jkti=] fgekpy izns'k

fgekpy izns'k jkT; 'kklu }kjk izdkf'kr

eaxyokj] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

fgekpy izns'k ljdkj

HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA-171 001

“NOTIFICATION”

Shimla, the 23rd August, 2016

No. HHC/Estt.3(487)/98.—07 days leave i.e. 02 days earned leave for 30.07.2016 and

31.07.2016 and 05 days commuted leave on and with effect from 01.08.2016 to 05.08.2016, is

hereby sanctioned, ex-post-facto, in favour of Smt. Poonam Mahajan, Additional Registrar of this

Registry.

108&jkti=@2016&30&08&2016

¼3793½

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jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

Certified that Smt. Poonam Mahajan has joined the same post and at the same station from where

she had proceeded on leave after the expiry of the above leave period.

Certified that Smt. Poonam Mahajan would have continued to officiate the same post of

Additional Registrar but for her proceeding on leave.

By order,

Sd/-

Registrar General.

___________

HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA-171 001

“NOTIFICATION”

Shimla, the 23rd August, 2016

No.HHC/Admn.3(400)/95-II.—09 days earned leave on and with effect from 29.07.2016

to 06.08.2016, with permission to suffix Sunday on 07.08.2016, is hereby sanctioned, ex-post-facto,

in favour of Shri Lal Singh Pathania, Secretary of this Registry.

Certified that Shri Lal Singh Pathania has joined the same post and at the same station from

where he had proceeded on leave after the expiry of the above leave period.

Certified that Shri Lal Singh Pathania would have continued to officiate the same post of

Secretary but for his proceeding on leave.

By order,

Sd/-

Registrar General.

__________

HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA-171 001

“NOTIFICATION”

Shimla, the 23rd August, 2016

No. HHC/Admn.3(179)/82-II.—In supersession of the earlier notification of even number

dated 27.07.2016, 06 days earned leave i.e. on and with effect from 01.08.2016 to 06.08.2016, with

permission to affix Sundays on 31.07.2016 and 07.08.2016, already sanctioned, is hereby cancelled

and 06 days commuted leave on and with effect from 01.08.2016 to 06.08.2016, with permission to

affix Sundays on 31.07.2016 and 07.08.2016, is hereby sanctioned, ex-post-facto, in favour of Smt.

Sudesh Kumari, Court Master of this Registry.

Certified that Smt. Sudesh Kumari has joined the same post and at the same station from

where she had proceeded on leave after the expiry of the above leave period.

3795

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

Certified that Smt. Sudesh Kumari would have continued to officiate the same post of Court

Master but for her proceeding on leave.

By order,

Sd/-

Registrar General.

___________

HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA-171 001

NOTIFICATION

Shimla, the 16th August, 2016

No. HHC/Admn.6(24)74-IX.—The Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh has been

pleased to assign the cases under the Negotiable Instruments Act to the Secretaries, District Legal

Service Authorities pending at their respective Headquarter(s) for adjudication and disposal, in

addition to their –own work.

By order,

Sd/-

Registrar General.

_________

LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Dharamshala, the 20th August, 2016

No: Shram (A) 6-2/2014 (Awards) D/Shala.—In exercise of the powers vested under

section 17(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased to

order the publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer, Labour

Court D/Shala on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment Government of

Himachal Pradesh:—

Sr.

No.

Case No.

Petitioner Respondent

Date of Award

1.

383/15

Mani Karan EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

2.

244/15

Bhag Siingh EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

3.

345/15

Devi Saran EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

4.

334/15

Inder Singh EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

5.

384/15

Guru Dutt EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

6.

337/15

Mehar Chand EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

7.

387/15

Mehar Chand EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

8.

386/15

Prem Nath EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

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9.

333/15

Mansa Ram EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

10.

243/15

Dhani Ram EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

11.

241/15

Mangat Ram EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

12.

344/15

Milkh Ram EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

13.

246/15

Rattan Dei EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

14.

340/15

Kamla Devi EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

15.

336/15

Leela EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

16.

380/15

Timru EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

17.

242/15

Chet Ram EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

18.

343/15

Janak Raj EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

19.

338/15

Nandei EE-HPPWD Killar

03.06.2016

20.

404/15

Seeta Ram EE-HPPWD Killar

28.06.2016

21.

405/15

Vijay Singh EE-HPPWD Killar

28.06.2016

22.

407/15

Subhash Chand EE-HPPWD Killar

28.06.2016

23.

415/15

Bhajan Singh EE-HPPWD Killar

28.06.2016

24.

416/15

Hari Nath EE-HPPWD Killar

28.06.2016

25.

418/15

Prithi Singh EE-HPPWD Killar

28.06.2016

26.

420/15

Bhender Lal EE-HPPWD Killar

28.06.2016

27.

421/15

Devi Chand EE-HPPWD Killar

28.06.2016

By order,

Sd/-

Pr. Secretary ( Lab. & Emp.)

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 383/2015

Date of Institution : 18.08.2015

Date of Decision : 03.06.2016

Shri Mani Karan s/o Shri Tega Ram, R/O Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

....Respondent.

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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Mani Karan S/O Shri Tega Ram,

R/O Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated-nil-received on 18.04.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of

service during August, 2003 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of

the services of Shri Mani Karan S/O Shri Tega Ram, R/O Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi,

Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D.

Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during August, 2003 without

complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not,

what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above

aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 2003 with the respondent/department.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 2003 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 2003 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of August, 2003 till the date of institution of present claim petition

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who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section

25 G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution

of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the

respondent in the month of August, 2003. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f.

month of August, 2003 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as

petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also

prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of

petitioner between 1994 to September, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and

regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and

per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh

Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2003

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2003 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

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8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.09.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil

received on 18.4.2012 qua his/her termination of service during year August, 2003 by

respondent suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,

2003 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? If so, its effect?

… OPP.

3. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:--

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs. 80,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2003 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1994 to August, 2003. He has also stated on oath that no notice

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under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the

same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination

was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and

all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2003 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2003. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required

for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of

any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 104 days in the year 1994, 54 days in 1996, 48 days in 1998, 143 days in 1999, 41.5

days in 2001, 119 days in 2002 and 84 days in 2003 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2003

in 7 years he had worked for 593.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner

had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with

regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year

2003 the petitioner had merely worked for 84 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar

months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to

meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the

respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

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remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1994 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2003 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in August, 2003, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter

as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

3802

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respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows“

17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

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we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

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lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

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dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 7 years and actually worked for 593.5 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2003 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about 12 ½ years i.e. demand notice was given dated nil. It is also pertinent to mention here that

petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 51 years who has sufficient spell of life to

work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to

judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for

back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013

(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on

the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be

solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was

reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees

eighty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

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25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

________ ____

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 244/2015

Date of Institution : 10.06.2015

Date of Decision : 03.06.2016

Shri Bhag Singh, s/o Shri Shambhu Ram, r/o Village and P.O. Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

....Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Bhag Singh S/O Shri

Shambhu Ram, R/O Village and Post Office Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 27.12.2011 regarding his alleged

illegal termination of service during August, 1998 suffers from delay and latches? If not,

Whether termination of the services of Shri Bhag Singh S/O Shri Shambhu Ram, R/O

Village and Post Office Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, I.& P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. during August, 1998 without complying the provisions of the Industrial

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Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the

above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 1998 with the respondent/department.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 1998 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 1998 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of August, 1998 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of August, 1998. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

August, 1998 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that

period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between 1994 to August, 1998 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the

service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP

Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P.

and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 1998

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

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and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1998 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence. 7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of

petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully

relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.01.2016 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

27.12.2011 qua his/her termination of service during year August, 1998 by respondent

suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,

1998 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

5.

If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

6.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-

Issue No.1

: Yes

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Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.50,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 1998 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1994 to August, 1998. He has also stated on oath that no notice

under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the

same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination

was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and

all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 1998 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

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RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 1998. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required

for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of

any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 58 days in the year 1994, 105 days in 1995, 20 days in 1996, 78 days in 1997 and 56

days in 1998 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 1998 in 5 years he had worked for 317 days

in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and

as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this

court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1998 the petitioner had merely worked for 56 days and

thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had

not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of

one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 1998 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

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of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in August, 1998, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter

as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

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the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the

appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of

existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

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and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1998 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 5 years and actually worked for 317 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 1998 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about 13 years i.e. demand notice was given dated 27.12.2011. It is also pertinent to mention here

that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 40 years who has sufficient spell of

life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

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21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees

fifty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and

circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 345/2015

Date of Institution : 05.08.2015

Date of Decision : 03.06.2016

Shri Devi Saran s/o Shri Nathu Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Shoon, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner.

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Versus

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

....Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Devi Saran S/O Shri Nathu Ram,

R/O Village and Post Office Shoon, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during

September, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services

of Shri Devi Saran S/O Shri Nathu Ram, R/O Village and Post Office Shoon, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2005 without complying the provisions of

the Industrail Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled

to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of June, 1996 who continuously worked till September, 2005 with the respondent/

department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160

days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in

the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be

counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of

September, 2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were

junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department

was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers

working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner

and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been

followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to

petitioner and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of

September, 2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not

served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of

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notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of

petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or

his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him

and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also

alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of

September, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere

gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to

have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner

prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of

September, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2005

along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained

unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of

intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between June,

1996 to September, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service

of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2004 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt.

in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to

any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till 2005

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

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mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

02.02.2012qua his termination of service during September, 2005 by respondent

suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. September,

2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

7.

If issue no.1 or issue no. 2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefit

the petitioner is entitled to?

…OPP.

8. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:--

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.

1,20,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1996 who continuously worked till 2005 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

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service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1996 to September, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2005 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2005.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-

examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by

the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of

work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As

such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold

that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 168 days in the year 1996, 148 days in 1997, 135 days in 1998, 101 days in 1999, 85

days in 2000, 116 days in 2001, 98 days in 2002, 106 days in 2003, 118 days in 2004 and 58 days

in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 1996 to 2005 in 10 years he had worked for 1133 days in

his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1997 to 2005 petitioner had worked for

more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the

point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal

termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had

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merely worked for 58 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month

of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law

of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have

issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not

violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandaysmdetails of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who

were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the

petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all

the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years

although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent

establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2005

even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly

violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of

the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined

service in 1996 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to

petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.

Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank

of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

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placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

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“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

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State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D. Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

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judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 10 years and actually worked for 1133 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2005

who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice

after about six years i.e. demand notice was given on 02.02.2012. It is also pertinent to mention

here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 35 years who has sufficient spell

of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees

one lakh twenty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in

the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

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of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 334/2015

Date of Institution : 05.08.2015

Date of Decision : 03.06.2016

Shri Inder Singh s/o Shri Mani Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

....Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Inder Singh S/O Shri Mani

Ram, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

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Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 04.04.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during

August, 1998 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of

Shri Inder Singh S/O Shri Mani Ram, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Division Killar, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during August, 1998 without complying the provisions of the

Industrial disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled

to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 1998 with the respondent/department.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 1998 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 1998 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of August, 1998 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of August, 1998. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

August, 1998 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that

period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between May, 1994 to August, 1998 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of

the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of

HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of

H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

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4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 1998

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1998 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 27.11.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

04.04.2012 qua his termination of service during August, 1998 by respondent suffers

from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,

1998 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

9.

If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

10. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? … OPR.

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Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:--

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.60,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 1998 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/departmentfor more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1994 to August, 1998. He has also stated on oath that no notice

under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the

same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination

was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and

all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 1998 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

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petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 1998. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required

for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of

any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 188 days in the year 1994, 164 days in 1995, 174 days in 1996, and 80 days in 1998 and

thus a total of his service in 1994 to 1998 in 5 years he had worked for 732 days in his entire

service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1995 and 1998 petitioner had worked for more

than 160 daysand as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of

artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination.

It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1998 the petitioner had merely worked

for 80 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination

of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having

continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a

notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated

the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1994 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 1998 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

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reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in August, 1998, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter

as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

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titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

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15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court).

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1998 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

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Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 5 years and actually worked for 732 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 1998 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about thirteen years i.e. demand notice was given dated 4.4.2012. It is also pertinent to mention

here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 35 years who has sufficient spell

of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

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reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees

sixty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and

circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 384/2015

Date of Institution : 18.08.2015

Date of Decision

: 03.06.2016

Shri Guru Dutt s/o Shri Dharam Chand, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

....Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Guru Dutt S/O Shri Dharam

Chand, R/O Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P. vide demand notice dated-nil-received on 18.04.2012 regarding his alleged illegal

termination of service during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not,

Whether termination of the services of Shri Guru Dutt S/O Shri Dharam Chand, R/O

Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive

Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during

September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is

legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent/

department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160

days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in

the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be

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counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September,

2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to

petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated

to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under

the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while

retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed

by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner

and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of

September, 2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not

served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of

notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of

petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or

his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him

and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also

alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of

September, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere

gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to

have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner

prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of

September, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004

along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained

unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of

intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994

to September, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of

petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in

pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any

other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

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petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.09.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated 18.4.2012

qua his/her termination of service during year September, 2004 by respondent suffers

from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during

September,2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

11. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

12. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,20,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1994 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-

examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by

the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of

work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As

such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold

that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 33.5 days in the year 1994, 107 days in 1995, 107 days in 1996, 113 days in 1997, 151

days in 1998, 125 days in 1999, 127 days in 2000, 118.5 days in 2001, 120 days in 2002, 119 days

in 2003 and 100 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2004 in 11 years he had

worked for 1221 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for

more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the

point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal

termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had

merely worked for 100 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month

of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law

of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have

issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not

violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1994 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

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17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

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industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

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the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum- Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference: Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-

Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court

that workman had completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation section

25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986.

Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in

view by the Labour Court- Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and

unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of

reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the

appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be

payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

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Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination of

service Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 11 years and actually worked for 1221 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004

who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice

after about 7 ½ years i.e. demand notice was given dated nil. It is also pertinent to mention here

that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 45 years who has sufficient spell of

life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees

one lakh twenty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in

the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 4

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22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four monthsfrom

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 337/2015

Date of Institution : 05.08.2015

Date of Decision : 03.06.2016

Shri Mehar Chand s/o Shri Baldev, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

Executive Engineer, I.P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, DistrictChamba, H.P.

....Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

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For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Mehar Chand S/O Shri

Baldev, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P. vide demand notice dated 25.12.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of

service during October, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of

the services of Shri Mehar Chand S/O Shri Baldev, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2005 without complying the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled

to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 2001 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent/department.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

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in the month of October, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that

period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between May, 2001 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of

the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2009 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of

HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of

H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 2001 who remained engaged till 2005

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 27.11.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

25.12.2011 qua his termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent suffers

from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

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2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,

2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

13. If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

14. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.75,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 2001 who continuously worked till 2005 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 2001 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

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obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2005. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required

for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of

any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 161 days in the year 2001, 146 days in 2002, 137 days in 2003, 127 days in 2004 and

139 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 2001 to 2005 in 5 years he had worked for 710

days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 2002 to 2005 petitioner had

worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla

on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged

illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner

had merely worked for 139 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the

month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement

of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent

to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to

have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2001 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

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workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 2001 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in October, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

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be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

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be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful reliefm from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

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has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

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petitioner in all remained engaged for about 5 years and actually worked for 710 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about six years i.e. demand notice was given on 25.12.2011. It is also pertinent to mention here that

petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 39 years who has sufficient spell of life to

work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to

judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for

back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013

(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on

the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be

solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was

reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees

seventy five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

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Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 387/2015

Date of Institution

: 18.08.2015

Date of Decision

: 03.06.2016

Shri Mehar Chand s/o Shri Kedar Nath, r/o Village and P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Mehar Chand S/O Shri

Kedar Nath, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before

the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

vide demand notice dated 25.12.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service

during August, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the

services of Shri Mehar Chand S/O Shri Kedar Nath, R/O Village and Post Office Rei,

Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during August, 2005 without complying the provisions

of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back

wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is

entitled to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

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month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 2005 with the respondent/department.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 2005 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 2005 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of August, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of August, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

August, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that

period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between May, 1994 to August, 1998 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of

the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of

HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of

H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2005

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

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per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

25.12.2011 qua his termination of service during August, 2005 by respondent suffers

from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,

2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

15. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits

the petitioner is entitled to?

…OPP.

16. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,30,000/- per

operative part of award.

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REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2005 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms andconditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1994 to August, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice

under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the

same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination

was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and

all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2005 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2005. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

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has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required

for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of

any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 160 days in the year 1994, 165 days in 1995, 158 days in 1996, 117 days in 1997, 88

days in 1998, 117 days in 1999, 91 days in 2001, 67 days in 2002, 85 days in 2003, 75 days in 2004

and 108 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2005 in 11 years he had worked for

1231 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1996 to 2005 petitioner

had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner,

Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to

alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the

petitioner had merely worked for 108 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months

from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet

requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from

respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the

respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1994 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2005 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

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orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in August, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter

as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW ] 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the

workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and

secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his

acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial

dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of

any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider

the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for

adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful

relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed bythe

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years

of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial

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discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination of

service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 11 years and actually worked for 1231 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2005 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about six years i.e. demand notice was given on 25.12.2011. It is also pertinent to mention here that

petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 38 years who has sufficient spell of life to

work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to

judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for

back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013

(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on

the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be

solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was

reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees

one lakh thirty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

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ISSUE NO. 4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being

notmaintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees one lakh thirty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No.

: 386/2015

Date of Institution : 18.08.2015

Date of Decision

: 03.06.2016

Shri Prem Nath s/o Shri Panchhi Lal, r/o Village Parghwal, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

....Respondent.

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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Prem Nath S/O Shri Panchhi

Lal, R/O Village Parghwal, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 18.09.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during

October, 2002 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of

Shri Prem Nath S/O Shri Panchhi Lal, R/O Village Parghwal, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2002 without complying the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled

to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1998 who continuously worked till October, 2000 with the respondent/department.

It is stated that after termination of the services of petitioner, he had preferred an Original

Application No. 41/2001 before the HP Administrative Tribunal and thereafter respondent/

department had reengaged the services of petitioner on 1.6.2001 and petitioner worked upto

October, 2002. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160

days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in

the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be

counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of

October, 2002 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were

junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department

was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers

working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner

and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been

followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to

petitioner and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of

October, 2002 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not

served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of

notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of

petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

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spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or

his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him

and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also

alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of October,

2002 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed

and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed

violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting

aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2002. He

further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2002 along-with back wages,

seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of

his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks

given time and again during entire service of petitioner between May, 1998 to October, 2002 be

counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.

01.01.2006 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief

petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1998 who remained engaged till 2002

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2002 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

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7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

18.09.2011 qua his termination of service during October, 2002 by respondent suffers

from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,

2002 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

17. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits

the petitioner is entitled to?

…OPP.

18. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

…OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:--

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.75,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1998 who continuously worked till 2002 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

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adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1998 to October, 2002. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2002 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2002. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required

for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of

any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 174.5 days in the year 1998, 73 days in 1999, 109 days in 2000, 141 days in 2001 and

150 days in 2002 and thus a total of his service in 1998 to 2002 in 5 years he had worked for 647.5

days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1999 to 2002 petitioner had

worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla

on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged

illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2002 the petitioner

had merely worked for 150 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the

month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement

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of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent

to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to

have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1992 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing

thatpetitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2002 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in October, 2002, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

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Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

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“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial disputem in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court).

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

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State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its properperspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2002 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

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judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 5 years and actually worked for 647.5 days as per

mandays chart on recordand that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2002 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about 9 years i.e. demand notice was given on 18.9.2011. It is also pertinent to mention here that

petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 32 years who has sufficient spell of life to

work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to

judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for

back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013

(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on

the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be

solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was

reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees

seventy five thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

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reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 333/2015

Date of Institution

: 05.08.2015

Date of Decision

: 03.06.2016

Shri Mansa Ram s/o Shri Mandev, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

....Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by worker Shri Mansa Ram S/O Shri Mandev,

R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

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Engineer, I.&P.H./ H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during

August, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of

Shri Mansa Ram S/O Shri Mandev, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during August, 2004 without complying the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled

to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1992 who continuously worked till August, 2004 with the respondent/department.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 2004 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 2004 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of August, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of August, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

August, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that

period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between May, 1994 to August, 1998 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of

the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy

of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs.

State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

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4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1992 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

02.02.2012 qua his termination of service during August, 2004 by respondent suffers

from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

19. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits

the petitioner is entitled to?

…OPP.

20. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

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Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,30,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1992 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner isentitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1992 to August, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no notice

under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the

same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination

was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and

all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2004 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the

LabourOfficer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as

the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

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petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2004. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required

for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of

any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 137 days in the year 1992, 161 days in 1993, 142 days in 1994, 79 days in 1995, 74

days in 1996, 113 days in 1997, 136 days in 1998, 86 days in 1999, 93 days in 2000, 52 days in

2001, 118 days in 2002, 117 days in 2003 and 47 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in

1992 to 2004 in 13 years he had worked for 1355 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed

that except the years 1992 and 1994 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as

there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this

court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that inthe year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 47 days and

thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had

not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of

one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. Assuch, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1992 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2004 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

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retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1992 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in August, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter

as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer

existedbetween petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched, without

compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed

after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it

may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled

for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

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Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

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15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

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Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22] Limitation Act, 1963.

Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination of service-Industrial

dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under

the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances

which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 13 years and actually worked for 1355 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2004 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about 7 ½ years i.e. demand notice was given on 02.02.2012. It is also pertinent to mention here

that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 43 years who has sufficient spell of

life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

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for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees

one lakh thirty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees one lakh thirty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 243/2015

Date of Institution

: 10.06.2015

Date of Decision

: 03.06.2016

Shri Dhani Ram s/o Shri Shiboo, r/o Village Monjhi, P.O. Sechu, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

....Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Dhani Ram S/O Shri Shiboo,

R/O Village Monjhi, P.O. Sechu, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Egnineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 27.08.2012 regarding his alleged illegal

termination of service during September, 2001 suffers from delay and latches? If not,

Whether termination of the services of Shri Dhani Ram S/O Shri Shiboo, R/O Village

Monjhi, P.O. Sechu, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar

Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during

September, 2001 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is

legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1995 who continuously worked till September, 2001 with the respondent/department.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

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services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2001 by an oral order without any

reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster

roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is

alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been

circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of

petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/

respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service

from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2001 when the

services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month

notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not

been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal

and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never

been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of

verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no

opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained

unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of September, 2001 till the date of

institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus

entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order

of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2001. He further prayed

for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2001 along-with back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between 1995 to September, 2001 be counted 160 days

continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having

completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1995 who remained engaged till 2001

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2001 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

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petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/

awards and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.09.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated 27.8.2012

qua his termination of service during year September, 2001 by respondent suffers from

vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2001 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

21. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits

the petitioner is entitled to?

…OPP.

22. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:--

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.80,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1995 who continuously worked till 2001 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1995 to September, 2001. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2001 by oral retained

in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-

H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had

served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had

never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching

petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not

approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had

moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report

was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised

by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where

direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred

and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2001.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-

examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by

the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of

work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As

such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold

that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 14.5 days in the year 1995, 177 days in 1996, 163 days in 1997, 154.5 days in 1998,

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140 days in 1999, 99 days in 2000, and 74 days in 2001 and thus a total of his service in 1995 to

2001 in 7 years he had worked for 822 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except

the years 1995 and 1998 to 2001 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no

reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to

confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2001 the petitioner had merely worked for 74 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not

rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one

year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1985 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2001 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1995

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2001, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

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thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Actmunder Article 137 has no application to make reference by them appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

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supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

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dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2001 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

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reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 7 years and actually worked for 822 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2001

who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice

after about 10 years & 11 months i.e. demand notice was given on 27.8.2012. It is also pertinent to

mention here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 52 years who has

sufficient spell of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned

above in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees

eighty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

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reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs. Rs.80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 241/2015

Date of Institution

: 10.06.2015

Date of Decision

: 03.06.2016

Shri Mangat Ram s/o Shri Bhima Ram, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

…Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

. . .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I. S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

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AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by worker Shri Mangat Ram S/O Shri Bhima Ram,

R/O Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated-nil-received on 09.04.2012 regarding his alleged

illegal termination of service during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not,

Whether termination of the services of Shri Mangat Ram S/O Shri Bhima Ram, R/O Village

Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar

Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during

September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is

legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent/department.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any

reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster

roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is

alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been

circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of

petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/

respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service

from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2004 when the

services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month

notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not

been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal

and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never

been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of

verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no

opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained

unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of September, 2004 till the date of

institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus

entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order

of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004. He further prayed

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for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994 to September, 2004 be counted 160 days

continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having

completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is

entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.09.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil qua

his/her termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from vice

of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. . .OPP.

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2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustifiedas alleged?

...OPP.

23. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits

the petitioner is entitled to?

...OPP.

24. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? ...OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,00,000/- per operative part

of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1997 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1997 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

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the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-

examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by

the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of

work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As

such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold

that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 26 days in the year 1997, 109 days in 1998, 78 days in 1999, 130 days in 2000, 70 days

in 2001, 1118 days in 2002, 113 days in 2003 and 80 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in

1997 to 2004 in 8 years he had worked for 724 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that

petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with

regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year

2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 80 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar

months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to

meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the

respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

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given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1997

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

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of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

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circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....”(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

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termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had completed

240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of the I.D.Act-

Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. His services

terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6

years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court

flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of

reinstatement compensation of Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-

employer within six weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

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per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 8 years and actually worked for 724 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004

who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice

after about 7 ½ years i.e. demand notice was given dated nil. It is also pertinent to mention here

that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 45 years who has sufficient spell of

life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees

one lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and

circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

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Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 344/2015

Date of Institution

: 05.08.2015

Date of Decision

: 03.06.2016

Shri Milkh Ram s/o Shri Mandev, r/o Village and P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

...Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

...Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Milk Ram S/O Shri Mandev, R/O

Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand

notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during

September, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services

of Shri Milk Ram S/o Shri Mandev, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2005 without complying the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled

to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

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3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1993 who continuously worked till September, 2005 with the respondent/

department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160

days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in

the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be

counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September,

2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to

petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated

to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under

the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while

retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed

by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner

and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of

September, 2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not

served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of

notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of

petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or

his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him

and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also

alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of

September, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere

gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to

have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner

prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of

September, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2005

along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained

unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of

intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1993

to September, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of

petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in

pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and

to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1993 who remained engaged till 2005

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

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alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 27.11.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

02.02.2012 qua his termination of service during year September, 2005 by respondent

suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

...OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

...OPP.

25. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

...OPP.

26. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? ...OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

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Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,00,000/- per operative part

of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1993 who continuously worked till 2005 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1993 to September, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2005 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

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admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2005.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-

examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by

the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of

work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As

such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold

that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 176 days in the year 1993, 162 days in 1994, 131 days in 1995, 134 days in 1996, 124

days in 1997, 80 days in 1998 and 61 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 1993 to 2005 in

7 years he had worked for 868 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years

1995 to 1998 and 2005 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference

from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its

findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 88 days and thus immediately in

preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service

of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it

was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the

Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2005 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1993

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

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RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

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has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference

of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as

there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the

workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it

is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring

the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due

to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not

debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

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and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court).

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 7 years and actually worked for 868 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2005

who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice

after about 6 years i.e. demand notice was given dated 2.2.2012. It is also pertinent to mention here

that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 40 years who has sufficient spell of

life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

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21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees

one lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and

circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 246/2015

Date of Institution

: 10.06.2015

Date of Decision

: 03.06.2016

Smt. Rattan Dei w/o Shri Madan Lal, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

...Petitioner.

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Versus

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

....Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by worker Smt. Rattan Dei W/O Shri Madan Lal,

R/O Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, I.&.P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 27.08.2012 regarding her alleged illegal

termination of service during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not,

Whether termination of the services of Smt. Rattan Dei W/O Shri Madan Lal, R/O Village

Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar

Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during

September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is

legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that she had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1990 who continuously worked till September, 2004 in IPH Sub Division, Killar.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any

reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster

roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is

alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been

circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of

petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/

respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service

from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2004 when the

services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, she was not served with one month

notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not

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been paid to her and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal

and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who never

been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at the time of

verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and the at the same time, no

opportunity of hearing had been afforded to her. The petitioner also alleges that she has remained

unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of September, 2004 till the date of

institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus

entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order

of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004. She further prayed

for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between May, 1990 to September, 2004 be counted

160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2000 having

completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is

entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1990 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 and

26 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos.

25 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 she would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her

affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of junior

workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,

respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division

Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of other co-

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workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for

determination which are as under:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

27.08.2012 qua her termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

...OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

...OPP.

3. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits

the petitioner is entitled to?

...OPP.

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? ...OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.80,000/- per operative part of

award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1990 who continuously worked till 2004 at IPH Sub Division Killar is

not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms

and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while

terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched

petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work intermittently as

per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to

plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the

backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with

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a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with

seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from May, 1990 to September, 2004. She has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus

her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in September, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-

examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the

respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work

as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in

absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that

respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 25 days in the year 1990, 31 days in 1991, 160 days in 1997, 85.5 days in 1999, 106

days in 2000, 84 days in 2001, 86 days in 2002, 96.5 days in 2003 and 97 days in 2004 and thus a

total of her service in 1990 to 2004 in 9 years she had worked for 771 days in her entire service

period. Be it noticed that except the years 1990, 1991 & 1999 to 2004 she had worked for more

than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of

artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination.

It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked

for 97 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination

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of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having

continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a

notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated

the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1990

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivatable land with her and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning

from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

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Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

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“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the

remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material

evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not

think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants

for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference

of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as

there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the

workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover,

it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and

referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material

evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial

dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous

and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the

demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

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State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference: Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-

Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court

that workman had completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o

section 25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial discretion

exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the

appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the

workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a.

will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

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Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 9 years and actually worked for 771 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004

who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice

after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on 27.08.2012. It is also pertinent to mention

here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 32 years who has sufficient spell

of life to work and earn her livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees

eighty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

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compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 340/2015

Date of Institution

: 05.08.2015

Date of Decision

: 03.06.2016

Ms. Kamla Devi d/o Shri Saran Dass, Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

....Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Ms. Kamla Devi D/O Shri Saran Dass,

R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 03.03.2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of service during

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October, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of

Ms. Kamla Devi D/O Shri Saran Dass, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar,

Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2004 without complying the provisions

of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back

wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is

entitled to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that she had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of September, 1997 who continuously worked till October, 2004 in IPH Sub Division,

Killar. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in

each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in

the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be

counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October,

2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to

petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated

to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under

the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while

retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed

by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner

and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October,

2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, she was not served with

one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period

had also not been paid to her and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima

facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record

who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at

the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and the at the same time,

no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to her. The petitioner also alleges that she has

remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 2004 till the date

of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus

entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order

of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2004. She further prayed

for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between September, 1997 to October, 2004 be counted

160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2006 having

completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

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denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 and

26 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos.

25 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 she would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her

affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of junior

workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,

respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division

Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of other co-

workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 27.11.2015 for

determination which are as under:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

03.03.2012 qua her termination of service during October, 2004 by respondent suffers

from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

...OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

...OPP.

3. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

5.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? ...OPR.

Relief.

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9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,00,000/- per operative part

of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1997 who continuously worked till 2004 at IPH Sub Division Killar is

not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms

and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while

terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched

petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work intermittently as

per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to

plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the

backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with

a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with

seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from June, 1997 to October, 2004. She has also stated on oath that

no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus her

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

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not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2004. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the

respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work

as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in

absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that

respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 115 days in the year 1997, 108 days in 1998, 164 days in 1999, 118 days in 2000, 108.5

days in 2001, 42 days in 2002, 108 days in 2003 and 110 days in 2004 and thus a total of her

service in 1997 to 2004 in 8 years she had worked for 973.5 days in her entire service period. Be it

noticed that except the years 1997, 1998 and to 2000 to 2004 she had worked for more than 160

days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial

breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is

evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for

110 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of

petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having

continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a

notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated

the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2004 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1997 was

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terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in October, 2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivatable land with her and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning

from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

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titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the

remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material

evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not

think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants

for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference

of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as

there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the

workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover,

it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and

referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material

evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial

dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous

and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her employer.

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15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the

demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

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Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 8 years and actually worked for 973.5 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2004 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on 03.03.2012. It is also pertinent to mention here

that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 32 years who has sufficient spell of

life to work and earn her livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

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pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees

one lakh only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and

circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,2 and 3

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 336/2015

Date of Institution

: 05.08.2015

Date of Decision

: 03.06.2016

Smt. Leela w/o Shri Kesi Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

...Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

...Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Leela W/O Shri Kesi Ram, R/O

Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 25.12.2011 regarding her alleged illegal termination of services during

August, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of service of Smt.

Leela W/O Shri Kesi Ram, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. during August, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the

above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that she had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1992 who continuously worked till August, 2004 in IPH Sub Division, Killar.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

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petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August, 2004 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 2004 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, she was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to her and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon her and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to her. The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her

illegal termination from month of August, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of August, 2004. She further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

August, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that

period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between May, 1992 to August, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of

the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of

HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State

of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1992 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 and

26 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos.

25 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 she would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

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5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her

affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of junior

workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,

respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division

Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of other co-

workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 27.11.2015 for

determination which are as under:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

25.12.2011 qua her termination of service during August, 2004 by respondent suffers

from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

3.

If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

6.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,40,000/- per operative part

of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the month of May, 1992 who continuously worked till 2004 at IPH Sub

Division Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work

intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from May, 1992 to August, 2004. She has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus her

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in August, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 2004. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the

respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work

as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in

absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that

respondent had established plea of abandonment.

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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 144 days in the year 1992, 167 days in 1993, 140 days in 1994, 102 days in 1995, 167

days in 1996, 116 days in 1997, 163 days in 1998, 127 days in 1999, 112 days in 2000, 117 days in

2001, 121 days in 2002, 121 days in 2004 and 95 days in 2003 and thus a total of her service in

1992 to 2004 in 13 years she had worked for 1692 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed

that except the years 1992, 1994, 1995, 1997 & 1999 to 2004 she had worked for more than 160

days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial

breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is

evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for

95 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of

petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having

continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a

notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated

the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2004 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1992 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

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17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in August, 2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivatable land with her and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning

from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

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industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the

remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material

evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not

think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants

for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by

this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on

hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial

dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that she would

be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from her employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the

demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case,

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the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

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Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of

service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 13 years and actually worked for 1692 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2004 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on 25.12.2011. It is also pertinent to mention here

that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 37 years who has sufficient spell of

life to work and earn her livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,40,000/- (Rupees

one lakh forty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

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ISSUE NO. 3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,40,000/- (Rupees one lakh forty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of

the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

______________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 380/2015

Date of Institution : 18.08.2015

Date of Decision

: 03.06.2016

Smt. Timru w/o Shri Pritam Singh, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

....Respondent

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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Timru W/O Shri Pritam Singh,

R/O Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated-nil-received on 18.07.2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of

service during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination

of the services of Smt. Timru W/O Shri Pritam Singh, R/O Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi,

Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D.

Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004 without

complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not,

what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above

aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that she had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent/

department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160

days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in

the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be

counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September,

2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to

petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated

to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under

the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while

retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed

by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner

and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of

September, 2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, she was not

served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of

notice period had also not been paid to her and for said reason termination of the services of

petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or

her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her

and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to her. The petitioner also

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alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of

September, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere

gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to

have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner

prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of

September, 2004. She further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004

along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained

unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of

intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between May,

1994 to September, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service

of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt.

in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to

any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 and

26 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos.

25 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 she would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved

her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

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8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.01.2016 for

determination which are as under:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil

received on18.7.2012 qua his/her termination of service during September, 2004 by

respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

3. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

7. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-

Issue No. 1 : Yes

Issue No. 2 : Yes

Issue No. 3 : Discussed

Issue No. 4 : No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,20,000/- per operative

part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the month of May, 1994 who continuously worked till 2004 at IPH Sub

Division Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work

intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have

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worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from May, 1994 to September, 2004. She has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus

her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in September, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-

examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the

respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work

as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in

absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that

respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 169 days in the year 1996, 114 days in 1997, 28 days in 1998, 139 days in 1999, 129

days in 2000, 115.5 days in 2001, 120 days in 2002, 109 days in 2003 and 77 days in 2004 and thus

a total of her service in 1994 to 2004 in 9 years she had worked for 1000.5 days in her entire

service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1997 to 2004 she had worked for more than 160

days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial

breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is

evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for

77 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of

petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having

continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a

notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated

the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

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15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years

although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent

establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004

even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly

violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of

the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined

service in 1994 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to

petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.

Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank

of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivatable land with her and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning

from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

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judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

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(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the

remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material

evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not

think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants

for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by

this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on

hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial

dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that she would

be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from her employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the

demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

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Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

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all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 9 years and actually worked for 1000.5 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004

who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice

after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given dated nil. It is also pertinent to mention here

that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 42 years who has sufficient spell of

life to work and earn her livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees

one lakh twenty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in

the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no.

1,2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

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today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 242/2015

Date of Institution

: 10.06.2015

Date of Decision

: 03.06.2016

Shri Chet Ram s/o Shri Bhan Chand, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Chet Ram S/O Shri Bhan

Chand, R/O Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated-nil-received on 31.10.2011 regarding his alleged

illegal termination of service during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not,

Whether termination of the services of Shri Chet Ram S/O Shri Bhan Chand, R/O Village

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Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar

Division H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during

September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is

legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent/department.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any

reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster

roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is

alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been

circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of

petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/

respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service

from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2004 when the

services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month

notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not

been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal

and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never

been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of

verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no

opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained

unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of September, 2004 till the date of

institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus

entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order

of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004. He further prayed

for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994 to September, 2004 be counted 160 days

continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having

completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

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stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.09.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil qua his

termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from vice of

delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

27. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits

the petitioner is entitled to?

…OPP.

28. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

Relief.

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9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:--

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,20,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1996 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1996 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

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13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-

examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by

the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of

work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As

such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold

that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 162 days in the year 1996, 161 days in 1997, 84 days in 1998, 147 days in 1999, 28

days in 2000, 26 days in 2001, 80 days in 2002, 111 days in 2003 and 19 days in 2004 and thus a

total of his service in 1996 to 2004 in 9 years he had worked for 818 days in his entire service

period. Be it noticed that except the years 1998 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160

days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial

breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is

evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for

19 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of

petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having

continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a

notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated

the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

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applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

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Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

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cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

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Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 9 years and actually worked for 818 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004

who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice

after about thirteen years i.e. demand notice was given dated nil. It is also pertinent to mention

here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 40 years who has sufficient spell

of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

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by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees

one lakh twenty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in

the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 343/2015

Date of Institution : 05.08.2015

Date of Decision

: 03.06.2016

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Shri Janak Raj s/o Shri Girdhari Lal, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Janak Raj S/O Shri Girdhari

Lal, R/O Village Kuthal, Post Office Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P. vide demand notice dated 08.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of

service during October, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of

the services of Shri Janak Raj S/O Shri Girdhari Lal, R/O Village Kuthal, Post Office Sach,

Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D.

Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2005 without

complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not,

what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above

aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of June, 1985 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent/department.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason

whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll

and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged

that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

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1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and

for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of

India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of October, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that

period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between 1985 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the

service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.1995 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of

HP Govt. in pursuance to and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1985 who remained engaged till 2005

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

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HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.09.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

08.08.2010 qua his/her termination of service during year October, 2005 by respondent

suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,

2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

29. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

30. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

…OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:--

Issue No. 1

: Yes

Issue No. 2

: Yes

Issue No. 3

: Discussed

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.150,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1985 who continuously worked till 2005 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

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intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1985 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2005. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required

for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of

any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 103 days in the year 1986, 82 days in 1988, 30 days in 1989, 25 days in 1996, 115 days

in 1997, 154 days in 1998, 110 days in 1999, 101 days in 2001, 68 days in 2002 and 88 days in

2005 and thus a total of his service in 1985 to 2005 in 10 years he had worked for 876 days in his

entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as

there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this

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court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 88 days and

thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had

not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of

one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in October, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

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admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

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14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid

down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in

the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing

industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would

be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

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17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D.Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

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referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 10 years and actually worked for 876 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about 5 years i.e. demand notice was given dated 8.8.2010. It is also pertinent to mention here that

petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 44 years who has sufficient spell of life to

work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to

judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for

back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013

(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on

the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be

solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was

reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees

one lakh fifty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of

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the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 338/2015

Date of Institution : 05.08.2015

Date of Decision

: 03.06.2016

Smt. Nandei w/o Shri Kartar Chand, r/o Village Hillour, P.O. Sahali, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Nandei W/O Shri Kartar

Chand, R/O Village Hillour, P.O. Sahali, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

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Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P. vide demand notice dated 27.08.2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of

service during September, 2004 suffers from vice of delay and latches? If not, Whether

termination of the services of Smt. Nandei W/O Shri Kartar Chand, R/O Village Hillour,

P.O. Sahali, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer,

I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September,

2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and

justified? If not, what amount of backw ages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that she had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2004 in IPH Sub Division, Killar.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any

reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster

roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is

alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been

circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of

petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/

respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service

from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2004 when the

services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, she was not served with one month

notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not

been paid to her and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal

and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who never

been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at the time of

verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and the at the same time, no

opportunity of hearing had been afforded to her. The petitioner also alleges that she has remained

unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of September, 2004 till the date of

institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus

entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order

of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004. She further prayed

for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 along-with back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between June, 1994 to September, 2004 be counted

160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having

completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

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4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 24 and

26 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos.

25 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 she would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved

her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, mandays chart of

other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of orders/awards and closed the

evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 27.11.2015 for

determination which are as under:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

27.98.2012 qua her termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

3. If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

…OPP.

8. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

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Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issuesare as follows:--

Issue No. 1

: Yes

Issue No. 2

: Yes

Issue No. 3

: Discussed

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,20,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till 2004 at IPH Sub

Division Killar is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work

intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from June, 1994 to September, 2004. She has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus

her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in September, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba

town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand

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notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did

not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the

Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour

Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-

examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the

respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work

as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in

absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that

respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 139 days in the year 1994, 171 days in 1995, 162 days in 1996, 165 days in 1997, 154

days in 1998, 81.5 days in 1999, 112 days in 2000, 48 days in 2001, 85 days in 2002, 69 days in

2003 and 97 days in 2004 and thus a total of her service in 1994 to 2004 in 11 years she had

worked for 1283.5 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1994 and

1998 to 2004 she had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with

regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year

2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 97 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar

months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to

meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the

respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

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were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivatable land with her and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning

from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

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Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the

remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material

evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not

think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants

for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by

this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on

hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial

dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the

circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case

pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that she would

be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to

adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter,

since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.

Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to

the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman

from claiming rightful relief from her employer.

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15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:--

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the

demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

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Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payabl.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 11 years and actually worked for 1283.5 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004

who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice

after about 8 years i.e. demand notice was given on 27.08.2012. It is also pertinent to mention here

that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 46 years who has sufficient spell of

life to work and earn her livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

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reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees

one lakh twenty thousand only) would be a appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in

the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no.

1,2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 3

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of June, 2016.

(K.K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 404/2015

Date of Institution : 10.09.2015

Date of Decision

: 28.6.2016

Shri Seeta Ram s/o Shri Shri Mehar Chand, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Churah,

District Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner

Versus

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

....Respondent

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Seeta Ram S/O Shri Mehar

Chand, R/O Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Churah, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, I&PH/HPPWD Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

vide demand notice dated 23.10.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services

during August, 1997 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the

services of Shri Seeta Ram S/O Shri Mehar Chand, R/O Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil

Churah, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I&PH/HPPWD Division, Killar,

Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during August, 1997 without complying the provisions

of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back

wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is

entitled to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of November, 1990 who continuously worked till August, 1997 with the respondent/

department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160

days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in

the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be

counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the

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applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of August,

1997 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to

petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated

to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under

the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while

retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed

by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner

and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August,

1997 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with

one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period

had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was

prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service

record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and

even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the

same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he

has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of August, 1997 till the

date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was

thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order

of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of August, 1997. He further prayed for

reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of August, 1997 along-with back wages, seniority including

continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994 to August, 1997 be counted 160 days

continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2001 having

completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is

entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1990 who remained engaged till 1997

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1997 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

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petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

23.10.2011 qua his termination of service during August, 1997 by respondent suffers

from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,

1997 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

31. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits

the petitioner is entitled to?

…OPP.

32. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:--

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.50,000/- per operative

part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1990 who continuously worked till 1997 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1990 to August, 1997. He has also stated on oath that no notice

under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the

same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination

was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and

all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that

respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 1997 by oral order had engaged

several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the

persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after August, 1997. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required

for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of

any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 16 days in the year 1990, 53 days in 1991, 28 days in 1992, 40 days in 1994, 58 days in

1995, 180 days in 1996 and 51 days in 1997 and thus a total of his service in 1990 to 1997 in 07

years he had worked for 426 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years

1990 to 1995 and 1997 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference

from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its

findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B that in the year 1997 the petitioner had merely worked for 51 days and thus immediately in

preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service

of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it

was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the

Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1990 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 1997 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1990 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in August, 1997, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter

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as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

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supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference

of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as

there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the

workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it

is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring

the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due

to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not

debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

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reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1997 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference: Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-

Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court

that workman had completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o

section 25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial discretion

exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the

appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the

workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a.

will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

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reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 07 years and actually worked for 426 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 1997 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about fourteen years i.e. demand notice was given on 23.10.2011. It is also pertinent to mention

here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 47 years who has sufficient spell

of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees

fifty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

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reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 405/2015

Date of Institution : 10.09.2015

Date of Decision : 28.6.2016

Shri Vijay Singh s/o Shri Vidya Nand, r/o Village Chasak, P.O. Saichu, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

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AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Vijay Singh S/O Shri

Vidya Nand, R/O Village Chasak, P.O. Saichu, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

before the Executive Engineer, I&PH/HPPWD Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 27.08.2012 regarding his alleged illegal

termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not,

Whether termination of the services of Shri Vijay Singh S/O Shri Vidya Nand, R/O

Village Chasak, P.O. Saichu, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive

Engineer, I&PH/HPPWD Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during

September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service

benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above

employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of September, 1992 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the

respondent/department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had

worked for 160 days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District

Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of

Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity).

Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way

of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such

breaks are required to be counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160

days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner

remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage

service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other

co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of

respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority

list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2004 when the services

of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice

of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not

been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie

illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who

never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even

at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the

same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that

he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of September, 2004

till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed

and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed

violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial

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Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting

aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004.

He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 along-with back

wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the

date

of

his

illegal

termination.

The

petitioner

has

also

prayed

that

period

of

intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between

1992 to September, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the

service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy

of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs.

State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1992 who remained engaged till

2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for

tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner

have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial

nos. 1 to 25 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and

at serial nos. 26 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner,

respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving

of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has

maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in

para no.7 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal

Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in

2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years

petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is

also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,

question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,

there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination.

It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not

entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim

petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of

petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was

specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

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8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.1.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

27.8.2012 qua his/her termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent

suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during

September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.40,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1992 who continuously worked till 2004 with the

respondent/department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any

written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in

dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of

respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the

job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience.

Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but

only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing

admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to

determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority

and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

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worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1992 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with

full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service.

Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in

service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act

which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served

respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had

never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching

petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not

approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner

had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure

report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial

dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing

CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it

could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays

chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1

specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the

respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the

other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in

between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks

had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that

petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence

led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of

abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 23.5 days in the year 1993, 77 days in 2002, 115 days in 2003 and 39 days in 2004

and thus a total of his service in 1992 to 2004 in 04 years he had worked for 254.5 days in his

entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as

there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks,

this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident

from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 39

days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of

petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having

continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued

a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not

violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

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15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that

large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to

07.9.1999 and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of

petitioner remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were

retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason.

Ex.PW1/B, Ex. PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who

were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1992 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E

to Ex. PW1/L are the mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex.

PW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly

junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in

a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C

also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160

days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of

evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time

after September, 2004 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the

respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors

workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior

from these co-workers having joined service in 1995 was terminated and even thereafter

respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also

violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419

in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of

the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of

provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as

reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner

and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to

be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the

basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being

junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not

worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his

service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of

provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated

the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and

also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets

belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been

earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance

has been placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road

Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench

comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully

employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was

income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely

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differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’.

Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning

from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his

family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex

Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in

holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated

to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for

his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not

be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship

of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was

illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act

although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner

was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out

of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab IC

4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12.

Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors

of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue

regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The

said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of

decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that

the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by

the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication

of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can

refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional

Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case

referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under

Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court

as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon

Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in

raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

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“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so

culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In

view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference

of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the

Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was

made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman

was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the

respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from

the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of

the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or

unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in

raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication

as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief

from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if

raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real

prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court

can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the

delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case

can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till

the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal.

The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages

instead of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

15. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the

case that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his

acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to

the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from

the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State

Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute

with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date

of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation

officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance,

the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it

cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the

dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

16. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional

issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State

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Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles

laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the Labour

Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent

Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power

of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed

that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was

raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced

by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture

Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of

the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F

of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years

of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of

the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one

lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks

failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-

Termination of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not

applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes

definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before

granting relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

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referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21

of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh

observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all

relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of

service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had

raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he

raised industrial dispute after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of

Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court

factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 04 years

and actually worked for 254.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had

raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years & 11 months i.e.

demand notice was given on 27.8.2012. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on the

date of filing claim petition was ageing 33 years who has sufficient spell of life to work and

earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments

of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages

but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR

25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the

matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be

solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was

reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow

University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC

3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 40,000/-

(Rupees forty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled

in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount

of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the

petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its

realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being

not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

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RELIEF:

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed

to pay the compensation of Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of

the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months

from today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on

the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open

Court today this 28th day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 407/2015

Date of Institution : 10.09.2015

Date of Decision : 28.6.2016

Shri Subhash Chand s/o Shri Budhi Ram, r/o Village Hillour, P.O. Sahali, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

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“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Subhash Chand S/O Shri Budhi

Ram, R/O Village Hillour, P.O. Sahali, Tehsil Panig, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, I&PH/HPPWD Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P. vide demand notice dated 27.08.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of

services during August, 1997 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination

of the services of Shri Subhash Chand S/O Shri Budhi Ram, R/O Village Hillour, P.O.

Sahali, Tehsil Panig, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I&PH/HPPWD

Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during August, 1997 without

complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified?

If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the

above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of April, 1994 who continuously worked till August, 1997 with the respondent/

department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for

160 days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba

and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-

B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments

made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as

for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end

of August, 1997 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who

were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of

respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority

list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 1997 when the services of petitioner

were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment

and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him

and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and

unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been

charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of

verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no

opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has

remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of August, 1997 till the date

of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus

entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside

oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of August, 1997. He

further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of August, 1997 along-with back wages,

seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date

of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional

breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994 to August, 1997 be

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counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.

01.01.2002 having completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance

to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any

other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till

1997 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for

tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner

have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial

nos. 1 to 25 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and

at serial nos. 26 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner,

respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving

of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has

maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in

para no.7 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal

Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in

1997 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years

petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is

also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,

question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,

there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination.

It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not

entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim

petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of

petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was

specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

27.8.2012 qua his termination of service during August, 1997 by respondent

suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

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2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during

August, 1997 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.40,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 1997 with the

respondent/department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any

written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in

dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of

respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the

job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience.

Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but

only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing

admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to

determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority

and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1994 to August, 1997. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with

full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

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alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 1997 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service.

Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in

service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act

which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served

respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had

never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching

petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not

approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner

had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure

report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial

dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing

CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it

could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays

chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1

specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

August, 1997. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the

part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the

respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the

other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in

between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks

had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that

petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence

led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of

abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 16 days in the year 1994, 57 days in 1995 and 73 days in 1997 and thus a total of his

service in 1994 to 1997 in 03 years he had worked for 146 days in his entire service period. Be

it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference

from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its

findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1997 the petitioner had merely worked for 73 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not

rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one

year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that

large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to

07.9.1999 and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of

petitioner remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were

retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason.

Ex.PW1/B, Ex. PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who

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were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1994 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E

to Ex. PW1/L are the mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex.

PW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly

junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in

a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C

also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160

days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of

evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time

after August, 1997 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the

respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors

workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from

these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was terminated and even thereafter respondent

omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the

provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed

reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which

Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there

was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as

reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner

and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to

be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the

basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being

junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not

worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his

service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of

provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated

the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in August, 1997, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld.

Authorized Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court

through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land

with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully

employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained

that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager

privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East

Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division

Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term

gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It

was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely

differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’.

Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning

from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his

family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex

Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in

holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be

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treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture

pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus

would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the

relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that

petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of

the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner

was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out

of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab IC

4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors

of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue

regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The

said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of

decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that

the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by

the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of

existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can

refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional

Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case

referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under

Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court

as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon

Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

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available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so

culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In

view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference

of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the

Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was

made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman

was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly,

the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal

from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in

spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss

or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay

in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for

adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming

rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if

raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real

prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court

can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the

delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case

can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till

the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal.

The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages

instead of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

15. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the

case that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his

acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to

the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from

the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State

Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute

with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date

of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation

officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance,

the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it

cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the

dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional

issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State

Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles

laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the Labour

Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent

Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power

of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

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Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed

that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1997 and the industrial dispute was

raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced

by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture

Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of

the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F

of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years

of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of

the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one

lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks

failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-

Termination of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not

applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes

definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view

before granting relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21

of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh

observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all

relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of

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service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had

raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he

raised industrial dispute after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of

Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court

factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 03 years

and actually worked for 146 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner

were disengaged in August, 1997 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial

dispute by issuance of demand notice after about fifteen years i.e. demand notice was given on

27.08.2011. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition

was ageing 36 years who has sufficient spell of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into

consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court

petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a

lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The

judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay

and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on

the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as

Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment

also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture

Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated by

the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow,

Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.40,000/-

(Rupees forty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled

in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount

of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the

petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its

realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being

not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed

to pay the compensation of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of

the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months

from today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on

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the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open

Court today this 28th day of June, 2016.

(K.K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 415/2015

Date of Institution : 10.09.2015

Date of Decision : 28.6.2016

Shri Bhajan Singh s/o Shri Lal Chand, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. . Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Bhajan Singh S/O Shri Lal

Chand, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before

the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P. vide demand notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of

services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether

termination of the services of Shri Bhajan Singh S/O Shri Lal Chand, R/O Village and

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Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer,

H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004

without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and

justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month

of

May,

1993

who

continuously

worked

till

September,

2004

with

the

respondent/department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had

worked for 160 days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District

Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of

Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity).

Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as

for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end

of September, 2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who

were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of

respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority

list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The

petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st August,

1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2004 when the services

of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice

of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not

been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie

illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who

never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even

at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the

same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that

he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of September, 2004

till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed

and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed

violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting

aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004.

He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 along-with back

wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the

date

of

his

illegal

termination.

The

petitioner

has

also

prayed

that

period

of

intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between

1993 to September, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the

service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy

of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs.

State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

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denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1993 who remained engaged till

2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for

tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner

have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial

nos. 1 to 25 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and

at serial nos. 26 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner,

respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving

of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has

maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in

para no.7 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal

Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in

2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years

petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is

also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,

question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,

there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination.

It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not

entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim

petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of

petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was

specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

02.02.2012 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent

suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during

September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . .OPP.

3.

If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits

the petitioner is entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. .OPR.

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Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,00,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1993 who continuously worked till 2004 with the

respondent/department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any

written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in

dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of

respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the

job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience.

Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but

only with regard to petitioner’s termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing

admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to

determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority

and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1993 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with

full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service.

Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in

service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act

which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served

respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had

never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching

petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not

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approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner

had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure

report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial

dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing

CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it

could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays

chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1

specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the

respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the

other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in

between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks

had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that

petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence

led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of

abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 166 days in the year 1993, 164 days in 1994, 53 days in 1995, 141 days in 1996, 96

days in 1997, 85 days in 1998, 74 days in 1999, 57 days in 2001, 98 days in 2002, 45 days in

2003 and 48 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1993 to 2004 in 11 years he had worked

for 1027 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1995 to 2004

petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only

with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in

the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 48 days and thus immediately in preceding

12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160

days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was

not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the

Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that

large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to

07.9.1999 and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of

petitioner remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were

retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason.

Ex. PW1/B, Ex. PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers

who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1993 or thereafter whereas Ex.

PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown

in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were

certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than

200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex.

RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than

160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of

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evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time

after September, 2004 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the

respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors

workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior

from these co-workers having joined service in 1992 was terminated and even thereafter

respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also

violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419

in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of

the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of

provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as

reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner

and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to

be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the

basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being

junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not

worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his

service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of

provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated

the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and

also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets

belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been

earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance

has been placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road

Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench

comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully

employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was

income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely

differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’.

Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning

from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his

family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex

Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in

holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated

to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for

his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not

be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship

of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was

illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act

although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner

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was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out

of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab IC

4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors

of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue

regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The

said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of

decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that

the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by

the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of

existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can

refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional

Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case

referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under

Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court

as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon

Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so

culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In

view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference

of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the

Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was

made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman

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was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the

respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from

the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of

the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or

unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in

raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication

as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief

from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if

raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real

prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court

can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the

delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case

can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till

the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal.

The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages

instead of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the

case that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his

acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to

the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from

the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State

Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute

with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date

of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation

officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance,

the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it

cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the

dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional

issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State

Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles

laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the Labour

Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent

Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power

of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed

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that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was

raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced

by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the

judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture

Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of

the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F

of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years

of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of

the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one

lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks

failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-

Termination of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not

applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes

definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before

granting relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21

of judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh

observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all

relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of

service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had

raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he

raised industrial dispute after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be

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enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of

Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court

factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 11 years

and actually worked for 1027 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had

raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand

notice was given on 02.02.2012. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on the

date of filing claim petition was ageing 53 years who has sufficient spell of life to work and earn

his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of

Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages

but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR

25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the

matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be

solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was

reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow

University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC

3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-

(Rupees one lakh only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the

petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization.

Issues no. 1, 2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being

not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed

to pay the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of

the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months

from today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on

the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

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26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open

Court today this 28th day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 416/2015

Date of Institution

: 10.09.2015

Date of Decision

: 28.6.2016

Shri Hari Nath s/o Shri Nakew, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

....Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Hari Nath S/O Shri Nakew, R/O

Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand

notice dated 25.12.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services, during

September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services

of Shri Hari Nath S/O Shri Nakew, R/O Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled

to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

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3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of April, 1992 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent/

department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160

days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in

the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be

counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of

September, 2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were

junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department

was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers

working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner

and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been

followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to

petitioner and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of

September, 2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not

served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of

notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of

petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or

his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him

and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also

alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of

September, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere

gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to

have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner

prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of

September, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004

along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained

unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of

intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1992

to September, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of

petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in

pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and

to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1992 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

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alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

25.12.2011 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent

suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

39. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits

the petitioner is entitled to?

…OPP.

40. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

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Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.80,000/- per operative part of

award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1992 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1992 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

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admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-

examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by

the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of

work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As

such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold

that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 184 days in the year 1992, 127 days in 1993, 68 days in 1994, 40 days in 1995, 29 days

in 1997, 25 days in 1998, 55 days in 2001, 122 days in 2002, 27 days in 2003 and 48 days in 2004

and thus a total of his service in 1992 to 2004 in 10 years he had worked for 725 days in his entire

service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1993 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than

160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of

artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination.

It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked

for 48 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination

of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having

continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a

notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated

the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1992 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1992

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

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of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

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the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference

of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as

there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the

workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it

is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring

the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due

to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not

debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

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by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

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Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 10 years and actually worked for 725 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004

who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice

after about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on 25.12.2011. It is also pertinent to mention

here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 39 years who has sufficient spell

of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

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Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees

eighty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 418/2015

Date of Institution

: 10.09.2015

Date of Decision

: 28.6.2016

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Shri Prithi Singh s/o Shri Kewal Ram, r/o Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

...Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

...Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Prithi Singh S/O Shri Kewal Ram,

R/O Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand

notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during

September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services

of Shri Prithi Singh S/O Shri Kewal Ram, R/O Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004 without complying the provisions of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled

to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

month of May, 1990 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent/

department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160

days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in

the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be

counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September,

2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to

petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated

to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under

the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while

retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed

by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner

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and joined service from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of

September, 2004 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not

served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of

notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of

petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or

his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him

and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also

alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of

September, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere

gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to

have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner

prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of

September, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004

along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained

unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of

intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1990

to September, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of

petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2000 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in

pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and

to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1990 who remained engaged till 2004

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

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junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

02.02.2012 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent

suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

...OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

...OPP.

41. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits

the petitioner is entitled to?

...OPP.

42. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? ...OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,50,000/- per operative part

of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO. 1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1990 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

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had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1990 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-

examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by

the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of

work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As

such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold

that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 163 days in the year 1990, 62 days in 1991, 168 days in 1992, 131 days in 1993, 171

days in 1994, 125 days in 1995, 106 days in 1996, 118 days in 1997, 58 days in 1998, 45 days in

1999, 136 days in 2000, 86 days in 2001, 118 days in 2002, 113 days in 2003 and 45 days in 2004

and thus a total of his service in 1990 to 2004 in 15 years he had worked for 1645 days in his entire

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service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1991, 1993 and 1995 to 2004 petitioner had

worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla

on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged

illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner

had merely worked for 45 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the

month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement

of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent

to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to

have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1990 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1990

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

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examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

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accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference

of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as

there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the

workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it

is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring

the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due

to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not

debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

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and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

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reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 15 years and actually worked for 1645 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004

who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice

after about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on 02.02.2012. It is also pertinent to mention

here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 43 years who has sufficient spell

of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees

one lakh fifty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

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reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of

the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 420/2015

Date of Institution

: 10.09.2015

Date of Decision

: 28.6.2016

Shri Bhender Lal s/o Shri Samal Dass, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

…Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

....Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

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AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Bhender Lal S/O Shri Samal

Dass, R/O Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 31.12.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during

September, 2003 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services

of Shri Bhender Lal S/O Shri Samal Dass, R/O Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2003 without complying the provisions of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled

to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1992 who continuously worked till September, 2003 with the respondent/department.

Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each

calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed

that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the

respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous

services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of

the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2003 by an oral order without any

reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster

roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is

alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been

circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of

petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed by the department/

respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service

from 1st August, 1997 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of September, 2003 when the

services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month

notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not

been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal

and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never

been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of

verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no

opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained

unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of September, 2003 till the date of

institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus

entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order

of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2003. He further prayed

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for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2003 along-with back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between 1992 to September, 2003 be counted 160 days

continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having

completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court titled as Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is

entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1992 who remained engaged till 2003

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2003 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

31.12.2011 qua his termination of service during September, 2003 by respondent

suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

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2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2003 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

43. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the

petitioner is entitled to?

…OPP.

44. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.1,30,000/- per operative part

of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1992 who continuously worked till 2003 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1992 to September, 2003. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2003 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

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the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2003.

No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent

in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the

petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment

has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-

examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work

intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by

the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of

work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As

such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold

that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 148 days in the year 1992, 127 days in 1993, 101 days in 1994, 70 days in 1995, 187

days in 1996, 149 days in 1997, 130 days in 1998, 107 days in 1999, 149 days in 2000, 88 days in

2001, 89 days in 2002, and 111 days in 2003 and thus a total of his service in 1992 to 2003 in 12

years he had worked for 1456 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years

1992 to 1995 and 1997 to 2003 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no

reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to

confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2003 the petitioner had merely worked for 111 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not

rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one

year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999

and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner

remains that principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and

services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex.

PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the

petitioner and had joined in the year 1992 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the

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mandays chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although

they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2003 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1992

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in September, 2003, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

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In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference

of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

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Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as

there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the

workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it

is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring

the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due

to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not

debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

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19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference: Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-

Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court

that workman had completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o

section 25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial discretion

exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the

appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the

workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a.

will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

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per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 12 years and actually worked for 1456 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2003

who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice

after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on 31.12.2011. It is also pertinent to mention

here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 45 years who has sufficient spell

of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees

one lakh thirty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in

the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees one lakh thirty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

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Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 421/2015

Date of Institution

: 10.09.2015

Date of Decision

: 28.6.2016

Shri Devi Chand s/o Shri Suraj Ram, r/o Village Sahali, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Churah, District

Chamba, H.P.

….Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

....Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Devi Chand S/O Shri Suraj Ram,

R/O Village Sahali, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Churah, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand

notice dated 29.06.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during October,

2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri

Devi Chand S/O Shri Suraj Ram, R/O Village Sahali, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Churah, District

Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2005 without complying the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled

to from the above employer?”

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties

in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged Mate-cum-beldar on muster roll

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basis in the month of June, 1999 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the

respondent/department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked

for 160 days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and

became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). Averments made in

the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be

counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October,

2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to

petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated

to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under

the respondent had not been circulated till termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while

retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of ‘Last come First go’ had not been followed

by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 12 persons who were junior to petitioner

and joined service from 1999 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when

the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month

notice of retrenchment and at the same time one month’s wages in lieu of notice period had also not

been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal

and unwarranted. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never

been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of

verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no

opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained

unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of

institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus

entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order

of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005 2004. He further

prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. October, 2005 alongwith back wages, seniority including

continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994 to September, 2004 be counted 160 days

continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2007 having

completed 8 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1999 who remained engaged till 2005

but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will

and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the

respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal

area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been

denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial nos. 1 to 25 in

para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial nos. 26 &

27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically

alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu

thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the

work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.7 are stated to have engaged as

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per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also

contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would have definitely raised industrial

dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is

bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not

arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of

petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully

employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of ‘Last come First go’ was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Bal Krishan Kapil, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

mandays chart of other co-workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 30.09.2015 for

determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

29.06.2011 qua his termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent suffers

from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

…OPP.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,

2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

…OPP.

45. If issue no.1 or issue no.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits

the petitioner is entitled to?

…OPP.

46. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? …OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation Rs.60,000/- per operative part of

award.

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REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which

can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on

muster roll basis in the year 1999 who continuously worked till 2005 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms andconditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written

order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it

had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt.

does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner’s termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have

worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba

District and remained engaged from 1999 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full

back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on

oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due

diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities

under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon’ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily

explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically

admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically

admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2005. No

reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in

not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner

to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be

proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination

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has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently

rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent

in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required

for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of

any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 27 days in the year 1999, 83 days in 2000, 115.5 days in 2002, 121.5 days in 2003, 66

days in 2004 and 86 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 1999 to 2005 in 6 years he had

worked for 499 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for

more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the

point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal

termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had

merely worked for 86 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month

of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law

of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have

issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not

violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large

number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 1999 to 2001 and these

workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that

principle of ‘Last come First go’ was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of

petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex. PW1/C,

Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner

and had joined in the year 1999 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the mandays

chart of other coworkers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise mandays

details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given

sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been

not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers

shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they

were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when

junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1999 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon’ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders

of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon’ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex.

RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D21. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that

respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner and for said reasons

they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in

pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D21 were primarily on the basis of court

orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to

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petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for

more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per

government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner’s

termination in October, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning

from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that ‘term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot

be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages.

In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not

be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate

and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld.

Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied

to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of

the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding

the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this

Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of

Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate

government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial

dispute between workmen and the employer.

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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relie

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is

not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate

government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the

industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to

supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section

10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in

accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit

cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay

in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer

deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing

the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in

material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However,

we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the

appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference

of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as

there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the

workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it

is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring

the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due

to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and

referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not

debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum- Processing

Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the

workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be

existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould

the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the

demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back

wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred

the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part

of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State

Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division

Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal

without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State

Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not

adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may

lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect

in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised after

several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court of H.P.

(Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by

court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has

been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon’ble High Court has held that

principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by

Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of

Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner

cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section 25-F of

the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

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discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing

which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld.

Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length

of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial

dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute

after six years. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single

Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench but

surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate

relief and thus Hon’ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9%

per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the

date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about 6 years and actually worked for 499 days as per

mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who

worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after

about 5 ½ years i.e. demand notice was given on 29.06.2011. It is also pertinent to mention here

that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 46 years who has sufficient spell of

life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in

pursuance to judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative

for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon’ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees

sixty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation

shall be paid within four months from the date of Award failing which the petitioner would be

4056

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entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. 4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement in services as well as the other consequential service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

today failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said

amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the

case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of June, 2016.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

fgekpy izns'k ckjgoha fo/kku lHkk

vf/klwpuk

f'keyk&171004] 29 vxLr] 2016

la0%fo0l0&fo/kk;u&izk0@1&1@2013-&&jkT;iky egksn; dk fuEufyf[kr vkns'k fnukad

29 vxLr] 2016 loZlk/kkj.k dh lwpukFkZ izdkf'kr fd;k tkrk gS %&&

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^^eSa] vkpk;Z nsoozr] jkT;iky] fgekpy izns'k] Hkkjrh; lafo/kku ds vuqPNsn 174 ¼2½¼,½ }kjk iznÙk

'kfDr;ksa ds vuqlj.k esa fgekpy izns'k ckjgoha fo/kku lHkk ds ckgjosa l= dk rRdky l=kolku

djrk gwa A

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HIMACHAL PRADESH TWELFTH VIDHAN SABHA

NOTIFICATION

Shimla–171004, the 29th August, 2016

No. V.S.-Legn.-Pri/1-1/2013.—The following order by the Governor of the State of

Himachal Pradesh, dated the 29th August, 2016 is hereby published for general information:

^^eSa] vkpk;Z nsoozr] jkT;iky] fgekpy izns'k] Hkkjrh; lafo/kku ds vuqPNsn 174 ¼2½¼,½ }kjk iznÙk

'kfDr;ksa ds vuqlj.k esa fgekpy izns'k ckjgoha fo/kku lHkk ds ckgjosa l= dk rRdky l=kolku

djrk gwa A

vkpk;Z nsoozr]

jkT;iky]

fgekpy izns'kA**

By order:

SUNDER SINGH VERMA

Secretary,

H.P. Vidhan Sabha.

_________

xzkeh.k fodkl foHkkkx

vf/klwpuk

f'keyk&9] ---- vxLr] 2016

la0 vkj0Mh0Mh0,0,0¼,½¼1½&1@99 ikVZ-&&fgekpy izns'k dh jkT;iky Hkkjr ds lafo/kku ds

vuqPNsn 309 ds ijUrqd }kjk inzÙk 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq,] fgekpy izns”k yksd lsok vk;ksx ds

4058

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

ijke'kZ ls] bl foHkkx dh vf/klwpuk la[;k% vkj0Mh0Mh0&,,¼,½¼1½&1@99 ikVZ rkjh[k 30&03&2016 }kjk

vf/klwfpr fgekpy izns'k xzkkeh.k fodkl foHkkx] [k.M+ fodkl vf/kdkjh] oxZ-I ¼jktif=r½ HkrhZ ,oa izksUufr

fu;e] 2016 dk vkSj la'kks/ku djus ds fy, fuEufyf[kr fu;e cukrh gS] vFkkZr %&&

1- laf{kIr uke vkSj izkjEHk-&&(i) bu fu;eksa dk laf{kIr uke fgekpy izns'k xzkeh.k fodkl

foHkkx] [k.M+ fodkl vf/kdkjh] oxZ&I ¼jktif=r½ HkrhZ vkSj izksUufr ¼lizFke la'kks/ku½ fu;e] 2016 gSA

¼ii½ ;s fu;e jkti=] fgekpy izns'k esa izdk”ku dh rkjh[k ls izo`Rr gksaxsA

2- mikcU/k ^^d** dk la'kks/ku-&&fgekpy izns'k xzkeh.k fodkl foHkkx] [k.M + fodkl vf/kdkjh]

ox&I ¼jktif=r½ HkrhZ ,oa izksUufr fu;e] 2003 ¼ftls blesa blds i”pkr~ mDr fu;e dgk x;k gS½ ds

micU/k ^^d** esa %&&

¼d½ LrEHk la[;k&15 ds lkkeus fo|eku micU/kksasa ds LFkku ij fuEufyf[kr j[kk tk,xk]

vFkkZr %&&

^^lsok esa fu;qfDr] fgekpy izns'k iz”kklfud lsok,a la;qDr izfr;ksxh ijh{kk iSVªu@ikB~;Øe

bR;kfn tks fd fgekpy izns”k iz”kklfud lsok,a fu;e] 1973 eas ;Fkk fofgr ds vk/kkj ij dh

tk,xh½**

vkns'k }kjk]

¼vkSadkj “kekZ½]

lfpo ¼xzkeh.k fodkl½A

&&&&&

mikcU/k ^^d**

fgekpy izns'k xzkeh.k fodkl foHkkx esa [k.M fodkl vf/kdkjh] oxZ&I ¼jktif=r½ ds in ds fy,

HkrhZ vkSj izksUufr fu;eA

1- in dk uke-&&[k.M fodkl vf/kdkjh

2- in ¼inksa½ dh la[;k-&&113 ¼,d lkS rsjg½

3- oxhZdj.k-&&oxZ&I ¼jktif=r½

4- Oksrueku-&&10300&34800 #Ik, tek #i, 5000@& #i, xzsM+ is

5- Þp;uß in vFkok ßvp;uÞ in-&&p;u

6- lh/kh HkrhZ ds fy, vk;q-&&tSlk fd fgekpy izns'k iz'kklfud lsokvksa ds fy, lh/kh HkrhZ gsrq

le;≤ ij fofgr dh tk,A

ijUrq lh/kh HkrhZ fd, tkus okys O;fDr;ksa fy, mijh vk;q lhek rnFkZ ;k lafonk ds vk/kkj ij

fu;qDr fd, x, O;fDr;ksa lfgr igys ls gh ljdkj dh lsok eas jr vH;fFkZ;ksa dks ykxw ugha gksxh %

ijUrq ;g vkSj fd ;fn rnFkZ ;k lafonk ds vk/kkj ij fu;qDr fd;k x;k vF;FkhZ bl :i eas

fu;qfDr dh rkjh[k dks vf/kd vk;q dk gks x;k gks] rks og rnFkZ ;k lafonk ds vk/kkj in fu;qfDr ds

dkj.k fofgr vk;q esa NwV dk ik= ugha gksxk %

4059

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

ijUrq ;g vkSj fd vuqlwfpr tkfr;ksa@vuqlwfpr tu&tkfr;ksa@vU; izoxksZa ds O;fDr;ksa ds fy;s

mijh vk;q lhek esa mruh gh NwV nh tk ldsxh ftruh fd fgekpy izns'k ljdkj ds lk/kkj.k ;k fo'ks"k

vkns'k ¼vkns'kksa½ ds v/khu vuqK; gS %

ijUrq ;g vkSj Hkh fd ifCyd lSDVj fuxeksa rFkk Lok;Rr fudk;ksa ds lHkh deZpkfj;ksasa dks] tks ,sls

ifCyd lSDVj fuxeksa rFkk Lok;Rr fudk;ksa ds izkjfEHkd xBu ds le; ,sls ifCyd lSDVj fuxeksa@Lok;Rr

fudk;ksa esa vkesyu ls iwoZ ljdkjh deZpkjh Fks] lh/kh HkrhZ ds fy, vk;q lhek esa ,slh gh fj;k;r nh

tk;xh tSlh ljdkjh deZpkfj;ksa dks vuKs gS] fdUrq bl izdkj dh fj;k;r ifCyd lSDVj fuxeksa rFkk

Lok;Rr fudk;kasa ds ,sls deZpkjho`Un dks ugha nh tk,xh tks i'pkrorhZ ,sls fuxeksa@Lok;r fudk;ksa }kjk

fu;qDr fd;s x;s Fks@fd;s x;s gSa vkSj mu ifCyd lSDVj fuxeksa@Lok;Rr fudk;ksa ds izkjfEHkd xBu ds

i'pkr ,sls fuxeksa@Lok;Rr fudk;ksa dh lsok esa vfUre :i ls vkesfyr fd;s x;s gaS@ fd;s x;s FksA

¼1½ lh/kh HkrhZ ds fy;s vk;q lhek dh x.kuk ml o"kZ ds izFke fnol ls dh tk,xh ftlesa fd

in ¼inksa½ dks vkosnu vkefU=r djus ds fy,] ;FkkfLFkfr] foKkfir fd;k x;k gS ;k

fu;kstuky;ksa dks vf/klwfpr fd;k x;k gSA

¼2½ vU;Fkk lqvfgZr vF;fFkZ;ksa dh n'kk esa lh/kh HkrhZ ds fy;s vk;q lhek vkSj vuqHko fgekpy

izns”k ykds lsok vk;ksx ds foosdkuqlkj f'kfFky fd;k tk ldsxkA

7- lh/ks HkrhZ fd;s tkus okys O;fDr ¼O;fDr;ksa½ ds fy, visf{kr U;wure 'kSf{kd vkSj vU;

vgZrk,sa-&&¼d½ vfuok;Z vgZrk¼,a½-&&tSlh fd fgekpy izns'k iz'kklfud lsok ds fy, lh/kh HkrhZ gsrq

le;≤ ij fofgr dh tk,aA

¼[k½ okaNuh; vgZrk ¼,a½-&&fgekpy izns'k dh :f<+;ksa jhfr;ksa vkSj cksfy;ksa dk Kku vkSj izns'k esa

fo|eku fof'k"V n'kkvksa esa fu;qfDr ds fy, mi;qDrrkA

8- lh/ks HkrhZ fd, tkus okys O;fDr ¼O;fDr;ksa½ ds fy, fofgr vk;q vkSj 'kkSf{kd vgZrk,a izksUufr

O;fDr ¼O;fDr;ksa½ dh n'kk esa ykxw gksxh ;k ugha-&& vk;q-&&ykxw ughaA

'kSf{kd vgZrk,a-&&tSlh uhps LrEHk la0 11 esa fofgr gSA

9- ifjoh{kk dh vof/k] ;fn dksbZ gks-&&nks o"kZ] ftldk ,d o"kZ ls vuf/kd ,slh vkSj vof/k ds

fy, foLrkj fd;k tk ldsxk] tSlk l{ke izkf/kdkjh fo'ks"k ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa vkSj dkj.kksa dks fyf[kr esa

vfHkfyf[kr djds vkns”k nsaA

10- HkrhZ dh i}fr % HkrhZ lh/kh gksxh ;k izksUufr ;k lSds.MesaV ;k LFkkukUrj.k }kjk vkSj fofHkUu

i}fr;ksa }kjk Hkjs tkus okys inksa dh izfr'krrk-&&

¼i½ ipkl izfr”kr lh/kh HkrhZ }kjk %

¼ii½ ipkl izfr”kr izksUufr }kjk vkSj ,slk u gksus ij lSds.MeSaV vk/kkj ij vkSj Hkkjrh;

iz”kklfud lsok@fgekpy izns'k iz”kklfud lsok ifjoh{kk/khuksa esas ls ¼ikap in½A

fVIi.kh-&&Hkkjrh; iz”kklfud lsok@fgekpy izns”k iz”kklfud lsok ifjoh{kk/khuksa ds fy, fpfUgr

05 ¼ikap½ inksa dks izksUufr ds fy, ipkl izfr”kr dksVs esa lek;ksftr fd;k tk,xkA

11- izksUufr ;k LFkkukUrj.k }kjk HkrhZ dh n'kk esa Jsf.k;ka ¼xzsM½ ftuls izksUufr] lSds.MeSaV

LFkkukUrj.k fd;k tk,xk-&&

4060

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

¼d½ fuEufyf[kr lEHkjd ¼iks’kd½ izoxksZa ds in/kkfj;ksa esa ls izksUufr }kjk tks Lukrd gSa vkSj

ftudk ikap o"kZ dk fu;fer lsokdky ;k xzsM esa dh xbZ yxkrkj rnFkZ lsok] ;fn dksbZ gks] dks lfEefyr

djds ikap o"kZ dk fu;fer lsokdky gks %&&

Øe

la[;k

lEHkjd ¼iks’kd½ izoxZ

izfr'kr

¼i½

lekt f'k{kk ,oa [k.M+ ;kstuk vf/kdkjh

20 %

¼ii½

v/kh{kd xzsM+-II

15 %

¼iii½

ftyk vkads{k.k vf/kdkjh@vuqns'kd

05 %

¼iv½

efgyk lekt f'k{kk la;ksftdk ¼eq[; lsfodk½

05 %

¼v½

izlkj vf/kdkjh ¼m|ksx½

2-5 %

¼vi½

izlkj vf/kdkjh ¼lgdkfjrk½

2-5 %

dqy - -

50 %

ijUrq ;fn vius laHkjd ¼iks"kd½ izoxZ dk in/kkjh Lukrd dh fofgr vgZrk ugha j[krk gS fdUrq

vU;Fkk ik= gS rks mls bl “krZ ds v/kk/khu [k.M fodkl vf/kdkjh ds in gsrq izksUufr ds fy, fopkjk

tk,xk fd mls bu fu;eksa ds jkti=] fgekpy izns”k esa izdk”ku dh rkjh[k ls 05 ¼ikap½ o’kZ ds Hkhrj

Lukrd dh vgZrk izkIr djuh gksxh] ,slk u gksus ij mls vius lEHkjd ¼iks"kd½ izoxZ@in ij izR;kofrZr

dj fn;k tk,xk vkSj dsoy visf{kr vgZrk izkIr djus ds i”pkr~ gh Hkfo’; esa izksUufr ds fy, fopkjk

tk,xk %

ijUrq ;g fd iwoksZDr “krZ mu in/kkfj;ksa ds ekeys eas ykxw ugha gksxh tks mijksDr 05 ¼ikap½ o’kZ dh

fofgr vof/k eas ;k mlls iwoZ lsokfuo`r gksus gSa %

ijUrq ;g vkSj fd lEHkjd ¼iks"kd½ izoxZ dk in/kkjh ¼os in/kkjh½] tks bu fu;ekasa ds izo`Ùk gksus ls

iwoZ [k.M fodkl vf/kdkjh ds :i esa igys ls izksUur gks x;k ¼x,½ gSa] mu [k.M fodkl vf/kdkfj;ksa ls

ofj’B jgsaxsA bl rF; dks fopkj esa yk, fcuk fd igys ls gh izksUur in/kkjh muds vius&vius lEHkjd

¼iks"kd½ izoxZ@in esa muls dfu’B Fks] tks bu fu;eksa ds izo`r gksus ds i”pkr izksUur gksaxsA

¼[k½ ,slk u gksus ij ln`”k in ds in/kkfj;ksa esa l]s tks Lukrd gSa vkSj tks fodkl lSDVj esasa {ks=h;

vuqHko gS rFkk tks fodkl lSDVj esasasas {ks=h; vuqHko j[krs gksa rFkk tks fgekpy izns'k ljdkj ds vU;

foHkkxksa@cksMksaZ@fuxeksa esa Hkh lerqY; osrueku esa dk;Zjr ;k Hkkjrh; iz'kklfud lsok@fgekpy izns'k

iz'kklfud lsok ds vf/kdkfj;ksa esa l]s rc rd tc rd dh in/kkjh vius&vius lEHkjd 1@4 1@4

¼iks"kd½ izoxksZaZ esa [k.M fodkl vf/kdkjh ds in ¼inksa½ ij izksUur fd, tkus ds fy, ik= ugha gks tkrs gSa]

lSd.MeSaV vk/kkj ijA

[k.M + fodkl vf/kdkjh ds inksa dks Hkjus ds fy, fuEufyf[kr 110 fcUnq in vk/kkfjr jksLVj dk

vuqlj.k fd;k tk,xk %&&

jksLVj fcUnq¼vksa½

izoxZ

igyk] rhljk] ikapoka] lkroka] ukSoka] X;kjgoka]

rsjgoka] iUnzgoka] l=kgoka] mUulhoka] bZDdhloka]

rsbZloka]

iPphloka]

lrkbZloka]

murhloka]

bZdrhloka]

rSarhloka]

iSarhloka]

lSarhloka]

mUkrkyhloks] bZdrkyhloka] rSrkyhloka] iSarkyhloka]

lSarkyhloka] mUkpkloka] bZd;kouoka] frjiuoka]

ipiuoka] lrkouoka] mulBoka] bdlBoka] frjlBoka]

iSalBoka]

lrklBoka]

mugRrjoka]

bdgrjoka]

fgekpy inzs'k iz'kklfud lsok bR;kfn la;qDr

izfr;ksxh ijh{kk ds ek/;e ls lh/kh HkrhZ }kjkA

4061

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

frgRrjoka] ipgRrjoka] lrgRrjoka] mUuklhoka]

bZD;klhoka]

frj;klhoka]

ipklhoka]

lrklhoka]

uoklhoka]

bD;kuosoka]

frjkuosoka]

ipkuosoka]

lrkuosoka] fuU;kUkosoka] ,d lkS ,doka] ,d lkS

rhuoka] ,d lkS ikapok] ,d lkS lkroka] ,oa ,d lkS

ukSokaA

nwljk] pkSFkk] vkBoka] nloka] pkSgnoka] ckbZloka]

pkSchloka]

vBkbZloka]

rhloka]

c;kyhloka]

vM+rkyhloka]

ipkloka]

pkSouoka]

pkSlBoka]

fN;klBoka] lRrjoka] cgRrjoka] fN;klhoka] uCcsoka]

vBkuosoka] ,d lkS nksoka ,oa ,d lkS vkBokaA

lekt f'k{kk ,oa [k.M+ ;kstuk vf/kdkjh

NBoka] ckjgoka] chloka] NCchloka] cRrhloka]

vM+rhloka]

fN;kyhloka]

ckouoka]

vBkouoka]

cklBoka]

vM+l+Boka]

pkSgRrjoka]

vVgRrjoka]

vBklhoka] ckuosoka ,oa lkSokaA

v/kh{kd xzsM+&II

vV~Bkjgoka]

pkSrhloka]

lkBoka]

fN;gRrjoka]

pkSjkuosoka ,oa ,d lkS pkjokaA

ftyk vdsa{k.k vf/kdkjh@vuqns'kd

lksyogka] pokyhloka] NIiuoka] pkSjklhoka] fN;kUkosoka

,oa ,d lkS NBokaA

efgyk lekt f'k{kk la;ksftdk@¼eq[; lsfodk½

Pkkyhloka] vLlhoka ,oa ,d lkS nlokaA

izlkj vf/kdkjh ¼m|ksx½

Nrhloka ,oa c;klhoka

izlkj vf/kdkjh ¼lgdkfjrk½

fVIi.kh-&&jksLVj izR;sd 110oha fjDr ds i'pkr~ rc rd nksgjk;k tkrk jgsxk] tc rd fd leLr

lEHkjd ¼iks"kd½ izoxksZa dk izfrfuf/kRo] [k.M fodkl vf/kdkjh ds dkMj esa] fofgr izfr”krrk rd izkIr ugha

gks tkrk gSA rRi”pkr] fjfDr mlh izoxZ ls Hkjh tk,xh] ftlls in fjDr gksrk gSA

d¼1½ ijUrq izksUufr ds iz;kstu ds fy, izR;sd deZpkjh dks] tutkrh;@nqxZe {ks=ksa esasa in ¼inksa½

dh ,sls {ks=ksa esa Ik;kZIr la[;k dh miyC/krk ds v/;/khu] de ls de ,d dk;Zdky rd lsok djuh gksxh(

ijUrq ;g vkSj fd mi;qZDr ijUrqd d¼1½ mu deZpkfj;ksa ds ekeys esa ykxw ugha gksxk ftudh

vf/kof"kZrk ds fy, ikaPk o"kZ ;k mlls de dh lsok 'ks"k jgh gks(

ijUrq ;g vkSj Hkh fd mu vf/kdkfj;ksa@ deZpkfj;ksasasa dks] ftUgkasus tutkrh;@nqxZe {ks= esa de ls

de ,d dk;Zdky rd lsok ugha dh gS] ,sls {ks= esa mlds laoxZ ¼dkMj½ esa loZFkk ofj"Brk ds vuqlkj

LFkkukUrj.k fd;k tk;xk A

Li"Vhdj.k-I-&&mi;ZqDr ijUrqd d¼1½ ds iz;kstu ds fy, tutkrh;@nqxeZ {ks=ksa esasa ^^dk;Zdky**

ls lk/kkj.kr;k rhu o"kZ dh vof/k ;k Ikz'kklfud vis{kkvksa vkSj deZpkjh }kjk fd, x, dk;Z dks /;ku esa

j[krs gq, ,sls {ks=ksa esa rSukrh dh blls de vof/k vfHkizsr gksxhA

Li"Vhdj.k-II-&&mi;qZDr ijUrqd d¼1½ d iz;kstu ds fy, tutkrh;@nqxZe {ks= fuEu izdkj ls

gksaxs%&&

1- ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifrA

4062

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

2- pEck ftyk dk ikaxh vkSj HkjekSj mi e.My A

3- jksgMw mi e.My dk MksMjk Dokj {ks= A

4- ftyk f'keyk dh jkeiqj rglhy dk iUnzg chl ijxuk equh”k njdkyh vkSj xzke iapk;r

dk'kkikVA

5- dqYyw ftyk ds rglhy fuje.M dk iUnzg chl ijxuk A

6- dkaxM+k ftyk ds cStukFk mi e.My dk cMk Hkaxky {ks= A

7- ftyk fdUukSj A

8- fljekSj ftyk esa mi rglhy dejm ds dkBokM vkSj dksjxk iVokj&o`Rr] js.kqdkth rglhy

ds HkykM&HkykSuk vkSj lkaxuk iVokj o`r vkjSjS f'kykbZ rglhy dk dkVk iko iVokj&o`RrA

9- e.Mh ftyk esa djlksx rglhy dk [kU;ksy&cxMk iVokj&o`Rr] ckyh pkSdh mi rglhy ds

xkMk xkslkbZ] eB;kuh] ?ku;kM] Fkkph] ckxh] lksexkM vkSj [kksykuky iVokj o`Rr i/kj

rglhy ds >kjokM] dqVx<] xzkeu] nsosx<] VSyk] jksik] dFkksx] flYg&HkMokuh] gLriqj]

?kejsM vkSj HkVs< iVokj&o`Rr] Fkqukx rglhy ds fp;w.kh] dkyhikj] ekux<] Fkkp&cxMk]

mRrjh ex: vkSj nf{k.kh ex: iVokj o`Rr vkSj lqUnjuxj rglhy dk cVokMk

iVokj&o`RrA

¼1½ izksUufr ds lHkh ekeykas esa in ij fu;fer fu;qfDr ls iwoZ lEHkjd ¼iks"kd½ in esa dh xbZ

yxkrkj rnFkZ lsok] ;fn dkbZ gks] izksUufr ds fy, bu fu;eksa esa ;Fkkfofgr lsokdky ds fy,] bl 'krZ ds

v/khu jgrs gq, x.kuk esa yh tk;xh] fd lEHkjd ¼iks"kd½ izoxZ esa rnFkZ fu;fqDr@izksUufr HkrhZ vkSj izksUufr

fu;eksa ds micU/kksa ds vuqlkj p;u dh mfpr Lohdk;Z izfØ;k dks viukus ds Ik'pkr dh xbZ Fkh(

ijUrq mu lHkh ekeyksa esasa ftuesasa dksbZ dfu"B O;fDr lEHkjd ¼iks"kd½ in esa vius dqy lsokdky

¼rnFkZ vk/kkj ij dh xbZ rnFk lsok lfgr] tks fu;fer lsok@fu;qfDr ds vuqlqj.k esa gks½ ds vk/kkj ij

mi;qZDr fufnZ"V micU/kksa ds dkj.k fopkj fd, tkus dk ik= gks tkrk gS] ogka vius&vius

izoZx@in@dkMj esa mlls ofj"B lHkh O;fDr fopkj fd, tkus ds ik= le>s tk,xsa vkSj fopkj djrs

le; dfu"B O;fDr ls Åij j[ks tk,xsa(

ijUrq ;g vkSj fd mu lHkh in/kkfj;ksa dh] ftu ij izkUsufr ds fy, fopkj fd;k tkuk gS de ls

de rhu o"kZ dh U;wure vgZrk lsok ;k in ds HkrhZ vkSj izksUufr fu;eksa esa fofgr lsok] tks Hkh de gks]

gksxh(

ijUrq ;g vkSj Hkh fd tgka dksbZ O;fDr iwoZxkeh ijUrqd dh vis{kkvksasa ds dkj.k izksUufr fd, tkus

lEcU/kh fopkj ds fy, vik= gks tkrk gS] ogka mlls dfu"B O;fDr Hkh ,slh izksUufr ds fopkj ds fy,

vik= le>k tk;sxk@le>s tk,axsaA

Li"Vhdj.k-&&vfaUre ijUrqd ds vUrxZr dfu"B in/kkjh izksUufr ds fy, vik= ugha le>k

tk,xk] ;fn ofj"B vik= O;fDr HkwriwoZ lSfud gS] ftls fMekschykbTM vkeMZ QksflZt ijlksuy ¼fjtosZ'ku

vkQ oSdsUlht bu fgekpy LVsV ukWu VSDuhdy lfoZlht½ :Yt] 1972 ds fu;e&3 ds micU/kksa ds

vUrxZr HkrhZ fd;k x;k gS vkSj buds vUrxZr ojh;rk ykHk fn, x, gksa ;k ftls ,Dl lohZleSu ¼fjtosZ'ku

vkQ oSdsUlht bu nh fgekpy izns'k VSDuhdy lfoZlht½ :Yt] 1985 ds fu;e&3 ds micU/kksasa ds vUrxZr

HkrhZ fd;k x;k gks vkSj buds vUrxZr ojh;rk ykHk fn, x, gksaA

¼2½ blh izdkj LFkk;hdj.k ds lHkh ekeyksasa es ,sls in ij fu;fer fu;qfDr@izksUufr ls iwoZ

lEHkjd ¼iks"kd½ in ij dh xbZ yxkrkj rnFkZ lsok] ;fn dksbZ gks] lsokdky ds fy, x.kuk eas yh tk,xh]

4063

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

;fn rnFkZ fu;qfDr@izksUufr mfpr p;u ds Ik'pkr vkSj HkrhZ vkSj izksUufr fu;eksa ds micU/kksa ds vuqlkj

dh xbZ Fkh%

ijUrq dh xbZ mi;qZDr fufnZ"V rnFkZ lsok dks x.kuk easa ysus ds Ik'pkr tks LFkk;hdj.k gksxk] mlds

QyLo:Ik ikjLifjd ojh;rk vifjofrZr jgsxhA

12- ;fn foHkkxh; izksUufr lfefr fo|eku gks rks mldh lajpuk-&&foHkkxh; izksUufr lfefr dh

v/;{krk v/;{k] fgekpy izns”k yksd lsok vk;ks ;k muds }kjk ukefunsf'kr lnL; }kjk dh tk,xhA

13- HkrhZ djus ds ftu ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa fgekpy izns”k yksd lsok vk;ksx l ijke'kZ fd;k

tk,x-&&tSlk fd fof/k }kjk visf{kr gksA

14- lh/kh HkrhZ ds fy, vfuok;Z vis{kk-&&fdlh lsok ;k in ij fu;qfDr ds fy, vH;FkhZ dks

Hkkjr dk ukxfjd gksuk vfuok;Z gSA

15- lh/kh HkrhZ }kjk in ij fu;qfDr ds fy, p;u-&&lsok esa fu;qfDr] fgekpy izns”k iz”kklfud

lsok,a la;qDr izfr;ksxh ijh{kk iSVªu@ikB~;Øe bR;kfn tks fd fgekpy izns”k iz”kklfud lsok, fu;e] 1973

eas ;Fkk fofgr ds vk/kkj ij dh tk,xhA

16- vkj{k.k-&&lsok esa fu;qfDr] fgekpy izns'k ljdkj }kjk le;&le; ivuqlwfpr tkfr;ksa@

vuqlwfpr tu tkfr;ksa@vU; fiNMa+s oxksZa @vU; izoxZ ds O;fDr;ksa ds fy, lsokvksa esa vkj{k.k dh ckcr

tkjh fd;s x, vkns'kksa ds v/khu gksxhA

17- foHkkxh; ijh{kk-&&lsok esa izR;sd lnL; dks vkxkeh mPprj in ij izksUufr ds fy,]

le;&le; ij ;Fkk la'kksf/kr fgekpy izns”k foHkkxh; ijh{kk fu;e] 1997 esasa ;Fkk fofgr foHkkxh; ijh{kk

ikl djuh gksxhA

18- f'kfFky djus dh 'kfDr-&&tgka jkT; ljdkj dh ;g jk; gks fd ,slk djuk vko';d ;k

lehphu gS ogka og dkj.kksa dks fyf[kr esa vfHkfyf[kr djds vkSj fgekpy izns'k yksd lsok vk;ksx ds

ijke'kZ ls vkns'k }kjk bu fu;eksa ds fdUgha micU/kksa dks fdlh oxZ ;k O;fDr ¼O;fDr;ksa½ ds izoxZ ;k

in¼inksas½ dh ckcr f'kfFky dj ldsxhA

&&&&&&

(Authoritative English text of this Department Government Notification No. RDD-AA(A)1-

1/2012 dated as required under clause (3) of Article 348 of the Constitution of India).

RURAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Shimla-9, …. August, 2016.

No. RDD-AA(A)(1)1/99.—In exercise of the powers conferred by proviso to article 309 of

the Constitution of India, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, in consultation with the Himachal

Pradesh Public Service Commission, is pleased to make the following rules further to amend the

Recruitment and Promotion Rules for the post of Block Development Officer Class-I (Gazetted) in

the Rural Development Department, Himachal Pradesh notified vide this Department Notification

No. RDD-AA(A)(1)-1/99, dated 30.03.16 namely:—

1.

Short title and Commencement.—(I) These rules may be called the Himachal

Pradesh Rural Development Department, Block Development Officer, Class-I (Gazetted)

Recruitment and Promotion (First Amendment) Rules, 2016.

4064

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(II) These rules shall come in to force from the date of publication in Rajpatra, Himachal

Pradesh.

2. Amendment of Annexure- ‘A’.—In Annexure ‘A’ to the Himachal Pradesh Rural

Development Department Block Development Officer, Class-I (Gazetted), Recruitment and

Promotion Rules, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules):—

(a) For the existing provisions against column No. 15, the following shall be substituted,

namely:—

“Selection for appointment to the post in the case of direct recruitment shall be made on the

basis of the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Services Combined Competitive Examination the

pattern/ syllabus etc. of which is as given in the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Services Rules,

1973 as amended from time to time”.

By order,

(ONKAR SHARMA),

Secretary.

_________

Annexure-A

RECRUITMENT AND PROMOTION RULES FOR THE POST OF BLOCK DEVELOPMENT

OFFICER, CLASS-I (GAZETTED) IN THE DEPARTMENT OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT,

HIMACHAL PRADESH

1. Name of post.—Block Development Officer

2. Number of post(s).—113 (One Hundred and Thirteen)

3. Classification.—Class-I (Gazetted)

4. Scale of pay.—Rs.10300-34800+ Rs.5000/- Grade Pay

5. Whether “Selection” post or “Non selection post”.—Selection.

6. Age for direct recruitment.—As may be prescribed for direct recruitment to the

Himachal Pradesh Administrative Services from time to time.

Provided that the upper age limit for direct recruits will not be applicable to the candidates

already in service of the Government including those who have been appointed on adhoc or on

contract basis:

Provided further that if a candidate appointed on adhoc basis or on contract basis had become

overage on the date when he/she was appointed as such he/ she shall not be eligible for any

relaxation in the prescribed age limit by virtue of his/her such adhoc or contract appointment:

Provided further that upper age-limit is relaxable for Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes /

Other categories of persons to the extent permissible under the general or special order(s) of the

Himachal Pradesh Government:

4065

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

Provided further that the employees of all the Public Sector Corporations and Autonomous

Bodies who happened to be Government Servants before absorption in Public Sector

Corporations/Autonomous Bodies at the time of initial constitution of such Corporations/

Autonomous Bodies shall be allowed age concession in direct recruitment as admissible to

Government servants. This concession will not, however, be admissible to such staff of the Public

Sector Corporations/Autonomous Bodies who were/are subsequently appointed by such

Corporations/Autonomous Bodies and who are/were finally absorbed in the service of such

Corporations/Autonomous Bodies after initial constitution of the Public Sector Corporations/

Autonomous Bodies.

Notes.—(1) Age limit for direct recruitment will be reckoned on the first day of the year in

which the post(s) is/are advertised for inviting applications or notified to the Employment

Exchanges or as the case may be.

(2) Age and experience in the case of direct recruitment is relaxable at the discretion of the

Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission in case the candidate is otherwise well qualified.

7. Minimum Educational & other qualification(s) for direct recruit(s).—(a)

ESSENTIAL QUALIFICATION(s).—As may be prescribed for direct recruitment to the Himachal

Pradesh Administrative Service from time to time.

(b) DESIRABLE QUALIFICATION(S).—Knowledge of customs, manners and dialects of

Himachal Pradesh and suitability for appointment in the peculiar conditions prevailing in the

Pradesh.

8. Whether age and educational qualification(s) prescribed for direct recruit(s) will

apply in the case of the promotee(s).—Age.—Not applicable

Educational Qualifications.—As prescribed in column No. 11 below

9. Period of probation, If any.— Two years’ subject to such further extension for a

period not exceeding one year as may be ordered by the competent authority in special

circumstances and reasons to be recorded in writing.

10. Method(s) of recruitment, whether by direct recruitment or by promotion,

secondment, transfer and the percentage of post(s) to be filled in by various methods.—(i)

50% by direct recruitment;

(ii) 50% by promotion failing which on secondment basis and from amongst the IAS /

HAS Probationers (05 posts.

Note.—05 (five) posts earmarked for IAS / HAS Probationers will be adjusted towards 50%

promotion quota.

11. In case of recruitment by promotion, secondment, transfer, grade from which

promotion/ secondment/transfer is to be made.—

(a) By promotion from amongst the incumbents of the following feeder categories who are

Graduate and possess five year’s regular service or regular combined with continuous adhoc

service, if any, in the grade:—

Sl. No.

Feeder category

%

i)

Social Education & Block Planning Officer

20%

4066

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ii)

Superintendent Grade-II

15%

iii)

District Audit Officer/Instructor

05%

iv)

Lady Social Education Organizer (Mukhya Sevika)

05%

v)

Extension officer (Industries)

2.5%

vi)

Extension Officer (Cooperation)

2.5%

Total ..

50%

Provided that if the incumbent of the respective feeder categories does not possess

prescribed qualification of graduation but is otherwise eligible shall be considered for promotion to

the post of Block Development Officer subject to the condition that he/she shall have to acquire

qualification of graduation within 05 (five) years from the date of publication of these rules in the

Rajpatra, Himachal Pradesh, failing which he/she shall be reverted to the respective feeder

category/ post and shall be considered for promotion in future only after acquiring the requisite

qualifications:

Provided further that the above condition shall not be applicable in case of those incumbents

who are to retire on or before the above prescribed period of 05 (five) years.

Provided further that the incumbents(s) of feeder categories who have already been

promoted as Block Development Officer before coming into force of these Rules shall remain

senior to those Block Development Officers who will be promoted after coming into force of these

rules, irrespective of the fact that the earlier promoted incumbents were junior to them in the cadre

of respective feeder category/ post.

(b) Failing which on secondment basis form amongst incumbents of analogous post who

are graduate and possess field experience in Development Sector and also working in the identical

pay scale from other Departments/ Boards/ Corporations of the H.P. Government or IAS/HAS

officers till the incumbent(s) in the respective feeder categories become(s) eligible for consideration

for promotion(s) to the post(s) of Block Development Officer.

For filling up the posts of Block Development Officer, the following 110 points post based

roster shall be followed:—

Roaster Point(s)

Categories

1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th, 11th, 13th, 15th, 17th,

19th, 21st, 23rd, 25th, 27th, 29th, 31st , 33rd,

35th, 37th 39th, 41st, 43rd , 45th, 47th, 49th,

51st, 53rd, 55th, 57th, 59th, 61st, 63rd, 65th,

67th ,69th, 71st, 73th, 75th, 77th, 79th, 81st,

83rd, 85th, 87th, 89th, 91st, 93rd, 95th, 97th,

99th, 101st, 103rd, 105th, 107th & 109th.

Direct

recruitment

through

the

H.

P.

Administrative

Service

Etc.

Combined

Competitive Examination.

2nd, 4th, 8th, 10th, 14th, 22nd, 24th 28th, 30th,

42nd, 48th, 50th, 54th, 64th, 66th, 70th, 72nd,

86th, 90th, 98th 102nd & 108th

Social Education & Block Planning Officer.

6th, 12th ,20th, 26th, 32nd, 38th, 46th, 52nd,

58th, 62nd, 68th, 74th, 78th, 88th, 92nd &

100th.

Superintendent Grade-II

18th, 34th, 60th, 76th, 94th & 104th

District Audit officer/ Instructor

16th, 44th, 56th, 84th, 96th & 106th

Lady Social Education organisor (Mukhya

Sevika)

4067

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40th, 80th & 110th

Extension Officer (Industries)

36th & 82nd

Extension Officer (Cooperation)

Note.—The roster will be rotated after every 110th vacancy till the representation to all

feeder categories is achieved upto the prescribed percentage in the cadre of Block Development

Officer. Thereafter, the vacancy will be filled up from the category which will vacate the post.

A(1) Provided that for the purpose of promotion every employee shall have to serve atleast

one term in the Tribal/Difficult areas subject to adequate number of post(s) available in such areas;

Provided further that the proviso A(I) supra shall not be applicable in the case of those

employees who have five years or less service, left for superannuation;

Provided further that Officers / Officials who have not served atleast one tenure in Tribal /

Difficult area shall be transferred to such area strictly in accordance with his/her seniority in the

respective cadre.

Explanation I.—For the purpose of proviso A(1) supra the “term” in Tribal /Difficult areas”

shall mean normally three years or less period of posting in such areas keeping in view the

administrative requirements and performance of the employee.

Explanation II.—For the purpose of Proviso A(1) supra the Tribal/Difficult areas shall be as

under:—

1. District Lahaul & Spiti.

2. Pangi and Bharmour Sub Division of Chamba District.

3. Dodra Kawar Area of Rohru Sub-Division.

4. Pandrah Bis Pargana, Munish Darkali and Gram Panchayat Kashapat, Gram

Panchayats of Rampur Tehsil of District Shimla.

5. Pandrah Bis Pargana of Tehsil Nirmand, Distt. Kullu District.

6. Bara Bhangal Areas of Baijnath Sub Division of Kangra District.

7. District Kinnaur.

8.

Kathwar and Korga Patwar Circles of Kamrau Sub Tehsil, Bhaladh Bhalona and

Sangna Patwar Circles of Renukaji Tehsil and Kota Pab Patwar Circle of Shillai

Tehsil, in Sirmour District.

9. Khanyol-Bagra Patwar Circle of Karsog Tehsil, Gada-Gussaini, Mathyani, Ghanyar,

Thachi Baggi, Somgad and Kholanal of Patwar Circle Bali-Chowki Sub Tehsil,

Jharwar, Kutgarh, Graman, Devgarh, Trailla, Ropa, Kathog, Silh-Badhwani, Hastpur,

Ghamrahar and Bhatehar Patwar Circle of Padhar Tehsil, Chiuni, Kalipar, Mangarh,

Thach-Bagra, North Magru and South Magru Patwar Circles of Thunag Tehsil and

Batwara Patwar Circle of Sunder Nagar Tehsil in Mandi Distrist.

(1) In all cases of promotion, the continuous adhoc service rendered in the feeder post, if

any, prior to regular appointment to the post shall be taken into account towards the length of

4068

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service as prescribed in these Rules for promotion subject to the condition that the adhoc

appointment/promotion in the feeder category had been made after following proper acceptable

process of selection in accordance with the provisions of the R&P Rules:

Provided that in all cases where a junior person becomes eligible for consideration by virtue

of his/her total length of service (including the service rendered on adhoc basis followed by regular

service/appointment ) in the feeder post in view of the provision referred to above, all persons

senior to him/her in the respective category/post/cadre shall be deemed to be eligible for

consideration and placed above the junior person in the field of consideration:

Provided further that all incumbents to be considered for promotion shall possess the

minimum qualifying service of at least three years’ or that prescribed in the R & P Rules for the

post, whichever is less:

Provided further that where a person becomes ineligible to be considered for promotion on

account of the requirements of the preceding proviso, the person(s) junior to him /her shall also be

deemed to be ineligible for consideration for such promotion:

Explanation.—The last proviso shall not render the junior incumbents(s) in-eligible for

consideration for promotion if the senior in-eligible person(s) happened to be Ex-Serviceman

recruited under the provisions of Rule-3 of the Demobilized Armed Forces Personnel (Reservation

of Vacancies in Himachal State Non- Technical Services) Rules, 1972 and having been given the

benefit of the seniority there under or recruited under the provision of Rule -3 of the Exservicemen

(Reservation of Vacancies in Himachal Pradesh Technical Services) Rules, 1985 and having been

given the benefit of seniority there-under.

(2) Similarly, in all cases of confirmation, continuous adhoc service rendered in the feeder

post, if any, prior to the regular appointment/promotion against such post shall be taken into

account towards the length of service, if the adhoc appointment/promotion had been made after

proper selection and in accordance with the provision of the R & P Rules.

Provided that inter-se-seniority as a result of confirmation after taking into account, adhoc

service rendered as referred to above shall remain unchanged.

12. If a Departmental Promotion Committee exists, what is its composition.—D.P.C.

to be presided over by the Chairman, H.P. Public Service Commission or a Member thereof to be

nominated by him.

13. Circumstances under which the H.P.P.S.C. is to be consulted in making

recruitment.—As required under the Law.

14. Essential requirement for a direct recruitment.—A candidate for appointment to

any service or post must be a citizen of India.

15. Selection for appointment to post by direct recruitment.—Selection for

appointment to the post in the case of direct recruitment shall be made on the basis of the Himachal

Pradesh Administrative Services Combined Competitive Examination the pattern/ syllabus etc. of

which is as given in the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Services Rules, 1973, as amended from

time to time.

16. Reservation.—The appointment to the service shall be subject to orders regarding

reservation in the service for Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes/Other Backward Classes/Other

categories of persons issued by the Himachal Pradesh Government from time to time.

4069

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

17. Departmental Examination.—Every member of the service shall pass a Departmental

Examination as prescribed in the Himachal Pradesh Departmental Examination Rules, 1997 as

amended from time to time for promotion to the next higher post.

18. Powers to relax.—Where the State Government is of opinion that it is necessary or

expedient to do so, it may, by order for reasons to be recorded in writing and in consultation with

the H.P Public Service Commission, relax any of the provision(s) of these Rules with respect to any

Class or Category of Person(s) or Post(s).

___________

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&&&&&&&&

[Authoritative English Text of this Department Notification No.EXN-F(10)-5/2016 dated 29/08/

2016 as required under clause (3) of Article 348 of the Constitution of India.]

EXCISE AND TAXATION DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Shimla-171002, the 29th August, 2016

No. EXN-F(10)-5/2016.—In exercise of the powers conferred by section 10 of the

Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005(Act No.12 of 2005), the Governor, Himachal

Pradesh proposes to make following amendments in SCHEDULE 'A' appended to the Act ibid and

the same are hereby published in the Official Gazette (e-gazette), Himachal Pradesh for the

information of general public;

If any interested person likely to be affected has any objection(s) or suggestion(s), with

regard to the aforesaid proposal, may send the same to the Excise and Taxation Commissioner,

Himachal Pradesh, Shimla-171009 within a period of ten days from the date publication of this

notification;

Objection(s)/suggestion(s), if any, received within the above stipulated period, shall be

taken into consideration by the Government before finalizing the same, namely:—

DRAFT AMENDMENTS OF SCHEDULE 'A'

In SCHEDULE 'A' appended to the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (Act

No. 12 of 2005),—

(a) in Part-I 'A' after entry number 2, the following new entries shall be inserted, namely

3.

Sugar and Khandsari

-------

4.

Textile fabrics

-------; and

(b) in Part-II-'A',-

(i) after entry 21, the following new entry shall be inserted, namely:—

"21 A. Compressed Natural Gas ------"; and

4071

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

(ii) the existing entries number 105 and 107 and Note appearing after entry number 117

shall be omitted.

By order,

Sd/-

Pr. Secretary (E&T).

__________

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fo"k;-&&izkFkZuk i= n#Lrh jktLo vf/kfu;e 1954 ds rgr ckjsA

loZlk/kkj.k dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd yyhrk nsoh vk;q 33 lky iq=h Jh Lo0 gse jkt] xkao

/kkjk iVkgjk] Mk0 enkuk] mi&rglhy lSat] ftyk dqYyw] gky fuoklh vkj0 ,l0 mIiy dkWVst] utnhd

ekdsZfVax cksMZ vkWfQl yksvj [kyhuh] f'keyk&2] ftyk f'keyk] fg0 iz0 us bl vnkyr esa ,d nj[okLr

xqtkjh gS fd mldk uke jktLo fjdkMZ QkVh o dksBh 'kka?kM+] mi&rglhy lSat] ftyk dqYyw esa yhyk

nsoh iq=h Lo0 Jh gse jkt ntZ gS tks fd xyr gSA tcfd izkfFkZu dk uke xzke iapk;r 'kka?kM+ ds fjdkMZ

esa o f'k{kk izek.k i= esa yyhrk nsoh iq=h Lo0 gse jkt ntZ gS tksfd lgh gSA

vr% bl b'rgkj }kjk loZlk/kkj.k dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd jktLo fjdkMZ esa izkfFkZu dk uke

yhyk nsoh ds LFkku ij yhyk nsoh mQZ yyhrk nsoh iq=h Lo0 Jh gse jkt ntZ djds n#Lrh dh tkuh gSA

bl lEcU/k esa fdlh O;fDr dks ;fn dksbZ vkifÙk gks rks og vlkyru o odkyru viuh vkifÙk

bl U;k;ky; esa fnukad 24&9&2016 dks ;k blls iwoZ izLrqr dj ldrk gS A vU;Fkk bldk bUnzkt

jktLo fjdkMZ esa djok fn;k tk,xkA

vkt fnukad 16&8&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr ls tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh@dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]

mi&rglhy lSat] ftyk dqYywA

&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh vfuy pkSgku] mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½ pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky]

ftyk f'keyk ¼fgekpy izns'k½

Jherh jek iRuh Jh x.ks'k pUn] xkao ctjksFk] Mkd?kj o xzke iapk;r cEVk] rglhy pkSiky] ftyk

f'keykA

cuke

¼1½ vke turkA

¼2½ iz/kku xzke iapk;r cEVk] rglhy pkSiky] ftyk f'keykA

fo"k;-&&izkfFkZ;k ds cPpksa dk uke o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r cEVk ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ

djok, tkus ckjsA fd v/khu /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oe~ e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr

tUe iathdj.k djus ckjsA

b'rgkj

gj [kkl o vke turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkfFkZ;k Jherh jek us

v/kksgLrk{kjh ds U;k;ky; esa ,d vkosnu i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mlus vius cPpksa dk uke o tUe

frfFk;ka xzke iapk;r cEVk ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ ugha djok;k gS] vc izkfFkZ;k vius cPpksa dk

uke o tUe frfFk;ka xzke iapk;r cEVk ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djokuk pkgrh gS] tks dh bl

izdkj ls gS%&

4073

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

Øe la[;k

uke

lacU/k

tUe frfFk

1-

fiz;ka'kq

iq=

05&01&2005

2-

lqty

iq=h

24&06&2006

vr% xzke iapk;r cEVk] rglhy pkSiky dh turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd

;fn fdlh O;fDr dks mijksDr iathdj.k ckjs dksbZ vkifÙk gks rks rkjh[k 12&09&2016 dks ;k blls iwoZ

vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuh vkifÙk izLrqr djsa vU;Fkk vkosnu i= ij tUe

iathdj.k vkns'k ikfjr djds lfpo xzke iapk;r cEVk dks vkxkeh dk;kZUo;u gsrq Hkst fn;k tk;sxkA

vkt fnukad 12&08&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr vnkyr ls tkjh fd;k x;kA

eksgjA

vfuy pkSgku]

mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½]

pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh vfuy pkSgku] mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½ pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky]

ftyk f'keyk ¼fgekpy izns'k½

Jh izse izdk'k 'kekZ iq= Jh jkb flag] xkao e'kjkgka] Mkd?kj e/kkuk] xzke iapk;r e/kkuk] rglhy

pkSiky] ftyk f'keyk] fgekpy izns'kA

cuke

¼1½ vke turkA

¼2½ iz/kku xzke iapk;r e/kkuk] rglhy pkSiky] ftyk f'keykA

fo"k;-&&izkFkhZ ds cPpksa dk uke o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r e/kkuk ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ

djok, tkus ckjsA fd v/khu /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oe~ e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr

tUe iathdj.k djus ckjsA

b'rgkj

gj [kkl o vke turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ Jh izse izdk'k 'kekZ us

v/kksgLrk{kjh ds U;k;ky; esa ,d vkosnu i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mlus vius cPpksa dk uke o tUe

frfFk;ka xzke iapk;r e/kkuk ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ ugha djok;k gS] vc izkFkhZ vius cPpksa dk

uke o tUe frfFk;ka xzke iapk;r e/kkuk ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djokuk pkgrk gS] tks dh bl

izdkj ls gS%&

Øe la[;k

uke

lacU/k

tUe frfFk

1-

fczt eksgu 'kekZ

iq=

01&08&1991

2-

vuqiek

iq=h

10&08&1993

vr% xzke iapk;r e/kkuk] rglhy pkSiky dh turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS

fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks mijksDr iathdj.k ckjs dksbZ vkifÙk gks rks rkjh[k 19&09&2016 dks ;k blls iwoZ

vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuh vkifÙk izLrqr djsa vU;Fkk vkosnu i= ij tUe

iathdj.k vkns'k ikfjr djds lfpo xzke iapk;r e/kkuk dks vkxkeh dk;kZUo;u gsrq Hkst fn;k tk;sxkA

4074

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

vkt fnukad 19&08&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr vnkyr ls tkjh fd;k x;kA

eksgjA

vfuy pkSgku]

mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½]

pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh vfuy pkSgku] mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½ pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky]

ftyk f'keyk ¼fgekpy izns'k½

Jh jfoanj flag iq= Jh NTtw jke] xkao ckanqj] Mkd?kj iokgu] rglhy pkSiky] ftyk f'keyk

cuke

¼1½ vke turkA

¼2½ iz/kku xzke iapk;r iokgu] rglhy pkSiky] ftyk f'keykA

fo"k;-&&izkFkhZ dk uke o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r iokgu ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djok, tkus

ckjsA fd v/khu /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oe~ e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr tUe iathdj.k

djus ckjsA

b'rgkj

gj [kkl o vke turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ Jh jfoanj flag us

v/kksgLrk{kjh ds U;k;ky; esa ,d vkosnu i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mlus viuk uke o tUe frfFk xzke

iapk;r iokgu ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ ugha djok;k gS] vc izkFkhZ viuk uke o tUe frfFk xzke

iapk;r iokgu ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djokuk pkgrk gS] tks dh bl izdkj ls gS%&

uke

lacU/k

tUe frfFk

jfoanj flag

iq= NTtw jke

14&11&1991

vr% xzke iapk;r iokgu] rglhy pkSiky dh turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS

fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks mijksDr iathdj.k ckjs dksbZ vkifÙk gks rks rkjh[k 19&09&2016 dks ;k blls iwoZ

vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuh vkifÙk izLrqr djsa vU;Fkk vkosnu i= ij tUe

iathdj.k vkns'k ikfjr djds lfpo xzke iapk;r iokgu dks vkxkeh dk;kZUo;u gsrq Hkst fn;k tk;sxkA

vkt fnukad 19&08&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr vnkyr ls tkjh fd;k x;kA

eksgjA

vfuy pkSgku]

mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½]

pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky ¼fg0 iz0½A

4075

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

c vnkyr Jh vfuy pkSgku] mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½ pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky]

ftyk f'keyk ¼fgekpy izns'k½

Jh gjh'k pan iq= Jh jk;ey] xkao FkaxkM] Mkd?kj FkaxkM] xzke iapk;r fdj.k] mi&rglhy us#ok]

rglhy pkSiky] ftyk f'keyk] fgekpy izns'kA

cuke

¼1½ vke turkA

¼2½ iz/kku xzke iapk;r fdj.k] mi&rglhy us#ok] rglhy pkSiky] ftyk f'keykA

fo"k;-&&izkFkhZ ds cPpksa dk uke o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r fdj.k ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ

djok, tkus ckjsA fd v/khu /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oe~ e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr

tUe iathdj.k djus ckjsA

b'rgkj

gj [kkl o vke turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ Jh gjh'k pan us

v/kksgLrk{kjh ds U;k;ky; esa ,d vkosnu i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mlus vius cPpksa dk uke o tUe frfFk

xzke iapk;r fdj.k ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ ugha djok;k gS] vc izkFkhZ vius cPpksa dk uke o

tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r fdj.k ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djokuk pkgrk gS] tks dh bl izdkj ls

gS%&

Øe la[;k

uke

lacU/k

tUe frfFk

1-

dkfrZd

iq=

18&04&1995

2-

vfiZr

iq=

13&02&1998

vr% xzke iapk;r fdj.k] mi&rglhy us#ok] rglhy pkSiky dh turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj

lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks mijksDr iathdj.k ckjs dksbZ vkifÙk gks rks rkjh[k

19&09&2016 dks ;k blls iwoZ vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuh vkifÙk izLrqr djsa

vU;Fkk vkosnu i= ij tUe iathdj.k vkns'k ikfjr djds lfpo xzke iapk;r fdj.k dks vkxkeh

dk;kZUo;u gsrq Hkst fn;k tk;sxkA

vkt fnukad 19&08&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr vnkyr ls tkjh fd;k x;kA

eksgjA

vfuy pkSgku]

mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½]

pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh vfuy pkSgku] mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½ pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky]

ftyk f'keyk ¼fgekpy izns'k½

Jh eksgen vyh iq= Jh Qrs nhu] xkao dhek panzkoyh] Mkd?kj dsnh] rglhy pkSiky] ftyk

f'keykA

cuke

¼1½ vke turkA

4076

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

¼2½ iz/kku xzke iapk;r dsnh] rglhy pkSiky] ftyk f'keykA

fo"k;-&&izkFkhZ ds iq= dk uke o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r dsnh ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djok,

tkus ckjsA fd v/khu /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oe~ e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr tUe

iathdj.k djus ckjsA

b'rgkj

gj [kkl o vke turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ Jh eksgen vyh us

v/kksgLrk{kjh ds U;k;ky; esa ,d vkosnu i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mlus vius csVs dk uke o tUe frfFk

xzke iapk;r dsnh ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ ugha djok;k gS] vc izkFkhZ vius csVs dk uke o tUe

frfFk xzke iapk;r dsnh ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djokuk pkgrk gS] tks dh bl izdkj ls gS%&

uke

lacU/k

tUe frfFk

vjeku

iq=

21&02&2002

vr% xzke iapk;r dsnh] rglhy pkSiky dh turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk

gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks mijksDr iathdj.k ckjs dksbZ vkifÙk gks rks rkjh[k 19&09&2016 dks ;k blls

iwoZ vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuh vkifÙk izLrqr djsa vU;Fkk vkosnu i= ij tUe

iathdj.k vkns'k ikfjr djds lfpo xzke iapk;r dsnh dks vkxkeh dk;kZUo;u gsrq Hkst fn;k tk;sxkA

vkt fnukad 19&08&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr vnkyr ls tkjh fd;k x;kA

eksgjA

vfuy pkSgku]

mi&e.Mykf/kdkjh ¼ukxfjd½]

pkSiky] rglhy pkSiky ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&

In the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Theog, District Shimla, H. P.

Smt. Soma d/o Shri Jaisi Ram, r/o Village Dohan, Tehsil Theog, District Shimla, H.P.

. . Applicant.

Versus

The General Public

. . Respondent.

Application under Section 13 (3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.

Whereas, Smt. Soma d/o Shri Jaisi Ram, r/o Village Dohan, Tehsil Theog, District Shimla,

Himachal Pradesh has moved an application stating therein that she could not register the death of

her sister namely Gora whose date of death is 09-09-2008 in the record of Gram Panchayat Nahol,

Tehsil Theog.

Whereas, by this notice, the general public is hereby informed that any person having any

objection for entries of the above mentioned date, may submit his/her objection in writing in this

court on or before 06-09-2016, failing which no objection will be entertained after expiry of date

and final order shall be issued for entry.

4077

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

Given under my hand and seal of the court on this 05-08-2016.

Seal.

Sd/-

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Theog, District Shimla.

__________

In the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Theog, District Shimla, H. P.

Smt. Soma d/o Shri Jaisi Ram, r/o Village Dohan, Tehsil Theog, District Shimla, H.P.

. . Applicant.

Versus

The General Public

. . Respondent.

Application under Section 13 (3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.

Whereas, Smt. Soma d/o Shri Jaisi Ram, r/o Village Dohan, Tehsil Theog, District Shimla,

Himachal Pradesh has moved an application stating therein that she could not register the death of

her mother namely Rasala whose date of death is 02-04-2012 in the record of Gram Panchayat

Nahol, Tehsil Theog.

Whereas, by this notice, the general public is hereby informed that any person having any

objection for entries of the above mentioned date of death, may submit his/her objection in writing

in this court on or before 06-09-2016, failing which no objection will be entertained after expiry of

date and final order shall be issued for entry.

Given under my hand and seal of the court on this 05-08-2016.

Seal.

Sd/-

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Theog, District Shimla.

__________

In the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Theog, District Shimla, H. P.

Smt. Soma d/o Shri Jaisi Ram, r/o Village Dohan, Tehsil Theog, District Shimla, H.P.

. . Applicant.

Versus

The General Public

. . Respondent.

Application under Section 13 (3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.

4078

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

Whereas, Smt. Soma d/o Shri Jaisi Ram, r/o Village Dohan, Tehsil Theog, District Shimla,

Himachal Pradesh has moved an application stating therein that she could not register the death of

her father namely Jaisi Ram s/o Lala Ram whose date of death is 22-12-2014 in the record of

Gram Panchayat Nahol, Tehsil Theog.

Whereas, by this notice, the general public is hereby informed that any person having any

objection for entries of the above mentioned date of death, may submit his/her objection in writing

in this court on or before 06-09-2016, failing which no objection will be entertained after expiry of

date and final order shall be issued for entry.

Given under my hand and seal of the court on this 05-08-2016.

Seal.

Sd/-

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Theog, District Shimla.

__________

c vnkyr Jh vkj0 ds0 eexkbZu] dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh mi&rglhy dejÅ]

ftyk fljekSj] fg0 iz0

fnus'k iq= Jh jksMk jke

cuke

vke turk

izkFkZuk&i= tsjs /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-

Jh fnus'k iq= Jh jksMk jke] fuoklh dejÅ ¼pkSdh½] mi&rglhy dejÅ us bl vnkyr esa ,d

izkFkZuk&i= xqtkjk gS fd mldh yM+dh dk uke xzke iapk;r dejÅ esa bf'kdk ntZ gS ftls izkFkhZ cny

dj T;ksfr ntZ djokuk pkgrk gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k dks bl b'rgkj ds ekQZr lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd bl ckjs fdlh dks dksbZ

mtj@,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 9&9&16 dks izkr% 11-00 cts vnkyr gtk fLFkr dejÅ esa vlkyru ;k

odkyru gkftj vkdj ntZ djk ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k ds i'pkr~ dksbZ vkifŸk izkIr u gksus dh lwjr

esa izkFkZuk&i= Jh fnus'k iq= jksMk jke ij fu;ekuqlkj dk;Zokgh dh tk;sxhA

vr% fnukad 16&08&16 dks esjs gLrk{kj o dk;kZy; eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]

mi&rglhy dejÅA

4079

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

c vnkyr Jh vkj0 ds0 eexkbZu] dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh mi&rglhy dejÅ]

ftyk fljekSj] fg0 iz0

dq0 jhuk Bkdqj

cuke

vke turk

izkFkZuk&i= tsjs /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-

dq0 jhuk Bkdqj iq=h Jh tksxh jke] fuoklh dejÅ us bl vnkyr esa ,d izkFkZuk&i= xqtkjk gS

fd mldk viuk uke xzke iapk;r dejÅ esa jhuk gS og vius Ldwy izek.k ds eqrkfcd jhuk Bkdqj djkuk

pkgrh gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k dks bl b'rgkj ds ekQZr lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd bl ckjs fdlh dks dksbZ

mtj@,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 3&9&16 dks izkr% vnkyr gtk fLFkr dejÅ esa vlkyru ;k odkyru

gkftj vkdj ntZ djk ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k ds i'pkr~ dksbZ vkifŸk izkIr u gksus dh lwjr esa

izkFkZuk&i= dq0 jhuk Bkdqj ij fu;ekuqlkj dk;Zokgh dh tk;sxhA

vr% fnukad 16&08&16 dks esjs gLrk{kj o dk;kZy; eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]

mi&rglhy dejÅA

&&&&&&&&

In the Court of Shri H. S. Rana, H.A.S., Marriage Officer (SDM) Paonta Sahib,

District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh

NOTICE UNDER SECTION 16 OF SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1954

In the matter of :

Shri Sumit Saini s/o Shri Gopal Singh, r/o Village Santokhgarh, Tehsil & District Una,

H.P. and Smt. Sarita d/o Shri Amar Singh, r/o Village & P.O. Gawali, Tehsil Shillai, District

Sirmaur, H.P.

Versus

General Public

An Application for registration of Marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954.

Shri Sumit Saini s/o Shri Gopal Singh, r/o Village Santokhgarh, Tehsil & District Una,

H.P. and Smt. Sarita d/o Shri Amar Singh, r/o Village & P.O. Gawali, Tehsil Shillai, District

4080

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

Sirmaur, H.P. before the undersigned on dated 16-08-2016 for registration of their marriage

solemnized between them on 16-11-2015 and they have been living as husband and wife ever since

then. Notices are given to all concerned and General Public to this effect that if any body have any

objection regarding the registration of marriage duly solemnized on 16-11-2015 of Shri Sumit Saini

s/o Shri Gopal Singh, r/o Village Santokhgarh, Tehsil & District Una, H.P. and Smt. Sarita d/o

Shri Amar Singh, r/o Village & P.O. Gawali, Tehsil Shillai, District Sirmaur, H.P. he should file

written objections and appear personally or through an authorized agent before this court within 30

days from the date of issue of this notice. After expiry of the said period, the marriage certificate

would be issued to the applicants by this court.

Issued under my hand and office seal of this court on 17-08-2016.

Seal.

HARI SINGH RANA (HAS),

Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur.

__________

In the Court of Shri H. S. Rana, H.A.S., Marriage Officer (SDM) Paonta Sahib,

District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh

NOTICE UNDER SECTION 16 OF SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1954

In the matter of :

Shri Mukesh Kumar s/o Shri Sita Ram, r/o Village Pagar, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District

Sirmaur, H.P. and Smt. Ravinder Kaur d/o Shri Phool Singh, r/o Jalampur Shekh, P.O. Station

Nehtaur, District Bijnoar, UP

Versus

General Public

An Application for registration of Marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954.

Shri Mukesh Kumar s/o Shri Sita Ram, r/o Village Pagar, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District

Sirmaur, H.P. and Smt. Ravinder Kaur d/o Shri Phool Singh, r/o Jalampur Shekh, P.O. Station

Nehtaur, District Bijnoar, UP before the undersigned on dated 16-08-2016 for registration of their

marriage solemnized between them on 20-7-2016 and they have been living as husband and wife

ever since then. Notices are given to all concerned and General Public to this effect that if any body

have any objection regarding the registration of marriage duly solemnized on 20-7-2016 of

Shri Mukesh Kumar s/o Shri Sita Ram, r/o Village Pagar, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur,

H.P. and Smt. Ravinder Kaur d/o Shri Phool Singh, r/o Jalampur Shekh, P.O. Station Nehtaur,

District Bijnoar, UP he should file written objections and appear personally or through an

authorized agent before this court within 30 days from the date of issue of this notice. After expiry

of the said period, the marriage certificate would be issued to the applicants by this court.

4081

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

Issued under my hand and office seal of this court on 17-08-2016.

Seal.

HARI SINGH RANA (HAS),

Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur.

__________

In the court of Shri H. S. Rana, H.A.S., Marriage Officer (SDM) Paonta Sahib,

District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh

NOTICE UNDER SECTION 16 OF SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1954

In the matter of :

Shri Vishal s/o Shri Padam Kumar, r/o Village Vikash Nagar, District Dehradun at present

Devi Nagar, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. and Smt. Anshul Gairola d/o Shri Gopi Ram

Gairola, r/o Vikash Nagar, District Dehradun, UK.

Versus

General Public

An Application for registration of Marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954.

Shri Vishal s/o Shri Padam Kumar, r/o Village Vikash Nagar, District Dehradun at present

Devi Nagar, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. and Smt. Anshul Gairola d/o Shri Gopi Ram

Gairola, r/o Vikash Nagar, District Dehradun, UK before the undersigned on dated 16-08-2016 for

registration of their marriage solemnized between them on 04-08-2016 and they have been living as

husband and wife ever since then. Notices are given to all concerned and General Public to this

effect that if any body have any objection regarding the registration of marriage duly solemnized on

4-8-2016 of Shri Vishal s/o Shri Padam Kumar, r/o Village Vikash Nagar, District Dehradun at

present Devi Nagar, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H. P. and Smt. Anshul Gairola d/o Shri Gopi

Ram Gairola, r/o Vikash Nagar, District Dehradun, UK he should file written objections and appear

personally or through an authorized agent before this court within 30 days from the date of issue of

this notice. After expiry of the said period, the marriage certificate would be issued to the

applicants by this court.

Issued under my hand and office seal of this court on 17-08-2016.

Seal.

HARI SINGH RANA (HAS),

Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur.

4082

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 30 vxLr] 2016@8 Hkknzin] 1938

In the Court of Shri H. S. Rana, H.A.S., Marriage Officer (SDM) Paonta Sahib,

District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh

NOTICE UNDER SECTION 16 OF SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1954

In the matter of :

Shri Lhundup s/o Shri Tashi, r/o Sakya Tibetan Society Puruwala Shampur Gorkhuwala,

Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. and Smt. Passang Thakchoe d/o Shri Wangla, r/o Sakya

Tibetan Society Puruwala Shampur Gorkhuwala, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P.

Versus

General Public

An Application for registration of Marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954.

Shri Lhundup s/o Shri Tashi, r/o Sakya Tibetan Society Puruwala Shampur Gorkhuwala,

Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. and Smt. Passang Thakchoe d/o Shri Wangla, r/o Sakya

Tibetan Society Puruwala Shampur Gorkhuwala, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. before

the undersigned on dated 16-08-2016 for registration of their marriage solemnized between them

on 15-03-2003 and they have been living as husband and wife ever since then. Notices are given to

all concerned and General Public to this effect that if any body have any objection regarding the

registration of marriage duly solemnized on 15-03-2003 of Shri Lhundup s/o Shri Tashi, r/o Sakya

Tibetan Society Puruwala Shampur Gorkhuwala, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. and

Smt. Passang Thakchoe d/o Shri Wangla, r/o Sakya Tibetan Society Puruwala Shampur

Gorkhuwala, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. he should file written objections and

appear personally or through an authorized agent before this court within 30 days from the date of

issue of this notice. After expiry of the said period, the marriage certificate would be issued to the

applicants by this court.

Issued under my hand and office seal of this court on 17-08-2016.

Seal.

HARI SINGH RANA (HAS),

Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur.

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