jkti=] fgekpy izns'k
fgekpy izns'k jkT; 'kklu }kjk izdkf'kr
eaxyokj] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
fgekpy izns'k ljdkj
HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA-171 001
“NOTIFICATION”
Shimla, the 23rd August, 2016
No. HHC/Estt.3(487)/98.—07 days leave i.e. 02 days earned leave for 30.07.2016 and
31.07.2016 and 05 days commuted leave on and with effect from 01.08.2016 to 05.08.2016, is
hereby sanctioned, ex-post-facto, in favour of Smt. Poonam Mahajan, Additional Registrar of this
Registry.
108&jkti=@2016&30&08&2016
¼3793½
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jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
Certified that Smt. Poonam Mahajan has joined the same post and at the same station from where
she had proceeded on leave after the expiry of the above leave period.
Certified that Smt. Poonam Mahajan would have continued to officiate the same post of
Additional Registrar but for her proceeding on leave.
By order,
Sd/-
Registrar General.
___________
HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA-171 001
“NOTIFICATION”
Shimla, the 23rd August, 2016
No.HHC/Admn.3(400)/95-II.—09 days earned leave on and with effect from 29.07.2016
to 06.08.2016, with permission to suffix Sunday on 07.08.2016, is hereby sanctioned, ex-post-facto,
in favour of Shri Lal Singh Pathania, Secretary of this Registry.
Certified that Shri Lal Singh Pathania has joined the same post and at the same station from
where he had proceeded on leave after the expiry of the above leave period.
Certified that Shri Lal Singh Pathania would have continued to officiate the same post of
Secretary but for his proceeding on leave.
By order,
Sd/-
Registrar General.
__________
HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA-171 001
“NOTIFICATION”
Shimla, the 23rd August, 2016
No. HHC/Admn.3(179)/82-II.—In supersession of the earlier notification of even number
dated 27.07.2016, 06 days earned leave i.e. on and with effect from 01.08.2016 to 06.08.2016, with
permission to affix Sundays on 31.07.2016 and 07.08.2016, already sanctioned, is hereby cancelled
and 06 days commuted leave on and with effect from 01.08.2016 to 06.08.2016, with permission to
affix Sundays on 31.07.2016 and 07.08.2016, is hereby sanctioned, ex-post-facto, in favour of Smt.
Sudesh Kumari, Court Master of this Registry.
Certified that Smt. Sudesh Kumari has joined the same post and at the same station from
where she had proceeded on leave after the expiry of the above leave period.
3795
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
Certified that Smt. Sudesh Kumari would have continued to officiate the same post of Court
Master but for her proceeding on leave.
By order,
Sd/-
Registrar General.
___________
HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA-171 001
NOTIFICATION
Shimla, the 16th August, 2016
No. HHC/Admn.6(24)74-IX.—The Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh has been
pleased to assign the cases under the Negotiable Instruments Act to the Secretaries, District Legal
Service Authorities pending at their respective Headquarter(s) for adjudication and disposal, in
addition to their –own work.
By order,
Sd/-
Registrar General.
_________
LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Dharamshala, the 20th August, 2016
No: Shram (A) 6-2/2014 (Awards) D/Shala.—In exercise of the powers vested under
section 17(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased to
order the publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer, Labour
Court D/Shala on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment Government of
Himachal Pradesh:—
Sr.
No.
Case No.
Petitioner Respondent
Date of Award
1.
383/15
Mani Karan EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
2.
244/15
Bhag Siingh EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
3.
345/15
Devi Saran EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
4.
334/15
Inder Singh EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
5.
384/15
Guru Dutt EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
6.
337/15
Mehar Chand EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
7.
387/15
Mehar Chand EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
8.
386/15
Prem Nath EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
3796
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9.
333/15
Mansa Ram EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
10.
243/15
Dhani Ram EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
11.
241/15
Mangat Ram EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
12.
344/15
Milkh Ram EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
13.
246/15
Rattan Dei EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
14.
340/15
Kamla Devi EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
15.
336/15
Leela EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
16.
380/15
Timru EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
17.
242/15
Chet Ram EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
18.
343/15
Janak Raj EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
19.
338/15
Nandei EE-HPPWD Killar
03.06.2016
20.
404/15
Seeta Ram EE-HPPWD Killar
28.06.2016
21.
405/15
Vijay Singh EE-HPPWD Killar
28.06.2016
22.
407/15
Subhash Chand EE-HPPWD Killar
28.06.2016
23.
415/15
Bhajan Singh EE-HPPWD Killar
28.06.2016
24.
416/15
Hari Nath EE-HPPWD Killar
28.06.2016
25.
418/15
Prithi Singh EE-HPPWD Killar
28.06.2016
26.
420/15
Bhender Lal EE-HPPWD Killar
28.06.2016
27.
421/15
Devi Chand EE-HPPWD Killar
28.06.2016
By order,
Sd/-
Pr. Secretary ( Lab. & Emp.)
___________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 383/2015
Date of Institution : 18.08.2015
Date of Decision : 03.06.2016
Shri Mani Karan s/o Shri Tega Ram, R/O Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
....Respondent.
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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Mani Karan S/O Shri Tega Ram,
R/O Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide
demand notice dated-nil-received on 18.04.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of
service during August, 2003 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of
the services of Shri Mani Karan S/O Shri Tega Ram, R/O Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi,
Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D.
Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during August, 2003 without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not,
what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above
aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 2003 with the respondent/department.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 2003 by an oral order without any reason
whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll
and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged
that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 2003 when the services of petitioner
were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment
and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and
for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.
The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted
for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,
no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his
illegal termination from month of August, 2003 till the date of institution of present claim petition
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who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section
25 G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution
of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the
respondent in the month of August, 2003. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f.
month of August, 2003 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as
petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also
prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of
petitioner between 1994 to September, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and
regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and
per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh
Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2003
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2003 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
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8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.09.2015 for
determination:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil
received on 18.4.2012 qua his/her termination of service during year August, 2003 by
respondent suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,
2003 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? If so, its effect?
… OPP.
3. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
…OPP.
4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:--
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs. 80,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2003 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1994 to August, 2003. He has also stated on oath that no notice
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under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the
same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination
was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and
all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that
respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2003 by oral order had engaged
several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the
persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2003. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent
in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required
for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of
any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 104 days in the year 1994, 54 days in 1996, 48 days in 1998, 143 days in 1999, 41.5
days in 2001, 119 days in 2002 and 84 days in 2003 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2003
in 7 years he had worked for 593.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner
had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour
Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with
regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year
2003 the petitioner had merely worked for 84 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar
months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to
meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required
from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the
respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
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remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1994 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2003 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in August, 2003, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter
as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
3802
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respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows“
17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
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we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in
the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing
industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case
pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would
be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to
adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,
since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.
Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to
the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman
from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
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lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
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dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 7 years and actually worked for 593.5 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2003 who
worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after
about 12 ½ years i.e. demand notice was given dated nil. It is also pertinent to mention here that
petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 51 years who has sufficient spell of life to
work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to
judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for
back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013
(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on
the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be
solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in
2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this
judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was
reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees
eighty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts
and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3
are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
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25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
________ ____
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 244/2015
Date of Institution : 10.06.2015
Date of Decision : 03.06.2016
Shri Bhag Singh, s/o Shri Shambhu Ram, r/o Village and P.O. Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
....Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent
: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Bhag Singh S/O Shri
Shambhu Ram, R/O Village and Post Office Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 27.12.2011 regarding his alleged
illegal termination of service during August, 1998 suffers from delay and latches? If not,
Whether termination of the services of Shri Bhag Singh S/O Shri Shambhu Ram, R/O
Village and Post Office Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive
Engineer, Killar Division, I.& P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. during August, 1998 without complying the provisions of the Industrial
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Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past
service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the
above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 1998 with the respondent/department.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 1998 by an oral order without any reason
whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll
and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged
that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 1998 when the services of petitioner
were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment
and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and
for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.
The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted
for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,
no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his
illegal termination from month of August, 1998 till the date of institution of present claim petition
who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25
G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of
India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent
in the month of August, 1998. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of
August, 1998 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has
remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that
period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner
between 1994 to August, 1998 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the
service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP
Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P.
and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 1998
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
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and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1998 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence. 7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of
petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully
relevant for disposed of this case.
8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.01.2016 for
determination:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
27.12.2011 qua his/her termination of service during year August, 1998 by respondent
suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,
1998 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
5.
If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
…OPP.
6.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-
Issue No.1
: Yes
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Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.50,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 1998 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1994 to August, 1998. He has also stated on oath that no notice
under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the
same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination
was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and
all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that
respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 1998 by oral order had engaged
several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the
persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
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RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 1998. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent
in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required
for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of
any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 58 days in the year 1994, 105 days in 1995, 20 days in 1996, 78 days in 1997 and 56
days in 1998 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 1998 in 5 years he had worked for 317 days
in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and
as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this
court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from
mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1998 the petitioner had merely worked for 56 days and
thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had
not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of
one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under
Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 1998 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
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of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in August, 1998, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter
as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
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the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the
appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of
existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in
the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing
industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case
pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would
be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to
adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,
since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.
Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to
the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman
from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
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and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1998 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 5 years and actually worked for 317 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 1998 who
worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after
about 13 years i.e. demand notice was given dated 27.12.2011. It is also pertinent to mention here
that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 40 years who has sufficient spell of
life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
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21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees
fifty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and
circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3
are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 345/2015
Date of Institution : 05.08.2015
Date of Decision : 03.06.2016
Shri Devi Saran s/o Shri Nathu Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Shoon, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner.
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Versus
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
....Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent
: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Devi Saran S/O Shri Nathu Ram,
R/O Village and Post Office Shoon, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide
demand notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during
September, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services
of Shri Devi Saran S/O Shri Nathu Ram, R/O Village and Post Office Shoon, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2005 without complying the provisions of
the Industrail Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled
to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of June, 1996 who continuously worked till September, 2005 with the respondent/
department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160
days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became
eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in
the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial
breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be
counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that
respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of
September, 2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were
junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department
was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers
working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner
and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been
followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to
petitioner and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of
September, 2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not
served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of
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notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of
petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had
spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or
his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him
and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also
alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of
September, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere
gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to
have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner
prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of
September, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2005
along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained
unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of
intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between June,
1996 to September, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service
of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2004 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt.
in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to
any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till 2005
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
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mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for
determination:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
02.02.2012qua his termination of service during September, 2005 by respondent
suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. September,
2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
…OPP.
7.
If issue no.1 or issue no. 2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefit
the petitioner is entitled to?
…OPP.
8. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:--
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.
1,20,000/- per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1996 who continuously worked till 2005 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
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service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1996 to September, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2005 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2005.
No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent
in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the
petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment
has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-
examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by
the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of
work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As
such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold
that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 168 days in the year 1996, 148 days in 1997, 135 days in 1998, 101 days in 1999, 85
days in 2000, 116 days in 2001, 98 days in 2002, 106 days in 2003, 118 days in 2004 and 58 days
in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 1996 to 2005 in 10 years he had worked for 1133 days in
his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1997 to 2005 petitioner had worked for
more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the
point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal
termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had
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merely worked for 58 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month
of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law
of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have
issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not
violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandaysmdetails of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who
were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the
petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all
the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years
although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent
establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2005
even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly
violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of
the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined
service in 1996 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to
petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.
Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank
of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in September, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
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placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
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“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in
the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing
industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case
pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would
be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to
adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,
since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.
Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to
the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman
from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
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State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D. Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
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judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 10 years and actually worked for 1133 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2005
who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice
after about six years i.e. demand notice was given on 02.02.2012. It is also pertinent to mention
here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 35 years who has sufficient spell
of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees
one lakh twenty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in
the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,
2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu
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of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K. K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 334/2015
Date of Institution : 05.08.2015
Date of Decision : 03.06.2016
Shri Inder Singh s/o Shri Mani Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
....Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Inder Singh S/O Shri Mani
Ram, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
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Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide
demand notice dated 04.04.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during
August, 1998 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of
Shri Inder Singh S/O Shri Mani Ram, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Division Killar, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during August, 1998 without complying the provisions of the
Industrial disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled
to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 1998 with the respondent/department.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 1998 by an oral order without any reason
whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll
and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged
that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 1998 when the services of petitioner
were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment
and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and
for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.
The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted
for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,
no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his
illegal termination from month of August, 1998 till the date of institution of present claim petition
who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-
G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of
India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent
in the month of August, 1998. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of
August, 1998 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has
remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that
period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner
between May, 1994 to August, 1998 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of
the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of
HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of
H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
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4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 1998
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1998 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 27.11.2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
04.04.2012 qua his termination of service during August, 1998 by respondent suffers
from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,
1998 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
9.
If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
…OPP.
10. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? … OPR.
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Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:--
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.60,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 1998 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/departmentfor more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1994 to August, 1998. He has also stated on oath that no notice
under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the
same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination
was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and
all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that
respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 1998 by oral order had engaged
several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the
persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
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petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 1998. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent
in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required
for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of
any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 188 days in the year 1994, 164 days in 1995, 174 days in 1996, and 80 days in 1998 and
thus a total of his service in 1994 to 1998 in 5 years he had worked for 732 days in his entire
service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1995 and 1998 petitioner had worked for more
than 160 daysand as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of
artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination.
It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1998 the petitioner had merely worked
for 80 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination
of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having
continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a
notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated
the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1994 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 1998 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
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reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in August, 1998, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter
as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
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titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in
the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing
industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case
pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would
be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to
adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,
since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.
Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to
the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman
from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
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15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court).
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1998 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
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Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 5 years and actually worked for 732 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 1998 who
worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after
about thirteen years i.e. demand notice was given dated 4.4.2012. It is also pertinent to mention
here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 35 years who has sufficient spell
of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
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reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees
sixty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and
circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3
are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 384/2015
Date of Institution : 18.08.2015
Date of Decision
: 03.06.2016
Shri Guru Dutt s/o Shri Dharam Chand, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
....Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Guru Dutt S/O Shri Dharam
Chand, R/O Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P. vide demand notice dated-nil-received on 18.04.2012 regarding his alleged illegal
termination of service during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not,
Whether termination of the services of Shri Guru Dutt S/O Shri Dharam Chand, R/O
Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive
Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during
September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is
legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent/
department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160
days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became
eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in
the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial
breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be
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counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September,
2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to
petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated
to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under
the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while
retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed
by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner
and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of
September, 2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not
served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of
notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of
petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had
spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or
his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him
and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also
alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of
September, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere
gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to
have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner
prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of
September, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004
along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained
unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of
intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994
to September, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of
petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in
pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any
other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2004
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
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petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.09.2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated 18.4.2012
qua his/her termination of service during year September, 2004 by respondent suffers
from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during
September,2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
11. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
…OPP.
12. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,20,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1994 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.
No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent
in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the
petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment
has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-
examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by
the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of
work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As
such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold
that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 33.5 days in the year 1994, 107 days in 1995, 107 days in 1996, 113 days in 1997, 151
days in 1998, 125 days in 1999, 127 days in 2000, 118.5 days in 2001, 120 days in 2002, 119 days
in 2003 and 100 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2004 in 11 years he had
worked for 1221 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for
more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the
point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal
termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had
merely worked for 100 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month
of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law
of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have
issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not
violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1994 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time
when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit
were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994
was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
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17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
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industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in
the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing
industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case
pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would
be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to
adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,
since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.
Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to
the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman
from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
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the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference: Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-
Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court
that workman had completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation section
25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986.
Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in
view by the Labour Court- Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and
unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of
reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the
appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be
payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
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Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination of
service Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 11 years and actually worked for 1221 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004
who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice
after about 7 ½ years i.e. demand notice was given dated nil. It is also pertinent to mention here
that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 45 years who has sufficient spell of
life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees
one lakh twenty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in
the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,
2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 4
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22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu
of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four monthsfrom
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 337/2015
Date of Institution : 05.08.2015
Date of Decision : 03.06.2016
Shri Mehar Chand s/o Shri Baldev, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
Executive Engineer, I.P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, DistrictChamba, H.P.
....Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
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For the Respondent
: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Mehar Chand S/O Shri
Baldev, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P. vide demand notice dated 25.12.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of
service during October, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of
the services of Shri Mehar Chand S/O Shri Baldev, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2005 without complying the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled
to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of May, 2001 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent/department.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason
whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll
and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged
that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner
were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment
and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and
for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.
The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted
for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,
no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his
illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition
who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-
G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of
India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent
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in the month of October, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of
October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has
remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that
period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner
between May, 2001 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of
the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2009 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of
HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of
H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 2001 who remained engaged till 2005
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 27.11.2015 for
determination:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
25.12.2011 qua his termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent suffers
from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
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2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,
2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
…OPP.
13. If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
…OPP.
14. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.75,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 2001 who continuously worked till 2005 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 2001 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
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obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2005. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent
in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required
for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of
any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 161 days in the year 2001, 146 days in 2002, 137 days in 2003, 127 days in 2004 and
139 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 2001 to 2005 in 5 years he had worked for 710
days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 2002 to 2005 petitioner had
worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla
on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged
illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner
had merely worked for 139 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the
month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement
of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent
to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to
have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2001 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
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workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 2001 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in October, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
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be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in
the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing
industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case
pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would
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be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to
adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,
since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.
Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to
the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman
from claiming rightful reliefm from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
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has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
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petitioner in all remained engaged for about 5 years and actually worked for 710 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who
worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after
about six years i.e. demand notice was given on 25.12.2011. It is also pertinent to mention here that
petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 39 years who has sufficient spell of life to
work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to
judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for
back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013
(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on
the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be
solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in
2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this
judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was
reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees
seventy five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the
facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,
2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
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Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 387/2015
Date of Institution
: 18.08.2015
Date of Decision
: 03.06.2016
Shri Mehar Chand s/o Shri Kedar Nath, r/o Village and P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Mehar Chand S/O Shri
Kedar Nath, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before
the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
vide demand notice dated 25.12.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service
during August, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the
services of Shri Mehar Chand S/O Shri Kedar Nath, R/O Village and Post Office Rei,
Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during August, 2005 without complying the provisions
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back
wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is
entitled to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
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month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 2005 with the respondent/department.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 2005 by an oral order without any reason
whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll
and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged
that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 2005 when the services of petitioner
were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment
and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and
for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.
The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted
for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,
no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his
illegal termination from month of August, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition
who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-
G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of
India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent
in the month of August, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of
August, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has
remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that
period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner
between May, 1994 to August, 1998 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of
the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of
HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of
H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2005
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
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per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for
determination:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
25.12.2011 qua his termination of service during August, 2005 by respondent suffers
from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,
2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
…OPP.
15. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
…OPP.
16. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,30,000/- per
operative part of award.
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REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2005 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms andconditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1994 to August, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice
under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the
same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination
was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and
all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that
respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2005 by oral order had engaged
several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the
persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2005. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
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has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent
in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required
for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of
any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 160 days in the year 1994, 165 days in 1995, 158 days in 1996, 117 days in 1997, 88
days in 1998, 117 days in 1999, 91 days in 2001, 67 days in 2002, 85 days in 2003, 75 days in 2004
and 108 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2005 in 11 years he had worked for
1231 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1996 to 2005 petitioner
had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner,
Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to
alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the
petitioner had merely worked for 108 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months
from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet
requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from
respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the
respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1994 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2005 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
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orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in August, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter
as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW ] 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in
the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing
the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the
workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and
secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his
acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial
dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of
any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider
the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for
adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful
relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed bythe
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years
of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial
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discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination of
service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 11 years and actually worked for 1231 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2005 who
worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after
about six years i.e. demand notice was given on 25.12.2011. It is also pertinent to mention here that
petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 38 years who has sufficient spell of life to
work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to
judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for
back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013
(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on
the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be
solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in
2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this
judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was
reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees
one lakh thirty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the
facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,
2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
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ISSUE NO. 4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being
notmaintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees one lakh thirty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu
of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref No.
: 386/2015
Date of Institution : 18.08.2015
Date of Decision
: 03.06.2016
Shri Prem Nath s/o Shri Panchhi Lal, r/o Village Parghwal, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
....Respondent.
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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent
: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Prem Nath S/O Shri Panchhi
Lal, R/O Village Parghwal, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide
demand notice dated 18.09.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during
October, 2002 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of
Shri Prem Nath S/O Shri Panchhi Lal, R/O Village Parghwal, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2002 without complying the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled
to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of May, 1998 who continuously worked till October, 2000 with the respondent/department.
It is stated that after termination of the services of petitioner, he had preferred an Original
Application No. 41/2001 before the HP Administrative Tribunal and thereafter respondent/
department had reengaged the services of petitioner on 1.6.2001 and petitioner worked upto
October, 2002. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160
days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became
eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in
the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial
breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be
counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that
respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of
October, 2002 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were
junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department
was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers
working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner
and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been
followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to
petitioner and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of
October, 2002 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not
served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of
notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of
petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had
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spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or
his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him
and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also
alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of October,
2002 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed
and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed
violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting
aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2002. He
further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2002 along-with back wages,
seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of
his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks
given time and again during entire service of petitioner between May, 1998 to October, 2002 be
counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.
01.01.2006 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to
judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief
petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1998 who remained engaged till 2002
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2002 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
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7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for
determination:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
18.09.2011 qua his termination of service during October, 2002 by respondent suffers
from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,
2002 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
…OPP.
17. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
…OPP.
18. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?
…OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:--
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.75,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1998 who continuously worked till 2002 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
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adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1998 to October, 2002. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2002 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2002. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent
in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required
for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of
any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 174.5 days in the year 1998, 73 days in 1999, 109 days in 2000, 141 days in 2001 and
150 days in 2002 and thus a total of his service in 1998 to 2002 in 5 years he had worked for 647.5
days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1999 to 2002 petitioner had
worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla
on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged
illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2002 the petitioner
had merely worked for 150 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the
month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement
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of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent
to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to
have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1992 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing
thatpetitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2002 even at the time
when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit
were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998
was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in October, 2002, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
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Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
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“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in
the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing
industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case
pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would
be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to
adjudicate the industrial disputem in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,
since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.
Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to
the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman
from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court).
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
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State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its properperspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2002 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
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judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 5 years and actually worked for 647.5 days as per
mandays chart on recordand that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2002 who
worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after
about 9 years i.e. demand notice was given on 18.9.2011. It is also pertinent to mention here that
petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 32 years who has sufficient spell of life to
work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to
judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for
back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013
(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on
the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be
solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in
2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this
judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was
reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees
seventy five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the
facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,
2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
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reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 333/2015
Date of Institution
: 05.08.2015
Date of Decision
: 03.06.2016
Shri Mansa Ram s/o Shri Mandev, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
....Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by worker Shri Mansa Ram S/O Shri Mandev,
R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
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Engineer, I.&P.H./ H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide
demand notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during
August, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of
Shri Mansa Ram S/O Shri Mandev, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during August, 2004 without complying the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled
to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of May, 1992 who continuously worked till August, 2004 with the respondent/department.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 2004 by an oral order without any reason
whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll
and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged
that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 2004 when the services of petitioner
were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment
and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and
for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.
The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted
for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,
no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his
illegal termination from month of August, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition
who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-
G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of
India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent
in the month of August, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of
August, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has
remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that
period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner
between May, 1994 to August, 1998 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of
the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy
of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs.
State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
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4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1992 who remained engaged till 2004
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
02.02.2012 qua his termination of service during August, 2004 by respondent suffers
from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
…OPP.
19. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
…OPP.
20. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.
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Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,30,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1992 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner isentitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1992 to August, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no notice
under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the
same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination
was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and
all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that
respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2004 by oral order had engaged
several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the
persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the
LabourOfficer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as
the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
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petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2004. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent
in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required
for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of
any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 137 days in the year 1992, 161 days in 1993, 142 days in 1994, 79 days in 1995, 74
days in 1996, 113 days in 1997, 136 days in 1998, 86 days in 1999, 93 days in 2000, 52 days in
2001, 118 days in 2002, 117 days in 2003 and 47 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in
1992 to 2004 in 13 years he had worked for 1355 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed
that except the years 1992 and 1994 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as
there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this
court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from
mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that inthe year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 47 days and
thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had
not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of
one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under
Section 25-F of the Act. Assuch, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1992 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2004 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
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retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1992 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in August, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter
as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer
existedbetween petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched, without
compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed
after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it
may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled
for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
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Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in
the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing
industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case
pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would
be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to
adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,
since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.
Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to
the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman
from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
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15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
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Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22] Limitation Act, 1963.
Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination of service-Industrial
dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under
the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances
which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 13 years and actually worked for 1355 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2004 who
worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after
about 7 ½ years i.e. demand notice was given on 02.02.2012. It is also pertinent to mention here
that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 43 years who has sufficient spell of
life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
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for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees
one lakh thirty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the
facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,
2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees one lakh thirty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu
of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 243/2015
Date of Institution
: 10.06.2015
Date of Decision
: 03.06.2016
Shri Dhani Ram s/o Shri Shiboo, r/o Village Monjhi, P.O. Sechu, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
....Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent
: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Dhani Ram S/O Shri Shiboo,
R/O Village Monjhi, P.O. Sechu, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Egnineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 27.08.2012 regarding his alleged illegal
termination of service during September, 2001 suffers from delay and latches? If not,
Whether termination of the services of Shri Dhani Ram S/O Shri Shiboo, R/O Village
Monjhi, P.O. Sechu, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar
Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during
September, 2001 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is
legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1995 who continuously worked till September, 2001 with the respondent/department.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
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services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2001 by an oral order without any
reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster
roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is
alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been
circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of
petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/
respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service
from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2001 when the
services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month
notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not
been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal
and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never
been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of
verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no
opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained
unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of September, 2001 till the date of
institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus
entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of
statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order
of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2001. He further prayed
for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2001 along-with back wages, seniority
including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal
termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time
and again during entire service of petitioner between 1995 to September, 2001 be counted 160 days
continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having
completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble
Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1995 who remained engaged till 2001
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2001 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
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petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/
awards and closed the evidence.
7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.09.2015 for
determination:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated 27.8.2012
qua his termination of service during year September, 2001 by respondent suffers from
vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2001 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
21. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
…OPP.
22. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:--
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.80,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1995 who continuously worked till 2001 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1995 to September, 2001. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2001 by oral retained
in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-
H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had
served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had
never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching
petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not
approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had
moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report
was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised
by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where
direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred
and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2001.
No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent
in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the
petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment
has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-
examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by
the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of
work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As
such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold
that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 14.5 days in the year 1995, 177 days in 1996, 163 days in 1997, 154.5 days in 1998,
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140 days in 1999, 99 days in 2000, and 74 days in 2001 and thus a total of his service in 1995 to
2001 in 7 years he had worked for 822 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except
the years 1995 and 1998 to 2001 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no
reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to
confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2001 the petitioner had merely worked for 74 days and thus
immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not
rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one
year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under
Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1985 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2001 even at the time
when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit
were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1995
was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in September, 2001, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
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thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Actmunder Article 137 has no application to make reference by them appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
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supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in
the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing
industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case
pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would
be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to
adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,
since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.
Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to
the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman
from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
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dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2001 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
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reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 7 years and actually worked for 822 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2001
who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice
after about 10 years & 11 months i.e. demand notice was given on 27.8.2012. It is also pertinent to
mention here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 52 years who has
sufficient spell of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned
above in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees
eighty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts
and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3
are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
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reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs. Rs.80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 241/2015
Date of Institution
: 10.06.2015
Date of Decision
: 03.06.2016
Shri Mangat Ram s/o Shri Bhima Ram, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
…Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
. . .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I. S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent
: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
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AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by worker Shri Mangat Ram S/O Shri Bhima Ram,
R/O Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated-nil-received on 09.04.2012 regarding his alleged
illegal termination of service during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not,
Whether termination of the services of Shri Mangat Ram S/O Shri Bhima Ram, R/O Village
Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar
Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during
September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is
legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent/department.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any
reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster
roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is
alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been
circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of
petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/
respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service
from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2004 when the
services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month
notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not
been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal
and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never
been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of
verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no
opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained
unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of September, 2004 till the date of
institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus
entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of
statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order
of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004. He further prayed
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for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority
including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal
termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time
and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994 to September, 2004 be counted 160 days
continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having
completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble
Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is
entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained engaged till 2004
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.09.2015 for
determination:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil qua
his/her termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from vice
of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. . .OPP.
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2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustifiedas alleged?
...OPP.
23. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
...OPP.
24. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? ...OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1 : Yes
Issue No.2 : Yes
Issue No.3 : Discussed
Issue No.4 : No
Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,00,000/- per operative part
of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1997 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1997 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
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the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.
No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent
in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the
petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment
has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-
examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by
the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of
work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As
such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold
that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 26 days in the year 1997, 109 days in 1998, 78 days in 1999, 130 days in 2000, 70 days
in 2001, 1118 days in 2002, 113 days in 2003 and 80 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in
1997 to 2004 in 8 years he had worked for 724 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that
petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour
Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with
regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year
2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 80 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar
months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to
meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required
from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the
respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
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given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time
when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit
were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1997
was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
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of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in
the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing
industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
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circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case
pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would
be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to
adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,
since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.
Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to
the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman
from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....”(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
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termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had completed
240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of the I.D.Act-
Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. His services
terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6
years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court
flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of
reinstatement compensation of Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-
employer within six weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
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per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 8 years and actually worked for 724 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004
who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice
after about 7 ½ years i.e. demand notice was given dated nil. It is also pertinent to mention here
that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 45 years who has sufficient spell of
life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees
one lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and
circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3
are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
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Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 344/2015
Date of Institution
: 05.08.2015
Date of Decision
: 03.06.2016
Shri Milkh Ram s/o Shri Mandev, r/o Village and P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
...Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
...Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Milk Ram S/O Shri Mandev, R/O
Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand
notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during
September, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services
of Shri Milk Ram S/o Shri Mandev, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2005 without complying the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled
to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
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3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of May, 1993 who continuously worked till September, 2005 with the respondent/
department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160
days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became
eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in
the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial
breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be
counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September,
2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to
petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated
to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under
the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while
retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed
by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner
and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of
September, 2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not
served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of
notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of
petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had
spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or
his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him
and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also
alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of
September, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere
gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to
have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner
prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of
September, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2005
along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained
unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of
intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1993
to September, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of
petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in
pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and
to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1993 who remained engaged till 2005
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
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alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 27.11.2015 for
determination:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
02.02.2012 qua his termination of service during year September, 2005 by respondent
suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
...OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
...OPP.
25. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
...OPP.
26. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? ...OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1 : Yes
Issue No.2 : Yes
Issue No.3 : Discussed
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Issue No.4 : No
Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,00,000/- per operative part
of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1993 who continuously worked till 2005 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1993 to September, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2005 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
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admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2005.
No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent
in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the
petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment
has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-
examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by
the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of
work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As
such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold
that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 176 days in the year 1993, 162 days in 1994, 131 days in 1995, 134 days in 1996, 124
days in 1997, 80 days in 1998 and 61 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 1993 to 2005 in
7 years he had worked for 868 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years
1995 to 1998 and 2005 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference
from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its
findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 88 days and thus immediately in
preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service
of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it
was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the
Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2005 even at the time
when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit
were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1993
was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
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RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in September, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
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has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference
of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour
Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as
there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the
workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it
is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring
the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due
to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not
debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
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and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court).
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 7 years and actually worked for 868 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2005
who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice
after about 6 years i.e. demand notice was given dated 2.2.2012. It is also pertinent to mention here
that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 40 years who has sufficient spell of
life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
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21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees
one lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and
circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3
are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 246/2015
Date of Institution
: 10.06.2015
Date of Decision
: 03.06.2016
Smt. Rattan Dei w/o Shri Madan Lal, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
...Petitioner.
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Versus
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
....Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent
: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by worker Smt. Rattan Dei W/O Shri Madan Lal,
R/O Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, Killar Division, I.&.P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 27.08.2012 regarding her alleged illegal
termination of service during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not,
Whether termination of the services of Smt. Rattan Dei W/O Shri Madan Lal, R/O Village
Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar
Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during
September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is
legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that she had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of May, 1990 who continuously worked till September, 2004 in IPH Sub Division, Killar.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any
reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster
roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is
alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been
circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of
petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/
respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service
from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2004 when the
services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, she was not served with one month
notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not
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been paid to her and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal
and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who never
been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at the time of
verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and the at the same time, no
opportunity of hearing had been afforded to her. The petitioner also alleges that she has remained
unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of September, 2004 till the date of
institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus
entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of
statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order
of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004. She further prayed
for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority
including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal
termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time
and again during entire service of petitioner between May, 1990 to September, 2004 be counted
160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2000 having
completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble
Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is
entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1990 who remained engaged till 2004
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 and
26 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos.
25 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 she would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6. In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her
affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of junior
workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,
respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division
Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of other co-
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workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the
evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for
determination which are as under:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
27.08.2012 qua her termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent
suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
...OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
...OPP.
3. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
...OPP.
4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? ...OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1 : Yes
Issue No.2 : Yes
Issue No.3 : Discussed
Issue No.4 : No
Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.80,000/- per operative part of
award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1990 who continuously worked till 2004 at IPH Sub Division Killar is
not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms
and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while
terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched
petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work intermittently as
per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to
plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the
backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with
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a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with
seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from May, 1990 to September, 2004. She has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus
her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in September, 2004 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour
Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.
No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent
in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the
petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment
has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-
examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the
respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work
as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in
absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that
respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 25 days in the year 1990, 31 days in 1991, 160 days in 1997, 85.5 days in 1999, 106
days in 2000, 84 days in 2001, 86 days in 2002, 96.5 days in 2003 and 97 days in 2004 and thus a
total of her service in 1990 to 2004 in 9 years she had worked for 771 days in her entire service
period. Be it noticed that except the years 1990, 1991 & 1999 to 2004 she had worked for more
than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of
artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination.
It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked
for 97 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination
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of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having
continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a
notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated
the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time
when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit
were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1990
was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in September, 2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivatable land with her and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning
from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
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Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
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“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the
remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material
evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not
think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants
for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference
of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour
Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as
there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the
workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover,
it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and
referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material
evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial
dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous
and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the
demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
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State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference: Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-
Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court
that workman had completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o
section 25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial discretion
exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the
appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the
workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a.
will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
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Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 9 years and actually worked for 771 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004
who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice
after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on 27.08.2012. It is also pertinent to mention
here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 32 years who has sufficient spell
of life to work and earn her livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees
eighty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts
and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3
are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 3
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
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compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 340/2015
Date of Institution
: 05.08.2015
Date of Decision
: 03.06.2016
Ms. Kamla Devi d/o Shri Saran Dass, Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
....Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Ms. Kamla Devi D/O Shri Saran Dass,
R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide
demand notice dated 03.03.2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of service during
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October, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of
Ms. Kamla Devi D/O Shri Saran Dass, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar,
Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2004 without complying the provisions
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back
wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is
entitled to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that she had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of September, 1997 who continuously worked till October, 2004 in IPH Sub Division,
Killar. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in
each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became
eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in
the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial
breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be
counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October,
2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to
petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated
to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under
the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while
retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed
by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner
and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October,
2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, she was not served with
one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period
had also not been paid to her and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima
facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record
who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at
the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and the at the same time,
no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to her. The petitioner also alleges that she has
remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 2004 till the date
of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus
entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of
statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order
of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2004. She further prayed
for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority
including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal
termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time
and again during entire service of petitioner between September, 1997 to October, 2004 be counted
160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2006 having
completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble
Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
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denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained engaged till 2004
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 and
26 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos.
25 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 she would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6. In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her
affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of junior
workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,
respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division
Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of other co-
workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the
evidence.
7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 27.11.2015 for
determination which are as under:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
03.03.2012 qua her termination of service during October, 2004 by respondent suffers
from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
...OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
...OPP.
3. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
…OPP.
5.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? ...OPR.
Relief.
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9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1 : Yes
Issue No.2 : Yes
Issue No.3 : Discussed
Issue No.4 : No
Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,00,000/- per operative part
of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1997 who continuously worked till 2004 at IPH Sub Division Killar is
not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms
and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while
terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched
petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work intermittently as
per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to
plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the
backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with
a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with
seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from June, 1997 to October, 2004. She has also stated on oath that
no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus her
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2004 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
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not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour
Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2004. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the
respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work
as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in
absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that
respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 115 days in the year 1997, 108 days in 1998, 164 days in 1999, 118 days in 2000, 108.5
days in 2001, 42 days in 2002, 108 days in 2003 and 110 days in 2004 and thus a total of her
service in 1997 to 2004 in 8 years she had worked for 973.5 days in her entire service period. Be it
noticed that except the years 1997, 1998 and to 2000 to 2004 she had worked for more than 160
days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial
breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is
evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for
110 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of
petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having
continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a
notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated
the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2004 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1997 was
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terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in October, 2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivatable land with her and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning
from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
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titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the
remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material
evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not
think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants
for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference
of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour
Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as
there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the
workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover,
it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and
referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material
evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial
dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous
and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her employer.
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15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the
demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
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Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 8 years and actually worked for 973.5 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2004 who
worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after
about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on 03.03.2012. It is also pertinent to mention here
that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 32 years who has sufficient spell of
life to work and earn her livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
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pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees
one lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and
circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,2 and 3
are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 3
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 336/2015
Date of Institution
: 05.08.2015
Date of Decision
: 03.06.2016
Smt. Leela w/o Shri Kesi Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
...Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
...Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent
: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Leela W/O Shri Kesi Ram, R/O
Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide
demand notice dated 25.12.2011 regarding her alleged illegal termination of services during
August, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of service of Smt.
Leela W/O Shri Kesi Ram, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. during August, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past
service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the
above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that she had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of May, 1992 who continuously worked till August, 2004 in IPH Sub Division, Killar.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
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petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 2004 by an oral order without any reason
whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll
and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged
that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 2004 when the services of petitioner
were terminated by way of oral order, she was not served with one month notice of retrenchment
and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to her and
for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.
The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted
for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,
no charge-sheet had been served upon her and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to her. The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her
illegal termination from month of August, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition
who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-
G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of
India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent
in the month of August, 2004. She further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of
August, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has
remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that
period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner
between May, 1992 to August, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of
the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of
HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State
of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1992 who remained engaged till 2004
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 and
26 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos.
25 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 she would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
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5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6. In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her
affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of junior
workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,
respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division
Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of other co-
workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the
evidence.
7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 27.11.2015 for
determination which are as under:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
25.12.2011 qua her termination of service during August, 2004 by respondent suffers
from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
…OPP.
3.
If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
…OPP.
6.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-
Issue No.1 : Yes
Issue No.2 : Yes
Issue No.3 : Discussed
Issue No.4 : No
Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,40,000/- per operative part
of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the month of May, 1992 who continuously worked till 2004 at IPH Sub
Division Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work
intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from May, 1992 to August, 2004. She has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus her
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in August, 2004 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour
Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2004. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the
respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work
as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in
absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that
respondent had established plea of abandonment.
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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 144 days in the year 1992, 167 days in 1993, 140 days in 1994, 102 days in 1995, 167
days in 1996, 116 days in 1997, 163 days in 1998, 127 days in 1999, 112 days in 2000, 117 days in
2001, 121 days in 2002, 121 days in 2004 and 95 days in 2003 and thus a total of her service in
1992 to 2004 in 13 years she had worked for 1692 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed
that except the years 1992, 1994, 1995, 1997 & 1999 to 2004 she had worked for more than 160
days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial
breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is
evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for
95 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of
petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having
continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a
notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated
the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2004 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1992 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
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17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in August, 2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivatable land with her and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning
from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
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industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the
remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material
evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not
think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants
for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by
this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on
hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial
dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case
pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that she would
be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to
adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,
since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.
Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to
the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman
from claiming rightful relief from her employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the
demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case,
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the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
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Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of
service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 13 years and actually worked for 1692 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2004 who
worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after
about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on 25.12.2011. It is also pertinent to mention here
that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 37 years who has sufficient spell of
life to work and earn her livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,40,000/- (Rupees
one lakh forty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the
facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,
2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
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ISSUE NO. 3
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,40,000/- (Rupees one lakh forty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of
the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
______________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 380/2015
Date of Institution : 18.08.2015
Date of Decision
: 03.06.2016
Smt. Timru w/o Shri Pritam Singh, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
....Respondent
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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Timru W/O Shri Pritam Singh,
R/O Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide
demand notice dated-nil-received on 18.07.2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of
service during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination
of the services of Smt. Timru W/O Shri Pritam Singh, R/O Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi,
Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D.
Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004 without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not,
what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above
aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that she had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent/
department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160
days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became
eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in
the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial
breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be
counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September,
2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to
petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated
to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under
the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while
retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed
by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner
and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of
September, 2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, she was not
served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of
notice period had also not been paid to her and for said reason termination of the services of
petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had
spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or
her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her
and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to her. The petitioner also
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alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of
September, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere
gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to
have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner
prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of
September, 2004. She further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004
along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained
unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of
intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between May,
1994 to September, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service
of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt.
in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to
any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till 2004
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 and
26 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos.
25 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 she would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved
her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD
Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of
other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the
evidence.
7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
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8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.01.2016 for
determination which are as under:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil
received on18.7.2012 qua his/her termination of service during September, 2004 by
respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
3. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
…OPP.
7. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-
Issue No. 1 : Yes
Issue No. 2 : Yes
Issue No. 3 : Discussed
Issue No. 4 : No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,20,000/- per operative
part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till 2004 at IPH Sub
Division Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work
intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have
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worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from May, 1994 to September, 2004. She has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus
her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in September, 2004 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour
Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.
No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent
in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the
petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment
has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-
examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the
respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work
as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in
absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that
respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 169 days in the year 1996, 114 days in 1997, 28 days in 1998, 139 days in 1999, 129
days in 2000, 115.5 days in 2001, 120 days in 2002, 109 days in 2003 and 77 days in 2004 and thus
a total of her service in 1994 to 2004 in 9 years she had worked for 1000.5 days in her entire
service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1997 to 2004 she had worked for more than 160
days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial
breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is
evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for
77 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of
petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having
continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a
notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated
the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
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15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years
although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent
establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004
even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly
violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of
the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined
service in 1994 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to
petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.
Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank
of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in September, 2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivatable land with her and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning
from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
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judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
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(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the
remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material
evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not
think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants
for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by
this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on
hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial
dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case
pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that she would
be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to
adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,
since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.
Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to
the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman
from claiming rightful relief from her employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the
demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
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Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
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all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 9 years and actually worked for 1000.5 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004
who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice
after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given dated nil. It is also pertinent to mention here
that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 42 years who has sufficient spell of
life to work and earn her livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees
one lakh twenty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in
the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no.
1,2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 3
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu
of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
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today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 242/2015
Date of Institution
: 10.06.2015
Date of Decision
: 03.06.2016
Shri Chet Ram s/o Shri Bhan Chand, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Chet Ram S/O Shri Bhan
Chand, R/O Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated-nil-received on 31.10.2011 regarding his alleged
illegal termination of service during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not,
Whether termination of the services of Shri Chet Ram S/O Shri Bhan Chand, R/O Village
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Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar
Division H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during
September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is
legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent/department.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any
reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster
roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is
alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been
circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of
petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/
respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service
from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2004 when the
services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month
notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not
been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal
and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never
been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of
verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no
opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained
unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of September, 2004 till the date of
institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus
entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of
statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order
of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004. He further prayed
for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority
including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal
termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time
and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994 to September, 2004 be counted 160 days
continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having
completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble
Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
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stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2004
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.09.2015 for
determination:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil qua his
termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from vice of
delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
…OPP.
27. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
…OPP.
28. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.
Relief.
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9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:--
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,20,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis in the year 1996 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1996 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
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13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.
No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent
in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the
petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment
has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-
examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by
the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of
work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As
such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold
that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 162 days in the year 1996, 161 days in 1997, 84 days in 1998, 147 days in 1999, 28
days in 2000, 26 days in 2001, 80 days in 2002, 111 days in 2003 and 19 days in 2004 and thus a
total of his service in 1996 to 2004 in 9 years he had worked for 818 days in his entire service
period. Be it noticed that except the years 1998 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160
days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial
breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is
evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for
19 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of
petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having
continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a
notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated
the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time
when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit
were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996
was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
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applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
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Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in
the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing
industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case
pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would
be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to
adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,
since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.
Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to
the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman
from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
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cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
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Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 9 years and actually worked for 818 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004
who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice
after about thirteen years i.e. demand notice was given dated nil. It is also pertinent to mention
here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 40 years who has sufficient spell
of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
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by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees
one lakh twenty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in
the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,
2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu
of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 343/2015
Date of Institution : 05.08.2015
Date of Decision
: 03.06.2016
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Shri Janak Raj s/o Shri Girdhari Lal, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Janak Raj S/O Shri Girdhari
Lal, R/O Village Kuthal, Post Office Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P. vide demand notice dated 08.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of
service during October, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of
the services of Shri Janak Raj S/O Shri Girdhari Lal, R/O Village Kuthal, Post Office Sach,
Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D.
Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2005 without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not,
what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above
aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of June, 1985 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent/department.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason
whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll
and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged
that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
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1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner
were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment
and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and
for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.
The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted
for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,
no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his
illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition
who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-
G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of
India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent
in the month of October, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of
October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has
remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that
period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner
between 1985 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the
service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.1995 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of
HP Govt. in pursuance to and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1985 who remained engaged till 2005
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
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HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.09.2015 for
determination:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
08.08.2010 qua his/her termination of service during year October, 2005 by respondent
suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,
2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
29. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
…OPP.
30. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?
…OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:--
Issue No. 1
: Yes
Issue No. 2
: Yes
Issue No. 3
: Discussed
Issue No. 4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.150,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1985 who continuously worked till 2005 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
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intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1985 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2005. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent
in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required
for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of
any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 103 days in the year 1986, 82 days in 1988, 30 days in 1989, 25 days in 1996, 115 days
in 1997, 154 days in 1998, 110 days in 1999, 101 days in 2001, 68 days in 2002 and 88 days in
2005 and thus a total of his service in 1985 to 2005 in 10 years he had worked for 876 days in his
entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as
there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this
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court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from
mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 88 days and
thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had
not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of
one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under
Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in October, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
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admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
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14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid
down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in
the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing
industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case
pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would
be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to
adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,
since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.
Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to
the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman
from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
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17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D.Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
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referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 10 years and actually worked for 876 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who
worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after
about 5 years i.e. demand notice was given dated 8.8.2010. It is also pertinent to mention here that
petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 44 years who has sufficient spell of life to
work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to
judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for
back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013
(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on
the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be
solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in
2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this
judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was
reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees
one lakh fifty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the
facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,
2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of
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the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 338/2015
Date of Institution : 05.08.2015
Date of Decision
: 03.06.2016
Smt. Nandei w/o Shri Kartar Chand, r/o Village Hillour, P.O. Sahali, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent
: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Nandei W/O Shri Kartar
Chand, R/O Village Hillour, P.O. Sahali, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
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Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P. vide demand notice dated 27.08.2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of
service during September, 2004 suffers from vice of delay and latches? If not, Whether
termination of the services of Smt. Nandei W/O Shri Kartar Chand, R/O Village Hillour,
P.O. Sahali, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer,
I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September,
2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and
justified? If not, what amount of backw ages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that she had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2004 in IPH Sub Division, Killar.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any
reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster
roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is
alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been
circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of
petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/
respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service
from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2004 when the
services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, she was not served with one month
notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not
been paid to her and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal
and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who never
been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at the time of
verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and the at the same time, no
opportunity of hearing had been afforded to her. The petitioner also alleges that she has remained
unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of September, 2004 till the date of
institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus
entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of
statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order
of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004. She further prayed
for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority
including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal
termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time
and again during entire service of petitioner between June, 1994 to September, 2004 be counted
160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having
completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble
Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
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4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2004
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 and
26 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos.
25 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 she would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved
her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD
Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of
other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the
evidence.
7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 27.11.2015 for
determination which are as under:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
27.98.2012 qua her termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent
suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
…OPP.
3. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
…OPP.
8. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.
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Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issuesare as follows:--
Issue No. 1
: Yes
Issue No. 2
: Yes
Issue No. 3
: Discussed
Issue No. 4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,20,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till 2004 at IPH Sub
Division Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work
intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from June, 1994 to September, 2004. She has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus
her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in September, 2004 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba
town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand
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notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did
not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the
Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour
Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.
No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent
in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the
petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment
has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-
examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the
respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work
as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in
absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that
respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 139 days in the year 1994, 171 days in 1995, 162 days in 1996, 165 days in 1997, 154
days in 1998, 81.5 days in 1999, 112 days in 2000, 48 days in 2001, 85 days in 2002, 69 days in
2003 and 97 days in 2004 and thus a total of her service in 1994 to 2004 in 11 years she had
worked for 1283.5 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1994 and
1998 to 2004 she had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour
Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with
regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year
2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 97 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar
months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to
meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required
from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the
respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time
when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit
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were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994
was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in September, 2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivatable land with her and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning
from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
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Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the
remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material
evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not
think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants
for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by
this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on
hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial
dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case
pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that she would
be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to
adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,
since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.
Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to
the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman
from claiming rightful relief from her employer.
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15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the
demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
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Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payabl.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 11 years and actually worked for 1283.5 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004
who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice
after about 8 years i.e. demand notice was given on 27.08.2012. It is also pertinent to mention here
that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 46 years who has sufficient spell of
life to work and earn her livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
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reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees
one lakh twenty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in
the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no.
1,2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 3
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu
of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.
(K.K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 404/2015
Date of Institution : 10.09.2015
Date of Decision
: 28.6.2016
Shri Seeta Ram s/o Shri Shri Mehar Chand, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Churah,
District Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner
Versus
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
....Respondent
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent
: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Seeta Ram S/O Shri Mehar
Chand, R/O Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Churah, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, I&PH/HPPWD Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
vide demand notice dated 23.10.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services
during August, 1997 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the
services of Shri Seeta Ram S/O Shri Mehar Chand, R/O Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil
Churah, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I&PH/HPPWD Division, Killar,
Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during August, 1997 without complying the provisions
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back
wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is
entitled to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of November, 1990 who continuously worked till August, 1997 with the respondent/
department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160
days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became
eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in
the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial
breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be
counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the
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applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August,
1997 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to
petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated
to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under
the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while
retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed
by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner
and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August,
1997 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with
one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period
had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was
prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service
record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and
even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the
same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he
has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of August, 1997 till the
date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was
thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of
statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order
of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of August, 1997. He further prayed for
reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of August, 1997 along-with back wages, seniority including
continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal
termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time
and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994 to August, 1997 be counted 160 days
continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2001 having
completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble
Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is
entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1990 who remained engaged till 1997
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1997 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
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petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for
determination:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
23.10.2011 qua his termination of service during August, 1997 by respondent suffers
from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,
1997 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
…OPP.
31. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
…OPP.
32. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:--
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.50,000/- per operative
part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis in the year 1990 who continuously worked till 1997 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1990 to August, 1997. He has also stated on oath that no notice
under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the
same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination
was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and
all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that
respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 1997 by oral order had engaged
several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the
persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 1997. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent
in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required
for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of
any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 16 days in the year 1990, 53 days in 1991, 28 days in 1992, 40 days in 1994, 58 days in
1995, 180 days in 1996 and 51 days in 1997 and thus a total of his service in 1990 to 1997 in 07
years he had worked for 426 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years
1990 to 1995 and 1997 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference
from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its
findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B that in the year 1997 the petitioner had merely worked for 51 days and thus immediately in
preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service
of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it
was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the
Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1990 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 1997 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1990 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in August, 1997, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter
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as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
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supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference
of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour
Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as
there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the
workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it
is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring
the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due
to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not
debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
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reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1997 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference: Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-
Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court
that workman had completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o
section 25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial discretion
exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the
appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the
workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a.
will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
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reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 07 years and actually worked for 426 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 1997 who
worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after
about fourteen years i.e. demand notice was given on 23.10.2011. It is also pertinent to mention
here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 47 years who has sufficient spell
of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees
fifty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts
and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3
are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
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reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 405/2015
Date of Institution : 10.09.2015
Date of Decision : 28.6.2016
Shri Vijay Singh s/o Shri Vidya Nand, r/o Village Chasak, P.O. Saichu, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
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AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Vijay Singh S/O Shri
Vidya Nand, R/O Village Chasak, P.O. Saichu, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
before the Executive Engineer, I&PH/HPPWD Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 27.08.2012 regarding his alleged illegal
termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not,
Whether termination of the services of Shri Vijay Singh S/O Shri Vidya Nand, R/O
Village Chasak, P.O. Saichu, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive
Engineer, I&PH/HPPWD Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during
September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service
benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of September, 1992 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the
respondent/department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had
worked for 160 days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District
Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of
Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity).
Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way
of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such
breaks are required to be counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160
days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner
remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage
service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other
co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of
respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority
list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2004 when the services
of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice
of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not
been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie
illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who
never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even
at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the
same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that
he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of September, 2004
till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed
and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed
violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial
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Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting
aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004.
He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 along-with back
wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the
date
of
his
illegal
termination.
The
petitioner
has
also
prayed
that
period
of
intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between
1992 to September, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the
service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy
of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs.
State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1992 who remained engaged till
2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for
tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner
have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial
nos. 1 to 25 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and
at serial nos. 26 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner,
respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving
of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has
maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in
para no.7 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal
Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in
2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years
petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is
also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,
question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,
there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination.
It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not
entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim
petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of
petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was
specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
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8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.1.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
27.8.2012 qua his/her termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent
suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during
September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1 : Yes
Issue No.2 : Yes
Issue No.3 : Discussed
Issue No.4 : No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.40,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis in the year 1992 who continuously worked till 2004 with the
respondent/department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any
written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in
dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of
respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the
job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience.
Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but
only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing
admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to
determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority
and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
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worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1992 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and
thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with
full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service.
Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in
service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act
which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served
respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had
never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching
petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not
approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner
had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure
report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial
dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing
CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which
delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it
could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays
chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1
specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after
September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on
the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence
calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the
respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the
other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in
between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks
had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that
petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence
led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of
abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 23.5 days in the year 1993, 77 days in 2002, 115 days in 2003 and 39 days in 2004
and thus a total of his service in 1992 to 2004 in 04 years he had worked for 254.5 days in his
entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as
there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks,
this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident
from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 39
days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of
petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having
continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued
a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not
violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
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15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that
large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to
07.9.1999 and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of
petitioner remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were
retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason.
Ex.PW1/B, Ex. PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who
were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1992 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E
to Ex. PW1/L are the mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex.
PW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly
junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in
a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C
also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160
days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of
evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time
after September, 2004 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the
respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors
workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior
from these co-workers having joined service in 1995 was terminated and even thereafter
respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also
violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419
in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of
the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of
provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of
orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as
reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through
which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner
and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to
be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the
basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being
junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not
worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his
service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of
provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated
the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and
also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets
belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been
earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance
has been placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road
Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench
comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully
employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was
income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely
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differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’.
Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning
from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his
family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex
Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in
holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated
to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for
his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not
be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship
of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was
illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act
although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of
judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner
was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out
of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab IC
4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12.
Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors
of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue
regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The
said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of
decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that
the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by
the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication
of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can
refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional
Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case
referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under
Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court
as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon
Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in
raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
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“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising
the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India
and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by
the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time
results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if
it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so
culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In
view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference
of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the
Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was
made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman
was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the
respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from
the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of
the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or
unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in
raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication
as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief
from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if
raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real
prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court
can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the
delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case
can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till
the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal.
The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages
instead of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
15. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the
case that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his
acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to
the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from
the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State
Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute
with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date
of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation
officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance,
the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it
cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the
dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
16. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional
issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State
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Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles
laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the Labour
Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent
Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power
of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the
Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred
to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost
important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at
large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed
that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was
raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court
of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced
by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the
judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture
Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of
the judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F
of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years
of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of
the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one
lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks
failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-
Termination of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not
applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes
definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before
granting relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
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referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21
of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh
observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all
relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of
service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had
raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he
raised industrial dispute after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though
compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be
enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and
circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of
Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court
factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 04 years
and actually worked for 254.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of
petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had
raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years & 11 months i.e.
demand notice was given on 27.8.2012. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on the
date of filing claim petition was ageing 33 years who has sufficient spell of life to work and
earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments
of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages
but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR
25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the
matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be
solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this
judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was
reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow
University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC
3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 40,000/-
(Rupees forty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled
in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount
of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the
petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its
realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being
not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
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RELIEF:
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed
to pay the compensation of Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of
the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months
from today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on
the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open
Court today this 28th day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No. : 407/2015
Date of Institution : 10.09.2015
Date of Decision : 28.6.2016
Shri Subhash Chand s/o Shri Budhi Ram, r/o Village Hillour, P.O. Sahali, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
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“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Subhash Chand S/O Shri Budhi
Ram, R/O Village Hillour, P.O. Sahali, Tehsil Panig, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, I&PH/HPPWD Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P. vide demand notice dated 27.08.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of
services during August, 1997 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination
of the services of Shri Subhash Chand S/O Shri Budhi Ram, R/O Village Hillour, P.O.
Sahali, Tehsil Panig, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I&PH/HPPWD
Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during August, 1997 without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified?
If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the
above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of April, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 1997 with the respondent/
department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for
160 days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba
and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-
B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments
made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of
intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks
are required to be counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as
for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that
respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end
of August, 1997 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who
were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of
respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority
list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 1997 when the services of petitioner
were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment
and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him
and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and
unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been
charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of
verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no
opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has
remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of August, 1997 till the date
of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus
entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of
statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside
oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of August, 1997. He
further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of August, 1997 along-with back wages,
seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date
of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional
breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994 to August, 1997 be
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counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.
01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance
to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any
other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till
1997 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for
tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner
have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial
nos. 1 to 25 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and
at serial nos. 26 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner,
respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving
of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has
maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in
para no.7 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal
Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in
1997 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years
petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is
also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,
question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,
there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination.
It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not
entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim
petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of
petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was
specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
27.8.2012 qua his termination of service during August, 1997 by respondent
suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
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2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during
August, 1997 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief.
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.40,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 1997 with the
respondent/department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any
written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in
dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of
respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the
job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience.
Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but
only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing
admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to
determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority
and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1994 to August, 1997. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and
thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with
full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
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alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 1997 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service.
Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in
service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act
which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served
respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had
never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching
petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not
approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner
had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure
report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial
dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing
CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which
delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it
could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays
chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1
specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after
August, 1997. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the
part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence
calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the
respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the
other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in
between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks
had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that
petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence
led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of
abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 16 days in the year 1994, 57 days in 1995 and 73 days in 1997 and thus a total of his
service in 1994 to 1997 in 03 years he had worked for 146 days in his entire service period. Be
it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference
from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its
findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1997 the petitioner had merely worked for 73 days and thus
immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not
rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one
year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under
Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that
large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to
07.9.1999 and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of
petitioner remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were
retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason.
Ex.PW1/B, Ex. PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who
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were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1994 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E
to Ex. PW1/L are the mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex.
PW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly
junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in
a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C
also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160
days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of
evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time
after August, 1997 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the
respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors
workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from
these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was terminated and even thereafter respondent
omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the
provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed
reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which
Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there
was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of
orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as
reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through
which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner
and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to
be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the
basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being
junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not
worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his
service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of
provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated
the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in August, 1997, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld.
Authorized Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court
through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land
with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully
employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained
that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager
privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East
Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division
Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term
gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It
was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely
differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’.
Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning
from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his
family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex
Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in
holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be
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treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture
pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus
would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the
relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that
petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of
the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of
judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner
was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out
of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab IC
4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors
of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue
regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The
said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of
decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that
the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by
the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of
existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can
refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional
Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case
referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under
Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court
as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon
Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising
the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India
and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by
the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time
results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if
it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
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available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so
culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In
view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference
of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the
Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was
made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman
was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly,
the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal
from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in
spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss
or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay
in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for
adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming
rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if
raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real
prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court
can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the
delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case
can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till
the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal.
The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages
instead of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
15. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the
case that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his
acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to
the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from
the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State
Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute
with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date
of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation
officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance,
the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it
cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the
dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional
issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State
Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles
laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the Labour
Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent
Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power
of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the
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Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred
to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost
important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at
large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed
that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1997 and the industrial dispute was
raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court
of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced
by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the
judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture
Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of
the judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F
of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years
of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of
the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one
lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks
failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-
Termination of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not
applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes
definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view
before granting relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21
of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh
observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all
relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of
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service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had
raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he
raised industrial dispute after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though
compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be
enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and
circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of
Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court
factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 03 years
and actually worked for 146 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner
were disengaged in August, 1997 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial
dispute by issuance of demand notice after about fifteen years i.e. demand notice was given on
27.08.2011. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition
was ageing 36 years who has sufficient spell of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into
consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court
petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a
lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The
judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay
and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on
the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as
Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment
also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture
Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow,
Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.40,000/-
(Rupees forty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled
in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount
of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the
petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its
realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being
not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed
to pay the compensation of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of
the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months
from today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on
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the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open
Court today this 28th day of June, 2016.
(K.K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No. : 415/2015
Date of Institution : 10.09.2015
Date of Decision : 28.6.2016
Shri Bhajan Singh s/o Shri Lal Chand, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
. . Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Bhajan Singh S/O Shri Lal
Chand, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before
the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P. vide demand notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of
services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether
termination of the services of Shri Bhajan Singh S/O Shri Lal Chand, R/O Village and
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Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer,
H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004
without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and
justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month
of
May,
1993
who
continuously
worked
till
September,
2004
with
the
respondent/department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had
worked for 160 days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District
Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of
Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity).
Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of
intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks
are required to be counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as
for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that
respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end
of September, 2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who
were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of
respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority
list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till
termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even
principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The
petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,
1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2004 when the services
of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice
of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not
been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie
illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who
never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even
at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the
same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that
he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of September, 2004
till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed
and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed
violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting
aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004.
He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 along-with back
wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the
date
of
his
illegal
termination.
The
petitioner
has
also
prayed
that
period
of
intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between
1993 to September, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the
service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy
of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs.
State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
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denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1993 who remained engaged till
2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for
tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner
have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial
nos. 1 to 25 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and
at serial nos. 26 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner,
respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving
of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has
maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in
para no.7 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal
Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in
2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years
petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is
also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,
question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,
there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination.
It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not
entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim
petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of
petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was
specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
02.02.2012 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent
suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during
September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . .OPP.
3.
If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?
. .OPR.
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Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1 : Yes
Issue No.2 : Yes
Issue No.3 : Discussed
Issue No.4 : No
Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,00,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis in the year 1993 who continuously worked till 2004 with the
respondent/department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any
written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in
dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of
respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the
job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience.
Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but
only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing
admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to
determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority
and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1993 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and
thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with
full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service.
Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in
service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act
which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served
respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had
never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching
petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not
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approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner
had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure
report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial
dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing
CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which
delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it
could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays
chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1
specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after
September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on
the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence
calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the
respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the
other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in
between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks
had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that
petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence
led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of
abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 166 days in the year 1993, 164 days in 1994, 53 days in 1995, 141 days in 1996, 96
days in 1997, 85 days in 1998, 74 days in 1999, 57 days in 2001, 98 days in 2002, 45 days in
2003 and 48 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1993 to 2004 in 11 years he had worked
for 1027 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1995 to 2004
petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour
Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only
with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in
the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 48 days and thus immediately in preceding
12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160
days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was
not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the
Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that
large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to
07.9.1999 and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of
petitioner remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were
retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason.
Ex. PW1/B, Ex. PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers
who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1993 or thereafter whereas Ex.
PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown
in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were
certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than
200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex.
RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than
160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of
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evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time
after September, 2004 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the
respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors
workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior
from these co-workers having joined service in 1992 was terminated and even thereafter
respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also
violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419
in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of
the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of
provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of
orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as
reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through
which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner
and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to
be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the
basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being
junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not
worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his
service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of
provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated
the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and
also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets
belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been
earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance
has been placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road
Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench
comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully
employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was
income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely
differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’.
Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning
from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his
family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex
Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in
holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated
to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for
his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not
be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship
of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was
illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act
although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of
judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner
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was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out
of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab IC
4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors
of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue
regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The
said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of
decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that
the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by
the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of
existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can
refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional
Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case
referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under
Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court
as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon
Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising
the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India
and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by
the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time
results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if
it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so
culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In
view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference
of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the
Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was
made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman
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was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the
respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from
the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of
the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or
unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in
raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication
as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief
from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if
raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real
prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court
can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the
delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case
can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till
the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal.
The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages
instead of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the
case that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his
acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to
the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from
the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State
Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute
with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date
of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation
officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance,
the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it
cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the
dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional
issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State
Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles
laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the Labour
Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent
Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power
of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the
Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred
to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost
important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at
large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed
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that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was
raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court
of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced
by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the
judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture
Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of
the judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F
of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years
of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of
the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one
lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks
failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-
Termination of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not
applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes
definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before
granting relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21
of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh
observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all
relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of
service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had
raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he
raised industrial dispute after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though
compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be
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enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and
circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of
Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court
factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 11 years
and actually worked for 1027 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of
petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had
raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand
notice was given on 02.02.2012. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on the
date of filing claim petition was ageing 53 years who has sufficient spell of life to work and earn
his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of
Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages
but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR
25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the
matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be
solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this
judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was
reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow
University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC
3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-
(Rupees one lakh only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts
and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the
petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization.
Issues no. 1, 2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being
not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed
to pay the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of
the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months
from today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on
the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
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26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open
Court today this 28th day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 416/2015
Date of Institution
: 10.09.2015
Date of Decision
: 28.6.2016
Shri Hari Nath s/o Shri Nakew, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
....Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Hari Nath S/O Shri Nakew, R/O
Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand
notice dated 25.12.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services, during
September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services
of Shri Hari Nath S/O Shri Nakew, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled
to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
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3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of April, 1992 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent/
department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160
days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became
eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in
the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial
breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be
counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that
respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of
September, 2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were
junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department
was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers
working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner
and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been
followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to
petitioner and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of
September, 2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not
served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of
notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of
petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had
spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or
his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him
and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also
alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of
September, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere
gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to
have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner
prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of
September, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004
along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained
unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of
intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1992
to September, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of
petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in
pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and
to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1992 who remained engaged till 2004
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
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alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for
determination:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
25.12.2011 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent
suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
…OPP.
39. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
…OPP.
40. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-
Issue No.1 : Yes
Issue No.2 : Yes
Issue No.3 : Discussed
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Issue No.4 : No
Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.80,000/- per operative part of
award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1992 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1992 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
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admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.
No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent
in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the
petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment
has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-
examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by
the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of
work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As
such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold
that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 184 days in the year 1992, 127 days in 1993, 68 days in 1994, 40 days in 1995, 29 days
in 1997, 25 days in 1998, 55 days in 2001, 122 days in 2002, 27 days in 2003 and 48 days in 2004
and thus a total of his service in 1992 to 2004 in 10 years he had worked for 725 days in his entire
service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1993 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than
160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of
artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination.
It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked
for 48 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination
of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having
continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a
notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated
the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1992 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time
when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit
were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1992
was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
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of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
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the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference
of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour
Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as
there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the
workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it
is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring
the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due
to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not
debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
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by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
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Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 10 years and actually worked for 725 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004
who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice
after about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on 25.12.2011. It is also pertinent to mention
here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 39 years who has sufficient spell
of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
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Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees
eighty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts
and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3
are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 418/2015
Date of Institution
: 10.09.2015
Date of Decision
: 28.6.2016
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Shri Prithi Singh s/o Shri Kewal Ram, r/o Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
...Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
...Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent
: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Prithi Singh S/O Shri Kewal Ram,
R/O Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand
notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during
September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services
of Shri Prithi Singh S/O Shri Kewal Ram, R/O Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004 without complying the provisions of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled
to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
month of May, 1990 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent/
department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160
days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became
eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in
the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial
breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be
counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September,
2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to
petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated
to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under
the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while
retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed
by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner
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and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of
September, 2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not
served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of
notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of
petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had
spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or
his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him
and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also
alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of
September, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere
gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to
have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner
prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of
September, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004
along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained
unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of
intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1990
to September, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of
petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2000 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in
pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and
to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1990 who remained engaged till 2004
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
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junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for
determination:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
02.02.2012 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent
suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
...OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
...OPP.
41. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
...OPP.
42. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? ...OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1 : Yes
Issue No.2 : Yes
Issue No.3 : Discussed
Issue No.4 : No
Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,50,000/- per operative part
of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1990 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
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had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1990 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.
No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent
in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the
petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment
has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-
examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by
the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of
work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As
such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold
that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 163 days in the year 1990, 62 days in 1991, 168 days in 1992, 131 days in 1993, 171
days in 1994, 125 days in 1995, 106 days in 1996, 118 days in 1997, 58 days in 1998, 45 days in
1999, 136 days in 2000, 86 days in 2001, 118 days in 2002, 113 days in 2003 and 45 days in 2004
and thus a total of his service in 1990 to 2004 in 15 years he had worked for 1645 days in his entire
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service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1991, 1993 and 1995 to 2004 petitioner had
worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla
on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged
illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner
had merely worked for 45 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the
month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement
of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent
to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to
have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1990 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time
when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit
were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1990
was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
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examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
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accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference
of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour
Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as
there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the
workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it
is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring
the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due
to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not
debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
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and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
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reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 15 years and actually worked for 1645 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004
who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice
after about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on 02.02.2012. It is also pertinent to mention
here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 43 years who has sufficient spell
of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees
one lakh fifty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the
facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,
2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
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reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of
the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_________
IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 420/2015
Date of Institution
: 10.09.2015
Date of Decision
: 28.6.2016
Shri Bhender Lal s/o Shri Samal Dass, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
…Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
....Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
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AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Bhender Lal S/O Shri Samal
Dass, R/O Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide
demand notice dated 31.12.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during
September, 2003 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services
of Shri Bhender Lal S/O Shri Samal Dass, R/O Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2003 without complying the provisions of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled
to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1992 who continuously worked till September, 2003 with the respondent/department.
Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each
calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed
that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the
respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous
services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of
the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged
petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2003 by an oral order without any
reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster
roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is
alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been
circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of
petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/
respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service
from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2003 when the
services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month
notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not
been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal
and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never
been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of
verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no
opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained
unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of September, 2003 till the date of
institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus
entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of
statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order
of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2003. He further prayed
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for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2003 along-with back wages, seniority
including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal
termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time
and again during entire service of petitioner between 1992 to September, 2003 be counted 160 days
continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having
completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble
Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is
entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1992 who remained engaged till 2003
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2003 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for
determination:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
31.12.2011 qua his termination of service during September, 2003 by respondent
suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
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2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2003 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
…OPP.
43. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the
petitioner is entitled to?
…OPP.
44. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1 : Yes
Issue No.2 : Yes
Issue No.3 : Discussed
Issue No.4 : No
Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,30,000/- per operative part
of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1992 who continuously worked till 2003 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1992 to September, 2003. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2003 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
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the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2003.
No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent
in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the
petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment
has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-
examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work
intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by
the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of
work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As
such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold
that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 148 days in the year 1992, 127 days in 1993, 101 days in 1994, 70 days in 1995, 187
days in 1996, 149 days in 1997, 130 days in 1998, 107 days in 1999, 149 days in 2000, 88 days in
2001, 89 days in 2002, and 111 days in 2003 and thus a total of his service in 1992 to 2003 in 12
years he had worked for 1456 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years
1992 to 1995 and 1997 to 2003 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no
reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to
confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2003 the petitioner had merely worked for 111 days and thus
immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not
rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one
year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under
Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999
and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner
remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and
services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.
PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the
petitioner and had joined in the year 1992 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the
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mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise
mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were
given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner
had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-
workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although
they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2003 even at the time
when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit
were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1992
was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in September, 2003, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
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In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference
of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour
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Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as
there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the
workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it
is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring
the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due
to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not
debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
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19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference: Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-
Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court
that workman had completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o
section 25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial discretion
exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the
appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the
workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a.
will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
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per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 12 years and actually worked for 1456 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2003
who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice
after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on 31.12.2011. It is also pertinent to mention
here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 45 years who has sufficient spell
of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees
one lakh thirty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in
the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner
would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,
2 and 3 are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees one lakh thirty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu
of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
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Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 421/2015
Date of Institution
: 10.09.2015
Date of Decision
: 28.6.2016
Shri Devi Chand s/o Shri Suraj Ram, r/o Village Sahali, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Churah, District
Chamba, H.P.
….Petitioner.
Versus
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
....Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent
: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Devi Chand S/O Shri Suraj Ram,
R/O Village Sahali, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Churah, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand
notice dated 29.06.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during October,
2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri
Devi Chand S/O Shri Suraj Ram, R/O Village Sahali, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Churah, District
Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2005 without complying the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled
to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged Mate-cum-beldar on muster roll
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basis in the month of June, 1999 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the
respondent/department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked
for 160 days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and
became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in
the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial
breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be
counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October,
2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to
petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated
to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under
the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while
retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed
by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 12 persons who were junior to petitioner
and joined service from 1999 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when
the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month
notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not
been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal
and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never
been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of
verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no
opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained
unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of
institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus
entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of
statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order
of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005 2004. He further
prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. October, 2005 alongwith back wages, seniority including
continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal
termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time
and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994 to September, 2004 be counted 160 days
continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2007 having
completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble
Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1999 who remained engaged till 2005
but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will
and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the
respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal
area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been
denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in
para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &
27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically
alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu
thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the
work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as
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per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also
contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial
dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is
bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not
been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not
arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of
petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully
employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.
6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of
junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,
mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.09.2015 for
determination:
1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
29.06.2011 qua his termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent suffers
from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
…OPP.
2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,
2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
…OPP.
45. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
…OPP.
46. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No.1 : Yes
Issue No.2 : Yes
Issue No.3 : Discussed
Issue No.4 : No
Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.60,000/- per operative part of
award.
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REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on
muster roll basis in the year 1999 who continuously worked till 2005 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms andconditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written
order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it
had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work
intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.
does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have
worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba
District and remained engaged from 1999 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his
termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full
back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on
oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due
diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any
explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,
no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities
under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily
explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2005. No
reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in
not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner
to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination
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has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently
rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent
in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required
for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of
any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 27 days in the year 1999, 83 days in 2000, 115.5 days in 2002, 121.5 days in 2003, 66
days in 2004 and 86 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 1999 to 2005 in 6 years he had
worked for 499 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for
more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the
point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal
termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had
merely worked for 86 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month
of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law
of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have
issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not
violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large
number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 1999 to 2001 and these
workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that
principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of
petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex. PW1/C,
Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner
and had joined in the year 1999 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the mandays
chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise mandays
details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given
sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been
not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers
shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they
were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when
junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1999 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders
of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.
RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that
respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons
they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in
pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court
orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to
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petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for
more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per
government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s
termination in October, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized
Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-
examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning
from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot
be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.
In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not
be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate
and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.
Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied
to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of
the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding
the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision
has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this
Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of
Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate
government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial
dispute between workmen and the employer.
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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relie
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is
not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate
government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the
industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to
supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section
10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in
accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit
cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay
in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer
deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in
material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,
we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference
of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour
Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as
there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the
workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it
is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring
the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due
to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not
debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be
existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould
the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in
appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred
the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part
of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State
Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal
without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may
lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect
in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised after
several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.
(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by
court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has
been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that
principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by
Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing
Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of
Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner
cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of
the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during
employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of
termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial
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discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the
workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac
directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing
which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination
of service Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.
Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute
after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single
Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but
surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate
relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%
per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the
date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the
petitioner in all remained engaged for about 6 years and actually worked for 499 days as per
mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who
worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after
about 5 ½ years i.e. demand notice was given on 29.06.2011. It is also pertinent to mention here
that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 46 years who has sufficient spell of
life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in
pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view
of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative
for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees
sixty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts
and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation
shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be
4056
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entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3
are answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO. 4
22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
RELIEF
23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said
amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of June, 2016.
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
fgekpy izns'k ckjgoha fo/kku lHkk
vf/klwpuk
f'keyk&171004] 29 vxLr] 2016
la0%fo0l0&fo/kk;u&izk0@1&1@2013-&&jkT;iky egksn; dk fuEufyf[kr vkns'k fnukad
29 vxLr] 2016 loZlk/kkj.k dh lwpukFkZ izdkf'kr fd;k tkrk gS %&&
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^^eSa] vkpk;Z nsoozr] jkT;iky] fgekpy izns'k] Hkkjrh; lafo/kku ds vuqPNsn 174 ¼2½¼,½ }kjk iznÙk
'kfDr;ksa ds vuqlj.k esa fgekpy izns'k ckjgoha fo/kku lHkk ds ckgjosa l= dk rRdky l=kolku
djrk gwa A
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HIMACHAL PRADESH TWELFTH VIDHAN SABHA
NOTIFICATION
Shimla–171004, the 29th August, 2016
No. V.S.-Legn.-Pri/1-1/2013.—The following order by the Governor of the State of
Himachal Pradesh, dated the 29th August, 2016 is hereby published for general information:
^^eSa] vkpk;Z nsoozr] jkT;iky] fgekpy izns'k] Hkkjrh; lafo/kku ds vuqPNsn 174 ¼2½¼,½ }kjk iznÙk
'kfDr;ksa ds vuqlj.k esa fgekpy izns'k ckjgoha fo/kku lHkk ds ckgjosa l= dk rRdky l=kolku
djrk gwa A
vkpk;Z nsoozr]
jkT;iky]
fgekpy izns'kA**
By order:
SUNDER SINGH VERMA
Secretary,
H.P. Vidhan Sabha.
_________
xzkeh.k fodkl foHkkkx
vf/klwpuk
f'keyk&9] ---- vxLr] 2016
la0 vkj0Mh0Mh0,0,0¼,½¼1½&1@99 ikVZ-&&fgekpy izns'k dh jkT;iky Hkkjr ds lafo/kku ds
vuqPNsn 309 ds ijUrqd }kjk inzÙk 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq,] fgekpy izns”k yksd lsok vk;ksx ds
4058
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
ijke'kZ ls] bl foHkkx dh vf/klwpuk la[;k% vkj0Mh0Mh0&,,¼,½¼1½&1@99 ikVZ rkjh[k 30&03&2016 }kjk
vf/klwfpr fgekpy izns'k xzkkeh.k fodkl foHkkx] [k.M+ fodkl vf/kdkjh] oxZ-I ¼jktif=r½ HkrhZ ,oa izksUufr
fu;e] 2016 dk vkSj la'kks/ku djus ds fy, fuEufyf[kr fu;e cukrh gS] vFkkZr %&&
1- laf{kIr uke vkSj izkjEHk-&&(i) bu fu;eksa dk laf{kIr uke fgekpy izns'k xzkeh.k fodkl
foHkkx] [k.M+ fodkl vf/kdkjh] oxZ&I ¼jktif=r½ HkrhZ vkSj izksUufr ¼lizFke la'kks/ku½ fu;e] 2016 gSA
¼ii½ ;s fu;e jkti=] fgekpy izns'k esa izdk”ku dh rkjh[k ls izo`Rr gksaxsA
2- mikcU/k ^^d** dk la'kks/ku-&&fgekpy izns'k xzkeh.k fodkl foHkkx] [k.M + fodkl vf/kdkjh]
ox&I ¼jktif=r½ HkrhZ ,oa izksUufr fu;e] 2003 ¼ftls blesa blds i”pkr~ mDr fu;e dgk x;k gS½ ds
micU/k ^^d** esa %&&
¼d½ LrEHk la[;k&15 ds lkkeus fo|eku micU/kksasa ds LFkku ij fuEufyf[kr j[kk tk,xk]
vFkkZr %&&
^^lsok esa fu;qfDr] fgekpy izns'k iz”kklfud lsok,a la;qDr izfr;ksxh ijh{kk iSVªu@ikB~;Øe
bR;kfn tks fd fgekpy izns”k iz”kklfud lsok,a fu;e] 1973 eas ;Fkk fofgr ds vk/kkj ij dh
tk,xh½**
vkns'k }kjk]
¼vkSadkj “kekZ½]
lfpo ¼xzkeh.k fodkl½A
&&&&&
mikcU/k ^^d**
fgekpy izns'k xzkeh.k fodkl foHkkx esa [k.M fodkl vf/kdkjh] oxZ&I ¼jktif=r½ ds in ds fy,
HkrhZ vkSj izksUufr fu;eA
1- in dk uke-&&[k.M fodkl vf/kdkjh
2- in ¼inksa½ dh la[;k-&&113 ¼,d lkS rsjg½
3- oxhZdj.k-&&oxZ&I ¼jktif=r½
4- Oksrueku-&&10300&34800 #Ik, tek #i, 5000@& #i, xzsM+ is
5- Þp;uß in vFkok ßvp;uÞ in-&&p;u
6- lh/kh HkrhZ ds fy, vk;q-&&tSlk fd fgekpy izns'k iz'kklfud lsokvksa ds fy, lh/kh HkrhZ gsrq
le;≤ ij fofgr dh tk,A
ijUrq lh/kh HkrhZ fd, tkus okys O;fDr;ksa fy, mijh vk;q lhek rnFkZ ;k lafonk ds vk/kkj ij
fu;qDr fd, x, O;fDr;ksa lfgr igys ls gh ljdkj dh lsok eas jr vH;fFkZ;ksa dks ykxw ugha gksxh %
ijUrq ;g vkSj fd ;fn rnFkZ ;k lafonk ds vk/kkj ij fu;qDr fd;k x;k vF;FkhZ bl :i eas
fu;qfDr dh rkjh[k dks vf/kd vk;q dk gks x;k gks] rks og rnFkZ ;k lafonk ds vk/kkj in fu;qfDr ds
dkj.k fofgr vk;q esa NwV dk ik= ugha gksxk %
4059
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
ijUrq ;g vkSj fd vuqlwfpr tkfr;ksa@vuqlwfpr tu&tkfr;ksa@vU; izoxksZa ds O;fDr;ksa ds fy;s
mijh vk;q lhek esa mruh gh NwV nh tk ldsxh ftruh fd fgekpy izns'k ljdkj ds lk/kkj.k ;k fo'ks"k
vkns'k ¼vkns'kksa½ ds v/khu vuqK; gS %
ijUrq ;g vkSj Hkh fd ifCyd lSDVj fuxeksa rFkk Lok;Rr fudk;ksa ds lHkh deZpkfj;ksasa dks] tks ,sls
ifCyd lSDVj fuxeksa rFkk Lok;Rr fudk;ksa ds izkjfEHkd xBu ds le; ,sls ifCyd lSDVj fuxeksa@Lok;Rr
fudk;ksa esa vkesyu ls iwoZ ljdkjh deZpkjh Fks] lh/kh HkrhZ ds fy, vk;q lhek esa ,slh gh fj;k;r nh
tk;xh tSlh ljdkjh deZpkfj;ksa dks vuKs gS] fdUrq bl izdkj dh fj;k;r ifCyd lSDVj fuxeksa rFkk
Lok;Rr fudk;kasa ds ,sls deZpkjho`Un dks ugha nh tk,xh tks i'pkrorhZ ,sls fuxeksa@Lok;r fudk;ksa }kjk
fu;qDr fd;s x;s Fks@fd;s x;s gSa vkSj mu ifCyd lSDVj fuxeksa@Lok;Rr fudk;ksa ds izkjfEHkd xBu ds
i'pkr ,sls fuxeksa@Lok;Rr fudk;ksa dh lsok esa vfUre :i ls vkesfyr fd;s x;s gaS@ fd;s x;s FksA
¼1½ lh/kh HkrhZ ds fy;s vk;q lhek dh x.kuk ml o"kZ ds izFke fnol ls dh tk,xh ftlesa fd
in ¼inksa½ dks vkosnu vkefU=r djus ds fy,] ;FkkfLFkfr] foKkfir fd;k x;k gS ;k
fu;kstuky;ksa dks vf/klwfpr fd;k x;k gSA
¼2½ vU;Fkk lqvfgZr vF;fFkZ;ksa dh n'kk esa lh/kh HkrhZ ds fy;s vk;q lhek vkSj vuqHko fgekpy
izns”k ykds lsok vk;ksx ds foosdkuqlkj f'kfFky fd;k tk ldsxkA
7- lh/ks HkrhZ fd;s tkus okys O;fDr ¼O;fDr;ksa½ ds fy, visf{kr U;wure 'kSf{kd vkSj vU;
vgZrk,sa-&&¼d½ vfuok;Z vgZrk¼,a½-&&tSlh fd fgekpy izns'k iz'kklfud lsok ds fy, lh/kh HkrhZ gsrq
le;≤ ij fofgr dh tk,aA
¼[k½ okaNuh; vgZrk ¼,a½-&&fgekpy izns'k dh :f<+;ksa jhfr;ksa vkSj cksfy;ksa dk Kku vkSj izns'k esa
fo|eku fof'k"V n'kkvksa esa fu;qfDr ds fy, mi;qDrrkA
8- lh/ks HkrhZ fd, tkus okys O;fDr ¼O;fDr;ksa½ ds fy, fofgr vk;q vkSj 'kkSf{kd vgZrk,a izksUufr
O;fDr ¼O;fDr;ksa½ dh n'kk esa ykxw gksxh ;k ugha-&& vk;q-&&ykxw ughaA
'kSf{kd vgZrk,a-&&tSlh uhps LrEHk la0 11 esa fofgr gSA
9- ifjoh{kk dh vof/k] ;fn dksbZ gks-&&nks o"kZ] ftldk ,d o"kZ ls vuf/kd ,slh vkSj vof/k ds
fy, foLrkj fd;k tk ldsxk] tSlk l{ke izkf/kdkjh fo'ks"k ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa vkSj dkj.kksa dks fyf[kr esa
vfHkfyf[kr djds vkns”k nsaA
10- HkrhZ dh i}fr % HkrhZ lh/kh gksxh ;k izksUufr ;k lSds.MesaV ;k LFkkukUrj.k }kjk vkSj fofHkUu
i}fr;ksa }kjk Hkjs tkus okys inksa dh izfr'krrk-&&
¼i½ ipkl izfr”kr lh/kh HkrhZ }kjk %
¼ii½ ipkl izfr”kr izksUufr }kjk vkSj ,slk u gksus ij lSds.MeSaV vk/kkj ij vkSj Hkkjrh;
iz”kklfud lsok@fgekpy izns'k iz”kklfud lsok ifjoh{kk/khuksa esas ls ¼ikap in½A
fVIi.kh-&&Hkkjrh; iz”kklfud lsok@fgekpy izns”k iz”kklfud lsok ifjoh{kk/khuksa ds fy, fpfUgr
05 ¼ikap½ inksa dks izksUufr ds fy, ipkl izfr”kr dksVs esa lek;ksftr fd;k tk,xkA
11- izksUufr ;k LFkkukUrj.k }kjk HkrhZ dh n'kk esa Jsf.k;ka ¼xzsM½ ftuls izksUufr] lSds.MeSaV
LFkkukUrj.k fd;k tk,xk-&&
4060
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
¼d½ fuEufyf[kr lEHkjd ¼iks’kd½ izoxksZa ds in/kkfj;ksa esa ls izksUufr }kjk tks Lukrd gSa vkSj
ftudk ikap o"kZ dk fu;fer lsokdky ;k xzsM esa dh xbZ yxkrkj rnFkZ lsok] ;fn dksbZ gks] dks lfEefyr
djds ikap o"kZ dk fu;fer lsokdky gks %&&
Øe
la[;k
lEHkjd ¼iks’kd½ izoxZ
izfr'kr
¼i½
lekt f'k{kk ,oa [k.M+ ;kstuk vf/kdkjh
20 %
¼ii½
v/kh{kd xzsM+-II
15 %
¼iii½
ftyk vkads{k.k vf/kdkjh@vuqns'kd
05 %
¼iv½
efgyk lekt f'k{kk la;ksftdk ¼eq[; lsfodk½
05 %
¼v½
izlkj vf/kdkjh ¼m|ksx½
2-5 %
¼vi½
izlkj vf/kdkjh ¼lgdkfjrk½
2-5 %
dqy - -
50 %
ijUrq ;fn vius laHkjd ¼iks"kd½ izoxZ dk in/kkjh Lukrd dh fofgr vgZrk ugha j[krk gS fdUrq
vU;Fkk ik= gS rks mls bl “krZ ds v/kk/khu [k.M fodkl vf/kdkjh ds in gsrq izksUufr ds fy, fopkjk
tk,xk fd mls bu fu;eksa ds jkti=] fgekpy izns”k esa izdk”ku dh rkjh[k ls 05 ¼ikap½ o’kZ ds Hkhrj
Lukrd dh vgZrk izkIr djuh gksxh] ,slk u gksus ij mls vius lEHkjd ¼iks"kd½ izoxZ@in ij izR;kofrZr
dj fn;k tk,xk vkSj dsoy visf{kr vgZrk izkIr djus ds i”pkr~ gh Hkfo’; esa izksUufr ds fy, fopkjk
tk,xk %
ijUrq ;g fd iwoksZDr “krZ mu in/kkfj;ksa ds ekeys eas ykxw ugha gksxh tks mijksDr 05 ¼ikap½ o’kZ dh
fofgr vof/k eas ;k mlls iwoZ lsokfuo`r gksus gSa %
ijUrq ;g vkSj fd lEHkjd ¼iks"kd½ izoxZ dk in/kkjh ¼os in/kkjh½] tks bu fu;ekasa ds izo`Ùk gksus ls
iwoZ [k.M fodkl vf/kdkjh ds :i esa igys ls izksUur gks x;k ¼x,½ gSa] mu [k.M fodkl vf/kdkfj;ksa ls
ofj’B jgsaxsA bl rF; dks fopkj esa yk, fcuk fd igys ls gh izksUur in/kkjh muds vius&vius lEHkjd
¼iks"kd½ izoxZ@in esa muls dfu’B Fks] tks bu fu;eksa ds izo`r gksus ds i”pkr izksUur gksaxsA
¼[k½ ,slk u gksus ij ln`”k in ds in/kkfj;ksa esa l]s tks Lukrd gSa vkSj tks fodkl lSDVj esasa {ks=h;
vuqHko gS rFkk tks fodkl lSDVj esasasas {ks=h; vuqHko j[krs gksa rFkk tks fgekpy izns'k ljdkj ds vU;
foHkkxksa@cksMksaZ@fuxeksa esa Hkh lerqY; osrueku esa dk;Zjr ;k Hkkjrh; iz'kklfud lsok@fgekpy izns'k
iz'kklfud lsok ds vf/kdkfj;ksa esa l]s rc rd tc rd dh in/kkjh vius&vius lEHkjd 1@4 1@4
¼iks"kd½ izoxksZaZ esa [k.M fodkl vf/kdkjh ds in ¼inksa½ ij izksUur fd, tkus ds fy, ik= ugha gks tkrs gSa]
lSd.MeSaV vk/kkj ijA
[k.M + fodkl vf/kdkjh ds inksa dks Hkjus ds fy, fuEufyf[kr 110 fcUnq in vk/kkfjr jksLVj dk
vuqlj.k fd;k tk,xk %&&
jksLVj fcUnq¼vksa½
izoxZ
igyk] rhljk] ikapoka] lkroka] ukSoka] X;kjgoka]
rsjgoka] iUnzgoka] l=kgoka] mUulhoka] bZDdhloka]
rsbZloka]
iPphloka]
lrkbZloka]
murhloka]
bZdrhloka]
rSarhloka]
iSarhloka]
lSarhloka]
mUkrkyhloks] bZdrkyhloka] rSrkyhloka] iSarkyhloka]
lSarkyhloka] mUkpkloka] bZd;kouoka] frjiuoka]
ipiuoka] lrkouoka] mulBoka] bdlBoka] frjlBoka]
iSalBoka]
lrklBoka]
mugRrjoka]
bdgrjoka]
fgekpy inzs'k iz'kklfud lsok bR;kfn la;qDr
izfr;ksxh ijh{kk ds ek/;e ls lh/kh HkrhZ }kjkA
4061
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
frgRrjoka] ipgRrjoka] lrgRrjoka] mUuklhoka]
bZD;klhoka]
frj;klhoka]
ipklhoka]
lrklhoka]
uoklhoka]
bD;kuosoka]
frjkuosoka]
ipkuosoka]
lrkuosoka] fuU;kUkosoka] ,d lkS ,doka] ,d lkS
rhuoka] ,d lkS ikapok] ,d lkS lkroka] ,oa ,d lkS
ukSokaA
nwljk] pkSFkk] vkBoka] nloka] pkSgnoka] ckbZloka]
pkSchloka]
vBkbZloka]
rhloka]
c;kyhloka]
vM+rkyhloka]
ipkloka]
pkSouoka]
pkSlBoka]
fN;klBoka] lRrjoka] cgRrjoka] fN;klhoka] uCcsoka]
vBkuosoka] ,d lkS nksoka ,oa ,d lkS vkBokaA
lekt f'k{kk ,oa [k.M+ ;kstuk vf/kdkjh
NBoka] ckjgoka] chloka] NCchloka] cRrhloka]
vM+rhloka]
fN;kyhloka]
ckouoka]
vBkouoka]
cklBoka]
vM+l+Boka]
pkSgRrjoka]
vVgRrjoka]
vBklhoka] ckuosoka ,oa lkSokaA
v/kh{kd xzsM+&II
vV~Bkjgoka]
pkSrhloka]
lkBoka]
fN;gRrjoka]
pkSjkuosoka ,oa ,d lkS pkjokaA
ftyk vdsa{k.k vf/kdkjh@vuqns'kd
lksyogka] pokyhloka] NIiuoka] pkSjklhoka] fN;kUkosoka
,oa ,d lkS NBokaA
efgyk lekt f'k{kk la;ksftdk@¼eq[; lsfodk½
Pkkyhloka] vLlhoka ,oa ,d lkS nlokaA
izlkj vf/kdkjh ¼m|ksx½
Nrhloka ,oa c;klhoka
izlkj vf/kdkjh ¼lgdkfjrk½
fVIi.kh-&&jksLVj izR;sd 110oha fjDr ds i'pkr~ rc rd nksgjk;k tkrk jgsxk] tc rd fd leLr
lEHkjd ¼iks"kd½ izoxksZa dk izfrfuf/kRo] [k.M fodkl vf/kdkjh ds dkMj esa] fofgr izfr”krrk rd izkIr ugha
gks tkrk gSA rRi”pkr] fjfDr mlh izoxZ ls Hkjh tk,xh] ftlls in fjDr gksrk gSA
d¼1½ ijUrq izksUufr ds iz;kstu ds fy, izR;sd deZpkjh dks] tutkrh;@nqxZe {ks=ksa esasa in ¼inksa½
dh ,sls {ks=ksa esa Ik;kZIr la[;k dh miyC/krk ds v/;/khu] de ls de ,d dk;Zdky rd lsok djuh gksxh(
ijUrq ;g vkSj fd mi;qZDr ijUrqd d¼1½ mu deZpkfj;ksa ds ekeys esa ykxw ugha gksxk ftudh
vf/kof"kZrk ds fy, ikaPk o"kZ ;k mlls de dh lsok 'ks"k jgh gks(
ijUrq ;g vkSj Hkh fd mu vf/kdkfj;ksa@ deZpkfj;ksasasa dks] ftUgkasus tutkrh;@nqxZe {ks= esa de ls
de ,d dk;Zdky rd lsok ugha dh gS] ,sls {ks= esa mlds laoxZ ¼dkMj½ esa loZFkk ofj"Brk ds vuqlkj
LFkkukUrj.k fd;k tk;xk A
Li"Vhdj.k-I-&&mi;ZqDr ijUrqd d¼1½ ds iz;kstu ds fy, tutkrh;@nqxeZ {ks=ksa esasa ^^dk;Zdky**
ls lk/kkj.kr;k rhu o"kZ dh vof/k ;k Ikz'kklfud vis{kkvksa vkSj deZpkjh }kjk fd, x, dk;Z dks /;ku esa
j[krs gq, ,sls {ks=ksa esa rSukrh dh blls de vof/k vfHkizsr gksxhA
Li"Vhdj.k-II-&&mi;qZDr ijUrqd d¼1½ d iz;kstu ds fy, tutkrh;@nqxZe {ks= fuEu izdkj ls
gksaxs%&&
1- ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifrA
4062
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
2- pEck ftyk dk ikaxh vkSj HkjekSj mi e.My A
3- jksgMw mi e.My dk MksMjk Dokj {ks= A
4- ftyk f'keyk dh jkeiqj rglhy dk iUnzg chl ijxuk equh”k njdkyh vkSj xzke iapk;r
dk'kkikVA
5- dqYyw ftyk ds rglhy fuje.M dk iUnzg chl ijxuk A
6- dkaxM+k ftyk ds cStukFk mi e.My dk cMk Hkaxky {ks= A
7- ftyk fdUukSj A
8- fljekSj ftyk esa mi rglhy dejm ds dkBokM vkSj dksjxk iVokj&o`Rr] js.kqdkth rglhy
ds HkykM&HkykSuk vkSj lkaxuk iVokj o`r vkjSjS f'kykbZ rglhy dk dkVk iko iVokj&o`RrA
9- e.Mh ftyk esa djlksx rglhy dk [kU;ksy&cxMk iVokj&o`Rr] ckyh pkSdh mi rglhy ds
xkMk xkslkbZ] eB;kuh] ?ku;kM] Fkkph] ckxh] lksexkM vkSj [kksykuky iVokj o`Rr i/kj
rglhy ds >kjokM] dqVx<] xzkeu] nsosx<] VSyk] jksik] dFkksx] flYg&HkMokuh] gLriqj]
?kejsM vkSj HkVs< iVokj&o`Rr] Fkqukx rglhy ds fp;w.kh] dkyhikj] ekux<] Fkkp&cxMk]
mRrjh ex: vkSj nf{k.kh ex: iVokj o`Rr vkSj lqUnjuxj rglhy dk cVokMk
iVokj&o`RrA
¼1½ izksUufr ds lHkh ekeykas esa in ij fu;fer fu;qfDr ls iwoZ lEHkjd ¼iks"kd½ in esa dh xbZ
yxkrkj rnFkZ lsok] ;fn dkbZ gks] izksUufr ds fy, bu fu;eksa esa ;Fkkfofgr lsokdky ds fy,] bl 'krZ ds
v/khu jgrs gq, x.kuk esa yh tk;xh] fd lEHkjd ¼iks"kd½ izoxZ esa rnFkZ fu;fqDr@izksUufr HkrhZ vkSj izksUufr
fu;eksa ds micU/kksa ds vuqlkj p;u dh mfpr Lohdk;Z izfØ;k dks viukus ds Ik'pkr dh xbZ Fkh(
ijUrq mu lHkh ekeyksa esasa ftuesasa dksbZ dfu"B O;fDr lEHkjd ¼iks"kd½ in esa vius dqy lsokdky
¼rnFkZ vk/kkj ij dh xbZ rnFk lsok lfgr] tks fu;fer lsok@fu;qfDr ds vuqlqj.k esa gks½ ds vk/kkj ij
mi;qZDr fufnZ"V micU/kksa ds dkj.k fopkj fd, tkus dk ik= gks tkrk gS] ogka vius&vius
izoZx@in@dkMj esa mlls ofj"B lHkh O;fDr fopkj fd, tkus ds ik= le>s tk,xsa vkSj fopkj djrs
le; dfu"B O;fDr ls Åij j[ks tk,xsa(
ijUrq ;g vkSj fd mu lHkh in/kkfj;ksa dh] ftu ij izkUsufr ds fy, fopkj fd;k tkuk gS de ls
de rhu o"kZ dh U;wure vgZrk lsok ;k in ds HkrhZ vkSj izksUufr fu;eksa esa fofgr lsok] tks Hkh de gks]
gksxh(
ijUrq ;g vkSj Hkh fd tgka dksbZ O;fDr iwoZxkeh ijUrqd dh vis{kkvksasa ds dkj.k izksUufr fd, tkus
lEcU/kh fopkj ds fy, vik= gks tkrk gS] ogka mlls dfu"B O;fDr Hkh ,slh izksUufr ds fopkj ds fy,
vik= le>k tk;sxk@le>s tk,axsaA
Li"Vhdj.k-&&vfaUre ijUrqd ds vUrxZr dfu"B in/kkjh izksUufr ds fy, vik= ugha le>k
tk,xk] ;fn ofj"B vik= O;fDr HkwriwoZ lSfud gS] ftls fMekschykbTM vkeMZ QksflZt ijlksuy ¼fjtosZ'ku
vkQ oSdsUlht bu fgekpy LVsV ukWu VSDuhdy lfoZlht½ :Yt] 1972 ds fu;e&3 ds micU/kksa ds
vUrxZr HkrhZ fd;k x;k gS vkSj buds vUrxZr ojh;rk ykHk fn, x, gksa ;k ftls ,Dl lohZleSu ¼fjtosZ'ku
vkQ oSdsUlht bu nh fgekpy izns'k VSDuhdy lfoZlht½ :Yt] 1985 ds fu;e&3 ds micU/kksasa ds vUrxZr
HkrhZ fd;k x;k gks vkSj buds vUrxZr ojh;rk ykHk fn, x, gksaA
¼2½ blh izdkj LFkk;hdj.k ds lHkh ekeyksasa es ,sls in ij fu;fer fu;qfDr@izksUufr ls iwoZ
lEHkjd ¼iks"kd½ in ij dh xbZ yxkrkj rnFkZ lsok] ;fn dksbZ gks] lsokdky ds fy, x.kuk eas yh tk,xh]
4063
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
;fn rnFkZ fu;qfDr@izksUufr mfpr p;u ds Ik'pkr vkSj HkrhZ vkSj izksUufr fu;eksa ds micU/kksa ds vuqlkj
dh xbZ Fkh%
ijUrq dh xbZ mi;qZDr fufnZ"V rnFkZ lsok dks x.kuk easa ysus ds Ik'pkr tks LFkk;hdj.k gksxk] mlds
QyLo:Ik ikjLifjd ojh;rk vifjofrZr jgsxhA
12- ;fn foHkkxh; izksUufr lfefr fo|eku gks rks mldh lajpuk-&&foHkkxh; izksUufr lfefr dh
v/;{krk v/;{k] fgekpy izns”k yksd lsok vk;ks ;k muds }kjk ukefunsf'kr lnL; }kjk dh tk,xhA
13- HkrhZ djus ds ftu ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa fgekpy izns”k yksd lsok vk;ksx l ijke'kZ fd;k
tk,x-&&tSlk fd fof/k }kjk visf{kr gksA
14- lh/kh HkrhZ ds fy, vfuok;Z vis{kk-&&fdlh lsok ;k in ij fu;qfDr ds fy, vH;FkhZ dks
Hkkjr dk ukxfjd gksuk vfuok;Z gSA
15- lh/kh HkrhZ }kjk in ij fu;qfDr ds fy, p;u-&&lsok esa fu;qfDr] fgekpy izns”k iz”kklfud
lsok,a la;qDr izfr;ksxh ijh{kk iSVªu@ikB~;Øe bR;kfn tks fd fgekpy izns”k iz”kklfud lsok, fu;e] 1973
eas ;Fkk fofgr ds vk/kkj ij dh tk,xhA
16- vkj{k.k-&&lsok esa fu;qfDr] fgekpy izns'k ljdkj }kjk le;≤ ivuqlwfpr tkfr;ksa@
vuqlwfpr tu tkfr;ksa@vU; fiNMa+s oxksZa @vU; izoxZ ds O;fDr;ksa ds fy, lsokvksa esa vkj{k.k dh ckcr
tkjh fd;s x, vkns'kksa ds v/khu gksxhA
17- foHkkxh; ijh{kk-&&lsok esa izR;sd lnL; dks vkxkeh mPprj in ij izksUufr ds fy,]
le;≤ ij ;Fkk la'kksf/kr fgekpy izns”k foHkkxh; ijh{kk fu;e] 1997 esasa ;Fkk fofgr foHkkxh; ijh{kk
ikl djuh gksxhA
18- f'kfFky djus dh 'kfDr-&&tgka jkT; ljdkj dh ;g jk; gks fd ,slk djuk vko';d ;k
lehphu gS ogka og dkj.kksa dks fyf[kr esa vfHkfyf[kr djds vkSj fgekpy izns'k yksd lsok vk;ksx ds
ijke'kZ ls vkns'k }kjk bu fu;eksa ds fdUgha micU/kksa dks fdlh oxZ ;k O;fDr ¼O;fDr;ksa½ ds izoxZ ;k
in¼inksas½ dh ckcr f'kfFky dj ldsxhA
&&&&&&
(Authoritative English text of this Department Government Notification No. RDD-AA(A)1-
1/2012 dated as required under clause (3) of Article 348 of the Constitution of India).
RURAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla-9, …. August, 2016.
No. RDD-AA(A)(1)1/99.—In exercise of the powers conferred by proviso to article 309 of
the Constitution of India, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, in consultation with the Himachal
Pradesh Public Service Commission, is pleased to make the following rules further to amend the
Recruitment and Promotion Rules for the post of Block Development Officer Class-I (Gazetted) in
the Rural Development Department, Himachal Pradesh notified vide this Department Notification
No. RDD-AA(A)(1)-1/99, dated 30.03.16 namely:—
1.
Short title and Commencement.—(I) These rules may be called the Himachal
Pradesh Rural Development Department, Block Development Officer, Class-I (Gazetted)
Recruitment and Promotion (First Amendment) Rules, 2016.
4064
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(II) These rules shall come in to force from the date of publication in Rajpatra, Himachal
Pradesh.
2. Amendment of Annexure- ‘A’.—In Annexure ‘A’ to the Himachal Pradesh Rural
Development Department Block Development Officer, Class-I (Gazetted), Recruitment and
Promotion Rules, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules):—
(a) For the existing provisions against column No. 15, the following shall be substituted,
namely:—
“Selection for appointment to the post in the case of direct recruitment shall be made on the
basis of the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Services Combined Competitive Examination the
pattern/ syllabus etc. of which is as given in the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Services Rules,
1973 as amended from time to time”.
By order,
(ONKAR SHARMA),
Secretary.
_________
Annexure-A
RECRUITMENT AND PROMOTION RULES FOR THE POST OF BLOCK DEVELOPMENT
OFFICER, CLASS-I (GAZETTED) IN THE DEPARTMENT OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT,
HIMACHAL PRADESH
1. Name of post.—Block Development Officer
2. Number of post(s).—113 (One Hundred and Thirteen)
3. Classification.—Class-I (Gazetted)
4. Scale of pay.—Rs.10300-34800+ Rs.5000/- Grade Pay
5. Whether “Selection” post or “Non selection post”.—Selection.
6. Age for direct recruitment.—As may be prescribed for direct recruitment to the
Himachal Pradesh Administrative Services from time to time.
Provided that the upper age limit for direct recruits will not be applicable to the candidates
already in service of the Government including those who have been appointed on adhoc or on
contract basis:
Provided further that if a candidate appointed on adhoc basis or on contract basis had become
overage on the date when he/she was appointed as such he/ she shall not be eligible for any
relaxation in the prescribed age limit by virtue of his/her such adhoc or contract appointment:
Provided further that upper age-limit is relaxable for Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes /
Other categories of persons to the extent permissible under the general or special order(s) of the
Himachal Pradesh Government:
4065
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
Provided further that the employees of all the Public Sector Corporations and Autonomous
Bodies who happened to be Government Servants before absorption in Public Sector
Corporations/Autonomous Bodies at the time of initial constitution of such Corporations/
Autonomous Bodies shall be allowed age concession in direct recruitment as admissible to
Government servants. This concession will not, however, be admissible to such staff of the Public
Sector Corporations/Autonomous Bodies who were/are subsequently appointed by such
Corporations/Autonomous Bodies and who are/were finally absorbed in the service of such
Corporations/Autonomous Bodies after initial constitution of the Public Sector Corporations/
Autonomous Bodies.
Notes.—(1) Age limit for direct recruitment will be reckoned on the first day of the year in
which the post(s) is/are advertised for inviting applications or notified to the Employment
Exchanges or as the case may be.
(2) Age and experience in the case of direct recruitment is relaxable at the discretion of the
Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission in case the candidate is otherwise well qualified.
7. Minimum Educational & other qualification(s) for direct recruit(s).—(a)
ESSENTIAL QUALIFICATION(s).—As may be prescribed for direct recruitment to the Himachal
Pradesh Administrative Service from time to time.
(b) DESIRABLE QUALIFICATION(S).—Knowledge of customs, manners and dialects of
Himachal Pradesh and suitability for appointment in the peculiar conditions prevailing in the
Pradesh.
8. Whether age and educational qualification(s) prescribed for direct recruit(s) will
apply in the case of the promotee(s).—Age.—Not applicable
Educational Qualifications.—As prescribed in column No. 11 below
9. Period of probation, If any.— Two years’ subject to such further extension for a
period not exceeding one year as may be ordered by the competent authority in special
circumstances and reasons to be recorded in writing.
10. Method(s) of recruitment, whether by direct recruitment or by promotion,
secondment, transfer and the percentage of post(s) to be filled in by various methods.—(i)
50% by direct recruitment;
(ii) 50% by promotion failing which on secondment basis and from amongst the IAS /
HAS Probationers (05 posts.
Note.—05 (five) posts earmarked for IAS / HAS Probationers will be adjusted towards 50%
promotion quota.
11. In case of recruitment by promotion, secondment, transfer, grade from which
promotion/ secondment/transfer is to be made.—
(a) By promotion from amongst the incumbents of the following feeder categories who are
Graduate and possess five year’s regular service or regular combined with continuous adhoc
service, if any, in the grade:—
Sl. No.
Feeder category
%
i)
Social Education & Block Planning Officer
20%
4066
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ii)
Superintendent Grade-II
15%
iii)
District Audit Officer/Instructor
05%
iv)
Lady Social Education Organizer (Mukhya Sevika)
05%
v)
Extension officer (Industries)
2.5%
vi)
Extension Officer (Cooperation)
2.5%
Total ..
50%
Provided that if the incumbent of the respective feeder categories does not possess
prescribed qualification of graduation but is otherwise eligible shall be considered for promotion to
the post of Block Development Officer subject to the condition that he/she shall have to acquire
qualification of graduation within 05 (five) years from the date of publication of these rules in the
Rajpatra, Himachal Pradesh, failing which he/she shall be reverted to the respective feeder
category/ post and shall be considered for promotion in future only after acquiring the requisite
qualifications:
Provided further that the above condition shall not be applicable in case of those incumbents
who are to retire on or before the above prescribed period of 05 (five) years.
Provided further that the incumbents(s) of feeder categories who have already been
promoted as Block Development Officer before coming into force of these Rules shall remain
senior to those Block Development Officers who will be promoted after coming into force of these
rules, irrespective of the fact that the earlier promoted incumbents were junior to them in the cadre
of respective feeder category/ post.
(b) Failing which on secondment basis form amongst incumbents of analogous post who
are graduate and possess field experience in Development Sector and also working in the identical
pay scale from other Departments/ Boards/ Corporations of the H.P. Government or IAS/HAS
officers till the incumbent(s) in the respective feeder categories become(s) eligible for consideration
for promotion(s) to the post(s) of Block Development Officer.
For filling up the posts of Block Development Officer, the following 110 points post based
roster shall be followed:—
Roaster Point(s)
Categories
1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th, 11th, 13th, 15th, 17th,
19th, 21st, 23rd, 25th, 27th, 29th, 31st , 33rd,
35th, 37th 39th, 41st, 43rd , 45th, 47th, 49th,
51st, 53rd, 55th, 57th, 59th, 61st, 63rd, 65th,
67th ,69th, 71st, 73th, 75th, 77th, 79th, 81st,
83rd, 85th, 87th, 89th, 91st, 93rd, 95th, 97th,
99th, 101st, 103rd, 105th, 107th & 109th.
Direct
recruitment
through
the
H.
P.
Administrative
Service
Etc.
Combined
Competitive Examination.
2nd, 4th, 8th, 10th, 14th, 22nd, 24th 28th, 30th,
42nd, 48th, 50th, 54th, 64th, 66th, 70th, 72nd,
86th, 90th, 98th 102nd & 108th
Social Education & Block Planning Officer.
6th, 12th ,20th, 26th, 32nd, 38th, 46th, 52nd,
58th, 62nd, 68th, 74th, 78th, 88th, 92nd &
100th.
Superintendent Grade-II
18th, 34th, 60th, 76th, 94th & 104th
District Audit officer/ Instructor
16th, 44th, 56th, 84th, 96th & 106th
Lady Social Education organisor (Mukhya
Sevika)
4067
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
40th, 80th & 110th
Extension Officer (Industries)
36th & 82nd
Extension Officer (Cooperation)
Note.—The roster will be rotated after every 110th vacancy till the representation to all
feeder categories is achieved upto the prescribed percentage in the cadre of Block Development
Officer. Thereafter, the vacancy will be filled up from the category which will vacate the post.
A(1) Provided that for the purpose of promotion every employee shall have to serve atleast
one term in the Tribal/Difficult areas subject to adequate number of post(s) available in such areas;
Provided further that the proviso A(I) supra shall not be applicable in the case of those
employees who have five years or less service, left for superannuation;
Provided further that Officers / Officials who have not served atleast one tenure in Tribal /
Difficult area shall be transferred to such area strictly in accordance with his/her seniority in the
respective cadre.
Explanation I.—For the purpose of proviso A(1) supra the “term” in Tribal /Difficult areas”
shall mean normally three years or less period of posting in such areas keeping in view the
administrative requirements and performance of the employee.
Explanation II.—For the purpose of Proviso A(1) supra the Tribal/Difficult areas shall be as
under:—
1. District Lahaul & Spiti.
2. Pangi and Bharmour Sub Division of Chamba District.
3. Dodra Kawar Area of Rohru Sub-Division.
4. Pandrah Bis Pargana, Munish Darkali and Gram Panchayat Kashapat, Gram
Panchayats of Rampur Tehsil of District Shimla.
5. Pandrah Bis Pargana of Tehsil Nirmand, Distt. Kullu District.
6. Bara Bhangal Areas of Baijnath Sub Division of Kangra District.
7. District Kinnaur.
8.
Kathwar and Korga Patwar Circles of Kamrau Sub Tehsil, Bhaladh Bhalona and
Sangna Patwar Circles of Renukaji Tehsil and Kota Pab Patwar Circle of Shillai
Tehsil, in Sirmour District.
9. Khanyol-Bagra Patwar Circle of Karsog Tehsil, Gada-Gussaini, Mathyani, Ghanyar,
Thachi Baggi, Somgad and Kholanal of Patwar Circle Bali-Chowki Sub Tehsil,
Jharwar, Kutgarh, Graman, Devgarh, Trailla, Ropa, Kathog, Silh-Badhwani, Hastpur,
Ghamrahar and Bhatehar Patwar Circle of Padhar Tehsil, Chiuni, Kalipar, Mangarh,
Thach-Bagra, North Magru and South Magru Patwar Circles of Thunag Tehsil and
Batwara Patwar Circle of Sunder Nagar Tehsil in Mandi Distrist.
(1) In all cases of promotion, the continuous adhoc service rendered in the feeder post, if
any, prior to regular appointment to the post shall be taken into account towards the length of
4068
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service as prescribed in these Rules for promotion subject to the condition that the adhoc
appointment/promotion in the feeder category had been made after following proper acceptable
process of selection in accordance with the provisions of the R&P Rules:
Provided that in all cases where a junior person becomes eligible for consideration by virtue
of his/her total length of service (including the service rendered on adhoc basis followed by regular
service/appointment ) in the feeder post in view of the provision referred to above, all persons
senior to him/her in the respective category/post/cadre shall be deemed to be eligible for
consideration and placed above the junior person in the field of consideration:
Provided further that all incumbents to be considered for promotion shall possess the
minimum qualifying service of at least three years’ or that prescribed in the R & P Rules for the
post, whichever is less:
Provided further that where a person becomes ineligible to be considered for promotion on
account of the requirements of the preceding proviso, the person(s) junior to him /her shall also be
deemed to be ineligible for consideration for such promotion:
Explanation.—The last proviso shall not render the junior incumbents(s) in-eligible for
consideration for promotion if the senior in-eligible person(s) happened to be Ex-Serviceman
recruited under the provisions of Rule-3 of the Demobilized Armed Forces Personnel (Reservation
of Vacancies in Himachal State Non- Technical Services) Rules, 1972 and having been given the
benefit of the seniority there under or recruited under the provision of Rule -3 of the Exservicemen
(Reservation of Vacancies in Himachal Pradesh Technical Services) Rules, 1985 and having been
given the benefit of seniority there-under.
(2) Similarly, in all cases of confirmation, continuous adhoc service rendered in the feeder
post, if any, prior to the regular appointment/promotion against such post shall be taken into
account towards the length of service, if the adhoc appointment/promotion had been made after
proper selection and in accordance with the provision of the R & P Rules.
Provided that inter-se-seniority as a result of confirmation after taking into account, adhoc
service rendered as referred to above shall remain unchanged.
12. If a Departmental Promotion Committee exists, what is its composition.—D.P.C.
to be presided over by the Chairman, H.P. Public Service Commission or a Member thereof to be
nominated by him.
13. Circumstances under which the H.P.P.S.C. is to be consulted in making
recruitment.—As required under the Law.
14. Essential requirement for a direct recruitment.—A candidate for appointment to
any service or post must be a citizen of India.
15. Selection for appointment to post by direct recruitment.—Selection for
appointment to the post in the case of direct recruitment shall be made on the basis of the Himachal
Pradesh Administrative Services Combined Competitive Examination the pattern/ syllabus etc. of
which is as given in the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Services Rules, 1973, as amended from
time to time.
16. Reservation.—The appointment to the service shall be subject to orders regarding
reservation in the service for Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes/Other Backward Classes/Other
categories of persons issued by the Himachal Pradesh Government from time to time.
4069
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
17. Departmental Examination.—Every member of the service shall pass a Departmental
Examination as prescribed in the Himachal Pradesh Departmental Examination Rules, 1997 as
amended from time to time for promotion to the next higher post.
18. Powers to relax.—Where the State Government is of opinion that it is necessary or
expedient to do so, it may, by order for reasons to be recorded in writing and in consultation with
the H.P Public Service Commission, relax any of the provision(s) of these Rules with respect to any
Class or Category of Person(s) or Post(s).
___________
vkcdkjh ,oa djk/kku foHkkx
vf/klwpuk
f'keyk&2] 29 vxLr] 2016
la[;k%bZ-,Dl-,u-&,Q¼10½&5@2016-&&fgekpy izns'k ds jkT;iky] fgekpy izns'k ewY; ifjof/kZr
dj vf/kfu;e] 2005 ¼2005 dk vf/kfu;e la[;kad 12½ dh /kkjk 10 }kjk iznÙk “kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs
gq,] iwoksZDr vf/kfu;e ls layXu vuqlwph ^d* esa fuEufyf[kr la'kks/ku djus dk izLrko djrs gSa vkSj bUgsa
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laHkkO; izHkkfor gksus okys fdlh fgrc) O;fDr ds ;fn mijksDr izLrko ds lEcU/k esa dksbZ vk{ksi
;k lq>ko gS@gSa rks og mls@mUgsa bl vf/klwpuk ds izdk'ku dh rkjh[k ls nl fnu dh vof/k ds Hkhrj
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vuqlwph *d^ esa]&
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Þ21 d- lEihfM+r izkd`frd xSl ¼ dkWEizSLM~ uSpjWy xSl½ ------Þ( vkSj
4070
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
¼ii½ fo|eku izfof"V la[;k 105 vkSj 107 rFkk izfof"V la[;k 117 ds i'pkr~ vk, fVIi.k dk yksi
fd;k tk,xk A
vkns'k }kjk]
gLrk{kfjr@&
iz/kku lfpo ¼vkcdkjh ,oa djk/kku½A
&&&&&&&&
[Authoritative English Text of this Department Notification No.EXN-F(10)-5/2016 dated 29/08/
2016 as required under clause (3) of Article 348 of the Constitution of India.]
EXCISE AND TAXATION DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla-171002, the 29th August, 2016
No. EXN-F(10)-5/2016.—In exercise of the powers conferred by section 10 of the
Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005(Act No.12 of 2005), the Governor, Himachal
Pradesh proposes to make following amendments in SCHEDULE 'A' appended to the Act ibid and
the same are hereby published in the Official Gazette (e-gazette), Himachal Pradesh for the
information of general public;
If any interested person likely to be affected has any objection(s) or suggestion(s), with
regard to the aforesaid proposal, may send the same to the Excise and Taxation Commissioner,
Himachal Pradesh, Shimla-171009 within a period of ten days from the date publication of this
notification;
Objection(s)/suggestion(s), if any, received within the above stipulated period, shall be
taken into consideration by the Government before finalizing the same, namely:—
DRAFT AMENDMENTS OF SCHEDULE 'A'
In SCHEDULE 'A' appended to the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (Act
No. 12 of 2005),—
(a) in Part-I 'A' after entry number 2, the following new entries shall be inserted, namely
3.
Sugar and Khandsari
-------
4.
Textile fabrics
-------; and
(b) in Part-II-'A',-
(i) after entry 21, the following new entry shall be inserted, namely:—
"21 A. Compressed Natural Gas ------"; and
4071
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
(ii) the existing entries number 105 and 107 and Note appearing after entry number 117
shall be omitted.
By order,
Sd/-
Pr. Secretary (E&T).
__________
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4072
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fo"k;-&&izkFkZuk i= n#Lrh jktLo vf/kfu;e 1954 ds rgr ckjsA
loZlk/kkj.k dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd yyhrk nsoh vk;q 33 lky iq=h Jh Lo0 gse jkt] xkao
/kkjk iVkgjk] Mk0 enkuk] mi&rglhy lSat] ftyk dqYyw] gky fuoklh vkj0 ,l0 mIiy dkWVst] utnhd
ekdsZfVax cksMZ vkWfQl yksvj [kyhuh] f'keyk&2] ftyk f'keyk] fg0 iz0 us bl vnkyr esa ,d nj[okLr
xqtkjh gS fd mldk uke jktLo fjdkMZ QkVh o dksBh 'kka?kM+] mi&rglhy lSat] ftyk dqYyw esa yhyk
nsoh iq=h Lo0 Jh gse jkt ntZ gS tks fd xyr gSA tcfd izkfFkZu dk uke xzke iapk;r 'kka?kM+ ds fjdkMZ
esa o f'k{kk izek.k i= esa yyhrk nsoh iq=h Lo0 gse jkt ntZ gS tksfd lgh gSA
vr% bl b'rgkj }kjk loZlk/kkj.k dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd jktLo fjdkMZ esa izkfFkZu dk uke
yhyk nsoh ds LFkku ij yhyk nsoh mQZ yyhrk nsoh iq=h Lo0 Jh gse jkt ntZ djds n#Lrh dh tkuh gSA
bl lEcU/k esa fdlh O;fDr dks ;fn dksbZ vkifÙk gks rks og vlkyru o odkyru viuh vkifÙk
bl U;k;ky; esa fnukad 24&9&2016 dks ;k blls iwoZ izLrqr dj ldrk gS A vU;Fkk bldk bUnzkt
jktLo fjdkMZ esa djok fn;k tk,xkA
vkt fnukad 16&8&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr ls tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh@dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
mi&rglhy lSat] ftyk dqYywA
&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh vfuy pkSgku] mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½ pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky]
ftyk f'keyk ¼fgekpy izns'k½
Jherh jek iRuh Jh x.ks'k pUn] xkao ctjksFk] Mkd?kj o xzke iapk;r cEVk] rglhy pkSiky] ftyk
f'keykA
cuke
¼1½ vke turkA
¼2½ iz/kku xzke iapk;r cEVk] rglhy pkSiky] ftyk f'keykA
fo"k;-&&izkfFkZ;k ds cPpksa dk uke o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r cEVk ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ
djok, tkus ckjsA fd v/khu /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oe~ e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr
tUe iathdj.k djus ckjsA
b'rgkj
gj [kkl o vke turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkfFkZ;k Jherh jek us
v/kksgLrk{kjh ds U;k;ky; esa ,d vkosnu i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mlus vius cPpksa dk uke o tUe
frfFk;ka xzke iapk;r cEVk ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ ugha djok;k gS] vc izkfFkZ;k vius cPpksa dk
uke o tUe frfFk;ka xzke iapk;r cEVk ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djokuk pkgrh gS] tks dh bl
izdkj ls gS%&
4073
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
Øe la[;k
uke
lacU/k
tUe frfFk
1-
fiz;ka'kq
iq=
05&01&2005
2-
lqty
iq=h
24&06&2006
vr% xzke iapk;r cEVk] rglhy pkSiky dh turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd
;fn fdlh O;fDr dks mijksDr iathdj.k ckjs dksbZ vkifÙk gks rks rkjh[k 12&09&2016 dks ;k blls iwoZ
vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuh vkifÙk izLrqr djsa vU;Fkk vkosnu i= ij tUe
iathdj.k vkns'k ikfjr djds lfpo xzke iapk;r cEVk dks vkxkeh dk;kZUo;u gsrq Hkst fn;k tk;sxkA
vkt fnukad 12&08&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr vnkyr ls tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
vfuy pkSgku]
mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½]
pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh vfuy pkSgku] mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½ pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky]
ftyk f'keyk ¼fgekpy izns'k½
Jh izse izdk'k 'kekZ iq= Jh jkb flag] xkao e'kjkgka] Mkd?kj e/kkuk] xzke iapk;r e/kkuk] rglhy
pkSiky] ftyk f'keyk] fgekpy izns'kA
cuke
¼1½ vke turkA
¼2½ iz/kku xzke iapk;r e/kkuk] rglhy pkSiky] ftyk f'keykA
fo"k;-&&izkFkhZ ds cPpksa dk uke o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r e/kkuk ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ
djok, tkus ckjsA fd v/khu /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oe~ e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr
tUe iathdj.k djus ckjsA
b'rgkj
gj [kkl o vke turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ Jh izse izdk'k 'kekZ us
v/kksgLrk{kjh ds U;k;ky; esa ,d vkosnu i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mlus vius cPpksa dk uke o tUe
frfFk;ka xzke iapk;r e/kkuk ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ ugha djok;k gS] vc izkFkhZ vius cPpksa dk
uke o tUe frfFk;ka xzke iapk;r e/kkuk ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djokuk pkgrk gS] tks dh bl
izdkj ls gS%&
Øe la[;k
uke
lacU/k
tUe frfFk
1-
fczt eksgu 'kekZ
iq=
01&08&1991
2-
vuqiek
iq=h
10&08&1993
vr% xzke iapk;r e/kkuk] rglhy pkSiky dh turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS
fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks mijksDr iathdj.k ckjs dksbZ vkifÙk gks rks rkjh[k 19&09&2016 dks ;k blls iwoZ
vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuh vkifÙk izLrqr djsa vU;Fkk vkosnu i= ij tUe
iathdj.k vkns'k ikfjr djds lfpo xzke iapk;r e/kkuk dks vkxkeh dk;kZUo;u gsrq Hkst fn;k tk;sxkA
4074
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
vkt fnukad 19&08&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr vnkyr ls tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
vfuy pkSgku]
mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½]
pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh vfuy pkSgku] mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½ pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky]
ftyk f'keyk ¼fgekpy izns'k½
Jh jfoanj flag iq= Jh NTtw jke] xkao ckanqj] Mkd?kj iokgu] rglhy pkSiky] ftyk f'keyk
cuke
¼1½ vke turkA
¼2½ iz/kku xzke iapk;r iokgu] rglhy pkSiky] ftyk f'keykA
fo"k;-&&izkFkhZ dk uke o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r iokgu ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djok, tkus
ckjsA fd v/khu /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oe~ e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr tUe iathdj.k
djus ckjsA
b'rgkj
gj [kkl o vke turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ Jh jfoanj flag us
v/kksgLrk{kjh ds U;k;ky; esa ,d vkosnu i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mlus viuk uke o tUe frfFk xzke
iapk;r iokgu ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ ugha djok;k gS] vc izkFkhZ viuk uke o tUe frfFk xzke
iapk;r iokgu ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djokuk pkgrk gS] tks dh bl izdkj ls gS%&
uke
lacU/k
tUe frfFk
jfoanj flag
iq= NTtw jke
14&11&1991
vr% xzke iapk;r iokgu] rglhy pkSiky dh turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS
fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks mijksDr iathdj.k ckjs dksbZ vkifÙk gks rks rkjh[k 19&09&2016 dks ;k blls iwoZ
vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuh vkifÙk izLrqr djsa vU;Fkk vkosnu i= ij tUe
iathdj.k vkns'k ikfjr djds lfpo xzke iapk;r iokgu dks vkxkeh dk;kZUo;u gsrq Hkst fn;k tk;sxkA
vkt fnukad 19&08&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr vnkyr ls tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
vfuy pkSgku]
mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½]
pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky ¼fg0 iz0½A
4075
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
c vnkyr Jh vfuy pkSgku] mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½ pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky]
ftyk f'keyk ¼fgekpy izns'k½
Jh gjh'k pan iq= Jh jk;ey] xkao FkaxkM] Mkd?kj FkaxkM] xzke iapk;r fdj.k] mi&rglhy us#ok]
rglhy pkSiky] ftyk f'keyk] fgekpy izns'kA
cuke
¼1½ vke turkA
¼2½ iz/kku xzke iapk;r fdj.k] mi&rglhy us#ok] rglhy pkSiky] ftyk f'keykA
fo"k;-&&izkFkhZ ds cPpksa dk uke o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r fdj.k ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ
djok, tkus ckjsA fd v/khu /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oe~ e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr
tUe iathdj.k djus ckjsA
b'rgkj
gj [kkl o vke turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ Jh gjh'k pan us
v/kksgLrk{kjh ds U;k;ky; esa ,d vkosnu i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mlus vius cPpksa dk uke o tUe frfFk
xzke iapk;r fdj.k ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ ugha djok;k gS] vc izkFkhZ vius cPpksa dk uke o
tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r fdj.k ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djokuk pkgrk gS] tks dh bl izdkj ls
gS%&
Øe la[;k
uke
lacU/k
tUe frfFk
1-
dkfrZd
iq=
18&04&1995
2-
vfiZr
iq=
13&02&1998
vr% xzke iapk;r fdj.k] mi&rglhy us#ok] rglhy pkSiky dh turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj
lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks mijksDr iathdj.k ckjs dksbZ vkifÙk gks rks rkjh[k
19&09&2016 dks ;k blls iwoZ vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuh vkifÙk izLrqr djsa
vU;Fkk vkosnu i= ij tUe iathdj.k vkns'k ikfjr djds lfpo xzke iapk;r fdj.k dks vkxkeh
dk;kZUo;u gsrq Hkst fn;k tk;sxkA
vkt fnukad 19&08&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr vnkyr ls tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
vfuy pkSgku]
mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½]
pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh vfuy pkSgku] mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½ pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky]
ftyk f'keyk ¼fgekpy izns'k½
Jh eksgen vyh iq= Jh Qrs nhu] xkao dhek panzkoyh] Mkd?kj dsnh] rglhy pkSiky] ftyk
f'keykA
cuke
¼1½ vke turkA
4076
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
¼2½ iz/kku xzke iapk;r dsnh] rglhy pkSiky] ftyk f'keykA
fo"k;-&&izkFkhZ ds iq= dk uke o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r dsnh ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djok,
tkus ckjsA fd v/khu /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oe~ e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr tUe
iathdj.k djus ckjsA
b'rgkj
gj [kkl o vke turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ Jh eksgen vyh us
v/kksgLrk{kjh ds U;k;ky; esa ,d vkosnu i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mlus vius csVs dk uke o tUe frfFk
xzke iapk;r dsnh ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ ugha djok;k gS] vc izkFkhZ vius csVs dk uke o tUe
frfFk xzke iapk;r dsnh ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djokuk pkgrk gS] tks dh bl izdkj ls gS%&
uke
lacU/k
tUe frfFk
vjeku
iq=
21&02&2002
vr% xzke iapk;r dsnh] rglhy pkSiky dh turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk
gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks mijksDr iathdj.k ckjs dksbZ vkifÙk gks rks rkjh[k 19&09&2016 dks ;k blls
iwoZ vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuh vkifÙk izLrqr djsa vU;Fkk vkosnu i= ij tUe
iathdj.k vkns'k ikfjr djds lfpo xzke iapk;r dsnh dks vkxkeh dk;kZUo;u gsrq Hkst fn;k tk;sxkA
vkt fnukad 19&08&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr vnkyr ls tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
vfuy pkSgku]
mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½]
pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&&
In the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Theog, District Shimla, H. P.
Smt. Soma d/o Shri Jaisi Ram, r/o Village Dohan, Tehsil Theog, District Shimla, H.P.
. . Applicant.
Versus
The General Public
. . Respondent.
Application under Section 13 (3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.
Whereas, Smt. Soma d/o Shri Jaisi Ram, r/o Village Dohan, Tehsil Theog, District Shimla,
Himachal Pradesh has moved an application stating therein that she could not register the death of
her sister namely Gora whose date of death is 09-09-2008 in the record of Gram Panchayat Nahol,
Tehsil Theog.
Whereas, by this notice, the general public is hereby informed that any person having any
objection for entries of the above mentioned date, may submit his/her objection in writing in this
court on or before 06-09-2016, failing which no objection will be entertained after expiry of date
and final order shall be issued for entry.
4077
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
Given under my hand and seal of the court on this 05-08-2016.
Seal.
Sd/-
Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Theog, District Shimla.
__________
In the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Theog, District Shimla, H. P.
Smt. Soma d/o Shri Jaisi Ram, r/o Village Dohan, Tehsil Theog, District Shimla, H.P.
. . Applicant.
Versus
The General Public
. . Respondent.
Application under Section 13 (3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.
Whereas, Smt. Soma d/o Shri Jaisi Ram, r/o Village Dohan, Tehsil Theog, District Shimla,
Himachal Pradesh has moved an application stating therein that she could not register the death of
her mother namely Rasala whose date of death is 02-04-2012 in the record of Gram Panchayat
Nahol, Tehsil Theog.
Whereas, by this notice, the general public is hereby informed that any person having any
objection for entries of the above mentioned date of death, may submit his/her objection in writing
in this court on or before 06-09-2016, failing which no objection will be entertained after expiry of
date and final order shall be issued for entry.
Given under my hand and seal of the court on this 05-08-2016.
Seal.
Sd/-
Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Theog, District Shimla.
__________
In the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Theog, District Shimla, H. P.
Smt. Soma d/o Shri Jaisi Ram, r/o Village Dohan, Tehsil Theog, District Shimla, H.P.
. . Applicant.
Versus
The General Public
. . Respondent.
Application under Section 13 (3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.
4078
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
Whereas, Smt. Soma d/o Shri Jaisi Ram, r/o Village Dohan, Tehsil Theog, District Shimla,
Himachal Pradesh has moved an application stating therein that she could not register the death of
her father namely Jaisi Ram s/o Lala Ram whose date of death is 22-12-2014 in the record of
Gram Panchayat Nahol, Tehsil Theog.
Whereas, by this notice, the general public is hereby informed that any person having any
objection for entries of the above mentioned date of death, may submit his/her objection in writing
in this court on or before 06-09-2016, failing which no objection will be entertained after expiry of
date and final order shall be issued for entry.
Given under my hand and seal of the court on this 05-08-2016.
Seal.
Sd/-
Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Theog, District Shimla.
__________
c vnkyr Jh vkj0 ds0 eexkbZu] dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh mi&rglhy dejÅ]
ftyk fljekSj] fg0 iz0
fnus'k iq= Jh jksMk jke
cuke
vke turk
izkFkZuk&i= tsjs /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-
Jh fnus'k iq= Jh jksMk jke] fuoklh dejÅ ¼pkSdh½] mi&rglhy dejÅ us bl vnkyr esa ,d
izkFkZuk&i= xqtkjk gS fd mldh yM+dh dk uke xzke iapk;r dejÅ esa bf'kdk ntZ gS ftls izkFkhZ cny
dj T;ksfr ntZ djokuk pkgrk gSA
vr% loZlk/kkj.k dks bl b'rgkj ds ekQZr lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd bl ckjs fdlh dks dksbZ
mtj@,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 9&9&16 dks izkr% 11-00 cts vnkyr gtk fLFkr dejÅ esa vlkyru ;k
odkyru gkftj vkdj ntZ djk ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k ds i'pkr~ dksbZ vkifŸk izkIr u gksus dh lwjr
esa izkFkZuk&i= Jh fnus'k iq= jksMk jke ij fu;ekuqlkj dk;Zokgh dh tk;sxhA
vr% fnukad 16&08&16 dks esjs gLrk{kj o dk;kZy; eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
mi&rglhy dejÅA
4079
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
c vnkyr Jh vkj0 ds0 eexkbZu] dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh mi&rglhy dejÅ]
ftyk fljekSj] fg0 iz0
dq0 jhuk Bkdqj
cuke
vke turk
izkFkZuk&i= tsjs /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-
dq0 jhuk Bkdqj iq=h Jh tksxh jke] fuoklh dejÅ us bl vnkyr esa ,d izkFkZuk&i= xqtkjk gS
fd mldk viuk uke xzke iapk;r dejÅ esa jhuk gS og vius Ldwy izek.k ds eqrkfcd jhuk Bkdqj djkuk
pkgrh gSA
vr% loZlk/kkj.k dks bl b'rgkj ds ekQZr lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd bl ckjs fdlh dks dksbZ
mtj@,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 3&9&16 dks izkr% vnkyr gtk fLFkr dejÅ esa vlkyru ;k odkyru
gkftj vkdj ntZ djk ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k ds i'pkr~ dksbZ vkifŸk izkIr u gksus dh lwjr esa
izkFkZuk&i= dq0 jhuk Bkdqj ij fu;ekuqlkj dk;Zokgh dh tk;sxhA
vr% fnukad 16&08&16 dks esjs gLrk{kj o dk;kZy; eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
mi&rglhy dejÅA
&&&&&&&&
In the Court of Shri H. S. Rana, H.A.S., Marriage Officer (SDM) Paonta Sahib,
District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh
NOTICE UNDER SECTION 16 OF SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1954
In the matter of :
Shri Sumit Saini s/o Shri Gopal Singh, r/o Village Santokhgarh, Tehsil & District Una,
H.P. and Smt. Sarita d/o Shri Amar Singh, r/o Village & P.O. Gawali, Tehsil Shillai, District
Sirmaur, H.P.
Versus
General Public
An Application for registration of Marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954.
Shri Sumit Saini s/o Shri Gopal Singh, r/o Village Santokhgarh, Tehsil & District Una,
H.P. and Smt. Sarita d/o Shri Amar Singh, r/o Village & P.O. Gawali, Tehsil Shillai, District
4080
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
Sirmaur, H.P. before the undersigned on dated 16-08-2016 for registration of their marriage
solemnized between them on 16-11-2015 and they have been living as husband and wife ever since
then. Notices are given to all concerned and General Public to this effect that if any body have any
objection regarding the registration of marriage duly solemnized on 16-11-2015 of Shri Sumit Saini
s/o Shri Gopal Singh, r/o Village Santokhgarh, Tehsil & District Una, H.P. and Smt. Sarita d/o
Shri Amar Singh, r/o Village & P.O. Gawali, Tehsil Shillai, District Sirmaur, H.P. he should file
written objections and appear personally or through an authorized agent before this court within 30
days from the date of issue of this notice. After expiry of the said period, the marriage certificate
would be issued to the applicants by this court.
Issued under my hand and office seal of this court on 17-08-2016.
Seal.
HARI SINGH RANA (HAS),
Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur.
__________
In the Court of Shri H. S. Rana, H.A.S., Marriage Officer (SDM) Paonta Sahib,
District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh
NOTICE UNDER SECTION 16 OF SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1954
In the matter of :
Shri Mukesh Kumar s/o Shri Sita Ram, r/o Village Pagar, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District
Sirmaur, H.P. and Smt. Ravinder Kaur d/o Shri Phool Singh, r/o Jalampur Shekh, P.O. Station
Nehtaur, District Bijnoar, UP
Versus
General Public
An Application for registration of Marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954.
Shri Mukesh Kumar s/o Shri Sita Ram, r/o Village Pagar, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District
Sirmaur, H.P. and Smt. Ravinder Kaur d/o Shri Phool Singh, r/o Jalampur Shekh, P.O. Station
Nehtaur, District Bijnoar, UP before the undersigned on dated 16-08-2016 for registration of their
marriage solemnized between them on 20-7-2016 and they have been living as husband and wife
ever since then. Notices are given to all concerned and General Public to this effect that if any body
have any objection regarding the registration of marriage duly solemnized on 20-7-2016 of
Shri Mukesh Kumar s/o Shri Sita Ram, r/o Village Pagar, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur,
H.P. and Smt. Ravinder Kaur d/o Shri Phool Singh, r/o Jalampur Shekh, P.O. Station Nehtaur,
District Bijnoar, UP he should file written objections and appear personally or through an
authorized agent before this court within 30 days from the date of issue of this notice. After expiry
of the said period, the marriage certificate would be issued to the applicants by this court.
4081
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
Issued under my hand and office seal of this court on 17-08-2016.
Seal.
HARI SINGH RANA (HAS),
Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur.
__________
In the court of Shri H. S. Rana, H.A.S., Marriage Officer (SDM) Paonta Sahib,
District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh
NOTICE UNDER SECTION 16 OF SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1954
In the matter of :
Shri Vishal s/o Shri Padam Kumar, r/o Village Vikash Nagar, District Dehradun at present
Devi Nagar, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. and Smt. Anshul Gairola d/o Shri Gopi Ram
Gairola, r/o Vikash Nagar, District Dehradun, UK.
Versus
General Public
An Application for registration of Marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954.
Shri Vishal s/o Shri Padam Kumar, r/o Village Vikash Nagar, District Dehradun at present
Devi Nagar, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. and Smt. Anshul Gairola d/o Shri Gopi Ram
Gairola, r/o Vikash Nagar, District Dehradun, UK before the undersigned on dated 16-08-2016 for
registration of their marriage solemnized between them on 04-08-2016 and they have been living as
husband and wife ever since then. Notices are given to all concerned and General Public to this
effect that if any body have any objection regarding the registration of marriage duly solemnized on
4-8-2016 of Shri Vishal s/o Shri Padam Kumar, r/o Village Vikash Nagar, District Dehradun at
present Devi Nagar, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H. P. and Smt. Anshul Gairola d/o Shri Gopi
Ram Gairola, r/o Vikash Nagar, District Dehradun, UK he should file written objections and appear
personally or through an authorized agent before this court within 30 days from the date of issue of
this notice. After expiry of the said period, the marriage certificate would be issued to the
applicants by this court.
Issued under my hand and office seal of this court on 17-08-2016.
Seal.
HARI SINGH RANA (HAS),
Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur.
4082
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938
In the Court of Shri H. S. Rana, H.A.S., Marriage Officer (SDM) Paonta Sahib,
District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh
NOTICE UNDER SECTION 16 OF SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1954
In the matter of :
Shri Lhundup s/o Shri Tashi, r/o Sakya Tibetan Society Puruwala Shampur Gorkhuwala,
Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. and Smt. Passang Thakchoe d/o Shri Wangla, r/o Sakya
Tibetan Society Puruwala Shampur Gorkhuwala, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P.
Versus
General Public
An Application for registration of Marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954.
Shri Lhundup s/o Shri Tashi, r/o Sakya Tibetan Society Puruwala Shampur Gorkhuwala,
Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. and Smt. Passang Thakchoe d/o Shri Wangla, r/o Sakya
Tibetan Society Puruwala Shampur Gorkhuwala, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. before
the undersigned on dated 16-08-2016 for registration of their marriage solemnized between them
on 15-03-2003 and they have been living as husband and wife ever since then. Notices are given to
all concerned and General Public to this effect that if any body have any objection regarding the
registration of marriage duly solemnized on 15-03-2003 of Shri Lhundup s/o Shri Tashi, r/o Sakya
Tibetan Society Puruwala Shampur Gorkhuwala, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. and
Smt. Passang Thakchoe d/o Shri Wangla, r/o Sakya Tibetan Society Puruwala Shampur
Gorkhuwala, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. he should file written objections and
appear personally or through an authorized agent before this court within 30 days from the date of
issue of this notice. After expiry of the said period, the marriage certificate would be issued to the
applicants by this court.
Issued under my hand and office seal of this court on 17-08-2016.
Seal.
HARI SINGH RANA (HAS),
Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur.
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