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LOCAL AUDIT DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla-2, the 8th July, 2016
No. 1-255/74 Fin (LA) Vol-8.—In supersession of this department Notification No. 1-
255/74 Fin (LA) Vol-8 dated 12.04.2016, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to promote
Shri Vijay Kumar Walia, Assistant Controller (Class-I-Gazetted) Local Audit Department, H.P. on
regular basis, who was earlier promoted purely on officiating basis under Next Below Rule, with
immediate effect.
Consequent upon the above promotion Shri Vijay Kumar Walia will remain posted for
Audit of various institutions of District Kangra and Chamba with Headquarter at Dharamshala.
By order,
Sd/-
Additional Chief Secretary (Finance).
_________
LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla, the 05th July, 2016
No: Shram (A) 6-2/2016 (Awards).—In exercise of the powers vested under section 17 (1)
of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order the
publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court
Shimla on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment Government of Himachal
Pradesh:—
Sr.No:
Case No:
Title of the Case
Date of
Award
1.
19/2015
Sh. Chamba Ram V/s The XEN, IPH, Division
Recong Peo, District Kinnaur.
31-05-2016
2.
25/2014
Sh. Shively V/s -do-
31-05-2016
3.
26/2015
Sh. Jia Lal V/s -do-
31-05-2016
4.
23/2015
Sh. Dev Raj V/S -do-
31-05-2016
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5.
25/2015
Sh. Inderpur V/S -do-
31-05-2016
6.
20/2015
Sh. Madan Singh V/S -do-
31-05-2016
7.
24/2015
Sh. Dharmani V/S -do-
31-05-2016
8.
21/2015
Sh. Santi Lal V/s -do-
31-05-2016
9.
81/2014
Sh. Guman Singh V/S Dy. Director of Horticulture, Nahan.
11-05-2016
10.
59/2014
Sh. Jeet Chand V/S M/S Patel Engineering Ltd.
18-05-2016
11.
58/2014
Sh Rajvansh Lal V/S -do-
18-05-2016
12.
60/2014
Sh. Kuldeep V/s -do-
18-05-2016
13.
17/2015
Sh. Rajesh Kumar V/s M/S Pyramid Electronics Ltd.
02-05-2016
14.
10/2015
Sh. Onkar Chand V/s M/S Cabcom Casble Ltd.
Kala Amb, Sirmour.
05-05-2016
15.
14/2011
Sh. Pritam Chand V/S M/S Kandhari Beverages Ltd.
20-05-2016
16.
38/2013
Sh. Mohinder Singh V/S Conservator of Forest
05-05-2016
17.
62/2015
Sh. Rupinder Singh V/S The XEN, IPH Division Shimla.
19-05-2016
18.
27/2010 Sh. Mehar Singh V/s M/S Ind. Swift Ltd. Parwanoo.
1-05-2016
By order,
Sd/-
Pr. Secretary ( Lab. & Emp.).
___________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P)
Ref. 19 of 2015.
Instituted on. 9.6.2015.
Decided on 31.5.2016.
Chamba Ram S/o Shri Misar Dass R/o VPO Urni, Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP.
. .Petitioner.
Vs.
1.
Executive Engineer, IPH Division Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, HP.
2.
Assistant Engineer, Sub Division Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner
: Shri G.S Negi, Advocate.
For respondent
: Shri H.N Kashyap, ADA.
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AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether non-regularization of the services of Shri Chamba Ram S/o Shri Misar Dass
R/o VPO Urni, Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP by the Executive Engineer, I&PH
Division Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, HP on completion of 8 years of continuous
service as per policy of H.P Government as alleged by the workman is legal nad
justified? If not, what relief of regularization and consequential monetary benefits the
aggrieved workman is entitled to from the employer?”
2.
Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that his services had been regularized by the
respondent department w.e.f 2015 whereas he had completed continuous service of eight years in
the year, 2002 by completing 180 days in each calendar year as required in tribal area but his
services had not been regularized within the prescribed period as mentioned for regularizing the
services of daily wager, hence, the respondent had violated the provisions of policy of State
Government. It is further stated that the services of junior persons namely Sumitra Devi, Partap and
Jagmohan have been regularized by the respondent by ignoring the eligibility and seniority of the
petitioner. It is also stated that by regularizing the services of the petitioner after 20 years from the
date of his engagement is straightway illegal and even he (petitioner) had made various oral
requests to the respondent department for considering more than 19 years services for
regularization but his such request was refused by the respondent. Against this back-drop, a prayer
has been made that the services of the petitioner be regularized from the date when the junior
persons to him became regular with full back-wages and seniority.
3.
By filing reply, the respondents had contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections had been taken qua barred by limitation, maintainability and that the
petitioner failed to fulfill the eligibility for regularization. On merits, it has been asserted that the
petitioner has not become eligible for regularization in the year, 2002 as he had not rendered 180
days in each calendar year till the year, 2008. The petitioner has been working continuously by
rendering 180 days in each calendar year from the year, 2008 and had completed eight years of
service on 31.3.2015, hence, he has been regularized to the post of beldar during the year, 2015 as
per instructions of the Government. It is further asserted that the services of the petitioner had been
engaged by the department w.e.f. 1.6.1995 but the petitioner had not rendered 180 days in each
calendar year from 1996 to 2007 whereas Smt. Sumitra Devi, Pratap and Jagmohan have fulfilled
criteria for regularization prior to the petitioner, hence, their services have been regularized. The
name of the petitioner has been considered for his regularization as per the instructions of the
Government and his services had been regularized after completion of eight years of continuous
daily waged service with 180 days in each calendar year. The respondents prayed for the dismissal
of the petition.
4. Rejoinder not filed. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which
were struck on 6.1.2016.
1. Whether the non-regularization of the services of petitioner by the respondent on
completion of eight years of continuous service as per policy of HP Government is
illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what relief of regularization and consequential
monetary benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the petition is time barred as alleged?
. .OPR.
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4.
Whether the petition is not maintainable?
. .OPR.
5.
Relief.
5. Besides having heard the learned counsels for the parties, I have also gone through the
record of the case carefully.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
No.
Issue no.2
Not entitled to any relief.
Issue no.3
No.
Issue no.4
No.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner
per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings
Issues no. 1.
7.
To prove his case, the petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered in
evidence his affidavit Ex. PW-1/A wherein he supported all the averments as stated in claim
petition. In cross-examination, he denied that he had not completed 180 days in any calendar year
from the year, 1996 to 2007 and that his services for regularization shall be counted from 2008
onwards. He further denied that his services for regularization have been completed on 31.3.2015.
He also denied that Ms. Sumitra, Pratap and Jagmohan are senior to him. He admitted that he had
been regularized in the department and is continuously working with the department.
8.
On the contrary, the respondents examined one Shri Tilak Raj Pathak, Assistant
Engineer as RW-1, who tendered in evidence affidavit Ex. RW-1/A wherein he supported almost
all the averments as stated in reply. He also tendered in evidence the mandays chart of petitioner
Ex. RW-1/B. In cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner had completed 180 days in a
calendar year. He denied that the department had not followed the government policy and also
violated the mandatory provisions of the policy. He further denied that the petitioner had worked
continuously.
9.
I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for petitioner as well as
learned ADA for the respondents and also scrutinized the record of the case minutely.
10. After the closer scrutiny of the record, it has become clear that the services of the
petitioner have been regularized by the respondent w.e.f. 22.6.2015. The case of the petitioner is
that he had completed continuous service of eight years with minimum of 180 days in each
calendar year from the date of his initial engagement in the year, 1995 and his services have not
been regularized within the prescribed period for regularizing the daily wager by the respondent in
violation of the mandatory provisions of the policy of the State Government. It is not disputed that
initially the petitioner was engaged in the year, 1995. However, the petitioner has failed to show
that he had become eligible for regularization in the year, 2002. The perusal of the mandays chart
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of the petitioner Ex. RW-1/B, shows that the petitioner has not completed 180 days (as required in
tribal area) in each calendar year w.e.f. the year, 1995 to the year, 2002 except for the year, 1995
rather he completed eight years of continuous service with minimum of 180 days in each calendar
year from the year 2008 onwards. As per mandays chart Ex. RW-1/B, the petitioner had completed
239 days in the year, 2008, 360 days in 2009, 349 days in 2010, 333 days in 2011, 338 days in
2012, 344 days in 2013 and 358 days in 2014 as such it cannot be said that the petitioner was
eligible for regularization in the year, 2002. From the perusal of the policy of State Government for
the regularization of daily waged/contingent paid workers mark C, it is clear that only the services
of those daily waged workers could be considered for regularization who have completed eight
years of continuous service with a minimum of 240 days (except where specified otherwise for the
tribal areas) as on 31.3.2011 against the available vacancies. However, the petitioner had completed
requisite period of regularization as per policy in the year, 2015 as per mandays chart Ex. RW-1/B.
Hence, it cannot be said that the services of the petitioner have not been regularized in terms of the
policy of State Government regarding regularization of daily waged/contingent paid workers.
11. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the services of Smt.
Sumitra Devi, Pratap and Jagmohan, who were juniors to the petitioner, have been regularized prior
to the petitioner by ignoring his seniority and continuity in service. However, except for the bald
statement of the petitioner, no evidence has been led by him that the services of aforesaid persons
have been regularized against the policy of the State Government. On the other hand, RW-1 has
categorically stated in his affidavit by way of evidence Ex. RW-1/A that Smt. Sumitra, Pratap and
Jagmohan had fulfilled the prescribed criteria for regularization prior to the petitioner. Hence, in the
absence of any evidence on record, it cannot be said that the seniority and continuity of the services
of the petitioner have been ignored.
12. Therefore, in view of my aforesaid discussion, it cannot be said that the
nonregularization of the services of the petitioner by the respondent on completion of eight years of
continuous service as per policy of State Government is illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, this
issue is decided against the petitioner and in favour of the respondent.
Issue No. 2
13. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1, this issue becomes redundant.
Issue no. 3
14. The learned ADA for respondents contended that the petition filed by the petitioner is
time barred. However, the law on the point is well settled that no limitation is prescribed either
under the Industrial Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for raising the Industrial Dispute. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in its various judgments has held that the relief under the Industrial
Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. It has been held by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in in (1999) 6 SCC 82, titled as Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co
operative Marketing –cumprocessing Service Society Limited and Another. that:—
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the
proceedings under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on
the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved
as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of
delay alone”
15. Therefore, the aforesaid law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various context
makes the legal position clear that there is no limitation prescribed either under the Industrial
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Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for raising the industrial dispute. The provision of Article
137 of the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the proceedings under
the Act and the relief under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on
the ground of delay. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
Issue no. 4.
16. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondents. However, the
petitioner has filed this claim petition pursuant to the reference made by the appropriate
government to this Court for adjudication and I find nothing wrong with this petition which is
perfectly maintainable. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 4, the claim of the
petitioner fails and is hereby dismissed and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in
favour of the respondents and against the petitioner. Let a copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned
to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 31st day of May, 2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P)
Ref.
: 25 of 2014.
Instituted on : 13.202014.
Decided on 31.5.2016.
Shivley S/o Shri Damodar Dass C/o Lala Som Prakash & Sons Near HP State Co-operative
Bank, Main Bazar Reckong Peo District Kinnaur, HP.
. .Petitioner.
Vs.
Executive Engineer, I&PH Division, Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, HP. . .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner
: Shri G.S Negi, Advocate.
For respondent
: Shri H.N Kashyap, ADA
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AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of services of Shri Shivley S/o Shri Damodar Dass C/o Lala
Som Prakash & Sons, Near HP State Co-operative Bank, Main Bazar Reckong Peo
District Kinnaur, HP by the Executive Engineer, I&PH Division, Reckong Peo,
District Kinnaur, HP on the pretext of allegedly attaining the age of superannuation
on 30.6.2010 by the above employer whereas as per medical certificate dated 18.9.2012
issued by Chairmancum- Senior Medical Superintendent State Medical Board,
DDUZH Shimla HP he was below 45 years during September, 2012 is legal and
justified? If not what benefits including re-instatement, amount of back-wages, salary,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from
the above employer?”
2.
In nutshell the case of the petitioner is that he was initially engaged as daily wager in
the year, 1990 by the respondent and worked as such till April, 2010 and thereafter his services
were terminated in an illegal and arbitrary manner as no notice as required under Industrial
Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as Act) was served upon him which amounts to violation of
section 25-F clause (a) and section 25-N of the Act. It is further stated that the petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding twelve months and had put more than 21 years of service with the
respondent. The petitioner repeatedly approached the respondent for his re-engagement but of no
avail and thereafter on 8.12.2011, he raised a demand notice on which the respondent had agreed to
re-engage the petitioner on production of date of birth certificate if he is found below 60 years. The
petitioner submitted his birth certificate to the respondent but without considering the birth
certificate of the petitioner, he was asked to appear before the Medical Board for his medical
examination upon which he appeared before the Medical Board DDU Hospital Shimla and was
duly examined and thereafter the Medical Board issued a medical certificate regarding his age and
a copy of which was also forwarded to respondent on 19.9.2012 and as per the medical certificate,
the age of petitioner was opined below 45 years. Against this back-drop a prayer has been made for
his re-engagement along-with back-wages, seniority and all other consequential service benefits.
3.
By filing reply, the respondent had contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections had been taken qua maintainability, estoppel and that the claim filed by the
petitioner is afterthought and based on menu plated documents. On merits, it has been asserted that
the petitioner was initially engaged as daily waged beldar in the year, 1990 and as per his mandays
chart, the petitioner left his job on his own during the years, 1990, 1991, 1993 to 1997 and again in
the years, 2004, 2005 & 2006 and since as per office record the petitioner has attained the age of 60
years on 30.6.2010, he was not issued further muster roll beyond attaining the age of 60 years under
the rules. It is further asserted that the petitioner had never completed the requisite years for his
regularization and the junior persons to the petitioner who have completed their continuous
qualifying service of eight years, were regularized according to the prevailing government policy.
The services of the petitioner were never terminated by the respondent and he has never completed
the requisite years for his regularization. The petitioner already completed 60 years as on 30.6.2010
and has also received his retrial benefits i.e gratuity amounting to ` 58442/-. It is also asserted that
the petitioner at different point of time had submitted various date of birth certificates to the
department and in the year, 2010 he submitted a form DPW-Esalary wherein he had mentioned his
date of birth as 1950 and thereafter he submitted another certificate issued by Sathaniya Vikas
Mantralya, Nepal Government wherein his date of birth has been recorded as 2030/3/30 (Vikrami
Samwat) i.e 38 years and even it is also on record that the son of petitioner named Dal Bahadur is
also working with the respondent as daily waged beldar and as per record his date of birth is
17.4.1985 i.e 27 years (in 2010), which reveals that the petitioner is only 11 years older to his son
which cannot be relied and appears to be fake. The respondent prayed for the dismissal of the
petition.
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4. Rejoinder not filed. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which
were struck on 24.9.2014.
1.
Whether the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 30.6.2010 were terminated illegally in
violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits, the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether this petition is not maintainable as alleged?
. .OPR.
4.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing this petition by his act, conduct etc.?
. .OPR.
5.
Relief.
5.
Besides having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have also gone through the
record of the case carefully.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1 No.
Issue no.2
Becomes redundant.
Issue no.3
No.
Issue no.4
Not pressed.
Relief.
Reasons for findings
Issues no.1.
7.
Ld. Counsel for petitioner contended that the petitioner had worked with the
respondent as daily waged beldar w.e.f. 1990 till April, 2010 but his services were illegally
terminated without complying with the provisions of the Act especially when he had completed
more than 240 days in twelve calendar months preceding his termination. He further contended that
the respondent without considering the Medical Certificate issued by the Medical Board in which
his age is mentioned as 40-45 years, had not issued the muster roll in his favour after April, 2010.
He also contended that respondent had retained/regularized juniors to the petitioner which is clear
cut violation of the provisions of section 25-G of the Act and also against the principles of “last
come first go” and since, the services of the petitioner were terminated in utter violation of the
provisions of the Act, he deserves to be reinstated/regularized along-with all the consequential
benefits including back wages.
8.
On the other hand, learned ADA appearing on behalf of the respondent has contended
that the services of the petitioner were never terminated but as per the record since the petitioner
had attained the age of superannuation as on 30.6.2010, no muster roll had been issued in his favour
after the age of 60 years.
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9.
To prove his case, the petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered his
affidavit Ex. PW-1/A wherein he supported almost all the averments as stated in the claim petition.
He also tendered in evidence the copy of demand notice Ex. PW-1/B, reply to demand notice Ex.
PW-1/C and date of birth certificate mark X, medical examination letter mark Y, letter regarding
issuance of birth certificate mark Z and medical certificate mark Z-1. In cross-examination, he
denied that he had not worked for eight years continuously and that he had not worked w.e.f. 1993
to 1997 and 2004 to 2006. He admitted that gratuity amount of ` 58442/ had been received by him.
He denied that he used to left the work at his choice. He denied that despite issuance of muster roll
for June, 2010, he had not worked. He denied that regarding his date of birth, he had submitted a
false certificate and that he had attained the age of 60 years.
10. PW-2 Dr. A. Banerjee has stated that he was a member of Medical Board constituted
on 18.9.2012 and examined Shir Shivley S/o Shri Damodar Dass who was medically examined for
assessment of age and vide assessment mark Z-1, the age of Shivley was assessed as per radiologist
below 45 years and clinically above 40 years. In cross-examination, he admitted that he has not
brought the original record of mark Z-1 and they have determined the age of Shivley by conducting
the Radiological examination. He further admitted that the Radiologist gives his opinion on the
basis of ossification of the bones and the age determined by the Radiologist is in the range of 2 to 3
years above or less.
11. On the contrary, the respondent examined one Shri Ankit Bisht, Assistant Engineer, as
RW-1, who tendered in evidence his affidavit Ex. RW-1/A wherein he supported almost all the
contents as made in reply. He also tendered in evidence authority letter Ex. RW-1/B, birth
certificate of the petitioner Ex. RW-1/C and mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW-1/D. In cross
examination, he admitted that initially the petitioner was engaged on daily wages beldar since 1990
and no notice was issued to the petitioner at the time of his termination. But volunteered that on
attaining the age of superannuation, he automatically stood relieved. No letter was issued to the
petitioner in this respect. He admitted that form mark A had been filled in by the department and in
the year, 2010, the department had asked the petitioner to bring his birth certificate and he had
produced the birth certificate Ex. RW-1/C before the department which was not considered. He
further admitted that the department had advised the petitioner to appear before Medical Board and
the certificate issued by the Board mark Z-1, was received by the department. He denied that
certificate mark-B has been procured fraudulently.
12. I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for petitioner as well as
learned ADA for respondent and also scrutinized the record of the case minutely.
13. After the closer scrutiny of the record, it has become clear that the petitioner was
initially engaged by the respondent as daily waged beldar in the year, 1990. It is also not disputed
that as per general principles/rules, the retirement age of class-IV employees is 60 years. As per the
case of the respondent since the petitioner has attained the age of 60 years on 30.6.2010 as per the
official record, therefore, he was not issued further muster roll beyond attaining the age of 60 years.
It is also not in dispute that the petitioner has received his retiral benefits i.e gratuity amounting to `
58,442/-. The perusal of the record reveals that the petitioner had submitted different date of birth
certificates at different points of time before the respondent. In the year, 2010 he also submitted E
salary form, mark A, in which he has mentioned his date of birth as 1950 and the aforesaid form
has been duly acknowledged by him by putting his signatures. It is not the case of the petitioner
that the aforesaid form had not been signed by him. Thereafter, the petitioner had submitted his
date of birth certificate issued by Sthaniya Vikas Mantralaya, Nepal Government, Tatopani, Jumla
wherein his date of birth has been recorded as 2030/3/30 (Vikrami Samvat) which means that in the
year, 2010 his age was about 38 years. It is also not disputed that the son of the petitioner namely
Shri Dal Bahadur is also working with the respondent as daily waged beldar and as per his service
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record his date of birth is 13.1.1985, the copy of which is mark B, which means that in the year,
2010, his age was 27 years. If both the aforesaid certificates are taken into consideration then it is
revealed that the petitioner is only 11 years older to his son which is not possible and therefore, the
certificate procured by the petitioner from Sthaniya Vikas Mantralaya, Nepal Government,
Tatopani, Jumla Ex. RW-1/C appears to be fake and cannot be relied upon.
14. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a medical certificate and in support of that he
examined PW-2 Dr. A Banerjee, who stated that the petitioner was medically examined for
assessment of age and vide certificate mark Z-1, the age of the petitioner was assessed below 45
years as per the opinion of Radiologist and clinically above 40 years. However, no original record
has been produced by the petitioner with respect to his medical examination. In a decision
reported in 1992 3 SCC 204, titled as Madan Lal Kakkad Vs. Naval Dubey and another, it has
been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the evidence given by the Medical Officer is only of an
advisory character and the expert witness is expected to put before the Court all the materials which
induced him to come to the conclusion. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads as
under:
“A medical witness called in as an expert to assist the Court is not a witness of fact and the
evidence given by the medical officer is really of an advisory character given on the basis of
the symptoms found on examination. The expert witness is expected to put before the Court
all materials inclusive of the data which induced him to come to the conclusion and
enlighten the Court on the technical aspect of the case by explaining the terms of science so
that the Court although, not an expert may form its own judgment on those materials after
giving due regard to the expert’s opinion because once the expert’s opinion is accepted, it is
not the opinion of the medical officer but of the Court.
However, in the present case no original record has been produced either by the petitioner
or by PW-2 Dr. A Banerjee, in respect of his medical examination. The Doctor has also failed to
place all the materials before this Court which induced the medical board to come to the
conclusion. Besides, the aforesaid medical certificate mark Z-1 issued by the Medical Board is only
in the form of an opinion and there is no certainty of the correct age as found in the medical
opinion. Since, there are contrary evidences regarding the date of birth of the petitioner, in that
event, it cannot be said that the age opined by the medical board is conclusive final and binding.
Hence, the aforesaid medical certificate which is in the form of only an opinion and totally contrary
to the service record of the petitioner cannot be considered to prevail upon the same in which his
year of birth has been recorded as 1950. Moreover, the petitioner slept over his right to get his date
of birth altered in the service record for more than 20 years and woke up from his deep slumber
only at the fag end of his carrier without explaining the inordinate delay. Such belated and stale
claim for alternation of date of birth recorded in the service book which has been made after more
than 20 years without any explanation for the delay cannot be considered in the absence of any
cogent and satisfactory evidence on record led by the petitioner. The burden was on the petitioner
to prove that he had not attained the age of 60 years as on 30.6.2016 but he has miserably failed to
discharge his burden. Therefore, in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, it
cannot be said that the services of the petitioner were terminated illegally.
15. The further case of the petitioner is that after the termination of his services, the
respondent had retained various persons junior to him and they have been regularized by the
department. However, except for the bald statement of the petitioner, no evidence has been led by
him to show that his juniors have been regularized by the respondent against the policy of the State
Government. The petitioner has also failed to lead any evidence with respect to the fact that he has
completed the requisite years of continuous service for regularization as per the Policy of the
Government. Moreover, as per my observations supra, the services of the petitioner were never
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terminated rather on attaining the age of superannuation, he was considered retired as on 30.6.2010,
hence, it cannot be said that the respondent had violated the provisions of sections 25-G & H of the
Act.
16. Therefore, in view of my aforesaid discussion, it cannot be said that the termination of
the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 30.6.2010 by the respondent is illegal and unjustified.
Accordingly, this issue is decided against the petitioner and in favour of the respondent.
Issue No. 2
17. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1, this issue becomes redundant.
Issue no. 3
18. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondent. However, the
petitioner has filed this claim petition pursuant to the reference made by the appropriate
government to this Court for adjudication and I find nothing wrong with this petition which is
perfectly maintainable. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
Issue no. 4
19. During the course of arguments, this issue was not pressed by the respondent, hence,
the same is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 4, the claim of the
petitioner fails and is hereby dismissed and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in
favour of the respondent and against the petitioner. Let a copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned
to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 31st day of May, 2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P)
Ref. 26 of 2015.
Instituted on. 9.6.2015.
Decided on 31.5.2016.
Jiya lal S/o Shri Mogal Dass R/o VPO Urni, Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP.
. .Petitioner.
2379
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Vs.
3.
Executive Engineer, IPH Division Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, HP.
4.
Assistant Engineer, Sub Division Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner :
Shri G.S Negi, Advocate.
For respondent :
Shri H.N Kashyap, ADA.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether non-regularization of the services of Shri Jiya lal S/o Shri Mogal Dass R/o
VPO Urni, Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP by the Executive Engineer, I&PH
Division Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, HP on completion of 8 years of continuous
service as per policy of H.P Government as alleged by the workman is legal and
justified? If not, what relief of regularization and consequential monetary benefits the
aggrieved workman is entitled to from the employer?”
2.
Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that his services had been regularized by the
respondent department w.e.f 2015 whereas he had completed continuous service of eight years in
the year, 2002 by completing 180 days in each calendar year as required in tribal area but his
services had not been regularized within the prescribed period as mentioned for regularizing the
services of daily wager, hence, the respondent had violated the provisions of policy of State
Government. It is further stated that the services of junior persons namely Sumitra Devi, Partap and
Jagmohan have been regularized by the respondent by ignoring the eligibility and seniority of the
petitioner. It is also stated that by regularizing the services of the petitioner after 20 years from the
date of his engagement is straightway illegal and even he (petitioner) had made various oral
requests to the respondent department for considering more than 19 years services for
regularization but his such request was refused by the respondent. Against this back-drop, a prayer
has been made that the services of the petitioner be regularized from the date when the junior
persons to him became regular with full back-wages and seniority.
3.
By filing reply, the respondents had contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections had been taken qua barred by limitation, maintainability and that the
petitioner failed to fulfill the eligibility for regularization. On merits, it has been asserted that the
petitioner has not become eligible for regularization in the year, 2002 as he had not rendered 180
days in each calendar year till the year, 2008. The petitioner has been working continuously by
rendering 180 days in each calendar year from the year, 2008 and had completed eight years of
service on 31.3.2015, hence, he has been regularized to the post of beldar during the year, 2015 as
per instructions of the Government. It is further asserted that the services of the petitioner had been
engaged by the department w.e.f. 1.10.1995 but the petitioner had not rendered 180 days in each
calendar year from 1996 to 2007 whereas Smt. Sumitra Devi, Pratap and Jagmohan have fulfilled
criteria for regularization prior to the petitioner, hence, their services have been regularized. The
name of the petitioner has been considered for his regularization as per the instructions of the
Government and his services had been regularized after completion of eight years of continuous
daily waged service with 180 days in each calendar year. The respondents prayed for the dismissal
of the petition.
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4. Rejoinder not filed. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which
were struck on 6.1.2016.
6.
Whether the non-regularization of the services of petitioner by the respondent on
completion of eight years of continuous service as per policy of HP Government is
illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
7. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what relief of regularization and consequential
monetary benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
8. Whether the petition is time barred as alleged?
. .OPR.
9. Whether the petition is not maintainable?
. .OPR.
10. Relief.
5.
Besides having heard the learned counsels for the parties, I have also gone through the
record of the case carefully.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
No.
Issue no.2
Not entitled to any relief.
Issue no.3
No.
Issue no.4
No.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner
per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issues no.1.
7.
To prove his case, the petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered in
evidence his affidavit Ex. PW-1/A wherein he supported all the averments as stated in claim
petition. In cross-examination, he denied that he had not completed 180 days in any calendar year
from the year, 1996 to 2007 and that his services for regularization shall be counted from 2008
onwards. He further denied that his services for regularization have been completed on 31.3.2015.
He also denied that Ms. Sumitra, Pratap and Jagmohan are senior to him. He admitted that he had
been regularized in the department and is continuously working with the department.
8.
On the contrary, the respondents examined one Shri Tilak Raj Pathak, Assistant
Engineer as RW-1, who tendered in evidence affidavit Ex. RW-1/A wherein he supported almost
all the averments as stated in reply. He also tendered in evidence the mandays chart of petitioner
Ex. RW-1/B. In cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner had completed 180 days in a
calendar year. He denied that the department had not followed the government policy and also
violated the mandatory provisions of the policy. He further denied that the petitioner had worked
continuously.
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9.
I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for petitioner as well as
learned ADA for the respondents and also scrutinized the record of the case minutely.
10. After the closer scrutiny of the record, it has become clear that the services of the
petitioner have been regularized by the respondent w.e.f. 22.6.2015. The case of the petitioner is
that he had completed continuous service of eight years with minimum of 180 days in each
calendar year from the date of his initial engagement in the year, 1995 and his services have not
been regularized within the prescribed period for regularizing the daily wager by the respondent in
violation of the mandatory provisions of the policy of the State Government. It is not disputed that
initially the petitioner was engaged in the year, 1995. However, the petitioner has failed to show
that he had become eligible for regularization in the year, 2002. The perusal of the mandays chart
of the petitioner Ex. RW-1/B, shows that the petitioner has not completed 180 days (as required in
tribal area) in each calendar year w.e.f. the year, 1995 to the year, 2002 rather he completed eight
years of continuous service with minimum of 180 days in each calendar year from the year 2008
onwards. As per mandays chart Ex. RW-1/B, the petitioner had completed 265 days in the year,
2008, 365 days in 2009, 363 days in 2010, 361 days in 2011, 366 days in 2012, 361 days in 2013
and 358 days in 2014 as such it cannot be said that the petitioner was eligible for regularization in
the year, 2002. From the perusal of the policy of State Government for the regularization of daily
waged/contingent paid workers mark C, it is clear that only the services of those daily waged
workers could be considered for regularization who have completed eight years of continuous
service with a minimum of 240 days (except where specified otherwise for the tribal areas) as on
31.3.2011 against the available vacancies. However, the petitioner had completed requisite period
of regularization as per policy in the year, 2015 as per mandays chart Ex. RW-1/B. Hence, it cannot
be said that the services of the petitioner have not been regularized in terms of the policy of State
Government regarding regularization of daily waged/contingent paid workers.
11. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the services of Smt.
Sumitra Devi, Pratap and Jagmohan, who were juniors to the petitioner, have been regularized prior
to the petitioner by ignoring his seniority and continuity in service. However, except for the bald
statement of the petitioner, no evidence has been led by him that the services of aforesaid persons
have been regularized against the policy of the State Government. On the other hand, RW-1 has
categorically stated in his affidavit by way of evidence Ex. RW-1/A that Smt. Sumitra, Pratap and
Jagmohan had fulfilled the prescribed criteria for regularization prior to the petitioner. Hence, in the
absence of any evidence on record, it cannot be said that the seniority and continuity of the services
of the petitioner have been ignored.
12. Therefore, in view of my aforesaid discussion, it cannot be said that the
nonregularization of the services of the petitioner by the respondent on completion of eight years of
continuous service as per policy of State Government is illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, this
issue is decided against the petitioner and in favour of the respondent.
Issue No. 2
13. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1, this issue becomes redundant.
Issue no. 3.
14. The learned ADA for respondents contended that the petition filed by the petitioner is
time barred. However, the law on the point is well settled that no limitation is prescribed either
under the Industrial Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for raising the Industrial Dispute. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in its various judgments has held that the relief under the Industrial
Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. It has been held by
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the Hon’ble Supreme Court in in (1999) 6 SCC 82, titled as Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-
operative Marketing –cumprocessing Service Society Limited and Another. that:-
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the
proceedings under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on
the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved
as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of
delay alone”
15. Therefore, the aforesaid law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various context
makes the legal position clear that there is no limitation prescribed either under the Industrial
Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for raising the industrial dispute. The provision of Article
137 of the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the proceedings under
the Act and the relief under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on
the ground of delay. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
Issue no. 4.
16. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondents. However, the
petitioner has filed this claim petition pursuant to the reference made by the appropriate
government to this Court for adjudication and I find nothing wrong with this petition which is
perfectly maintainable. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 4, the claim of the
petitioner fails and is hereby dismissed and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in
favour of the respondents and against the petitioner. Let a copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned
to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 31st day of May, 2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P)
Ref. 23 of 2015.
Instituted on. 9.6.2015.
Decided on 31.5.2016.
Dev Raj S/o Shri Ratten Dass R/o VPO Jani, Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP.
. .Petitioner.
2383
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+ 1938
Vs.
5.
Executive Engineer, IPH Division Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, HP.
6.
Assistant Engineer, Sub Division Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner :
Shri G.S Negi, Advocate.
For respondent :
Shri H.N Kashyap, ADA.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether non-regularization of the services of Shri Dev Raj S/o Shri Ratten Dass R/o
VPO Jani, Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP by the Executive Engineer, I&PH
Division Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, HP on completion of 8 years of continuous
service as per policy of H.P Government as alleged by the workman is legal nad
justified? If not, what relief of regularization and consequential monetary benefits the
aggrieved workman is entitled to from the employer?”
2.
Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that his services had been regularized by the
respondent department w.e.f 2015 whereas he had completed continuous service of eight years in
the year, 2002 by completing 180 days in each calendar year as required in tribal area but his
services had not been regularized within the prescribed period as mentioned for regularizing the
services of daily wager, hence, the respondent had violated the provisions of policy of State
Government. It is further stated that the services of junior persons namely Sumitra Devi, Partap and
Jagmohan have been regularized by the respondent by ignoring the eligibility and seniority of the
petitioner. It is also stated that by regularizing the services of the petitioner after 20 years from the
date of his engagement is straightway illegal and even he (petitioner) had made various oral
requests to the respondent department for considering more than 19 years services for
regularization but his such request was refused by the respondent. Against this back-drop, a prayer
has been made that the services of the petitioner be regularized from the date when the junior
persons to him became regular with full back-wages and seniority.
3.
By filing reply, the respondents had contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections had been taken qua barred by limitation, maintainability and that the
petitionerfailed to fulfill the eligibility for regularization. On merits, it has been asserted that the
petitioner has not become eligible for regularization in the year, 2002 as he had not rendered 180
days in each calendar year till the year, 2008. The petitioner has been working continuously by
rendering 180 days in each calendar year from the year, 2008 and had completed eight years of
service on 31.3.2015, hence, he has been regularized to the post of beldar during the year, 2015 as
per instructions of the Government. It is further asserted that the services of the petitioner had been
engaged by the department w.e.f. 1.6.1995 but the petitioner had not rendered 180 days in each
calendar year from 1996 to 2007 whereas Smt. Sumitra Devi, Pratap and Jagmohan have fulfilled
criteria for regularization prior to the petitioner, hence, their services have been regularized. The
name of the petitioner has been considered for his regularization as per the instructions of the
Government and his services had been regularized after completion of eight years of continuous
daily waged service with 180 days in each calendar year. The respondents prayed for the dismissal
of the petition.
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4.
Rejoinder not filed. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which
were struck on 6.1.2016.
11. Whether the non-regularization of the services of petitioner by the respondent on
completion of eight years of continuous service as per policy of HP Government is
illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
12. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what relief of regularization and consequential
monetary benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
13. Whether the petition is time barred as alleged?
. .OPR.
14. Whether the petition is not maintainable?
. .OPR.
15. Relief.
5.
Besides having heard the learned counsels for the parties, I have also gone through the
record of the case carefully.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
No.
Issue no.2
Not entitled to any relief.
Issue no.3
No.
Issue no.4
No.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner
per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issues no.1.
7.
To prove his case, the petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered in
evidence his affidavit Ex. PW-1/A wherein he supported all the averments as stated in claim
petition. In cross-examination, he denied that he had not completed 180 days in any calendar year
from the year, 1996 to 2007 and that his services for regularization shall be counted from 2008
onwards. He further denied that his services for regularization have been completed on 31.3.2015.
He also denied that Ms. Sumitra, Pratap and Jagmohan are senior to him. He admitted that he had
been regularized in the department and is continuously working with the department.
8.
On the contrary, the respondents examined one Shri Tilak Raj Pathak, Assistant
Engineer as RW-1, who tendered in evidence affidavit Ex. RW-1/A wherein he supported almost
all the averments as stated in reply. He also tendered in evidence the mandays chart of petitioner
Ex. RW-1/B. In cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner had completed 180 days in a
calendar year. He denied that the department had not followed the government policy and also
violated the mandatory provisions of the policy. He further denied that the petitioner had worked
continuously.
2385
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+ 1938
9.
I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for petitioner as well as
learned ADA for the respondents and also scrutinized the record of the case minutely.
10. After the closer scrutiny of the record, it has become clear that the services of the
petitioner have been regularized by the respondent w.e.f. 22.6.2015. The case of the petitioner is
that he had completed continuous service of eight years with minimum of 180 days in each
calendar year from the date of his initial engagement in the year, 1995 and his services have not
been regularized within the prescribed period for regularizing the daily wager by the respondent in
violation of the mandatory provisions of the policy of the State Government. It is not disputed that
initially the petitioner was engaged in the year, 1995. However, the petitioner has failed to show
that he had become eligible for regularization in the year, 2002. The perusal of the mandays chart
of the petitioner Ex. RW-1/B, shows that the petitioner has not completed 180 days (as required in
tribal area) in each calendar year w.e.f. the year, 1995 to the year, 2002 except for the year, 1996 &
1999 rather he completed eight years of continuous service with minimum of 180 days in each
calendar year from the year 2008 onwards. As per mandays chart Ex. RW-1/B, the petitioner had
completed 353 days in the year, 2008, 365 days in 2009, 362 days in 2010, 363 days in 2011, 366
days in 2012, 328 days in 2013 and 323 days in 2014 as such it cannot be said that the petitioner
was eligible for regularization in the year, 2002. From the perusal of the policy of State
Government for the regularization of daily waged/contingent paid workers mark C, it is clear that
only the services of those daily waged workers could be considered for regularization who have
completed eight years of continuous service with a minimum of 240 days (except where specified
otherwise for the tribal areas) as on 31.3.2011 against the available vacancies. However, the
petitioner had completed requisite period of regularization as per policy in the year, 2015 as per
mandays chart Ex. RW-1/B. Hence, it cannot be said that the services of the petitioner have not
been regularized in terms of the policy of State Government regarding regularization of daily
waged/contingent paid workers.
11. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the services of Smt.
Sumitra Devi, Pratap and Jagmohan, who were juniors to the petitioner, have been regularized prior
to the petitioner by ignoring his seniority and continuity in service. However, except for the bald
statement of the petitioner, no evidence has been led by him that the services of aforesaid persons
have been regularized against the policy of the State Government. On the other hand, RW-1 has
categorically stated in his affidavit by way of evidence Ex. RW-1/A that Smt. Sumitra, Pratap and
Jagmohan had fulfilled the prescribed criteria for regularization prior to the petitioner. Hence, in the
absence of any evidence on record, it cannot be said that the seniority and continuity of the services
of the petitioner have been ignored.
12. Therefore, in view of my aforesaid discussion, it cannot be said that the
nonregularization of the services of the petitioner by the respondent on completion of eight years of
continuous service as per policy of State Government is illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, this
issue is decided against the petitioner and in favour of the respondent.
Issue No. 2
13. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1, this issue becomes redundant.
Issue no. 3
14. The learned ADA for respondents contended that the petition filed by the petitioner is
time barred. However, the law on the point is well settled that no limitation is prescribed either
under the Industrial Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for raising the Industrial Dispute. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in its various judgments has held that the relief under the Industrial
2386
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+] 1938
Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. It has been held by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in in (1999) 6 SCC 82, titled as Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co
operative Marketing –cumprocessing Service Society Limited and Another. that:-
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the
proceedings under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on
the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved
as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of
delay alone”
15. Therefore, the aforesaid law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various context
makes the legal position clear that there is no limitation prescribed either under the Industrial
Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for raising the industrial dispute. The provision of Article
137 of the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the proceedings under
the Act and the relief under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on
the ground of delay. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
Issue no.4.
16. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondents. However, the
petitioner has filed this claim petition pursuant to the reference made by the appropriate
government to this Court for adjudication and I find nothing wrong with this petition which is
perfectly maintainable. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 4, the claim of the
petitioner fails and is hereby dismissed and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in
favour of the respondents and against the petitioner. Let a copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned
to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 31st day of May, 2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
__________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P.)
Ref. 25 of 2015.
Instituted on. 9.6.2015.
Decided on 31.5.2016.
Inderpur W/o Shri Khayalapur R/o VPO Jani, Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP.
. .Petitioner.
2387
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+ 1938
Vs.
7.
Executive Engineer, IPH Division Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, HP.
8.
Assistant Engineer, Sub Division Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner :
Shri G.S Negi, Advocate.
For respondent :
Shri H.N Kashyap, ADA.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether non-regularization of the services of Smt. Inderpur W/o Shri Khayalapur
R/o VPO Jani, Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP by the Executive Engineer, I&PH
Division Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, HP on completion of 8 years of continuous
service as per policy of H.P Government as alleged by the workman is legal and
justified? If not, what relief of regularization and consequential service monetary the
aggrieved workman is entitled to from the employer?”
2. Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that her services had been regularized by the
respondent department w.e.f 2015 whereas she had completed continuous service of eight years in
the year, 2002 by completing 180 days in each calendar year as required in tribal area but her
services had not been regularized within the prescribed period as mentioned for regularizing the
services of daily wager, hence, the respondent had violated the provisions of policy of State
Government. It is further stated that the services of junior persons namely Sumitra Devi, Partap and
Jagmohan have been regularized by the respondent by ignoring the eligibility and seniority of the
petitioner. It is also stated that by regularizing the services of the petitioner after 20 years from the
date of her engagement is straightway illegal and even she (petitioner) had made various oral
requests to the respondent department for considering more than 19 years services for
regularization but her such request was refused by the respondent. Against this back-drop, a prayer
has been made that the services of the petitioner be regularized from the date when the junior
persons to her became regular with full back-wages and seniority.
3.
By filing reply, the respondents had contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections had been taken qua barred by limitation, maintainability and that the
petitioner failed to fulfill the eligibility for regularization. On merits, it has been asserted that the
petitioner has not become eligible for regularization in the year, 2002 as she had not rendered 180
days in each calendar year till the year, 2008. The petitioner did not fulfill the required
academic/educational criteria accordingly her case has been sent to the Superintending Engineer for
relaxation of academic qualification. The petitioner has been working continuously by rendering
180 days in each calendar year from the year, 2008 and had completed eight years of service on
31.3.2015, hence, she has been regularized to the post of beldar during the year, 2015 as per
instructions of the Government. It is further asserted that the services of the petitioner had been
engaged by the department w.e.f. 1.6.1995 but the petitioner had not rendered 180 days in each
calendar year from 1996 to 2007 whereas Smt. Sumitra Devi, Pratap and Jagmohan have fulfilled
criteria for regularization prior to the petitioner, hence, their services have been regularized. The
name of the petitioner has been considered for his regularization as per the instructions of the
Government and her services had been regularized after completion of eight years of continuous
2388
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daily waged service with 180 days in each calendar year. The respondents prayed for the dismissal
of the petition.
4. Rejoinder not filed. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which
were struck on 6.1.2016.
16. Whether the non-regularization of the services of petitioner by the respondent on
completion of eight years of continuous service as per policy of HP Government is
illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
17. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what relief of regularization and consequential
monetary benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
18. Whether the petition is time barred as alleged?
. .OPR.
19. Whether the petition is not maintainable?
. .OPR.
20. Relief.
5.
Besides having heard the learned counsels for the parties, I have also gone through the
record of the case carefully.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under. Issue no.1 No. Issue no.2 Not entitled to any
relief.
Issue no.3
No.
Issue no.4
No.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner
per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings
Issues no.1.
7.
Before, I proceed further, it is important to mention here that to prove her case, the
petitioner has been afforded repeated opportunities in order to lead her evidence but the petitioner
has failed to lead her evidence in support of her case. Hence, vide order dated 26.4.2016, the
evidence of the petitioner was closed by the order of this Court.
8.
On the other hand, the respondents examined one Shri Tilak Raj Pathak, Assistant
Engineer as RW-1, who tendered in evidence affidavit Ex. RW-1/A wherein he supported almost
all the averments as stated in reply. He also tendered in evidence the mandays chart of petitioner
Ex. RW-1/B, letter of relaxation for regularization Ex. RW-1/C and appointment letter Ex. RW
1/D. In cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner had completed 180 days in a calendar year.
He denied that the department had not followed the government policy and also violated the
mandatory provisions of the policy. He further denied that the petitioner had worked continuously.
9.
I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for petitioner as well as
learned ADA for the respondents and also scrutinized the record of the case minutely.
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10. After the closer scrutiny of the record, it has become clear that the services of the
petitioner have been regularized by the respondent w.e.f. 15.3.2016 as is evident from the office
order dated 17.3.2016 Ex. RW-1/D. The case of the petitioner is that she had completed continuous
service of eight years with minimum of 180 days in each calendar year from the date of her initial
engagement in the year, 1995 and her services have not been regularized within the prescribed
period for regularizing the daily wager by the respondent in violation of the mandatory provisions
of the policy of the State Government. It is not disputed that initially the petitioner was engaged in
the year, 1995. However, the petitioner has failed to show that she had become eligible for
regularization in the year, 2002. The perusal of the mandays chart of the petitioner Ex. RW-1/B,
shows that the petitioner has not completed 180 days (as required in tribal area) in each calendar
year w.e.f. the year, 1995 to the year, 2002 except for the year, 1999 rather she completed eight
years of continuous service with minimum of 180 days in each calendar year from the year 2008
onwards. As per mandays chart Ex. RW-1/B, the petitioner had completed 353 days in the year,
2008, 365 days in 2009, 362 days in 2010, 363 days in 2011, 366 days in 2012, 358 days in 2013
and 361 days in 2014 as such it cannot be said that the petitioner was eligible for regularization in
the year, 2002. From the perusal of the policy of State Government for the regularization of daily
waged/contingent paid workers, it is clear that only the services of those daily waged workers could
be considered for regularization who have completed eight years of continuous service with a
minimum of 240 days (except where specified otherwise for the tribal areas) as on 31.3.2011
against the available vacancies. However, the petitioner had completed requisite period of
regularization as per policy in the year, 2015 as per mandays chart Ex. RW-1/B. Moreover, since
the petitioner did not fulfill the required criteria of educational qualification for the purpose of
regularization, hence, relaxation in academic qualification was obtained from the Superintending
Engineer by the Executive Engineer vide letter dated 10.9.2015 Ex. RW-1/C and thereafter her
services were regularized. Hence, it cannot be said that the services of the petitioner have not been
regularized in terms of the policy of State Government regarding regularization of daily
waged/contingent paid workers.
11. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the services of Smt.
Sumitra Devi, Pratap and Jagmohan, who were juniors to the petitioner, have been regularized prior
to the petitioner by ignoring her seniority and continuity in service. However, for the failure of the
petitioner to appear before this Court in order to lead evidence, it cannot be said that the services of
aforesaid persons have been regularized against the policy of the State Government. On the other
hand, RW-1 has categorically stated in his affidavit by way of evidence Ex. RW-1/A that Smt.
Sumitra, Pratap and Jagmohan had fulfilled the prescribed criteria for regularization prior to the
petitioner. Hence, in the absence of any evidence on record, it cannot be said that the seniority and
continuity of the services of the petitioner have been ignored.
12. Therefore, in view of my aforesaid discussion, it cannot be said that the
nonregularization of the services of the petitioner by the respondent on completion of eight years of
continuous service as per policy of State Government is illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, this
issue is decided against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents.
Issue No. 2
13. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1, this issue becomes redundant.
Issue no. 3
14. The learned ADA for respondents contended that the petition filed by the petitioner is
time barred. However, the law on the point is well settled that no limitation is prescribed either
under the Industrial Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for raising the Industrial Dispute. The
2390
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Hon’ble Supreme Court in its various judgments has held that the relief under the Industrial
Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. It has been held by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in in (1999) 6 SCC 82, titled as Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co
operative Marketing –cumprocessing Service Society Limited and Another. that:-
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the
proceedings under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on
the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved
as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of
delay alone”
15. Therefore, the aforesaid law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various context
makes the legal position clear that there is no limitation prescribed either under the Industrial
Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for raising the industrial dispute. The provision of Article
137 of the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the proceedings under
the Act and the relief under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on
the ground of delay. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
Issue no.4.
16. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondents. However, the
petitioner has filed this claim petition pursuant to the reference made by the appropriate
government to this Court for adjudication and I find nothing wrong with this petition which is
perfectly maintainable. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 4, the claim of the
petitioner fails and is hereby dismissed and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in
favour of the respondents and against the petitioner. Let a copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned
to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 31st day of May, 2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P.)
Ref. 20 of 2015.
Instituted on. 9.6.2015.
Decided on 31.5.2016.
Madan Singh S/o Shri Bilbar Dass R/o VPO Jani, Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP.
. .Petitioner.
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Vs.
9.
Executive Engineer, IPH Division Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, HP.
10. Assistant Engineer, Sub Division Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner :
Shri G.S Negi, Advocate.
For respondent :
Shri H.N Kashyap, ADA.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether non-regularization of the services of Shri Madan Singh S/o Shri Bilbar Dass
R/o VPO Jani, Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP by the Executive Engineer, I&PH
Division Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, HP on completion of 8 years of continuous
service as per policy of H.P Government as alleged by the workman is legal and
justified? If not, what relief of regularization and consequential monetary benefits the
aggrieved workman is entitled to from the employer?”
2.
Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that his services had been regularized by the
respondent department w.e.f 2015 whereas he had completed continuous service of eight years in
the year, 2002 by completing 180 days in each calendar year as required in tribal area but his
services had not been regularized within the prescribed period as mentioned for regularizing the
services of daily wager, hence, the respondent had violated the provisions of policy of State
Government. It is further stated that the services of junior persons namely Sumitra Devi, Partap and
Jagmohan have been regularized by the respondent by ignoring the eligibility and seniority of the
petitioner. It is also stated that by regularizing the services of the petitioner after 20 years from the
date of his engagement is straightway illegal and even he (petitioner) had made various oral
requests to the respondent department for considering more than 19 years services for
regularization but his such request was refused by the respondent. Against this back-drop, a prayer
has been made that the services of the petitioner be regularized from the date when the junior
persons to him became regular with full back-wages and seniority.
3.
By filing reply, the respondents had contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections had been taken qua barred by limitation, maintainability and that the
petitioner failed to fulfill the eligibility for regularization. On merits, it has been asserted that the
petitioner has not become eligible for regularization in the year, 2002 as he had not rendered 180
days in each calendar year till the year, 2008. The petitioner did not fulfill the required
academic/educational criteria accordingly his case has been sent to the Superintending Engineer for
relaxation of academic qualification. The petitioner has been working continuously by rendering
180 days in each calendar year from the year, 2008 and had completed eight years of service on
31.3.2015, hence, he has been regularized to the post of beldar during the year, 2015 as per
instructions of the Government. It is further asserted that the services of the petitioner had been
engaged by the department w.e.f. 1.6.1995 but the petitioner had not rendered 180 days in each
calendar year from 1996 to 2007 whereas Smt. Sumitra Devi, Pratap and Jagmohan have fulfilled
criteria for regularization prior to the petitioner, hence, their services have been regularized. The
name of the petitioner has been considered for his regularization as per the instructions of the
Government and his services had been regularized after completion of eight years of continuous
2392
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daily waged service with 180 days in each calendar year. The respondents prayed for the dismissal
of the petition.
4.
Rejoinder not filed. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which
were struck on 6.1.2016.
21. Whether the non-regularization of the services of petitioner by the respondent on
completion of eight years of continuous service as per policy of HP Government is
illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
22. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what relief of regularization and consequential
monetary benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
23. Whether the petition is time barred as alleged?
. .OPR.
24. Whether the petition is not maintainable?
. .OPR.
25. Relief.
5.
Besides having heard the learned counsels for the parties, I have also gone through the
record of the case carefully.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
No.
Issue no.2
Not entitled to any relief.
Issue no.3
No.
Issue no.4
No.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner
per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issues no.1.
7. Before, I proceed further, it is important to mention here that to prove his case, the
petitioner has been afforded repeated opportunities in order to lead his evidence but the petitioner
has failed to lead his evidence in support of his case. Hence, vide order dated 26.4.2016, the
evidence of the petitioner was closed by the order of this Court.
8.
On the other hand, the respondents examined one Shri Tilak Raj Pathak, Assistant
Engineer as RW-1, who tendered in evidence affidavit Ex. RW-1/A wherein he supported almost
all the averments as stated in reply. He also tendered in evidence the mandays chart of petitioner
Ex. RW-1/B, letter of relaxation for regularization Ex. RW-1/C and appointment letter Ex. RW
1/D. In cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner had completed 180 days in a calendar year.
He denied that the department had not followed the government policy and also violated the
mandatory provisions of the policy. He further denied that the petitioner had worked continuously.
2393
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9.
I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for petitioner as well as
learned ADA for the respondents and also scrutinized the record of the case minutely.
10. After the closer scrutiny of the record, it has become clear that the services of the
petitioner have been regularized by the respondent w.e.f. 15.3.2016 as is evident from the office
order dated 17.3.2016 Ex. RW-1/D. The case of the petitioner is that he had completed continuous
service of eight years with minimum of 180 days in each calendar year from the date of his initial
engagement in the year, 1995 and his services have not been regularized within the prescribed
period for regularizing the daily wager by the respondent in violation of the mandatory provisions
of the policy of the State Government. It is not disputed that initially the petitioner was engaged in
the year, 1995. However, the petitioner has failed to show that he had become eligible for
regularization in the year, 2002. The perusal of the mandays chart of the petitioner Ex. RW-1/B,
shows that the petitioner has not completed 180 days (as required in tribal area) in each calendar
year w.e.f. the year, 1995 to the year, 2002 except for the year, 1999 rather he completed eight
years of continuous service with minimum of 180 days in each calendar year from the year 2008
onwards. As per mandays chart Ex. RW-1/B, the petitioner had completed 353 days in the year,
2008, 365 days in 2009, 362 days in 2010, 361 days in 2011, 366 days in 2012, 363 days in 2013
and 361 days in 2014 as such it cannot be said that the petitioner was eligible for regularization in
the year, 2002. From the perusal of the policy of State Government for the regularization of daily
waged/contingent paid workers, it is clear that only the services of those daily waged workers could
be considered for regularization who have completed eight years of continuous service with a
minimum of 240 days (except where specified otherwise for the tribal areas) as on 31.3.2011
against the available vacancies. However, the petitioner had completed requisite period of
regularization as per policy in the year, 2015 as per mandays chart Ex. RW-1/B. Moreover, since
the petitioner did not fulfill the required criteria of educational qualification for the purpose of
regularization, hence, relaxation in academic qualification was obtained from the Superintending
Engineer by the Executive Engineer vide letter dated 10.9.2015 Ex. RW-1/C and thereafter his
services were regularized. Hence, it cannot be said that the services of the petitioner have not been
regularized in terms of the policy of State Government regarding regularization of daily
waged/contingent paid workers.
11. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the services of Smt.
Sumitra Devi, Pratap and Jagmohan, who were juniors to the petitioner, have been regularized prior
to the petitioner by ignoring his seniority and continuity in service. However, for the failure of the
petitioner to appear before this Court in order to lead evidence, it cannot be said that the services of
aforesaid persons have been regularized against the policy of the State Government. On the other
hand, RW-1 has categorically stated in his affidavit by way of evidence Ex. RW-1/A that Smt.
Sumitra, Pratap and Jagmohan had fulfilled the prescribed criteria for regularization prior to the
petitioner. Hence, in the absence of any evidence on record, it cannot be said that the seniority and
continuity of the services of the petitioner have been ignored.
12. Therefore, in view of my aforesaid discussion, it cannot be said that the
nonregularization of the services of the petitioner by the respondent on completion of eight years of
continuous service as per policy of State Government is illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, this
issue is decided against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents.
Issue No. 2
13. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1, this issue becomes redundant.
Issue no. 3
14. The learned ADA for respondents contended that the petition filed by the petitioner is
time barred. However, the law on the point is well settled that no limitation is prescribed either
2394
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under the Industrial Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for raising the Industrial Dispute. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in its various judgments has held that the relief under the Industrial
Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. It has been held by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in in (1999) 6 SCC 82, titled as Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co
operative Marketing –cumprocessing Service Society Limited and Another. that:-
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the
proceedings under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on
the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved
as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of
delay alone”
15. Therefore, the aforesaid law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various context
makes the legal position clear that there is no limitation prescribed either under the Industrial
Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for raising the industrial dispute. The provision of Article
137 of the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the proceedings under
the Act and the relief under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on
the ground of delay. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
Issue no.4.
16. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondents. However, the
petitioner has filed this claim petition pursuant to the reference made by the appropriate
government to this Court for adjudication and I find nothing wrong with this petition which is
perfectly maintainable. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 4, the claim of the
petitioner fails and is hereby dismissed and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in
favour of the respondents and against the petitioner. Let a copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned
to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 31st day of May, 2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P.)
Ref. 24 of 2015.
Instituted on. 9.6.2015.
Decided on 31.5.2016.
Dharam Mani W/o Shri Jiya Lal R/o VPO Urni, Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP.
. .Petitioner.
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Vs.
11. Executive Engineer, IPH Division Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, HP.
12. Assistant Engineer, Sub Division Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP. . .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner :
Shri G.S Negi, Advocate.
For respondent :
Shri H.N Kashyap, ADA.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether non-regularization of the services of Smt. Dharam Mani W/o Shri Jiya Lal
R/o VPO Urni, Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP by the Executive Engineer, I&PH
Division Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, HP on completion of 8 years of continuous
service as per policy of H.P Government as alleged by the workman is legal and
justified? If not, what relief of regularization and consequential monetary benefits the
aggrieved workman is entitled to from the employer?”
2.
Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that her services had been regularized by the
respondent department w.e.f 2015 whereas she had completed continuous service of eight years in
the year, 2002 by completing 180 days in each calendar year as required in tribal area but her
services had not been regularized within the prescribed period as mentioned for regularizing the
services of daily wager, hence, the respondent had violated the provisions of policy of State
Government. It is further stated that the services of junior persons namely Sumitra Devi, Partap and
Jagmohan have been regularized by the respondent by ignoring the eligibility and seniority of the
petitioner. It is also stated that by regularizing the services of the petitioner after 20 years from the
date of his engagement is straightway illegal and even she (petitioner) had made various oral
requests to the respondent department for considering more than 19 years services for
regularization but her such request was refused by the respondent. Against this back-drop, a prayer
has been made that the services of the petitioner be regularized from the date when the junior
persons to her became regular with full back-wages and seniority.
3.
By filing reply, the respondents had contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections had been taken qua barred by limitation, maintainability and that the
petitioner failed to fulfill the eligibility for regularization. On merits, it has been asserted that the
petitioner has not become eligible for regularization in the year, 2002 as she had not rendered 180
days in each calendar year till the year, 2008. The petitioner did not fulfill the required
academic/educational criteria accordingly his case has been sent to the Superintending Engineer for
relaxation of academic qualification. The petitioner has been working continuously by rendering
180 days in each calendar year from the year, 2008 and had completed eight years of service on
31.3.2015, hence, she has been regularized to the post of beldar during the year, 2015 as per
instructions of the Government. It is further asserted that the services of the petitioner had been
engaged by the department w.e.f. 1.6.1995 but the petitioner had not rendered 180 days in each
calendar year from 1996 to 2007 whereas Smt. Sumitra Devi, Pratap and Jagmohan have fulfilled
criteria for regularization prior to the petitioner, hence, their services have been regularized. The
name of the petitioner has been considered for her regularization as per the instructions of the
Government and her services had been regularized after completion of eight years of continuous
2396
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daily waged service with 180 days in each calendar year. The respondents prayed for the dismissal
of the petition.
4.
Rejoinder not filed. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which
were struck on 6.1.2016.
26. Whether the non-regularization of the services of petitioner by the respondent on
completion of eight years of continuous service as per policy of HP Government is
illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
27. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what relief of regularization and consequential
monetary benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
28. Whether the petition is time barred as alleged?
. .OPR.
29. Whether the petition is not maintainable?
. .OPR.
30. Relief.
5.
Besides having heard the learned counsels for the parties, I have also gone through the
record of the case carefully.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
No.
Issue no.2
Not entitled to any relief.
Issue no.3
No.
Issue no.4
No.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner
per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issues no.1.
7.
To prove her case, the petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered in
evidence her affidavit Ex. PW-1/A wherein she supported all the averments as stated in claim
petition. In cross-examination, she denied that she had not completed 180 days in any calendar year
from the year, 1996 to 2007 and that her services for regularization shall be counted from 2008
onwards. She further denied that her services for regularization have been completed on 31.3.2015.
She also denied that Ms. Sumitra, Pratap and Jagmohan are senior to her. She admitted that she had
been regularized in the department and is continuously working with the department.
8.
On the contrary, the respondents examined one Shri Tilak Raj Pathak, Assistant
Engineer as RW-1, who tendered in evidence affidavit Ex. RW-1/A wherein he supported almost
all the averments as stated in reply. He also tendered in evidence the mandays chart of petitioner
Ex. RW-1/B. In cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner had completed 180 days in a
2397
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calendar year. He denied that the department had not followed the government policy and also
violated the mandatory provisions of the policy. He further denied that the petitioner had worked
continuously.
9.
I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for petitioner as well as
learned ADA for the respondents and also scrutinized the record of the case minutely.
10. After the closer scrutiny of the record, it has become clear that the services of the
petitioner have been regularized by the respondent w.e.f. 15.3.2016 as per office order Ex. RW 1/D.
The case of the petitioner is that she had completed continuous service of eight years with
minimum of 180 days in each calendar year from the date of her initial engagement in the year,
1995 and her services have not been regularized within the prescribed period for regularizing the
daily wager by the respondent in violation of the mandatory provisions of the policy of the State
Government. It is not disputed that initially the petitioner was engaged in the year, 1995. However,
the petitioner has failed to show that she had become eligible for regularization in the year, 2002.
The perusal of the mandays chart of the petitioner Ex. RW-1/B, shows that the petitioner has not
completed 180 days (as required in tribal area) in each calendar year w.e.f. the year, 1995 to the
year, 2002 rather she completed eight years of continuous service with minimum of 180 days in
each calendar year from the year 2008 onwards. As per mandays chart Ex. RW-1/B, the petitioner
had completed 251 days in the year, 2008, 365 days in 2009, 348 days in 2010, 352 days in 2011,
338 days in 2012, 359 days in 2013 and 361 days in 2014 as such it cannot be said that the
petitioner was eligible for regularization in the year, 2002. From the perusal of the policy of State
Government for the regularization of daily waged/contingent paid workers mark C, it is clear that
only the services of those daily waged workers could be considered for regularization who have
completed eight years of continuous service with a minimum of 240 days (except where specified
otherwise for the tribal areas) as on 31.3.2011 against the available vacancies. However, the
petitioner had completed requisite period of regularization as per policy in the year, 2015 as per
mandays chart Ex. RW-1/B. Moreover, since the petitioner did not fulfill the required criteria of
educational qualification for the purpose of regularization, hence, relaxation in academic
qualification was obtained from the Superintending Engineer by the Executive Engineer vide letter
dated 10.9.2015 Ex. RW-1/C and thereafter her services were regularized. Hence, it cannot be said
that the services of the petitioner have not been regularized in terms of the policy of State
Government regarding regularization of daily waged/contingent paid workers.
11. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the services of Smt.
Sumitra Devi, Pratap and Jagmohan, who were juniors to the petitioner, have been regularized prior
to the petitioner by ignoring his seniority and continuity in service. However, except for the bald
statement of the petitioner, no evidence has been led by her that the services of aforesaid persons
have been regularized against the policy of the State Government. On the other hand, RW-1 has
categorically stated in his affidavit by way of evidence Ex. RW-1/A that Smt. Sumitra, Pratap and
Jagmohan had fulfilled the prescribed criteria for regularization prior to the petitioner. Hence, in the
absence of any evidence on record, it cannot be said that the seniority and continuity of the services
of the petitioner have been ignored.
12. Therefore, in view of my aforesaid discussion, it cannot be said that the
nonregularization of the services of the petitioner by the respondent on completion of eight years of
continuous service as per policy of State Government is illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, this
issue is decided against the petitioner and in favour of the respondent.
Issue No.2
13. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1, this issue becomes redundant.
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Issue no.3.
14. The learned ADA for respondents contended that the petition filed by the petitioner is
time barred. However, the law on the point is well settled that no limitation is prescribed either
under the Industrial Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for raising the Industrial Dispute. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in its various judgments has held that the relief under the Industrial
Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. It has been held by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in in (1999) 6 SCC 82, titled as Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co
operative Marketing –cumprocessing Service Society Limited and Another. that:—
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the
proceedings under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on
the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved
as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of
delay alone”
15. Therefore, the aforesaid law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various context
makes the legal position clear that there is no limitation prescribed either under the Industrial
Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for raising the industrial dispute. The provision of Article
137 of the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the proceedings under
the Act and the relief under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on
the ground of delay. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
Issue no.4.
16. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondents. However, the
petitioner has filed this claim petition pursuant to the reference made by the appropriate
government to this Court for adjudication and I find nothing wrong with this petition which is
perfectly maintainable. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 4, the claim of the
petitioner fails and is hereby dismissed and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in
favour of the respondents and against the petitioner. Let a copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned
to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 31st day of May, 2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
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IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P.)
Ref. 21 of 2015.
Instituted on. 9.6.2015.
Decided on 31.5.2016.
Santi Lal S/o Shri Zinpur R/o VPO Jani, Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP. . .Petitioner.
Vs.
13. Executive Engineer, IPH Division Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, HP.
14. Assistant Engineer, Sub Division Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP. . .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner :
Shri G.S Negi, Advocate.
For respondent :
Shri H.N Kashyap, ADA.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether non-regularization of the services of Shri Shanti Lal S/o Shri Zinpur R/o
VPO Jani, Tehsil Nichar, District Kinnaur, HP by the Executive Engineer, I&PH
Division Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, HP on completion of 8 years of continuous
service as per policy of H.P Government as alleged by the workman is legal and
justified? If not, what relief of regularization and consequential service monetary the
aggrieved workman is entitled to from the employer?”
2.
Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that his services had been regularized by the
respondent department w.e.f 2015 whereas he had completed continuous service of eight years in
the year, 2002 by completing 180 days in each calendar year as required in tribal area but his
services had not been regularized within the prescribed period as mentioned for regularizing the
services of daily wager, hence, the respondent had violated the provisions of policy of State
Government. It is further stated that the services of junior persons namely Sumitra Devi, Partap and
Jagmohan have been regularized by the respondent by ignoring the eligibility and seniority of the
petitioner. It is also stated that by regularizing the services of the petitioner after 20 years from the
date of his engagement is straightway illegal and even he (petitioner) had made various oral
requests to the respondent department for considering more than 19 years services for
regularization but his such request was refused by the respondent. Against this back-drop, a prayer
has been made that the services of the petitioner be regularized from the date when the junior
persons to him became regular with full back-wages and seniority.
3.
By filing reply, the respondents had contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections had been taken qua barred by limitation, maintainability and that the
petitioner failed to fulfill the eligibility for regularization. On merits, it has been asserted that the
petitioner has not become eligible for regularization in the year, 2002 as he had not rendered 180
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days in each calendar year till the year, 2008. The petitioner did not fulfill the required
academic/educational criteria accordingly his case has been sent to the Superintending Engineer for
relaxation of academic qualification. The petitioner has been working continuously by rendering
180 days in each calendar year from the year, 2008 and had completed eight years of service on
31.3.2015, hence, he has been regularized to the post of beldar during the year, 2015 as per
instructions of the Government. It is further asserted that the services of the petitioner had been
engaged by the department w.e.f. 1.6.1995 but the petitioner had not rendered 180 days in each
calendar year from 1996 to 2007 whereas Smt. Sumitra Devi, Pratap and Jagmohan have fulfilled
criteria for regularization prior to the petitioner, hence, their services have been regularized. The
name of the petitioner has been considered for his regularization as per the instructions of the
Government and his services had been regularized after completion of eight years of continuous
daily waged service with 180 days in each calendar year. The respondents prayed for the dismissal
of the petition.
4. Rejoinder not filed. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which
were struck on 6.1.2016.
31. Whether the non-regularization of the services of petitioner by the respondent on
completion of eight years of continuous service as per policy of HP Government is
illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
32. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what relief of regularization and consequential
monetary benefits the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
33. Whether the petition is time barred as alleged?
. .OPR.
34. Whether the petition is not maintainable?
. .OPR.
35. Relief.
5.
Besides having heard the learned counsels for the parties, I have also gone through the
record of the case carefully.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
No.
Issue no.2
Not entitled to any relief.
Issue no.3
No.
Issue no.4
No.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner
per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issues no.1.
7.
Before, I proceed further, it is important to mention here that to prove his case, the
petitioner has been afforded repeated opportunities in order to lead his evidence but the petitioner
has failed to lead his evidence in support of his case. Hence, vide order dated 26.4.2016, the
evidence of the petitioner was closed by the order of this Court.
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8.
On the other hand, the respondents examined one Shri Tilak Raj Pathak, Assistant
Engineer as RW-1, who tendered in evidence affidavit Ex. RW-1/A wherein he supported almost
all the averments as stated in reply. He also tendered in evidence the mandays chart of petitioner
Ex. RW-1/B, letter of relaxation for regularization Ex. RW-1/C and appointment letter Ex. RW
1/D. In cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner had completed 180 days in a calendar year.
He denied that the department had not followed the government policy and also violated the
mandatory provisions of the policy. He further denied that the petitioner had worked continuously.
9.
I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for petitioner as well as
learned ADA for the respondents and also scrutinized the record of the case minutely.
10. After the closer scrutiny of the record, it has become clear that the services of the
petitioner have been regularized by the respondent w.e.f. 15.3.2016 as is evident from the office
order dated 17.3.2016 Ex. RW-1/D. The case of the petitioner is that he had completed continuous
service of eight years with minimum of 180 days in each calendar year from the date of his initial
engagement in the year, 1995 and his services have not been regularized within the prescribed
period for regularizing the daily wager by the respondent in violation of the mandatory provisions
of the policy of the State Government. It is not disputed that initially the petitioner was engaged in
the year, 1995. However, the petitioner has failed to show that he had become eligible for
regularization in the year, 2002. The perusal of the mandays chart of the petitioner Ex. RW-1/B,
shows that the petitioner has not completed 180 days (as required in tribal area) in each calendar
year w.e.f. the year, 1995 to the year, 2002 except for the year, 1999 rather he completed eight
years of continuous service with minimum of 180 days in each calendar year from the year 2008
onwards. As per mandays chart Ex. RW-1/B, the petitioner had completed 353 days in the year,
2008, 365 days in 2009, 365 days in 2010, 363 days in 2011, 366 days in 2012, 365 days in 2013
and 361 days in 2014 as such it cannot be said that the petitioner was eligible for regularization in
the year, 2002. From the perusal of the policy of State Government for the regularization of daily
waged/contingent paid workers, it is clear that only the services of those daily waged workers could
be considered for regularization who have completed eight years of continuous service with a
minimum of 240 days (except where specified otherwise for the tribal areas) as on 31.3.2011
against the available vacancies. However, the petitioner had completed requisite period of
regularization as per policy in the year, 2015 as per mandays chart Ex. RW-1/B. Moreover, since
the petitioner did not fulfill the required criteria of educational qualification for the purpose of
regularization, hence, relaxation in academic qualification was obtained from the Superintending
Engineer by the Executive Engineer vide letter dated 10.9.2015 Ex. RW-1/C and thereafter his
services were regularized. Hence, it cannot be said that the services of the petitioner have not been
regularized in terms of the policy of State Government regarding regularization of daily
waged/contingent paid workers.
11. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the services of Smt.
Sumitra Devi, Pratap and Jagmohan, who were juniors to the petitioner, have been regularized prior
to the petitioner by ignoring his seniority and continuity in service. However, for the failure of the
petitioner to appear before this Court in order to lead evidence, it cannot be said that the services of
aforesaid persons have been regularized against the policy of the State Government. On the other
hand, RW-1 has categorically stated in his affidavit by way of evidence Ex. RW-1/A that Smt.
Sumitra, Pratap and Jagmohan had fulfilled the prescribed criteria for regularization prior to the
petitioner. Hence, in the absence of any evidence on record, it cannot be said that the seniority and
continuity of the services of the petitioner have been ignored.
12. Therefore, in view of my aforesaid discussion, it cannot be said that the
nonregularization of the services of the petitioner by the respondent on completion of eight years of
continuous service as per policy of State Government is illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, this
issue is decided against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents.
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Issue No. 2
13. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1, this issue becomes redundant.
Issue no. 3
14. The learned ADA for respondents contended that the petition filed by the petitioner is
time barred. However, the law on the point is well settled that no limitation is prescribed either
under the Industrial Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for raising the Industrial Dispute. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in its various judgments has held that the relief under the Industrial
Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. It has been held by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in in (1999) 6 SCC 82, titled as Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co
operative Marketing –cumprocessing Service Society Limited and Another. that:-
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the
proceedings under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on
the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved
as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of
delay alone”
15. Therefore, the aforesaid law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various context
makes the legal position clear that there is no limitation prescribed either under the Industrial
Disputes Act or under the Limitation Act for raising the industrial dispute. The provision of Article
137 of the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the proceedings under
the Act and the relief under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on
the ground of delay. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
Issue no. 4.
16. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondents. However, the
petitioner has filed this claim petition pursuant to the reference made by the appropriate
government to this Court for adjudication and I find nothing wrong with this petition which is
perfectly maintainable. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 4, the claim of the
petitioner fails and is hereby dismissed and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in
favour of the respondents and against the petitioner. Let a copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned
to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 31st day of May, 2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
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IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P.).
Ref. No. 81 of 2014.
Instituted on. 26.12.2014.
Decided on 11.5.2016.
Guman Singh S/o Shri Geeta Ram R/o Village & P.O Purwala, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District
Sirmour, HP, ex-beldar Horticulture Department.
. .Petitioner.
Vs.
1.
The Deputy Director, Horticulture with headquarters at Nahan District Sirmour, HP.
2.
The Horticulture Development Officer, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, HP.
3.
The PCDO Dhaulakaun, District Sirmour, HP.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner : Shri Abhyendra Gupta, Advocate.
For respondents : Shri H.N Kashyap, ADA.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of services of Shri Guman Singh S/o Shri Geeta Ram R/o
Village Puruwala Kanshipur, P.O Purewala, District Sirmour, HP employed as piece
rated worker during November, 2012 by the Deputy Director Horticulture Nahan
District Sirmour, HP is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back-wages,
seniority, past service beneftis and compensation the above worker is entitled to from
the above employer (s)?”
2.
Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that he was serving as beldar in Horticulture
Department at Dhaulakaun District Sirmour, HP w.e.f. November, 2010 and completed 240 days in
a calendar year but his services were disengaged in the year, 2012 without following the mandatory
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act) as no notice or any sort
of compensation was given to him. It is further stated that the petitioner met the concerned
authorities several times but nothing has happened except false assurances. It is also stated that the
petitioner is not gainfully employed. Against this back-drop a prayer has been made for his re
instatement, along-with back-wages and other consequential service benefits.
3.
By filing reply, the respondents had contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections had been taken that the petitioner has no locus standi to file this petition as
he had worked under the invitation of quotations, no jurisdiction and estoppel. On merits, it has
been asserted that the petitioner never served as beldar or daily wager with the respondents as the
work was awarded to him after publishing advertisement and as such he had only worked on bill
basis by calculating his work hours and quantum of work during the period from September, 2010
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to March, 2012 and he was paid on the basis of bills raised by him duly verified by the incharge
concerned, hence, the petitioner is not covered under the provisions of the Act and as such no
notice or any compensation was required for his dis-engagement. It is further asserted that the
petitioner was engaged and dis-engaged on the requirement of seasonal Horticultural works and no
assurance was given to him for re-engagement. The respondent prayed for the dismissal of the
claim petition.
4.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed his allegations by denying those of the
respondents.
5.
Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
5.1.2016.
36. Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner during November, 2012 by the
respondent is illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
37. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what relief of service benefits, the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
38. Whether the petitioner has no locus standi to file the present case as alleged? . .OPR.
39. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the case as alleged?
. .OPR.
40. Relief.
6. Besides having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have also gone through the
record of the case carefully.
7.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
No.
Issue no.2
Becomes redundant.
Issue no.3
No.
Issue no. 4
Not pressed.
Relief.
Reference answered against the petitioner and in favour of respondents per
operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issues no.1.
8.
Ld. Counsel for petitioner contended that the petitioner had worked as daily wager
with the respondent w.e.f. November, 2010 till November, 2012 and his services have been
terminated orally without following the mandatory provisions of the Act. He further contended that
the respondents had engaged other daily wagers in the department and retained juniors to the
petitioner which is clear cut violation of the provisions of section 25-G & H of the Act and also
against the principles of “last come first go” and since, the services of the petitioner were
terminated in utter violation of the provisions of the Act, he deserves to be reinstated along-with all
the consequential benefits including back wages.
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9.
On the other hand, learned ADA appearing for the respondents contended that the
petitioner never served as beldar or daily wager with the respondents as the work was awarded to
him after publishing advertisement and as such he had only worked on bill basis by calculating his
working hours and quantum of work during the period from September, 2010 to March, 2012 and
he was paid on the basis of bills raised by him duly verified by the incharge concerned, hence, the
petitioner is not covered under the provisions of the Act and as such no notice or any compensation
was required for his dis-engagement.
10. To prove his case, the petitioner examined two PWs including himself. The petitioner
stepped into the witness box as PW-1 to depose that in the month of December, 2010, he had joined
as beldar/graftner with the respondents department and his services were terminated in the month of
November, 2012 without any notice and compensation. He had worked continuously from
December, 2010 to November, 2012 without any break and completed 240 days in every year. He
was being paid salary @ ` 3200 to ` 3300. At the time of his termination, he was assured that on the
availability of work, his services would be re-engaged. Along-with him, four other beldars were
also working who were regular beldars. After his termination, he is unemployed. In cross
examination, he admitted that before engaging him, quotations were invited. He further admitted
that some other persons also sent their quotations but the work was allotted to him. He also
admitted that no record has been annexed by him to show that he had worked for more than 240
days.
11. PW-2 Shri Ranjot Singh has stated that he is working as beldar in Horticulture
department and his services had been regularized w.e.f. 1998 and he knows the petitioner who had
worked with him w.e.f. September, 2010 to April, 2012. In cross-examination, he expressed his
ignorance that the petitioner was engaged temporarily on bill basis by the department. He denied
that the work of cutting and pruning is of seasonal in nature and that the work which was allotted to
the petitioner was seasonal and the services of the petitioner had been engaged on contract basis.
12. On the contrary, the respondents examined one Shri Sant Ram Sharma, Horticulture
Development Officer as RW-1, who tendered his affidavit Ex, RW-1/A in examination-inchief
wherein he supported all the averments as made in reply He also tendered in evidence copies of
advertisement Ex. RW-1/B -1 to Ex. RW-1/B-6, copies of bills Ex. RW-1/C-1 to Ex. RW-1/C-17
and copy of detail of bill Ex. RW-1/D. In cross-examination, he stated that the petitioner had
worked under his supervision in the year, 2011 and he was doing cutting, pruning and grafting
work. The services of the petitioner were taken on the availability of the work and except him no
one else was engaged on quotation basis. No muster roll/ attendance register is maintained with
respect to the workers on quotation basis and there are three beldars who are working in his office.
The petitioner used to work with the regular beldars at times and he was paid on the basis of bills
raised by him.
13. I have considered the respective contentions of the learned counsel for petitioner and
learned ADA for the respondents and also scrutinized the record of the case minutely.
14. After the closer scrutiny of the record of the case, it has become clear that the work
was awarded to the petitioner after publishing the advertisement Ex. Rw-1/B-1 wherein quotations
were invited for the work of grafting, pruning etc. on contract basis. The petitioner had submitted
his quotation Ex. RW-1/B-4 and on the basis of rates given by him the work was allotted to him. In
crossexamination, also the petitioner admitted that he had submitted the quotations and on the basis
of rates given by him the work was allotted to him. Therefore, it is clear from the record that the
services of the petitioner have not been engaged by the respondents as daily rated beldar/worker
rather he had worked on contract with the respondents on bill basis. The respondents have also
placed on record the copies of bills Ex. RW-1/C-1 to Ex. RW-1/C-17, which shows that the
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payments for the work, done by the petitioner from time to time have been received by him which
is also clear from the cross-examination of petitioner wherein he identified his signatures on the
bills. Therefore, it stands duly proved on record that the services of the petitioner had not been
engaged on daily wages basis but he had been engaged on the basis of need of work by inviting
quotations. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2006) 6 SCC 221 incase titled as
Reserve Bank Of India Vs. Gopi Nath Sharma & Another that workman not appointed to any
regular post but engaged on the basis of need of work on day to day basis, had no right to the post.
The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“22. In our view, respondent No.1 was not appointed to any regular post but was only
engaged on the basis of the need of the work on day to-day basis and he has no right to the
post and that his dis-engagement cannot be treated as arbitrary………………..”
Apart from it, it was further held in 2006 LLR 68 SC titled as Punjab State Electricity
Board V. Darbara Singh and in 2006 LLR 1009 SC. titled as Municipal Council Samrala V.
Surhwinder Kaur that when material on record established that engagement of workman was for
specific period as such his termination will be excluded as per the provisions of section 2(oo)(bb)
of the I.D Act and hence, no retrenchment compensation will be payable on his termination even
when he has worked for more than 240 days in the preceding 12 calendar months.
15. Thus, having regard to the above cited rulings and entire evidence on record, it can
safely be concluded that the petitioner was engaged for specific period on bill basis by inviting
quotations and as such it does not lie in the mouth of petitioner to claim his reengagement on the
basis of his previous work with the respondent and even if it is proved on record that the petitioner
had completed 240 working days in a calendar year preceding his termination even then he is not
entitled to be reengaged in service by giving him the protection under section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 as it is now well settled principle of law that the engagement made for specific
period comes to an end by the efflux of time and the person on such post can have no right to
continue on the post and it does not matter even if he had worked for more than 240 working days
in any 12 calendar months preceding his termination.
16. Now, adverting to the other aspect of the case, it is also the case of the petitioner that
he was terminated by the respondents in violation of the provisions of sections 25-G and H of the
Act. However, since the petitioner has failed to prove on record that he was engaged as daily rated
beldar/worker by the respondents, hence, the applicability of the provisions of sections 25-G & H
does not arise.
17. Therefore, in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said
that the services of the petitioner have been illegally terminated by the respondents. Accordingly,
issue No. 1 is decided in favour of the respondents and against the petitioner.
Issue No.2
18. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1, this issue becomes redundant.
Issue no.3.
19. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondents which could go to
show that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the present case. Hence, in the absence of any
evidence on record, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents.
Issue no.4.
20. During the course of arguments, the learned ADA has not pressed the aforesaid issue,
hence, the same is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents.
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Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 4, the claim of the
petitioner fails and is hereby dismissed and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in
favour of the respondents and against the petitioner. Let a copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned
to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 11th day of May, 2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P.)
Ref. 59 of 2014.
Instituted on. 11.8.2014.
Decided on 18.5.2016.
Jeet Chand S/o Shri Ram Lal R/o VPO Barang, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur, HP.
. .Petitioner.
Vs.
The General Manager, Patel Engineering Ltd., Shongthong Karcham HE Project (450 MW)
Near State Bank of Patiala, Village & P.O Khwangi, Tehsil Kalpa District Kinnaur, HP.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner :
Shri Niranjan Verma, Advocate.
For respondent :
Already ex-parte.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of services of Shri Jeet Chand S/o Shri Ram Lal R/o VPO
Barang, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur, HP by the General Manager, Patel
Engineering Ltd., Shongthong Karcham HEP Project (450 MW) Near State Bank of
Patiala, Village & P.O Khwangi, Tehsil Kalpa District Kinnaur, HP w.e.f. 29th /30th
October, 2013 without following the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is
legal and justified? If not, what amount of back-wages, seniority, past service benefits
and compensation, the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employer?”
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2.
In nutshell the case of the petitioner is that he had worked as driver LTV since
12.3.2013 to the entire satisfaction of the respondent till 29.10.2013 but his services were
terminated illegally without assigning any reason, issuing any notice and conducting any enquiry
w.e.f. 29.10.2013 and even no opportunity of being heard was afforded to him despite the fact that
he had completed 180 days in a calendar year/preceding year being the tribal area. It is further
stated that juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. It is also stated
that the petitioner time and again requested the respondent to set aside the illegal order dated
29.10.2013 and to reinstate him but of no avail and thereafter he raised industrial dispute under
section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as to Act). Against his back
drop a prayer has been made for his reinstatement in service alongwith all consequential service
benefits including back-wages.
3.
By filing reply, the respondent had contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections had been taken qua maintainability, that the respondent being contractor
does not fall within the definition of “industry”, the petitioner has not approached this Court with
clean hands and estoppel. On merits, it is admitted that the petitioner was working as driver
LMV/LTV (Ambulance) with the respondent but it is denied that he was working w.e.f. 12.3.2013
and his services were terminated without assigning any lawful reason. It is asserted that the
petitioner had joined the services w.e.f. 9.3.2013 and his services had been rightly dismissed as he
was involved in repetitive acts of disobeying the orders of his superiors and spoiled the work
culture of the respondent for which he was issued various show cause notices on different
occasions and as such he was afforded sufficient opportunities to mend his ways and to submit his
reply in writing but he failed to do so, hence, his services were terminated. The respondent prayed
for the dismissal of the petition.
4.
Rejoinder not filed. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which
were struck on 7.10.2015.
1.
Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 29th /30th October,
2013 is in violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what relief of service benefits, the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the petition is not maintainable as alleged?
. .OPR.
4.
Relief.
5.
Besides having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, I have also gone through
the record of the case carefully.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
Yes.
Issue no.2
Entitled to reinstatement with seniority and continuity but without back-
wages.
Issue no.3
No.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the petitioner and against respondent per
operative part of award.
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Reasons for findings.
Issues no.1.
7.
Ld. Counsel for petitioner contended that the petitioner had worked with the
respondent as driver LMV w.e.f. 12.3.2013 till 29.10.2013 but his services were illegally
terminated without complying with the provisions of the Act especially when being tribal area he
had completed more than 180 days in twelve calendar months preceding his termination. He further
contended that the respondent had retained juniors to the petitioner which is clear cut violation of
the provisions of section 25-G of the Act and also against the principles of “last come first go” and
since, the services of the petitioner were terminated in utter violation of the provisions of the Act,
he deserves to be reinstated along-with all the consequential benefits including back wages.
8.
To prove his case, the petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 to depose that
he was appointed as driver to drive the Ambulance on 11.3.2013 by the respondent and his work
was satisfactory and no warning was ever issued to him. His services were terminated by the
respondent vide office order dated 29.10.2013, Ex. PW-1/A because he raised the lawful demands
of the workers and the copy of demand charter is Ex. PW-1/B. No enquiry was conducted before
terminating his services. He had completed 180 days in a calendar year. In cross-examination, he
denied that he had received the termination letter and that any enquiry was conducted before
terminating his service.
9.
Before, I proceed further, it is important to mention here that the evidence of the
petitioner was closed on 4.3.2016 and thereafter the case was listed for the evidence of the
respondent on 5.4.2016 on which date at the request of learned counsel for the respondent, the case
was adjourned to 2.5.2016 for the evidence of the respondent but none appeared on behalf of the
respondent and vide order dated 2.5.2016, the respondent was proceeded against ex-parte.
10. I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for petitioner and also
scrutinized the record of the case minutely.
11. After the closer scrutiny of the record, it has become clear that the petitioner was
working as driver (Ambulance) with the respondent and admittedly he had joined the services on
9.3.2013. It is also the case of the respondent that as per office order dated 29.10.2013, the services
of the petitioner were terminated. Therefore, it has become clear that the petitioner had completed
180 days (in tribal area) in twelve calendar months preceding his termination. However, the
respondent in its reply has stated that the services of the petitioner were disengaged due to the
reason that he was involved in acts of disobeying the orders of his superiors and has been spoiling
the work culture of the respondent and he was also issued various show cause notices on different
occasions for willful disobedience of the orders of his superiors, deliberately casing financial loss
to the respondent and also for taking part in antiestablishment activities and even the petitioner was
afforded sufficient opportunities to submit his reply but he failed to submit the same. But there is
nothing on record to suggest that any opportunity of being heard was afforded to the petitioner by
the respondent before terminating his services. The petitioner was never asked to answer any
charges as no chargesheet was issued to him and no enquiry was held before terminating his
services, on the basis of the alleged misconduct. Since, the petitioner had completed 180 days (in
tribal area) in twelve calendar months preceding his termination, it was the duty of the respondent
that a reasonable opportunity of being heard should have been afforded to the petitioner and proper
enquiry should have been held before terminating his services. In D. K Yadav Vs. M/s J.M A
Industries Ltd. as reported in 1993-1 Supreme Court Service Law Judgments -221, the Hon’ble
Apex Court has held as under:
“Reasonable opportunity be given to the employee concerned to put forth his case and
proper enquiry be held before terminating his service.”
2410
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In a recent judgment of our Hon’ble High Court in ILR-XLV (VI) 938 titled as
Gurcharan Singh Deceased through his LR’s Vs. State of HP and ors. the workman was
arrested and was convicted of the offence punishable under section 324 of the IPC and he was
terminated without conducting any enquiry. The Hon’ble High Court has held that his termination
could not have been ordered without conducting any enquiry as the workman had completed 240
days and was therefore entitled to the enquiry. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads
as under:
“8. The moot question is whether termination can be ordered without conducting any
inquiry? The answer is in the negative for the following reasons:
9.
……………………………………..
10. While going through the impugned award and the writ petition, one comes to an
inescapable conclusion that the termination of deceased Gurcharan Singh was made
without following the mandate of law.
11. ……………………………………..
12. …………………………………….
13. In the instant case, deceased Gurcharan Singh had completed 240 days in a calendar
year, as discussed and held by the Labour Court, after scanning the evidence, the
inquiry was required, not to speak of only issuance of the notice.
Thus, keeping in view the law laid down (supra), the termination of the services of the
petitioner without conducting any enquiry and without affording reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the petitioner is in utter violation of the principles of natural justice. Moreover, before
terminating the services of the petitioner, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have complied
with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act which lay down certain conditions precedent to the
retrenchment of a workman (workmen) and requires the employer to comply with those conditions
as per clauses (a) to (c) which are mandatory in nature. In 2010 (5) SCC 497 titled as Anoop
Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public Health division no.1, Panipat (Haryana), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that the termination of the services of an employee by way of retrenchment
without complying with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act is a nullity. The relevant extract
of aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed in
any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an
employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions enumerated in Clauses (a)
and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are satisfied. In terms of Clause (a), the employer is
required to give to the workman one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu of the notice. Clause (b) casts a duty upon the
employer to pay to the workman at the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to
fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof
in excess of six months.
17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Act is mandatory
and
non-compliance
thereof
renders
the
retrenchment
of
an
employee
nullity……………..”
12. Therefore, in view of my aforesaid discussion, as it is clear that the petitioner had
worked for more than 180 days in the tribal area in twelve calendar months preceding his
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termination, the respondent was under the legal obligation to comply with the provisions of the
section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act before terminating his services. But, no such compliance
was made by the respondent, hence, there is violation of section 25-F of the Act, on the part of
respondent.
13. The learned counsel of the petitioner also contended that at the time of the termination
of the petitioner, the respondent had retained his juniors who are still working as such the
respondent had violated the principles of “last come first go”. However, no evidence has been led
by him to prove that the persons junior to him have been retained by the respondent. Hence, in the
absence of any evidence on record, the case of the petitioner does not fall under section 25-G of the
Act.
14. Thus, having regard to my foregoing discussion and in view of law laid down (supra), I
have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the termination of the services of the petitioner
w.e.f. 29th /30th October, 2013, without conducting enquiry and without complying with the
provisions of section 25-F of the Act is illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, this issue is decided in
favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue no. 2.
15. Since, I have held under issue no.1 above that the termination of services of the
petitioner by the respondent without following the provisions of the Act is improper, illegal and
unjustified, hence, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in service with seniority and
continuity. 16. Now, the question which arises for consideration, before this Court is as to whether
the petitioner is entitled to full back wages as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In
(2009) 1 SCC 20, Kanpur Electricity Supply Company Limited Vs. Shamim Mirza, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that once the order of termination of services of an employee is
set-aside, ordinarily, the relief of reinstatement is available to him. However, the entitlement of an
employee to get reinstated does not necessarily result in payment of full or partial back-wages,
which is independent of reinstatement. It has further been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
2010 (1) SLJ S.C 70, M/s Ritu Marbals Vs. Prabhakant Shukla that full back wages cannot be
granted mechanically, upon an order of termination be declared illegal. It is further held that
reinstatement must not be accompanied by payment of full back wages even for the period when
the workman remained out of service and contributed little or nothing to the Industry.
17. Moreover, the petitioner was under an obligation to prove by leading cogent evidence
that he was not gainfully employed after the termination of his services. The initial burden is on the
workman/employee to show that he was not gainfully employed as held by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 363 titled as Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and
another Vs. S.C Sharma that:
“16…………..When, the question of determining the entitlement of a person to back-wages
is concerned, the employee has to show that he was not gainfully employed. The initial
burden is on him. After and if he places materials in that regard, the employer can bring on
record materials to rebut the claim…………..”
18. In the present case, the petitioner has failed to discharge his burden by placing any
material on record that he was not gainfully employed after his termination/disengagement.
Therefore, in view of the entire evidence, on record, coupled with the rulings (supra), I have no
hesitation in holding that the petitioner is not entitled to any back-wages. Accordingly, issue no.2 is
partly decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
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Issue no. 3.
19. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondent. For the failure of
the respondent to lead any evidence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 3, the claim of the
petitioner succeeds and is hereby allowed with the result, the petitioner is ordered to be reinstated
in service with seniority and continuity. However, the petitioner is not entitled to any back-wages
and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in the
official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 18th day of May, 2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P.)
Ref. 58 of 2014.
Instituted on. 11.8.2014.
Decided on 18.5.2016.
Rajvansh Lal S/o Shri Jeet Ram R/o VPO Meber (Ralli), Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur,
HP.
. .Petitioner.
Vs.
The General Manager, Patel Engineering Ltd., Shongthong Karcham HE Project (450 MW)
Near State Bank of Patiala, Village & P.O Khwangi, Tehsil Kalpa District Kinnaur, HP.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner :
Shri Niranjan Verma, Advocate.
For respondent :
Already ex-parte.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
2413
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“Whether termination of services of Shri Rajvansh Lal S/o Shri Jeet Ram R/o VPO
Ralli (Meber), Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur, HP by the General Manager, Patel
Engineering Ltd., Shongthong Karcham HEP Project (450 MW) Near State Bank of
Patiala, Village & P.O Khwangi, Tehsil Kalpa District Kinnaur, HP w.e.f. 29th /30th
October, 2013 without following the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is
legal and justified? If not, what amount of back-wages, seniority, past service benefits
and compensation, the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
In nutshell the case of the petitioner is that he had worked as store helper since
20.1.2013 to the entire satisfaction of the respondent till 29.10.2013 but his services were
terminated illegally without assigning any reason, issuing any notice and conducting any enquiry
w.e.f. 29.10.2013 and even no opportunity of being heard was afforded to him despite the fact that
he had completed 180 days in a calendar year/preceding year being the tribal area. It is further
stated that juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. It is also stated
that the petitioner time and again requested the respondent to set aside the illegal order dated
29.10.2013 and to reinstate him but of no avail and thereafter he raised industrial dispute under
section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as to Act). Against his back
drop a prayer has been made for his reinstatement in service alongwith all consequential service
benefits including back-wages.
3.
By filing reply, the respondent had contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections had been taken qua maintainability, that the respondent being contractor
does not fall within the definition of “industry”, the petitioner has not approached this Court with
clean hands and estoppel. On merits, it is admitted that the petitioner was working as store helper
with the respondent but it is denied that he was working w.e.f. 20.1.2013 and his services were
terminated without assigning any lawful reason. It is asserted that the petitioner had joined the
services w.e.f. 20.2.2013 and his services had been rightly dismissed as he was involved in
repetitive acts of disobeying the orders of his superiors and spoiled the work culture of the
respondent for which he was issued various show cause notices on different occasions and as such
he was afforded sufficient opportunities to mend his ways and to submit his reply in writing but he
failed to do so, hence, his services were terminated. The respondent prayed for the dismissal of the
petition.
4.
Rejoinder not filed. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which
were struck on 7.10.2015.
1.
Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 29th /30th October,
2013 is in violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as alleged? . .OPP.
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what relief of service benefits, the petitioner is
entitled to? . .OPP.
3.
Whether the petition is not maintainable as alleged?
. .OPR.
4.
Relief.
5.
Besides having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, I have also gone through
the record of the case carefully.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
Yes.
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Issue no.2
Entitled to reinstatement with seniority and continuity but without back-
wages.
Issue no.3
No.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the petitioner and against respondent per
operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issues no.1.
7.
Ld. Counsel for petitioner contended that the petitioner had worked with the
respondent as store helper w.e.f. 20.1.2013 till 29.10.2013 but his services were illegally terminated
without complying with the provisions of the Act especially when being tribal area he had
completed more than 180 days in twelve calendar months preceding his termination. He further
contended that the respondent had retained juniors to the petitioner which is clear cut violation of
the provisions of section 25-G of the Act and also against the principles of “last come first go” and
since, the services of the petitioner were terminated in utter violation of the provisions of the Act,
he deserves to be reinstated along-with all the consequential benefits including back wages.
8.
To prove his case, the petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 to depose that
he was appointed as store helper on 20.1.2013 by the respondent and on 28.10.2013, they have
submitted the demand charter to the management regarding the implementation of Labour Laws in
the respondent company. His services were terminated by the respondent on 29.10.2013 without
complying with the mandatory provisions of the Act as neither any notice was served nor any
enquiry was conducted against him and even no compensation was paid to him. He had worked
w.e.f. 20.1.2013 till 29.10.2013 and completed 180 days in a calendar year. He had worked in tribal
area and his termination letter is mark PA. His junior Shri Chet Ram is still working with the
respondent management. In cross-examination, he denied that the company had issued any show
cause notice to him. He further denied that his services were terminated after holding enquiry.
9.
Before, I proceed further, it is important to mention here that the evidence of the
petitioner was closed on 4.3.2016 and thereafter the case was listed for the evidence of the
respondent on 5.4.2016 on which date at the request of learned counsel for the respondent, the case
was adjourned to 2.5.2016 for the evidence of the respondent but none appeared on behalf of the
respondent and vide order dated 2.5.2016, the respondent was proceeded against ex-parte.
10. I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for petitioner and also
scrutinized the record of the case minutely.
11. After the closer scrutiny of the record, it has become clear that the petitioner was
working as a store helper with the respondent and admittedly he had joined the services on
20.2.2013. It is also the case of the respondent that as per office order dated 29.10.2013, the
services of the petitioner were terminated. Therefore, it has become clear that the petitioner had
completed 180 days (in tribal area) in twelve calendar months preceding his termination. However,
the respondent in its reply has stated that the services of the petitioner were disengaged due to the
reason that he was involved in acts of disobeying the orders of his superiors and has been spoiling
the work culture of the respondent and he was also issued various show cause notices on different
occasions for willful disobedience of the orders of his superiors, deliberately casing financial loss
to the respondent and also for taking part in antiestablishment activities and even the petitioner was
afforded sufficient opportunities to submit his reply but he failed to submit the same. But there is
2415
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+ 1938
nothing on record to suggest that any opportunity of being heard was afforded to the petitioner by
the respondent before terminating his services. The petitioner was never asked to answer any
charges as no chargesheet was issued to him and no enquiry was held before terminating his
services, on the basis of the alleged misconduct. Since, the petitioner had completed 180 days (in
tribal area) in twelve calendar months preceding his termination, it was the duty of the respondent
that a reasonable opportunity of being heard should have been afforded to the petitioner and proper
enquiry should have been held before terminating his services. In D. K Yadav Vs. M/s J.M A
Industries Ltd. as reported in 1993-1 Supreme Court Service Law Judgments -221, the Hon’ble
Apex Court has held as under:
“Reasonable opportunity be given to the employee concerned to put forth his case and
proper enquiry be held before terminating his service.”
In a recent judgment of our Hon’ble High Court in ILR-XLV (VI) 938 titled as
Gurcharan Singh Deceased through his LR’s Vs. State of HP and ors. the workman was
arrested and was convicted of the offence punishable under section 324 of the IPC and he was
terminated without conducting any enquiry. The Hon’ble High Court has held that his termination
could not have been ordered without conducting any enquiry as the workman had completed 240
days and was therefore entitled to the enquiry. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads
as under:
“8. The moot question is whether termination can be ordered without conducting any
inquiry? The answer is in the negative for the following reasons:
9.
……………………………………..
10. While going through the impugned award and the writ petition, one comes to an
inescapable conclusion that the termination of deceased Gurcharan Singh was made
without following the mandate of law.
11. ……………………………………..
12. …………………………………….
13. In the instant case, deceased Gurcharan Singh had completed 240 days in a calendar
year, as discussed and held by the Labour Court, after scanning the evidence, the
inquiry was required, not to speak of only issuance of the notice.
Thus, keeping in view the law laid down (supra), the termination of the services of the
petitioner without conducting any enquiry and without affording reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the petitioner is in utter violation of the principles of natural justice. Moreover, before
terminating the services of the petitioner, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have complied
with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act which lay down certain conditions precedent to the
retrenchment of a workman (workmen) and requires the employer to comply with those conditions
as per clauses (a) to (c) which are mandatory in nature. In 2010 (5) SCC 497 titled as Anoop
Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public Health division no.1, Panipat (Haryana), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that the termination of the services of an employee by way of retrenchment
without complying with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act is a nullity. The relevant extract
of aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed in
any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an
2416
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+] 1938
employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions enumerated in
Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are satisfied. In terms of Clause (a), the
employer is required to give to the workman one month’s notice in writing indicating
the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu of the notice. Clause (b) casts a
duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at the time of retrenchment,
compensation equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of
continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.
17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Act is mandatory
and
non-compliance
thereof
renders
the
retrenchment
of
an
employee
nullity……………..”
12. Therefore, in view of my aforesaid discussion, as it is clear that the petitioner had
worked for more than 180 days in the tribal area in twelve calendar months preceding his
termination, the respondent was under the legal obligation to comply with the provisions of the
section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act before terminating his services. But, no such compliance
was made by the respondent, hence, there is violation of section 25-F of the Act, on the part of
respondent.
13. The learned counsel of the petitioner also contended that at the time of the termination
of the petitioner, the respondent had retained his juniors who are still working as such the
respondent had violated the principles of “last come first go”. However, except for the bald
statement of the petitioner as PW-1, no other evidence has been led by him to prove that the
persons junior to him have been retained by the respondent. Hence, in the absence of any cogent
and satisfactory evidence on record, the case of the petitioner does not fall under section 25-G of
the Act.
14. Thus, having regard to my foregoing discussion and in view of law laid down (supra), I
have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the termination of the services of the petitioner
w.e.f. 29th /30th October, 2013, without conducting enquiry and without complying with the
provisions of section 25-F of the Act is illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, this issue is decided in
favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue no. 2.
15. Since, I have held under issue no.1 above that the termination of services of the
petitioner by the respondent without following the provisions of the Act is improper, illegal and
unjustified, hence, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in service with seniority and
continuity.
16. Now, the question which arises for consideration, before this Court is as to whether the
petitioner is entitled to full back wages as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In
(2009) 1 SCC 20, Kanpur Electricity Supply Company Limited Vs. Shamim Mirza, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that once the order of termination of services of an employee is
set-aside, ordinarily, the relief of reinstatement is available to him. However, the entitlement of an
employee to get reinstated does not necessarily result in payment of full or partial back-wages,
which is independent of reinstatement. It has further been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
2010 (1) SLJ S.C 70, M/s Ritu Marbals Vs. Prabhakant Shukla that full back wages cannot be
granted mechanically, upon an order of termination be declared illegal. It is further held that
reinstatement must not be accompanied by payment of full back wages even for the period when
the workman remained out of service and contributed little or nothing to the Industry.
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17. Moreover, the petitioner was under an obligation to prove by leading cogent evidence
that he was not gainfully employed after the termination of his services. The initial burden is on the
workman/employee to show that he was not gainfully employed as held by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 363 titled as Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and
another Vs. S.C Sharma that:
“16. …………..When, the question of determining the entitlement of a person to back
wages is concerned, the employee has to show that he was not gainfully employed. The
initial burden is on him. After and if he places materials in that regard, the employer can
bring on record materials to rebut the claim…………..”
18. In the present case, the petitioner has failed to discharge his burden by placing any
material on record that he was not gainfully employed after his termination/disengagement.
Therefore, in view of the entire evidence, on record, coupled with the rulings (supra), I have no
hesitation in holding that the petitioner is not entitled to any back-wages. Accordingly, issue no.2 is
partly decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue no.3.
19. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondent. For the failure of
the respondent to lead any evidence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 3, the claim of the
petitioner succeeds and is hereby allowed with the result, the petitioner is ordered to be reinstated
in service with seniority and continuity. However, the petitioner is not entitled to any back-wages
and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in the
official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 18th day of May, 2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
__________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P.)
Ref. 60 of 2014.
Instituted on. 11.8.2014.
Decided on 18.5.2016.
Kuldeep S/o Shri Jeet Ram R/o Village Powari, P.O Shongtong, Tehsil Kalpa, District
Kinnaur, HP.
. .Petitioner.
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Vs.
The General Manager, Patel Engineering Ltd., Shongthong Karcham HE Project (450 MW)
Near State Bank of Patiala, Village & P.O Khwangi, Tehsil Kalpa District Kinnaur, HP.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner :
Shri Niranjan Verma, Advocate.
For respondent :
Already ex-parte.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of services of Shri Kuldeep S/o Shri Jeet Ram R/o Village
Powari, P.O Shongtong, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur, HP by the General Manager,
Patel Engineering Ltd., Shongthong Karcham HEP Project (450 MW) Near State
Bank of Patiala, Village & P.O Khwangi, Tehsil Kalpa District Kinnaur, HP w.e.f.
29th /30th October, 2013 without following the provisions of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back-wages, seniority, past
service benefits and compensation, the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
In nutshell the case of the petitioner is that he had worked as heavy vehicle driver since
11.3.2013 to the entire satisfaction of the respondent till 29.10.2013 but his services were
terminated illegally without assigning any reason, issuing any notice and conducting any enquiry
w.e.f. 29.10.2013 and even no opportunity of being heard was afforded to him despite the fact that
he had completed 180 days in a calendar year/preceding year being the tribal area. It is further
stated that juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. It is also stated
that the petitioner time and again requested the respondent to set aside the illegal order dated
29.10.2013 and to reinstate him but of no avail and thereafter he raised industrial dispute under
section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as to Act). Against his back
drop a prayer has been made for his reinstatement in service along-with all consequential service
benefits including back-wages.
3.
By filing reply, the respondent had contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections had been taken qua maintainability, that the respondent being contractor
does not fall within the definition of “industry”, the petitioner has not approached this Court with
clean hands and estoppel. On merits, it is admitted that the petitioner was working as heavy vehicle
driver with the respondent but it is denied that he was working w.e.f. 11.3.2013 and his services
were terminated without assigning any lawful reason. It is asserted that the petitioner had joined the
services w.e.f. 2.3.2013 and his services had been rightly dismissed as he was involved in repetitive
acts of disobeying the orders of his superiors and spoiled the work culture of the respondent for
which he was issued various show cause notices on different occasions and as such he was afforded
sufficient opportunities to mend his ways and to submit his reply in writing but he failed to do so,
hence, his services were terminated. The respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
4.
Rejoinder not filed. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which
were struck on 7.10.2015.
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1.
Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 29th /30th October,
2013 is in violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what relief of service benefits, the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the petition is not maintainable as alleged?
. .OPR.
4.
Relief.
5.
Besides having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, I have also gone through
the record of the case carefully.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
Yes.
Issue no.2
Entitled to reinstatement with seniority and continuity but without back-
wages.
Issue no.3
No.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the petitioner and against respondent per
operative part of award.
Reasons for findings
Issues no. 1
7.
Ld. Counsel for petitioner contended that the petitioner had worked with the
respondent as heavy vehicle driver w.e.f. 11.3.2013 till 29.10.2013 but his services were illegally
terminated without complying with the provisions of the Act especially when being tribal area he
had completed more than 180 days in twelve calendar months preceding his termination. He further
contended that the respondent had retained juniors to the petitioner which is clear cut violation of
the provisions of section 25-G of the Act and also against the principles of “last come first go” and
since, the services of the petitioner were terminated in utter violation of the provisions of the Act,
he deserves to be reinstated along-with all the consequential benefits including back wages.
8.
To prove his case, the petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 to depose that
he was appointed as driver on 11.3.2013 by the respondent and on 28.10.2013, they have submitted
the demand charter to the management regarding the implementation of Labour Laws in the
respondent company. His services were terminated by the respondent on 29.10.2013 without
complying with the mandatory provisions of the Act as neither any notice was served nor any
enquiry was conducted against him and even no compensation was paid to him. He had worked
w.e.f. 11.3.2013 till 29.10.2013 and completed 180 days in a calendar year. He had worked in tribal
area and his termination letter is mark PA. His juniors S/Shri Jai Pal Rajesh Kumar and
Dharmender are still working with the respondent management. In cross-examination, he denied
that the company had issued any show cause notice to him. He further denied that his services were
terminated after holding enquiry.
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9.
Before, I proceed further, it is important to mention here that the evidence of the
petitioner was closed on 4.3.2016 and thereafter the case was listed for the evidence of the
respondent on 5.4.2016 on which date at the request of learned counsel for the respondent, the case
was adjourned to 2.5.2016 for the evidence of the respondent but none appeared on behalf of the
respondent and vide order dated 2.5.2016, the respondent was proceeded against ex-parte.
10. I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for petitioner and also
scrutinized the record of the case minutely.
11. After the closer scrutiny of the record, it has become clear that the petitioner was
working as heavy vehicle driver with the respondent and admittedly he had joined the services on
2.3.2013. It is also the case of the respondent that as per office order dated 29.10.2013, the services
of the petitioner were terminated. Therefore, it has become clear that the petitioner had completed
180 days (in tribal area) in twelve calendar months preceding his termination. However, the
respondent in its reply has stated that the services of the petitioner were disengaged due to the
reason that he was involved in acts of disobeying the orders of his superiors and has been spoiling
the work culture of the respondent and he was also issued various show cause notices on different
occasions for willful disobedience of the orders of his superiors, deliberately casing financial loss
to the respondent and also for taking part in antiestablishment activities and even the petitioner was
afforded sufficient opportunities to submit his reply but he failed to submit the same. But there is
nothing on record to suggest that any opportunity of being heard was afforded to the petitioner by
the respondent before terminating his services. The petitioner was never asked to answer any
charges as no chargesheet was issued to him and no enquiry was held before terminating his
services, on the basis of the alleged misconduct. Since, the petitioner had completed 180 days (in
tribal area) in twelve calendar months preceding his termination, it was the duty of the respondent
that a reasonable opportunity of being heard should have been afforded to the petitioner and proper
enquiry should have been held before terminating his services. In D. K Yadav Vs. M/s J.M A
Industries Ltd. as reported in 1993-1 Supreme Court Service Law Judgments -221, the Hon’ble
Apex Court has held as under:
“Reasonable opportunity be given to the employee concerned to put forth his case and
proper enquiry be held before terminating his service.”
In a recent judgment of our Hon’ble High Court in ILR-XLV (VI) 938 titled as
Gurcharan Singh Deceased through his LR’s Vs. State of HP and ors. the workman was
arrested and was convicted of the offence punishable under section 324 of the IPC and he was
terminated without conducting any enquiry. The Hon’ble High Court has held that his termination
could not have been ordered without conducting any enquiry as the workman had completed 240
days and was therefore entitled to the enquiry. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads
as under:
“8. The moot question is whether termination can be ordered without conducting any
inquiry? The answer is in the negative for the following reasons:
9.
……………………………………..
10. While going through the impugned award and the writ petition, one comes to an
inescapable conclusion that the termination of deceased Gurcharan Singh was made
without following the mandate of law.
11. ……………………………………..
12. …………………………………….
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13. In the instant case, deceased Gurcharan Singh had completed 240 days in a calendar
year, as discussed and held by the Labour Court, after scanning the evidence, the
inquiry was required, not to speak of only issuance of the notice.
Thus, keeping in view the law laid down (supra), the termination of the services of the
petitioner without conducting any enquiry and without affording reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the petitioner is in utter violation of the principles of natural justice. Moreover, before
terminating the services of the petitioner, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have complied
with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act which lay down certain conditions precedent to the
retrenchment of a workman (workmen) and requires the employer to comply with those conditions
as per clauses (a) to (c) which are mandatory in nature. In 2010 (5) SCC 497 titled as Anoop
Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public Health division no.1, Panipat (Haryana), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that the termination of the services of an employee by way of retrenchment
without complying with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act is a nullity. The relevant extract
of aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed in
any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an
employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions enumerated in
Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are satisfied. In terms of Clause (a), the
employer is required to give to the workman one month’s notice in writing indicating
the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu of the notice. Clause (b) casts a
duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at the time of retrenchment,
compensation equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of
continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.
17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Act is mandatory
and
non-compliance
thereof
renders
the
retrenchment
of
an
employee
nullity……………..”
12. Therefore, in view of my aforesaid discussion, as it is clear that the petitioner had
worked for more than 180 days in the tribal area in twelve calendar months preceding his
termination, the respondent was under the legal obligation to comply with the provisions of the
section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act before terminating his services. But, no such compliance
was made by the respondent, hence, there is violation of section 25-F of the Act, on the part of
respondent.
13. The learned counsel of the petitioner also contended that at the time of the termination
of the petitioner, the respondent had retained his juniors who are still working as such the
respondent had violated the principles of “last come first go”. However, except for the bald
statement of the petitioner as PW-1, no other evidence has been led by him to prove that the
persons junior to him have been retained by the respondent. Hence, in the absence of any cogent
and satisfactory evidence on record, the case of the petitioner does not fall under section 25-G of
the Act.
14. Thus, having regard to my foregoing discussion and in view of law laid down (supra), I
have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the termination of the services of the petitioner
w.e.f. 29th /30th October, 2013, without conducting enquiry and without complying with the
provisions of section 25-F of the Act is illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, this issue is decided in
favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
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Issue no. 2.
15. Since, I have held under issue no.1 above that the termination of services of the
petitioner by the respondent without following the provisions of the Act is improper, illegal and
unjustified, hence, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in service with seniority and
continuity.
16. Now, the question which arises for consideration, before this Court is as to whether the
petitioner is entitled to full back wages as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In
(2009) 1 SCC 20, Kanpur Electricity Supply Company Limited Vs. Shamim Mirza, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that once the order of termination of services of an employee is
set-aside, ordinarily, the relief of reinstatement is available to him. However, the entitlement of an
employee to get reinstated does not necessarily result in payment of full or partial back-wages,
which is independent of reinstatement. It has further been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
2010 (1) SLJ S.C 70, M/s Ritu Marbals Vs. Prabhakant Shukla that full back wages cannot be
granted mechanically, upon an order of termination be declared illegal. It is further held that
reinstatement must not be accompanied by payment of full back wages even for the period when
the workman remained out of service and contributed little or nothing to the Industry.
17. Moreover, the petitioner was under an obligation to prove by leading cogent evidence
that he was not gainfully employed after the termination of his services. The initial burden is on the
workman/employee to show that he was not gainfully employed as held by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 363 titled as Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and
another Vs. S.C Sharma that:
“16…………..When, the question of determining the entitlement of a person to back-wages
is concerned, the employee has to show that he was not gainfully employed. The initial
burden is on him. After and if he places materials in that regard, the employer can bring on
record materials to rebut the claim…………..”
18. In the present case, the petitioner has failed to discharge his burden by placing any
material on record that he was not gainfully employed after his termination/disengagement.
Therefore, in view of the entire evidence, on record, coupled with the rulings (supra), I have no
hesitation in holding that the petitioner is not entitled to any back-wages. Accordingly, issue no.2 is
partly decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue no. 3.
19. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondent. For the failure of
the respondent to lead any evidence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 3, the claim of the
petitioner succeeds and is hereby allowed with the result, the petitioner is ordered to be reinstated
in service with seniority and continuity. However, the petitioner is not entitled to any back-wages
and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in the
official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned to records.
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Announced in the open Court today on this 18th day of May, 2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
___________
2.5.2016.
Present:
None for the petitioner.
Shri R.K Khidtta, Advocate for respondent.
It is 10: 30 AM. Case called twice but none appeared on behalf of the petitioner. Be called
again.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
__________
Case called again.
Present:
None for the petitioner.
Shri R.K Khidtta, Advocate for respondent.
It is 12:55 PM case called again but none appeared on behalf of the petitioner. Be called
after lunch.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
__________
Case called after lunch.
Present:
None for the petitioner.
Shri R.K Khidtta, Advocate for respondent.
It is 3:40 PM. Case called repeatedly in pre and post lunch sessions but none appeared on
behalf of the petitioner despite the fact that for today, the case was listed for filing of claim being
last opportunity but neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared before this Court and to file
claim petition which shows that the petitioner is not interested to pursue his claim arising out of the
reference which has been sent by the appropriate government to this Court for adjudication, hence,
this Court is left with no other alternative but to decide the reference on the basis of material
whatsoever available on file. The reference sent by the appropriate government for adjudication is
as under:
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“Whether termination of the services of Shri Rajesh Kumar S/o Shri RoshanLal R/o
Village Patta, P.O Kallar, TeshilSadar, District Bilaspur HP w.e.f. 3.6.2012 by the
Managing Director/Employer, M/s Pyramid Electronics, Village Snade, P.O Manpura,
Tehsil Nalagarh, District Solan, HP without complying with the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back-
wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to
from the above employer?”
In the absence of any claim petition and evidence on behalf of petitioner, it cannot be held
that the termination of the services of petitioner w.e.f. 3.6.2012 by the respondent without
complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is illegal and unjustified. Hence,
the reference is answered against the petitionerand the award is passed accordingly. Let a copy of
this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after
completion be consigned to records.
Announced:
(SushilKukreja)
2.5.2016.
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
__________
5.5.2016.
Present:
None.
This case is being listed for the service of the petitioner from 17.3.2015 and thereafter as
many as eight times the notices were issued/sent for the service of the petitioner on the address
given by the Labour Commissioner on reference itself. Today, also the case is listed for the service
of petitioner. The notice issued to the petitioner received back with the report that the petitioner is
working in some company at Rajasthan and the notice has been duly received by his wife at the
given address. Therefore, it is deemed to be a proper service as per the provision contained in order
5 rule 15 CPC. The notice was also sent to the petitioner through registered AD and the postal
acknowledgement has also been received back duly served. Moreover, it is relevant to mention that
the Labour Commissioner has also informed the petitioner about the present reference by sending a
copy of this reference to him. So, petitioner was having knowledge that the reference was sent to
this Court by the Labour Commissioner. Thus, he could have himself appeared before this Court in
order to file his claim.
In the light of aforesaid facts, it appears that the petitioner is not interested to pursue his
claim. Therefore, to further adjourn the case would be a futile exercise. The following reference
qua the termination of services of petitioner was received from appropriate government for
adjudication:
“Whether termination of the services of Shri Onkar Chand S/Shri BihariLal R/o
Village Ramed, P.O Ramed, Tehsil and District Kangra, HP w.e.f. 12/17.9.2013 by the
Employer/ General Manager M/s Cabcom Cable Ltd., Suketi Road Kala Amb Tehsil
Nahan District Sirmour, HP without complying with the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back-wages, seniority, past service
benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”
However, in the absence of any claim petition and evidence on behalf of petitioner, it
cannot be held that his services were wrongly and illegally terminated by the respondent. Hence,
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the reference is answered against the petitioner and the award is passed accordingly. Let a copy of
this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in official gazette. File, after
completion be consigned to records.
Announced:
(SushilKukreja)
5.5.2016.
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
__________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P.)
Ref. No. 14 of 2011.
Instituted on. 26.5.2011.
Decided on 20.5.2016.
1.
Pritam Chand s/o Shri Lehar Chand, R/o Village Jhamech, P.O Balakropi, Tehsil
Jaisinghpur, District Kangra, HP.
2.
Rajiv Shah S/o Shri Uttam Shah R/o Basantbihar House no. 1899, Kalka, District
Panchkula Haryana.
3.
Sanjeev Kumar C/o Kapril Electronics, Sai Road Baddi, Near UCO Bank Tehsil
Nalagarh, District Solan HP.
4.
Bhagat Ram S/o Shri Balelu Ram, R/o Village Kalami, P.O Bhakhra, Tehsil Sri Naina
Devi Ji, District Bilaspur, HP.
5.
Shri Bali Mohd., S/o Shri Shafi Mohd., R/o Village Jhinda, P.O Nanakpur, Tehsil
Kalka, District Panchkula, Haryana.
6.
Surinder Singh S/o Shri Iqubal Singh R/o Village Jhainda, P.O Nanakpur, Tehsil
Kalka, District Panchkula, Haryana.
7.
Joginder Singh S/o Shri Lachha Ram R/o Village Khulni, P.O Bhakhra, Tehsil Shir
Naina Devi, District Bilaspur, HP.
8.
Anand Ram S/o Shri Negi Ram R/o Village Vetarighar, P.O Deghah, Tehsil MJikosin,
District Almorah, Uttranchal.
9.
Kuldeep Singh S/o Shri Bhalau R/o Village & P.O Chimor, Tehsil Dehra District
Kangra, HP.
10. Bhupinder Singh S/o Shri Krishan Chand R/o Village Bihara, P.O Bhatar, Tehsil Amb,
District Una, HP.
. .Petitioners.
Vs.
The Manager M/s Kandhri Beverages, Ltd., Kasha Baddi, District Solan, HP. . .Respondent.
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Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioners :
Shri R.K Khidtta, Advocate.
For respondent :
Shri Rajesh Kashyap, Advocate.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of the services of Shri Pritam Chand S/o Shri Lehar Chand &
ten others workman (list attached) by the Manager M/s Kandhari Beverages Ltd.,
Village Kasha Baddi, District Solan, HP w.e.f. 7.3.2006 without complying with the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? If not, what
relief of service benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is
entitled to?”
2.
Before, I proceed further, it is important to mention here that vide order dated
3.6.2014, the name of original petitioner no.3 Surinder Singh (since deceased) has been deleted and
the common reference, aforesaid, was decided against him for the failure of his LR’s to move this
Court in order to bring them on record. It is also important to mention here that a common
reference has been sent by the appropriate Government on behalf of eleven workmen including Shri
Pritam Chand & 10 others to the Ld. Presiding Judge, HP Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court,
Dharamshala where the same was tried and when the reference was listed for the remaining
evidence of the respondent, the same was sent to this Court vide order dated 21.12.2010 on the
point of jurisdiction and thereafter the reference was reregistered in this Court. Earlier all the eleven
workers have filed separate statements of claims before the Ld. Labour Court, Dharamshala which
were lateron amended vide order dated 4.9.2014.
3.
Facts in brief as narrated in all the claim petitions filed by the petitioners, which are
necessary for deciding/answering the present reference are as under:
4.
All the petitioners have been employed on regular basis as helpers by the respondent
on the basis of qualification and completing all the necessary formalities. Petitioners S/Shri
Joginder Singh (petitioner no. 8), Bhupinder Singh (petitioner no. 11), Bhagat Ram (petitioner no.
5), were appointed as helpers in the month of March, 1999, petitioners S/Shri Rajiv Singh
(petitioner no. 2), Pritam Chand (petitioner no.1), Sanjeev Kumar (petitioner no.4), Anand Ram
(petitioner no.9), Surinder Singh (petitioner no.7), and Kuldeep Singh (petitioner no.10) were
appointed as helpers in the year, 1998 and Shri Bali Mohd. (petitioner no. 6), was appointed as
helper in the month of March 2002. The petitioners have worked for more than 240 days with the
respondent company in the each calendar year and despite the fact that there was lot of work
available with the respondent company, the services of the petitioners have been terminated by an
order w.e.f. 6.3.2006 in utter violation of the mandatory provisions of law as envisaged under
Industrial Disputes Act, (hereinafter referred as Act) more specifically sections 25-B, 25-F, 25-G &
H of the Act and even no opportunity of being heard was afforded to the petitioners before
terminating their services. It is further stated in the claim petitions that before issuing the
chargesheet no show cause notice was issued by the respondent company and not only this no fair
and proper enquiry was conducted. The enquiry officer had not conducted the enquiry fairly as
proper opportunity to defend the case was not given to the petitioners and principles of natural
justice was also not followed by the enquiry officer as such the report of the enquiry officer cannot
be looked into. Not only this, the punishment of the dismissal of the petitioners is also
disproportionate. While terminating the services of the petitioners, the demand notices dated
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26.9.2005 and 5.10.2005 submitted by the petitioners and other workers were pending adjudication
before the conciliation officer and the respondent company had not taken the approval/permission
from this Court as such the termination of the services of the petitioners is illegal and the same
deserves to be declared as null & void. The respondent company had not followed the mandatory
and statutory provisions as contained under section 25-F of the Act as such on this score also the
termination was illegal, null & void. It is further asserted that after the illegal termination of the
petitioners, the respondent company retained juniors to them and also engaged fresh hands in
violation of the provisions of sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act. Against this back-drop a common
prayer has been made by all the petitioners to set aside the termination order dated 7.3.2006 and to
re-instate them with all the consequential service benefits including back-wages.
5.
By filing a reply on behalf of Pritam Chand, the respondent had contested the claims of
the petitioners wherein preliminary objections had been taken qua maintainability, the petitioner
had not approached this Court with clean hands and that this Court has no jurisdiction to try and
decide the claim petition. On merits, it has been denied that the petitioner carried out the work
honestly, diligently, attentively and with great zeal without any complaint. The services of the
petitioner had been terminated as punishment for misconduct by way of disciplinary action on the
basis of proper enquiry conducted after giving adequate opportunity of being heard to the
petitioner. It is admitted that the petitioner had worked for more than 240 days in each calendar
year and the work was of continuous nature. It is asserted that the chargesheet dated 6.12.2005 was
issued to the petitioner which was duly replied by him on 26.12.2005 but the reply of the petitioner
was not found satisfactory and domestic enquiry was conducted and the services of the petitioner
were terminated after giving adequate opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. It is denied that
before issuing the chargesheet, no show cause notice was issued to the petitioner. Since, the
services of the petitioner had been terminated on the basis of enquiry, hence, the question of
preference to the retrenched workers under section 25-H does not arise. The petitioner was assigned
the duty of inspecting the empty as well as filled bottles during its online process but due to
continuous willful negligence and carelessness, the petitioner failed to remove/reject dirty bottles
while performing the duty of bottle inspection and consequently dirty bottles started getting filled
up and finally entered in to the market and the petitioner was warned verbally for the negligent
working attitude at many occasions but the petitioner failed to improve his working attitude despite
proper training, hence, he was chargesheeted after following the proper procedure of law. It is
further asserted that the application filed under sub section 2 of section 33 of the Act before the
Conciliation Officer Baddi is already on record. The respondent prayed for the dismissal of the
claim petition.
6.
Vide separate statement recorded on 4.7.2014, the learned counsel for the respondent
has stated that the reply filed to the claim of Pritam Chand be read as reply to the claim of all other
petitioners.
7.
By filing a common rejoinder to the amended reply, the petitioners have reiterated
allegations as made in the claim petitions by denying those of the respondent.
8.
Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
1.4.2009 by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Dharamshala.
41. Whether the termination of services of the petitioners by the respondent is unlawful? If
so, what relief the petitioners are entitled to?
. .OPP.
42. Whether the termination of services of the petitioners by the respondent does not
amount to “retrenchment” as defined under section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947?
. .OPR.
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43. Whether the reference is not maintainable?
. .OPR.
44. Relief.
9.
Besides having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have also gone through the
record of the case carefully.
10. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
Yes.
Issue no.2
No.
Issue no.3
No.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the petitioners and against the respondent
per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issues no.1 & 2.
11. The petitioner Shri Pritam Chand has appeared into the witness box as PW-1 and
tendered his affidavit Ex. PW-1/A in evidence wherein he supported almost all the averments as
stated in the claim petition. He also tendered in evidence documents Ex. PW-1/B to Ex. PW-1/K. In
crossexamination, he admitted that he was chargesheeted on 6.12.2005 and enquiry was got
conducted against him. He further admitted that on the basis of enquiry, he was terminated. He
denied that separate enquires had been conducted against all the petitioners but explained that a
joint enquiry was conducted. He denied that he had not performed his work honestly.
12. Petitioner Shri Rajiv Shah, stepped into the witness box as PW-2 and tendered his
affidavit Ex. PW-2/A in evidence. He also tendered in evidence documents Ex. PW-2/B to Ex. PW-
2/K. Petitioner Shri Surinder Singh, stepped into the witness box as PW-3 and tendered his
affidavit Ex. PW-3/A in evidence. He also tendered in evidence documents Ex. PW-3/B to Ex. PW
3/K. Petitioner Shri Sanjeev Kumar, stepped into the witness box as PW-4 and tendered his
affidavit Ex. PW-4/A in evidence. He also tendered in evidence documents Ex. PW-4/B to Ex. PW
4/K. Petitioner Shri Bhagat Ram, stepped into the witness box as PW-5 and tendered his affidavit
Ex. PW-5/A in evidence. He also tendered in evidence documents Ex. PW-5/B to Ex. PW-5/K.
Petitioner Shri Bali Mohd, stepped into the witness box as PW-6 and tendered his affidavit Ex. PW
6/A in evidence. He also tendered in evidence documents Ex. PW-6/B to Ex. PW-6/K. Petitioner
Shri Surinder Singh, stepped into the witness box as PW-7 and tendered his affidavit Ex. PW-7/A
in evidence. He also tendered in evidence documents Ex. PW-7/B to Ex. PW-7/J. Petitioner Shri
Joginder Singh, stepped into the witness box as PW-8 and tendered his affidavit Ex. PW-8/A in
evidence. He also tendered in evidence documents Ex. PW-8/B to Ex. PW-8/I. Petitioner Shri
Anand Ram, stepped into the witness box as PW-9 and tendered his affidavit Ex. PW-9/A in
evidence. He also tendered in evidence documents Ex. PW-9/B to Ex. PW-9/J. Petitioner Shri
Bhupinder Singh, stepped into the witness box as PW-10 and tendered his affidavit Ex. PW-10/A in
evidence. He also tendered in evidence documents Ex. PW-10/B to Ex. PW-10/K. All the
petitioners, aforesaid, have been cross-examined on the same grounds as petitioner Shri Pritam
Chand was crossexamined.
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13. Thereafter, on allowing the application filed under order 6 rule 17 CPC vide order
dated 4.9.2014, the petitioners have examined two PWs. Petitioner, Shri Pritam Chand again
appeared in the witness box as PW-11 and has stated that he along-with nine/ten other workers
were terminated on the basis of false allegations. They all were appointed as operators. The work of
bottle inspection was not their work which was being done by the workers who have been engaged
on contract basis. Before issuing chargesheet no show cause notice was given to them. A joint
enquiry had been conducted by the enquiry officer against them and their consent in this regard had
not been obtained. Before starting of enquiry, the enquiry officer had not made known to them
about the procedure of enquiry. They were not afforded opportunity of being heard. The enquiry
had been conducted by the enquiry officer at the instance of the management. At the time of their
termination, two demand notices dated 26.9.2005 & 5.10.2005 were pending before the Labour
Officer and no permission had been taken by the respondent before terminating their services. After
their termination, all the petitioners are unemployed. In cross-examination, he admitted that they
were doing the work of filling the bottles. He denied that regarding his work, a show cause notice
was issued by the company to him and other petitioners. He denied that he and other workers had
not filed reply to the show cause notice. He admitted that a joint enquiry had been conducted
against them. He denied that the enquiry had been conducted fairly. He admitted that they have
appeared before the enquiry officer through their Representative Shri Shyam Singh. He denied that
the charges leveled against them have been proved. He admitted that at the time of termination,
they have been paid one month’s salary. He denied that they had not raised the demand notice.
After the termination, he had been working at Balakrupi, District Kangra. He further admitted that
all other terminated petitioners are also working.
14. PW-12, Shri Devinder Kumar, Clerk O/o Labour Officer, Solan has stated that the
petitioners had raised a demand notice Ex. PW-1/F, which was pending in their office. In
crossexamination, he stated that on the demand notice, the labour inspector, Baddi was directed to
take action and the report of labour inspector had been received on 6.1.2006 and the same was
forwarded to Labour Commissioner on 24.1.2006.
15. On the contrary, the respondent examined two RWs. RW-1 Shri S.K Grover, Vice
President Technical has tendered his affidavit Ex. RW-1/A examination- in-chief wherein he
supported all the averments as made in the reply. He also tendered in evidence documents Ex. R-1
to Ex. R-22. In cross-examination, he admitted that the petitioners had worked for more than 240
days in each calendar year. He further admitted that till the end of year 2004, there were no
complaints against the petitioners. He also admitted that the petitioners had raised a joint demand
notice Ex. PW-1/F on 26.9.2005. He expressed his ignorance that except Bali Mohd. Bhupinder
and Rajiv Saha all other petitioners were deputed in bottle inspection section. He denied that the
company had pressurized the 24 workers to withdraw their demand notice. He further denied that
since the petitioners had not settled their dispute with the company, hence, a joint enquiry had been
conducted against them. He admitted that the work of bottle inspection was not an independent
work which was done as a team work. He denied that after issuance of chargesheet the petitioners
were not afforded opportunity to file reply and the enquiry report had not been given to them. He
admitted that after the termination of the petitioners, the company had engaged other workers.
16. RW-2 Shri M.R Dhiman, Enquiry Officer has tendered his affidavit Ex. RW-2/A in
evidence wherein he has stated that he was appointed as an enquiry officer by the respondent
company and proper opportunity had been afforded to the petitioners to defend themselves. The
petitioners filed their reply to the chargesheet and the principles of natural justice were also
observed and he conducted the enquiry in fair and proper manner and after the conclusion of the
enquiry proceedings, findings report was submitted on 25.2.2006 and all the charges leveled against
the petitioners were fully proved. The services of the petitioner were terminated on the basis of
enquiry report and keeping in view the gravity of misconduct committed by them. The petitioners
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were never chargesheeted behind the back. In crossexamination, he admitted that there were 36
workers working in the bottle inspection in two shifts. He admitted that the work of petitioners was
of technical nature. He admitted that a joint enquiry had been conducted against the petitioners. He
admitted that on the basis of statement of petitioner Surinder Singh, the enquiry had been
conducted and the statement of Surinder Singh had been read on behalf of all other petitioners. He
admitted that the same charges have been leveled against all the petitioners. He denied that a joint
enquiry report had been given. He denied that a wrong enquiry report had been prepared by him.
17. I have closely scrutinized the entire evidence on record, and from the closer scrutiny
thereof, it has become clear that all the petitioners were the employees of the respondent and all
of them have been terminated w.e.f. 7.3.2006. It is also not disputed that all the petitioners had
worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year and the work was continuous in nature. It is
also the admitted case that a separate chargesheet dated 6.12.2005 was issued to each of the
petitioners leveling therein allegations of misconduct and the petitioners have filed reply on
26.12.2005 to each chargesheet. But as the reply of the petitioners was not found satisfactory by the
respondent, therefore, a domestic enquiry was ordered to be conducted against all the petitioners
and accordingly Shri M.R Dhiman, Advocate was appointed as an enquiry officer to enquire into
the charges leveled against them in respect of the chargesheet issued to each of the petitioners.After
conclusion of the enquiry, the enquiry officer had submitted separate reports dated 25.2.2006
against each of the petitioners and all the charges leveled against the petitioners stood proved as
such they were terminated w.e.f. 7.3.2006 vide termination letters Ex. PW-1/D, Ex. PW-2/D, Ex.
PW-3/D, Ex. PW-4/D, Ex. PW-5/D, Ex. PW-6/D and PW-10/D. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners
raised the demand notice before the Labour-cum-conciliation Officer and after the failure of the
conciliation proceedings, the present reference was sent by the appropriate government to this
Court.
18. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that there was a violation of the
principles of natural justice in the instant case as the enquiry officer did not allow the petitioners to
be represented through a co-worker. Not only this, the enquiry officer also did not allow the
petitioners to lead defence evidence. The enquiry officer had not conducted the separate enquiries
and before starting the joint enquiry, the enquiry officer did not take the consent of the petitioners
for initiation of joint enquiry which resulted in denial of justice to the petitioners as the petitioners
could not get the proper opportunity to defend their case. Hence, the enquiry, which was got
conducted against the petitioners cannot be said to have been conducted by following the principles
of natural justice and for this reason, it requires to be set aside.
19. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the respondent contended that on the basis of
proper and fair enquiry, which had been conducted in accordance with the principles of natural
justice, the charges against the petitioners stood proved and thereafter, their services were
terminated in accordance with law. He further contended that the petitioners had been served with
the chargesheet and they were afforded opportunity to be represented by a defence assistant and the
opportunity to cross examine the witnesses was also given to them. Thus, it cannot be said that the
Enquiry Officer had not followed the prescribed procedure as per the principles of natural justice as
such no fault can be found in the enquiry, so conducted against the petitioners and the punishment,
imposed upon them.
20. Now, the question which arises for consideration is as to whether the domestic enquiry
conducted against the petitioners is unfair and violative of principles of natural justice. It is a settled
proposition of law that the technicalities of the evidence Act are not applicable in the domestic
enquiry but at the same time it is also true that the domestic enquiry is not an empty formality and
the principles of natural justice have to be followed. In State of Haryana Vs. Rattan Singh (1977)
2 SCC 491, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court as under:
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“In a domestic enquiry all the strict and sophisticated rules of the Evidence Act may not
apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible,
though departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating
such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the
Evidence Act. The essence of judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous
materials or considerations, and observance of rules of natural justice. Fair play is the basis
and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment, vitiate the
conclusion reached, such a finding, even of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held to be good.
The simple point in all these cases is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence-
not in the sense of the technical rules governing Court proceedings but in a fair
commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Sufficiency of
evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny by court, while
absence of any evidence in support of the finding is an error of law apparent on the record
and the court can interfere with the finding”.
21. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is to the effect that while
conducting the enquiry the enquiry officer did not allow the petitioners to be represented through
their co-worker in the proceedings and the same amounted to the violation of the principles of
natural justice. However, this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is devoid of any
force as the basic principle of the domestic enquiry is that the employees have no right to be
represented in the domestic enquiry by any other person or a lawyer unless the rules specifically
provide for the same. In the present case, as per enquiry report the petitioners had filed a joint
application before the enquiry officer to allow them to be represented through Shri Shyam Singh
who was an outsider and was not the co-worker and the enquiry officer allowed Shri Shyam Singh
to represent all the petitioners in the enquiry. Admittedly, no request was made by the petitioners to
the enquiry officer that they should be allowed to be represented by a co-worker. Even otherwise
non-permitting the petitioners to be represented by any coworker does not violate the principles of
natural justice. It has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in (2008)-1 SCC (L&S) titled as D.G
Railway Protection Force and ors Vs. K.Raghuram Babu as under:
“11. Following the above decision it has to be held that there is no vested or absolute right
in any charge-sheeted employee to representation either through a counsel or through any
other person unless the statute or rules/standing orders provide for such a right. Moreover,
the right to representation through some one, even if granted by the rules, can be granted as
a restricted or controlled right. Refusal to grant representation through an agent does not
violate the principles of natural justice.”
22. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid judgment and also in view of the facts and
circumstances of the present case, the non-representation of the petitioners by co-worker does not
violate the principles of natural justice especially when they were duly represented by one Shri
Shyam Singh in the enquiry proceedings.
23. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that a joint
enquiry was conducted against the all chargesheeted employees and before starting the joint
enquiry the enquiry officer did not take the consent of all the chargesheeted workers due to which
the petitioners’ could not get the proper opportunity to defend their case. However, this contention
of the learned counsel also cannot be accepted because the mere fact that a joint enquiry was
conducted against the chargesheeted employees will not vitiate the domestic enquiry unless and
until it is shown by the petitioners that a prejudice has been caused to them in conducting the joint
enquiry against them. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (1997) 3 SCC 371 titled
as Balbir Chand Vs. Food Corporation of India Ltd and others that a disciplinary enquiry
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should not be equated as prosecution for an offence in a criminal court where the delinquents are
arrayed as co-accused. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“5………...When more than one delinquent officer are involved, then with a view to avoid
multiplicity of the proceedings, needless delay resulting from conducting the same and
overlapping adducting of evidence or omission thereof and conflict of decision in that
behalf, it is always necessary and salutary that common enquiry should be conducted
against all the delinquent officers. ……………………………...
…………………Obviously, disciplinary enquiry should not be equated as a prosecution for
an
offence
in
a
criminal
court
where
the
delinquents
are
arrayed
as
coaccused………………………………”
24. In the instant case, the learned counsel for the petitioners has failed to show that any
prejudice was caused to the petitioners in conducting the joint enquiry against them. Therefore, in
the absence of any prejudice having been caused to the petitioners, it cannot be said that the
conducting of joint enquiry against them violated the principles of natural justice.
25. The learned counsel for the petitioners next contended that the petitioners were not
allowed by the enquiry officer to lead evidence in defence as such no proper opportunity was given
to them to get their case defended in a proper manner which resulted in denial of justice to them. It
is a settled proposition that the procedural fairness is the essence of natural justice and procedural
violation cannot lightly be brushed aside. From the perusal of the evidence on record it is clear that
enquiry officer Shri M.R Dhiman is the practicing Advocate and therefore it can reasonably be
presumed that he was well conversant with the intricacies and procedure of domestic enquiry. The
perusal of the enquiry reports shows that after the conclusion of the evidence of the management,
only one petitioner namely Shri Surender Singh appeared before the enquiry officer and in the
enquiry report, it has been mentioned that Surender Singh stated that his statement be read in all
other eleven cases of chargesheeted workers who were facing the present enquiry with him. In
cross-examination as RW-2, the enquiry officer admitted that the enquiry was based upon the
statement of Shri Surender Singh and his statement was read with respect to all the chrgesheeted
workers. However, there is no material on record to suggest as to whether the other petitioners have
authorized the petitioner Surender Singh to depose on their behalf. The enquiry officer has also
admitted that no such statement by the other workers is on record. In my opinion, without any
authorization by the other petitioners, the statement of petitioner Surender Singh could not have
been read for all the other petitioners/chargesheeted workers who were facing the enquiry.
Therefore, it has become clear that no opportunity was given to the petitioners to defend their case
in a proper manner and to lead defence evidence which is clear cut violation of the principles of
natural justice. Hence, all the aforesaid facts would show that a great prejudice has been caused to
the petitioners by denial of the opportunity to them to lead their evidence in defence. Therefore,
keeping view the aforesaid facts, I have no hesitation in holding that the enquiry conducted against
the petitioners is unfair and violative of principles of natural justice and as such the enquiry reports
against all the petitioners are set aside. The respondent could have led the evidence before this
Court in order to prove the alleged misconduct against the petitioners. However, except for the bald
statement of RW-1, no such evidence has been led by the respondent. RW-1 had only stated in his
affidavit Ex. RW-1/A that the petitioners were assigned the duty of inspecting the empty as well as
filled bottles during its on-line process but due to continues willful negligence and carelessness the
petitioners failed to remove/reject dirty bottles and consequently dirty bottles getting filled up and
finally entering in to the market. Except for this nothing has been stated by RW-1 regarding the
alleged misconduct, therefore, no credence can be attached to the statement of RW-1. Hence, in
view of the fact that the enquiry against the petitioners had been set aside and the respondent had
failed to prove the alleged misconduct of the petitioners before this Court, it can safely be
concluded that the termination of the petitioners w.e.f 7.3.2006 was unlawful.
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26. The learned counsel for the petitioners next contended that while terminating the
services of the petitioners, the respondent had not followed the mandatory provisions of the Act as
at the time of termination of the services of the petitioner, demand notice dated 5.10.2005, Ex. PW
1/F, submitted by the petitioners and other workers regarding their demands was pending
consideration before the Conciliation Officer/appropriate government and the respondent company
has not followed the mandatory provisions of section 33-2(b) of the Act by taking the approval of
termination of the petitioners as such the termination of their services is illegal and deserves to be
declared as null & void. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon
the statement of PW-12 Shri Devinder Kumar an official from the Labour Office, Solan who stated
that the petitioners had raised a demand notice Ex. PW-1/F, which was pending in their office. In
cross-examination, he stated that on the demand notice, the labour inspector, Baddi was directed to
take action and the report of labour inspector had been received on 6.1.2006, the copy of which was
forwarded to Labour Officer, Solan and Labour Commissioner, Shimla on 24.1.2006. At this stage,
it would be relevant to reproduce section 33-2 (a & b) of the Act which reads as under:
“(2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the
employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman
concerned in such dispute 2*[or, where there are no such standing orders, in
accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him
and the workman],--
(a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service
applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such
proceeding;
or
(b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, or discharge or punish, whether by
dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be
discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an
application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the
proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer”.
27. Thus, from the perusal of the aforesaid provision of section 33-2(b) of the Act, it is
clear that the same is mandatory in nature. From the perusal of the material on record, it is clear
that the demand notice dated 5.10.2005, Ex. PW-1/F was pending consideration before the
Conciliation Officer Baddi at the time of termination of the services of the petitioners on 6.3.2006.
In para 12 of the reply, the respondent had also admitted that they had filed an application under
sub section 2 of section 33 of the Act before the Conciliation Officer, Baddi and in the letters of
termination Ex. PW-1/D, Ex. PW-2/D, Ex. PW-3/D, Ex. PW-4/D, Ex. PW-5/D, Ex. PW-6/D and
PW-10/D, also it has been admitted by the respondent that since a dispute is pending before the
Conciliation Officer, Baddi, HP they have made an application for approval of the termination in
order to comply with the provisions of section 33-2 of the Act. However, except for the statement
of RW-1, there is no evidence on record led by the respondent to show that any such application
has been filed under section 33-2(b) of the Act for seeking approval of the termination of the
services of the petitioners. In fact, RW-1 had tendered in evidence the copies of documents Ex. R-1
to Ex. R-22 including the copies of aforesaid applications without proving the same in accordance
with law. Even, the person who had signed the aforesaid applications has not stepped into the
witness box. It was incumbent upon the respondent to produce/summon the record from the office
of Conciliation Officer, Baddi in order to prove that the application for seeking the approval of the
termination of the petitioners was filed. However, no such record from the office of Conciliation
Officer, Baddi has been produced/summoned by the respondent. As per the case of the respondent,
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the applications for approval had been filed on 6.3.2006. However, it has not been proved by the
respondent as to what action had been taken thereafter by the Conciliation Office Baddi, if they had
filed any such applications. Hence, in the absence of any cogent and satisfactory evidence on
record, it cannot be said that any such application has been filed under section 33-2(b) of the Act
for seeking approval of the termination of the petitioners and thereafter any action had been taken
by the Conciliation Officer, Baddi on such applications. Therefore, it has become clear that on the
day i.e 6.3.2006, on which date the orders for the dismissal of the services of the petitioners were
passed by the respondent, the demand notice was pending before the Conciliation Officer as such
he was to examine the issue and make a reference. However, the respondent company did not take
the approval to dismiss the services of the petitioners as provided under section 33-2(b) of the Act.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in case reported in AIR 2002 SC 643 in case titled as Jaipur Zila
Sehkari Bhumi Vikas bank Ltd. Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma has held that:-
“It is well-settled rule of interpretation that no part of statute shall be construed as
unnecessary or superfluous. The proviso cannot be diluted or disobeyed by an employer. He
cannot disobey the mandatory provision and then say that the order of discharge or
dismissal made in contravention of Section 33(2)(b) is not void or inoperative. He cannot be
permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. The interpretation of statute must be such
that it should advance the legislative intent and serve the purpose for which it is made rather
than to frustrate it. The proviso to Section 33(2)(b) affords protection to a workman to
safeguard his interest and it is a shield against victimization and unfair labour practice by
the employer during the pendency of industrial dispute when the relationship between them
are already strained. An employer cannot be permitted to use the provision of Section
33(2)(b) to ease out a workman without complying with the conditions contained in the said
proviso for any alleged misconduct said to be unconnected with the already pending
industrial dispute. The protection afforded to a workman under the said provision cannot be
taken away. If it is to be held that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer
without complying with the requirements of the said proviso is not void or inoperative, the
employer may with impunity discharge or dismiss a workman.”
28. In a case reported in 2007 SC 3071 titled as united bank of India Vs. Siharth
Chokborty it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the provisions of section 33 2 (b)
are mandatory and non-compliance thereof is sufficient to refuse approval and the worker is
entitled to reinstatement.
29. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is clear that
once the conciliation proceedings were pending before the Conciliation Officer, the respondent
company was not competent to dismiss the petitioners from service without seeking approval as
provided under section 33-2(b) of the Act. The non-making of an application under section 33-2(b)
of the Act for seeking approval of the termination of the services of the petitioners is a clear cut
case of the contravention of the proviso of section 33-2(b) of the Act. Thus, on this ground also the
order terminating the services of the petitioners is bad in law.
30. Therefore, in view of my aforesaid discussion, as the petitioners have succeeded in
proving that their termination of the services by the respondent is unlawful, hence, the petitioners
are held entitled to reinstatement in service with seniority and continuity.
31. Now, the question which arises for consideration, before this Court is as to whether the
petitioners are entitled to full back wages as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In
(2009) 1 SCC 20, Kanpur Electricity Supply Company Limited Vs. Shamim Mirza, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that once the order of termination of services of an employee is
setaside, ordinarily, the relief of reinstatement is available to him. However, the entitlement of an
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employee to get reinstated does not necessarily result in payment of full or partial back-wages,
which is independent of reinstatement. It has further been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
2010 (1) SLJ S.C 70, M/s Ritu Marbals Vs. Prabhakant Shukla that full back wages cannot be
granted mechanically, upon an order of termination be declared illegal. It is further held that
reinstatement must not be accompanied by payment of full back wages even for the period when
the workman remained out of service and contributed little or nothing to the Industry.
32. Moreover, the petitioners were under an obligation to prove by leading cogent
evidence that they were not gainfully employed after the termination of their services. The initial
burden is on the workman/employee to show that he was not gainfully employed as held by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 363 titled as Kendriya Vidyalaya
Sangathan and another Vs. S.C Sharma that:
“16…………..When, the question of determining the entitlement of a person to back-wages
is concerned, the employee has to show that he was not gainfully employed. The initial
burden is on him. After and if he places materials in that regard, the employer can bring on
record materials to rebut the claim…………..”
33. In the present case, the petitioners have failed to discharge their burden by placing any
material on record that they were not gainfully employed after their termination/disengagement.
Rather, petitioner Shri Pritam Chand as PW-11, admitted in crossexamination that after the
termination of his services by the respondent, he was working at Balakrupi, District Kangra and all
the other petitioners whose services were terminated were also employed. Therefore, since all the
petitioners are gainfully employed after their termination, no back-wages can be granted to them.
Thus, in view of the entire evidence, on record, coupled with the rulings (supra), I have no
hesitation in holding that the petitioners are not entitled to any back-wages. Accordingly, this issue
is decided in favour of the petitioners and against the respondent.
Issue No.2.
34. In view of my findings on issue no. 1 above, it cannot be said that the termination of
the services of the petitioners does not amount to retrenchment as defined under section 2 (oo) of
the Act. Therefore, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioners and against the respondent.
Issue No.3.
35. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondent which could go to
show as to how the present reference is not maintainable. Accordingly, this issue is decided in
favour of the petitioners and against the respondent.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 3, the claim of the
petitioners is partly allowed and the petitioners are ordered to be reinstated in service forthwith
with seniority and continuity. However, the petitioners are not entitled to back wages and as such
the reference is ordered to be answered in favour of the petitioners and against the respondent. File,
after completion, be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 20th day of May, 2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
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IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, HP INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA
Ref. No. 38 of 2013.
Instituted on.24.6.2013.
Decided on. 5.5.2016.
Mohinder Singh S/o Shri Prehlad R/o Village Chukra, P.O Rajera, Tehsil & District
Chamba, HP.
. .Petitioner.
VS.
The conservator of Forest (Planning & Project) Circle Talland Shimla-2, HP. . .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner :
Shri R.K Chauva, Advocate.
For respondent :
Shri H.N Kashyap, ADA.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government to this Court for
adjudication:
“Whether termination of the services of Shri Mohinder Singh S/o Shri Prehlad R/o
Village Chukra, P.O Rajera Tehsil & District Chamba, HP by the Conservator of
Forests ( Planning & Project) Circle Talland, Shimla HP w.e.f. 1.4.2001 as alleged by
the workman without following the provisions of the section 25-G and 25-H of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back-
wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to
from the above employer?”
2.
Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that he was employed as daily wager by the
respondent during the month of December, 1996 and remained as such till March, 2001 when he
was removed from job without compliance of statutory and mandatory provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act). It is further stated that the petitioner had worked
with the respondent for more than 240 days during the preceding calendar year and even his
services had orally been terminated without complying any procedure and the persons junior to him
namely Jai Krishan, Mohinder Singh, Dhuni Chand, Ishwar Kumar, Jeet Ram, Pinku Ram, Surya
Parkash, Goving Kumar, Hem Raj, Amar Singh and Ginder Singh had been retained/engaged in the
year, 2002 and all benefits have been given to them. It is also stated that during the entire service
tenure, the petitioner was never served with any explanation call, show cause notice and warning
letter by the respondent and even no domestic enquiry was conducted against the petitioner before
terminating his services. The respondent had not complied with the mandatory provisions of section
25-N and 25-F of the Act. The petitioner is unemployed since the date of his illegal retrenchment
and that he had not abandoned his job at his own. Against this back-ground a prayer has been made
for his re-instatement along-with all consequential service benefits.
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3.
By filing reply, respondent has contested the claim of the petitioner, wherein
preliminary objections had been taken that the petitioner was engaged as daily wager during July,
1996 in DFID (Department for International Development) Project aided by U.K and worked as
such till March, 2001 as the Project was completed on 31.3.2001 and the respondent had served a
notice upon the petitioner and five others regarding their retrenchment due to closure of the Project.
The petitioner approached the Labour Commissioner for adjudication of his reference which was
declined by the Labour Commissioner and thereafter the petitioner filed CWP No. 2995/2012 and
before terminating the service of the petitioner, proper notice had been given to him. On merits, it is
admitted that the petitioner had worked with minimum of 240 days in preceding twelve months
upto March, 2001 and completed 1533 days as per year wise detail given as under:
Year
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Mandays
175
364
251
296
366
81
It is further asserted that before the DFID Project came to an end w.e.f. 31.3.2001, the
petitioner and five other workers were served with a notice of retrenchment by Chief Conservator
of Forest (Project) vide letter dated 1.3.2001 and the services of S/Shri Jai Kishan, Mohinder Singh,
Dhuni Chand Ishwar Kumar etc., who were engaged in a different project named as NOARD, were
too disengaged on different dates with the closure of the aforesaid project. The services of the
aforesaid persons have been regularized by virtue of the orders passed by the Labour Court/
Administrative Tribunal assigning seniority and continuity in favour of these daily wagers. The
services of the petitioner have been lawfully and legally terminated by adhering to the provisions of
the Act. It is also asserted that the petitioner is not entitled for the protection of section 25-G and
25-H of the Act as he was engaged in a project named as DFID which was culminated on 31.3.2001
and the petitioner and five others were served notice on 1.3.2001 stating therein that their services
would automatically came to an end with the closure of the Project. The respondent prayed for the
dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner has reiterated his allegations by denying those of the
respondent.
5.
Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
15.9.2014.
1.
Whether the termination of services of the petitioner w.e.f. 1.4.2001 are illegal and
unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits, the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim put forth by the petitioner is not maintainable as alleged? . .OPR.
4.
Relief.
6.
I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned ADA for respondent
and have also gone through the record of the case carefully.
7.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
No.
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Issue no.2
Becomes redundant.
Issue no.3
No.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner
per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issue no. 1
8. Ld. Counsel for petitioner contended that the petitioner had worked as daily wager
with the respondent w.e.f. December, 1996 till March, 2001 continuously and his services have
been terminated orally without following the mandatory provisions of the Act. He further
contended that the respondent had engaged other daily wagers in the department and retained
juniors to the petitioner which is clear cut violation of the provisions of section 25-G & H of the
Act and also against the principles of “last come first go” and since, the services of the petitioner
were terminated in utter violation of the provisions of the Act, he deserves to be reinstated along
with all the consequential benefits including back wages.
9.
On the contrary, learned ADA for respondent contended that the services of the
petitioner had been engaged on daily wages basis under the DFID project aided by U.K and on the
completion of the said Project, his services were terminated by serving a notice upon him and five
others regarding their retrenchment due to closure of the project. Hence, the petitioner is not
entitled to any relief from the respondent.
10. To prove his case, the petitioner examined five PWs including himself. PW-1 Shri
Moti Lal, Superintendent has brought the service record of Shri Hem Raj S/o Shri Jagat Ram, who
is posted as peon in the office of Conservator of Forests Chamba and as per the mandays chart Ex.
PW-1/A, Shri Hem Raj was engaged by the department in the year, 1993 as daily wager and he
(Hem Raj) was also engaged in DFID project in the year, 1998. The petitioner was engaged as daily
wager in the same project (DFID) in July, 1996. The DFID project was closed on 31.3.2001 and all
the workers of the aforesaid project were terminated by giving them notices. Mohinder Singh &
five other workers were never reengaged by the department and the services of Hem Raj were
never terminated and he was regularized in the year, 2007. In cross-examination, he admitted that
no notice was issued to Hem Raj by the department because he was already serving with the
department and his services were never disengaged by the department. He further admitted that
Mohinder Singh had never made any representation to the department for his re-engagement from
the year, 2001 till the year, 2009. He also admitted that DFID project was never revived after the
year, 2001 and that the department had assured the petitioner and other workers to re-engage them
on the revival of the project.
11. PW-2 Ms. Prabha, Forest Guard has stated that Ex. PW-2/A is the letter issued by DFO
Rohru and as per the record Jawhar Singh S/o Shri Mangal Jew was appointed on 1.10.1999 as a
daily wager and regularized in December, 2015. As per service book of Shri Jawhar Singh, he was
regularized on 24.12.2015. In cross-examination, she admitted that Jawahar Singh was permanent
employee with the department and she expressed her ignorance that the petitioner ever remained as
a worker of the department.
12. PW-3 Shri Atma Ram, Deputy Ranger has stated that as per record, Shri Chajju Ram
S/o Shri Dhantu Ram was initially engaged as daily wager in the year, 2000 and now he is regular
employee with the department w.e.f. December, 2015 and Smt. Jayanti Devi W/o Liaq Ram was
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initially engaged in the year, 2001 as daily wager and now she has also ben regularized in the year,
2015 and Ex. PW-3/B is the copy of mandays chart of both employees. In cross-examination, he
admitted that Chajju Ram and Jayanti Devi have been woring with the department continuously
since the years, 2000 and 2001 respectively and they have completed more than 240 days in each
calendar year and the petitioner never remained as a worker under DFO Chopal.
13. PW-4 Shri Bhuvnesh Gupta, Deputy Ranger has stated that as per the record Kishori
Lal S/o Shri Jalpu Ram was initially engaged as a daily wager in the year 2000 and now he is
regular employee with the department w.e.f. December, 2015. In cross-examination, he admitted
that Kishori Lal remained as a permanent worker with the department and he had never worked
under any project. The petitioner never worked under DFO Shimla (Urban).
14. The petitioner appeared into the witness as PW-5 and tendered his affidavit Ex. PW-5/
A in evidence wherein he supported almost all the averments as stated in the claim petition. He also
tendered in evidence certified copy of O.A No. 857/2001 which is Ex. PW-5/B and COPC no.
755/2012 which is Ex. PW-5/C. In cross-examination, he denied that he had worked under DFID
project but admitted that he had worked till March, 2001 and thereafter he had never worked with
the department. He denied that the work under the project was for a specific period on con-terminus
basis. He admitted that before the closure of the project, a notice was issued to him regarding
termination of his services. He admitted his signatures on notice Ex. RX in red circle. He further
admitted that four other workers also worked under DFID Project and they have not filed any case.
He denied that he had not visited the department for his re-engagement. He could not state that
S/Shri Jai Kishan, Dhuni Chand, Mohinder Singh, Ishwar Kumar, Jeet Ram, Pinku Ram, Surya
Parkash, Govind Kumar, Hem Raj, Amar singh and Ginder Singh were working under the different
projects continuously.
15. On the contrary, respondent examined one Smt. Anita Vashist, Registrar
Establishment, who tendered in evidence her affidavit Ex. RW-1/A. She also tendered in evidence,
the authority letter Ex. RW-1/B and office order dated 2.4.2013, Ex. RW-1/C. In cross
examination, she admitted that the petitioner was working in the forest department but volunteered
that he was working under DFID project. She admitted that office order Ex. PY has been issued by
Principal Chief Conservator of Forests Shimla as per which Shri Hem Raj, daily wager was on
Vidhan Sabha duty. She admitted that Shri Hem Raj was regularized in the department. She denied
that Mohinder Singh was also daily wager in the department and he was removed without giving
any notice. She admitted that Mohinder Singh had completed 240 days in one calendar year as per
Ex. RW-1/C. She denied that the petitioner was illegally terminated.
16. I have considered the respective contentions of the learned counsel for petitioner and
learned ADA for the respondent and also scrutinized the record of the case minutely.
17. After the closer scrutiny of the record of the case, it has become clear that the
petitioner was engaged as daily wager by the respondent under DFID Project during July, 1996 and
he worked as such till the year, 2001 as is evident from the office order dated 2.4.2013 Ex. RW
1/C. From the perusal of office order dated 2.4.2013, Ex. RW-1/C, it is clear that the petitioner had
worked for 175 days in the year, 1996, 364 days in the year, 1997, 251 days in 1998, 296 days in
1999, 366 days in 2000 and 81 days in 2001. However, the case of the respondent is that the
petitioner was engaged for specific work under DFID project whose services came to an end with
the completion of the project and even before terminating his services, a notice Ex. RX was also
served to the petitioner and other workers who were working in the same project. The petitioner as
PW-5 has admitted in cross-examination that before the closure of the project a notice was issued to
them regarding termination of their services. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
(2006) 6 SCC 221 incase titled as Reserve Bank Of India Vs. Gopi Nath Sharma & Another that
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workman not appointed to any regular post but engaged on the basis of need of work on day to day
basis, had no right to the post. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as
under:
“22. In our view, respondent No.1 was not appointed to any regular post but was only
engaged on the basis of the need of the work on day to-day basis and he has no right to the
post and that his dis-engagement cannot be treated as arbitrary………………..”
Apart from it, it was further held in 2006 LLR 68 SC titled as Punjab State Electricity
Board V. Darbara Singh and in 2006 LLR 1009 SC. titled as Municipal Council Samrala V.
Surhwinder Kaur that when material on record established that engagement of workman was for
specific period as such his termination will be excluded as per the provisions of section 2(oo)(bb)
of the I.D Act and hence, no retrenchment compensation will be payable on his termination even
when he has worked for more than 240 days in the preceding 12 calendar months.
18. Thus, having regard to the above cited rulings and entire evidence on record, it can
safely be concluded that the petitioner was engaged for specific period under the project and on the
completion of the project/work, his services came to an end and as such it does not lie in the mouth
of petitioner to claim his reengagement on the basis of his previous work with the respondent and
even if it is proved on record that the petitioner had completed 240 working days in a calendar year
preceding his termination even then he is not entitled to be reengaged in service by giving him the
protection under section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as it is now well settled principle
of law that the engagement made for specific period comes to an end by efflux of time and the
person on such post can have no right to continue on the post and it does not matter even if he had
worked for more than 240 working days in any 12 calendar months preceding his termination.
19. Now, adverting to the other aspect of the case, it is also the case of the petitioner that
he was terminated by the respondent in violation of the provisions of sections 25-G and H of the
Act. The petitioner as PW-1 has stated in his affidavit Ex. PW-5/A that junior/fresh persons namely
Jai Kishan, Mohinder Singh, Dhuni Chand, Mohinder Singh, Ishwar Kumar, Jeet Ram, Pinku Ram,
Surya Parkash, Govind Kumar, Hem Raj, Amar Singh and Ginder Singh were retained/engaged in
the year, 2002 and thereafter, they have been given regularization etc., without complying with the
provisions of sections 25-G & H of the Act. However, the petitioner has failed to prove on record
that the aforesaid persons have been engaged in the same project in which he was working and
even there is no record which could go to show that the persons working in DFID project with the
petitioner were re-engaged by the department. PW-1, has stated that Hemraj was engaged by the
department in the year, 1993 as daily wager whereas Mahinder Singh was engaged in the DFID
project in the year, 1996. PW-2, stated that Jawhar Singh was appointed as a daily wager and was
the permanent employee with the department. PW- 3 stated that Chajju Ram and Jayvanti Devi
were also engaged as daily wagers by the department. PW-4 has stated that Kishori Lal was also
engaged as a daily wager by the department and he had never worked under any project. Hence,
there is no evidence on record to suggest that fresh persons have been engaged and the persons
junior to the petitioner have been retained who were working in the same project in which the
petitioner was working. The perusal of the evidence on record shows that the persons who have
been regularized by the department have been engaged as daily wagers by the department and they
have never worked under DFID project. The petitioner was engaged in DFID project which came to
an end on 31.3.2001 and after the closure of the said project, it was never revived as such no fresh
persons were engaged and no juniors to the petitioner were retained. Therefore, in the absence of
any evidence on record, it cannot be said that the respondent had engaged fresh workers and
retained junior persons to the petitioner and failed to comply with the provisions of sections 25-G
& H of the Act while terminating the services of the petitioner. Hence, I have no hesitation in
coming to the conclusion that the termination of services of petitioner w.e.f. 1.4.2001 by
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respondent on the completion of the project/work is legal and justified and does not call for any
interference by this court. Accordingly this issue is decided in favour of respondent and against the
petitioner.
Issue no.2
20. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1 above, this issue becomes
redundant.
Issue no.3.
21. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondent. However, the
petitioner has filed this claim petition pursuant to the reference made by the appropriate
government to this Court for adjudication and I find nothing wrong with this petition which is
perfectly maintainable. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 3, the claim of the
petitioner fails and is hereby dismissed and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in
favour of the respondent and against the petitioner. Let a copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned
to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 5th day of May, 2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
__________
19.5.2016.
Present:
None for the petitioner.
Shri H.N Kashyap, ADA for respondents.
Case called repeatedly but neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared before this Court
which clearly shows that the petitioner is not interested to pursue his case. Since, none appeared on
behalf of the petitioner, hence, this Court is left with no other alternative but to decide the reference
on the basis of material whatsoever available on file. The reference sent by the appropriate
government for adjudication is as under:
“Whether termination of Shri Rupinder Singh S/o late Shri DayaNand R/o Village
Manju, P.O Baldeyan, Tehsil & District Shimla, HP by the Executive Engineer, I& PH
Division no.2 Tehsil & District Shimla w.e.f. 30.11.1998 without complying the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping
inview the delay of more than 10 years in raising the industrial dispute what amount
of back-wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved
workman is entitled to from the above employer”
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For the failure of the petitioner to appear before this Court and to place on record any
material/evidence, it cannot be held that his services were illegally terminated by the respondent
w.e.f. 30.11.1998 without complying with the provisions of the Act. Hence, the reference is
answered against the petitionerand in favour of the respondents. Let a copy of this award be sent to
the appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after completion be
consigned to records.
Announced:
(SushilKukreja)
19.5.2016.
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
__________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P.)
Ref. No. 27 of 2010.
Instituted on. 12.4.2010.
Decided on 10.5.2016.
Mehar Singh S/o Shri Hiru Ram R/o Village Lehtana, P.O Shalaghat, Tehsil Arki, District
Solan, HP.
. .Petitioner.
Vs.
M/s Ind Swift Ltd., Plot no. 17-B, Sector-2, Parwanoo, Tehsil Kasauli, District Solan, HP,
through its Managing Director and General Manager.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner :
Shri Rajinder Thakur, Advocate.
For respondent :
Already ex-parte.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether the termination of the services of Shri Mehar Singh S/o Shri Hiru Ram
exsecurity workman by the management M/s Ind Swift Ltd., Plot no. 17B sector-2,
Parwanoo, District Solan, HP w.e.f. 15.10.2008 without complying the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and retaining junior workmen, as alleged by the
workman is proper and justified? If not, what relief including reinstatement, back-
wages, seniority the above worker is entitled to?”
2. Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that he was engaged as Guard by the respondent on
11.5.2005 and thereafter in the month of October, 2007 he was promoted as Security Supervisor at
the monthly wages of ` 4800/-. The petitioner was discharging his duties honestly, diligently and
according to the best of his abilities and there had been no complaint against him but on
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14.10.2008, the petitioner was telephonically informed by S/Shri Sultan Patel, General Manager
and Chaman Jariyal, Manger HRD not to come on duty and then on 15.10.2008, a security guard
telephonically intimated the petitioner to attend his duty and when the petitioner came to attend the
duty on the same day, Shri Chaman Jariyal told him “Chutti Karo” and thereafter the petitioner
went to the office of Labour Inspector, who told to Mr. Chaman Jariyal to allow the petitioner to
join his duties but the officials of respondent had not allowed to join his (petitioner) duties. It is
further stated that there were more than 300 workers deployed by the respondent, hence, the
respondent was duty bound to comply with the provisions of sections 25-F, 25-G & H and 25-N of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act but the services of the petitioner
had been terminated orally without complying with the provisions of the Act despite the fact that
junior to him namely Prakesh Chand etc. have been retained. It is further stated that the petitioner is
ex-serviceman, who served with the Indian Army w.e.f. 25.2.1978 till 30.6.2000, when he was
discharged from Asam Rifles at Shillong and joined the respondent w.e.f. 11.5.2005. It is also
stated that the respondent had established their two factories at plot no. 17 & 23-B and third factory
at Baddi and in case the respondent had any inhabitation to allow the petitioner to continue at the
present place of posting, he could have been shifted in another factory at Parwanoo especially when
the junior persons have been allowed to be retained. The respondent management had failed to give
the benefits of ESI, PF, over time charges etc., to the petitioner and even the respondent had
withheld the overtime of 10 days for the month of September, 2008, salary @ ` 5350/- per month
from October, 2008 onward and increments, house rent allowance @ ` 1,000/- per month from
October, 2008 till date to which the petitioner was entitled. Further, the following other amounts
have been withheld by the respondent management:
a.
Wages @ ` 240 per day for 13 Sundays, one National Holiday and
six leaves = 20 days,
` 4800/-
b.
Bonus for the year, 2008
` 2500/-
c.
Medical bills totaling till date
`55000/-
d.
Refreshment @ ` 5 per day from October, 2008 till date
e.
Litigation costs including bus fare from Shalaghat to Parwanoo
`10000/-
f.
Dress such as Jersey & Jacket from October, 2008 to December,
2008 which comes to
`10000/-
g.
Uniform such as pent, shirt, shoes, socks, cap, belt etc., @ ` 1200/-
for two years
`2400/-
h.
Damages/Compensation on account of harassment, humiliation and
mental torture.
`50000/-
It is further stated that the respondent is liable to pay the aforesaid dues with interest @ 18%
per annum to the petitioner. Against this back-drop a prayer has been made for his re-engagement
by quashing order dated 14/15.10.2008, along-with back-wages and other consequential service
benefits.
3. By filing reply, the respondent had contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections had been taken qua maintainability, that the petitioner does not fall within
the definition of section 2(s) of the Act, jurisdiction and willful absenteeism. On merits, it has been
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asserted that since the petitioner was initially engaged on contractual basis, hence, he is not covered
under the definition of the term “workman”. It is further asserted that due to the sudden absence of
the petitioner from his duties without assigning any reasons or pre-information, the company
incurred huge losses, hence, alternative arrangements had to be made to make sure that the security
supervisory service are not adversely affected for which the company reserves its full right to claim
from the petitioner. The respondent prayed for the dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
Rejoinder not filed. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which
were struck on 28.9.2010.
1.
Whether the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 15.10.2008 have been terminated in an
illegal and improper manner in contravention of the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue no.1 is proved to what service benefits, the petitioner is entitled to? . .OPP.
3. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction as alleged?
. .OPR.
4. Relief.
5.
Besides having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, I have also gone through
the record of the case carefully.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
Yes.
Issue no.2
Entitled to reinstatement with seniority and continuity but without back-
wages.
Issue no.3
No.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of petitioner and against the respondent per
operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issues no.1.
7.
The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the services of the petitioner had
been terminated by the respondent illegally without serving him any notice as required under
section 25-F of the Act. It was further urged that juniors to the petitioner are still working with the
respondent in violation of the principles of “last come first go” and even after the termination of the
petitioner, the respondent had engaged fresh hands in violation of the provisions of section 25-H of
the Act.
8.
The petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered his affidavit Ex.
PW-1/A in examination-in-chief wherein he reiterated almost all the averments as made in the
claim petition. He also tendered in evidence documents mark X to mark X-5. In cross-examination,
he admitted that he was working in the capacity of security supervisor with the respondent
company. He denied that he joined the services with the respondent w.e.f. 1.8.2005. He admitted
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that he was getting ` 5350/- per month as salary. He denied that he was appointed on contract basis.
He admitted that he was getting `8000/- per month as pension as he retired from Asam Rifles. He
admitted that he had not turned up after 13.10.2008 for his service. He denied that he intentionally
absented himself from duty without any intimation.
9.
Before, I proceed further, it is important to mention here that the petitioner closed his
evidence on 16.12.2015 and thereafter several opportunities have been afforded to the respondent
in order to lead evidence but the respondent failed to lead any evidence and when on 22.4.2016,
none appeared on behalf of the respondent, it was proceeded against ex-parte.
10. I have closely scrutinized the entire evidence, on record, and from the closer scrutiny
thereof, it has become clear that being ex-serviceman, the petitioner was engaged as security
supervisor by the respondent. The stand which has been taken by the respondent in its reply is to
the effect that the petitioner was working as security supervisor in the supervisory capacity and as
such he does not fall under the category of ‘workman’ as prescribed in section 2 (s) of the Act.
Now, this Court is required to ascertain as to whether the petitioner falls within the category of
workman or not as per section 2 (s) of the Act. At this juncture, it would be relevant to re-produce
section 2 (s) of the Act, which reads as under:
“workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any
manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or
reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of
any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person
who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence
of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, dischasrge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but
does not include any such person:
(i)
who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of
1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand
six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached
to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a
managerial nature.”
11. It is a settled provision of law that in determining as to whether a person is a workman
or not, the Court has to principally see the main or substantial work for which he was employed.
Neither the designation nor any incidental work done by him will get him out-side the preview of
the Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in (1994) 5 S.C.C 737, titled as H.R Adyanthaya and
others Vs. Sandoz (India) Ltd., and another has held that for an employee to be covered by the
definition of workman he must be employed in any industry to do any manual, un-skilled, skilled,
technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work. If he falls within these categories, it has then to
be seen whether he comes within any of the four excluded categories mentioned in section 2 (s) of
the Act. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:
24…………. Hence, the position in law as it obtains today is that a person to be a
workman under the ID Act must be employed to do the work of any of the categories,
viz., manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory. It is not
enough that he is not covered by either of the four exceptions of the definition. We
reiterate the said interpretation.”
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12. In the instant case, from the perusal of evidence on record, it has become clear that
initially the petitioner was engaged as security guard and thereafter in October, 2007, he was
promoted as security supervisor and was getting ` 5350/- per month as wages. Therefore, it was for
the
respondent
to
prove
that
the
petitioner
was
employed
in
a
managerial
or
administrative/supervisory capacity or by the reason of power vested under him, the functions of
the petitioner were mainly of a supervisory nature. However, no evidence has been produced on
record by the respondent that the petitioner was working in the supervisory capacity and his duty
was mainly of supervisory nature. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence on record, it cannot be
said that the petitioner was not a ‘workman’.
13. Another plea which has been taken by the respondent in its reply is that the petitioner
had willfully absented himself from duty since 14.10.2008 without any intimation and as such he
had voluntarily abandoned his job. Abandonment of service has not been defined in the Act. In a
case titled as G.T Lad and others Vs. Chemicals and Fibers India Ltd. reported in AIR 1979
SC 582, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that to constitute abandonment, there must be total or
complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an intention not to resume the same. The relevant
portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“From the connotations reproduced above it clearly follows that to constitute
abandonment, there must be total or complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an
intention not to resume the same.
In Buckingham Co. v. Venkatiah (1964) 4 SC R 265: (AIR 1964 SC 1272), it was
observed by this Court that under common law an inference that an employee has
abandoned or relinquished service is not easily drawn unless from the length of
absence and from other surrounding circumstances an inference to that effect can be
legitimately drawn and it can be assumed that the employee intended to abandon
service. Abandonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention,
and normally, such an intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate
evidence in that behalf. Thus whether there has been a voluntary abandonment of
service or not is a question of fact which has to be determined in the light of the
surrounding circumstances of each case.”
It is also well settled that once, it is admitted that the workman had been in service of the
management, the burden of proving that he himself abandoned the job lies on the management as
has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s Nicks (India) Tools Vs. Ram Surat reported
in 2004 (103) FLR 102. Thus, voluntarily abandonment of job can only be proved by the
respondent/management by bringing on record evidence of absence of employee along-with his
intention not to join back. However, in the present case, there is no iota of evidence on record
which could go to show that the petitioner had left the job on his own as no material regarding
abandonment of the job by the petitioner is placed on record by the respondent. Therefore, in the
absence of any record, inference cannot be drawn that the petitioner had voluntarily abandoned the
job on his own since 14.10.2008.
14. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since the petitioner has completed
240 working days in twelve calendar months preceding his termination, hence there is violation of
section 25-F of the Act. However, when regard is given to the evidence on record, there is no
material on record which could show that the petitioner has completed 240 working days in twelve
calendar months preceding his termination. In 2009 (120) FLR 1007 incase titled as Relip
Nagarpalika Vs. Babuji Gabhaji Thakore and others , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as
under:
“The burden of proof lies on the workman to show that he had worked continuously for
240 days for the preceding one year and it is for the workman to adduce evidence apart
from examining himself to prove the factum of being in employment of the employer.”
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15. In AIR 2006 S.C. 110 case titled as Surindernagar District Panchyat V/s Dayabhai
Amar Singh, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:—
“Incase workman claims to have worked for more than 10 years as daily wager. Apart
from oral evidence workman has not produced any evidence to prove fact that he has
worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that
regard was produced: no co-worker was examined; muster roll produced by employer has
not been contradicted. Workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in
employment for 240 days during preceding 12 months of date of termination of his
service. Workman not entitled for protection of Section 25-F before his service was
terminated.”
A bare perusal of the extract of the judgment re-produced, hereinabove, shows that the
burden to prove completion of 240 days service lies on the workman and this burden is discharged
on workman stepping in the witness box and adducing cogent evidence. However, in the instant
case, the petitioner has failed to prove on record that he had put in 240 days in twelve calendar
months preceding his termination. Hence, the case of the petitioner does not fall under section 25-F
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such no protection of section 25-F can be granted to the
petitioner.
16. The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that number of junior persons i.e
Prakash Chand etc. have been retained and some other security supervisors have been engaged by
the respondent without giving an opportunity to the petitioner for re-employment as such the
respondent had violated the provisions of sections 25-G & 25-H of the Act. It has been held by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in series of judgments that it is not necessary for the workman to have
completed 240 days during preceding twelve calendar months for taking the benefits of sections 25
G and 25-H of the Act. In a decision titled as Ajaypal Singh Vs. Haryana Warehousing
Corporation (2015) 6 SCC 321, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that for attracting
section 25-G and 25-H, the workman is not required to prove that he had worked for a period of
240 days during twelve calendar months preceding his termination. It has further been held that the
retrenched workman shall be given preference over other workers if the employer proposes to
employ other person. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:
“11. For attracting the provisions of section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the
workman is not required to prove that he had worked for a period of 240 days during twelve
calendar months preceding the termination of his service and it is sufficient for him to plead and
prove that while effecting retrenchment, the employer violated the rule of “last come first go”
without any tangible reason.
12. Section 25-H is couched in wide language and is capable of application to all
“retrenched workmen” and not merely those covered under Section 25-F of the Act.
13. ………………………………………
14. In case if an employer proposes to employ any person, it is mandatory on the part of
the employer to give an opportunity to the retrenched workmen who offer themselves for re
employment and such workmen who offer themselves for re-employment shall have
preference over other persons. The provision of section 25-H is in conformity with Articles
14 & 16 of the Constitution of India.”
17. In the instant case, except for the bald statement of the petitioner, no other evidence
has been led by him to establish that junior persons have been retained by the respondent.
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Therefore, in the absence of any evidence on record, it cannot be said that persons junior to the
petitioner are still working with the respondent in violation of the provisions of section 25-G of the
Act. However, the respondent has admitted in its reply that due to the sudden absence of the
petitioner from his duties without assigning any reasons or pre-information, the company incurred
huge losses, hence, alternative arrangements had to be made to make sure that the security
supervisory services are not adversely affected. Therefore, from the aforesaid admission, it is clear
that after the termination of the services of the petitioner, the respondent had appointed fresh
security supervisors without giving any opportunity to the petitioner for re-employment in violation
of section 25-H of the Act.
18. Thus, having regard to the entire evidence on record, I have no hesitation in coming to
the conclusion that after the termination of the services of the petitioner, fresh security supervisors
have been engaged by the respondent and as such the termination of the services of the petitioner
by the respondent without complying with the provisions of section 25-H of the Act is illegal and
unjustified. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue no. 2.
19. Since, I have held under issue no.1 above that the termination of services of the
petitioner by the respondent without following the provisions of section 25-H of the Act is illegal
and unjustified, hence, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in service with seniority and
continuity.
20. Now, the question which arises for consideration, before this Court is as to whether the
petitioner is entitled to full back wages as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In
(2009) 1 SCC 20, Kanpur Electricity Supply Company Limited Vs. Shamim Mirza, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that once the order of termination of services of an employee is
set-aside, ordinarily, the relief of reinstatement is available to him. However, the entitlement of an
employee to get reinstated does not necessarily result in payment of full or partial back-wages,
which is independent of reinstatement. It has further been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
2010 (1) SLJ S.C 70, M/s Ritu Marbals Vs. Prabhakant Shukla that full back wages cannot be
granted mechanically, upon an order of termination be declared illegal. It is further held that
reinstatement must not be accompanied by payment of full back wages even for the period when
the workman remained out of service and contributed little or nothing to the Industry.
21. Moreover, the petitioner was under an obligation to prove by leading cogent evidence
that he was not gainfully employed after the termination of his services. The initial burden is on the
workman/employee to show that he was not gainfully employed as held by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 363 titled as Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and
another Vs. S.C Sharma that :
“16…………..When, the question of determining the entitlement of a person to back-wages
is concerned, the employee has to show that he was not gainfully employed. The initial
burden is on him. After and if he places materials in that regard, the employer can bring on
record materials to rebut the claim…………..”
22. In the present case, the petitioner has failed to discharge his burden by placing any
material on record that he was not gainfully employed after his termination/disengagement.
Therefore, in view of the entire evidence, on record, coupled with the rulings (supra), I have no
hesitation in holding that the petitioner is not entitled to any back-wages. Accordingly, issue no.2 is
partly decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
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Issue No. 3.
23. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondent in order to show
that as to how this Court has no jurisdiction to try this case especially when a reference has been
made by the appropriate government to this Court for adjudication Accordingly, this issue is
decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 3, the claim of the
petitioner succeeds and is hereby partly allowed and the petitioner is ordered to be reinstated in
service forthwith with seniority and continuity. However, the petitioner is not entitled to back
wages and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in favour of the petitioner and against
the respondent. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in
official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 10th Day of May, 2016.
(Sushil Kukreja)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
__________
foRr ¼fofu;e½ foHkkx
vf/klwpuk
f”keyk&2] 28 twu] 2016
la[;k% fQu¼lh½,¼3½&1@2014-&&fgekpy izns”k ds jkT;iky] Hkkjr ds lafo/kku ds vuqPNsn 309
ds ijUrqd }kjk iznRr “kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq,] fgekpy izns”k jkT; esa ykxw lSUVªy flfoy lfoZflt
¼yho½ :Yt] 1972 dk vkSj la”kks/ku djus ds fy, fuEufyf[kr fu;e cukrs gSa] vFkkZr~ %&&
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¼2½ ;s fu;e jkti=] fgekpy izns”k esa izdk”ku dh rkjh[k ls izo`r gksaxsA
:y 50 dk la'kks/ku-&&fgekpy izns”k jkT; es ykxw lSUVªy flfoy lfoZflt ¼yho ½ :Yt] 1972]
ds :y 50 ds lc&:y ¼5½ ds fo|eku DykWt (ii) (iii) ds LFkku ij fuEufyf[kr DykWt j[ks tk,xs]
vFkkZr~ %&&
“(ii) who has not crossed the age of 50 years on the date of submitting the application for
such study leave; and
(iii) who executes a Bond as laid down in rule 53(4) undertaking to serve the Government
for a period of five years after the expiry of the leave.”
vkns”k }kjk]
MkW0 JhdkUr ckYnh]
vfrfjDr eq[; lfpo ¼foRr½A
2450
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+] 1938
[Authoritative English text of this Department Notification No. Fin (C) A(3)-1/2014 dated
28-06-2016 as required under Clause (3) of Article-348 of the Constitution of India.]
FINANCE (REGULATION) DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla-2, the 28th June, 2016
No. Fin (C) A(3)-1/2014.—In exercise of the powers conferred by proviso to Article-309 of
the Constitution of India, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, is pleased to make the following rules
further to amend the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972, in their application to the State of
Himachal Pradesh, namely :—
Short title and commencement.—(1) These rules may be called the Central Civil Services
(Leave) Himachal Pradesh (First Amendment) Rules, 2016.
(2) They shall come into force from the date of publication in the Rajpatra, Himachal
Pradesh.
Amendment of rule 50.— In rule 50 of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972, in
their application to the State of Himachal Pradesh, in sub- rule (5) for the existing clauses (ii) &
(iii), the following clauses shall be substituted, namely :—
“(ii) who has not crossed the age of 50 years on the date of submitting the application for
such study leave; and
(iii) who executes a Bond as laid down in rule 53(4) undertaking to serve the Government
for a period of five years after the expiry of the leave.”
By order,
DR. SHRIKANT BALDI,
Additional Chief Secretary(Finance).
___________
In the Court of Ms. Kritika Kulhari, IAS, Marriage Officer-cum-Sub Divisional
Magistrate, Hamirpur
In the matter of :
1.
Suresh Kumar aged 43 years s/o Shri Suhru Ram, r/o VPO Bohni Panjwin, Tehsil &
District Hamirpur (HP).
2.
Bandna Kumari aged 27 years d/o Shri Dev Raj, r/o VPO Utpur, Tehsil Tauni Devi,
District Hamirpur (HP)
. . Applicants.
Versus
General Public
Subject:—Notice of the Intended Marriage.
2451
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+ 1938
Suresh Kumar and Bandna Kumari have filed an application U/S 5 of Special Marriage Act,
1954 alongwith affidavits in the court of undersigned in which they stated they intend to
solemnized marriage within three calendar months.
Therefore, the general public is hereby informed through this notice that any person who
has any objection regarding this marriage can file the objection personally or in writing before this
court on or before 29-07-2016. The objection received after 29-07-2016 will not be entertained and
marriage will be registered accordingly.
Issued today on 25-06-2016 under my hand and seal of the court.
Seal.
Sd/-
Marriage Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate,
Hamirpur.
__________
In the Court of Ms. Kritika Kulhari, IAS, Marriage Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate,
Hamirpur (Himachal Pradesh)
In the matter of :
1.
Anil Pathania aged 36 years s/o Shri Shakti Chand, r/o Village Dhalot, PO Bohani,
Tehsil & District Hamirpur.
2.
Anupma aged 26 years d/o Shri Kulwant Singh, r/o Village Salot, PO Sarahkar, Tehsil
& District Hamirpur
. . Applicants.
Versus
General Public
Subject:—Notice of the Intended Marriage.
Anil Pathania and Anupma have filed an application U/S 5 of Special Marriage Act, 1954
alongwith affidavit and other documents in the court of undersigned in which they stated that they
intend to solemnized marriage within three calendar months.
Therefore, the general public is hereby informed through this notice that any person who
has any objection regarding this marriage can file the objection personally or in writing before this
court on or before 27-07-2016. The objection received after 27-07-2016 will not be entertained and
marriage will be registered accordingly.
Issued today on 25-06-2016 under my hand and seal of the court.
Seal.
Sd/-
Marriage Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate,
Hamirpur (H.P.).
2452
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+] 1938
In the Court of Ms. Kritika Kulhari, IAS, Marriage Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate,
Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh
In the matter of :
1.
Vinod aged 25 years s/o Shri Parkash Chand, r/o Ward No. 3, Village Uparla Manjah,
Tehsil Palampur, District Kangra.
2.
Shallu Kumari aged 18 years d/o Shri Ramesh Kumar, r/o Village & PO Kharoti,
Tehsil Salooni, District Chamba (H.P.)
. . Applicants.
Versus
General Public
Subject:—Notice of the Intended Marriage.
Vinod and Shallu Kumari have filed an application u/s 5 of Special Marriage Act, 1954
alongwith affidavit and other documents in the court of undersigned in which they stated that they
intend to solemnized marriage within three calendar months.
Therefore, the general public is hereby informed through this notice that any person who
has any objection regarding this marriage can file the objection personally or in writing before this
court on or before 27-07-16. The objection received after 27-07-16 will not be entertained and
marriage will be registered accordingly.
Issued today on 25-06-2016 under my hand and seal of the court.
Seal.
Sd/-
Marriage Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate,
Hamirpur (H.P.).
__________
In the Court of Ms. Kritika Kulhari, IAS, Marriage Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate,
Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh
In the matter of :
1.
Ankit Kumar aged 29 years s/o Shri Surjeet Singh, r/o Ward No. 2, Nagar Panchayat
Daulatpur Chowk, Tehsil Amb, District Una at present RBO SBI Gurukul Mall
Hamirpur,
2.
Shashi Bala aged 28 years d/o Shri Julfi Ram, r/o Ward No. 2, Village Raipur, PO
Marwari, Tehsil Amb, District Una (H.P.)
. . Applicants.
Versus
General Public
2453
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+ 1938
Subject:—Notice of the Intended Marriage.
Ankit Kumar and Shashi Bala have filed an application u/s 16 of Special Marriage Act,
1954 alongwith affidavits and other documents in the court of undersigned in which they stated that
they solemnized marriage on 28th November, 2015.
Therefore, the General Public is hereby informed through this notice that any person who
has any objection for this marriage can file the objection personally or in writing before this court
on or before 25-07-16. The objection received after 25-07-16 will not be entertained and marriage
will be registered accordingly.
Issued today on 25-06-2016 under my hand and seal of the court.
Seal.
Sd/-
Marriage Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate,
Hamirpur (H.P.).
__________
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izkFkhZ fryd jkt jSuk iq= tSlh jke] fuoklh xxy] Mk0 ynokM+k] rglhy 'kkgiqj us izkFkZuk&i=
e; gfYQ;k C;ku bl vk'k; ls xqtkjk gS fd mldh iq=h Lokrh jSuk dk tUe fnukad 08&11&1992 dks
gqvk gS ijUrq vKkurko'k mldk bUnzkt lEcfU/kr xzke iapk;r edM+ksVh ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ u djok;k tk
ldk gSA
vr% bl b'rgkj ds ek/;e ls vke turk o lfpo] xzke iapk;r edM+ksVh dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk
gS fd izkFkhZ dh iq=h dh tUe frfFk dks lEcfU/kr xzke iapk;r edM+ksVh ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ djokus ckjs ;fn
fdlh dks dksbZ ,rjkt@mtj gks rks og fnukad 16&07&2016 dks nksigj ckn 2 cts bl vnkyr esa
vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vkdj viuk i{k j[k ldrk gSA gkftj u vkus dh lwjr esa fu/kkZfjr frfFk
ds ckn fdlh Hkh izdkj dk dksbZ Hkh nkok Lohdk;Z u gksxk vkSj izkFkhZ dh iq=h dh tUe frfFk ntZ djus
ckjs vkns'k ikfjr dj fn, tk,axsA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
'kkgiqj A
&&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k] fg0 iz0
eqdnek % bUnzkt tUe frfFk
rkjh[k is'kh % 16&07&2016
fryd jkt jSuk iq= tSlh jke] fuoklh xxy] Mk0 ynokM+k] rglhy 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxMk]
fg0 iz0 A
cuke
1- vke turkA
2- lfpo] xzke iapk;r edM+ksVhA
fo"k;-&&ckcr bUnzkt tUe frfFk v/khu tsj /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-
izkFkhZ fryd jkt jSuk iq= tSlh jke] fuoklh xxy] Mk0 ynokM+k] rglhy 'kkgiqj us izkFkZuk&i=
e; gfYQ;k C;ku bl vk'k; ls xqtkjk gS fd mlds iq= fu'kkar jSuk dk tUe fnukad 30&09&1991 dks
gqvk gS ijUrq vKkurko'k mldk bUnzkt lEcfU/kr xzke iapk;r edM+ksVh ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ u djok;k tk
ldk gSA
2455
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+ 1938
vr% bl b'rgkj ds ek/;e ls vke turk o lfpo] xzke iapk;r edM+ksVh dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk
gS fd izkFkhZ ds iq= dh tUe frfFk dks lEcfU/kr xzke iapk;r edM+ksVh ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ djokus ckjs ;fn
fdlh dks dksbZ ,rjkt@mtj gks rks og fnukad 16&07&2016 dks nksigj ckn 2 cts bl vnkyr esa
vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vkdj viuk i{k j[k ldrk gSA gkftj u vkus dh lwjr esa fu/kkZfjr frfFk
ds ckn fdlh Hkh izdkj dk dksbZ Hkh nkok Lohdk;Z u gksxk vkSj izkFkhZ ds iq= dh tUe frfFk ntZ djus ckjs
vkns'k ikfjr dj fn, tk,axsA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
'kkgiqj A
&&&&&&
c vnkyr dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k] fg0 iz0
eqdnek % bUnzkt tUe frfFk
rkjh[k is'kh % 16&07&2016
jes'k pUn iq= veha pUn] fuoklh jtksy] rglhy 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxMk] fg0 iz0
cuke
1- vke turkA
2- lfpo] xzke iapk;r jtksyA
fo"k;-&&ckcr bUnzkt tUe frfFk v/khu tsj /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-
izkFkhZ jes'k pUn iq= veha pUn] fuoklh jtksy] rglhy 'kkgiqj us izkFkZuk&i= e; gfYQ;k C;ku
bl vk'k; ls xqtkjk gS fd mlds iq= fuHkZ; uj;ky] fuoklh jtksy dk tUe fnukad 28&10&1995 dks
gqvk gS ijUrq vKkurko'k mldk bUnzkt lEcfU/kr xzke iapk;r jtksy ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ u djok;k tk
ldk gSA
vr% bl b'rgkj ds ek/;e ls vke turk o lfpo xzke iapk;r jtksy dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS
fd izkFkhZ ds iq= dh tUe frfFk dks lEcfU/kr xzke iapk;r jtksy ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ djokus ckjs ;fn fdlh
dks dksbZ ,rjkt@mtj gks rks og fnukad 16&07&2016 dks nksigj ckn 2 cts bl vnkyr esa vlkyru
;k odkyru gkftj vkdj viuk i{k j[k ldrk gSA gkftj u vkus dh lwjr esa fu/kkZfjr frfFk ds ckn
fdlh Hkh izdkj dk dksbZ Hkh nkok Lohdk;Z u gksxk vkSj izkFkhZ ds iq= dh tUe frfFk ntZ djus ckjs vkns'k
ikfjr dj fn, tk,axsA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
'kkgiqjA
&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh fxjts'k pkSgku] lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh] 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k] fg0 iz0
fo"k;-&eqdnek rdlhe Hkwfe
rkjh[k is'kh % 22 tqykbZ] 2016
Jh fd'kksjh yky iq= Jh fnrw] fuoklh ldksm] rglhy 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxMk] fg0 iz0
cuke
2456
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+] 1938
oq/kh flag] fot; dqekj iq=ku o eksfudk nsoh] fu'kk nsoh iqf=;ka o jruh nsoh iRuh Lo0 Jh ns'k
jkt] vksadkj flag] v'kksd dqekj iq=ku gks';kj flag] fuoklhx.k ldksm] rglhy 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+kA
eqdíek ckcr rdlhe Hkwfe [kkrk ua0 09] [krkSuh ua0 22 rk 39] [kljk fdÙkk 26] jdck rknknh
02&41&37 gS0 okD; egky ldksm] ekStk jsgyw] rglhy 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k] fg0 iz0A
mijksDr fo"k; ls lacfU/kr rdlhe Hkwfe dh fely v/kksgLrk{kjh ds ikl fopkjk/khu gS ftlesa
mijksDr izfroknhx.k dks bl vnkyr }kjk leu tkjh gq, ijUrq leu fcuk rkehy ds izkIr gq,A blfy,
bl vnkyr dks fo'okl gks pqdk gS fd mijksDr izfroknhx.k dh rkehy lk/kkj.k rjhds ls ugha gks ldrh
gSA vr% bl b'rgkj jkti= }kjk mijksDr izfroknhx.k dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mijksDr fo"k; ds
lacU/k esa fnukad 22 tqykbZ] 2016 dks nksigj ckn 2 cts bl vnkyr esa vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj
vkdj viuk i{k@,rjkt@mtj is'k dj ldrk gSA gkftju vkus dh lwjr esa ,d rjQk dk;Zokgh vey
esa ykbZ tk,xhA
vkt fnukad 23@6@16 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr bl vnkyr ls tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh]
'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k] fg0 iz0A
&&&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh fxjts'k pkSgku] dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k] fgekpy izns'k
eqdíek % fookg iathdj.k
rkjh[k is'kh % 16&07&2016
ghjk yky iq= Hkheh jke] fuoklh 'kkgiqj] rglhy 'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k fgekpy izns'k
cuke
¼1½ vke turk]
¼2½ lfpo] xzke iapk;r 'kkgiqjA
fo"k;-&izkFkZuk i= tsj /kkjk 8¼4½ ds vUrxZr fookg ds iathdj.k ckjsA
mijksDr izkFkhZ us izkFkZuk&i= e; gfYQ;k C;ku }kjk vf/koDrk Jh /khjt yxoky bl vk'k; ls
xqtkjk gS fd mldh 'kknh Jherh dqark nsoh iq=h dsgj flag] fuoklh <ka<+ /kkj] Mk0 dysy] rglhy pqjkg]
ftyk pEck ds lkFk fnukad 22&01&2009 dks fgUnw jhfr fjokt ls gqbZ gS ijUrq xyrh ds dkj.k mlus
'kknh dk iathdj.k xzke iapk;r 'kkgiqj ds fjdkMZ esa ugha djok;k gSA ftls izkFkhZ vc ntZ djokuk pkgrk
gSA
vr% bl lEcU/k esa dqark nsoh dh ekrk o firk dsgj flag] fuoklh <ka< /kkj] Mk0 dysy] rglhy
pqjkg] ftyk pEck o lfpo] xzke iapk;r 'kkgiqj o vke turk dks bl jkti= b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k
tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ dh 'kknh ds iathdj.k ckjs ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks dksbZ mtj ;k ,rjkt gks rks og
fnukad 16&07&2016 dks vlkyru ;k odkyru bl vnkyr esa gkftj vkdj vius mtj@,rjkt is'k
dj ldrk gSA gkftj u vkus dh lwjr esa fu;ekuqlkj 'kknh iathdj.k ds vkns'k ikfjr dj fn;s tk;saxsA
2457
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+ 1938
vkt fnukad 23&6&16 dks gekjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr ls tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
fxjts'k pkSgku
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
'kkgiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k] fgekpy izns'kA
&&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh ukjk;.k flag pkSgku] dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh ¼rglhynkj½ cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0
eqdnek ua0 % 28@2016
rkjh[k jtqvk % 23&05&2016
Jh n'kZu flag iq= Jh eksfgUnz flag] fuoklh xzke y.Msoky] rglhy cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0
- - oknhA
cuke
vke turk ctfj;k % xzke iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~] gjhiqj l.Mksyh] rglhy cn~nh] ftyk lksyu
¼fg0 iz0½
- - izfroknhA
b'rgkj tsj /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e 1969-
b'rgkj cuke vke turkA
gjxkg mijksDr eqdíek muoku okyk esa gj vke@[kkl vke turk o tu&lk/kkj.k dks ctfj;k
b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd Jh n'kZu flag iq= Jh eksfgUnz flag] fuoklh xzke y.Msoky] rglhy
cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0 oknh us bl vnkyr esa vius yM+ds gjnso flag ds tUe bUnzkt ckjs
izkFkZuk&i= tsjs /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr vius C;ku gfYQ;k lfgr nk;j
fd;k gS fd mldh /keZiRuh Jherh izdk'k dkSj us fnukad 13&01&1991 dks ,d cPps dks tUe fn;k Fkk
ftldk fdlh dkj.ko'k og xzke iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~ gjhiqj l.Mksyh ds fjdkMZ esa tUe bUnzkt ugha
djok lds FksA ftldk vc og xzke iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~ gjhiqj l.Mksyh] rglhy cn~nh] ftyk lksyu]
fg0 iz0 esa tUe bUnzkt djokuk pkgrs gSaA ;fn fdlh dks mijksDr dh tUe frfFk dk bUnzkt xzke
iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~ gjhiqj l.Mksyh] rglhy cn~nh ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ gksus ckjs dksbZ ,rjkt gks rks og
fnukad 18&07&2016 ;k blls iwoZ viuk ,rjkt fyf[kr ;k ekSf[kd :i ls bl vnkyr esa is'k dj
ldrs gSA vU;Fkk oknh o vU; xokgu }kjk vkosnu ds lkFk izLrqr fd;s C;ku gfYQ;kukek o dyecan
fd;s x;s C;kukr ds vk/kkj ij mijksDr dh tUe frfFk dk bUnzkt fd;s tkus ds vkns'k ikfjr dj fn;s
tk;saxs rFkk ckn xqtjus fe;kn fdlh dk dksbZ Hkh ,rjkt dkcys lek;r u gksxkA
vkt fnukad 17&06&2016 dks gekjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0A
2458
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+] 1938
c vnkyr Jh ukjk;.k flag pkSgku] dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh ¼rglhynkj½ cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0
eqdnek ua0 % 27@2016
rkjh[k jtqvk % 23&05&2016
Jh n'kZu flag iq= Jh eksfgUnz flag] fuoklh xzke y.Msoky] rglhy cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0
- - oknhA
cuke
vke turk ctfj;k % xzke iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~] gjhiqj l.Mksyh] rglhy cn~nh] ftyk lksyu
¼fg0 iz0½
- - izfroknhA
b'rgkj tsj /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e 1969-
b'rgkj cuke vke turkA
gjxkg mijksDr eqdíek muoku okyk esa gj vke@[kkl vke turk o tu&lk/kkj.k dks ctfj;k
b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd Jh n'kZu flag iq= Jh eksfgUnz flag] fuoklh xzke y.Msoky] rglhy
cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0 oknh us bl vnkyr esa vius yM+ds estj flag ds tUe bUnzkt ckjs
izkFkZuk&i= tsjs /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr vius C;ku gfYQ;k lfgr nk;j
fd;k gSA fd mldh /keZiRuh Jherh izdk'k dkSj us fnukad 18&08&1989 dks ,d cPps dks tUe fn;k Fkk
ftldk fdlh dkj.ko'k og xzke iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~ gjhiqj l.Mksyh ds fjdkMZ esa tUe bUnzkt ugha
djok lds FksA ftldk vc og xzke iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~ gjhiqj l.Mksyh] rglhy cn~nh] ftyk lksyu]
fg0 iz0 esa tUe bUnzkt djokuk pkgrs gSaA ;fn fdlh dks mijksDr dh tUe frfFk dk bUnzkt xzke
iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~ gjhiqj l.Mksyh] rglhy cn~nh ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ gksus ckjs dksbZ ,rjkt gks rks og
fnukad 18&07&2016 ;k blls iwoZ viuk ,rjkt fyf[kr ;k ekSf[kd :i ls bl vnkyr esa is'k dj
ldrs gSA vU;Fkk oknh o vU; xokgu }kjk vkosnu ds lkFk izLrqr fd;s C;ku gfYQ;kukek o dyecan
fd;s x;s C;kukr ds vk/kkj ij mijksDr dh tUe frfFk dk bUnzkt fd;s tkus ds vkns'k ikfjr dj fn;s
tk;saxs rFkk ckn xqtjus fe;kn fdlh dk dksbZ Hkh ,rjkt dkcys lek;r u gksxkA
vkt fnukad 17&06&2016 dks gekjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0A
&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh ukjk;.k flag pkSgku] dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh ¼rglhynkj½ cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0
eqdnek ua0 % 24@2016
rkjh[k jtqvk % 18&05&2016
Jherh lqjthr dkSj iRuh Lo0 Jh jkt dqekj] fuoklh xzke fd'kuiqjk] rglhy cn~nh] ftyk
lksyu] fg0 iz0
- - okfn;kA
cuke
2459
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+ 1938
vke turk ctfj;k % xzke iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~] fd'kuiqjk] rglhy cn~nh] ftyk lksyu ¼fg0 iz0½
- - izfroknhA
b'rgkj tsj /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e 1969-
b'rgkj cuke vke turkA
gjxkg mijksDr eqdíek muoku okyk esa gj vke@[kkl vke turk o tu&lk/kkj.k dks ctfj;k
b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd Jherh lqjthr dkSj iRuh Lo0 Jh jkt dqekj] fuoklh xzke fd'kuiqjk]
rglhy cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0 okfnuh us bl vnkyr esa viuh yM+dh bZdefizr ds tUe bUnzkt ckjs
izkFkZuk&i= tsjs /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr vius C;ku gfYQ;k lfgr nk;j
fd;k gSA fd mlds ifr Lo0 Jh jkt dqekj ds flde ls mlus fnukad 08&12&2012 dks ,d yM+dh dks
tUe fn;k FkkA ftldk fdlh dkj.ko'k og xzke iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~ fd'kuiqjk ds fjdkMZ esa tUe
bUnzkt ugha djok lds FksA ftldk vc og xzke iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~ fd'kuiqjk] rglhy cn~nh] ftyk
lksyu] fg0 iz0 esa tUe bUnzkt djokuk pkgrs gSaA ;fn fdlh dks mijksDr dh tUe frfFk dk bZUnzkt xzke
iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~ fd'kuiqjk] rglhy cn~nh ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ gksus ckjs dksbZ ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad
13&07&2016 ;k blls iwoZ viuk ,rjkt fyf[kr ;k ekSf[kd :i ls bl vnkyr esa is'k dj ldrs gSA
vU;Fkk oknh o vU; xokgu }kjk vkosnu ds lkFk izLrqr fd;s C;ku gfYQ;kukek o dyecan fd;s x;s
C;kukr ds vk/kkj ij mijksDr dh tUe frfFk dk bUnzkt fd;s tkus ds vkns'k ikfjr dj fn;s tk;saxs rFkk
ckn xqtjus fe;kn fdlh dk dksbZ Hkh ,rjkt dkcys lek;r u gksxkA
vkt fnukad 13&06&2016 dks gekjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0A
&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh ukjk;.k flag pkSgku] dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh ¼rglhynkj½ cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0
eqdnek ua0 % 23@2016
rkjh[k jtqvk % 18&05&2016
Jh ljou iq= Jh lhrk jke] fuoklh xzke xqYyjokyk] rglhy cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0
- - oknhA
cuke
vke turk ctfj;k % xzke iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~] xqYyjokyk] rglhy cn~nh] ftyk lksyu
¼fg0 iz0½
- - izfroknhA
b'rgkj tsj /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e 1969-
b'rgkj cuke vke turkA
2460
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+] 1938
gjxkg mijksDr eqdíek muoku okyk esa gj vke@[kkl vke turk o tu&lk/kkj.k dks ctfj;k
b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd Jh ljou iq= Jh lhrk jke] fuoklh xzke xqYyjokyk] rglhy cn~nh]
ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0 oknh us bl vnkyr esa viuh ekrk Lo0 Jherh thrks nsoh iRuh Lo0 Jh lhrk jke
dh e`R;q bUnzkt ckjs izkFkZuk&i= tsjs /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr vius C;ku
gfYQ;k lfgr nk;j fd;k gS fd mldh ekrk Lo0 Jherh thrks nsoh dh fnukad 29&08&2010 dks e`R;q gks
xbZ FkhA ftldk fdlh dkj.ko'k og xzke iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~ xqYyjokyk ds fjdkMZ esa e`R;q bUnzkt ugha
djok lds FksA ftldk vc og xzke iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~ xqYyjokyk] rglhy cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0
iz0 esa e`R;q bUnzkt djokuk pkgrs gSaA ;fn fdlh dks mijksDr dh e`R;q frfFk dk bUnzkt xzke
iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~ xqYyjokyk] rglhy cn~nh ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ gksus ckjs dksbZ ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad
13&07&2016 ;k blls iwoZ viuk ,rjkt fyf[kr ;k ekSf[kd :i ls bl vnkyr esa is'k dj ldrs gSA
vU;Fkk oknh o vU; xokgu }kjk vkosnu ds lkFk izLrqr fd;s C;ku gfYQ;kukek o dyecan fd;s x;s
C;kukr ds vk/kkj ij mijksDr dh e`R;q frfFk dk bUnzkt fd;s tkus ds vkns'k ikfjr dj fn;s tk;saxs rFkk
ckn xqtjus fe;kn fdlh dk dksbZ Hkh ,rjkt dkcys lek;r u gksxkA
vkt fnukad 13&06&2016 dks gekjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0A
&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh ukjk;.k flag pkSgku] dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh ¼rglhynkj½ cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0
eqdnek ua0 % 26@2016
rkjh[k jtqvk % 19&05&2016
Jh j.kthr flag iq= Jh jkek uUn] fuoklh xzke o Mk0 ekuiqjk] rglhy cn~nh] ftyk lksyu]
fg0 iz0
- - oknhA
cuke
vke turk ctfj;k % xzke iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~] ekuiqjk] rglhy cn~nh] ftyk lksyu ¼fg0 iz0½
- - izfroknhA
b'rgkj tsj /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e 1969-
b'rgkj cuke vke turkA
gjxkg mijksDr eqdíek muoku okyk esa gj vke@[kkl vke turk o tu&lk/kkj.k dks ctfj;k
b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd Jh j.kthr flag iq= Jh jkek uUn] fuoklh xzke o Mk0 ekuiqjk] rglhy
cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0 oknh us bl vnkyr esa vius yM+ds mn; 'kekZ ds tUe bUnzkt ckjs
izkFkZuk&i= tsjs /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr vius C;ku gfYQ;k lfgr nk;j
fd;k gS fd mldh /keZiRuh Jherh eerk nsoh us fnukad 13&06&2004 dks ,d cPps dks tUe fn;k FkkA
ftldk fdlh dkj.ko'k og xzke iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~ ekuiqjk ds fjdkMZ esa tUe bUnzkt ugha djok lds
FksA ftldk vc og xzke iapk;r@uxj ifj"kn~ ekuiqjk] rglhy cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0 ds fjdkMZ
2461
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+ 1938
esa tUe bUnzkt djokuk pkgrs gSaA ;fn fdlh dks mijksDr dh tUe frfFk dk bUnzkt xzke iapk;r@uxj
ifj"kn~ ekuiqjk] rglhy cn~nh ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ gksus ckjs dksbZ ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 15&07&2016 ;k
blls iwoZ viuk ,rjkt fyf[kr ;k ekSf[kd :i ls bl vnkyr esa is'k dj ldrs gSA vU;Fkk oknh o vU;
xokgu }kjk vkosnu ds lkFk izLrqr fd;s C;ku gfYQ;kukek o dyecan fd;s x;s C;kukr ds vk/kkj ij
mijksDr dh tUe frfFk dk bUnzkt fd;s tkus ds vkns'k ikfjr dj fn;s tk;saxs rFkk ckn xqtjus fe;kn
fdlh dk dksbZ Hkh ,rjkt dkcys lek;r u gksxkA
vkt fnukad 15&06&2016 dks gekjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
cn~nh] ftyk lksyu] fg0 iz0A
&&&&&&&&&
lkoZtfud lwpuk
eSa] ehuk iq=h LoxhZ; Jh ljunkl] Cykd ua0 23] lSV ua0 15] Qsl III utnhd iznw"k.k cksMZ]
ch0lh0,l0] U;w f'keyk] fg0 iz0A eSa] ehuk iRuh xksiky pØorhZ] eSaus viuk uke ehuk pØorhZ ls cnydj
ehuk dj fn;k gSA
ehuk
iq=h LoxhZ; Jh ljunkl]
Cykd ua0 23] lSV ua0 15] Qsl III
utnhd iznw"k.k cksMZ] ch0lh0,l0] U;w f'keyk] fg0 iz0A
&&&&&&&&&
lkoZtfud lwpuk
eSa] vfHkeU;w pkSgku iq= Jh xksiky] Cykd ua0 23] lSV ua0 15] Qsl 3 utnhd iznw"k.k cksMZ]
ch0lh0,l0] U;w f'keyk] fg0 iz0A eSaus viuk uke vfHkeU;w pØorhZ ls cnydj vfHkeU;w pkSgku dj fn;k
gSA
vfHkeU;w pkSgku
iq= Jh xksiky]
Cykd ua0 23] lSV ua0 15] Qsl 3
utnhd iznw"k.k cksMZ] ch0lh0,l0] U;w f'keyk] fg0 iz0A
2462
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 12 tqykbZ] 2016@21 vk"kk<+] 1938
fu;U=d] eqnz.k rFkk ys[ku lkexzh] fgekpy izns'k] f'keyk&5 }kjk eqfnzr rFkk izdkf'kr
bysDVªkWfud gLrk{kfjr jkti=] oSclkbV http://rajpatrahimachal.nic.in ij miyC/k gS ,oe~ vkWuykbu lR;kfir fd;k tk ldrk gS