had worked for 584.5 days in his entire service period.

Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference

from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its

findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 54 days and thus immediately in

preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service

of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it

was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the

Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co-workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C als established that all the co

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after July, 2004 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1995 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

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they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in July, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as

such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized Representative

of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the

petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private

labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner

in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as

well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda

(2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice

Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here

that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the LabourCourt was not

justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot

be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture

pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus

would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the

relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that

petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act

although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment

of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully

employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being

terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

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Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

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the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

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completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to reference

made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important

circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief”. I have gone

through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld. Dy. D.A. for State.

Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments referred to above it is

held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important circumstance and court has to

keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has

referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer

Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before

exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including

the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on

which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief

in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas his

services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six years. The Hon’ble

Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon’ble High Court

was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the

workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex

Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent

failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in

hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged

for about 09 years and actually worked for 584.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in July, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had

raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e. demand notice was

given on 26.01.2011. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on the date of filing claim

petition was ageing 48 years who has sufficient spell of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking

into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court

petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a

lumpsum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments

relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is

more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of

delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s

case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex

Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the

year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division

Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment

titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar

Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees

one lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and

circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

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shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. 24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid

terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 1st day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 128/2015

Date of Institution : 18.03.2015

Date of Decision : 01.04.2016

Shri Sant Ram s/o Shri Madho Ram, r/o V.P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner :

Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Sant Ram S/O Shri Madho Ram,

R/O V.P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer,

H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated

27-04-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during June, 2003 suffers

from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Sant Ram S/O

Shri Madho Ram, R/O V.P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during June, 2003

by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal

and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1993 who continuously worked till June, 2003 with the respondent/department.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of June, 2003 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of June, 2003 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of June, 2003 till the date of institution of present claim petition

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who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of June, 2003. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of June,

2003 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained

unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of

intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between May,

1993 to June, 2003 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of

petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in

pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and

to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2003

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2003 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other coworkers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

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8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28.08.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

June, 2003 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

11. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

12. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. :

Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.75,000/- per operative

part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2003 at HPPWD Sub Division

Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement

of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was

passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not

retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1994 to June, 2003. He has also stated on oath that no notice

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under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the

same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination

was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and

all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in June, 2003 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after June, 2003. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required

for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of

any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 179 days in the year 1994, 191 days in 1996, 142 days in 1997, 57 days in 2001, 133

days in 2002 and 27 days in 2003 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2003 in 6 years he had

worked for 729 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1997 to 2000

petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with

regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year

2003 the petitioner had merely worked for 27 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar

months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to

meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the

respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

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remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co-workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after June, 2003 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in June, 2003, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as

such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized Representative

of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the

petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private

labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner

in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as

well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda

(2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice

Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here

that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was

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not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he

cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from

agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed

and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the

relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that

petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act

although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment

of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully

employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being

terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

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material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

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adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR

125], the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference: Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-Industrial

dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had completed 240

days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of the I.D.Act-

Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. His

services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination.

Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial discretion

exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not

the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be

paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @

workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to reference

made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important

circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

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after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 7 years and actually worked for 729 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in June, 2003 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on 27.04.2012. It is also pertinent to mention here

that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 43 years who has sufficient spell of

life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lumpsum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees

seventy five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

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25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 1st day of April, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 160/2015

Date of Institution : 11.04.2015

Date of Decision : 01.04.2016

Shri Kishan Chand s/o Shri Nek Chand, r/o V.P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner :

Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Kishan Chand S/O Shri Nek

Chand, R/O VPO Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer,

Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated

02-02-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during September, 2004

suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Kishan

Chand S/O Shri Nek Chand, R/O VPO Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during

September, 2004 by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi),

District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service

benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”

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2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1995 who continuously worked till September, 2004 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any

reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster

roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is

alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been

circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of

petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the

department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and

joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September,

2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with

one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period

had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was

prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service

record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and

even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the

same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he

has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of August, 2003 till the

date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was

thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order

of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004. He further prayed

for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 alongwith back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between May, 1995 to September, 2004 be counted

160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having

completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 & 26

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in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 25

& 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other coworkers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.08.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

September, 2004 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

13. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

14. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

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Issue No.4 : No

Relief. :

Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.80,000/- per operative

part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1997 who continuously worked till 2004 at HPPWD Sub Division Sach

is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of

terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed

while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched

petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as

per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to

plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the

backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with

a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith

seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1997 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25- F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

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admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross

examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by

the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of

work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As

such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold

that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 28 days in the year 1997, 160 days in 1999, 119 days in 2000, 106.5 days in 2001, 143

days in 2002, 116 days in 2003 and 97 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1997 to 2004

in 7 years he had worked for 769.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the

years 1997 and 2000 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no

reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to

confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 97 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not

rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one

year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co-workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these coworkers having joined service in 1997

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

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of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

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the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceasesto exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due tothe delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

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and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble

Apex

Court

titled

as

Assistant

Engineer,

Rajasthan

State

Agriculture

MarketingBoard, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para

of the judgment are produced below for reference:

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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22] Limitation Act, 1963.

Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination of service- Industrial

dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under

the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances

which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 7 years and actually worked for 769.5 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004

who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice

after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on 02.02.2012. It is also pertinent to mention

here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 40 years who has sufficient spell

of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

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21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees

eighty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 1st day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 163/2015

Date of Institution : 11.04.2015

Date of Decision : 01.04.2016

Shri Bhisham Singh s/o Shri Soni Ram, r/o Village and P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

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Versus

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner :

Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Bhisham Singh S/O Shri Soni

Ram, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P. vide demand notice dated 25.12.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of

service during August, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of

the services of Shri Bhisham Singh S/O Shri Soni Ram, R/O Village and Post Office Rei,

Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D.

Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during August, 2004 without complying the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of

back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved

workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 2004 in HPPWD Sub Division Killar.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 2004 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 2004 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

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for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of August, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of August, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

August, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that

period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between May, 1994 to August, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of

the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of

HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of

H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1995 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum- Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other coworkers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

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7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28.08.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

August, 2004 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

15. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

16. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. :

Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.80,000/- per operative

part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1995 who continuously worked till 2004 at HPPWD Sub Division

Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement

of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was

passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not

retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

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12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1995 to August, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no notice

under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the

same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination

was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and

all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2004 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2010 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2004. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required

for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of

any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 21 days in the year 1995, 164 days in 1997, 99 days in 1998, 28 days in 1999, 118.5

days in 2001, 120 days in 2002, 96 days in 2003 and 47 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service

in 1995 to 2004 in 08 years he had worked for 693.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed

that except the years 1995 and 1998 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as

there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this

court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 47 days and

thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had

not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of

one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

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15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co-workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2004 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1995 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in August, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter

as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

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judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

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(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

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Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

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all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 08 years and actually worked for 693.5 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2004 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on 25.12.2011. It is also pertinent to mention here

that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 36 years who has sufficient spell of

life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees

eighty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

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today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 1st day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 164/2015

Date of Institution : 11.04.2015

Date of Decision : 01.04.2016

Shri Dharam Chand s/o Shri Sukh Dev r/o Village Mojhi, Post Office Seichu, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner :

Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Dharam Chand S/O Shri Sukh

Dev, R/O Village Mojhi, Post Office Seichu, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, Killar Division H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

vide demand notice dated 31.12.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service

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during September, 1998 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the

services of Shri Dharam Chand S/O Shri Sukh Dev, R/O Village Mojhi, Post Office Seichu,

Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D.

Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 1998 without complying the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of

back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved

workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1984 who continuously worked till September, 1998 in HPPWD Sub Division Killar.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 1998 by an oral order without any

reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster

roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is

alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been

circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of

petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the

department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and

joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September,

1998 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with

one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period

had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was

prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service

record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and

even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the

same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he

has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of October, 2004 till the

date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was

thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order

of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 1998. He further prayed

for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 1998 alongwith back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between November, 1984 to September, 1998 be

counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.

01.01.1994 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and to any other

relief petitioner is entitled.

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4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 1998

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum- Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1998 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other coworkers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.08.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

September, 1998 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

17. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

18. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

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Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. :

Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.25,000/- per operative

part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 1998 at HPPWD Sub Division

Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement

of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was

passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not

retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1994 to September, 1998. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 1998 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

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notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 1998.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross

examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by

the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of

work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As

such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold

that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 29 days in the year 1994 and 27 days in 1998 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to

1998 in 2 years he had worked for 56 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner

had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with

regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year

1998 the petitioner had merely worked for 27 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar

months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to

meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the

respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co-workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 1998 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these coworkers having joined service in 1994

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

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reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 1998, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

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“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

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“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1998 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

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20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 02 years and actually worked for 56 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 1998

who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice

after about thirteen years i.e. demand notice was given on 31.12.2011. It is also pertinent to

mention here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 52 years who has

sufficient spell of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned

above in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

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petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees

twenty five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 1st day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 166/2015

Date of Institution : 11.04.2015

Date of Decision : 01.04.2016

Shri Des Raj s/o Shri Kanshi Ram, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner :

Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Des Raj S/O Shri Kanshi Ram,

R/O Village Kuthal, Post Office Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, Killar Division H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

vide demand notice dated 03.04.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service

during October, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the

services of Shri Des Raj S/O Shri Kanshi Ram, R/O Village Kuthal, Post Office Sach,

Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D.

Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2004 without complying the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of

back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved

workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2004 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

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the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October, 2004 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2004 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of October, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of October, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

October, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that

period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between November, 1994 to October, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and

regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2004 having completed 8 years of service and

per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh

Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1998 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 & 26

in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 25

& 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

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5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other coworkers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.08.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

October, 2004 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

19. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

20. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. :

Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,00,000/- per operative

part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1998 who continuously worked till 2004 at HPPWD Sub Division Sach

is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of

terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed

while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched

petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as

per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to

plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the

backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with

a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith

seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1998 to October, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2010 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2004. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required

for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of

any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 162 days in the year 1998, 169 days in 1999, 134 days in 2000, 115 days in 2001, 116

days in 2002, 117 days in 2003 and 124 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1998 to 2004

in 07 years he had worked for 937 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the

years 2000 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from

the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its

findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 124 days and thus immediately

in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered

service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and

thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F

of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of

the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co-workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2004 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

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17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in October, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

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industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

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the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

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Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 07 years and actually worked for 937 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2004 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on 03.04.2012. It is also pertinent to mention here

that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 34 years who has sufficient spell of

life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lumpsum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees

one lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and

circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

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reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 1st day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 167/2015

Date of Institution : 11.04.2015

Date of Decision : 01.04.2016

Smt. Ful Dei d/o Shri Shankar Dev, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner :

Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

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For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Ful Dei D/O Shri Shankar Dev,

R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

vide demand notice dated 09.04.2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of service

during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the

services of Smt. Ful Dei D/O Shri Shankar Dev, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H.

Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004 without complying the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of

back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved

workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that she had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of June, 1997 who continuously worked till September, 2004 in IPH Sub Division, Killar.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any

reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster

roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is

alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been

circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of

petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the

department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and

joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September,

2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, she was not served with

one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period

had also not been paid to her and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima

facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record

who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at

the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and the at the same time,

no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to her. The petitioner also alleges that she has

remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of September, 2004 till the

date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was

thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

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1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order

of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004. She further prayed

for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between June, 1997 to September, 2004 be counted

160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2005 having

completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 and

26 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos.

25 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 she would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her

affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of junior

workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,

respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division

Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of other

coworkers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.8.2015 for

determination which are as under:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

September, 2004 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

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2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 :

Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. :

Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.75,000/- per operative

part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the month of 1997 who continuously worked till 2004 at IPH Sub Division

Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement

of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was

passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not

retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work

intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from June, 1997 to September, 2004. She has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus

her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in September, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several coworkers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

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persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross

examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the

respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work

as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in

absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that

respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 165 days in the year 1997, 157 days in 1998, 142 days in 1999, 143 days in 2000, 84

days in 2001, 58 days in 2002 and 47 days in 2004 and thus a total of her service in 1997 to 2004 in

7 years she had worked for 796 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years

1998 to 2004 she had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with

regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year

2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 47 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar

months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to

meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the

respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co-workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

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given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these coworkers having joined service in 1997

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivatable land with her and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning

from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

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of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the

remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material

evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not

think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants

for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by

this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on

hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial

dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

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circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that she would

be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from her employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the

demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

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termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

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per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 7 years and actually worked for 796 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004

who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice

after about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on 09.4.2012. It is also pertinent to mention

here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 35 years who has sufficient spell

of life to work and earn her livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees

seventy five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no.

1,2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

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Announced in the open Court today this 1st day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 172/2015

Date of Institution : 04.04.2015

Date of Decision : 01.04.2016

Shri Ram Lal s/o Shri Suraj Ram, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner :

Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Ram Lal S/O Shri Suraj Ram, R/O

Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand

notice dated 18.8.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services w.e.f. August,

2003 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri

Ram Lal S/O Shri Suraj Ram, R/O Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. w.e.f. August, 2003 without complying the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the

above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

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3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of June,1994 who continuously worked till August, 2003 in HPPWD Sub Division Sach.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 2003 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 2003 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of August, 2003 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of August, 2003. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

August, 2003 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that

period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between June, 1994 to August, 2003 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of

the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of

HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of

H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1999 who remained engaged till 2003

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 & 26

in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 25

& 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

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thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2003 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other coworkers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.08.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

August, 2003 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

21. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

22. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

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Relief. :

Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.35,000/- per operative

part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1999 who continuously worked till 2003 at HPPWD Sub Division Sach

is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of

terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed

while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched

petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as

per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to

plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the

backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with

a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith

seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1999 to August, 2003. He has also stated on oath that no notice

under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the

same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination

was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and

all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2003 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2010 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2003. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

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not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required

for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of

any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 106 days in the year 1999, 18 days in 2002 and 21 days in 2003 and thus a total of his

service in 1999 to 2003 in 3 years he had worked for 145 days in his entire service period. Be it

noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the

Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings

only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in

the year 2003 the petitioner had merely worked for 21 days and thus immediately in preceding 12

calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days

so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all

required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such,

the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co-workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2003 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1999 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

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pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in August, 2003, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter

as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

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government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

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demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

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completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 3 years and actually worked for 145 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2003 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on 18.08.2010. It is also pertinent to mention here

that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 40 years who has sufficient spell of

life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lumpsum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

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21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.35,000/- (Rupees

thirty five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.35,000/- (Rupees thirty five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. 24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid

terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 1st day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 173/2015

Date of Institution : 04.04.2015

Date of Decision : 01.04.2016

Shri Shambhu Ram s/o Shri Maya Dass, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

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Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner :

Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Shambhu Ram S/O Shri Maya

Dass, R/O Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 18.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services w.e.f.

October, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of

Shri Shambhu Ram S/O Shri Maya Dass, R/O Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. w.e.f. October, 2004 without complying the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled

to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of November, 1994 who continuouslyworked till October, 2004 in HPPWD Sub Division

Sach. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in

each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in

the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be

counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of

October, 2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were

junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department

was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers

working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner

and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been

followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to

petitioner and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of

October, 2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not

served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of

notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of

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petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or

his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him

and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also

alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of October,

2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed

and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed

violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting

aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2004. He

further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2004 along-with back wages,

seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of

his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks

given time and again during entire service of petitioner between November, 1994 to October, 2004

be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.

01.01.2003 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief

petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 & 26

in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 25

& 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as haraness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other coworkers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

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7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.08.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during the year

October, 2004 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

23. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

24. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. :

Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.90,000/- per operative

part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2004 at HPPWD Sub Division Sach

is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of

terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed

while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched

petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as

per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to

plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the

backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with

a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith

seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

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12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1994 to October, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2010 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross

examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by

the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of

work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As

such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold

that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 23 days in the year 1994, 127.5 days in 1995, 144 days in 1996, 25 days in 1998, 96

days in 1999, 80.5 days in 2000, 23 days in 2001, 94 days in 2002, 89 days in 2003 and 96 days in

2004 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2004 in 10 years he had worked for 798 days in his

entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as

there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this

court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 106 days and

thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had

not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of

one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

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15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other co-workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these coworkers having joined service in 1994

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in October, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

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judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

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(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

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Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

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all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 10 years and actually worked for 798 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2004 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about six years i.e. demand notice was given on 18.08.2010. It is also pertinent to mention here that

petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 45 years who has sufficient spell of life to

work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to

judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for

back wages but compensation a lumpsum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013

(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on

the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be

solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was

reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.90,000/- (Rupees

Ninety thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.90,000/- (Rupees Ninety thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

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amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 1st day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref: No. 84/ 2015

Sh. Parma Ram s/o Shri Rupia Ram, r/o V.P.O. Sainthal, Tehsil Joginder Nagar, District

Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondent.

07-04-2016 Present: None for the petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due

knowledge. It is 11.20 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

07-04-2016 Present: None for the petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D. A. for the respondent.

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is

3.15 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his Authorised Representative today is indicative of the

fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for

non-prosecution.

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Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and

further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:

07-04-2016

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT DISTRICT KANGRA AT

DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No: 317/2015

Date of Presentation : 16.07.2015

Date of Decision: 09-04-2016

Sh. Sushil Kumar s/o Shri Karam Singh c/o Shri Nanak Chand, r/o House#176, Ward No.5,

Main Bazar Mehatpur, District Una, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Employer, M/S Seagull Laboratories(1)(P) Limited, Plot No. 29, Industrial Area

Mehatpur, District Una, H.P.

. .Respondent.

09-04-2016 Present: Petitioner in person.

None for the respondent.

Case taken up for conciliation before National Lok Adalat today. As result of conciliation,

petitioner has made statement for withdrawal of claim petition/reference which is placed on record.

In view of the separate statement made by the petitioner, this reference is dismissed as withdrawn.

The parties to bear their own costs.

2.

The reference is answered accordingly.

3.

A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for further

necessary action at its end.

4.

Be consigned to the Records after due completion.

Announced:

(Gaurav Chaudhary)

(K. K. Sharma)

09-04-2016

Member

Judge

National Lok Adalat

National Lok Adalat

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BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT DISTRICT KANGRA AT

DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref.No: 102/2014

Date of Presentation : 26.02.2014

Date of Decision: 09-04-2016

Sh. Kamal Kumar s/o Shri Gurdas Ram Rana, r/o Village Bangarh, P.O. Jakhera, District

Una, H.P.(Since deceased through legal heirs).

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Employer/Factory Manager, M/S A.K. Industries, Plot No. 124, Industrial Area

Mehatpur, Tehsil & District Una, H.P.

. .Respondent.

09-04-2016 Present: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, A.R. for the legal heirs of deceased petitioner. Sh. Deepak

Dhacholia, Manager HR, A.K. Industries for the respondent company.

Sh. Sushil Kumar, adv. csl. for the respondent.

Case taken up for conciliation before National Lok Adalat held today. Ld. authorised

representative for the legal heirs of deceased petitioner Kamal Kumar has made statement at the bar

that particulars of all the legal heirs including widow along-with legal heirs certificate would be

filed by him. He has also stated that all the class-I legal heir of deceased would be mentioned in the

certificate but process for issuance of legal heirs may takes few days. At this stage, Manager of the

respondent company present before National Lok Adalat is ready to pay lump-sum Rs. 20,000/-

(Twenty Thousand only) to the widow of deceased petitioner which is acceptable to the A.R. for

the legal heirs of deceased petitioner. Accordingly, respondent company shall pay a lump-sum Rs.

20,000/- (Rs. Twenty Thousand only) as full and final settlement of claim petition to the widow of

deceased petitioner and payment of claim shall be paid by cheque. Since particulars of widow of

deceased is to be filed by A.R. of deceased who is directed to file legal heir certificate as well as

affidavit of widow of deceased Kamal Kumar within one month from today and on furnishing of

both these documents a lump-sum of Rs. 20,000/- shall be remitted by the respondent company

through a cross cheque to the widow of deceased. Let legal heirs certificate as well as affidavit be

filed within one month and thereafter on receipt these documents through A.R. of deceased a cross

cheque amounting Rs. 20,000/- (Rs. Twenty Thousand only) be released by respondent company to

the widow of deceased petitioner Kamal Kumar.

2.

The reference is answered accordingly.

3.

A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for further

necessary action at its end.

4. Be consigned to the Records after due completion.

Announced:

(Gaurav Chaudhary)

(K.K.Sharma)

09-04-2016

Member

Judge

National Lok Adalat

National Lok Adalat

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BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT DISTRICT KANGRA AT

DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No: 81/2015

Date of Presentation : 21.02.2015

Date of Decision: 09-04-2016

Shri Prem Kumar s/o Shri Salig Ram, r/o V.P.O. Nangal Salangari, Tehsil & District Una,

H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Employer/Managing Director, M/S Couslight Telecom India Private Limited,

V.P.O. Dhamadari, Tehsil & District Una, H.P.(Principal Employer)

2. M/S Peregrine Guarding Private Limited, Plot No. 13, Sector-18, Electronic City

Gurgaon, (Contractor)

. .Respondent.

09-04-2016 Present: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, A.R. for the petitioner.

Sh. Sachin Thakur, Dy.Manager for the respondent no.1.

Sh. Mukesh Arora, HR. Exe. For the respondent no.2.

Case taken up for conciliation before National Lok Adalat held today, as result of which

petitioner and respondent no.2 have amicably resolved dispute qua termination of service of

petitioner. Said Prem Kumar has testified on oath that during conciliation respondent no.2 has

given consent for engaging petitioner in Baddi, Nalagarh or Ropar as per vacancies available. He

has also stated that whenever respondent no.2 company gets contract for security in District Una,

he would be posted there besides maintained that he be given seniority and continuity in service

and compensation. According to compromise, petitioner is no more interested to pursue present

petition. Admitting correctness of statement of authorised representative of the respondent no.2 in

which he undertaken to pay lump-sum compensation of Rs. 10,000/-(Rs.Ten Thousand only) within

one month by cheque to the petitioner. Statements recorded and placed on file. In view of the

separate statement made by the petitioner, this claim petition/reference is hereby dismissed as

withdrawn. Parties shall however be bound their statements in particular, respondent no.2 shall re

engage petitioner in job within period of one month from today and would also be paid lump-sum

compensation Rs. 10000/- as stated above.

2.

The reference is answered accordingly.

3.

A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for further

necessary action at its end.

4.

Be consigned to the Records after due completion.

Announced:

(Gaurav Chaudhary)

(K.K.Sharma)

09-04-2016

Member

Judge

National Lok Adalat

National Lok Adalat

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BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT DISTRICT KANGRA AT

DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No: 65/2015

Date of Presentation : 23.02.2015

Date of Decision: 09-04-2016

Sh. Devender Singh s/o Shri Kewal Singh, r/o Village Dabat, P.O. Majari, Tehsil Shri Naina

Deviji, District Bilaspur, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Changar Area Lift Irrigation Project Division Bassi, District

Bilaspur, H.P.

. .Respondent.

09-04-2016 Present: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, A.R. vice of Sh. S.S. Sippy, A.R. for the

petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.

Case taken up for conciliation before National Lok Adalat today. As result of conciliation,

authorised representative for the petitioner has made statement for withdrawal of claim

petition/reference which is placed on record. In view of the separate statement made by the

authorised representative for the petitioner, this claim petition/ reference is dismissed as withdrawn.

The parties to bear their own costs.

2.

The reference is answered accordingly.

3.

A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for further

necessary action at its end.

4. Be consigned to the Records after due completion.

Announced:

(Gaurav Chaudhary)

(K.K.Sharma)

09-04-2016

Member

Judge

National Lok Adalat

National Lok Adalat

__________

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT DISTRICT KANGRA AT

DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No: 65/2015

Date of Presentation : 23.02.2015

Date of Decision: 09-04-2016

Sh. Devender Singh s/o Shri Kewal Singh, r/o Village Dabat, P.O. Majari, Tehsil Shri Naina

Deviji, District Bilaspur, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

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Versus

The Executive Engineer, Changar Area Lift Irrigation Project Division Bassi, District

Bilaspur, H.P.

. .Respondent.

09-04-2016 Present: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, A.R. vice of Sh. S.S. Sippy, A.R. for the petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.

Case taken up for conciliation before National Lok Adalat today. As result of conciliation,

authorised representative for the petitioner has made statement for withdrawal of claim

petition/reference which is placed on record. In view of the separate statement made by the

authorised representative for the petitioner, this claim petition/ reference is dismissed as withdrawn.

The parties to bear their own costs.

2. The reference is answered accordingly.

3.

A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for further

necessary action at its end.

4.

Be consigned to the Records after due completion.

Announced:

(Gaurav Chaudhary)

(K. K. Sharma)

09-04-2016

Member

Judge

National Lok Adalat

National Lok Adalat

___________

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT DISTRICT KANGRA AT

DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No: 516/2015

Date of Presentation : 21.11.2015

Date of Decision: 09-04-2016

Sh. Papu Kumar son of Sh. Roshan Lal, V.P.O. Karana, Tehsil Ani, Distt. Kullu, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Member Secretary, Rogi Kalyan Samittee (RKS)CHC Anni, Distt. Kullu, H.P.

. .Respondent.

09-04-2016 Present: Sh. Rohit Datta, adv. csl. for the petitioner.

Sh. Rohit Panchkaran, adv. vice of Sh. Deepak Azad, adv. csl. for the

respondent.

Case taken up for conciliation before National Lok Adalat held today, vide letter dated 16

02-2016 petitioner Papu Kumar son of Sh. Roshan Lal, V.P.O. Karana, Tehsil Ani, Distt. Kullu,

H.P. has requested this Court to stop proceeding against respondent as he has already filed same

case before Hon’ble High Court of H.P. in pursuance to which he had been reinstated the applicant

2238

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/petitioner as specific reference he had been allowed to join service with the respondent. In view of

the registered letter received from petitioner dated 16-02-2016, reference is hereby dismissed as

withdrawn. The parties to bear their own costs.

2.

The reference is answered accordingly.

3.

A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for further

necessary action at its end.

4.

Be consigned to the Records after due completion.

Announced:

(Gaurav Chaudhary)

(K. K. Sharma)

09-04-2016

Member

Judge

National Lok Adalat

National Lok Adalat

__________

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT DISTRICT KANGRA AT

DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref.No: 295/2014

Date of Presentation : 18.09.2014

Date of Decision: 09-04-2016

Smt. Swari Devi w/o Shri Sadhu Ram, r/o Village Dol, P.O. Lagna, Tehsil Joginder Nagar,

District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, B&R Division H.P.P.W.D., Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondent.

09-04-2016 Present: Sh. Rohit Panchkaran, adv. vice of Sh. Deepak Azad, adv. csl. for the

petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.

Sh. Virender Singh Guleria, Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD,

Joginder Nagar in person.

Case taken up for conciliation before National Lok Adalat today. As result of conciliation,

ld. csl. for the petitioner has made statement for withdrawal of reference which is placed on record.

In view of the separate statement made by the ld. csl. for the petitioner, this reference is dismissed

as withdrawn. The parties to bear their own costs.

2.

The reference is answered accordingly.

3.

A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for further

necessary action at its end.

4. Be consigned to the Records after due completion.

Announced:

(Gaurav Chaudhary)

(K.K.Sharma)

09-04-2016

Member

Judge

National Lok Adalat

National Lok Adalat

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BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT DISTRICT KANGRA AT

DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref.No: 298/2014

Date of Presentation : 18.09.2014

Date of Decision: 09-04-2016

Smt. Kaushlya Devi w/o Shri Birbal, r/o Village Jon, P.O. Pipli, Tehsil Joginder Nagar,

District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, B&R Division H.P.P.W.D., Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondent.

09-04-2016 Present: Sh. Rohit Panchkaran, adv. vice of Sh. Deepak Azad, adv. csl. for the

petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.

Sh. Virender Singh Guleria, Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD,

Joginder Nagar in person.

Case taken up for conciliation before National Lok Adalat today. As result of conciliation,

ld. csl. for the petitioner has made statement for withdrawal of claim reference which is placed on

record. In view of the separate statement made by the ld. csl. for the petitioner, this reference is

dismissed as withdrawn. The parties to bear their own costs.

2.

The reference is answered accordingly.

3.

A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for further

necessary action at its end.

4.

Be consigned to the Records after due completion.

Announced:

(Gaurav Chaudhary)

(K.K.Sharma)

09-04-2016

Member

Judge

National Lok Adalat

National Lok Adalat

___________

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT DISTRICT KANGRA AT

DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref.No: 47/2014

Date of Presentation : 21.02.2014

Date of Decision: 09-04-2016

Sh. Kahan Singh s/o Shri Bhichhu Ram, r/o Village Chhapru, P.O. Bassi, Tehsil Joginder

Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

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Versus

The Executive Engineer, B&R Division H.P.P.W.D., Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondent.

09-04-2016 Present: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, A.R. for the petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.

Sh. Virender Singh Guleria, Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD,

Joginder Nagar in person.

Case taken up for conciliation before National Lok Adalat today. As result of conciliation,

authorised representative for the petitioner has made statement for withdrawal of claim

petition/reference which is placed on record. In view of the separate statement made by the

authorised representative for the petitioner, this reference is dismissed as withdrawn. The parties to

bear their own costs.

2.

The reference is answered accordingly.

3.

A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for further

necessary action at its end.

4.

Be consigned to the Records after due completion.

Announced:

(Gaurav Chaudhary)

(K. K. Sharma)

09-04-2016

Member

Judge

National Lok Adalat

National Lok Adalat

___________

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT DISTRICT KANGRA AT

DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No: 330/2014

Date of Presentation : 25.10.2014

Date of Decision: 09-04-2016

Sh. Mast Ram s/o Shri Swaru Ram, r/o Village Suka Bag, P.O. Chauntra, Tehsil Joginder

Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, B&R Division H.P.P.W.D., Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondent.

09-04-2016 Present: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, A.R. for the petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.

Sh. Virender Singh Guleria, Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD,

Joginder Nagar in person.

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Case taken up for conciliation before National Lok Adalat today. As result of conciliation,

authorised representative for the petitioner has made statement for withdrawal of reference which is

placed on record. In view of the separate statement made by the authorised representative for the

petitioner, this reference is dismissed as withdrawn. The parties to bear their own costs.

2.

The reference is answered accordingly.

3.

A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for further

necessary action at its end.

4.

Be consigned to the Records after due completion.

Announced:

(Gaurav Chaudhary)

(K.K.Sharma)

09-04-2016

Member

Judge

National Lok Adalat

National Lok Adalat

____________

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT DISTRICT KANGRA AT

DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref.No: 614/2015

Date of Presentation : 19.12.2015

Date of Decision: 09-04-2016

The President/General Secretary, Nestle Employees Union, Tahliwal, District Una, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Factory Manager, Nestle India Limited, Industrial Area, Tahliwal, District Una, H.P.

. .Respondent.

09-04-2016 Present: Sh. Rohit Datta, adv. csl. for the petitioner.

Sh. Yadvinder Vasudeva, Manager HR for the respondent company.

Sh. Hardesh Sharma, adv. csl. for the respondent.

Case taken up for conciliation before National Lok Adalat held today. Vide letter of

authority Ex.-R1, Sh. Yadvinder Vasudeva has made statement that he has been authorised

respondent company to appear in this case. He has further stated that petitioner has entered into

compromise with the respondent company and has prayed for dismissal of case. Statement recorded

and placed on file. Perusal of record of this case further reveals that petitioners Sh. Satinder Kumar

and Sushil Kumar who were office bearers of Union of Nestle Employees Santokhgarh has

admitted in statement before this Court on 16-03-2016 vide resolution no. 16 Ex-P1 petitioner

Satinder Kumar being President and Sh. Sushil Kumar being Gen. Secretary have been authorised

by the Nestle Employees Union to enter into compromise. Said Satinder Kumar as well as Sushil

Kumar vide their separate statement have admitted correctness of compromise Ex. –C1 dated 16

09-2014 spread over in 12 pages and also contains admitted that same signature of other office

bearers of union. Sh. Satinder Kumar has also identified his signature in compromise Ex.-C1.

Similarly Sushil Kumar, Gen. Secy too has admitted to have signed Ex-C1 which is binding of the

2242

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Nestle Employees Union. Statements recorded and placed on record. In view of the statements

made by the parties, aforesaid reference, is hereby dismissed as withdrawn. It is further made clear

that parties shall be bound by the compromise Ex.-C1 entered into between the Nestle Employees

Union and respondent company.

2.

The reference is answered accordingly.

3.

A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for further

necessary action at its end.

4.

Be consigned to the Records after due completion.

Announced:

(Gaurav Chaudhary)

(K.K.Sharma)

09-04-2016

Member

Judge

National Lok Adalat

National Lok Adalat

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref: No. 289/ 2014

Smt. Shakuntla Devi w/o Shri Roshan Lal, r/o Village Patrain, P.O. Gangoti, Tehsil

Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondent.

22-04-2016 Present: None for the petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due

knowledge. It is 11.20 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

22-04-2016 Present: None for the petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is

2.35 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or her Authorised Representative today is indicative of the

fact that she is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of

for non-prosecution.

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Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and

further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:

22-04-2016

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 324/2014

Date of Institution : 25.10.2014

Date of decision : 22.4.2016

Shri Giru Ram s/o Shri Kalu Ram, r/o Village Pahahala, P.O. Kharihar, Tehsil & District

Kullu, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Divisional Forest Officer, Parbati Forest Division Shamshi, District Kullu, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner :

Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

1.

The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Giru Ram S/O Shri Kalu Ram,

R/O Village Pahahala, P.O. Kharihar, Tehsil & District Kullu, H.P. during year 1999 to year

2010 and finally during April, 2010 by the Divisional Forest Officer, Parbati Forest

Division Shamshi, District Kullu, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the

above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that the services of petitioner/claimant

had been engaged by respondent as daily waged beldar w.e.f. September, 1987 under Parvati

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Division of Forest at Shamshi who continued to work upto July, 2010 and petitioner had worked

240 days of continuous service during the said period. It is alleged that respondent had given

fictional breaks to the petitioner from time to time although these breaks were given to the

petitioner by the respondent so that he could not be regularized and suddenly in April, 2010,

respondent had illegally and unlawfully retrenched the services of petitioner. It is claimed that

while disengaging petitioner from service, the respondent had not followed the provisions of

Section 25-H and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is further claimed that respondent had not

given any notice to petitioner while terminating his service which act and conduct of the respondent

was highly arbitrary and against the law and procedure of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is stated

that petitioner falls within the definition of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act which is

governed by the relevant provisions of the Act per petitioner’s retrenchment was concerned. It is

alleged that after termination of the services of petitioner, the respondent had engaged junior

persons namely Saroji Devi, Pyaru Ram, Fagnu, Raju, Chunni Devi and Mehar Singh. It is stated

that petitioner has no source of income after his termination from service by the respondent. It is

alleged that respondent had terminated the services of petitioner as well as given breaks to his

which just to give benefit to his junior employee. The petitioner prayed that respondent be directed

to reengage the services of petitioner from the date of his appointment.

4.

Respondent resisted claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary objections

of maintainability and cause action. On merits admitted that the services of petitioner had been

engaged on daily wage basis on seasonal works during September, 1987 under Bhuntar Range and

while petitioner was turned up for work his name was entered in the muster roll as per availability

of works and funds intermittently upto July, 2010. It is denied that the petitioner had worked

continuously w.e.f. September 1987 till July, 2010. It is stated that petitioner had not been

retrenched by the respondent in July, 2010 but he had abandoned the work against which he was

deployed. It is denied that petitioner had completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is stated that

petitioner had left the job of his own sweet will and question of retrenchment from service does not

arise and the respondent had not violated any provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is

further stated that the petitioner had also used to report for duty as per his own convenience as such

he was intermittent worker. It is further stated that the persons namely Fagnu, Raju, Chuni Devi

and Mehar Singh had also worked upto 2010 but they had also not completed 240 days of work in

any calendar year. It is pertinent to mention here that the persons Pyaru Ram and Saroji Devi were

not engaged by the respondent/department. It is stated that the persons who continuously worked

with the respondent/department and have completed 240 days but the petitioner attended his work

as per his own sweet will and as such there was no violation of provisions of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947. Although, petitioner engaged himself in agricultural work and remained gainfully

employed and did not attend the job assigned by the respondent. Thus, petitioner is stated to be not

entitled to any relief. Accordingly, petition was sought to be dismissed. Reply filed by respondent

is supported by affidavit.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition

and contentions raised by the respondent had been denied by petitioner.

6.

To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the

evidence led by petitioner, respondent had examined Shri Hira Lal Rana, Divisional Forest Officer

Parvati at Shamshi as RW1 tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, Ex. RW1/B the mandays

chart of petitioner, Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex. RW1/C4 copies of mandays chart of co-workers and closed

evidence.

7.

I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.

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8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 15.9.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during

the years, 1999 to 2010 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged? . .OPP.

2.

Whether final termination of services of petitioner during April, 2010 is/was improper

and unjustified?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no.1 or issue no. 2 are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the

petitioner is entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPP.

5.

Whether the petitioner has no cause of action to file the present case as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my

findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Issue No.5 : Unpressed

Relief :

Petition is allowed in part per operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1,2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Stepping into the witness box as PW1, petitioner has sworn in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A

under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC stipulating therein the manner in which he was engaged and continued

to work uninterruptedly under the supervision of Forest Range Bhuntar upto July, 2010. He has

specifically deposed on oath that from the year 1987 to 2010, his services had been engaged and

disengaged by the respondent/department by giving fictional breaks to petitioner. He has

categorically deposed on oath that the fictional breaks had been given by respondent with the object

that petitioner did not complete 240 days of work for the purpose of continuous service and

regularization. Be it noticed that petitioner has denied that his co-workers namely Fagnu, Raj,

Chuni Devi and Mehar Singh had been worked upto 2010 self stated they had worked after 2010

with the respondent/department.

12. Ex. RW1/B is the mandays chart of petitioner reflecting that he had been appointed in

the month of September, 1987. The contents of said document revealed that the working mandays

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showing that petitioner to have worked for 26 days in the year, 2010, 24 days in 2003, 21 days in

2002, 56 days in 2001, 235 days in 2000, 220 days in 1999, 12 days in 1994, 34 days in 1993, 31

days in 1992, 25 days in 1990, 53 days in 1989, 241 days in 1988 and 13 days in 1987. Be it stated

that petitioner has admitted that department/respondent had regularized the services of only those

workers who had completed 240 days or more but the case of petitioner primarily remains that he

had been given fictional breaks and that coworkers who were junior to his were retained whereas he

was not issued muster roll for whole month. It would, therefore, apt to scrutinize entire evidence so

as to determine if fictional breaks had been given with the object that petitioner did not complete

240 days in a given year and thus could not avail benefit of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act.

13. It is the admitted case of the parties that services of petitioner were engaged as daily

wager by respondent in the month of September, 1987 as claimed by his in statement of claim. This

fact find supports from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B. Be it noticed that the respondent has not

placed/exhibited or filed any document establishing that the services of petitioner were engaged for

undertaking forestry works only. Otherwise also, the mandays chart referred to above unfolds the

fact that petitioner had worked for 26 days in the year, 2010, 24 days in 2003, 21 days in 2002, 56

days in 2001, 235 days in 2000, 220 days in 1999, 12 days in 1994, 34 days in 1993, 31 days in

1992, 25 days in 1990, 53 days in 1989, 241 days in 1988 and 13 days in 1987 and therefore when

petitioner had served respondent for more than 200/240 days in several calendar years as per

mandays chart it could not be construed that petitioner was a seasonal worker instead the plea so

raised by respondent manifestly established in order to escape liability, plea of forestry work being

seasonal in nature. It is nowhere in evidence of respondent that forest department has been declared

as seasonal work as required under the law. 14. It is settled principle of law that plea of

‘abandonment’ has to be proved like any other fact by respondent/department. Simply because

workman fails to report for duty intermittently cannot be construed to mean that concerned

workman has abandoned the job. There is no iota of evidence on record establishing that any notice

was ever issued or served to petitioner by respondent when he had absented from duty calling upon

his to resume duty or explain the cause for his unauthorized absence as absence from duty is

serious misconduct requiring initiation of departmental proceedings before any taking action

against workman Again there is no iota of evidence showing that the respondent had initiated any

action in the absence of petitioner from duty. It is evident from record that no explanation of

petitioner was called even no show cause notice was issued by respondent qua absence of petitioner

from duty from time to time when he absented as per the mandays referred to above. Thus, the plea

of abandonment or absence from duty put forth by the respondent also merits rejection being

devoid of merits.

15. It has also come in the evidence that muster roll had not been issued for whole month

in a year. Even in some months muster rolls were not at all issued. No muster roll was issued as

petitioner is shown to have not been given any work however it is evident from the mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B that petitioner was engaged and disengaged whimsically in arbitrary manner without

cogent reason and that no letter or notice whatsoever had been issued qua non attendance and as

such the plea of petitioner for having been given fictional breaks cannot be disbelieved. In view of

foregoing evidence on record, it can be safely concluded that artificial/fictional breaks in service

was provided to petitioner by respondent from 1999 to 2010 which is an unfair labour practice

within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act and the break period has to be counted for the

purposes of “continuous service” envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. At the same time, non

issuance of one month’s notice or wages in lieu thereof is violative of Section 25-F of Industria

Disputes Act moreso when respondent/department has failed to establish that petitioner had

abandoned the job or that petitioner was engaged in seasonal work.

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16. Another aspect of the case which cannot be lost sight while appreciating evidence on

record is that junior workmen were allowed to be retained and that petitioner was disengaged

arbitrarily by respondent in violation of Section 25-G of the Act. Examination of RW1, the then

Divisional Forest Officer on oath revealed that person junior to petitioner who were retained in

service leading to inference that while retrenching petitioner, junior workman was allowed to be

retained in service which showed arbitrary and whimsical manner in which petitioner was

disengaged recurrently in different ignoring his seniority. It is pertinent to mention here that

respondent Shri Hira Lal Rana admitted in cross-examination that Chuni Devi was junior to the

petitioner. He further admitted that seniority list Ex. P1 was issued by the respondent/department.

As per seniority list Ex. P1 persons namely Sarojni Devi and and Pyar Chand were juniors to the

petitioner who were appointed in December, 1988 and January, 1996 respectively and their services

had been regularized by the respondent/department. As such, the break in service given during the

period 1999 to 2010 appears to be deliberately done with the object so that petitioner failed to

complete 240 days entitling his for benefit of Section 25-‘B’ of the Industrial Disputes Act and

manifestly in the nature of fictional breaks.

17. Ld. AR/counsel for the petitioner has contended that for applicability of Section 25-G

of the Act, it is not necessary that the petitioner should have worked for 240 days atleast in a

calendar year as has also been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as Central Bank of India

vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419. That being so, the relief sought for by petitioner is liable to be

granted in view of violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act by respondent. Thus,

petitioner/claimant has succeeded in establishing that fictional breaks had been given to petitioner

illegally by respondent due to which he could not complete 240 days in any calendar year more-so

when respondent had failed to prove allegation of abandonment as stated above and petitioner

being engaged in seasonal work. As the petitioner himself has not discharged initial onus qua

remaining unemployed during break period or not gainfully employed, so he cannot be awarded

back wages however petitioner is entitled to relief of continuity in service from the date of initial

engagement as well as seniority except back wages for the reasons stated hereinabove. Issue no.1

for the aforestated reason is answered in affirmative in favour of petitioner and against respondent

however issue no.2 is decided holding that petitioner is entitled reinstatement, continuity in service

with seniority except back wages.

ISSUE NO.4

18. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondent department has contended with vehemence

that claim petition is not maintainable. As has come in my findings in foregoing paras that

respondent had deliberately given fictional breaks to petitioner by not issuing any muster roll for

the whole month in a calendar year, it cannot not be stated that the petitioner cannot claim that the

period of fictional break be counted in his services under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act. Otherwise also, it is not specifically mentioned in what manner the claim petition is not

maintainable. Since petitioner is a workman working with the respondent who had been given

fictional breaks, as stated in foregoing paras, with the object that he did not complete 240 days, the

claim petition cannot be stated to be not maintainable. Issue in hand is answered in negative in

favour of petitioner and against respondent.

ISSUE NO.5

19. This issue was not pressed by ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent at the time of

arguments which are decided unpressed in favour of petitioner and against respondent.

RELIEF

20. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, petitioner is held to be in continuous

uninterrupted service with the respondent from 1999 to 2010 and that the breaks given by the

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respondent being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of service of

the petitioner and termination of the services of petitioner is set aside and quashed. Accordingly,

claim petition is hereby allowed in part and respondent is directed to reengage the petitioner

forthwith. he shall be entitled to seniority and continuity in service except back wages. The parties,

however, shall bear their own costs. 21. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

22. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

23. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open

Court today this 22nd day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 325/2014

Date of Institution : 25.10.2014

Date of decision : 22.4.2016

Smt. Tara Devi w/o Shri Maghu Ram, r/o Village Paha, P.O. Kharihar, Tehsil & District

Kullu, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Divisional Forest Officer, Parbati Forest Division Shamshi, District Kullu, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner :

Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

1.

The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether time to time termination of the services of Smt. Tara Devi W/O Shri Maghu Ram,

R/O Village Paha, P.O. Kharihar, Tehsil & District Kullu, H.P. during year 1996 to year

2010 and finally during April 2010 by the Divisional Forest Officer, Parbati Forest Division

Shamshi, District Kullu, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above

employer(s)?”

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2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that the services of petitioner/claimant

had been engaged by respondent as daily waged beldar w.e.f. September, 1987 under Parvati

Division of Forest at Shamshi who continued to work upto April, 2010 and petitioner had worked

240 days of continuous service during the said period. It is alleged that respondent had given

fictional breaks to the petitioner from time to time although these breaks were given to the

petitioner by the respondent so that he could not be regularized and suddenly in April, 2010,

respondent had illegally and unlawfully retrenched the services of petitioner. It is claimed that

while disengaging petitioner from service, the respondent had not followed the provisions of

Section 25-H and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is further claimed that respondent had not

given any notice to petitioner while terminating his service which act and conduct of the respondent

was highly arbitrary and against the law and procedure of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is stated

that petitioner falls within the definition of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act which is

governed by the relevant provisions of the Act per petitioner’s retrenchment was concerned. It is

alleged that after termination of the services of petitioner, the respondent had engaged junior

persons namely Saroji Devi, Pyaru Ram, Fagnu, Raju, Chunni Devi and Mehar Singh. It is stated

that petitioner has no source of income after her termination from service by the respondent. It is

alleged that respondent had terminated the services of petitioner as well as given breaks to her

which just to give benefit to her junior employee. The petitioner prayed that respondent be directed

to reengage the services of petitioner from the date of her appointment.

4.

Respondent resisted claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary objections

of maintainability and cause action. On merits admitted that the services of petitioner had been

engaged on daily wage basis on seasonal works during September, 1988 under Bhuntar Range and

while petitioner was turned up for work her name was entered in the muster roll as per availability

of works and funds intermittently upto April, 2010. It is denied that the petitioner had worked

continuously w.e.f. September 1987 till April, 2010. It is stated that petitioner had not been

retrenched by the respondent in April, 2010 but she had abandoned the work against which she was

deployed. It is denied that petitioner had completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is stated that

petitioner had left the job of her own sweet will and question of retrenchment from service does not

arise and the respondent had not violated any provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is

further stated that the petitioner had also used to report for duty as per her own convenience as such

she was intermittent worker. It is further stated that the persons namely Fagnu, Raju, Chuni Devi

and Mehar Singh had also worked upto 2010 but they had also not completed 240 days of work in

any calendar year. It is pertinent to mention here that the persons Pyaru Ram and Saroji Devi were

not engaged by the respondent/department. It is stated that the persons who continuously worked

with the respondent/department and have completed 240 days but the petitioner attended her work

as per her own sweet will and as such there was no violation of provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947. Although, petitioner engaged herself in agricultural work and remained

gainfully employed and did not attend the job assigned by the respondent. Thus, petitioner is stated

to be not entitled to any relief. Accordingly, petition was sought to be dismissed. Reply filed by

respondent is supported by affidavit.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition

and contentions raised by the respondent had been denied by petitioner.

6.

To prove his case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the

evidence led by petitioner, respondent had examined Shri Hira Lal Rana, Divisional Forest Officer

Parvati at Shamshi as RW1 tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, Ex. RW1/B the mandays

chart of petitioner, Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex. RW1/C4 copies of mandays chart of co-workers and closed

evidence.

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7.

I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 15.9.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during

the years, 1996 to 2010 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether final termination of services of petitioner during April, 2010 is/was improper

and unjustified?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no.1 or issue no. 2 are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the

petitioner is entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPP.

5.

Whether the petitioner has no cause of action to file the present case as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my

findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Issue No.5 : Unpressed

Relief :

Petition is allowed in part per operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1,2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Stepping into the witness box as PW1, petitioner has sworn in her affidavit Ex. PW1/A

under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC stipulating therein the manner in which she was engaged and continued

to work uninterruptedly under the supervision of Forest Range Bhuntar upto April, 2010. She has

specifically deposed on oath that from the year 1988 to 2010, her services had been engaged and

disengaged by the respondent/department by giving fictional breaks to petitioner. She has

categorically deposed on oath that the fictional breaks had been given by respondent with the object

that petitioner did not complete 240 days of work for the purpose of continuous service and

regularization. Be it noticed that petitioner has denied that her co-workers namely Fagnu, Raj,

Chuni Devi and Mehar Singh had been worked upto 2010 self stated they had worked after 2010

with the respondent/department.

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12. Ex. RW1/B is the mandays chart of petitioner reflecting that she had been appointed in

the month of January, 1988. The contents of said document revealed that the working mandays

showing that petitioner to have worked for 16 days in the year, 2010, 89 days in 2003, 117 days in

2002, 266 days in 2001, 268 days in 2000, 342 days in 1999, 312 days in 1998, 173 days in 1997,

281 days in 1996, 35 days in 1995, 61 days in 1993, 22 days in 1989 and 31 days in 1988. Be it

stated that petitioner has admitted that department/respondent had regularized the services of only

those workers who had completed 240 days or more but the case of petitioner primarily remains

that she had been given fictional breaks and that coworkers who were junior to her were retained

whereas she was not issued muster roll for whole month. It would, therefore, apt to scrutinize entire

evidence so as to determine if fictional breaks had been given with the object that petitioner did not

complete 240 days in a given year and thus could not avail benefit of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

13. It is the admitted case of the parties that services of petitioner were engaged as daily

wager by respondent in the month of January, 1988 and not in September, 1988 as claimed by her

in statement of claim. This facts find supports from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B. Be it noticed that

the respondent has not placed/exhibited or filed any document establishing that the services of

petitioner were engaged for undertaking forestry works only. Otherwise also, the mandays chart

referred to above unfolds the fact that petitioner had worked for 16 days in the year, 2010, 89 days

in 2003, 117 days in 2002, 266 days in 2001, 268 days in 2000, 342 days in 1999, 312 days in

1998, 173 days in 1997, 281 days in 1996, 35 days in 1995, 61 days in 1993, 22 days in 1989 and

31 days in 1988 and therefore when petitioner had served respondent for more than 200/240 days in

several calendar years as per mandays chart it could not be construed that petitioner was a seasonal

worker instead the plea so raised by respondent manifestly established in order to escape liability,

plea of forestry work being seasonal in nature. It is nowhere in evidence of respondent that forest

department has been declared as seasonal work as required under the law.

14. It is settled principle of law that plea of ‘abandonment’ has to be proved like any other

fact by respondent/department. Simply because workman fails to report for duty intermittently

cannot be construed to mean that concerned workman has abandoned the job. There is no iota of

evidence on record establishing that any notice was ever issued or served to petitioner by

respondent when she had absented from duty calling upon her to resume duty or explain the cause

for his unauthorized absence as absence from duty is serious misconduct requiring initiation of

departmental proceedings before any taking action against workman Again there is no iota of

evidence showing that the respondent had initiated any action in the absence of petitioner from

duty. It is evident from record that no explanation of petitioner was called even no show cause

notice was issued by respondent qua absence of petitioner from duty from time to time when she

absented as per the mandays referred to above. Thus, the plea of abandonment or absence from

duty put forth by the respondent also merits rejection being devoid of merits.

15. It has also come in the evidence that muster roll had not been issued for whole month

in a year. Even in some months muster rolls were not at all issued. No muster roll was issued as

petitioner is shown to have not been given any work however it is evident from the mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B that petitioner was engaged and disengaged whimsically in arbitrary manner without

cogent reason and that no letter or notice whatsoever had been issued qua non attendance and as

such the plea of petitioner for having been given fictional breaks cannot be disbelieved. In view of

foregoing evidence on record, it can be safely concluded that artificial/fictional breaks in service

was provided to petitioner by respondent from 1996 to 2010 which is an unfair labour practice

within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act and the break period has to be counted for the

purposes of “continuous service” envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. At the same time, non

issuance of one month’s notice or wages in lieu thereof is violative of Section 25-F of Industrial

Disputes Act moreso when respondent/department has failed to establish that petitioner had

abandoned the job or that petitioner was engaged in seasonal work.

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16. Another aspect of the case which cannot be lost sight while appreciating evidence on

record is that junior workmen were allowed to be retained and that petitioner was disengaged

arbitrarily by respondent in violation of Section 25-G of the Act. Examination of RW1, the then

Divisional Forest Officer on oath revealed that persons junior to petitioner who were retained in

service leading to inference that while retrenching petitioner, junior workman was allowed to be

retained in service which showed arbitrary and whimsical manner in which petitioner was

disengaged recurrently in different ignoring his seniority. It is pertinent to mention here that

respondent Shri Hira Lal Rana admitted in cross-examination that Chuni Devi was junior to the

petitioner. He further admitted that seniority list Ex. P1 was issued by the respondent/department.

As per seniority list Ex. P1 persons namely Sarojni Devi and and Pyar Chand were juniors to the

petitioner who were appointed in December, 1988 and January, 1996 respectively and their services

had been regularized by the respondent/department. As such, the break in service given during the

period 1996 to 2010 appears to be deliberately done with the object so that petitioner failed to

complete 240 days entitling her for benefit of Section 25-‘B’ of the Industrial Disputes Act and

manifestly in the nature of fictional breaks.

17. Ld. AR/counsel for the petitioner has contended that for applicability of Section 25-G

of the Act, it is not necessary that the petitioner should have worked for 240 days atleast in a

calendar year as has also been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as Central Bank of India

vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419. That being so, the relief sought for by petitioner is liable to be

granted in view of violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act by respondent. Thus,

petitioner/claimant has succeeded in establishing that fictional breaks had been given to petitioner

illegally by respondent due to which she could not complete 240 days in any calendar year more-so

when respondent had failed to prove allegation of abandonment as stated above and petitioner

being engaged in seasonal work. As the petitioner herself has not discharged initial onus qua

remaining unemployed during break period or not gainfully employed, so she cannot be awarded

back wages however petitioner is entitled to relief of continuity in service from the date of initial

engagement as well as seniority except back wages for the reasons stated hereinabove. Issue no.1

for the aforestated reason is answered in affirmative in favour of petitioner and against respondent

however issue no.2 is decided holding that petitioner is entitled reinstatement, continuity in service

with seniority except back wages.

ISSUE NO.4

18. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondent department has contended with vehemence

that claim petition is not maintainable. As has come in my findings in foregoing paras that

respondent had deliberately given fictional breaks to petitioner by not issuing any muster roll for

the whole month in a calendar year, it cannot not be stated that the petitioner cannot claim that the

period of fictional break be counted in his services under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act. Otherwise also, it is not specifically mentioned in what manner the claim petition is not

maintainable. Since petitioner is a workman working with the respondent who had been given

fictional breaks, as stated in foregoing paras, with the object that she did not complete 240 days, the

claim petition cannot be stated to be not maintainable. Issue in hand is answered in negative in

favour of petitioner and against respondent.

ISSUE NO.5

19. This issue was not pressed by ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent at the time of

arguments which are decided unpressed in favour of petitioner and against respondent.

RELIEF

20. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, petitioner is held to be in continuous

uninterrupted service with the respondent from 1996 to 2010 and that the breaks given by the

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respondent being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of service of

the petitioner and termination of the services of petitioner is set aside and quashed. Accordingly,

claim petition is hereby allowed in part and respondent is directed to reengage the petitioner

forthwith. She shall be entitled to seniority and continuity in service except back wages. The

parties, however, shall bear their own costs.

21. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

22. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

23. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 22nd day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 115/2015

Date of Institution : 13.3.2015

Date of decision : 22.04.2016

Shri Suresh Chand s/o Shri Nurata Ram, r/o Village Behna, P.O. Hari Behna, Tehsil

Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The District Sericulture Officer Tassar, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

1.

The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Suresh Chand S/O Shri Nurata

Ram, R/O Village Behna, P.O. Hari Behna, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f.

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11-01- 1993 to year 2005 by the District Sericulture Officer Tassar, Mandi, District Mandi,

H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal

and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer? ”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that the services of petitioner/claimant

had been initially engaged by respondent on muster roll as daily waged basis w.e.f. 11.1.1993

without any written appointment order/letter who continued to work uninterruptedly upto

31.12.2005. It is stated that respondent had given fictional breaks to the petitioner w.e.f. 11.1.1993

to 31.12.2005 not to complete 240 days in each calendar year for the purpose of regularization

despite petitioner had worked 321 days in the yea r1995, 273 days in 1997 and 245 days in 1998

rather he could not be completed 240 days in the years 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1999 to 2005

respectively due to fictional breaks which had been given by the respondent and if the workman

had completed 240 days in block of 12 calendar months in the year 1995 petitioner was covered

under Section 25-B (2) (a) (ii) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is further stated that when the

respondent given fictional breaks to the petitioner, no notice was served upon the petitioner which

was mandatory required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The grievance of

petitioner remains that the at the time of giving fictional breaks to petitioner, respondent had not

followed the principle of ‘Last come Fist go’ and persons junior to him had been retained in service

by the respondent namely S/Sh. Suresh Chand, Dila Ram, Mahant Ram and Smt. Bimla Devi and

same had been violated under Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act as well as respondent had

also violated Chapter V-A and V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is alleged that the breaks given

to the petitioner from 11.1.1993 to 31.12.2005 not to complete 240 days which was illegally,

arbitrary, unconstitutional and against mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act although

the same was unfair labour practice under the fifth schedule Clause 10 of the Act. It is claimed that

petitioner is entitled for his regularization w.e.f. 1.1.2003 with other consequential benefits

included back arrears as per the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Mool Raj Upadhyaya and

Gehar Singh. It is stated that petitioner is entitled for regularization after completion of 10 years

continuous service as per judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Mool Raj Upadhyaya and Gehar

Singh. It is further stated the persons junior to petitioner namely S/Sh. Chabinder Dev, Uttam Singh

and Joginder Pal had been regularized by the respondent/department earlier to petitioner.

Accordingly, petitioner seeks relief to the extent that fictional breaks illegally given to him be

treated and counted as period of continuity in service for the purposes of his regularization and

respondent be directed to consider the case of petitioner for his regularization per the policy of the

state government with all consequential benefits and to any other relief to which petitioner is found

entitled.

4.

Respondent resisted claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary objections

of maintainability. On merits admitted that petitioner was initially engaged as daily waged worker

w.e.f. 11.1.1993 and he worked intermittently with the respondent upto 2005 and therefore

petitioner report for work as per his own convenience and did not complete 240 days in each

calendar year. It is stated that petitioner is still working with the respondent/department. It is further

submitted that petitioner had completed 321 days in the year 1995, 273 days in 1997 and 245 days

in 1998 although petitioner worked upto 2005 intermittently due to availability of work with the

concerned Incharge of Sericulture Centre with the department. It is stated that the services of

petitioner had been regularized vide letter no.16-5/94-Ind-II-Vol-IX dated 27.9.2014 and as such

question of violation of Section 25-B (ii) (a) (ii) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 does not arise.

It is alleged that the services of petitioner were never retrenched nor any fictional breaks had been

given to him deliberately therefore question of violation of provisions of Section 25-F (a) (b) and

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(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act also did not arise. It is stated that the services were engaged prior

to the other persons namely S/Sh. Suresh Chand, Dila Ram, Mahant Ram and Smt. Bimla Devi but

they were engaged with Incharge of Sericulture Farm at different located sericulture centre and as

such there was no violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’. It is alleged that the services of

petitioner were engaged as daily waged worker in the year 1993 who had not completed 240 days

in each calendar year and as such the judgment of Mool Raj Upadhayaya and Gehar Singh are not

applicable to this case. It is denied that petitioner had been completed 10 years of continuous

service w.e.f. 11.1.1993 to 31.12.2002 but the petitioner had worked intermittently during the said

period who had not completed 240 days of work in each calendar year. It is further denied that

persons namely S/Sh. Chabinder Dev, Uttam Singh and Joginder Pal had been regularized by the

respondent earlier to the petitioner besides Chabinder Dev, Uttam Singh and Joginder Pal were

regularized along-with petitioner vide letter No.16- 5/94-Ind-II-Vol-IX dated 27.9.2014 and as such

there was no violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is admitted that the

services of petitioner were regularized w.e.f. 1.10.2014. It is stated that petitioner had worked with

the respondent/department intermittently till 2005 who had not completed 240 days in each

calendar year as such petitioner was not entitled for regularization w.e.f. 1.1.2003. Accordingly,

petition was sought to be dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition

and contentions raised by the respondent had been denied by petitioner.

6. To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondent had examined Shri Rajesh Kumar, General

Manager, District Industries Centre Mandi as RW1 tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, Ex.

RW1/B copy of mandays chart of petitioner, Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex. RW1/C6 copies of mandays chart

of other workers, Ex. RW1/D copy of seniority list, copy of office order dated 27.9.2014 Ex.

RW1/E and closed evidence.

7.

I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 05.8.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

11.01.1993 to year 2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . .OPP.

2. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPP.

Relief.

9. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my

findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

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Relief :

Petition is allowed in part per operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1 AND 2

10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Stepping into the witness box as PW1, petitioner has sworn in his affidavit Ex. PW1/A

under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC stipulating therein the manner in which he was engaged and continued

to work uninterruptedly with the respondent upto 2005. He has specifically deposed on oath that

from the year 1993 to 2005, his services had been engaged and disengaged by the

respondent/department by giving fictional breaks to petitioner. He has categorically deposed on

oath that the fictional breaks had been given by respondent with the object that petitioner did not

complete 240 days of work for the purpose of continuous service and that due to fictional breaks

from 1993 till 2005, petitioner could not complete 240 days. He denied that respondent had never

given fictional breaks to him. He also denied that the workers whose services had been regularized

by the respondent/department were regularized with the petitioner in the year 2014. He further

denied that no juniors had been kept on service. He admitted that he had own cultivable land for his

livelihood.

12. Ex. RW1/B is the mandays chart of petitioner reflecting that she had been appointed in

the 1993. The contents of said document revealed working mandays showing that petitioner to have

worked for 26 days in the year 1993, 144 days in 1994, 321 days in 1995, 170 days in 1996, 272

days in 1997, 245 days in 1998, 168 days in 1999, 201 days in 2000, 178 days in 2001, 227 days in

2002, 136 days in 2003, 156 days in 2004, 175 days in 2005, 249 days in 2006, 304 days in 2007,

321 days in 2008, 365 days in 2009, 365 days in 2010, 365 days in 2011, 364 days in 2012, 365

days in 2013 and 273 days in 2014. Be it stated that petitioner has admitted that

department/respondent had regularized the services of only those workers who had completed 240

days or more but the case of petitioner primarily remains that he had been given fictional breaks

and that co-workers who were junior to him were retained whereas he was not issued muster roll

for whole month. It would, therefore, apt to scrutinize entire evidence so as to determine if fictional

breaks had been given with the object that petitioner did not complete 240 days in a given year and

thus could not avail benefit of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act.

13. It is the admitted case of the parties that services of petitioner were engaged as daily

wager by respondent in the 1993 as claimed by petitioner in his statement of claim. This fact find

supports from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B. Be it noticed that the respondent has not placed/exhibited

or filed any document establishing that the services of petitioner were engaged for undertaking

intermittent work only. Otherwise also, the mandays chart referred to above unfolds the fact that

petitioner had worked for 26 days in the year 1993, 144 days in 1994, 321 days in 1995, 170 days

in 1996, 272 days in 1997, 245 days in 1998, 168 days in 1999, 201 days in 2000, 178 days in

2001, 227 days in 2002, 136 days in 2003, 156 days in 2004, 175 days in 2005, 249 days in 2006,

304 days in 2007, 321 days in 2008, 365 days in 2009, 365 days in 2010, 365 days in 2011, 364

days in 2012, 365 days in 2013 and 273 days in 2014 and therefore when petitioner had served

respondent for more than 200/240 days in several calendar years as per mandays chart it could not

be construed that petitioner was intermittent worker instead the plea so raised by respondent

manifestly established in order to escape liability, plea of intermittent work being intermittently in

nature. It is nowhere in evidence of respondent that department has been declared as intermittent

work as required under the law.

14. It is settled principle of law that plea of ‘abandonment’ has to be proved like any other

fact by respondent/department. Simply because workman fails to report for duty intermittently

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cannot be construed to mean that concerned workman has abandoned the job. There is no iota of

evidence on record establishing that any notice was ever issued or served to petitioner by

respondent when he had absented from duty calling upon him to resume duty or explain the cause

for his unauthorized absence as absence from duty is serious misconduct requiring initiation of

departmental proceedings before any taking action against workman Again there is no iota of

evidence showing that the respondent had initiated any action in the absence of petitioner from

duty. It is evident from record that no explanation of petitioner was called even no show cause

notice was issued by respondent qua absence of petitioner from duty from time to time when he

absented as per the mandays referred to above. Thus, the plea of abandonment or absence from

duty put forth by the respondent also merits rejection being devoid of merits.

15. It has also come in the evidence that muster roll had not been issued for whole month

in a year. Even in some months muster rolls were not at all issued. No muster roll was issued as

petitioner is shown to have not been given any work however it is evident from the mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B that petitioner was engaged and disengaged whimsically in arbitrary manner without

cogent reason and that no letter or notice whatsoever had been issued qua non attendance and as

such the plea of petitioner for having been given fictional breaks cannot be disbelieved. In view of

foregoing evidence on record, it can be safely concluded that artificial/fictional breaks in service

was provided to petitioner by respondent from 1993 to 2005 which is an unfair labour practice

within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act and the break period has to be counted for the

purposes of “continuous service” envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act.

16. Another aspect of the case which cannot be lost sight while appreciating evidence on

record is that junior workmen were allowed to be retained and that petitioner was disengaged

arbitrarily by respondent in violation of Section 25-G of the Act. Another aspect of the case which

cannot be lost sight while appreciating evidence on record is that junior workmen were allowed to

be retained and that petitioner was disengaged arbitrarily by respondent in violation of Section 25

G of the Act. Be it noticed that while retrenching petitioner, junior workman was allowed to be

retained in service which showed arbitrary and whimsical manner in which petitioner was

disengaged recurrently in different ignoring his seniority. It is pertinent to mention here that

respondent Shri Rajesh Kumar has admitted in crossexamination that as per Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex.

RW1/C6 no fictional breaks had been given to those persons as mentioned in the aforestated

documents. As per seniority list Ex. RW1/D many persons mentioned this document were juniors

to the petitioner who were appointed after the petitioner and their services had been regularized by

the respondent/department. As such, for the break in service given during the period 1993 to 2005

petitioner which was not given to other co-workers as also reflected in Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex. RW1/C6

is entitled for benefit of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act and manifestly in the nature of

fictional breaks. Ld. AR/counsel for the petitioner has contended that for applicability of Section

25-G of the Act, it is not necessary that the petitioner should have worked for 240 days atleast in a

calendar year as has also been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as Central Bank of India

vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419. That being so, the relief sought for by petitioner is liable to be

granted in view of violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act by respondent. Thus,

petitioner/claimant has succeeded in establishing that fictional breaks had been given to petitioner

illegally by respondent due to which she could not complete 240 days in any calendar years 1993 to

2005 more-so when respondent had failed to prove allegation of “abandonment” as stated above. It

is accordingly held that respondent had given fictional breaks from time to time to the petitioner in

particular years from 1993 to 2005 which is illegal and unjustified. As the petitioner herself has not

discharged initial onus qua remaining unemployed during break period or not gainfully employed,

so she cannot be awarded back wages however petitioner is entitled to relief of continuity in service

from the date of initial engagement as well as seniority except back wages for the reasons stated

hereinabove. Issue no.1 for the aforestated reason is answered in affirmative in favour of petitioner

and against respondent however issue no.2 is decided holding that petitioner is entitled continuity

in service with seniority except back wages.

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ISSUE NO.3

17. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondent department has contended with vehemence

that claim petition is not maintainable. As has come in my findings in foregoing paras that

respondent had deliberately given fictional breaks to petitioner by not issuing any muster roll for

the whole month in a calendar year, it cannot not be stated that the petitioner cannot claim that the

period of fictional break be counted in his services under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act. Otherwise also, it is not specifically mentioned in what manner the claim petition is not

maintainable. Since petitioner is a workman working with the respondent who had been given

fictional breaks, as stated in foregoing paras, with the object that she did not complete 240 days, the

claim petition cannot be stated to be not maintainable. Issue in hand is answered in negative in

favour of petitioner and against respondent.

RELIEF

18. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, petitioner is held to be in continuous

uninterrupted service with the respondent from year 1993 to 2005 and that the breaks given by the

respondent being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of service of

the petitioner. Accordingly, claim petition is hereby allowed in part and reference is accordingly

answered in favour of petitioner. The petitioner shall thus be deemed to be in continuous service of

respondent as stated above with all consequential benefits except back wages. The parties,

however, shall bear their own costs.

19. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

20. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

21. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 22nd day of April, 2015.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 192/2015

Date of Institution : 21.04.2015

Date of decision

: 23.04.2016

Smt. Seeta Devi w/o Shri Basakha Ram, r/o V.P.O. Tullah, Tehsil Joginder Nagar, District

Mandi, H.P.

…Petitioner

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. (B&R) Division, Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.

….Respondent

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Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

1. The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether time to time termination of the services of Smt. Seeta Devi W/O Shri Basakhu

Ram, R/O V.P.O. Tullah, Tehsil Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. during December,

1999 to 31-08-2007 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., (B&R) Division Joginder

Nagar, District Mandi, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above

employer?”

2. Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that the services of petitioner were

engaged by the B&R Department as a daily wager on muster roll basis w.e.f. December, 1999 who

worked under the Assistant Engineer, HPPWD Sub Division, Joginder Nagar but no appointment

order/letter was issued in her name by the respondent. Averments made in claim petition further

stipulates that the latter used to engage petitioner’s for 15 to 20 days every month instead of the full

month and that fictional breaks for 10-15 days in each month were continued to be given by the

respondent till 30.09.2007. Thereafter, as per the instructions issued by the Principal Secretary

(PW) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh per letter dated 14.9.2007, her services were

continuously engaged by the respondent. It is alleged that the respondent had given petitioner

artificial breaks from the year 1999 to 30.09.2007. Not only this, the persons who were working

with her (petitioner) or joined the service after her were not given any break by the respondent

deliberately. At the time while giving artificial/fictional breaks, the principle of ‘last come first go’

was also not followed by the respondent and the persons junior to petitioner namely Shri Rajinder

Singh and Sh. Sumer Singh and others worked with the respondent/department without any break

and that the period of artificial breaks is required to be counted as continuous service for the

purpose of the regularization of petitioner’s services. It is alleged that the persons junior to

petitioner have been regularized by the respondent earlier to her contrary to the policy of the State.

A similar case titled as Suresh Kumar vs. The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Baijnath

bearing reference No.23/2010 has already been decided in favour of the workman by this Court per

Award dated 28.11.2011 and thus petitioner having completed eight years of continuous service on

30.11.2007 and was liable to be regularized as work charged beldar as per the policy

framed/approved in Rakesh Kumar’s case in the pay scale of Rs.4910-10680/- with all other perks

and allowances. It is also contended that petitioner is still working with the respondent/department.

The act and conduct of the respondent is also alleged to be unfair labour practice which also

violates Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947, ‘the Act’

for short).

3. Respondent contested petition, filed separate reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections qua non-maintainability as no legal or fundamental right of the petitioner has been

infringed, the petition being hit by the vice of delay and laches and bad for not impleading the State

of Himachal Pradesh and the Executive Engineer, National Highway Division, HPPWD, Joginder

Nagar as parties to the petition. On merits, engagement of the services of the petitioner from

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January, 2001 is admitted. However, it has been pleaded that the petitioner was employed by the

Executive Engineer, National Highway Division, HPPWD, Joginder Nagar and that respondent’s

office was created in the month of January, 2004 vide notification dated 9th December, 2003. The

office started functioning w.e.f. 2nd January, 2004 and after the creation of his (respondent’s)

office, the petitioner and some other workmen were transferred to the newly created Division from

the National Highway Division, Joginder Nagar. The claim of the petitioner prior to 01.1.2004

pertains to the office of the Executive Engineer, National Highway Division, Joginder Nagar, who

is not a party to the case. It has been emphatically denied that if fictional breaks were given to the

petitioner at any point of time rather the services of the petitioner were engaged as per the

availability of the work and funds. As and when the services of the petitioner were engaged in

accordance with her verbal requests from time to time, she was duly made aware regarding the

availability of the work besides maintained that no continuous work for the entire month was

provided to the petitioner who used to report for duty intermittently as per her convenience. The

workmen whose names have been disclosed by the petitioner, worked in continuity and that their

services have been regularized as per the seniority and policy of the State. The policy framed in

Mool Raj Upadhaya’s case is stated to be not applicable to the present case as in that case, one time

benefit was given to the employees who had either completed 10 years of continuous service with

240 days in each calendar year as on 31.12.1993 or the employees who had rendered one or more

year of service but had not completed 10 years of service up-to 31.12.1993. It is further asserted

that the services of the petitioner would be regularized as per the policy of the State besides denied

to have indulged in any unfair labour practice and maintained that no provision of the Act has been

violated. Accordingly, cause of action as pleaded in the claim petition filed by petitioner is denied

and the petition is sought to be dismissed.

4. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

5. To prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the

evidence led by petitioner, respondent had examined Shri V.S. Guleria, the then Executive

Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Division Joginder Nagar as RW1 tendered Ex. RW1/A notification

dated 9th December, 2003, Ex. RW1/B copy of letter dated 2.1.2004 regarding creation of PWD

Division (B&R) Joginder Nagar in the year 2004, Ex. RW1/C mandays chart of petitioner, Ex.

RW1/D year-wise working days of daily wage Beldar and closed the evidence.

6. I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.

7. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 27.07.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether time to time termination of the services of the petitioner/giving breaks in

service to the petitioner by the respondent during December, 1999 to 31.8.2007 is/was

illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. . .OPP.

2. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. . .OPP.

3. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . . .OPR.

4. Whether the claim petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as alleged?

. . .OPR.

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5. Whether the petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of applicant as

alleged?

. . .OPR.

Relief.

8. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my

findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:

Issue No. 1 : Yes

Issue No. 2 : Discussed

Issue No. 3 : No

Issue No. 4 : No

Issue No. 5 : No

Relief

: Petition is allowed per operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1 AND 2

9. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

10. Factum of petitioner having been appointed as daily waged beldar on muster roll by the

respondent w.e.f. January, 2001 is not in dispute. It is the admitted case of petitioner that petitioner

had worked since January, 2001 but she had been deliberately given fictional breaks by respondent

so that petitioner did not complete 240 days to get benefits of Section 25-B of the Act. The plea of

respondent, on the other hand remains that petitioner was still working but had been working

intermittently as she of her own used to not come on her duty besides she willfully absented several

times from her duty. To appreciate the genuineness of the plea so raised by respondent, suffice

would be to state here that bald assertion of the respondent that petitioner willfully absented from

her duties is devoid of merit as there is nothing corresponding in evidence to show that any letter or

intimation was sent to petitioner for her unauthorized absence from her duties. Rather, it is

projected to be case as if petitioner came of her own for work and left the work of her own sweet

will. The plea of petitioner, on the other hand remains that fictional breaks were given to her and

that several persons junior to her namely Smt. Guddi Devi, Sh. Prithi Chand, Sh. Ravinder Kumar,

Sh. Dalip Singh, Sh. Gautam Ram, Sh. Bhawani Singh and Sh. Ram Dhan have been regularized by

respondent and these persons were actually not given fictional breaks at any point of time.

11. A bare glance on mandays chart Ex. RW1/C would reveal that in the year 2001

petitioner had worked for 147 days, 168 days in the year 2002, 167 days in the year 2003, 169 days

in the year 2004, 170 days in the year 2005, 167 days in the year 2006, 232 days in the year 2007,

362 days in the year 2008, 361 days in the year 2009, 361 days in the year 2010, 337 days in the

year 2011, 352 days in the year 2012, 363 days in the year 2013 330 days in the year 2014 and 90

days in the year 2015. It can be noticed that till 2007 petitioner has worked for less than 240 days

whereas for other remaining years she had worked for more than 240 days. It may be pertinent to

state here that vide letter dated 14.9.2007 direction has been given by government to provide

muster roll to all labourers who have been engaged for 15/20 days or 30 days be provided muster

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roll for full month in certain situation but this instruction appears to be have been completely

ignored by respondent department as claimant petitioner was engaged in 2001 much prior to year

2007 and had not completed 10 years who was to be issued muster roll for full month in relaxation

of policy as special case. Thus, break in service being within a period of seven years from her

termination was definitely a fictional break as in remaining years she had worked for more than 240

days. The act of the respondent in giving fictional break is manifestly arbitrary without any basis.

Seniority list of regular labourers HPPWD (B&R) Division has also been relied upon by respondent

which is Ex. RW1/D on record in which all the persons named above are shown to have joined in

the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 except at serial nos. 3,6,7 & 10 who had joined earlier to petitioner

as workman at serial nos. 1,2,4,5,8 and 9 joined in the year 2002, 2003 and 2004 respectively

whereas petitioner had joined in January, 2001. Since respondent had not disputed to have engaged

petitioner in February, 2001, she ought to have been regularized having continuously worked for

about 7 years with requisite number of days required for regularization and there being no fictional

break as stated above, which would show that other persons who had joined along-with her have

been regularized but the petitioner has been deprived of her legitimate right for regularization till

now. Although respondent department ipso facto does not dislodge petitioner from claiming her

seniority and continuity in service from her initial engagement and thus fictional breaks in no

manner would affect or eclipse her legitimate right of regularization in service.

12. Stepping into the witness box as PW1, petitioner has sworn detailed affidavit under

Order 18 Rule 4 CPC stipulating therein that she had been engaged and disengaged between 2001

to 2007 by giving fictional break whereas the persons junior to her have been continuously engaged

by department for the whole year who had completed more than 240 days in a calendar year. In

cross-examination, she has admitted that she has been provided work more than 240 days of work

after September, 2007 which means the dispute is only for the years 2001 to 2007 as stated in the

affidavit. RW1 Shri V.S. Guleira has admitted in cross-examination that seniority list Ex. RW1/D

of all the labourers shown in the said seniority list were employed after the engagement of the

petitioner. He has admitted that working of 240 days is to be established by petitioner to claim

benefit of deemed service under Section 25-B of the Act. He has admitted that petitioner has been

engaged in the year 2001 who had not been issued any appointment letter. He has denied that

petitioner had been deliberately given breaks in the years from 2001 to 2007 but he could not prove

as no corresponding record has been produced by the respondent to establish that on absence of

petitioner from her duty any notice was issued for unauthorized absence and the version of RW1

that she came and go of her own from duty cannot be accepted which manifestly appear to be

afterthought. Moreover, RW1 has admitted that as per record no notice was given to petitioner for

her absence from duty at any point of time. As such, the plea of fictional break given to the

petitioner from the year 2001 to 2007 get substantiated not only from documentary evidence on

record but from testimony on oath of RW1 as well.

13. Although, petitioner being in employment at the time of passing of having fictional

breaks as stated above is duly established yet she cannot be deprived of her legitimate right to seek

seniority as well as continuity in service form her date of joining along-with other persons working

with her besides petitioner could not have been discriminated arbitrarily between similarly situated

workmen. No reason whatsoever has been assigned by respondent for not giving any fictional

breaks to others which further shows that plea of non availability of work or the funds as the case

may be was not correct stand of respondent made with the object to defeat the claim of petitioner.

In view of aforesaid discussion, it is held that time to time termination of the services of the

petitioner and giving fictional breaks in service by the respondent from 2001 to 2007 was certainly

illegal and unjustified in contravention of provisions of Section 25-F, 25-G & 25-H of the Act but

as the petitioner is still in employment with the respondent, she is to be given benefit of seniority

and continuity in service except back wages particularly when she has admitted to have remained

gainfully employed while working as an agriculturist. Issue in question is thus as stated above

decided in part in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

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ISSUE NO.3

14. On the plea non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial

Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has contended that present claim

petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had abandoned the job of her own and did not join her

duty despite issuance of muster roll for the relevant period. From the pleadings of the parties and

evidence on record as discussed in foregoing paras, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised instead the same is held to be maintainable. As such, the issue in hand

is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

ISSUE NO.5

15. In the light of my findings on the issues no.1 and 2 in foregoing para, it is held that the

Executive Engineer, HPPWD, National Highway Division, Joginder Nagar is not a necessary party

to be impleaded in this case. Claim petition as petitioner was initially appointed with respndoent

only PW1 has admitted in cross examination that she was working with respondent although she

earlier worked with Executive Engineer HPPWD National Highways. Thus, creation of separate

HPWPD division vide office order Ex. RW1/D shall have no serious consequence on merits of

case. Issue in hand is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against respondent.

ISSUE NO.4

16. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the

Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered

by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon’ble High

Court in Bhatag Ram’s case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs.

Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not

come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the

provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon

the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and

applied. In Deepa Ram vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there

was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was

a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager vs. Mohinder Kumar,

there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425,

it has been held by the Hon’ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim

on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government and the

Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government and same

is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The

Hon’ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 752, has

categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of Section

33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to put the restriction of

limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the provision and in absence of

any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to introduce the limitation on the

ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding

under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of

fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference

to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.

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17. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was

inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any

prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot

be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is

decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.

RELIEF

18. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, it is held that the petitioner was in

continuous uninterrupted service with the respondent from the date of her initial engagement and

that the breaks given by the respondent being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the

seniority and continuity of service of the petitioner and her seniority shall be reckoned from her

initial date of engagement. Accordingly, claim of petition is hereby allowed and reference is

accordingly answered in favour of petitioner. The petitioner shall thus be deemed to be in

continuous service of respondent with all consequential benefits except back wages. She shall,

however, be considered for regularization by respondent at the time when her juniors have been

regularized as per policy governing daily wagers as framed by State Govt. and operative from time

to time. The parties, however, shall bear their own costs.

19. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

20. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

21. File after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 23rd day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 56/2014

Date of Institution

: 22.2.2014

Date of decision

: 23.04.2016

Shri Hem Singh s/o Shri Bhopat Ram, r/o Village Kudnu, P.O. Drahal, Tehsil Joginder

Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

…Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, B&R Division, H.P.P.W.D. Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.

….Respondent.

Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

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For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

1. The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Hem Singh S/O Shri Bhopat Ram,

R/O Village Kudnu, P.O. Drahal, Tehsil Joginder, District Mandi, H.P. during 6-1997 to

2007 by the Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi,

H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal

and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that the services of petitioner were

engaged by the B&R Department as a daily wager on muster roll basis w.e.f. June, 1997 who

worked under the Assistant Engineer, HPPWD Sub Division, Joginder Nagar but no appointment

order/letter was issued in his name by the respondent. Averments made in claim petition further

stipulates that respondent used to engage petitioner only for 15 to 20 days in a month instead of

issuing muster roll for full month however fictional breaks for 10-15 days in each month continued

to be given by the respondent till 30.09.2007. Thereafter, as per the instructions issued by the

Principal Secretary (PW) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh per letter dated 14.9.2007, his

services were continuously engaged by the respondent in which muster roll was issued for full

month. It is alleged that the respondent had given petitioner artificial breaks from year 1997 to

30.09.2007. Not only this, the persons who were working with petitioner or joined the service after

him were not given any break by the respondent arbitrarily. At the time while giving

artificial/fictional breaks, the principle of ‘Last come First go’ was also not followed by the

respondent and the persons junior to petitioner namely Shri Rajinder Singh and Sh. Sumer Singh

and others worked with the respondent/department without any break and that the period of

artificial breaks is required to be counted as continuous service for the purpose of the regularization

of petitioner’s services. It is alleged that the persons junior to petitioner have been regularized by

the respondent earlier to him contrary to the policy of the State for regularization. A similar case

titled as Suresh Kumar vs. The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Baijnath bearing reference

No.23/2010 has already been decided in favour of the workman by this Court per Award dated

28.11.2011 and thus petitioner having completed eight years of continuous service on 31.12.2005

and 10 years of continuous service on 31.12.2007 was liable to be regularized as work charged

beldar as per the policy framed/approved in Mool Raj Upadhaya’s case. It is also contended that

petitioner is still working with the respondent/department besides alleged that the act and conduct

of the respondent falls within the ambit of unfair labour practice and also violated provisions of

Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947, ‘the Act’ for short).

4. The respondent contested petition, filed separate reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections qua non-maintainability as no legal or fundamental right of the petitioner has been

infringed, the petition being hit by the vice of delay and laches and bad for not impleading the State

of Himachal Pradesh and the Executive Engineer, National Highway Division, HPPWD, Joginder

Nagar as parties to the petition. On merits, engagement of the services of the petitioner from

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September, 1997 is admitted. However, it has been pleaded that the petitioner was employed by the

Executive Engineer, National Highway Division, HPPWD, Joginder Nagar and that respondent’s

office was created in the month of January, 2004 vide notification dated 9th December, 2003. The

office is stated to have started functioning w.e.f. 2nd January, 2004 and after the creation of his

(respondent’s) office, the petitioner and some other workmen were transferred to the newly created

Division from the National Highway Division, Joginder Nagar. The claim of the petitioner prior to

01.1.2004 pertains to the office of the Executive Engineer, National Highway Division, Joginder

Nagar, who is alleged to be not a party to the case. It has been emphatically denied that fictional

breaks had been given to the petitioner at any point of time instead the services of the petitioner

were engaged as per the availability of the work and funds. As and when the services of the

petitioner were engaged in accordance with his verbal requests from time to time, he was duly

made aware regarding the availability of the work besides maintained that no continuous work for

the entire month was provided to the petitioner who used to abandon the job invariably and report

for duty intermittently per his convenience. The workmen whose names have been disclosed by the

petitioner, worked in continuity and that their services have been regularized as per the seniority

and policy of the State. The policy framed in Mool Raj Upadhaya’s case is stated to be not

applicable to the present case as in that case, one time benefit was given to the employees who had

either completed 10 years of continuous service with 240 days in each calendar year as on

31.12.1993 or the employees who had rendered one or more year of service but had not completed

10 years of service up-to 31.12.1993. It is further asserted that the services of the petitioner would

be regularized as per the policy of the State besides denied to have indulged in any unfair labour

practice and maintained that no provision of the Act has been violated. Accordingly, cause of

action as pleaded in the claim petition filed by petitioner is denied and the petition is sought to be

dismissed.

5. No rejoinder has been filed by petitioner.

6. To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B copy of letter dated 14th September,

2007 of Pr. Secretary (PW) to The Engineer-in-Chief and others regarding providing of muster roll

for complete month to the workers in PWD without break instead of 15/18/20 or 30 days with

intermittent breaks and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by

petitioner, respondent had examined Shri V.S. Guleria, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

(B&R) Division as RW1 tendered/proved Ex. RW1/A copy of notification dated 9.12.2003, Ex.

RW1/B copy of letter dated 2.1.2004 regarding creation of PWD Division (B&R) Joginder Nagar

in the year 2004, Ex. RW1/C mandays chart of petitioner, Ex. RW1/D year-wise working days of

daily wage Beldar and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 04.7.2015 _________for

determination:

1. Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during

years June, 1997 to 2007 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. . .OPP.

2. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

.

3. Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

…OPR.

4. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of the necessary parties as alleged? …OPR.

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5. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

claimant as alleged?

…OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my

findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Issue No.5 : No

Relief : Petition is allowed per operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1 AND 2

10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Factum of petitioner having been appointed as daily waged beldar on muster roll by the

respondent w.e.f. September, 1997 is not in dispute. It is the admitted case of petitioner that he had

worked since September, 1997 had been deliberately given fictional breaks by respondent so that

petitioner did not complete 240 days to get benefit of continuous service envisaged under Section

25-B of the Act. The plea of respondent, on the other hand remains that petitioner was still working

but had been working intermittently as he of his own, used to not come on his duty besides he

willfully absented several times from his duty. To appreciate the genuineness of the plea so raised

by respondent, suffice would be to state here that bald assertion of the respondent that petitioner

willfully absented from his duties is devoid of merit as there is nothing corresponding in evidence

to show that any letter or intimation was sent to petitioner for his unauthorized absence from his

duties. Rather, it is projected to be case as if petitioner came of his own for work and left the work

of his own sweet will. The plea of petitioner, on the other hand remains that fictional breaks were

given to him and that several persons junior to him namely Smt. Guddi Devi, Sh. Prithi Chand, Sh.

Ravinder Kumar, Sh. Dalip Singh, Sh. Gautam Ram, Sh. Bhawani Singh and Sh. Ram Dhan have

been regularized by respondent and these persons were actually not given fictional breaks at any

point of time whereas the petitioner had been given fictional breaks as has come in the evidence.

12. A bare glance on mandays chart Ex. RW1/C would reveal that in the year 1997

petitioner had worked for 75 days, 155 days in 1998, 158 days in 1999, 184 days in 2000, 178 days

in 2001, 164 days in 2002, 164 days in 2003, 149 days in 2004, 159 days in 2005, 161 days in

2006, 221 days in 2007, 340 days in 2008, 343 days in 2009, 351 days in 2010, 318 days in 2011,

300 days in 2012, 286 days in 2013 and 291 days in 2014. It can be noticed that till 2007 petitioner

has worked for less than 240 days whereas for other remaining years he had worked for more than

240 days. It may be pertinent to state here that vide letter dated 14.9.2007 Ex. PW1/B direction has

been given by government to provide muster roll to all labourers who have been engaged for 15/20

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days or 30 days be provided muster roll for full month in certain situation but this instruction

appears to have been completely ignored by respondent department as claimant petitioner was

engaged in 1997 much prior to year 2007 and had not completed 10 years who was to be issued

muster roll for full month in relaxation of policy as special case. Thus, break in service being

within a period of nine years from his termination was definitely a fictional break as in remaining

years he had worked for more than 240 days. The act of the respondent in giving fictional break is

manifestly arbitrary without any basis.

13. Seniority list of regular labourers HPPWD (B&R) Division has also been relied upon

by respondent which is Ex. RW1/D on record in which all the persons named above are shown to

have joined in the years 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 who had joined after petitioner as

whereas petitioner had joined in September, 1997. Since respondent had not disputed to have

engaged petitioner in September, 1997, he ought to have been regularized having continuously

worked for about 11 years with requisite number of days required for regularization and if there

being no fictional break as stated above, petitioner ought to have been regularized as other persons

who had joined along-with him and thus petitioner has been deprived of his legitimate right for

regularization till now. Although respondent department ipso facto does not dislodge petitioner

from claiming his seniority and continuity in service from his initial engagement and thus fictional

breaks in no manner would affect or eclipse him legitimate right of regularization in service.

14. Stepping into the witness box as PW1, petitioner has sworn detailed affidavit under

Order 18 Rule 4 CPC stipulating therein that he had been engaged and disengaged between 1997 to

2007 by giving fictional break whereas the persons junior to him have been continuously engaged

by department for the whole year who had completed more than 240 days in a calendar year. In

cross-examination, he has admitted that he has been provided work more than 240 days of work

after September, 2007 which means the dispute is only for the years 1997 to 2007 as stated in the

affidavit. RW1 Shri V.S. Guleria has admitted in cross-examination that seniority list Ex. RW1/D

of all the labourers shown in the said seniority list were employed after the engagement of the

petitioner. He has admitted that working of 240 days is to be established by petitioner to claim

benefit of deemed service under Section 25-B of the Act. He has admitted that petitioner has been

engaged in the year 997 who had not been issued any appointment letter. He has denied that

petitioner had been deliberately given breaks in the years from 1997 to 2007 but he could not prove

as no corresponding record has been produced by the respondent to establish that on absence of

petitioner from his duty any notice was issued for unauthorized absence and the version of RW1

that petitioner abandoned the job and absented from duty cannot be accepted which manifestly

appear to be afterthought. It is settled law that abandonment has to be proved like any other fact.

RW1 has admitted that as per record no notice was given to petitioner for his absence from duty at

any point of time or that any departmental proceedings were initiated. Thus, bald plea of

respondent that petitioner had abandoned the job intermittently cannot be accepted. As such, the

plea of fictional break given to the petitioner from the year 1997 to 2007 gets substantiated not only

from documentary evidence on record but from testimony on oath of RW1 as well.

15. Although petitioner being in employment at the time of giving fictional breaks as

stated above is duly established yet he cannot be deprived of his legitimate right to seek seniority as

well as continuity in service form his date of joining alongwith other persons working with him

besides petitioner could not have been discriminated arbitrarily between similarly situated

workmen. It would be pertinent to mention here that as per seniority list Ex.RW1/D persons figured

at serial nos. 3 and 4 have been regularized but they were not given any fictional break in 2000 to

2003 which further establishes arbitrary manner of working of respondent in the matter of giving

fictional break. No reason whatsoever has been assigned by respondent for not giving any fictional

breaks to others which further shows that plea of non availability of work or the funds as the case

may be was not correct stand of respondent made with the object to defeat the claim of petitioner.

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In so far as remaining ‘gainfully employed’ during fictional break period of petitioner is concerned,

suffice would be to state here that petitioner himself admitted on oath to have remained engaged in

agricultural work during break period and thus he would not be entitled for back wages for this

period. In view of aforesaid discussion, it is held that time to time termination of the services of the

petitioner and giving fictional breaks in service by the respondent from 1997 to 2007 was certainly

illegal and unjustified and in contravention of provisions of Section 25-F, 25-G & 25-H of the Act

but as the petitioner is still in employment with the respondent, he is to be given benefit of seniority

and continuity in service except back wages. Issue in question is thus as stated above decided in

part in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

ISSUE NO. 3

16. On the plea non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial

Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has contended that present claim

petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had abandoned job of his own and did not join his duty

despite issuance of muster roll for the relevant period. From the pleadings of the parties and

evidence on record as discussed in foregoing paras, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised instead the same is held to be maintainable. As such, the issue in hand

is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

ISSUE NO. 4

17. In the light of my findings on the issues no.1 and 2 in foregoing para, it is held that the

Executive Engineer, HPPWD, National Highway Division, Joginder Nagar is not a necessary party

to be impleaded in this case. As per claim petition, as petitioner was initially appointed with

respondent PW1 has admitted in cross examination that petitioner was working with respondent

although he earlier worked with Executive Engineer HPPWD National Highways. Thus, creation of

separate HPWPD division vide office order Ex. RW1/D shall have no serious consequence on

merits of case as seniority list qua workmen under the division remains the same. Issue in hand is

answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against respondent.

ISSUE NO. 5

18. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the

Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered

by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon’ble High

Court in Bhatag Ram’s case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs.

Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not

come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the

provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon

the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and

applied. In Deepa Ram vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there

was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was

a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager vs. Mohinder Kumar,

there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425,

it has been held by the Hon’ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim

on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government and the

Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government and same

is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The

Hon’ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 752, has

categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of Section

33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to put the restriction of

limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the provision and in absence of

any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to introduce the limitation on the

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ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding

under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of

fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to

the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.

19. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was

inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any

prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot

be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is

answered in negative in favour of petitioner against the respondent.

RELIEF

20. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, it is held that the petitioner was in

continuous uninterrupted service with the respondent from the date of his initial engagement and

that the breaks given by the respondent being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the

seniority and continuity of service of the petitioner and his seniority shall be reckoned from his

initial date of engagement. Accordingly, claim of petitioner is hereby allowed in part and reference

is accordingly answered in favour of petitioner. The petitioner shall thus be deemed to be in

continuous service of respondent with all consequential benefits except back wages. He shall,

however, be considered for regularization by respondent at the time when his juniors have been

regularized as per policy governing daily wagers as framed by State Govt. and operative from time

to time. The parties, however, shall bear their own costs.

21. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

22. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

23. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 23rd day of April, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 373/2015

Date of Institution : 18.08.2015

Date of Decision

: 23.04.2016

Smt. Godda Devi w/o Shri Braham Dass, r/o Village and Post Office Kot, Tehsil Sarkaghat,

District Mandi, H.P.

….Petitioner.

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Versus

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi,

H.P. .

...Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Godda Devi W/O Shri Braham

Dass, R/O Village and Post Office Kot, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi,

H.P. vide demand notice dated 11.4.2009 regarding her alleged illegal termination of

service during December, 2001 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination

of the services of Smt. Godda Devi W/O Shri Braham Dass, R/O Village and Post Office

Kot, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D.

Division, Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. during December, 2001

without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and

justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that she had been engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis w.e.f. 4th July,

1998 who continuously worked till December, 2001 and she had completed 240 days of work in

each calendar year and petitioner has duly covered under the definition of continuous service as

defined under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’

for brevity). Averments made in the petition further revealed that the services of petitioner had been

terminated by the respondent oral order in the month of December, 2001without prior issuance of

one month notice and retrenchment compensation under Section 25-F of the Act. It is averred that

at the time of termination of the services of petitioner respondent had not followed the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act as such no notice was served upon her neither one month notice in lieu of

notice period had been paid to her nor the retrenchment compensation has been paid to her by the

respondent therefore her termination from service without complying the same is null, void and ab-

initio. It is stated that respondent/department had been terminated the service of more than 2000

daily waged workmen engaged by the respondent in Dharampur Division from time to time without

following any procedure. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had not

followed the principle of ‘Last come First go’ and retained some juniors workmen namely S/Sh.

Prabhu Ram who was appointed on 1.8.1998, Shashi Pal on 6.4.1999, Roshani Devi on 4.7.1999,

Mamta Devi on 6.4.2000 and Inder Singh on 1.1.2000 and the respondent had violated the

provisions envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further averred that

respondent/department had engaged new/fresh hands namely S/Sh. Ajay Kumar who was appointed

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on 1.12.2003, Pardeep Kumar on 23.11.2007, Lekh Raj on 11/2004 and Smt. Satya Devi on

27.1.2011 respectively but respondent had not given an opportunity for reemployment to petitioner

as such same had been violated the principle of Section 25-H of the Act. After the termination of

petitioner’s services and the other workmen numbering 1697, in the months of June and July, 2004,

some of the workmen have been re-engaged by the respondent. she was not given an opportunity of

re-employment. In the month of December, 2004, she approached the respondent to provide her the

work on the basis of her seniority but the respondent expressed to petitioner orally that they are not

in a position to provide her the job being surplus. The respondent/department further told petitioner

that the retrenchment process of the other workmen who are surplus is still continuing because of

which her services cannot be re-engaged. Approximately 500 workmen have been reinstated by the

respondent and paid 50% back wages with all consequential service benefits including the seniority

as per the order passed by this Court. The retrenchment order dated 08.7.2005 has been quashed by

this Court/Tribunal. The persons who have been reinstated in service and paid 50% back wages are

S/Sh. Vijay Kumar, Megh Singh and Sanjay Kumar etc. All of them are/were junior to petitioner.

The act and conduct of the respondent is highly unjustified, arbitrary and unconstitutional. It is also

in contravention of the provisions contained under Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The

petitioner is unemployed from the date of her illegal termination. As such, as is evident from the

prayer clause of the petition/statement of claim, the petitioner has claimed for setting aside illegal

termination order passed by the respondent dated May, 2001 and directed to respondent to reinstate

the services of applicant with full back wages, seniority, in continuity of service with all

consequential service benefits. The petitioner further prayed that respondent be directed to

regularize the services of petitioner on the basis of policy framed by the State Government and on

the basis of her seniority fall in the cadre post besides pay the Rs.15000/- as litigation cost as well

as counsel fee and if any other relief deemed fit may kindly be granted in the favour of petitioner in

the interest of justice.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, delay and laches. On merits denied that the services of petitioner

were engaged as daily waged beldar on July, 1998 and she worked upto December, 2001

intermittently. It is alleged that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will who had not

completed 240 days of work in each calendar year. It is stated that if the petitioner had abandoned

the work of her own convenience in the month of May, 2000 there was no violation of any

provisions of the Act. It is stated that during the years 2005, 1087 workers had been retrenched but

the services of petitioner were not terminated because she had already abandoned the job of her

own sweet will in the month of May, 2000. It is further stated that petitioner had raised demand

notice in the year 2009 i.e. after about 5 years from her termination and never approached the

respondent/department after her retrenchment. It is also contended that since the services of

petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in

lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing

any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and

gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6. In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her

affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Naresh Kumar

Gupta, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur as RW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit Ex. RW1/A and mandays chart Ex. RW1/B and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative/counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

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8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.11.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

11.04.2009 qua her termination of service during December, 2001 by respondent suffers from the

vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. December,

2001 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

3. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to? OPP

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

…OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.35,000/- per operative part

of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1998 who continuously worked till 2001 at HPPWD Division

Dharampur is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work

intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 240 days in Dharampur Division Mandi

District and remained engaged from 1998 to 2001. she has also stated on oath that no notice under

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Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her service and at the same

time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus her termination was

illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all

the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating her services in December, 2001 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. He admitted that petitioner had not given any representation to the

respondent/department w.e.f. 2001 to 2009. He denied that she had left the work of her own sweet

will after December, 2001. He further denied that no juniors had been kept by the respondent. He

admitted that demand notice was given by petitioner in the year 2009. He admitted that petitioner

worked on privately for her livelihood.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after December, 2001.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-

examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather she has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to her by

the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 240 days of

work as required and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any

specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 115 days in the year 1998. 328 days in 1999, 289.5 days in 2000 and 220 days in 2001

and thus a total of her service in 1998 to 2001 petitioner had worked for 952.5 days in her entire

service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 240 days and as there is

no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to

confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2000 the petitioner had merely worked for 220 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not

rendered service of 240 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one

year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been

retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of ‘Last come

First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being

senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PA is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

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workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 2001. Some of these co-

workers shown in Ex. PA the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD

Dharampur were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those

years more than 240 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the

whole month. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after December, 2001 even at the time when junior

persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of

Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in the affidavit were retained whereas

petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was terminated and even

thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which

also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5)

SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-

H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in

case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. These

judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated

the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. As

such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 240 days in preceding 01

year which entitled her for regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is

not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in December, 2001, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivatable land with her and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning

from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

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be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the

remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material

evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not

think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants

for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by

this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on

hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial

dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that she would

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be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from her employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the

demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2001 and the industrial

dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld.

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counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007

LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held

that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief

however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional

Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of

more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that principle of

Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial

Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR

125], the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22] Limitation Act, 1963.

Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination of service- Industrial

dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under

the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances

which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

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compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 4

years and actually worked for 952.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in December, 2001 who worked as non skilled

worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about 8 years

i.e. demand notice was given on 11.4.2009. It is also pertinent to mention here that

petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 42 years who has sufficient spell of

life to work and earn her livelihood.

21. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. titled as The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Dharampur Division vs.

Shri Dhani Ram & Ors. reported in Latest HLJ 2010 (HP) 972. I have gone through this

judgment which merely speaks about compensation and not reinstatement. Taking into

consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court

petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but compensation

a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The

judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay

and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely

declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as

in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the

Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s

case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice

Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare

& another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.35,000/- (Rupees

thirty five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.35,000/- (Rupees thirty five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

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24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 23rd day of April, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 423/2015

Date of Institution : 10.09.2015

Date of Decision

: 23.04.2016

Shri Satish Kumar s/o Shri Lachhman Singh, r/o Village Thana, P.O. Baroti, Tehsil

Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

….Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P. ....Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Satish Kumar S/O Shri Lachhman

Singh, R/O Village Thana, P.O. Baroti, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P. vide demand

notice dated 23.03.2013 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during May,

2000 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri

Satish Kumar S/O Shri Lachhman Singh, R/O Village Thana, P.O. Baroti, Tehsil Sarkaghat,

District Mandi, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Dharampur, District

Mandi, H.P. during May, 2000 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service

benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above

employer?”

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2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis w.e.f. 8th July,

1998 who continuously worked till May, 2000 and he had completed 240 days of work in each

calendar year and petitioner has duly covered under the definition of continuous service as defined

under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for

brevity). Averments made in the petition further revealed that the services of petitioner had been

terminated by the respondent oral order in the month of May, 2000 without prior issuance of one

month notice and retrenchment compensation under Section 25-F of the Act. It is averred that at the

time of termination of the services of petitioner respondent had not followed the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act as such no notice was served upon him neither one month notice in lieu of

notice period had been paid to him nor the retrenchment compensation has been paid to him by the

respondent therefore his termination from service without complying the same is null, void and ab-

initio. It is stated that respondent/department had been terminated the service of more than 2000

daily waged workmen engaged by the respondent in Dharampur Division from time to time without

following any procedure. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had not

followed the principle of ‘Last come First go’ and retained some juniors workmen namely S/Sh.

Prabhu Ram who was appointed on 1.8.1998, Shashi Pal on 6.4.1999, Roshani Devi on 4.7.1999,

Mamta Devi on 6.4.2000 and Inder Singh on 1.1.2000 and the respondent had violated the

provisions envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further averred that

respondent/department had engaged new/fresh hands namely S/Sh. Ajay Kumar who was appointed

on 1.12.2003, Pardeep Kumar on 23.11.2007, Lekh Raj on 11/2004 and Smt. Satya Devi on

27.1.2011 respectively but respondent had not given an opportunity for reemployment to petitioner

as such same had been violated the principle of Section 25-H of the Act. After the termination of

petitioner’s services and the other workmen numbering 1697, in the months of June and July, 2004,

some of the workmen have been re-engaged by the respondent. He was not given an opportunity of

re-employment. In the month of December, 2004, he approached the respondent to provide him the

work on the basis of his seniority but the respondent expressed to petitioner orally that they are not

in a position to provide him the job being surplus. The respondent/department further told

petitionerthat the retrenchment process of the other workmen who are surplus is still continuing

because of which his services cannot be re-engaged. Approximately 500 workmen have been

reinstated by the respondent and paid 50% back wages with all consequential service benefits

including the seniority as per the order passed by this Court. The retrenchment order dated

08.7.2005 has been quashed by this Court/Tribunal. The persons who have been reinstated in

service and paid 50% back wages are S/Sh. Vijay Kumar, Megh Singh and Sanjay Kumar etc. All

of them are/were junior to petitioner. The act and conduct of the respondent is highly unjustified,

arbitrary and unconstitutional. It is also in contravention of the provisions contained under Sections

25-G and 25-H of the Act. The petitioner is unemployed from the date of his illegal termination. As

such, as is evident from the prayer clause of the petition/statement of claim, the petitioner has

claimed for setting aside illegal termination order passed by the respondent dated May, 2001 and

directed to respondent to reinstate the services of applicant with full back wages, seniority, in

continuity of service with all consequential service benefits. The petitioner further prayed that

respondent be directed to regularize the services of petitioner on the basis of policy framed by the

State Government and on the basis of his seniority fall in the cadre post besides pay the Rs.15000/-

as litigation cost as well as counsel fee and if any other relief deemed fit may kindly be granted in

the favour of petitioner in the interest of justice.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, delay and laches. On merits denied that the services of petitioner

were engaged as daily waged beldar on November, 1999 and he worked upto May, 2000

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intermittently. It is alleged that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will who had not

completed 240 days of work in each calendar year. It is stated that if the petitioner had abandoned

the work of his own convenience in the month of May, 2000 there was no violation of any

provisions of the Act. It is stated that during the years 2005, 1087 workers had been retrenched but

the services of petitioner were not terminated because he had already abandoned the job of his own

sweet will in the month of May, 2000. It is further stated that petitioner had raised demand notice in

the year 2013 i.e. after about 13 years from his termination and never approached the

respondent/department after his retrenchment. It is also contended that since the services of

petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in

lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing

any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and

gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. 6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his affidavit

Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the

evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Naresh Kumar Gupta, the then

Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur as RW1 tendered/proved his affidavit Ex.

RW1/A and mandays chart Ex. RW1/B and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative/counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 09.12.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

23.03.2013 qua his termination of service during May, 2000 by respondent suffers

from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. May, 2000

is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

3. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

5. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

…OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1

:

Issue No.2

:

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.25,000/- per operative

part of award.

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REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1999 who continuously worked till 2000 at HPPWD Division

Dharampur is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 240 days in Dharampur Division Mandi

District and remained engaged from 1999 to 2000. He has also stated on oath that no notice under

Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same

time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was

illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all

the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in May,2000 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. He admitted that petitioner had not given any representation to the

respondent/department w.e.f. 2000 to March, 2013. He denied that he had left the work of his own

sweet will after May, 2000. He further denied that no juniors had been kept by the respondent. He

admitted that demand notice was given by petitioner in the year 2013. He admitted that petitioner

worked on privately for his livelihood.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after May, 2000. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

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in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 240 days of work as required

and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and

reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea

of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 55 days in the year 1999 and 129 days in 2000 and thus a total of his service in 1999 to

2000 in 01 year he had worked for 184 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner

had not worked for more than 240 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with

regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year

2000 the petitioner had merely worked for 129 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar

months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 240 days so as to

meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the

respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been

retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of ‘Last come

First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being

senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PA is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 2000. Some of these co-

workers shown in Ex. PA the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD

Dharampur were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those

years more than 240 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the

whole month. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after May, 2000 even at the time when junior persons

were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G

of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was

senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1999 was terminated and even thereafter

respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also

violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has

placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in

which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act,

there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of

provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. These

judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated

the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. As

such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 240 days in preceding 01

years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is

not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in May, 2000, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as

such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized Representative

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of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the

petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private

labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner

in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as

well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda

(2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice

Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here

that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was

not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he

cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from

agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed

and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the

relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that

petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act

although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment

of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully

employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being

terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

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10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot bedenied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

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and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2000 and the industrial

dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld.

counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007

LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held

that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief

however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional

Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of

more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that principle of

Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial

Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR

125], the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act-Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

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Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as

ld. Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about

01 years and actually worked for 184 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in May, 2000 who worked as non skilled worker and

had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about 12 years i.e. demand

notice was given on 23.3.2013. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on the date

of filing claim petition was ageing 42 years who has sufficient spell of life to work and earn

his livelihood.

21. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. titled as The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Dharampur Division vs.

Shri Dhani Ram & Ors. reported in Latest HLJ 2010 (HP) 972. I have gone through this

judgment which merely speaks about compensation and not reinstatement. Taking into

consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court

petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but compensation

a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The

judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay

and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely

declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as

in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the

Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s

case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice

Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare

& another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

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21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees

twenty five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 23rd day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_________

IN THE COURT OF K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 375/2015

Date of Institution : 18.08.2015

Date of Decision

: 23.04.2016

Shri Daulat Ram alias Surinder Kumar s/o Shri Devi Singh, r/o Village Langehar, P.O.

Guin, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

….Petitioner.

Versus

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Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi,

H.P.

....Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Daulat Ram alias Surinder Kumar

S/O Shri Devi Singh, R/O Village Langehar, P.O. Guin, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

before the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi,

H.P. vide demand notice dated 06.03.2013 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service

during August, 2001 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of

Shri Daulat Ram alias Surinder Kumar S/O Shri Devi Singh, R/O Village Langehar, P.O. Guin,

Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division,

Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. during August, 2001 without complying the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back

wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled

to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis w.e.f. 5th July,

1999 who continuously worked till December, 2001 and he had completed 240 days of work in

each calendar year and petitioner has duly covered under the definition of continuous service as

defined under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’

for brevity). Averments made in the petition further revealed that the services of petitioner had been

terminated by the respondent oral order in the month of August, 2001 without prior issuance of one

month notice and retrenchment compensation under Section 25-F of the Act. It is averred that at the

time of termination of the services of petitioner respondent had not followed the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act as such no notice was served upon him neither one month notice in lieu of

notice period had been paid to him nor the retrenchment compensation has been paid to him by the

respondent therefore his termination from service without complying the same is null, void and ab-

initio. It is stated that respondent/department had been terminated the service of more than 2000

daily waged workmen engaged by the respondent in Dharampur Division from time to time without

following any procedure. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had not

followed the principle of ‘Last come First go’ and retained some juniors workmen namely S/Sh.

Prabhu Ram who was appointed on 1.8.1998, Shashi Pal on 6.4.1999, Roshani Devi on 4.7.1999,

Mamta Devi on 6.4.2000 and Inder Singh on 1.1.2000 and the respondent had violated the

provisions envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further averred that

respondent/department had engaged new/fresh hands namely S/Sh. Ajay Kumar who was appointed

on 1.12.2003, Pardeep Kumar on 23.11.2007, Lekh Raj on 11/2004 and Smt. Satya Devi on

27.1.2011 respectively but respondent had not given an opportunity for reemployment to petitioner

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as such same had been violated the principle of Section 25-H of the Act. After the termination of

petitioner’s services and the other workmen numbering 1697, in the months of June and July, 2004,

some of the workmen have been re-engaged by the respondent. He was not given an opportunity of

re-employment. In the month of December, 2004, he approached the respondent to provide him the

work on the basis of his seniority but the respondent expressed to petitioner orally that they are not

in a position to provide him the job being surplus. The respondent/department further told

petitionerthat the retrenchment process of the other workmen who are surplus is still continuing

because of which his services cannot be re-engaged. Approximately 500 workmen have been

reinstated by the respondent and paid 50% back wages with all consequential service benefits

including the seniority as per the order passed by this Court. The retrenchment order dated

08.7.2005 has been quashed by this Court/Tribunal. The persons who have been reinstated in

service and paid 50% back wages are S/Sh. Vijay Kumar, Megh Singh and Sanjay Kumar etc. All

of them are/were junior to petitioner. The act and conduct of the respondent is highly unjustified,

arbitrary and unconstitutional. It is also in contravention of the provisions contained under Sections

25-G and 25-H of the Act. The petitioner is unemployed from the date of his illegal termination. As

such, as is evident from the prayer clause of the petition/statement of claim, the petitioner has

claimed for setting aside illegal termination order passed by the respondent dated May, 2001 and

directed to respondent to reinstate the services of applicant with full back wages, seniority, in

continuity of service with all consequential service benefits. The petitioner further prayed that

respondent be directed to regularize the services of petitioner on the basis of policy framed by the

State Government and on the basis of his seniority fall in the cadre post besides pay the Rs.15000/-

as litigation cost as well as counsel fee and if any other relief deemed fit may kindly be granted in

the favour of petitioner in the interest of justice.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, delay and laches. On merits denied that the services of petitioner

were engaged as daily waged beldar on July, 1999 and he worked upto August, 2003 intermittently.

It is alleged that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will who had not completed 240 days

of work in each calendar year. It is stated that if the petitioner had abandoned the work of his own

convenience in the month of August, 2000 there was no violation of any provisions of the Act. It is

stated that during the year 2005, 1087 workers had been retrenched but the services of petitioner

were not terminated because he had already abandoned the job of his own sweet will. It is further

stated that petitioner had raised demand notice in the year 2013 i.e. after about 13 years from his

termination and never approached the respondent/department after his retrenchment. It is also

contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question

of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended

that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Naresh Kumar

Gupta, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur as RW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit Ex. RW1/A and mandays chart Ex. RW1/B and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative/counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.11.2015 for

determination:

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1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

06.03.2013 qua his termination of service during August, 2001 by respondent suffers

from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. August, 2001

is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

3. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

6. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

…OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No. 1 : Yes

Issue No. 2 : Yes

Issue No. 3 : Discussed

Issue No. 4 : No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.25,000/- per operative

part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1999 who continuously worked till 2001 at HPPWD Division

Dharampur is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 240 days in Dharampur Division Mandi

District and remained engaged from 1999 to 2001. He has also stated on oath that no notice under

Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same

time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was

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illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all

the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2001 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. He admitted that petitioner had not given any representation to the

respondent/department w.e.f. 2001 to March, 2013. He denied that he had left the work of his own

sweet will after August, 2001. He further denied that no juniors had been kept by the respondent.

He admitted that demand notice was given by petitioner in the year 2013. He admitted that

petitioner worked on privately for his livelihood.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2001. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 240 days of work as required

and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and

reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea

of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 152.5 days in the year 1999, 287 days in 2000 and 124 days in 2001 and thus a total of

his service in 1999 to 2001 in 03 years he had worked for 563.5 days in his entire service period.

Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 240 days and as there is no reference

from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its

findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B that in the year 2001 the petitioner had merely worked for 124 days and thus immediately

in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered

service of 240 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and

thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F

of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of

the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been

retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of ‘Last come

First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being

senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PA is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 2000. Some of these co-

workers shown in Ex. PA the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD

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Dharampur were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those

years more than 240 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the

whole month. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2001 even at the time when junior persons

were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G

of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was

senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1999 was terminated and even thereafter

respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also

violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has

placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in

which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act,

there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of

provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. These

judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated

the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. As

such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 240 days in preceding 01

years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is

not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in August, 2001, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter

as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

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18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

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Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2001 and the industrial

dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld.

counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007

LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held

that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief

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however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional

Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of

more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that principle of

Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial

Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR

125], the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as

ld. Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

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compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about

01 years and actually worked for 563.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2001 who worked as non skilled worker

and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about 13 years i.e.

demand notice was given on 06.3.2013. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on

the date of filing claim petition was ageing 36 years who has sufficient spell of life to work

and earn his livelihood.

21. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. titled as The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Dharampur Division vs.

Shri Dhani Ram & Ors. reported in Latest HLJ 2010 (HP) 972. I have gone through this

judgment which merely speaks about compensation and not reinstatement. Taking into

consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court

petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but compensation

a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The

judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay

and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely

declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as

in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the

Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s

case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice

Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare

& another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees

twenty five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

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24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 23rd day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 374/2015

Date of Institution : 18.08.2015

Date of Decision

: 23.04.2016

Shri Hem Singh s/o Shri Tota, r/o Village Ban, P.O. Chimnu, Tehsil Joginder Nagar,

District Mandi, H.P.

….Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi,

H.P.

....Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Hem Singh S/O Shri Tota, R/O

Village Ban, P.O. Chimnu, Tehsil Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi,

H.P. vide demand notice dated 19.02.2013 regarding his alleged illegal termination of

service during year, 2001 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the

services of Shri Hem Singh S/O Shri Tota, R/O Village Ban, P.O. Chimnu, Tehsil Joginder

Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur,

Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. during year 2001 without complying the provisions

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of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back

wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is

entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis w.e.f. November,

1998 who continuously worked till 2001 and he had completed 240 days of work in each calendar

year and petitioner has duly covered under the definition of continuous service as defined under

Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity).

Averments made in the petition further revealed that the services of petitioner had been terminated

by the respondent oral order in the year 2001 without prior issuance of one month notice and

retrenchment compensation under Section 25-F of the Act. It is averred that at the time of

termination of the services of petitioner respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F

of the Act as such no notice wasserved upon him neither one month notice in lieu of notice period

had been paid to him nor the retrenchment compensation has been paid to him by the respondent

therefore his termination from service without complying the same is null, void and ab-initio. It is

stated that respondent/department had been terminated the service of more than 2000 daily waged

workmen engaged by the respondent in Dharampur Division from time to time without following

any procedure. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had not followed

the principle of ‘Last come First go’ and retained some juniors workmen namely S/Sh. Prabhu Ram

who was appointed on 1.8.1998, Shashi Pal on 6.4.1999, Roshani Devi on 4.7.1999, Mamta Devi

on 6.4.2000 and Inder Singh on 1.1.2000 and the respondent had violated the provisions envisaged

under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further averred that respondent/department had engaged

new/fresh hands namely S/Sh. Ajay Kumar who was appointed on 1.12.2003, Pardeep Kumar on

23.11.2007, Lekh Raj on 11/2004 and Smt. Satya Devi on 27.1.2011 respectively but respondent

had not given an opportunity for reemployment to petitioner as such same had been violated the

principle of Section 25-H of the Act. After the termination of petitioner’s services and the other

workmen numbering 1697, in the months of June and July, 2004, some of the workmen have been

re-engaged by the respondent. He was not given an opportunity of re-employment. In the month of

December, 2004, he approached the respondent to provide him the work on the basis of his

seniority but the respondent expressed to petitioner orally that they are not in a position to provide

him the job being surplus. The respondent/department further told petitioner that the retrenchment

process of the other workmen who are surplus is still continuing because of which his services

cannot be re-engaged. Approximately 500 workmen have been reinstated by the respondent and

paid 50% back wages with all consequential service benefits including the seniority as per the order

passed by this Court. The retrenchment order dated 08.7.2005 has been quashed by this

Court/Tribunal. The persons who have been reinstated in service and paid 50% back wages are

S/Sh. Vijay Kumar, Megh Singh and Sanjay Kumar etc. All of them are/were junior to petitioner.

The act and conduct of the respondent is highly unjustified, arbitrary and unconstitutional. It is also

in contravention of the provisions contained under Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The

petitioner is unemployed from the date of his illegal termination. As such, as is evident from the

prayer clause of the petition/statement of claim, the petitioner has claimed for setting aside illegal

termination order passed by the respondent dated May, 2001 and directed to respondent to reinstate

the services of applicant with full back wages, seniority, in continuity of service with all

consequential service benefits. The petitioner further prayed that respondent be directed to

regularize the services of petitioner on the basis of policy framed by the State Government and on

the basis of his seniority fall in the cadre post besides pay the Rs.15000/- as litigation cost as well

as counsel fee and if any other relief deemed fit may kindly be granted in the favour of petitioner in

the interest of justice.

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4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, delay and laches. On merits denied that the services of petitioner

were engaged as daily waged beldar on December, 1998 and he worked upto September, 1999

intermittently. It is alleged that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will who had not

completed 240 days of work in each calendar year. It is stated that if the petitioner had abandoned

the work of his own convenience in the month of October, 1999 there was no violation of any

provisions of the Act. It is stated that during the years 2005, 1087 workers had been retrenched but

the services of petitioner were not terminated because he had already abandoned the job of his own

sweet will in the month of October, 1999. It is further stated that petitioner had raised demand

notice in the year 2013 i.e. after about 13 years from his termination and never approached the

respondent/department after his retrenchment. It is also contended that since the services of

petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in

lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing

any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and

gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Naresh Kumar

Gupta, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur as RW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit Ex. RW1/A and mandays chart Ex. RW1/B and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative/counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.11.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

19.02.2013 qua his termination of service during year, 2001 by respondent suffers

from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during year

2001 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

3. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

…OPP.

7. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

…OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

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Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.25,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1998 who continuously worked till 1999 at HPPWD Division

Dharampur is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 240 days in Dharampur Division Mandi

District and remained engaged from 1998 to 1999. He has also stated on oath that no notice under

Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same

time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was

illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all

the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in year 2001 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. He admitted that petitioner had not given any representation to the

respondent/department w.e.f. 1999 to 2013. He denied that he had left the work of his own sweet

will after 2001. He further denied that no juniors had been kept by the respondent. He admitted that

demand notice was given by petitioner in the year 2013. He admitted that petitioner worked on

privately for his livelihood.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after 1999. No reason

whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not

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initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to

join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 240 days of work as required

and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and

reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea

of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 18 days in the year 1998 and 250 days in 1999 and thus a total of his service in 1998 to

1999, petitioner had worked for 268 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed there is no

reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to

confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. As per mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B, from August, 1998 to September, 1999 when services of petitioner had been terminated,

petitioner had worked for 240 days i.e. he had completed requisite number of days fro the

applicability of Section 25-B of Industrial Disputes Act and thus notice of retrenchment or

compensation in lieu thereof was to paid which has not so been done. As such, respondent is held to

have violated Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended withvehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been

retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of ‘Last come

First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being

senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PA is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 2000. Some of these co-

workers shown in Ex. PA the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD

Dharampur were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those

years more than 240 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the

whole month. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after 1999 even at the time when junior persons were

reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of

the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was

senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was terminated and even thereafter

respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also

violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has

placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in

which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act,

there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of

provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. These

judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated

the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. As

such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 240 days in preceding 01

years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is

not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

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17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in 1999, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized Representative of

petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner

who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus,

plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-

examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as

he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda

(2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice

Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here

that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was

not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he

cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from

agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed

and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the

relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that

petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act

although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment

of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully

employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being

terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

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industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. TelecoDistrict

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

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the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1999 and the industrial

dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld.

counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007

LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held

that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief

however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional

Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of

more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that principle of

Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial

Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR

125], the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act-Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

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Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as

ld. Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about

01 years and actually worked for 268 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged in 1999 who worked as non skilled worker and had

raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about 13 years i.e. demand

notice was given on 19.2.2013. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on the date

of filing claim petition was ageing 45 years who has sufficient spell of life to work and earn

his livelihood.

21. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. titled as The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Dharampur Division vs.

Shri Dhani Ram & Ors. reported in Latest HLJ 2010 (HP) 972. I have gone through this

judgment which merely speaks about compensation and not reinstatement. Taking into

consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court

petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but compensation

a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The

judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay

and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely

declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as

in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the

Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s

case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice

Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare

& another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

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21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees

twenty five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within three months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 23rd day of April, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 140/2011

Date of Institution

: 28.11.2011

Date of Decision

: 23.04.2016

Shri Rajesh Kumar s/o Shri Thakur Singh, r/o Village Khalanu, P.O. Panjalag, Tehsil

Ladbhrol, District Mandi, H.P.

….Petitioner.

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Versus

The Additional Superintending Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division Joginder Nagar,

District Mandi, H.P.

….Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Pradeep Dogra, Adv.

AWARD

The below given reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services/giving breaks in service of Sh. Rajesh Kumar S/O

Sh. Thakur Singh, Village-Khalanu, P.O. Panjalag, Tehsil Ladbhrol, Distt. Mandi (H.P.) by

The Additional Superintending Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division Joginder Nagar, Distt.

Mandi, H.P. from time to time, w.e.f. 21.9.1999 to 20.7.2000 and finally w.e.f. 21.7.2000,

without compliance of provisions contained in Section 25-F, G & H of the ibid Act, as

abandonments of services has not been established, is legal & justified, if not, what amount

of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above workman is

entitled to from the above employer?”

2. Vide Award dated 3rd August, 2013 in Reference no.140/2011, my ld. predecessor had

passed Award in favour of petitioner setting aside the retrenchment with direction to reinstate

petitioner forthwith along-with seniority and continuity in service from date of illegal termination

except back wages. In pursuance to the Award, the Assistant Superintending Engineer, HPSEB

Electrical Division, Joginder Nagar had preferred Civil Writ Petition No. 8987 of 2013 which was

decided by the Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh on 16th May, 2014 vide which the Award

so passed by this Tribunal was quashed with further directions for disposal of claim petition with

reference to certain latest judicial pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred to in

abovesaid order passed in CWP.

3. Vide order dated 16th May, 2014 passed in CWP no.8987/2013, Hon’ble High Court

had specifically observed that recently the Apex Court vide judgment dated 16.8.2013 in Civil

Appeal No.6795 of 2013 titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Borad, Sub Division Kota versus Mohan Lal, had granted compensation to the claimant/petitioner.

The Hon’ble Apex Court has further relied upon judgments reported in (1999) 6 SCC 82 titled as

Ajaib Singh vs. Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Limited and

another, Jagbir Singh vs. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board reported in (2009) 15 SCC

327, Balbir Singh vs. Punjab Roadways reported in (2001) 1 SCC 133 and Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Gitam Singh reported in (2013) 5 SCC 136.

4. In the aforesaid judgments the Hon’ble Apex Court has held in unambiguous terms

that Limitation Act, 1963 was not applicable to the reference made under the Industrial Disputes

Act but delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important circumstances which the

Labour Court must keep in view at the time of exercise of discretion irrespective of whether or not

such objection has been raised by the other side. The legal position laid down by this Court in

Gitam Singh’s case must be invariably followed before exercising its judicial discretion, the

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Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been

set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute.

Accordingly, the case was reregistered at its old number. It would be relevant to mention here that

in the order dated 16.5.2014 passed in CWP No.8987 of 2013 Hon’ble High Court of H.P. had

directed the parties to appear before this Tribunal on 23rd June, 2014 but on said date order was not

received in the Tribunal however, petitioner had moved an application under Section 151 on

26.7.2014 and case was heard along-with the order passed by the Hon’ble High Court. Requests

were made for extension of time for disposal of claim petition and the Hon’ble High Court vide

order dated 11.4.2016 had extended two weeks time i.e. on or before 25th April, 2016 for disposal

of petition.

5.

Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as

daily waged beldar on muster roll basis by the respondent w.e.f. 21.9.1999 who worked in

Electrical Sub Division, Lad Bharol till 20.7.2000 and that during period of engagement, no letter

of appointment or order was issued. The grievance of petitioner remains that during the period of

employment, respondent used to give fictional breaks so that petitioner did not complete 240 days

of continuous service envisaged under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. On 22.6.2000,

Assistant Engineer had dispensed with the service of by final termination vide written order no.373

dated 22.6.2000 w.e.f. 21.7.2000. It is alleged at that time Shri Gian Chand and Tara Chand were

junior to petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent and thus respondent failed to

abide by the principle of ‘Last come First go’. It is also alleged that after disengagement of the

services of petitioner, fresh hands had been employed by the respondent and the newly appointed

persons were Lekh Ram and Sanjay Kumar who were still employed and even at that time,

petitioner was not given offer of reemployment by respondent. It is alleged that the services of

Lekh Ram had been regularized in the regular pay scale however, while terminating the services of

petitioner on 22.6.2000, it was stipulated that petitioner’s services would be reengaged as per

availability of material on the basis of his seniority. However, petitioner continued to approach the

respondent time and again to seek reemployment but in all vein. The grievance of the petitioner

also remains that he come to know that in the year 2007 fresh hands have been engaged by the

respondent. Petitioner had raised demand notice on 22.9.2007 stipulating therein that during the

break period and after final termination, petitioner was not gainfully employed. Thus, the act of

respondent was stated to be illegal in violation of provisions of Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the

Industrial Disputes Act which was highly unjustified. Accordingly, petitioner has prayed for setting

aside retrenchment with prayer to condone the breaks period of petitioner in continuity in service

and also regularization.

6.

In pursuance to notice, respondent filed reply raising preliminary objections of locus

standi, cause of action, petition is being barred by delay and laches. It has been emphatically denied

that the petitioner had worked for 240 days in a calendar year and thus claim petition was not

maintainable. It is admitted on merits that petitioner had joined on 21.9.1999 and left the job on

20.7.2000 and thus petitioner is stated to have worked with the respondent only 135 days. It is

contended that employment of petitioner was purely on casual basis who had no locus standi to file

claim petition besides the Standing Orders of the HPSEB (Himachal Pradesh State Electricity

Board) are not in force and claim is bad on delay and laches on the part of petitioner. It is also

contended that petitioner was engaged for performing specific work on casual basis and that no

persons junior to him had been retained in service while terminating the services of petitioner. It

has been denied that petitioner had ever approached respondent for reengagement besides petitioner

is stated to have remained gainfully employed and thus petition was sought to be dismissed.

7. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition

and refuted allegations of respondent in reply.

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8.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B demand notice dated 22.9.2007,

copy of order Ex. PW1/C, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/D. The petitioner has also tendered in

evidence Ex. P1 to Ex. P8 and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by

the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Ranjeet Singh Thakur, Assistant Engineer, HPSEB,

Ladbharol as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B and closed the

evidence.

9. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. counsel for

respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

10. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed by my ld. Predecessor on

05.09.2012 for determination:

11. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-

1. Whether the termination of the services/giving breaks in service to the petitioner

by the respondent from time to time w.e.f. 21.9.1999 to 20.7.2000 is illegal and

unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

2. Whether the services of the petitioner have been wrongly and illegally terminated

by the respondent w.e.f. 21.7.2000 as alleged?

…OPP.

3. Whether the petitioner has locus standi to sue?

…OPP.

4. Whether the petitioner has a cause of action?

…OPP.

5. Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form?

…OPR.

6. Whether the petition is hit by the vice of delay and laches as alleged. If so, its

effect?

…OPR.

7. Relief.

12. I have heard the ld. counsel/AR for the parties and have gone through the case file.

13. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : No

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Issue No.5 : No

Issue No.6 : Discussed

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.75,000/- per operative

part of award.

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REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 6

14. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

15. Aggrieved with impugned Award, respondent had preferred CWP No.8987 of 2013

vide which Award was passed by this Tribunal was quashed with certain directions. Accordingly,

parties were heard at length on the controversy raised in pursuance to verdict referred to by the

Hon’ble Apex Court. The bone of contention in this case remains about the reinstatement of

petitioner with back wages, seniority and continuity in service or that the petitioner was entitled for

some other relief by moulding relief in view of circumstances for which mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been

set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute in finally giving relief to claimant/petitioner.

16. Before adverting to the merits of case, it would be relevant to mention here that

claimant/petitioner had worked only for 135 days with the respondent from 21.9.1999 to 20.7.2000.

Demand notice was raised on 22.9.2007 although petitioner had not worked for 240 days as was

required to be established so as to prove violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act,

yet he would certainly entitled protection envisaged under Section 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act if he succeeded establishing that persons junior to him were retained and regularized

or that while engaging new hands fresh notice had not been issued to the petitioner. Admittedly

petitioner was engaged as daily wager on 21.9.1999 who worked interruptedly upto 20.7.2000 as is

evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B. Cross-examination of petitioner reveals that he served

respondent in two spells and that petitioner was engaged for carrying out work of temporary nature

and same come to an end on completion of said works. Admittedly termination notice Ex. P1 and

Ex. P2 were served, therefore artificial breaks cannot be stated to have been given by respondent.

As such, plea of time to time termination merits rejection.

17. In so far as observations of my ld. predecessor in his Award dated 03.8.2013 with

regard to violation of Section 25-G and 25-H of Industrial Disputes Act. are concerned which is

proved on record that certain persons junior to petitioner were retained in service and few new

hands were also engaged. It is relevant to mention here that Gian Chand and Tara Chand who were

junior to petitioner had been retained whereas Lekh Ram and Sanjay Kumar were fresh hands

engaged by the respondent and that petitioner was not issued any notice for reemployment by

respondent. Thus, respondent had certainly terminated the services of petitioner illegally although

not for violation of Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act. Demand notice was sent after almost

about seven years for which there is no satisfactory explanation although respondent had not given

reply to the notice yet by not replying the notice petitioner does not succeed establishing explaining

delay in sending demand notice after about seven years which is essentially fatal to the case of the

petitioner. The reference has been received from Labour Commissioner on 14.11.2011 which

shows that after serving of notice in 2007 conciliation proceedings took place but failed and on the

basis of failure report the reference was made to this Tribunal. In any situation, delay from 2007 to

2011 is explained satisfactorily essence with matter was conciliation officer and thereafter before

the Labour Commissioner but prior to that 2000 to 2007 there is no reasonable or acceptable

explanation from the petitioner. It is also relevant to mention here that petitioner was engaged

without following needful procedure although availability of budget and funds and therefore in

view of judgment of Hon’ble Apex court titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473

petitioner could not seek reengagement. It has been contended that engagement of

claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio

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of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can negated and thus

compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. In pursuance

that Shri N.L. Kaundal, AR for petitioner had tendered Ex. P1 to Ex. P9 and closed evidence. On

the other hand respondent did not lead any evidence as statement of counsel to this fact recorded

separately.

18. With the aid of Award dated 7.1.2012 Ex. P2 and Award dated 29.11.2011 Ex. P6,

petitioner had made futile attempt to establish that he was liable to be reinstated as was done in

other judgment referred to above but certainly the stand so taken by petitioner could not be

sustained in view of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court. Ld. AR for the petitioner has relied upon the

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as State of UP and others vs. Parmanand Shukla (Dead)

by Lrs. reported in 2015 (145) FLR 213. The relevant para of this judgment reproduce d for

reference:

“Daily wager. Relief of reinstatement and consequential benefits. Granted to respondent

daily wager. In view of order and judgment by High Court and death of workman-

respondent pending this appeal. Direction issued to pay a lump sum compensation of Rs.10

Lacs to wife of the deceased. Respondent in full and final settlement of all claims. Which

could meet the ends of justice”

Relying upon the above said judgment, it has been contended that petitioner could be

awarded compensation upto Rs.10 lakhs instead of reinstatement. In case of Hon’ble Apex Court

claimant/petitioner had died during pendency of appeal and Hon’ble Apex Court sympathetically

viewed the fact that deceased petitioner left behind five unmarried daughters, one minor son, old

father and mother but in the case in hand there is no such fact regarding family constitution of the

petitioner or any strong circumstances requiring indulgence of this Tribunal for enhanced

compensation leniently in favour of petitioner. In another judgment relied by the ld. AR titled as

Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation etc. vs. Jadeja Govubha Chhanubha & Anr. reported in

2015 LLR 160, the Hon’ble Apex Court had awarded lump sum compensation of Rs.2.5 lakhs

keeping in view short length of service, long litigation and closure of establishment and looking to

the totality of circumstances to meet the ends of justice. This case too had different facts. It was

specifically observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that reinstatement of respondent in service does

not appear to be an acceptable option and that monetary compensation keeping in view the length

of service rendered by the respondent the wages that he was receiving during that period which

according to the evidence was around Rs.24.75 per day would sufficiently meet the ends of justice.

Thus facts of present case in hand do not fall squarely judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court. Similarly,

in case titled as Collector Singh vs. L.M.L. Ltd. Kanpur reported in 2015 LLR 1 SC relied by ld.

AR for petitioner, claimant/petitioner had been awarded a lump sum of Rs.5 lakh but in that case

claimant/petitioner had reached near superannuation after litigating for 20 years, but in the case in

hand, no such presumption that petitioner must have been gainfully employed and therefore most of

compensation awarded by the Hon’ble Apex Court in different cases were primarily on different

facts and circumstances. In the case in hand petitioner had worked only for 135 days who was

alleged to be attending office intermittently. Although petitioner in his affidavit has claimed to have

remained unemployed after illegal termination but in cross-examination he has specifically

admitted that he was doing agriculture pursuits besides worked as labourer. Thus he cannot be

stated to be not gainfully employed and thus for all abovesaid reasons, compensation in money

would be appropriate relief to petitioner.

19. Lastly, Ld. counsel for respondent has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other

hand, ld. Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported

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in 2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for

reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

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15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to

Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief

under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay

if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real

prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown

to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately

mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

20. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2000 and the industrial dispute was raised after

seven years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has

placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag

Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at

the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been

condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP)

1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing

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Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

21. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act-Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as

ld. counsel for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various

judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an

important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para

nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013

(136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation

and another vs. Geetam Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the

Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of

appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has

been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an

industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra)

before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992

whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after six

years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division

Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not

the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about

one year and actually worked for 135 days as per mandays chart on record and that the

services of petitioner were disengaged w.e.f. 20.7.2000 who worked as non skilled worker

and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e.

demand notice was given on 22.09.2007. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner

on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 31 years who has sufficient spell of life to

work and earn his livelihood.

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22. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of

Hon’ble Apex Court, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but

compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25

(SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter of

delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined

on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as

Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also

the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous

judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees

seventy five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization.

ISSUE NO.3

24. Ld. counsel for the respondent has raised the objection on the locus standi of the

petitioner to sue but as the petitioner was employee of respondent whose services had been

allegedly illegally terminated, he could certainly challenge the action of the respondent/board

which was illegal and unjustified. Thus, from facts on record, it cannot be stated that petitioner had

no locus standi to sue respondent. Issue in hand is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and

against the respondent.

ISSUE NO.4

25. In view of the findings on the above issues petitioner has cause of action, moreso when

he had claimed his termination from service by respondent illegally. Hence, this issue is decided in

favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

ISSUE NO.5

26. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. counsel for respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what

manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also,

from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could

be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the

respondent.

RELIEF

27. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization however petitioner is awarded with

litigation costs of Rs.10,000/-.

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28. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

29. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

30. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 23rd day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.(Camp at Mandi)

Ref: No.12/ 2013

Shri Sidhu Ram s/o Shri Sant Ram, r/o Village Salwana, P.O. Salwana, Tehsil Sundernagar,

District Mandi, H.P.

….Petitioner.

Versus

The Divisional Forest Officer, Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

….Respondent.

26-04-2016

Present : None for the petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.

Sh. Rattan Lal, Sr. Assistant o/o D.F.O. Suket, Sunder Nagar is present

today along-with relevant record. He is discharged for today.

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the

petitioner despite due knowledge. It is 11.20 A.M. Be awaited and put up after

lunch hours.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

26-04-2016

Present: None for the petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on

behalf of petitioner. It is 2.35 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. csl.

today is indicative of the fact that she is not interested to pursue present reference

and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.

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Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their

own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for

information and further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion

be consigned to the records.

Announced:

26-04-2016

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No.

: 369/2015

Date of Institution : 18.08.2015

Date of Decision : 29.04.2016

Shri Pratap Chand s/o Late Shri Chamaru Ram, r/o Village Burli Kothi, P.O. Paprola, Tehsil

Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P.

.…Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, Electrical Division, H.P.S.E.B.L. Division Baijnath, District Kangra,

H.P.

….Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. Pradeep Dogra, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Kapil Singh Mandyal, Adv.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Pratap Chand S/O Late Shri

Chamaru Ram, R/O Village Burli Kothi, P.O. Paprola, Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra,

H.P. before the Executive Engineer, H.P.S.E.B.L. Division, Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P.

vide demand notice dated 17.12.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service

during year, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the

services of Shri Pratap Chand S/O Late Shri Chamaru Ram, R/O Village Burli Kothi, P.O.

Paprola, Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.S.E.B.L.

Division, Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. during year, 2004 without complying the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of

back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved

workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

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3. Averments made in the claim petition reveal that claimant/petitioner was appointed as

daily paid worker in June, 1996 who worked at Electrical Division Baijnath and Sub Division

Paprola where he worked from 6th June, 1996 to 20th November, 1999 on muster roll. Thereafter,

petitioner claims to have worked at Electrical Sub Division Baijnath where he continued to

discharge his duties satisfactorily till June, 2000 however, service of petitioner is alleged to be

illegally terminated by the respondent in the year June, 2000 without any reason and even while

terminating the services of petitioner, respondent did not follow the provisions of Section 25-F of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 although petitioner had completed 240 days in calendar year and

was covered under the definition of continuous service envisaged under Section 25-B (2) (a) (ii) of

the Industrial Disputes Act. It is alleged that even the reason for termination was not communicated

to petitioner who claims to have made several requests representations of the respondent before the

officials and authorities took note of the prior service and petitioner was confirmed about his

working from the officials of the electric sub division and division where petitioner has discharged

his duties and after satisfying the work of the petitioner, respondent/board reinstated the petitioner

on service in the year 2001 and asked to work at electric sub division Baijnath where he worked till

2004 and again in 2004, respondent/board directed petitioner not to come on job without assigning

any reason as a result of which petitioner was asked to work under various contractors who were

executing various electrical works for respondent/board and in 2012, petitioner was asked to work

with Satish Kumar, contractor who had been working for the respondent/board at 25KV station,

11KV HT Line, 3 Phase LT Line and single Phase Lt Line and also provided BPL connections to

the consumers while working along-with other regularly appointed workers namely Vijay Kumar,

Puran Chand, Des Raj and Jitender who were appointed with the petitioner have been retained by

the respondent. Even some juniors namely Dalip Kumar, Raj Kumar and Sanjay Kumar are stated

to have been retained by the respondent/board. Thus, alleging to have violated principle of “Last go

First come”, petitioner alleges that despite his continuous service he was retrenched without giving

notice as required under Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act and thus the respondent/board

were liable to punish under Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act. The grievance of petitioner

remains that after his illegal termination he filed a demand notice before Labour-cum-Conciliation

Officer on 17.12.2012 but the said authority failed and failure report dated 29.10.2013 was sent to

the Labour Commissioner. Thereafter, Labour Commissioner vide order dated 24.4.2013 had

refused to make reference to this Tribunal whereupon the petitioner had moved to the Hon’ble High

Court of H.P. and get order of the Labour Commissioner quashed with direction to the Labour

Commissioner to make reference to Labour Court under Section 12 (4) of the Industrial Disputes

Act. It is alleged that petitioner has remained unemployed due to respondent’s illegal order and not

gainfully employed anywhere from the date of illegal termination and was thus entitled for back

wages. Accordingly, petitioner has prayed for setting aside the illegal termination order w.e.f. 20th

November, 1999 with direction to the respondent/board to reinstate the petitioner with full back

wages, seniority, continuity in service with all consequential benefits and also directed to

respondent to grant work-charge status to the petitioner and litigation costs of Rs.1,50,000/- and to

any other relief petitioner is found entitled by this Tribunal.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objection of maintainability, cause of action, estoppel, no locus standi, bad for non-joinder of

necessary party. On merits, admitted that petitioner Suresh Kumar had worked on muster roll from

June, 1996 to 20th November, 1999 intermittently at electrical sub division HPSEB Baijnath and

Paprola under electrical Division Baijnath. It is alleged that petitioner had never completed 240

days continuously in any calendar year and was thus not covered under the definition of continuous

service within the meaning of Section 25-B (2) (a) (ii) of the Industrial Disputes Act as claimed by

the claimant/petitioner. Denying to have violated any provisions and Rules of the Industrial

Disputes Act, respondent claims to have not committed any offence as alleged by the petitioner. It

has been emphatically denied that petitioner was illegally disengaged in utter violation of

mandatory provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is contended that

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since the petitioner had not fulfilled the terms and conditions as per law in the matter so the

question of the benefits as claimed by the petitioner did not arise. Accordingly, petition was sought

to be dismissed.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6. To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved her

affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B copy of muster roll, Ex. PW1/C

demand notice, Ex. PW1/D copy of order dated April, 2014, Ex. PW1/E copy of order of Hon’ble

High Court and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,

respondent examined RW1 Shri Satish Kumar, the then Sr. Executive Engineer, HPSEBL, Baijnath

by way of examination-in-chief and closed evidence.

7. I have heard the counsel representing petitioner and ld. counsel for respondent, gone

through records of the case carefully.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 02.12.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

17.12.2012 qua his termination of service during year, 2004 by respondent suffers

from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during year, 2004

is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

3. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

5. Whether the petitioner has no locus standi to file the present claim as alleged? …OPR.

6. Whether the petitioner has no cause of action to file the present case as alleged?

…OPR.

7. Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the present petition by his act and

conduct as alleged?

…OPR.

8. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder/mis-joinder of necessary parties as alleged?

…OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : No

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Issue No.5 : No

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Issue No.6 : No

Issue No.7 : Unpressed

Issue No.8 : Unpressed

Relief. : Claim petition is allowed in part per operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 2 AND 3

10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. It is admitted case of the respondent that petitioner had worked with the

respondent/department from June 1996 to 20th November, 1999. It is equally admitted case of the

respondent that its office does not have any record of petitioner. At the same time, RW1 the main

contesting respondent has shown his ignorance about Vijay Kumar, Puran Chand, Desh Raj and

Jitender kept in service with the petitioner who have since been regularized. It may not be

erroneous to mention here that it was duty of the respondent to maintain all the records of

employees who served with him but it seems that the department is left with few muster rolls on the

basis of which the exact number of days which the petitioner could not be completed 240 days of

work. Thus, in absence of documentary evidence on point of petitioner having worked for 240

days, this court is left with no option but to hold that petitioner was the workman of the respondent

who worked for about three years but it was not proved that he had worked during this period

probably due to nonavailability of work and funds as per oral as well as documentary evidence and

testimony on oath. For said reasons, it is held that petitioner had not worked for 240 days due to

which the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act could not be applicable as

contended by the ld. counsel for respondent. There is nothing on record to show that any notice was

issued or any wages in lieu of salary was given to petitioner while terminating him from service. As

such, for aforesaid reasons this court left with no option but to hold that respondent had not violated

provisions of Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act.

12. In so far as violation of the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act are concerned, it would be relevant to mention here that respondent has ignorance

about the seniority list of employees/beldars with HPSEB Ltd. Division Baijnath. This goes to

show that respondent despite being responsible to maintain seniority list of employees/beldars

working under it had failed to tender such records before the court establishing that as to who were

the workers junior to the petitioner or the manner in which provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of

the Industrial Disputes Act were complied with. Ld. counsel for petitioner has relied upon the

judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2015 LLR 337 titled as Mackinon Machenize &

Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union, in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that non

preparation of seniority list or non displaying of seniority list is breach of Section 25-G of the

Industrial Disputes Act. Not only this, respondent RW1 who is contesting on behalf of the

respondent/department in cross-examination had shown his ignorance about Vijay Kumar, Puran

Chand, Desh Raj and Jitender to be working with the petitioner who had since been regularized.

Similarly, he has also shown his ignorance on the fact that persons junior to the petitioner were

working with the department. Even RW1 has shown his ignorance about Vijay Kumar, Puran

Chand, Desh Raj and Jitender who have been regularized. Thus, evasive replies given by RW1 on

oath clearly indicates that respondent was not deposing according to factual record available with

the department. Not only this, the respondent had not prepared seniority list from 1996 to 2004 and

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there was no plausible explanation from the respondent side which strengthens the case of the

petitioner and also in view of Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as North East Karnataka Road

Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765. In view of the same when

workers were juniors to the petitioner as contended by the petitioner himself were retained by

respondent/department and that seniority list was admittedly not prepared as deposed by RW1, this

court is left with no option but to hold that respondent has deliberately violated the provisions of

Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. Since, there is non availability of seniority list from

1996 to 2004 as aforestated the respondent had also violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the

Industrial Disputes Act, moreso when there is no iota of evidence on being petitioner was ever

given offer of reemployment after the year 2000 although several workers were admittedly engaged

after retrenchment/disengagement of petitioner.

13. As regards, petitioner being gainfully employed ever since he was illegally terminated

as claimed by the petitioner suffice would be state here that in cross-examination of petitioner

denied that he was working after termination when he was disengaged from job by the respondent

he started working with contractor. He further denied that he had left the job of his own. He also

denied that the persons mentioned in his affidavit they are not working with the

respondent/department. Thus, plea of petitioner having not remained engaged or gainfully

employed get falsified from his own statement as well as statement of RW1 as stated above. RW1

Shri Satish Kumar Verma, Executive Engineer, HPSEB had stated that petitioner had abandoned

the job of his own. To prove abandonment of the job, the respondent was required to lead specific

evidence and by simply stating that petitioner had abandoned the job, such plea as not be sufficient

to prove abandoning job and the respondent was mandatorily required to issue notice or initiate

proceeding against the petitioner on his unauthenticated absence which has not been so done by the

respondent. As such, even when the petitioner has not succeeded in establishing his claim under

Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act, yet he would be entitled for relief sought for within the

ambit of Section 25-G as well as 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. In view of the foregoing

discussions the termination of the services of claimant/petitioner by the respondent is held to be

illegal and unjustified. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances, petitioner besides being given

relief of being reinstated in service he is also entitled for seniority and consequential benefits

except back wages from the date of demand notice dated 17.12.2012 Ex. PW1/C on record. Issues

in hand are decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

ISSUE NO. 4

14. On the plea non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial

Disputes Act, ld. counsel representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what

manner petition is not maintainable. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no

inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. That

being so when petitioner/claimant was removed from service which is to be adjudicated y this

Court, the court is left with no option but hold that present claim petition is maintainable. Issue in

question is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

ISSUE NO. 5

15. Ld. counsel for the respondent has raised the objection on the locus standi of the

petitioner to sue but as the petitioner was employee of respondent whose services had been

allegedly illegally terminated, he could certainly challenge the action of the respondent/board

which was illegal and unjustified. Thus, from facts on record, it cannot be stated that petitioner had

no locus standi to sue respondent. Issue in hand is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and

against the respondent.

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ISSUE NO.6

16. In view of the findings on the above issues petitioner has cause of action, moreso when

he had claimed his termination from service by respondent illegally. Hence, this issue is decided in

favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

ISSUES NO. 7& 8

17. These issues were not pressed by ld. counsel for the respondent, as such the issues are

decided as unpressed against the respondent and in favour of petitioner. Resultantly, issues in

question are answered in negative.

ISSUE NO. 1

18. Ld. counsel for respondent/department has contended with vehemence that claim

petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination

of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years

of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed

reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s

case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time

of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned.

In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay

of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that principle of

Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon’ble Apex

Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited

and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963

did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act. It was observed that the relief

under Industrial Disputes Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of delay. It has been

contended that delay if any raised by employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact and that

no reference made by appropriate government can be questioned on the ground of delay alone. In

the case in hand, respondent department has failed to prove on record any material by which it

could be stated that there was inordinate delay which has remained unexplained due to which any

prejudice had been caused to the respondent rather petitioner in his evidence has highlighted and

proved material facts establishing that on account of conciliation proceeding before authority under

Act, industrial dispute was not raised by petitioner immediately or earlier on retrenchment and

finally raised when his services were illegally terminated. Thus, the petition filed by petitioner

cannot be stated to be bad on vice of delay and laches. Issue in question thus is accordingly

answered in negative against respondent and in favour of petitioner.

RELIEF

19. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the termination order of petitioner is

quashed and set aside and the respondent is hereby directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith who

shall be entitled to seniority and continuity in service except back wages from date of demand

notice i.e. 17.12.2012 except back wages. Accordingly, claim petition is hereby allowed in part

and reference is accordingly answered in favour of petitioner. The parties, however, shall bear their

own costs.

20. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.\

21. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

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22. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 29th day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No.

: 229/2015

Date of Institution : 27.5.2015

Date of decision

: 30.04.2016

Shri Ravi Kumar s/o Shri Bachitter Singh, r/o Village Kholu, P.O. Karsal, Tehsil Joginder

Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

…Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. (B&R) Division, Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.

….Respondent.

Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. Suresh Kumar Sharma, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

1. The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Ravi Kumar S/O Shri Bachitter

Singh, R/O Village Kholu, P.O. Karsal, Tehsil Joginder Nagar, Mandi, H.P. during January,

1999 to 31-08-2007 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., (B&R) Division Joginder

Nagar, District Mandi, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above

employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner was engaged as daily

rated beldar by respondent w.e.f. 16.1.1999 in its National Highway Division, Joginder Nagar and

later he (petitioner) worked with the respondent in the newly created HPPWD Division in 2004 but

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he was given fictional breaks from time to time from his initial engagement till 31.8.2007. It is

alleged that he was issued muster rolls for 15 days in a month, though the work was available for

the entire month but, his juniors namely Dalip Singh, Gautam Singh, Geeta Devi, Pradeep Kumar,

Kishhori Lal, Sanjay Kumar, Bhag Mal, Nihal Chand, Anil Kumar and Chanchal. were not given

such breaks and they were allowed to complete 240 days in each calendar year and the above

named juniors have now been regularized. It is alleged that the respondent has stopped giving

fictional breaks to the petitioner from 01.9.2007 and thereafter, the petitioner has completed 240

days in each calendar year. Therefore, there has been violation of the provisions of Sections 25-F,

25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, for brevity).

This Court/Tribunal has already decided a similar matter i.e. Reference No.110/2006 titled as

General Secretary vs. Executive Engineer, HPPWD per Award dated 02.11.2010 in favour of the

workmen. The petitioner thus has filed a demand notice with the labour department but matter

could not be reconciled as the petitioner has prayed for giving him the benefit of seniority,

regularization and back wages etc.

4. Respondent contested petition, filed separate reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, petition being bad for non- joinder of necessary parties and claim

petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits, engagement of the petitioner from

January, 1999 is admitted. The allegation of giving fictional breaks up-to 31.8.2007 has been

specifically denied. It is alleged that the work was made available to the petitioner as per the

requirement and availability of the funds from time to time as per mandays chart annexure-RII and

that all the workers in the annexure R-III were senior to the petitioner who have since been

regularized. It is further alleged that the disengagement of the workmen on the availability of the

funds and the work was strictly in accordance with the policy of ‘last come first go’ and thus

allegation of violation of Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act has been

specifically denied. Thus, relying upon the plea of reference of regularization of petitioner, cause of

action as pleaded in the claim petition filed by petitioner is denied and the petition is sought to be

dismissed.

5. No rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner.

6. To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit Ex. PW1/ A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondent had examined Shri V.S. Guleria, the then

Executive Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Division, Joginder Nagar as RW1, tendered Ex. RW1/A copy

of letter dated 9th December, 2003, Ex. RW1/B regarding creation of PWD Division (B&R)

Joginder Nagar in the year 2004, Ex. RW1/C mandays chart of petitioner, Ex. RW1/D yearwise

working days of daily wage Beldar and closed evidence.

7. I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 07.10.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during

the year January, 1999 to 31-08-2007 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? …OPP.

2. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

3. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

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4. Whether the claim petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as alleged?

…OPR.

5. Whether the petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner

as alleged. If so, its effect?

…OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my

findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Issue No.5 : No

Relief : Petition is allowed per operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1 AND 2

10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Factum of petitioner having been appointed as daily waged beldar on muster roll by the

respondent w.e.f. January, 1999 is not in dispute. It is the admitted case of petitioner that he had

worked since January, 1999 but he had been deliberately given fictional breaks by respondent so

that he could not complete 240 days to get benefits of Section 25-B of the Act. The plea of

respondent, on the other hand remains that petitioner was still working but had been working

intermittently as he of his own use to not come on his duty besides he willfully absented several

times from it.

12. To appreciate the genuineness of the plea so raised by respondent, suffice would be to

state here that bald assertion of the respondent cannot be accepted that petitioner willfully absented

from his duties as there is nothing corresponding in evidence to show that any letter or intimation

was sent to petitioner for his unauthorized absence from his duties as absence from duty is serious

misconduct, it is projected to be case as if petitioner came of his own and worked at his whims. The

plea of petitioner, on the other hand remains that fictional breaks were deliberately given to him

and that several other persons junior to petitioner namely Smt. Geeta Devi, Dalip Singh, Goutam

Singh and Anil Kumar and others have been regularized by respondent who were actually not given

fictional breaks at any point of time.

13. Perusal of mandays chart Ex. RW1/C would reveal that in the year 1999 petitioner had

worked for 110 days, 220 days in 2000, 186 days in 2001, 171 days in 2002, 170 days in 2003, 147

days in 2004, 167 days in 2005, 155 days in 2006, 230 days in 2007, 348 days in 2008, 352 days in

2009, 354 days in 2010, 361 days in 2011, 353 days in 2012, 360 days in 2013, 363 days in 2014

and 90 days in 2015. It can be noticed that in the several years petitioner has worked for less than

240 days, whereas for other remaining years he had worked for more than 240 days. Seniority list

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of regular labourers HPPWD (B&R) Division has also been relied upon by respondent which is Ex.

RW1/D on record in which all the persons named above are shown to have joined in the years

1999, 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2004 except at serial nos.6 who had joined earlier to petitioner whereas

petitioner had joined in 1999. Since respondent had not disputed to have engaged petitioner in

January, 1999, he ought to have been regularized having continuously worked for about 8 years

with requisite number of days required for regularization and on account of fictional break as stated

above, which would show that other persons who had joined alongwith him have been regularized

but the petitioner has been deprived of his legitimate right for regularization till now. Thus, break in

service being within a period of nine years from his termination was definitely a fictional break as

in remaining years he had worked for more than 240 days. The act of the respondent in giving

fictional break is manifestly arbitrary without any basis. Although respondent department ipso facto

does not dislodge petitioner from claiming his seniority and continuity in service from his initial

engagement but fictional breaks in no manner would affect or eclipse legitimate right of

regularization in service of petitioner. However, petitioner has admitted in cross-examination that

he had agricultural land and remained employed and as such it could not be stated with certainty

that petitioner was not gainfully employed during the period of fictional breaks.

14. Stepping into the witness box as PW1, petitioner has sworn in detailed affidavit under

Order 18 Rule 4 CPC stipulating therein that he had been engaged and disengaged between 1999 to

2007 by giving fictional break whereas the persons junior to petitioner have been continuously

engaged by department for the whole year who had completed more than 240 days in a calendar

year as they had been invariably issued muster roll for whole of month in these years. In cross

examination, petitioner has admitted that he has been regularly provided with more than 240 days

of work after 2007 which means the dispute is only for the years 1999 to 2007 as stated in the

affidavit. It needs to be noticed that other co-workers working with petitioner or say who were

junior were given muster roll for full month so that they completed 240 days in a year. RW1 Shri

V.S. Guleria has admitted in cross-examination that seniority list Ex. RW1/D of all the labourers

who have been shown in the said seniority list were employed after the engagement of the

petitioner except serial no. 6. He has admitted that working of 240 days is to be established by

petitioner to claim benefit of deemed service under Section 25-B of the Act. He has admitted that

petitioner has been engaged in the year 1999 who had not been issued any appointment letter but

denied that petitioner had been deliberately given breaks in the years from 1999 to 2007 but he

could not plead so as no corresponding record has been produced by the respondent to establish that

on absence of petitioner from his duty, any notice was issued for unauthorized absence and the

version of RW1 that petitioner came and worked & go of his own from duty cannot be accepted

which manifestly appear to be afterthought. Moreover, RW1 has admitted that as per record no

notice was given to petitioner for his absence from duty at any point of time. Since absence from

duty is serous misconduct, and there being nothing on record to show initiation of proceeding, plea

set forth by respondent qua abandonment of job by petitioner intermittently merits rejection. As

such, the plea of fictional break given to the petitioner from the year 1999 to 2007 gets

substantiated not only from documentary evidence on record but from testimony on oath of RW1 as

well. Although, petitioner being in employment at the time of passing of award, being given

fictional breaks as stated above is duly established but petitioner cannot be deprived of his

legitimate right to seek seniority as well as continuity in service from his date of joining along-with

other persons working with him. Thus, petitioner could not have been discriminated arbitrarily who

has certainly been discriminated as stated in foregoing paras. In view of aforesaid discussion, it is

held that time to time termination of the services of the petitioner and giving fictional breaks in

service by the respondent during 1999 to 2007 was certainly illegal and unjustified which is

manifestly in contravention of provisions of Section 25-F, 25-G & 25-H of the Act but as the

petitioner is still in employment with the respondent, he is to be given benefit of seniority and

continuity in service except back wages in the circumstances of the case. Issues are accordingly

decided in part in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

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ISSUE NO. 3

15. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on

record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against

claimant/petitioner. As such, issue in hand is answered in negative against the respondent and in

favour of petitioner.

ISSUE NO. 4

16. In the light of my findings on the issues no.1 and 2 in foregoing para, it is held that the

Executive Engineer, HPPWD, National Highway Division, Joginder Nagar is not a necessary party

to be impleaded in this case in claim petition as petitioner was initially appointed with respndoent

only PW1 has admitted in cross examination that petitioner was working with respondent although

he earlier worked with Executive Engineer HPPWD National Highways. Thus, creation of separate

HPWPD division vide office order Ex. RW1/D shall have no serious consequence on merits of

case. Issue in hand is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against respondent.

ISSUE NO. 5

17. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing state respondent has contended that petition so filed was bad

on account of delay and laches. It is evident from findings in foregoing paras that petitioner was

given fictional breaks from 1999 to 2007 which was not within knowledge of petitioner. It seems

that when workmen junior to petitioner had been regularized, he come to know about intermittent

breaks. The matter was brought to notice of Conciliation Officer where it did not materialize and

consequently Labour Commissioner made reference to this court. Ld. counsel for petitioner, on the

other hand, has maintained that no prejudice had been caused to petitioner. Moreover, not a single

question has been asked by ld. Dy. D.A. on delay to the petitioner. As such, delay which is not

questioned stands explained as stated above. Otherwise also, plea of delay or limitation would not

eclipse claim of petitioner in any manner. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is

referred to for determination, the Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in

raising the dispute may be considered by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has

been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Bhatag Ram’s case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional

Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more

than 10 years was held to have not come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally

terminated by holding that the provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute

but however, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and

laches have to be seen and applied. In Deepa Ram vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal

Law Journal 248, there was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand vs. Union of India, CWP

No. 812 of 2000, there was a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional

Manager vs. Mohinder Kumar, there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar vs. HPSEB

and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425, it has been held by the Hon’ble High Court of H.P. that the

Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been

referred by the State Government and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was

made by the State Government and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without

touching the aspect of delay and laches. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. vs.

Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees,

who are entitled to take the benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights

and it may not be right to put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have

to make under the provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to

the Court to introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh vs.

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Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC

82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding

under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of

fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to

the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.

18. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was

inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any

prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot

be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is

decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.

RELIEF

19. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, petitioner is held to be in continuous

uninterrupted service with the respondent from the date of his initial engagement, the breaks given

by the respondent being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of

service of the petitioner and his seniority shall be reckoned from his initial date of engagement.

Accordingly, claim of petitioner is hereby allowed in part and reference is accordingly answered in

favour of petitioner. The petitioner shall thus be deemed to be in continuous service of respondent

with all consequential benefits except back wages. He shall, however, be considered for

regularization by respondent at the time when his juniors have been regularized as per policy

governing daily wagers as framed by State Govt. and operative from time to time. The parties,

however, shall bear their own costs.

20. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

21. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

22. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 30th day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 227/2015

Date of Institution : 27.5.2015

Date of decision

: 30.04.2016

Shri Subhash Chand s/o Shri Roshan Lal, r/o Village Challothi, P.O. Panlalag, Tehsil

Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

…Petitioner.

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Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. (B&R) Division, Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.

….Respondent.

Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. Suresh Kumar Sharma, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

1. The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Subhash Chand s/o Shri Roshan

Lal, R/O Village Challothi, P.O. Panlalag, Tehsil Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

during December, 1998 to 31-08-2007 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., (B&R)

Division Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P., without complying with the provisions of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the

above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner was engaged as daily

rated beldar by respondent w.e.f. 4.12.1998 in its National Highway Division, Joginder Nagar and

later he (petitioner) worked with the respondent in the newly created HPPWD Division in 2004 but

he was given fictional breaks from time to time from his initial engagement till 31.8.2007. It is

alleged that he was issued muster rolls for 15 days in a month, though the work was available for

the entire month but, his juniors namely Dalip Singh, Gautam Singh, Geeta Devi, Pradeep Kumar,

Kishhori Lal, Sanjay Kumar, Bhag Mal, Nihal Chand, Anil Kumar and Chanchal. were not given

such breaks and they were allowed to complete 240 days in each calendar year and the above

named juniors have now been regularized. It is alleged that the respondent has stopped giving

fictional breaks to the petitioner from 01.9.2007 and thereafter, the petitioner has completed 240

days in each calendar year. Therefore, there has been violation of the provisions of Sections 25-F,

25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, for brevity).

This Court/Tribunal has already decided a similar matter i.e. Reference No.110/2006 titled as

General Secretary vs. Executive Engineer, HPPWD per Award dated 02.11.2010 in favour of the

workmen. The petitioner thus has filed a demand notice with the labour department but matter

could not be reconciled as the petitioner has prayed for giving him the benefit of seniority,

regularization and back wages etc.

4. Respondent contested petition, filed separate reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, petition being bad for non- joinder of necessary parties and claim

petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits, engagement of the petitioner from

December, 1998 is admitted. The allegation of giving fictional breaks up-to 31.8.2007 has been

specifically denied. It is alleged that the work was made available to the petitioner as per the

requirement and availability of the funds from time to time as per mandays chart annexure-RII and

that all the workers in the annexure R-III were senior to the petitioner who have since been

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regularized. It is further alleged that the disengagement of the workmen on the availability of the

funds and the work was strictly in accordance with the policy of ‘last come first go’ and thus

allegation of violation of Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act has been

specifically denied. Thus, relying upon the plea of reference of regularization of petitioner, cause of

action as pleaded in the claim petition filed by petitioner is denied and the petition is sought to be

dismissed.

5. No rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner.

6. To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit Ex. PW1/ A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondent had examined Shri V.S. Guleria, the then

Executive Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Division, Joginder Nagar as RW1, tendered Ex. RW1/A copy

of letter dated 9th December, 2003, Ex. RW1/B regarding creation of PWD Division (B&R)

Joginder Nagar in the year 2004, Ex. RW1/C mandays chart of petitioner, Ex. RW1/D yearwise

working days of daily wage Beldar and closed evidence.

7. I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 31.08.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during

the year December, 1998 to 31-08-2007 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

2. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

3. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

4. Whether the claim petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as alleged?

…OPR.

5. Whether the petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner

as alleged. If so, its effect?

. . .OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my

findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Issue No.5 : No

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Relief

: Petition is allowed per operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1 AND 2

10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Factum of petitioner having been appointed as daily waged beldar on muster roll by the

respondent w.e.f. December, 1998 is not in dispute. It is the admitted case of petitioner that he had

worked since December, 1998 but he had been deliberately given fictional breaks by respondent so

that he could not complete 240 days to get benefits of Section 25-B of the Act. The plea of

respondent, on the other hand remains that petitioner was still working but had been working

intermittently as he of his own use to not come on his duty besides he willfully absented several

times from it.

12. To appreciate the genuineness of the plea so raised by respondent, suffice would be to

state here that bald assertion of the respondent cannot be accepted that petitioner willfully absented

from his duties as there is nothing corresponding in evidence to show that any letter or intimation

was sent to petitioner for his unauthorized absence from his duties as absence from duty is serious

misconduct, it is projected to be case as if petitioner came of his own and worked at his whims. The

plea of petitioner, on the other hand remains that fictional breaks were deliberately given to him

and that several other persons junior to petitioner namely Smt. Geeta Devi, Dalip Singh, Goutam

Ram and Anil Kumar and others have been regularized by respondent who were actually not given

fictional breaks at any point of time.

13. Perusal of mandays chart Ex. RW1/C would reveal that in the year 1998 petitioner had

worked for 20 days, 210 days in 1999, 220 days in 2000, 187 days in 2001, 181 days in 2002, 168

days in 2003, 167 days in 2004, 168 days in 2005, 153 days in 2006, 226 days in 2007, 366 days in

2008, 359 days in 2009, 357 days in 2010, 348 days in 2011, 324 days in 2012, 360 days in 2013,

349 days in 2014 and 178 days in 2015. It can be noticed that in the several years petitioner has

worked for less than 240 days, whereas for other remaining years he had worked for more than 240

days. Seniority list of regular labourers HPPWD (B&R) Division has also been relied upon by

respondent which is Ex. RW1/D on record in which all the persons named above are shown to have

joined in the years 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2004 except at serial nos.6 who had joined earlier to

petitioner whereas petitioner had joined in 1998. Since respondent had not disputed to have

engaged petitioner in December, 1998, he ought to have been regularized having continuously

worked for about 9 years with requisite number of days required for regularization and on account

of fictional break as stated above, which would show that other persons who had joined along-with

him have been regularized but the petitioner has been deprived of his legitimate right for

regularization till now. Thus, break in service being within a period of nine years from his

termination was definitely a fictional break as in remaining years he had worked for more than 240

days. The act of the respondent in giving fictional break is manifestly arbitrary without any basis.

Although respondent department ipso facto does not dislodge petitioner from claiming his seniority

and continuity in service from his initial engagement but fictional breaks in no manner would affect

or eclipse legitimate right of regularization in service of petitioner. However, petitioner has

admitted in cross examination that he had agricultural land and remained employed and as such it

could not be stated with certainty that petitioner was not gainfully employed during the period of

fictional breaks.

14. Stepping into the witness box as PW1, petitioner has sworn in detailed affidavit under

Order 18 Rule 4 CPC stipulating therein that he had been engaged and disengaged between 1998 to

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2007 by giving fictional break whereas the persons junior to petitioner have been continuously

engaged by department for the whole year who had completed more than 240 days in a calendar

year as they had been invariably issued muster roll for whole of month in these years. In cross

examination, petitioner has admitted that he has been regularly provided with more than 240 days

of work after 2007 which means the dispute is only for the years 1998 to 2007 as stated in the

affidavit. It needs to be noticed that other co-workers working with petitioner or say who were

junior were given muster roll for full month so that they completed 240 days in a year. RW1 Shri

V.S. Guleria has admitted in cross-examination that seniority list Ex. RW1/D of all the labourers

who have been shown in the said seniority list were employed after the engagement of the

petitioner except serial no. 6. He has admitted that working of 240 days is to be established by

petitioner to claim benefit of deemed service under Section 25-B of the Act. He has admitted that

petitioner has been engaged in the year 1998 who had not been issued any appointment letter but

denied that petitioner had been deliberately given breaks in the years from 1998 to 2007 but he

could not plead so as no corresponding record has been produced by the respondent to establish that

on absence of petitioner from his duty, any notice was issued for unauthorized absence and the

version of RW1 that petitioner came and worked & go of his own from duty cannot be accepted

which manifestly appear to be afterthought. Moreover, RW1 has admitted that as per record no

notice was given to petitioner for his absence from duty at any point of time. Since absence from

duty is serous misconduct, and there being nothing on record to show initiation of proceeding, plea

set forth by respondent qua abandonment of job by petitioner intermittently merits rejection. As

such, the plea of fictional break given to the petitioner from the year 1998 to 2007 gets

substantiated not only from documentary evidence on record but from testimony on oath of RW1 as

well. Although, petitioner being in employment at the time of passing of award, being given

fictional breaks as stated above is duly established but petitioner cannot be deprived of his

legitimate right to seek seniority as well as continuity in service from his date of joining along-with

other persons working with him. Thus, petitioner could not have been discriminated arbitrarily who

has certainly been discriminated as stated in foregoing paras. In view of aforesaid discussion, it is

held that time to time termination of the services of the petitioner and giving fictional breaks in

service by the respondent during 1998 to 2007 was certainly illegal and unjustified which is

manifestly in contravention of provisions of Section 25-F, 25-G & 25-H of the Act but as the

petitioner is still in employment with the respondent, he is to be given benefit of seniority and

continuity in service except back wages in the circumstances of the case. Issues are accordingly

decided in part in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

ISSUE NO. 3

15. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on

record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against

claimant/petitioner. As such, issue in hand is answered in negative against the respondent and in

favour of petitioner.

ISSUE NO.4

16. In the light of my findings on the issues no.1 and 2 in foregoing para, it is held that the

Executive Engineer, HPPWD, National Highway Division, Joginder Nagar is not a necessary party

to be impleaded in this case in claim petition as petitioner was initially appointed with respndoent

only PW1 has admitted in cross examination that petitioner was working with respondent although

he earlier worked with Executive Engineer HPPWD National Highways. Thus, creation of separate

HPWPD division vide office order Ex. RW1/D shall have no serious consequence on merits of

case. Issue in hand is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against respondent.

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ISSUE NO.5

17. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing state respondent has contended that petition so filed was bad

on account of delay and laches. It is evident from findings in foregoing paras that petitioner was

given fictional breaks from 1998 to 2007 which was not within knowledge of petitioner. It seems

that when workmen junior to petitioner had been regularized, he come to know about intermittent

breaks. The matter was brought to notice of Conciliation Officer where it did not materialize and

consequently Labour Commissioner made reference to this court. Ld. counsel for petitioner, on the

other hand, has maintained that no prejudice had been caused to petitioner. Moreover, not a single

question has been asked by ld. Dy. D.A. on delay to the petitioner. As such, delay which is not

questioned stands explained as stated above. Otherwise also, plea of delay or limitation would not

eclipse claim of petitioner in any manner. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is

referred to for determination, the Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in

raising the dispute may be considered by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has

been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Bhatag Ram’s case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional

Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more

than 10 years was held to have not come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally

terminated by holding that the provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute

but however, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and

laches have to be seen and applied. In Deepa Ram vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal

Law Journal 248, there was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand vs. Union of India, CWP

No. 812 of 2000, there was a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional

Manager vs. Mohinder Kumar, there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar vs. HPSEB

and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425, it has been held by the Hon’ble High Court of H.P. that the

Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been

referred by the State Government and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was

made by the State Government and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without

touching the aspect of delay and laches. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. vs.

Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees,

who are entitled to take the benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights

and it may not be right to put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have

to make under the provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to

the Court to introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh vs.

Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC

82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding

under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of

fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to

the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.

18. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was

inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any

prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot

be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is

decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.

RELIEF

19. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, petitioner is held to be in continuous

uninterrupted service with the respondent from the date of his initial engagement, the breaks given

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by the respondent being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of

service of the petitioner and his seniority shall be reckoned from his initial date of engagement.

Accordingly, claim of petitioner is hereby allowed in part and reference is accordingly answered in

favour of petitioner. The petitioner shall thus be deemed to be in continuous service of respondent

with all consequential benefits except back wages. He shall, however, be considered for

regularization by respondent at the time when his juniors have been regularized as per policy

governing daily wagers as framed by State Govt. and operative from time to time. The parties,

however, shall bear their own costs.

20. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

21. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

22. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 30th day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 236/2015

Date of Institution : 10.6.2015

Date of decision

: 30.04.2016

Shri Mintu Ram s/o Shri Prabhu Ram, r/o V.P.O. Khaddar, Tehsil Joginder Nagar, District

Mandi, H.P.

…Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, (B&R) Division, H.P.P.W.D. Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.

….Respondent.

Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. Suresh Kumar Sharma, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

1. The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Mintu Ram S/O Shri Prabhu Ram,

R/O V.P.O. Khaddar, Tehsil Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. during February, 2002 to

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31-08-2007 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., (B&R) Division Joginder Nagar,

District Mandi, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service

benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner was engaged as daily

rated beldar by respondent w.e.f. 02.2.2002 in its National Highway Division, Joginder Nagar and

later he (petitioner) worked with the respondent in the newly created HPPWD Division in 2004 but

he was given fictional breaks from time to time from his initial engagement till 31.8.2007. It is

alleged that he was issued muster rolls for 15 days in a month, though the work was available for

the entire month but, his juniors namely Dalip Singh, Gautam Singh, Geeta Devi, Pradeep Kumar,

Kishhori Lal, Sanjay Kumar, Bhag Mal, Nihal Chand, Anil Kumar and Chanchal. were not given

such breaks and they were allowed to complete 240 days in each calendar year and the above

named juniors have now been regularized. It is alleged that the respondent has stopped giving

fictional breaks to the petitioner from 01.9.2007 and thereafter, the petitioner has completed 240

days in each calendar year. Therefore, there has been violation of the provisions of Sections 25-F,

25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, for brevity).

This Court/Tribunal has already decided a similar matter i.e. Reference No.110/2006 titled as

General Secretary vs. Executive Engineer, HPPWD per Award dated 02.11.2010 in favour of the

workmen. The petitioner thus has filed a demand notice with the labour department but matter

could not be reconciled as the petitioner has prayed for giving him the benefit of seniority,

regularization and back wages etc.

4. Respondent contested petition, filed separate reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, petition being bad for non- joinder of necessary parties and claim

petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits, engagement of the petitioner from

January, 2002 is admitted. The allegation of giving fictional breaks up-to 31.8.2007 has been

specifically denied. It is alleged that the work was made available to the petitioner as per the

requirement and availability of the funds from time to time as per mandays chart annexure-RII and

RIII and that all the workers in the annexure R-III were senior to the petitioner who have since been

regularized. It is further alleged that the disengagement of the workmen on the availability of the

funds and the work was strictly in accordance with the policy of ‘last come first go’ and thus

allegation of violation of Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act has been

specifically denied. Thus, relying upon the plea of reference of regularization of petitioner, cause of

action as pleaded in the claim petition filed by petitioner is denied and the petition is sought to be

dismissed.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6. To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit Ex. PW1/ A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondent had examined Shri V.S. Guleria, the then

Executive Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Division, Joginder Nagar as RW1, tendered Ex. RW1/A copy

of letter dated 9th December, 2003, Ex. RW1/B regarding creation of PWD Division (B&R)

Joginder Nagar in the year 2004, Ex. RW1/C mandays chart of petitioner, Ex. RW1/D yearwise

working days of daily wage Beldar and closed evidence.

7. I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.

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8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 07.10.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during

the years February, 2002 to 31-08-2007 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

2. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to? OPP

3. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

4. Whether the claim petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as alleged?

…OPR.

5. Whether the petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner

as alleged. If so, its effect?

…OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my

findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Issue No.5 : No

Relief : Petition is allowed per operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1 AND 2

10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Factum of petitioner having been appointed as daily waged beldar on muster roll by the

respondent w.e.f. January, 2002 is not in dispute. It is the admitted case of petitioner that he had

worked since January, 2002 but he had been deliberately given fictional breaks by respondent so

that he could not complete 240 days to get benefits of Section 25-B of the Act. The plea of

respondent, on the other hand remains that petitioner was still working but had been working

intermittently as he of his own use to not come on his duty besides he willfully absented several

times from it.

12. To appreciate the genuineness of the plea so raised by respondent, suffice would be to

state here that bald assertion of the respondent cannot be accepted that petitioner willfully absented

from his duties as there is nothing corresponding in evidence to show that any letter or intimation

was sent to petitioner for his unauthorized absence from his duties as absence from duty is serious

misconduct, it is projected to be case as if petitioner came of his own and worked at his whims. The

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plea of petitioner, on the other hand remains that fictional breaks were deliberately given to him

and that several other persons junior to petitioner namely Smt. Geeta Devi, Dalip Singh, Goutam

Singh and Anil Kumar and others have been regularized by respondent who were actually not given

fictional breaks at any point of time.

13. Perusal of mandays chart Ex. RW1/C would reveal that in the year 2002 petitioner had

worked for 110 days, 12 days in 2003, 158 days in 2004, 168 days in 2005, 149 days in 2006, 216

days in 2007, 351 days in 2008, 347 days in 2009, 352 days in 2010, 348 days in 2011, 341 days in

2012, 331 days in 2013, 365 days in 2014 and 90 days in 2015. It can be noticed that in the several

years petitioner has worked for less than 240 days, whereas for other remaining years he had

worked for more than 240 days. Seniority list of regular labourers HPPWD (B&R) Division has

also been relied upon by respondent which is Ex. RW1/D on record in which all the persons named

above are shown to have joined in the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 except at serial nos.3,6,7, and 10

who had joined earlier to petitioner whereas petitioner had joined in 2002. Since respondent had not

disputed to have engaged petitioner in January, 2002, he ought to have been regularized having

continuously worked for about 6 years with requisite number of days required for regularization

and on account of fictional break as stated above, which would show that other persons who had

joined along-with him have been regularized but the petitioner has been deprived of his legitimate

right for regularization till now. Thus, break in service being within a period of nine years from his

termination was definitely a fictional break as in remaining years he had worked for more than 240

days. The act of the respondent in giving fictional break is manifestly arbitrary without any basis.

Although respondent department ipso facto does not dislodge petitioner from claiming his seniority

and continuity in service from his initial engagement but fictional breaks in no manner would affect

or eclipse legitimate right of regularization in service of petitioner. However, petitioner has

admitted in cross examination that he had agricultural land and remained employed and as such it

could not be stated with certainty that petitioner was not gainfully employed during the period of

fictional breaks.

14. Stepping into the witness box as PW1, petitioner has sworn in detailed affidavit under

Order 18 Rule 4 CPC stipulating therein that he had been engaged and disengaged between 2002 to

2007 by giving fictional break whereas the persons junior to petitioner have been continuously

engaged by department for the whole year who had completed more than 240 days in a calendar

year as they had been invariably issued muster roll for whole of month in these years. In cross

examination, petitioner has admitted that he has been regularly provided with more than 240 days

of work after 2007 which means the dispute is only for the years 2002 to 2007 as stated in the

affidavit. It needs to be noticed that other co-workers working with petitioner or say who were

junior were given muster roll for full month so that they completed 240 days in a year. RW1 Shri

V.S. Guleria has admitted in cross-examination that seniority list Ex. RW1/D of all the labourers

who have been shown in the said seniority list were employed after the engagement of the

petitioner except serial nos. 3,6,7, and 10. He has admitted that working of 240 days is to be

established by petitioner to claim benefit of deemed service under Section 25-B of the Act. He has

admitted that petitioner has been engaged in the year 2002 who had not been issued any

appointment letter but denied that petitioner had been deliberately given breaks in the years from

2002 to 2007 but he could not plead so as no corresponding record has been produced by the

respondent to establish that on absence of petitioner from his duty, any notice was issued for

unauthorized absence and the version of RW1 that petitioner came and worked & go of his own

from duty cannot be accepted which manifestly appear to be afterthought. Moreover, RW1 has

admitted that as per record no notice was given to petitioner for his absence from duty at any point

of time. Since absence from duty is serous misconduct, and there being nothing on record to show

initiation of proceeding, plea set forth by respondent qua abandonment of job by petitioner

intermittently merits rejection. As such, the plea of fictional break given to the petitioner from the

year 2002 to 2007 gets substantiated not only from documentary evidence on record but from

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testimony on oath of RW1 as well. Although, petitioner being in employment at the time of passing

of award, being given fictional breaks as stated above is duly established but petitioner cannot be

deprived of his legitimate right to seek seniority as well as continuity in service from his date of

joining along-with other persons working with him. Thus, petitioner could not have been

discriminated arbitrarily who has certainly been discriminated as stated in foregoing paras. In view

of aforesaid discussion, it is held that time to time termination of the services of the petitioner and

giving fictional breaks in service by the respondent during 2002 to 2007 was certainly illegal and

unjustified which is manifestly in contravention of provisions of Section 25-F, 25-G & 25-H of the

Act but as the petitioner is still in employment with the respondent, he is to be given benefit of

seniority and continuity in service except back wages in the circumstances of the case. Issues are

accordingly decided in part in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

ISSUE NO.3

15. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on

record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/

petitioner. As such, issue in hand is answered in negative against the respondent and in favour of

petitioner.

ISSUE NO.4

16. In the light of my findings on the issues no.1 and 2 in foregoing para, it is held that the

Executive Engineer, HPPWD, National Highway Division, Joginder Nagar is not a necessary party

to be impleaded in this case in claim petition as petitioner was initially appointed with respndoent

only PW1 has admitted in cross examination that petitioner was working with respondent although

he earlier worked with Executive Engineer HPPWD National Highways. Thus, creation of separate

HPWPD division vide office order Ex. RW1/D shall have no serious consequence on merits of

case. Issue in hand is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against respondent.

ISSUE NO. 5

17. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing state respondent has contended that petition so filed was bad

on account of delay and laches. It is evident from findings in foregoing paras that petitioner was

given fictional breaks from 2002 to 2007 which was not within knowledge of petitioner. It seems

that when workmen junior to petitioner had been regularized, he come to know about intermittent

breaks. The matter was brought to notice of Conciliation Officer where it did not materialize and

consequently Labour Commissioner made reference to this court. Ld. counsel for petitioner, on the

other hand, has maintained that no prejudice had been caused to petitioner. Moreover, not a single

question has been asked by ld. Dy. D.A. on delay to the petitioner. As such, delay which is not

questioned stands explained as stated above. Otherwise also, plea of delay or limitation would not

eclipse claim of petitioner in any manner. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is

referred to for determination, the Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in

raising the dispute may be considered by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has

been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Bhatag Ram’s case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional

Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more

than 10 years was held to have not come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally

terminated by holding that the provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute

but however, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and

laches have to be seen and applied. In Deepa Ram vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal

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Law Journal 248, there was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand vs. Union of India, CWP

No. 812 of 2000, there was a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional

Manager vs. Mohinder Kumar, there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar vs. HPSEB

and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425, it has been held by the Hon’ble High Court of H.P. that the

Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been

referred by the State Government and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was

made by the State Government and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without

touching the aspect of delay and laches. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. vs.

Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees,

who are entitled to take the benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights

and it may not be right to put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have

to make under the provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to

the Court to introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh vs.

Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC

82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding

under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of

fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to

the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.

18. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was

inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any

prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot

be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is

decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.

RELIEF

19. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, petitioner is held to be in continuous

uninterrupted service with the respondent from the date of his initial engagement, the breaks given

by the respondent being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of

service of the petitioner and his seniority shall be reckoned from his initial date of engagement.

Accordingly, claim of petitioner is hereby allowed in part and reference is accordingly answered in

favour of petitioner. The petitioner shall thus be deemed to be in continuous service of respondent

with all consequential benefits except back wages. He shall, however, be considered for

regularization by respondent at the time when his juniors have been regularized as per policy

governing daily wagers as framed by State Govt. and operative from time to time. The parties,

however, shall bear their own costs.

20. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

21. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

22. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 30th day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 222/2015

Date of Institution : 27.5.2015

Date of decision

: 30.04.2016

Shri Sarwan Kumar s/o Shri Kharku Ram, r/o Village Kathoun, P.O. Panjalag, Tehsil

Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

…Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. (B&R) Division, Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.

….Respondent.

Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. Suresh Kumar Sharma, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

1. The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Sarwan Kumar S/O Shri Kharku

Ram, R/O Village Kathoun, P.O. Panjalag, Tehsil Ladbharol, Mandi, H.P. during January,

1999 to 31-08-2007 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., (B&R) Division Joginder

Nagar, District Mandi, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above

employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner was engaged as daily

rated beldar by respondent w.e.f. 06.1.1999 in its National Highway Division, Joginder Nagar and

later he (petitioner) worked with the respondent in the newly created HPPWD Division in 2004 but

he was given fictional breaks from time to time from his initial engagement till 31.8.2007. It is

alleged that he was issued muster rolls for 15 days in a month, though the work was available for

the entire month but, his juniors namely Dalip Singh, Gautam Singh, Geeta Devi, Pradeep Kumar,

Kishhori Lal, Sanjay Kumar, Bhag Mal, Nihal Chand, Anil Kumar and Chanchal. were not given

such breaks and they were allowed to complete 240 days in each calendar year and the above

named juniors have now been regularized. It is alleged that the respondent has stopped giving

fictional breaks to the petitioner from 01.9.2007 and thereafter, the petitioner has completed 240

days in each calendar year. Therefore, there has been violation of the provisions of Sections 25-F,

25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, for brevity).

This Court/Tribunal has already decided a similar matter i.e. Reference No.110/2006 titled as

General Secretary vs. Executive Engineer, HPPWD per Award dated 02.11.2010 in favour of the

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workmen. The petitioner thus has filed a demand notice with the labour department but matter

could not be reconciled as the petitioner has prayed for giving him the benefit of seniority,

regularization and back wages etc.

4. Respondent contested petition, filed separate reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, petition being bad for non- joinder of necessary parties and claim

petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits, engagement of the petitioner from

January, 1999 is admitted. The allegation of giving fictional breaks up-to 31.8.2007 has been

specifically denied. It is alleged that the work was made available to the petitioner as per the

requirement and availability of the funds from time to time as per mandays chart annexure-RII and

that all the workers in the annexure R-III were senior to the petitioner who have since been

regularized. It is further alleged that the disengagement of the workmen on the availability of the

funds and the work was strictly in accordance with the policy of ‘last come first go’ and thus

allegation of violation of Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act has been

specifically denied. Thus, relying upon the plea of reference of regularization of petitioner, cause of

action as pleaded in the claim petition filed by petitioner is denied and the petition is sought to be

dismissed.

5. No rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner.

6. To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit Ex. PW1/ A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondent had examined Shri V.S. Guleria, the then

Executive Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Division, Joginder Nagar as RW1, tendered Ex. RW1/A copy

of letter dated 9th December, 2003, Ex. RW1/B regarding creation of PWD Division (B&R)

Joginder Nagar in the year 2004, Ex. RW1/C mandays chart of petitioner, Ex. RW1/D yearwise

working days of daily wage Beldar and closed evidence.

7. I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 31.08.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent

during the year January, 1999 to 31-08-2007 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

2. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

4. Whether the claim petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as alleged?

…OPR.

5. Whether the petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner

as alleged. If so, its effect?

…OPR.

Relief.

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9. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my

findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Issue No.5 : No

Relief : Petition is allowed per operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1 AND 2

10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Factum of petitioner having been appointed as daily waged beldar on muster roll by the

respondent w.e.f. January, 1999 is not in dispute. It is the admitted case of petitioner that he had

worked since January, 1999 but he had been deliberately given fictional breaks by respondent so

that he could not complete 240 days to get benefits of Section 25-B of the Act. The plea of

respondent, on the other hand remains that petitioner was still working but had been working

intermittently as he of his own use to not come on his duty besides he willfully absented several

times from it.

12. To appreciate the genuineness of the plea so raised by respondent, suffice would be to

state here that bald assertion of the respondent cannot be accepted that petitioner willfully absented

from his duties as there is nothing corresponding in evidence to show that any letter or intimation

was sent to petitioner for his unauthorized absence from his duties as absence from duty is serious

misconduct, it is projected to be case as if petitioner came of his own and worked at his whims. The

plea of petitioner, on the other hand remains that fictional breaks were deliberately given to him

and that several other persons junior to petitioner namely Smt. Geeta Devi, Dalip Singh, Goutam

Ram and Anil Kumar and others have been regularized by respondent who were actually not given

fictional breaks at any point of time.

13. Perusal of mandays chart Ex. RW1/C would reveal that in the year 1999 petitioner had

worked for 206 days, 220 days in 2000, 189 days in 2001, 165 days in 2002, 175 days in 2003, 170

days in 2004, 170 days in 2005, 160 days in 2006, 223 days in 2007, 360 days in 2008, 347 days in

2009, 349 days in 2010, 342 days in 2011, 320 days in 2012, 337 days in 2013 and 326 days in

2014. It can be noticed that in the several years petitioner has worked for less than 240 days,

whereas for other remaining years he had worked for more than 240 days. Seniority list of regular

labourers HPPWD (B&R) Division has also been relied upon by respondent which is Ex. RW1/D

on record in which all the persons named above are shown to have joined in the years 2000, 2002,

2003 and 2004 except at serial nos.6 who had joined earlier to petitioner whereas petitioner had

joined in 1999. Since respondent had not disputed to have engaged petitioner in January, 1999, he

ought to have been regularized having continuously worked for about 8 years with requisite number

of days required for regularization and on account of fictional break as stated above, which would

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show that other persons who had joined along-with him have been regularized but the petitioner has

been deprived of his legitimate right for regularization till now. Thus, break in service being within

a period of nine years from his termination was definitely a fictional break as in remaining years he

had worked for more than 240 days. The act of the respondent in giving fictional break is

manifestly arbitrary without any basis. Although respondent department ipso facto does not

dislodge petitioner from claiming his seniority and continuity in service from his initial engagement

but fictional breaks in no manner would affect or eclipse legitimate right of regularization in

service of petitioner. However, petitioner has admitted in cross-examination that he had agricultural

land and remained employed and as such it could not be stated with certainty that petitioner was not

gainfully employed during the period of fictional breaks.

14. Stepping into the witness box as PW1, petitioner has sworn in detailed affidavit under

Order 18 Rule 4 CPC stipulating therein that he had been engaged and disengaged between 1999 to

2007 by giving fictional break whereas the persons junior to petitioner have been continuously

engaged by department for the whole year who had completed more than 240 days in a calendar

year as they had been invariably issued muster roll for whole of month in these years. In cross

examination, petitioner has admitted that he has been regularly provided with more than 240 days

of work after 2007 which means the dispute is only for the years 1999 to 2007 as stated in the

affidavit. It needs to be noticed that other co-workers working with petitioner or say who were

junior were given muster roll for full month so that they completed 240 days in a year. RW1 Shri

V.S. Guleria has admitted in cross-examination that seniority list Ex. RW1/D of all the labourers

who have been shown in the said seniority list were employed after the engagement of the

petitioner except serial no. 6. He has admitted that working of 240 days is to be established by

petitioner to claim benefit of deemed service under Section 25-B of the Act. He has admitted that

petitioner has been engaged in the year 1999 who had not been issued any appointment letter but

denied that petitioner had been deliberately given breaks in the years from 1999 to 2007 but he

could not plead so as no corresponding record has been produced by the respondent to establish that

on absence of petitioner from his duty, any notice was issued for unauthorized absence and the

version of RW1 that petitioner came and worked & go of his own from duty cannot be accepted

which manifestly appear to be afterthought. Moreover, RW1 has admitted that as per record no

notice was given to petitioner for his absence from duty at any point of time. Since absence from

duty is serous misconduct, and there being nothing on record to show initiation of proceeding, plea

set forth by respondent qua abandonment of job by petitioner intermittently merits rejection. As

such, the plea of fictional break given to the petitioner from the year 1999 to 2007 gets

substantiated not only from documentary evidence on record but from testimony on oath of RW1 as

well. Although, petitioner being in employment at the time of passing of award, being given

fictional breaks as stated above is duly established but petitioner cannot be deprived of his

legitimate right to seek seniority as well as continuity in service from his date of joining along-with

other persons working with him. Thus, petitioner could not have been discriminated arbitrarily who

has certainly been discriminated as stated in foregoing paras. In view of aforesaid discussion, it is

held that time to time termination of the services of the petitioner and giving fictional breaks in

service by the respondent during 1999 to 2007 was certainly illegal and unjustified which is

manifestly in contravention of provisions of Section 25-F, 25-G & 25-H of the Act but as the

petitioner is still in employment with the respondent, he is to be given benefit of seniority and

continuity in service except back wages in the circumstances of the case. Issues are accordingly

decided in part in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

ISSUE NO. 3

15. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on

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record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against

claimant/petitioner. As such, issue in hand is answered in negative against the respondent and in

favour of petitioner.

ISSUE NO. 4

16. In the light of my findings on the issues no.1 and 2 in foregoing para, it is held that the

Executive Engineer, HPPWD, National Highway Division, Joginder Nagar is not a necessary party

to be impleaded in this case in claim petition as petitioner was initially appointed with respndoent

only PW1 has admitted in cross examination that petitioner was working with respondent although

he earlier worked with Executive Engineer HPPWD National Highways. Thus, creation of separate

HPWPD division vide office order Ex. RW1/D shall have no serious consequence on merits of

case. Issue in hand is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against respondent.

ISSUE NO. 5

17. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing state respondent has contended that petition so filed was bad

on account of delay and laches. It is evident from findings in foregoing paras that petitioner was

given fictional breaks from 1999 to 2007 which was not within knowledge of petitioner. It seems

that when workmen junior to petitioner had been regularized, he come to know about intermittent

breaks. The matter was brought to notice of Conciliation Officer where it did not materialize and

consequently Labour Commissioner made reference to this court. Ld. counsel for petitioner, on the

other hand, has maintained that no prejudice had been caused to petitioner. Moreover, not a single

question has been asked by ld. Dy. D.A. on delay to the petitioner. As such, delay which is not

questioned stands explained as stated above. Otherwise also, plea of delay or limitation would not

eclipse claim of petitioner in any manner. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is

referred to for determination, the Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in

raising the dispute may be considered by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has

been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Bhatag Ram’s case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional

Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more

than 10 years was held to have not come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally

terminated by holding that the provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute

but however, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and

laches have to be seen and applied. In Deepa Ram vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal

Law Journal 248, there was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand vs. Union of India, CWP

No. 812 of 2000, there was a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional

Manager vs. Mohinder Kumar, there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar vs. HPSEB

and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425, it has been held by the Hon’ble High Court of H.P. that the

Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been

referred by the State Government and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was

made by the State Government and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without

touching the aspect of delay and laches. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. vs.

Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees,

who are entitled to take the benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights

and it may not be right to put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have

to make under the provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to

the Court to introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh vs.

Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC

82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding

under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of

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delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of

fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to

the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.

18. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was

inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any

prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot

be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is

decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.

RELIEF

19. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, petitioner is held to be in continuous

uninterrupted service with the respondent from the date of his initial engagement, the breaks given

by the respondent being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of

service of the petitioner and his seniority shall be reckoned from his initial date of engagement.

Accordingly, claim of petitioner is hereby allowed in part and reference is accordingly answered in

favour of petitioner. The petitioner shall thus be deemed to be in continuous service of respondent

with all consequential benefits except back wages. He shall, however, be considered for

regularization by respondent at the time when his juniors have been regularized as per policy

governing daily wagers as framed by State Govt. and operative from time to time. The parties,

however, shall bear their own costs.

20. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

21. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

22. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 30th day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.

________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 224/2015

Date of Institution : 27.5.2015

Date of decision

: 30.04.2016

Smt. Meera Devi w/o Shri Chand Ram, r/o Village Chakrod, P.O. Khaddar, Tehsil

Ladbharol, District Mandi, H.P.

…Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. (B&R) Division, Joginder Nagar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.

….Respondent.

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Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. Suresh Kumar Sharma, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

1. The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether time to time termination of the services of Smt. Meera Devi W/O Shri Chand

Ram, R/O Village Chakrod, P.O. Khaddar, Tehsil Ladbharol, District Mandi, H.P. during

December, 1998 to 31-08-2007 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., (B&R) Division

Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the

above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed her statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner was engaged as daily

rated beldar by respondent w.e.f. 25.10.1998 in its National Highway Division, Joginder Nagar and

later she (petitioner) worked with the respondent in the newly created HPPWD Division in 2004

but she was given fictional breaks from time to time from her initial engagement till 31.8.2007. It is

alleged that she was issued muster rolls for 15 days in a month, though the work was available for

the entire month but, her juniors namely Dalip Singh, Gautam Singh, Geeta Devi, Pradeep Kumar,

Kishhori Lal, Sanjay Kumar, Bhag Mal, Nihal Chand, Anil Kumar and Chanchal. were not given

such breaks and they were allowed to complete 240 days in each calendar year and the above

named juniors have now been regularized. It is alleged that the respondent has stopped giving

fictional breaks to the petitioner from 01.9.2007 and thereafter, the petitioner has completed 240

days in each calendar year. Therefore, there has been violation of the provisions of Sections 25-F,

25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, for brevity).

This Court/Tribunal has already decided a similar matter i.e. Reference No.110/2006 titled as

General Secretary vs. Executive Engineer, HPPWD per Award dated 02.11.2010 in favour of the

workmen. The petitioner thus has filed a demand notice with the labour department but matter

could not be reconciled as the petitioner has prayed for giving her the benefit of seniority,

regularization and back wages etc.

4. Respondent contested petition, filed separate reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, petition being bad for non- joinder of necessary parties and claim

petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits, engagement of the petitioner from

December, 1998 is admitted. The allegation of giving fictional breaks up-to 31.8.2007 has been

specifically denied. It is alleged that the work was made available to the petitioner as per the

requirement and availability of the funds from time to time as per mandays chart annexure-RII and

that all the workers in the annexure R-III were senior to the petitioner who have since been

regularized. It is further alleged that the disengagement of the workmen on the availability of the

funds and the work was strictly in accordance with the policy of ‘last come first go’ and thus

allegation of violation of Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act has been

specifically denied. Thus, relying upon the plea of reference of regularization of petitioner, cause of

action as pleaded in the claim petition filed by petitioner is denied and the petition is sought to be

dismissed.

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5. No rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner.

6. To prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her

affidavit Ex. PW1/ A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondent had examined Shri V.S. Guleria, the then

Executive Engineer, HPPWD (B&R) Division, Joginder Nagar as RW1, tendered Ex. RW1/A copy

of letter dated 9th December, 2003, Ex. RW1/B regarding creation of PWD Division (B&R)

Joginder Nagar in the year 2004, Ex. RW1/C mandays chart of petitioner, Ex. RW1/D yearwise

working days of daily wage Beldar and closed evidence.

7. I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel representing petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. for respondent, gone through records of the case carefully.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 31.8.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during

the year December, 1998 to 31-08-2007 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

2. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

3. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

4. Whether the claim petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as alleged?

…OPR.

5. Whether the petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner

as alleged. If so, its effect?

…OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my

findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Issue No.5 : No

Relief : Petition is allowed per operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1 AND 2

10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11. Factum of petitioner having been appointed as daily waged beldar on muster roll by the

respondent w.e.f. December, 1998 is not in dispute. It is the admitted case of petitioner that she had

worked since December, 1998 but she had been deliberately given fictional breaks by respondent

so that she could not complete 240 days to get benefits of Section 25-B of the Act. The plea of

respondent, on the other hand remains that petitioner was still working but had been working

intermittently as she of her own use to not come on her duty besides she willfully absented several

times from it.

12. To appreciate the genuineness of the plea so raised by respondent, suffice would be to

state here that bald assertion of the respondent cannot be accepted that petitioner willfully absented

from her duties as there is nothing corresponding in evidence to show that any letter or intimation

was sent to petitioner for her unauthorized absence from her duties as absence from duty is serious

misconduct, it is projected to be case as if petitioner came of her own and worked at her whims.

The plea of petitioner, on the other hand remains that fictional breaks were deliberately given to her

and that several other persons junior to petitioner namely Smt. Geeta Devi, Dalip Singh, Goutam

Singh and Anil Kumar and others have been regularized by respondent who were actually not given

fictional breaks at any point of time.

13. Perusal of mandays chart Ex. RW1/C would reveal that in the year 1998 petitioner had

worked for 30 days, 162 days in 1999, 213 days in 2000, 178 days in 2001, 106 days in 2002, 10

days in 2003, 144 days in 2004, 159 days in 2005, 161 days in 2006, 226 days in 2007, 364 days in

2008, 356 days in 2009, 322 days in 2010, 354 days in 2011, 353 days in 2012, 343 days in 2013,

363 days in 2014 and 69 days in 2015. It can be noticed that in the several years petitioner has

worked for less than 240 days, whereas for other remaining years she had worked for more than

240 days. Seniority list of regular labourers HPPWD (B&R) Division has also been relied upon by

respondent which is Ex. RW1/D on record in which all the persons named above are shown to have

joined in the years 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2004 except at serial nos.6 who had joined earlier to

petitioner whereas petitioner had joined in 1998. Since respondent had not disputed to have

engaged petitioner in December, 1998, she ought to have been regularized having continuously

worked for about 9 years with requisite number of days required for regularization and on account

of fictional break as stated above, which would show that other persons who had joined along-with

her have been regularized but the petitioner has been deprived of her legitimate right for

regularization till now. Thus, break in service being within a period of nine years from her

termination was definitely a fictional break as in remaining years she had worked for more than 240

days. The act of the respondent in giving fictional break is manifestly arbitrary without any basis.

Although respondent department ipso facto does not dislodge petitioner from claiming her seniority

and continuity in service from her initial engagement but fictional breaks in no manner would

affect or eclipse legitimate right of regularization in service of petitioner. However, petitioner has

admitted in cross-examination that she had agricultural land and remained employed and as such it

could not be stated with certainty that petitioner was not gainfully employed during the period of

fictional breaks.

14. Stepping into the witness box as PW1, petitioner has sworn in detailed affidavit under

Order 18 Rule 4 CPC stipulating therein that she had been engaged and disengaged between 1998

to 2007 by giving fictional break whereas the persons junior to petitioner have been continuously

engaged by department for the whole year who had completed more than 240 days in a calendar

year as they had been invariably issued muster roll for whole of month in these years. In cross

examination, petitioner has admitted that she has been regularly provided with more than 240 days

of work after 2007 which means the dispute is only for the years 1998 to 2007 as stated in the

affidavit. It needs to be noticed that other co-workers working with petitioner or say who were

junior were given muster roll for full month so that they completed 240 days in a year. RW1 Shri

V.S. Guleria has admitted in cross-examination that seniority list Ex. RW1/D of all the labourers

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who have been shown in the said seniority list were employed after the engagement of the

petitioner except serial no. 6. He has admitted that working of 240 days is to be established by

petitioner to claim benefit of deemed service under Section 25-B of the Act. He has admitted that

petitioner has been engaged in the year 1998 who had not been issued any appointment letter but

denied that petitioner had been deliberately given breaks in the years from 1998 to 2007 but she

could not plead so as no corresponding record has been produced by the respondent to establish that

on absence of petitioner from her duty, any notice was issued for unauthorized absence and the

version of RW1 that petitioner came and worked & go of her own from duty cannot be accepted

which manifestly appear to be afterthought. Moreover, RW1 has admitted that as per record no

notice was given to petitioner for her absence from duty at any point of time. Since absence from

duty is serous misconduct, and there being nothing on record to show initiation of proceeding, plea

set forth by respondent qua abandonment of job by petitioner intermittently merits rejection. As

such, the plea of fictional break given to the petitioner from the year 1998 to 2007 gets

substantiated not only from documentary evidence on record but from testimony on oath of RW1 as

well. Although, petitioner being in employment at the time of passing of award, being given

fictional breaks as stated above is duly established but petitioner cannot be deprived of her

legitimate right to seek seniority as well as continuity in service from her date of joining along-with

other persons working with him. Thus, petitioner could not have been discriminated arbitrarily who

has certainly been discriminated as stated in foregoing paras. In view of aforesaid discussion, it is

held that time to time termination of the services of the petitioner and giving fictional breaks in

service by the respondent during 1998 to 2007 was certainly illegal and unjustified which is

manifestly in contravention of provisions of Section 25-F, 25-G & 25-H of the Act but as the

petitioner is still in employment with the respondent, she is to be given benefit of seniority and

continuity in service except back wages in the circumstances of the case. Issues are accordingly

decided in part in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

ISSUE NO. 3

15. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on

record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against

claimant/petitioner. As such, issue in hand is answered in negative against the respondent and in

favour of petitioner.

ISSUE NO. 4

16. In the light of my findings on the issues no.1 and 2 in foregoing para, it is held that the

Executive Engineer, HPPWD, National Highway Division, Joginder Nagar is not a necessary party

to be impleaded in this case in claim petition as petitioner was initially appointed with respndoent

only PW1 has admitted in cross examination that petitioner was working with respondent although

she earlier worked with Executive Engineer HPPWD National Highways. Thus, creation of

separate HPWPD division vide office order Ex. RW1/D shall have no serious consequence on

merits of case. Issue in hand is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against respondent.

ISSUE NO. 5

17. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing state respondent has contended that petition so filed was bad

on account of delay and laches. It is evident from findings in foregoing paras that petitioner was

given fictional breaks from 1998 to 2007 which was not within knowledge of petitioner. It seems

that when workmen junior to petitioner had been regularized, she come to know about intermittent

breaks. The matter was brought to notice of Conciliation Officer where it did not materialize and

2352

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consequently Labour Commissioner made reference to this court. Ld. counsel for petitioner, on the

other hand, has maintained that no prejudice had been caused to petitioner. Moreover, not a single

question has been asked by ld. Dy. D.A. on delay to the petitioner. As such, delay which is not

questioned stands explained as stated above. Otherwise also, plea of delay or limitation would not

eclipse claim of petitioner in any manner. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is

referred to for determination, the Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in

raising the dispute may be considered by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has

been held by our own Hon’ble High Court in Bhatag Ram’s case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional

Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more

than 10 years was held to have not come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally

terminated by holding that the provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute

but however, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and

laches have to be seen and applied. In Deepa Ram vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal

Law Journal 248, there was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand vs. Union of India, CWP

No. 812 of 2000, there was a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional

Manager vs. Mohinder Kumar, there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar vs. HPSEB

and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425, it has been held by the Hon’ble High Court of H.P. that the

Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been

referred by the State Government and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was

made by the State Government and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without

touching the aspect of delay and laches. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. vs.

Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees,

who are entitled to take the benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights

and it may not be right to put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have

to make under the provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to

the Court to introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh vs.

Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC

82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding

under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of

delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of

fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to

the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.

18. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was

inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any

prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot

be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is

decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.

RELIEF

19. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, petitioner is held to be in continuous

uninterrupted service with the respondent from the date of her initial engagement, the breaks given

by the respondent being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of

service of the petitioner and her seniority shall be reckoned from her initial date of engagement.

Accordingly, claim of petitioner is hereby allowed in part and reference is accordingly answered in

favour of petitioner. The petitioner shall thus be deemed to be in continuous service of respondent

with all consequential benefits except back wages. She shall, however, be considered for

regularization by respondent at the time when her juniors have been regularized as per policy

governing daily wagers as framed by State Govt. and operative from time to time. The parties,

however, shall bear their own costs.

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20. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

21. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

22. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 30th day of April, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

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&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&

In the Court of Dr. (Maj.) Avaninder Kumar, HPAS, Sub-Divisional Magistrate

Kalpa at Reckong Peo, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur Himachal Pradesh-172107

Case No. 61/2016

Date of Institute : 21-06-2016

Date of decision :

Shri Narendra Pal s/o Shri Tirth Ram r/o Village Kalpa, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur,

H. P.

. . Applicant.

2355

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 tqykbZ] 2016@20 vk"kk<+ 1938

Versus

General Public

Application u/s 13(3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.

Notice for publication in the HP Rajpatra.

The above named applicant has presented an application under section 13(3) of Birth and

Death Registration Act, 1969 supported by an affidavit stating that his son named Nitesh Kumar

who was born on 12-08-1996 but due to inadvertence, he could not get the birth registered in the

record of Gram panchayat Kalpa, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur, H.P. He further requested to

issue an order for registration of birth of the same in the records of Gram panchayat Kalpa, Tehsil

Kalpa, District Kinnaur, H.P.

Therefore, notice is hereby issued to the general public through this publication that if

anybody has any objection for the registration of his son named Nitesh Kumar whose date of birth

is 12-08-1996 prefer his written or verbal objection before the undersigned within a period of one

month i.e. before 31-07-2016 failing which it will be presumed that nobody has any objection for

registration of birth of said son and order under the Act, ibid will be issued to the Local Registrar

of Gram Panchayat Kalpa.

Issued under my hand and seal of the Court today on the 21st day of June, 2016.

Seal.

Dr. (Maj.) AVANINDER KUMAR, HPAS,

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Kalpa at Reckong Peo (H.P.).

____________

In the Court of Dr. (Maj.) Avaninder Kumar, HPAS, Sub-Divisional Magistrate

Kalpa at Reckong Peo, Tehsil Kalpa District Kinnaur Himachal Pradesh-172107

Case No. 63/2016

Date of Institute : 21-06-2016

Date of decision :

Shri Dame Lama s/o Shri Repa Mala, r/o Village Brelingi, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur,

H. P.

. . Applicant.

Versus

General Public

Application u/s 13(3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.

Notice for publication in the HP Rajpatra.

The above named applicant has presented an application under section 13(3) of Birth and

Death Registration Act, 1969 supported by an affidavit stating that his daughter named Kanchiomo

2356

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who was born on 03-03-1986 but due to invertance, he could not get the birth registered in the

record of Gram panchayat Duni, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur, H.P. He further requested to issue

an order for registration of birth of the same in the records of Gram Panchayat Duni, Tehsil Kalpa,

District Kinnaur, H.P.

Therefore, notice is hereby issued to the general public through this publication that if

anybody has any objection for the registration of daughter named Kanchiomo whose date of birth is

03-03-1986 prefer his written or verbal objection before the undersigned within a period of one

month i .e. before 31-07-2016 failing which it will be presumed that nobody has any objection for

registration of birth of said son and order under the Act, ibid will be issued to the Local Registrar

of Gram Panchayat Duni.

Issued under my hand and seal of the Court today on the 21st day of June, 2016.

Seal.

Dr. (Maj.) AVANINDER KUMAR, HPAS,

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Kalpa at Reckong Peo (H.P.).

_________

In the Court of Dr. (Maj.) Avaninder Kumar, HPAS, Sub-Divisional Magistrate

Kalpa at Reckong Peo, Tehsil Kalpa District Kinnaur Himachal Pradesh-172107

Case No. 64/2016

Date of Institute : 21-06-2016

Date of decision :

Shri Parmeshwar Urao s/o Shri Chumana Urao, r/o Village Brelingi, Tehsil Kalpa, District

Kinnaur, H. P.

. . Applicant.

Versus

General Public

Application u/s 13(3) of Birth and Deaths Registration Act, 1969.

Notice for publication in the HP Rajpatra.

The above named applicant has presented an application under section 13(3) of Birth and

Death Registration Act, 1969 supported by an affidavit stating that his son named Bimal Urao who

was born on 10-03-2006 but due to invertence, he could not get the birth registered in the record of

Gram panchayat Duni, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur H.P. He further requested to issue an order

for registration of birth of the same in the records of Gram Panchayat Duni, Tehsil Kalpa, District

Kinnaur, H.P.

Therefore, notice is hereby issued to the general public through this publication that if

anybody has any objection for the registration of his son named Bimal Urao whose date of birth is

10-03-2006 prefer his written or verbal objection before the undersigned within a period of one

2357

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month i .e. before 31-07-2016 failing which it will be presumed that nobody has any objection for

registration of birth of said son and order under the Act, ibid will be issued to the Local Registrar

of Gram Panchayat Duni.

.

Issued under my hand and seal of the Court today on the 21st day of June, 2016.

Seal.

Dr. (Maj.) AVANINDER KUMAR, HPAS,

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Kalpa at Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur (H.P.).

____________

In the Court of Dr. (Maj.) Avaninder Kumar, HPAS, Sub-Divisional Magistrate

Kalpa at Reckong Peo, Tehsil Kalpa District Kinnaur Himachal Pradesh-172107

Case No. 65/2016

Date of Institute : 21-06-2016

Date of decision :

Smt. Vidya Devi w/o Shri Ram Lal, r/o Village Pangi, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur,

H. P.

. . Applicant.

Versus

General Public

Application u/s 13(3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.

Notice for publication in the HP Rajpatra.

The above named applicant has presented an application under section 13(3) of Birth and

Death Registration Act, 1969 supported by an affidavit stating that their children namely Renu

Raza who was born on 15-09-1989 and Ranju Bala was born on 01-03-1991 but due to invertence,

he could not get the birth registered in the record of Gram panchayat Pangi, Tehsil Kalpa, District

Kinnaur, H.P. She further requested to issue an order for registration of birth of the same in the

records of Gram Panchayat Pangi, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur, H.P.

Therefore, notice is hereby issued to the general public through this publication that if

anybody has any objection for the registration of the birth of said children prefer his written or

verbal objection before the undersigned within a period of one month i .e. before 31-07-2016

failing which it will be presumed that nobody has any objection for registration of birth of said

children and order under the Act, ibid will be issued to the Local Registrar of Gram Panchayat

Pangi.

Issued under my hand and seal of the Court today on the 21st day of June, 2016.

Seal.

Dr. (Maj.) AVANINDER KUMAR, HPAS,

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Kalpa at Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur (H.P.).

2358

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In the Court of Dr. (Maj.) Avaninder Kumar, HPAS, Sub-Divisional Magistrate

Kalpa at Reckong Peo, Tehsil Kalpa District Kinnaur Himachal Pradesh-172107

Case No. 66/2016

Date of Institute : 21-06-2016

Date of decision :

Shri Suraj Bhadur s/o Shri Chabe Lal, r/o Village Yuwaringi, Tehsil Kalpa, District

Kinnaur, H. P.

. . Applicant.

Versus

General Public

Application u/s 13(3) of Birth and Deaths Registration Act, 1969.

Notice for publication in the HP Rajpatra.

The above named applicant has presented an application under section 13(3) of Birth and

Deaths Registration Act, 1969 supported by an affidavit stating that his son named Sanjay Kumar

who was born on 22-06-2001 but due to invertence, he could not get the birth registered in the

record of Gram panchayat Kalpa, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur, H.P. He further requested to

issue an order for registration of birth of the same in the records of Gram Panchayat Kalpa, Tehsil

Kalpa, District Kinnaur, H.P.

Therefore, notice is hereby issued to the general public through this publication that if

anybody has any objection for the registration of his son named Sanjay Kumar whose date of birth

is 22-06-2001 prefer his written or verbal objection before the undersigned within a period of one

month i .e. before 31-07-2016 failing which it will be presumed that nobody has any objection for

registration of birth of said son and order under the Act, ibid will be issued to the Local Registrar

of Gram Panchayat Kalpa.

Issued under my hand and seal of the Court today on the 21st day of June, 2016.

Seal.

Dr. (Maj.) AVANINDER KUMAR, HPAS,

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Kalpa at Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur (H.P.) .

____________

In the Court of Dr. (Maj.) Avaninder Kumar, HPAS, Sub-Divisional Magistrate

Kalpa at Reckong Peo, Tehsil Kalpa District Kinnaur Himachal Pradesh-172107

Case No. 67/2016

Date of Institute : 21-06-2016

Date of decision :

Shri Karma Lama s/o Shri Jamling Lama, r/o Village Brelingi, Tehsil Kalpa, District

Kinnaur, H. P.

. . Applicant.

Versus

General Public

2359

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 tqykbZ] 2016@20 vk"kk<+ 1938

Application u/s 13(3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.

Notice for publication in the HP Rajpatra.

The above named applicant has presented an application under section 13(3) of Birth and

Death Registration Act, 1969 supported by an affidavit stating that his following children were

born on 01-11-1990 and 26-04-1993 respectively but due to invertence, he could not get the birth

registered in the record of Gram Panchayat Duni, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur H.P. He further

requested to issue an order for registration of birth of the same in the records of Gram Panchayat

Duni, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur, H.P.

Therefore, notice is hereby issued to the general public through this publication that if

anybody has any objection for the registration of his children whose date of birth is 01-11-1990 and

26-04-1993 respectively prefer his written or verbal objection before the undersigned within a

period of one month i .e. before 31-07-2016 failing which it will be presumed that nobody has any

objection for registration of birth of said sons and order under the Act, ibid will be issued to the

Local Registrar of Gram Panchayat Duni.

Issued under my hand and seal of the Court today on the 21st day of June, 2016.

Seal.

Dr. (Maj.) AVANINDER KUMAR, HPAS,

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Kalpa at Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur (H.P.).

Margin

Shri Sange Lama (DOB 01-11-1990)

Shri Sanju Lama (DOB 26-04-1993)

____________

In the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate Kalpa, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur,

Himachal Pradesh-172107

PRESS NOTE

No. 68.—Shri Ynagdev Chhering s/o Shri Muril, r/o Village Boningsaring, Tehsil Sangla,

District Kinnaur, H.P. has submitted an application in this office regarding change of this name

from Yangdup Chhering to Medup Chhering, In this support he has submitted his affidavits,

addressed and age proof of and Panchayat record. Therefore, general public is invited to file their

objections if any regarding change of name from Yangdup Chhering to medup Chhering in this

office before the next date of hearing i.e. 31-07-2016. If no objections are received in this office

during this period, necessary order will be passed.

Seal.

Dr. (Maj.) AVANINDER KUMAR, HPAS,

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Kalpa at Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur (H.P.).

2360

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fo"k;-&nqj[kklr tkfr oa'kkcyh esa ntZ djus ckjsA

Jh jkt dqekj iq= Jh /;ku flag] fuoklh /kelw] rglhy eukyh] ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0 us bl

U;k;ky; esa vkosnu i= fn;k gS fd 'ktjk uLo esa mldh tkfr ukekywe n'kkZbZ xbZ gS ijUrq og rj[kku

tkfr mi&tkfr Fkkoh ls lEcU/k j[krk gSA ftls og ntZ 'ktjk uLo dkxtkr eky ntZ djuk pkgrk gSA

bl ckjs vkosnd us tkfr rj[kku] mi&tkfr Fkkoh] xkao j'kkyk] rglhy iVokj {ks= ftHkh] rglhy catkj]

ftyk dqYyw ls izkIr 'ktjk uLo layXu fd;k gS lkFk gh C;ku gfYQ;k Hkh izLrqr fd;k gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k dks bl b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks jkt dqekj

iq= Jh /;ku flag] fuoklh /kelw dh tkfr 'ktjk uLo ¼oa'kkcyh½ esa ntZ djokus ckjs vkifÙk gks rks og

fnukad 21&7&16 dks ;k blls iwoZ vnkyr gtk esa viuh vkifÙk ntZ djok ldrk gSA blds mijkUr

dksbZ Hkh mtj ,rjkt ekU; u gksxk rFkk fu;ekuqlkj mDr O;fDr dk uke cnyus ds vkns'k ikfjr fd,

tk;saxsA

vkt fnukad 21&6&16 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh ,oa rglhynkj]

eukyhA

&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] rglhy eukyh] fgekpy izns'k

Dr. Lobsang Soepa s/o Shri Yeshi Gyatso] fuoklh okMZ ua0 7] xksEik jksM eukyh] rglhy

eukyh] ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0A

2361

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 tqykbZ] 2016@20 vk"kk<+ 1938

cuke

vke turk

fo"k;-&izdk'ku b'rgkj ckor tUe frfFk iathdj.k tsj /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q vf/kfu;e] 1969-

uksfVl cuke vke turkA

Dr. Lobsang Soepa s/o Shri Yeshi Gyatso] fuoklh okMZ ua0 7] xksEik jksM eukyh] rglhy

eukyh] ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0 us bl U;k;ky; esa vkosnu&i= e; 'kiFk&i= xqtkjk gS fd mldk tUe

fnukad 15&6&1976 dks eukyh esa gqvk gS ijUrq mldh tUe frfFk uxj ifj"kn~ eukyh ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ

ugha dh xbZ gS] ftls vc ntZ djokus ds vkns'k lknj Qjek;s tkosaA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k dks bl b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks Dr.

Lobsang Soepa dh tUe frfFk ntZ djokus ckjs vkifÙk gks rks og fnukad 21&7&16 dks ;k blls iwoZ

vnkyr gtk esa viuh vkifÙk ntZ djok ldrk gSA blds mijkUr dksbZ Hkh mtj ,rjkt ekU; u gksxk

rFkk fu;ekuqlkj tUe frfFk ntZ djokus ds vkns'k ikfjr dj fn;s tk;saxsA

vkt fnukad 21&6&16 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh gqvkA

eksgj vnkyrA

gLrk{kfjr@&

dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]

rglhy eukyh] ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0A

&&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] rglhy eukyh] fgekpy izns'k

uSuk iq=h Jh eqds'k] fuoklh okMZ ua0 3 utnhd xU/kkjk gksVy eukyh] rglhy eukyh] ftyk

dqYyw] fg0 iz0A

cuke

vke turk

fo"k;-&izdk'ku b'rgkj ckor tUe frfFk iathdj.k tsj /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q vf/kfu;e] 1969-

uksfVl cuke vke turkA

uSuk iq=h Jh eqds'k] fuoklh okMZ ua0 3 utnhd xU/kkjk gksVy eukyh] rglhy eukyh] ftyk

dqYyw] fg0 iz0 us bl U;k;ky; esa vkosnu&i= e; 'kiFk&i= xqtkjk gS fd mldk tUe fnukad

09&01&1993 dks eukyh esa gqvk gS ijUrq mldh tUe frfFk uxj ifj"kn~ eukyh ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ ugha dh

xbZ gS] ftls vc ntZ djokus ds vkns'k lknj Qjek;s tkosaA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k dks bl b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks uSuk dh

tUe frfFk ntZ djokus ckjs vkifÙk gks rks og fnukad 15&7&16 dks ;k blls iwoZ vnkyr gtk esa viuh

vkifÙk ntZ djok ldrk gSA blds mijkUr dksbZ Hkh mtj ,rjkt ekU; u gksxk rFkk fu;ekuqlkj tUe

frfFk ntZ djokus ds vkns'k ikfjr dj fn;s tk;saxsA

2362

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 tqykbZ] 2016@20 vk"kk<+] 1938

vkt fnukad 15&6&16 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh gqvkA

eksgj vnkyrA

gLrk{kfjr@&

dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]

rglhy eukyh] ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0A

&&&&&&&&&&

In the Court of Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Urban,

District Mandi, H. P.

In the matter of :—

1.

Shri Dev Kant Pilot s/o Shri Tulsi Ram, r/o Village Lower Bhiuli, P.O. Purani Mandi,

Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, H. P.

2.

Smt. Sarika Sood d/o Shri Gopal Krishan Sood, r/o Village Jalpehar, P.O. Sheru,

Tehsil Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. (At present wife of Shri Dev Kant Pilot s/o Shri Tulsi

Ram, r/o Village Lower Bhiuli, P.O. Purani Mandi, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, H. P.)

. . Applicants.

Versus

General Public

Subject.—Application for the registration of Marriage under Section 15 of Special Marriage Act,

1954.

Shri Dev Kant Pilot s/o Shri Tulsi Ram, r/o Village Lower Bhiuli, P.O. Purani Mandi,

Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, H. P. and Smt. Sarika Sood d/o Shri Gopal Krishan Sood, r/o Village

Jalpehar, P.O. Sheru, Tehsil Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P. (At present wife of Shri Dev

Kant Pilot s/o Shri Tulsi Ram, r/o Village Lower Bhiuli, P.O. Purani Mandi, Tehsil Sadar, District

Mandi, H. P.) have filed an application along with affidavits in the court of undersigned under

Section 15 of Special Marriage Act, 1954 that they have solemnized their marriage on 24-01-2007

according to Hindu rites and customs at Bhiuli, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, H. P. and they are

living together as husband and wife since then. Hence, their marriage may be registered under

Special Marriage Act, 1954.

Therefore, the general public is hereby informed through this notice that any person who

has any objection regarding this marriage, can file the objection personally or in writing before this

court on or before 25-07-2016 after that no objection will be entertained and marriage will be

registered.

Issued today on 24th day of June, 2016 under my hand and seal of the court.

Seal.

Sd/-

Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Mandi (Urban), District Mandi .

2363

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 tqykbZ] 2016@20 vk"kk<+ 1938

In the Court of Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Urban,

District Mandi, H. P.

In the matter of :—

1.

Shri Gopal Singh s/o Shri Hukam Singh, r/o Village Baniur, P.O. Padhiun, Tehsil

Sadar, District Mandi, H. P.

2.

Smt. Bandana Devi d/o Shri Roop Singh, r/o Village Ridha Kufari, P.O. Kufari, Tehsil

Padhar, District Mandi, H.P. (At present wife of Shri Gopal Singh s/o Shri Hukam Singh, r/o

Village Baniur, P.O. Padhiun, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, H. P.)

. . Applicants

Versus

General Public

Subject.—Application for the registration of Marriage under Section 15 of Special Marriage Act,

1954.

Shri Gopal Singh s/o Shri Hukam Singh, r/o Village Baniur, P.O. Padhiun, Tehsil Sadar,

District Mandi, H. P. and Smt. Bandana Devi d/o Shri Roop Singh, r/o Village Ridha Kufari, P.O.

Kufari, Tehsil Padhar, District Mandi, H.P. (At present wife of Shri Gopal Singh s/o Shri Hukam

Singh, r/o Village Baniur, P.O. Padhiun, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, H.P.) have filed an

application along with affidavits in the court of undersigned under Section 15 of Special Marriage

Act, 1954 that they have solemnized their marriage on 1-05-2016 according to Hindu rites and

customs at Dev Bala Kameshwar Baniuri, Tehsil Chachyot, District Mandi, H.P. and they are living

together as husband and wife since then. Hence, their marriage may be registered under Special

Marriage Act, 1954.

Therefore, the general public is hereby informed through this notice that any person who

has any objection regarding this marriage, can file the objection personally or in writing before this

court on or before 25-07-2016 after that no objection will be entertained and marriage will be

registered.

Issued today on 25th day of June, 2016 under my hand and seal of the court.

Seal.

Sd/-

Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Mandi (Urban), District Mandi,.

________

c vnkyr lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh] yMHkMksy] ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½

eqdnek 'kh"kZd % rdlheA

Jh nyhi pUn iq= nhuk iq= fl/kw] fuoklh djky] rglhy yMHkMksy] ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½

- - izkFkhZ

cuke

Jh gks';kj flag] eaxy nkl iq= o Jherh 'khyk nsoh iq=h lkyh] nhiw iq= 'kqd:] p.kw iq= fl/kw]

enu yky] ns'k jkt iq= o Jherh foVks nsoh iq=h Jherh lqrk nsoh] txnh'k pUn] ns'k jkt iq= nhuk]

lHkh fuoklh eqgky djky] rglhy yMHkMksy] ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½

- - Qjhdnks;e

2364

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 tqykbZ] 2016@20 vk"kk<+] 1938

izkFkZuk&i= v/khu /kkjk 123 fg0 iz0 Hkw&jktLo vf/kfu;e] 1954-

bZ'rgkj jkti=@eqL=h equknh %

mijksDr izkFkhZ us bl U;k;ky; esa Hkwfe eqnZtk [ksoV [krkSuh uEcj 10@10] fdÙkk 40] jdok

9&01&11 ch?kk okD; eqgky djky@26 dh rdlhe gsrq izkFkZuk&i= fn;k gSA Qjhdnks;e dks bl

U;k;ky; }kjk leu tkjh fd;s x;s ijUrq bu ij rkehy leu lk/kkj.k rjhds ls ugha gks jgh gSA vr%

Qjhdnks;e mijksDr dks bl bZ'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh dks mDr rdlhe ckjs dksbZ

,rjkt gks rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru fnukad 14&7&2016 dks izkr% 10-00 cts mifLFkr U;k;ky;

gksdj viuk mtj is'k djs vU;Fkk xSj gktjh dh lwjr esa dk;Zokgh ,d rjQk vey esa ykbZ tk,xhA

gLrk{kj gekjs o eksgj vnkyr ls vkt fnukad 14&6&2016 dks tkjh gq,A

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh]

yMHkMksy] ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&

vt vnkyr dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] rglhy tksfxUnz uxj] ftyk e.Mh] fg0 iz0

rkjh[k is'kh % 20&7&2016

nhid osgy iq= jkt osgy] fuoklh <syw] Mkd?kj Mksgx] rglhy tksfxUnz uxj] ftyk e.Mh]

fg0 iz0 - - izkFkhZ

cuke

vke turk

- - Qjhdnkse

tsj /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr vkosnu&i=A

nhid osgy iq= gse jkt osgy] fuoklh <syw] Mkd?kj Mksgx] rglhy tksfxUnzuxj] ftyk e.Mh]

fg0iz0 us bl U;k;ky; esa vkosnu&i= xqtkjk gS fd izkFkhZ dh okLrfod tUe frfFk 24&7&1990 gS tks

izkFkhZ ds f'k{kk vfHkys[k esa Hkh ntZ gSA ysfdu izkFkhZ dh tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r <syw ds tUe iathdj.k

vfHkys[k esa ntZ ughs gSA ftls ntZ djus ds vkns'k fn;s tkosA

vr% bZ'rgkj jkti= ds ek/;e ls loZlk/kkj.k dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks

mDr eqdnek ckjs dksbZ mtj ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 20&7&2016 dks izkr% 10-00 cts vlkyru o

odkyru bl U;k;ky; esa gkftj gksdj vius mtj ,rjkt is'k djs vU;Fkk xSj gktjh dh lwjr esa ,d

rjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tk,xhA

vkt fnukad 21&6&2016 dks gekjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr ls tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]

tksfxUnz uxj] ftyk e.Mh] fg0 iz0A

2365

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 tqykbZ] 2016@20 vk"kk<+ 1938

c vnkyr dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh ,oe~ lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke oxZ gjksyh] ftyk Åuk] fg0 iz0

oyohj dkSj

cuke

vke turk

vkosnu i= v/khu /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q jftLVªhdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-

Jherh oyohj dkSj iRuh Lo0 Jh j.kthr flag oklh i.Mksxk] mi&rglhy bZliqj] rglhy gjksyh]

ftyk Åuk us bl dk;kZy; esa fuosnu fd;k gS fd mlds ifr j.kthr flag dh e`R;q fnukad 7&4&2002

dks xkao i.Mksxk esa gqbZ gS ysfdu mldh e`R;q dh frfFk xzke iapk;r iUMksxk ds vfHkys[k esa ntZ ugha gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k dks bl b'rgkj ds ek/;e ls lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd bl ckjs fdlh O;fDr dks

dksbZ mtj ;k ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 16&7&2016 dks izkr% 10-00 cts v/kksgLrk{kjh ds dk;kZy;

U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr gksdj dj ldrk gSA

;fn mijksDr of.kZr frfFk dks fdlh Hkh O;fDr dk dksbZ mtj ,rjkt bl U;k;ky; esa izkIr ugha

gksrk gS rks bl U;k;ky; }kjk e`R;q frfFk ntZ djus gsrq xzke yyMh dks vkns'k ns fn;s tk,axsA

vkt fnukad 22&6&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj ,oa dk;kZy; U;k;ky; eksgj ls tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh ,oa lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke oxZ]

gjksyh] ftyk ÅukA

&&&&&&&

c vnkyr rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] Åuk] rglhy o ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½

uksfVl cuke-&turk vke

Jh jktho oRl

cuke

vke turk

nqj[okLr tsj /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q jftLVªhdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-

Jh jktho oRl iq= Jh t; d`".k oRl] fuoklh iksfy;k ijksgrk] rglhy Åuk] ftyk Åuk us bl

vnkyr esa nqj[okLr nh gS fd mldh ekrk jk/kk jkuh dh e`R;q xkao Åuk okMZ uEcj 10 esa fnukad

13&06&2000 dks gqbZ Fkh] ijUrq bl ckjs iapk;r ds fjdkMZ esa iathdj.k ugha djok;k tk ldkA vc

iathdj.k djus ds vkns'k fn, tk,aA

2366

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 11 tqykbZ] 2016@20 vk"kk<+] 1938

vr% bl uksfVl ds ek/;e ls loZ&lk/kkj.k dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks

mijksDr e`R;q ds iathdj.k gksus ckjs dksbZ mtj@,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 16&7&2016 dks izkr% nl cts

v/kksgLrk{kjh ds le{k vlkyru@odkyru gkftj vkdj is'k dj ldrk gSA vU;Fkk mijksDr e`R;q dk

iathdj.k djus ds vkns'k ns fn, tk,axsA

vkt fnukad------------06&2016 dks gLrk{kj esjs o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]

Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A

fu;U=d] eqnz.k rFkk ys[ku lkexzh] fgekpy izns'k] f'keyk&5 }kjk eqfnzr rFkk izdkf'kr

bysDVªkWfud gLrk{kfjr jkti=] oSclkbV http://rajpatrahimachal.nic.in ij miyC/k gS ,oe~ vkWuykbu lR;kfir fd;k tk ldrk gS