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LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Shimla, the 30^th November, 2016

No: Shram (A) 6-3/2016 (Awards).—In exercise of the powers vested under section 17 (1)

of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order the

publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court

Shimla on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment Government of Himachal

Pradesh:—

Sr.No:

Case No.

Title of the Case

Date of Award

57/2014

Shri Vijay Kumar V/S M/S JST Stesalit

Transformers, Jharmajri, Baddi District Solan,

H.P.

56/2014

Shri Naresh Kumar V/s -do-

08/2013

Shri Amar Singh & Ors. V/S The General

Manager, Euro Solo Energy System Ltd. Solan.

50/2016

Shri Naresh Kumar V/S The Executive

Engineer, HPPWD Division Rajgarh District

Sirmour, H.P.

23/2016

Shri Pritam Singh V/S M/S Indo farm Equipent

Ltd. Baddi Districtt Solan, H.P.

66/2012

Smt. Shakuntla Devi V/S the General Manager,

L.S. Industries, Village Bersan, Nalagarh

District Solan, H.P.

By order,

Sd/-

Pr. Secretary (Lab. & Emp.).

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IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL

TRIBUNAL-CUMLABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P).

Ref. No. 57 of 2014.

Instituted on.11.8.2014.

Decided on 25.10.2016.

Vijay Kumar S/o Shri Milkhi Ram R/o Village Lower Thana, P.O Jahmat, Tehsil Sarkaghat,

District Mandi, HP.

. .Petitioner.

Vs.

M/s JST Stesalit Transformers HB No. 214, Bhatoli Kalan, Hill Top, Industrial Adre-1,

Jharmajari, Tehsil Baddi, District Solan, HP through its Employer/Managing Director.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For petitioner :

Shri R.K Khidtta, Advocate.

For respondent :

Shri Rahul Mahajan, Advocate.

AWARD

The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Vijay Kumar S/o Shri Milkhi Ram R/o

Village Lower Thana, P.O Jahmat, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, HP w.e.f.

13.6.2013 by the Managing Director of M/s JST Transformers HB No. 214, Bhatoli

Kalan, Hill Top, Industrial Area-1, Jharmajari, Tehsil Baddi, District Solan, HP

without complying with the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

is legal and justified? If not, what benefits, including reinstatement, amount of back-

wages, salary, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is

entitled to from the above employer?”

In nutshell, the case of the petitioner is that he being qualified in welding and electric

trade was engaged as welder by the respondent management w.e.f. 1.10.2012 and worked as such

till 6.5.2013 continuously and that his services had been terminated by the respondent w.e.f.

7.5.2013 (which has been wrongly mentioned in the demand notice as 13.6.2013) without

following the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as to

Act) as well as against the terms of employment agreement between the parties as neither any

notice nor retrenchment compensation had been paid to him. The petitioner is a workman as

defined under the provisions of the Act and he used to work manually and that the allegations

leveled by the respondent in the termination letter are false. It is further stated that the petitioner is

EN-ISO certified in welding and was having seven years’ experience and was having certificate of

welding test and due to his certificate, the respondent started the welding work and that he visited

the office of respondent number of times for his reengagement but except assurances nothing has

been done. The work and conduct of the petitioner was always appreciated by the concerned

official as nothing contrary was ever conveyed to him as neither warning letter nor chargesheet was

ever served upon him during his service period. It is also stated that after the termination of the

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services of the petitioner, new persons have been engaged and junior persons to him are still

working with the respondent which is against the principle of “last come first go” and that the work

which the petitioner was performing is still available with the respondent. It is also stated that after

termination, the petitioner filed one complaint to the Hon’ble Chief Justice and also filed demand

notice before the Conciliation Officer, Baddi and that the petitioner is unemployed w.e.f. 7.5.2013

and the illegal termination of the petitioner tantamounts to unfair labour practice. Against this back-

drop a prayer has been made for reinstatement with seniority, continuity and back-wages along-

with damages to the tune of ` 1,00,000/-.

The respondent contested the claim by filing reply wherein preliminary objections had

been raised qua maintainability of petition and reference, that the petitioner being a trainee is not a

workman and that the petitioner is gainfully employed. On merits, it has been asserted that the

petitioner was working as technician-cum-operator/welder/trainee who executed an employment

agreement dated 1.10.2012 notarized on 8.10.2012 and he was also issued appointment letter dated

1.10.2012 and since he was appointed as trainee his services had rightly been terminated in terms of

employment agreement on account of unsatisfactory work/performance and even the petitioner

being a trainee is not a workman and the principle of “last come first go” is not applicable in the

present case. It is further submitted that the petitioner is gainfully employed and he never visited

the office of respondent for re-engagement. The respondent prayed for the dismissal of the claim

petition.

By filing rejoinder to the reply, the petitioner reaffirmed the allegations by denying

those of the respondent.

Pleadings of the parties give rise to the following issues which were struck on

15.9.2015.

Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 13.6.2013, is in

violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as alleged? . .OPP.

If issue no.1. is proved in affirmative to what relief of service benefits, the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

Whether the petitioner is not a workman as per section 2-s of the Act? . .OPR.

Whether the petition is not maintainable as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

Besides having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have also gone through the

record of the case carefully.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,

my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.

Issue no.1

Yes.

Issue no.2

Entitled to reinstatement in service with seniority and continuity but without

back-wages.

Issue no.3

No.

Issue no.4

No.

Relief.

Reference answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent

per operative part of award.

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Reasons for findings.

Issues no.1&3.

Being interlinked and correlated both these issues are taken up together for decision.

The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the services of the petitioner had

been terminated in utter violation of the provisions of the Act as neither any enquiry was conducted

nor he was afforded any opportunity of being heard. He further contended that fresh hands have

been engaged and juniors have been retained after the termination of the services of the petitioner

in violation of the provisions of section 25-G & H of the Act.

10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent contended that being the trainee,

the services of the petitioner had rightly been terminated by the respondent in terms of agreement

dated 1.10.2012 for unsatisfactory work. He further contended that the petitioner was engaged as

trainee, hence, does not fall within the category of workman.

11. To prove issue no.1, the petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 to depose that

he joined the respondent company on 1.10.2012 as certified welder and worked as such till

6.5.2013, copy of appointment letter is Ex. PW-1/A. At the time of his joining in the company, an

agreement was executed with the company to serve for three years but his services were terminated

on 6.5.2013 and before terminating his services neither any notice was issued nor any

compensation was paid to him and even no warning letter was issued and no enquiry was

conducted against him. He was doing manual work. The copy of termination letter is Ex. PW-1/B.

Despite requests, he was not reengaged by the respondent. His juniors are still working with the

respondent and the work which he was performing is still available. Ex. PW-1/C is the copy of

demand notice and that after his termination, he is unemployed. In cross-examination, he admitted

that employment agreement dated 1.10.2012 Ex. RP-1 was signed by him and that except

appointment letter Ex. PW-1/A and agreement Ex. RP-1, no other appointment letter was ever

issued to him. He denied that he was appointed as trainee welder. He admitted that ` 5000/- to

` 7000/- per month are required for meeting day to day expenses of the family and ` 17903 were

deposited in his account.

12. On the other hand, the respondent has examined one Shri Anil Gupta, General

Manager, who tendered his affidavit Ex. RW-1/A, in examination-in-chief wherein he has

reiterated almost all the contents of reply filed by the respondent He also tendered in evidence

certificate dated 16.7.2015 Ex. RW-1/B, employment contract dated 1.9.2015 Ex. RW-1/C, postal

receipt dated 7.5.2013 Ex. RW-1/D, reply to demand notice Ex. RW-1/E, full and final payment

detail mark RX, counter foil of bank receipt mark RY and board resolution dated 24.9.2012 mark

RZ. In cross-examination, he admitted that the petitioner was appointed on 1.10.2012 vide

appointment letter Ex. PW-1/A and he worked till 6.5.2013 continuously and that they used to pay

the salary to the petitioner. He admitted that neither any notice was issued nor any compensation

was paid to the petitioner and the enquiry was also not conducted against him prior to his

termination. He further admitted that the petitioner is EN-ISO-15085 certified in welding and he

was having seven years of experience prior to joining. He further admitted that at a later stage,

fresh hands have been appointed after the termination of the petitioner. He denied that the petitioner

had completed 240 days in 12 calendar months preceding his termination.

13. I have gone through the respective contentions of the learned counsels for the parties

and also closely scrutinized the entire evidence, on record, and from the closer scrutiny thereof, it

has become clear that the petitioner was appointed on 1.10.2012 vide appointment letter Ex. PW-

1/A and he worked till 6.5.2013. The case of the respondent is that the petitioner was appointed as a

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trainee and in terms of employment agreement Ex. RP-1, his services were terminated on 6.5.2013

on account of unsatisfactory work/performance. However, no satisfactory evidence has been led by

the respondent to show that the petitioner was appointed as a trainee. The perusal of the

appointment letter Ex. PW-1/A shows that the petitioner was appointed as welder w.e.f. 1.10.2012.

At this stage, it would be relevant to reproduce the relevant extract of appointment letter which

reads as under:

“We are pleased to offer you employment in the position of welder with JST Stesallt

Transformers Pvt. Ltd. Your appointment as welder will commence on 01.10.2012.

As Welder you will be entitled to a monthly starting remuneration of ` 18490/- (` Eighteen

Thousand four hundred ninety only).”

Even, in the agreement dated 1.10.2012, Ex. RP-1, it has been mentioned that the petitioner

has been selected and appointed as Technician-cum-Operator in the company. The learned counsel

for the respondent contended that in clause-4 of the terms and conditions of the employment

agreement Ex. RP- 1, it has been mentioned that, “the trainee shall abide by the Standing orders or

general rules of the company during the tenure”. However, I have perused the employment

agreement Ex. RP-1 and the fact that the term, “trainee” has been mentioned in clause 4, would not

make the petitioner a trainee particularly in view of the fact that in the rest of the terms and

conditions of the employment agreement the word, “employee” has been mentioned. No other

evidence has been led by the respondent to prove that the petitioner was appointed as a trainee.

Therefore, in view of the appointment letter Ex. PW-1/A coupled with the employment agreement

Ex. RP-1, it cannot be said that the petitioner was appointed as a trainee and as such it cannot be

said that the petitioner is not a “workman” as defined under section 2(s) of the Act as contended by

the learned counsel for the respondent.

14. Admittedly, the petitioner had worked with the respondent w.e.f. 1.10.2012 till

6.5.2013. Now, the question which arises for consideration is as to whether the services of the

petitioner had been terminated in contravention of the provisions of the Act or not. It is the case of

the petitioner that he had completed 240 working days in twelve calendar months preceding his

termination, hence there is violation of section 25-F of the Act. However, when regard is given to

the evidence on record, there is no material on record which could show that the petitioner has

completed 240 working days in twelve calendar months preceding his termination. In 2009 (120)

FLR 1007 incase titled as Relip Nagarpalika Vs. Babuji Gabhaji Thakore and others , the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has held as under:

“The burden of proof lies on the workman to show that he had worked continuously for 240

days for the preceding one year and it is for the workman to adduce evidence apart from

examining himself to prove the factum of being in employment of the employer.”

15. In AIR 2006 S.C. 110 case titled as Surindernagar District Panchyat V/s

Dayabhai Amar Singh, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:—“Incase workman claims

to have worked for more than 10 years as daily wager. Apart from oral evidence workman has not

produced any evidence to prove fact that he has worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary

or wages or any record or order in that regard was produced: no co-worker was examined; muster

roll produced by employer has not been contradicted. Workman has failed to discharge his burden

that he was in employment for 240 days during preceding 12 months of date of termination of his

service. Workman not entitled for protection of Section 25-F before his service was terminated.”

A bare perusal of the extract of the judgment re-produced, hereinabove, shows that the

burden to prove completion of 240 days service lies on the workman and this burden is discharged

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on workman stepping in the witness box and adducing cogent evidence. However, in the instant

case, the petitioner has failed to prove on record that he had put in 240 days in twelve calendar

months preceding his termination. It is the admitted case of the petitioner that he had worked w.e.f.

1.10.2012 till 6.5.2013 as such he has not completed 240 working days in twelve calendar months

preceding his termination. Hence, the case of the petitioner does not fall under section 25-F of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such no protection of section 25-F can be granted to the

petitioner.

16. The learned counsel of the petitioner also contended that at the time of the termination

of the petitioner, the respondent had retained his juniors who are still working as such the

respondent had violated the principles of “last come first go”. However, except for the bald

statement of the petitioner, no other evidence has been led by him. There is no cogent and

satisfactory evidence led by the petitioner to prove that the persons junior to him have been retained

by the respondent. Hence, in the absence of any cogent and satisfactory evidence on record, the

case of the petitioner does not fall under section 25-G.

17. The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that after the termination of the

petitioner fresh hands have been engaged by the respondent in violation of section 25-H of the Act.

The petitioner while appearing in the witness box before this Court deposed that after the

termination of his services fresh appointments were made by the respondent. This fact has also

been admitted by RW-1 Shri Amit Gupta, General Manager of the respondent company in his

cross-examination that at a later stage the company had appointed fresh hands after the termination

of the petitioner. There is no evidence on record to suggest that any opportunity was given to the

petitioner for re-employment at the time of appointment of fresh hands. It has been held by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in a series of judgments that it is not necessary for the workman to

complete 240 days during preceding twelve calendar months for taking the benefit of section 25-H

of the Act . In a case Central Bank of India Vs. S. Satyam and others (1996) 5 SCC 419, it has been

held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that 240 days of continuous service necessarily need not be

completed within 12 months for taking benefit of section 25-G and H of the Industrial Disputes

Act. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:

“The plain language of Section 25-H speaks only of re-employment of “retrenched

workmen”. The ordinary meaning of the expression “retrenched workmen” must relate to

the wide meaning of ‘retrenchment’ given in Section 2(oo). Section 25-F also uses the word

‘retrenchment’ but qualifies it by use of the further words “workman… who has been in

continuous service for not less than one year”. Thus, Section 25-F does not restrict the

meaning of retrenchment but qualifies the category of retrenched workmen covered therein

by use of the further words “workman… who has been in continuous service for not less

than one year”. It is clear that Section 25-F applies to the retrenchment of a workman who

has been in continuous service for not less than one year and not to any workman who has

been in continuous service for less than one year; and it does not restrict or curtail the

meaning of retrenchment merely because the provision therein is made only for the

retrenchment of a workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year.

Chapter V-A deals with all retrenchments while Section 25-F is confined only to the mode

of retrenchment of workmen in continuous service for not less than one year. Section 25-G

prescribes the principles for retrenchment and applies ordinarily the principles of “last come

first go” which is not confined only to workmen who have been in continuous service for

not less than one year, covered by Section 25-F.”

After relying upon the aforesaid judgment, our own Hon’ble High Court in a case Latest

HLJ 2007 (HP) 903, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and others Vs. Bhatag Ram and others, has

held that it is not necessary for the workman to complete 240 days during 12 calendar months for

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taking the benefits of section 25-G and 25-H of the Act. In the present case, as observed earlier, it

has been admitted by RW-1 that the respondent had engaged fresh hands after the termination of

the services of the petitioner. Since, no opportunity was given to the petitioner for re-employment,

at the time of engaging fresh hands, it can ly be held that the termination of the services of the

petitioner is in violation of the provisions of section 25-H of the Act.

18. Thus, in view of the law laid down (supra) and my foregoing discussion, I have no

hesitation in holding that the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f 7.5.2013 by the

respondent is in contravention of the provisions of section 25-H of the Act. Accordingly, both these

issues are decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

Issue no.2.

19. Since, I have held under issue no.1 above that the termination of services of the

petitioner by the respondent without complying with the provisions of the Act is improper, illegal

and unjustified, hence, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in service with seniority and

continuity.

20. Now, the question which arises for consideration, before this Court is as to whether the

petitioner is entitled to full back wages as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In

(2009) 1 SCC 20, Kanpur Electricity Supply Company Limited Vs. Shamim Mirza, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has held that once the order of termination of services of an employee is set-aside,

ordinarily, the relief of reinstatement is available to him. However, the entitlement of an employee

to get reinstated does not necessarily result in payment of full or partial back-wages, which is

independent of reinstatement. It has further been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2010 (1)

SLJ S.C 70, M/s Ritu Marbals Vs. Prabhakant Shukla that full back wages cannot be granted

mechanically, upon an order of termination be declared illegal. It is further held that reinstatement

must not be accompanied by payment of full back wages even for the period when the workman

remained out of service and contributed little or nothing to the Industry.

21. Moreover, the petitioner was under an obligation to prove by leading cogent evidence

that he was not gainfully employed after the termination of his services. The initial burden is on the

workman/employee to show that he was not gainfully employed as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court

in (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 363 titled as Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and another Vs. S.C

Sharma that:

“16…………..When, the question of determining the entitlement of a person to back-wages

is concerned, the employee has to show that he was not gainfully employed. The initial

burden is on him. After and if he places materials in that regard, the employer can bring on

record materials to rebut the claim…………..”

22. In the present case, the petitioner as PW-1 has only stated that he is nowhere gainfully

employed. However, except for his bald statement, no other evidence has been led by the petitioner

to prove that he was not gainfully employed. The petitioner has failed to discharge his burden by

placing any concrete material on record and by leading any cogent and satisfactory evidence that he

was not gainfully employed after his termination/disengagement. Therefore, in view of the entire

evidence, on record, coupled with the rulings (supra), I have no hesitation in holding that the

petitioner is not entitled to any back-wages. Accordingly, issue no.2 is partly decided in favour of

the petitioner and against the respondent.

Issue no.4.

23. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondent which could go to

show that as to how this petition is not maintainable especially when the same was filed by the

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petitioner pursuant to reference sent by the appropriate government to this Court for adjudication.

Therefore, by holding it to be maintainable, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent.

Relief.

As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 4, the claim of the

petitioner succeeds and is hereby allowed with the result, the petitioner is ordered to be reinstated

in service forth-with with seniority and continuity. However, the petitioner is not entitled to any

back-wages and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for

publication in the official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned to records.

Announced in the open Court today on this 25th day of October, 2016.

(SUSHIL KUKREJA),

Presiding Judge,

Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla.

___________

IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL

TRIBUNAL-CUMLABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P)

Ref. No. 56 of 2014.

Instituted on.11.8.2014.

Decided on 25.10.2016.

Naresh Kumar S/o Shri Durga Dass R/o Village & P.O Barota, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District

Bilsapur, HP.

. .Petitioner.

Vs.

M/s JST Stesalit Transformers HB No. 214, Bhatoli Kalan, Hill Top, Industrial Adre-1,

Jharmajari, Tehsil Baddi, District Solan, HP through its Employer/Managing Director.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For petitioner :

Shri R.K Khidtta, Advocate.

For respondent :

Shri Rahul Mahajan, Advocate.

AWARD

The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Naresh Kumar S/o Shri Durga Dass R/o

Village & P.O Barota, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, HP w.e.f. 13.6.2013 by the

Managing Director of M/s JST Transformers HB No. 214, Bhatoli Kalan, Hill Top,

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Industrial Area-1, Jharmajari, Tehsil Baddi, District Solan, HP without complying

with the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and

justified? If not, what benefits, including reinstatement, amount of backwages, salary,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from

the above employer?”

In nutshell, the case of the petitioner is that he was engaged as Junior Engineer by the

respondent management w.e.f. 17.9.2012 vide appointment letter dated 3.9.2012 and worked as

such till 5.5.2013 continuously and that his services had been terminated by the respondent w.e.f.

5.5.2013 (which has been wrongly mentioned in demand notice as 13.6.2013) without following

the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as to Act) as

well as against the norms of appointment letter as neither any notice was issued nor retrenchment

compensation was paid to him. The petitioner is a workman as defined under the provisions of the

Act and he used to work manually and that the allegations leveled by the respondent in the

termination letter are false as the petitioner was not probationer at the time of his termination. It is

further stated that the petitioner visited the office of respondent number of times for his

reengagement but except assurances nothing has been done. The work and conduct of the petitioner

was always appreciated by the concerned official as nothing contrary was ever conveyed to him as

neither warning letter nor chargesheet was ever served upon him during his service period. It is also

stated that after the termination of the services of the petitioner, new persons have been engaged

and junior persons to him are still working with the respondent which is against the principle of

“last come first go” and that the work which the petitioner was performing is still available with the

respondent. It is also stated that after termination, the petitioner filed one complaint to the Hon’ble

Chief Justice and also filed demand notice before the Conciliation Officer, Baddi and that the

petitioner is unemployed w.e.f. 5.5.2013 and the illegal termination of the petitioner tantamounts to

unfair labour practice. Against this back-drop a prayer has been made for reinstatement with

seniority, continuity and back-wages along-with damages to the tune of ` 1,00,000/-.

The respondent contested the claim by filing reply wherein preliminary objections had

been raised qua maintainability of petition and reference, that the petitioner was appointed on

probation as Junior Engineer, that the petitioner being Junior Engineer is not a workman and that

the petitioner is gainfully employed. On merits, it has been asserted that the petitioner joined on

probation basis which was not extended or confirmed, hence his services came to an end at the

closing hours of 4.5.2013 and the services of probationer could be terminated for unsatisfactory

work during the probation period and in terms of appointment letter dated 3.9.2012, no notice is

required to terminate the services of the probationer during the probationary period. The services of

petitioner had been terminated on account of lack of performance i.e unsatisfactory work during

probation period as the respondent was not satisfied with the performance of petitioner, who never

followed the instructions of superiors on quality standards repeatedly during his training and

probation period, hence, his services had been rightly and legally terminated in terms of

appointment letter and the principle of “last come first go” is not applicable in the present case. It is

further submitted that the petitioner is gainfully employed. The respondent prayed for the dismissal

of the claim petition.

By filing rejoinder to the reply, the petitioner reaffirmed the allegations by denying

those of the respondent.

Pleadings of the parties give rise to the following issues which were struck on

15.9.2015.

Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 13.6.2013, is in

violation of the provisions of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as

alleged?

. .OPP.

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If issue no.1. is proved in affirmative to what relief of service benefits, the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

Whether the petition is not maintainable as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief.

Besides having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have also gone through the

record of the case carefully.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,

my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.

Issue no.1

No.

Issue no.2

Becomes redundant.

Issue no.3

No.

Relief.

Reference answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner

per operative part of award.

Reasons for findings

Issue no.1.

The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the services of the petitioner had

been terminated in utter violation of the provisions of the Act as neither any enquiry was conducted

nor he was afforded any opportunity of being heard. He further contended that fresh hands have

been engaged and juniors have been retained after the termination of the services of the petitioner.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent contended that being the

probationer, the services of the petitioner had rightly been terminated by the respondent for

unsatisfactory work. He further contended that the petitioner was engaged as Junior Engineer,

hence, he does not fall within the category of workman.

10. To prove issue no.1, the petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 to depose that

he joined the respondent company on 7.9.2012 as Junior Engineer and worked as such till 5.5.2013,

copy of appointment letter is Ex. PW-1/A. His services were terminated by the respondent on

5.5.2013 and before terminating his services, neither any notice was issued nor any compensation

was paid to him and even no warning letter was issued and no enquiry was conducted against him.

He was doing manual work, the copy of termination letter is Ex. PW-1/B. Despite requests, he was

not reengaged by the respondent. His juniors are still working with the respondent and the work

which he was performing is still available. Ex. PW-1/C is the copy of demand notice and that after

his termination, he is unemployed. In cross-examination, he admitted that except letter Ex. PW-

1/A, no other appointment letter was ever issued to him. He denied that he was appointed on

probation but admitted that he had worked till 4.5.2013 evening. He admitted that ` 12332/- were

deposited in his account and that ` 15000/- per month are required for meeting day to day expenses

of the family and the entire family is dependent upon him. He denied that he was never confirmed.

11. On the other hand, the respondent has examined one Shri Anil Gupta, General

Manager, who tendered his affidavit Ex. RW-1/A, in examination-in-chief wherein he has

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reiterated almost all the contents of reply filed by the respondent He also tendered in evidence

certificate dated 16.7.2015 Ex. RW-1/B, employment contract dated 1.9.2015 Ex. RW-1/C, postal

receipt dated 7.5.2013 Ex. RW-1/D, reply to demand notice Ex. RW-1/E, full and final payment

detail mark RX, counter foil of bank receipt mark RY and board resolution dated 24.9.2012 mark

RZ. In cross-examination, he admitted that the petitioner was engaged as Junior Engineer w.e.f.

17.9.2012 vide appointment letter Ex. PW-1/A and he worked as such till 5.5.2013 continuously.

He denied that the petitioner was not engaged on probation basis and that the probation period was

only for a period of six months. He admitted that after the completion of six months, the petitioner

had worked with the respondent. He admitted that neither any notice was issued nor any

compensation was paid to the petitioner and the enquiry was also not conducted against him prior

to his termination. He admitted that the petitioner was working manually on machines. He further

admitted that fresh hands have been engaged after the termination of the petitioner. He expressed

his ignorance that the petitioner had completed 240 days in 12 calendar months preceding his

termination.

12. I have closely scrutinized the entire evidence, on record, and from the closer scrutiny

thereof, it has become clear that the petitioner was engaged as Junior Engineer by the respondent

company on probation for a period of six months as per appointment letter Ex. PW-1/A and his

services were terminated vide termination letter dated 4.5.2013 Ex. PW-1/B.

13. The law in relation to the service of an employee on probation is well settled. The

termination of the services of the probationer, during or at the end of the period of probation does

not affect any of his right, as indeed he has no right to continue to hold the post, save and except

after confirmation. However, where a probationer is stigmatized, evil consequences flow. He has to

live with the stigma all his life. This stigma would affect his future prospects of finding suitable

employment elsewhere. Therefore harmonizing the right of the employer and the right of employee,

the service jurisprudence has recognized that where the termination of the services of a probationer

visits him with a stigma or is penal or malafide, the probationer would have a right to justify that

the cause which has resulted in his being removed is other than relating to his personal capacity,

suitability, utility or capacity to work. In (1999) 2 SCC 21, titled as Radhey Shyam Gupta Vs. U.P

State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd., and another, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court

that the test applicable to government servants or public sector employees, are equally applicable to

labour dispute of such nature relating to the private sector. In (2010) 2 SCC 623, titled as Chaitanya

Prakash & another Vs. H. Omkarappa, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that even if

an order of termination refers to unsatisfactory service of the person concerned, the same cannot be

said to be stigmatic. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:

“18. It is no longer res integra that even if an order of termination refers to unsatisfactory

service of the person concerned, the same cannot be said to be stigmatic………………….

19. ……………………………………..

20. In Pavanendra Narayan verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences, this Court

had the occasion to determine as to whether the impugned order therein was a letter of

termination of services simpliciter or stigmatic termination. After considering various

earlier decisions of this court in para 21 of the aforesaid decision it was stated by this Court

thus :—

“21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of

termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full-

scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct

which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the

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termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination

order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been

upheld.”

21. In Abhijit Gupta, this Court considered as to what will be the real test to be applied in a

situation where an employee is removed by an innocuous order of termination i.e whether

he is discharged as unsuitable or he is punished for his misconduct. In order to answer the

said question, the Court relied and referred to the decision of this Court in Allahabad Bank

Officers Assn. V. Allahabad Bank where it is stated thus :—

“14…….As pointed out in this judgment, expressions like “want of application”, “lack

of potential” and “found not dependable” when made in relation to the work of the

employee would not be sufficient to attract the charge that they are stigmatic and

intended to dismiss the employee from service.”

In 2010 LLR 970 case titled as Ram Lal Sharma Vs. Himachal Road Transport

Corporation & Anr., it has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court that it is always expected

from the employer to keep on reviewing the work and conduct of the employee to assess whether

he is suitable to be retained on the post or not during the period of probation. The relevant portion

of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:

“In the present case, the notice has been issued to the petitioner when the employer was not

satisfied with his work and conduct. It is always expected from the employer to keep on

reviewing the work and conduct of the employee to assess whether he is suitable to be

retained on the post or not during the period of probation. The petitioner was on probation

for a period of two years which was extended by another one year. It was during the

extended period of probation that his work and conduct was looked into by the employer.

The fact that it has been mentioned in the notice that few passengers were found ticket less

at the time of checking of the bus will not make the termination of the petitioner

stigmatic/punitive. This was quoted only to apprise the petitioner that his work and conduct

was not satisfactory.”

14. From the aforesaid decisions, the legal position which emerges is that where an

enquiry is conducted into an alleged misconduct committed by the probationer behind his back and

a simple order of termination is passed founded on the report of the enquiry indicting the

probationer, the action of the termination of the services of the probationer would be tainted. But

where no findings are arrived at, any enquiry or no enquiry is held but the employer chooses to dis-

continue the services of an employee against whom complaints are received, it would be a case of

complaints motivating the action of termination of the services of the probationer and hence would

not be tainted.

15. In the back-drop of the above legal position, now it has to be determined as to whether

the order dated 4.5.2013 passed by the respondent company terminating the services of the

petitioner is stigmatic/punitive and tainted. The petitioner was on probation and his services have

been terminated during the period of probation. No material has been placed on record by the

petitioner that his services have been confirmed at any point of time. The appointment of the

petitioner was subject to the conditions of appointment stipulated in the appointment letter Ex. PW-

1/A. In the terms and condition of the appointment letter it has been clearly mentioned that regular

performance review will be conducted to assess the terms and suitability and unless the petitioner is

confirmed in writing at the end of the probation period or extension thereof, his services with the

company will automatically stand terminated. The relevant portion of the terms and conditions of

the appointment letter reads as under:

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“Probation and termination of employee: You will be on a probation period of six months.

Regular performance review will be conducted to access your performance and suitability.

Your continued employment as Junior Engineer is dependent on your successful completion

of the probationary period. This period may be extended at company’s option. During

probationary period, the service will be terminated on either side without any notice and

assigning any reason. Unless you are confirmed in writing at the end of probation period or

extension thereof, your service with the company will be automatically stand terminated.”

As per termination letter Ex. PW-1/B, the services of the petitioner were terminated for lack

of performance. At this stage, it will be relevant to reproduce the extract of the termination letter

which is as under:

“This is to inform you that the management has hereby decided to terminate your services

with immediate effect. The reason for the same is lack of performance.

We would also like to bring your notice that you are on probationary period and company

found that reason and unsatisfied with your working, the company cannot extend your

probationary period. That why decided to terminate your services with immediate effect.

Your services to our organization would cease at the closing hours of 4th day of May,

2013.”

A bare perusal of the aforesaid order of termination order shows that it was not passed by

way of punishing the petitioner for any misconduct. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the

termination order Ex. PW-1/B was stigmatic or punitive in nature. It was only an order of

termination simpliciter and no stigma was attached to it and it cannot be regarded as punitive

requiring an enquiry into his conduct or attracting the principles of natural justice.

16. The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that as per the appointment letter

Ex. PW-1/A, the probation period of the petitioner was for six months w.e.f. 3.9.2012 but after the

expiry of the probation period, he was allowed to continue in service as such it was a deemed

confirmation and his services could not have been terminated without conducting an enquiry.

However, this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner deserves to be rejected because

mere continuance of the services of the petitioner without confirmation cannot be said to be a

deemed confirmation. In CWP No. 3736/2009 titled as Suman Sharma Vs. Union of India, decided

on 31.12.2014, it has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court that the confirmation order in

writing is must and mere continuance, after expiry of probation period could not be said to be

deemed confirmation. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:

“26. Applying the ratio and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case on

hand, read with the discussion made by the Administrative Tribunal, we are of the

considered view that the confirmation order in writing was must and mere continuance,

after expiry of probation period, cannot be said to be deemed confirmation.”

Hence, in view of the aforesaid decision of the our own Hon’ble high Court, since, the

services of the petitioner were never confirmed in writing as such mere allowing him to continue in

service after the expiry of the probation period cannot be said to be a deemed confirmation as

contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

17. Now, the next question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to

whether section 25-F of the Act is attracted in the present case. The stand of the respondent is that

the petitioner was a probationer and during the period of probation his services could be terminated

without any notice or without assigning any reason as stipulated in the appointment letter as such

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the termination of the petitioner did not amount to retrenchment and provisions contained in section

25-F of the Act are not attracted.

18. In AIR 1994 Supreme Court 1343 titled as M. Venugopal Vs. Divisional Manager,

Life Insurance, Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, Andra Pradesh and another, the Hon’ble

Apex Court had an occasion to consider similar case of termination of probationer and it was held

that the employer was entitled to terminate the services of a probationer during the period of

probation without any notice. It was further held that the termination of the probationer shall not be

deemed to be retrenchment within the meaning of section 2 (oo) of the Act. The relevant portion of

the aforesaid judgment reads as under:

“14. The amendments introduced in Section 48 of the Corporation Act have clearly

excluded the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act so far as they are in conflict with the rules

framed under Section 48(2)(cc). The result whereof will be that termination of the service of the

appellant shall not be deemed to be a "retrenchment" within the meaning of Section 2(oo) even if

sub-section (bb) had not been introduced in the said section. Once Section 2(oo) is not attracted,

there is no question of application of Section 25-F on the basis of which the termination of the

service of the appellant can be held to be invalid. The termination of the service of the appellant

during the period of probation is in terms of the order of appointment read with I Regulation 14 of

the Regulations, which shall be deemed to be now Rules under Section 48(2)(cc) of the Corporation

Act.

15. Even under general law, the service of a probationer can be terminated after making an

overall assessment of his performance during the period of probation and no notice is

required to be given before termination of such service. This aspect has been examined by

this Court in the case of The Governing Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology,

Bangalore v. Dr Pandurang Godwalka where it has been pointed out that if the performance

of the employee concerned during the period of probation is not found to be satisfactory on

overall assessment, then it is open to the competent authority to terminate his service.”

19. In the instant case, the conditions incorporated in the letter of appointment clearly

provide for termination of service during the period of probation without any notice and without

any reason. Therefore, it can safely be held that in bringing about an end to the services of the

petitioner during the period of probation, the respondent was not required to give any notice or to

pay any compensation in terms of section 25-F of the Act. The termination of the services of the

petitioner did not amount to retrenchment and could not be invalidated for non-compliance of

section 25-F of the Act. Moreover, it is the admitted case of the petitioner that he joined with the

respondent on 17.9.2012 and his services were terminated w.e.f. 5.5.2013 as such he had not

completed 240 days, therefore also, the provisions of section 25-F of the Act are not applicable to

the present case.

20. The further case of the petitioner is that after his termination, the respondent had

appointed fresh hands and retained his juniors. However, except for his bald statement, no other

evidence has been led by him. There is no cogent and satisfactory evidence led by the petitioner to

prove that fresh hands have been engaged and his juniors have been retained by the respondent

after his termination. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence on record, it cannot be said that the

termination of the petitioner is in violation of the provisions of section 25-G and 25-H of the Act.

21. Thus, in view of the law laid down (supra) and my foregoing discussion, I have no

hesitation in holding that the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f 5.5.2013 by the

respondent is not illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, issue no.1 is decided in favour of the

respondent and against the petitioner.

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Issue no.2.

22. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1 above, this issue becomes

redundant.

Issue No.3.

23. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondent. However, the

petitioner has filed this claim petition pursuant to the reference made by the appropriate

government to this Court for adjudication and I find nothing wrong with this petition which is

perfectly maintainable. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the

respondent.

Relief.

As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 3, the claim of the

petitioner fails and is hereby dismissed and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in

favour of the respondent and against the petitioner. Let a copy of this award be sent to the

appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned

to records.

Announced in the open Court today on this 25th Day of October, 2016.

(SUSHIL KUKREJA),

Presiding Judge,

Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla.

___________

IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL

TRIBUNALCUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P)

Reference no. 8 of 2013.

Instituted on. 6.3.2013.

Decided on 27.10.2016.

Suresh Kumar S/o Shri Baldev Krishan, R/o Village Nari, P.O Dera Bab Rudru,

District Una HP.

Shashi Pal S/o Shri Dharam Pal R/o Village Gagal, P.O Gagal Khlio, Tehsil Palampur,

District Kangra HP.

Rajeev Chauhan S/o Shri Ranbir Singh R/o Village Aakrohal, P.O Bhareri, Tehsil

Bhoranj, District Hamirpur, HP.

Sushil Kumar S/o Shri Param Chand R/o Village & P.O Goraldhar, Tehsil Jaswan

Kotla, District Kangra, HP.

Ram Chand S/o Shri Tulsi Ram R/o Village Tallar P.O Sai, Tehsil Baddi, District

Solan, HP.

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Anil Kumar S/o Shri Bansi Ram R/o VPO Khundla, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi,

HP.

7. Amar Singh S/o Shri Ramasra R/o Village Thalla, P.O Thana, Tehsil Nalagarh, District

Solan, HP.

Shashi Kumar S/o Shri Rama Nand R/o Village Simmu, P.O Piplughat, Tehsil Arki

District Solan, HP.

Leela Bati W/o Shri Sanja Kumar R/o Village Dhanrishi, P.O Soddot, Tehsil

Sarkaghat, District Mandi, HP.

10. Lalita Sharma D/o Shri Deep Ram Sharma R/o Village Dhalaya, P.O Jabri, Tehsil &

District Shimla, HP.

11. Shanta Devi W/o Shri Yudhvir Singh R/o Village Chhaprahan-II, P.O Nandi, Tehsil

Gohar, District Mandi, HP.

.Petitioners.

Vs.

The managing Director, Euro Solo Energy System Ltd., 4th Floor, Euro House above

Tangent Furniture, Mind Space, Chincholi Bunder Road Office Link Road behind

Inhrbit Mall, Malda (W) Mumbai.

The General Manager, Euro Solo Energy System Ltd. Village Gullarwala, District

Solan, HP.

. .Respondents.

Reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For petitioners :

Shri Rajinder Sharma, Advocate.

For respondents :

Already ex-parte. AWARD.

The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services on the pretext of Lay-off of Shri Amar Singh &

10 other workers (as per list attached along-with addresses at Annexure –A) by the

General Manager, Euro Solo Energy, Ltd Village Gullarwala, District Solan during

May, 2011 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back-wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation etc., the above workmen are entitled to from the

above management/employer?”

2. Before, I proceed further it is important to mention here that after the receipt of

reference, in this Court, notices were issued to the parties, however, the respondents have failed to

appear before this Court despite having been served, hence, vide order dated 4.3.2014, they were

proceeded against ex-parte.

The petitioners have filed a joint statement of claim wherein it has been stated that

petitioners no. 1 to 6 & 8 to 11 were initially engaged as machine operators on 26.7.2006, 8.5.2006,

8.5.2006, 25.6.2006, 5.5.2006, 4.5.2006, 10.5.2006, 5.5.2006 and 8.5.2006 respectively and

petitioner no.7 was initially engaged as electrician on 15.5.2006 and since the date of their

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engagements, they discharged their duties honestly to the entire satisfaction of their superiors and

nothing adverse has ever been conveyed regarding their work and conduct. All the petitioners have

completed 240 days in each calendar year but on 11.5.2011, when they reached the office of

respondent company, they saw the notice regarding the layoff of the company and after enquiry it

was disclosed to them by the respondent management that due to financial crisis in the company,

the respondent is not in a position to run the company in future which stand had been taken by the

company just to mislead the workers as till date the company was not declared as sick company by

the appropriate government, hence, the notice displayed regarding layoff is just to harass the

petitioners along-with other workers and with the intention to retrench the workers from the

company as the management wants to merge or transfer the company with other company. The

layoff notice dated 11.5.2011 is illegal as the respondents company was duty bound to give prior

notice to this effect but no such prior notice had been served upon the petitioners which is

mandatory in law and even regarding layoff, prior permission from the State Government had not

been taken by the respondents. It is further stated that the respondents have miserably failed to

comply with the provisions of sections 25-C, 25-F, 25-G, 25-H and 25-N of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as to Act) as no notice was ever issued to the petitioners before

terminating their services and that the petitioners have come to know that on 22.5.2011, settlement

had been signed by some of the workers of the company but the said agreement is not binding upon

the rights of the petitioners as they are not the parties in that settlement/agreement. It is also stated

that after declaration of layoff, the respondents company had closed the company at Baddi, hence,

the petitioners are entitled to compensation and future loss compensation as per law as the

respondents have not followed the mandatory law as per the Act and even the services of the

petitioners have been terminated during the pendency of the demand notice. Against this back-drop

it is prayed that the layoff notice dated 11.5.2011 be quashed and set aside and the respondents be

directed to reinstate the petitioners with all the consequential service benefits and in the alternative

the respondents be directed to pay compensation to the tune of ` 1,00,000/- to each of the petitioner

for undue harassment.

By leading ex-parte evidence, all the petitioners have stepped into witness box as PW-

1 to PW-11 and tendered their affidavits Ex. PW-1/A to Ex. PW-11/A wherein they have reiterated

almost all the averments as made in the claim petition.

I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and also scrutinized the entire

record of the case.

After the closer scrutiny of the record of the case, it has become clear that all the

petitioners were employed with the respondent company w.e.f. the year, 2006 and they were the

regular employees of the company on its muster rolls. In their deposition before this Court all of

them have stated that they have completed more than 240 days in each calendar year. It has been

specifically deposed by all of the petitioners that on 11.5.2011, the respondent company put the

lock on the main gate and displayed the notice annexure P-2 regarding the layoff of the company

At this stage, it would be relevant to reproduce notice Annexure P-2, which reads as under:

“All the workers, employees of Euro Solo Energy System P. Ltd., Village Gullarwala, Solan

Dist. HP are hereby informed that due to unavoidable circumstances, the management is

constrained to declare LAY-OFF in the factory with effect from 11.5.2011 till further

notice.”

The perusal of the aforesaid notice shows that the lay-off has been declared in the factory

due to unavoidable circumstances. However, as per section 2(kkk) of the Act the only reason for

“lay-off” could be due to shortage of coal, power or raw materials or the accumulation of stocks or

the break-down of machinery or natural calamity or for any other connected reason. At this stage it

would be relevant to reproduce section 2(kkk) of the Act which reads as under:

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“lay-off" (with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions) means the failure,

refusal or inability of an employer on account of shortage of coal, power or raw materials or

the accumulation of stocks or the break-down of machinery [or natural calamity or for any

other connected reason] to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on the

muster rolls of his industrial establishment and who has not been retrenched.”

The perusal of the aforesaid section shows that it does not take care of the other situation

which may require the employer to declare instantaneous lay-off without leaving any scope for

seeking permission of the authority under the Act. “Unavoidable Circumstances” is not a case for

which lay-off can be declared. As per annexure P-4 filed along-with the petition, it has become

clear that there were more than 200 employees employed in the respondent company. As there were

more than 200 workers working in the respondent company, hence, the provisions of chapter-V-B

are applicable in the present case. So far as the question of exemption from the condition of prior

permission is concerned, an industrial establishment to which chapter-V-B applies can lay-off

without permission only when the lay-off is for the reasons specified in section 25-M(1) i.e

shortage of power and natural calamity. The petitioners have placed on record the information

under Right to Information Act dated March, 16th from PIO-cum- Dy. Labour Commissioner, HP

wherein it has been informed to the workers that no application has been received by the office of

the Labour Commissioner from the management of M/s Euro Solo Energy System Ltd., Village

Gullarwala (Baddi) District Solan HP for declaring lay-off of its workers during 2011 and that the

Labour Commissioner has been vested with the powers of appropriate government to grant

permission for declaring lay off under section 25-M of the Act.

From the perusal of the evidence on record led by the petitioners it is clear that no

application has been filed by the respondent company for taking prior permission from the

appropriate authority under the Act for declaring lay-off as per the provisions of section 25-M (1)

of the Act. Hence, in the absence of any prior permission from the competent authority for laying-

off, such lay-off without permission would be in contravention of the provisions of section 25-M

(1) of the Act. Section 25-M (8) of the Act provides that where no application for permission is

made before laying-off the workmen, they shall be entitled to all the benefits. At this juncture it

would be relevant to reproduce section 25-M(8) which reads as under:

”Where no application for permission under sub- section (1) is made, or where no

application for permission under sub- section (3) is made within the period specified

therein, or where the permission for any lay- off has been refused, such lay- off shall be

deemed to be illegal from the date on which the workmen had been laid- off and the

workmen shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if

they had not been laid- off.”

In the present case also since no prior permission has been obtained from the appropriate

authority by the respondent company for declaring lay-off as such the lay-off declared by the

respondent company w.e.f. 11.5.2011 by means of notice annexure P-2 is illegal. From the perusal

of evidence on record, it is clear that the respondent company has declared lay-off only to oust the

petitioners out of service and had terminated their services under the garb of the declaration of lay-

off which amounts to unfair labour practice. Hence, the termination of the services of the

petitioners on the pretext of lay-off is illegal and unjustified.

Since, I have held that the termination of the services of the petitioners on the pretext

of lay-off is illegal and unjustified, hence, it is to be seen as to what service benefits can be granted

to the petitioners. In the claim petition it has been pleaded that after the declaration of lay-off, the

respondent company closed down its unit at Baddi. It is by now well settled that if the termination

of employee is found to be illegal, the relief by way of reinstatement with back-wages is not

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automatic. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh Kumar Seal and others reported in 2010 LLR

677: 2010 III CLR 17 SC, has held that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not

automatic even if termination of an employee is found to be illegal or is in contravention of the

prescribed procedure and that mandatory compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages in

cases of such nature may be appropriate.

In Jagbir Singh Vs. Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (2009) 15 SCC 327,

the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:

“It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal

position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of

reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there

has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently

taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and

maybe wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an

employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of

reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.“

10. In the present case, even though the termination of the petitioners on the pretext of lay-

off is held to be illegal but their reinstatement will not be appropriate relief in view of the fact that

the respondent company had closed its unit at Baddi. Therefore, in such a situation, it would not be

appropriate to make the order of reinstatement in the present case. Hence, taking into account all

the facts and circumstances of the case, the ends of justice would be met, if the lump sum

compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back-wages is awarded to the petitioners. Therefore, in

my view the petitioners are entitled to receive a suitable, appropriate, just and equitable

compensation from the respondents and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, it

would be quite reasonable and justified if lump sum compensation of ` 50,000/- (` Fifty Thousand

only) is awarded to each of the petitioners instead of reinstatement.

Final Order:

As a sequel to my aforesaid discussion, the claim of the petitioners is allowed and as such

the respondents are directed to pay ` 50,000/- (` Fifty Thousand only) as lump sum compensation

to each petitioner within a period of three months from today failing which the same shall carry

interest @ 9% per annum from the date of publication of this award. The reference is answered

accordingly. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in

official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records.

Announced in the open Court today on this 27th Day of October, 2016.

(SUSHIL KUKREJA),

Presiding Judge,

Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla.

____________

19.10.2016.

Present:

None for the petitioner.

Shri VinayVerma, ADA for respondent.

Case called twice but none appeared on behalf of the petitioner. It is 10:45 AM.

Be awaited.

(SUSHILKUKREJA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court, Shimla.

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Case called again.

Present:

None for the petitioner.

Shri VinayVerma, ADA for respondent.

It is 12:50 PM. Case called again but none appeared on behalf of the petitioner. Be called

after lunch.

(SUSHILKUKREJA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court, Shimla.

____________

Case called after lunch.

Present:

None for the petitioner.

Shri VinayVerma, ADA for respondent.

Case called repeatedly in pre an post lunch sessions but none appeared on behalf of

petitioner. For today, the case has been listed for filing of claim petition on behalf of the petitioner

but neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared before this Court which shows that the petitioner

is not interested to pursue his claim arising out of the reference. Hence, this Court is left with no

other alternative but to decide the reference on the basis of material whichever is available on file.

The following reference has been received from appropriate government for adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Naresh Kumar S/o Shri Changu Ram

R/o Village Roog, P.O Dahan, Tehsil Rajgarh, District Solan, HP during the year, 1986

by the Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Rajgarh, District Sirmour, HP, who has

raised his industrial dispute after about 25 years allegedly without complying with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in

view the delay of 25 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back

wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is

entitled to from the above employer?”

From the aforesaid reference is the clear that the petitioner has alleged his termination

during the year, 1986 to be illegal and unjustified but despite having afforded opportunities, he has

failed to file any claim. The aforesaid reference also makes it clear that the petitioner has raised the

present dispute after about 25 years which seems that the petitioner is not serious about the present

dispute. Therefore, in the absence of any material on record, it cannot be said that the services of

the petitioner had been illegally terminated by the respondent during the year 1986. Hence, the

reference is answered against the petitioner and the award is passed accordingly. Let a copy of this

award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in official gazette. File, after

completion be consigned to records.

Announced:

(SUSHILKUKREJA),

19.10.2016.

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court, Shimla.

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Pritam Singh

Reference No. 23/2016

M/S Indo Farm Equipment Ltd. Baddi District Solan H.P.

19-10-2016. Present: Petitioner with Shri J.C. Bhardwaj, AR.

Shri Chatter Singh, Manager, with Shri H.R. Thakur, Advocate.

At this stage, it has been stated by Shri Chatter Singh, Manager for respondent company

that the company is ready and willing to re-instate the petitioner in service with seniority and

continuity but without back-wages at Baddi in serving department where he was working prior to

his termination. He further stated that the petitioner may join with respondent company on or

before 2-11-2016. To this effect his statement recorded separately.

Vide separate statement, the petitioner has stated that he is willing to be reinstated in service

with seniority and continuity but without back-wages and reference be decided accordingly.

In view of the aforesaid statements of the parties. I am satisfied that a lawful

compromise/settlement has been effected between the parties. Therefore, the respondent is directed

to reinstate the petitioner in service with seniority and continuity but without backwages at Baddi

where he was serving prior to his termination on or before 2-11-2016 and as such the award is

passed accordingly in terms of the statements of the parties which shall form part of this award. Let

a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication of official gazette. File,

after completion be consigned to records.

Annjounced:

(SUSHIL KUKREJA),

19-10-2016

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court, Shimla.

___________

IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL

TRIBUNAL-CUMLABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P) CAMP AT NALAGARH

Ref. No. 66 of 2012.

Instituted on. 14.12.2012.

Decided on 21.10.2016.

Shakuntla Devi W/o Shri Ram Asray Maurya, R/o VPO Rajpura, Tehsil Nalagarh, District

Solan, HP though Shri J.C Bhardwaj, President, HP AITUC, HQ Saproon, Solan, HP. . .Petitioner.

Vs.

M/s L.S Industries Ltd., Village, Bersan, P.O Manjholi, Tehsil Nalagarh, District Solan, HP,

through its General Manager.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For petitioner :

Shri J.C Bhardwaj, AR

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For respondent :

Shri Rajiv Sharma, Advocate.

AWARD

The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Smt. Shakuntla Devi W/o Shri Ram Asre

Morya, Post Office Rajpura, Tehsil Nalagarh, District Solan, HP w.e.f. 21.6.2011 by

the General Manager, L.S Industries Ltd., Village Bersan, P.O Manjholi, Tehsil?

Nalagarh, District Solan, HP without complying the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back-wages, seniority,

past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the

above employer?”

2. In nutshell the case of the petitioner is that she was appointed as helper by the

respondent company during the month of July, 2010 and remained continued as such till 21.6.2011

when she was illegally removed from service without any cogent reasons. The petitioner from

21.6.2011 till 24.6.2011 continuously visited the factory gate with the purpose of resuming her

duties but the management had dispensed her services without the compliance of section 25-F/ 25-

N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as to Act) and even her earned wages

for the month of June, 2011 were not paid by the respondent. It is further stated that the respondent

management had issued two letters dated 18.6.2011 and 23.6.2011 in the name of show cause

notice, wherein in the first letter it has been mentioned that the petitioner had misbehaved with her

senior incharge and in the second letter it was alleged that she remained willfully absent and gross-

negligence of the duties. On 29.6.2011 the petitioner submitted truth based explanation to the above

said letters. From 21.6.2011 to 24.6.2011, she attempted to resume her duties and also approached

the higher authorities of the company but she was not allowed to meet unless she submits her

resignation from service and finally she was told that her services had already been terminated.

Thereafter, the petitioner sent a written representation on 24.6.2011 and the copy of the same was

also endorsed to the labour-cum-conciliation officer, hence, the conciliation proceedings were

commenced but the management had not reinstated her in service. On 4.6.2011, the petitioner fell

seriously ill and admitted in the ESI Hospital where she remained under treatment till 8.6.2011 and

after discharge, the Doctor had advised her complete rest till 12.6.2011 and she had conveyed about

her illness to the respondent management along-with medical certificates and resumed her duties on

14.6.2011 but after some time the supervisor came there and started abusing loudly on the

petitioner without knowing the reason of her absence from the work and when she tried to explain

her position, then the supervisor threatened her by stating that he would slap on her face in case she

failed to submit her resignation from service. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the Manager

HR and G.M of the factory but no action was taken against the supervisor and she had been

threatened to be terminated from service. Due to weakness and incomplete rest, the petitioner again

fell ill and took treatment from Civil Hospital Nalagarh since 16.6.2011 and after the recovery from

illness, she went to join her duties on 21.6.2011 but her entry on the gate was stopped and she was

asked to submit her resignation. The action of the respondent management in terminating of the

services of the petitioner without following any procedure is unfair labour practice as no notice

under section 25-N/25-F was issued to her. The petitioner had completed 240 days in each calendar

year and her juniors had been retained in the employment in violation of the provisions of section

25-G and 25-H of the Act. Against this back-drop a prayer has been made that she be reinstated in

service with all the consequential service benefits including back-wages.

The respondent contested the claim of the petitioner by filing reply wherein various

preliminary objections have been taken qua maintainability, that the petitioner has not come to this

Court with clean hands and that the petitioner is gainfully employed. On merits, it has been asserted

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that the petitioner joined with the respondent on 27 th July, 2010 and remained as such till

14.6.2011 on which date she indulged in grave misconduct with her superior and when the other

immediate superior tried to make her understand she left the place and thereafter remained absent

from duty without any sanctioned leave or information and the respondent management waited for

the petitioner upto 18.6.2011 but she failed to join her duties. Thereafter, a show cause notice had

been issued to petitioner but of no use and then again on 23.6.2011, a 2nd show cause notice was

issued but of no use and thereafter a final notice dated 25.6.2011 was issued to her by giving her

three months prior notice salary with all financial dues and deleted her name from the roll of the

company and as such the case of the petitioner does not fall under illegal retrenchment and even

she had not completed 240 days with the respondent, hence, she cannot claim any benefits of

section 25-F of the Act. Since, the petitioner choosed to remain absent after committing grave

misconduct and remained mum over the show cause notices, hence, her services had rightly been

terminated. The respondent prayed for the dismissal of the claim petition.

By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed his allegations by denying those of the

respondent.

Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on

31.12.2013.

Whether the termination of services of the petitioner without complying with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

Whether the petition is not maintainable?

. .OPR.

9. Relief.

Besides having heard the AR for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent, I

have also gone through the record of the case carefully.

7. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,

my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.

Issue no.1

Yes.

Issue no.2

Entitled to reinstatement in service with seniority and continuity but without

back-wages.

Issue no.3

No.

Relief.

Reference answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent

per operative part of award.

Reasons for findings.

Issues no.1

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The AR for the petitioner contended that the services of the petitioner had been

terminated illegally without complying with the provisions of the Act especially when she had

completed more than 240 working days in the calendar year preceding her termination. He further

contended that the services of the petitioner had been terminated without conducting any enquiry

and without issuing any chargesheet. He also contended that juniors to the petitioner are still

working with the respondent company.

Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that petitioner had

abandoned the job at her own. He further contended that as the petitioner failed to resume her

duties despite issuance of show cause notices, hence, her name was deleted from the rolls of the

company by giving her three months prior notice salary with her all financial dues.

10. To prove this issue, the petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered

in evidence her affidavit Ex. PA wherein she reiterated almost all the averments as stated in the

claim petition. She also tendered in evidence discharge slip Ex. P-1, fitness certificate Ex. P-2,

letter of medical reimbursement from ESI Ex. P-3, OPD treatment slip Ex. P-4, certificate of fitness

Ex. P-5, show cause notice Ex. P-6, second show cause notice dated 23.6.2011 Ex. P-7,

representation and demand notice Ex. P-8, letter dated 25.6.2011 Ex. P-9, reply to notices dated

18.6.2011, 23.6.2011 and 25.6.2011 Ex. P-10. In cross-examination, she admitted that photocopy of

ration card Ex. R-1 had been submitted by her to the respondent at the time when she applied for

job and that Ex. R-2 is her bio-data. She further admitted that Kamal was her unit incharge and she

worked under him. She expressed her ignorance that she misbehaved with Shri Kamal Raj on

14.6.2011. She denied that she used filthy language against her superior. She further denied that she

had not worked for 240 days. She also denied that she had not submitted any documents regarding

her illness and that she had abandoned the job at her own.

11. On the contrary, the respondent examined two RWs. RW-1 Shri Prem Raj, HR

Manager has stated that the petitioner was working with them and she joined on 27.7.2010 and

worked till 14.6.2011. The petitioner misbehaved with her senior and on the complaint of her

senior, a show cause notice Ex. RW-1/A was issued to her on her permanent residential address

vide postal receipt Ex. RW- 1/B which was also sent to her on her temporary address vide Ex. RW-

1/C and postal receipt is Ex. RW- 1/D thereafter second show cause notice was issued to her on her

permanent as well as temporary address vide Ex. RW-1/E and Ex. RW-1/F vide postal receipts Ex.

RW-1/G and Ex. RW-1/H and then final show cause notice was issued to her on her permanent as

well as on temporary addresses, vide Ex. RW-1/J and Ex. RW-1/K postal receipts of which are Ex.

RW-1/L and Ex. RW-1/M. He further deposed that when the petitioner did not turn up, full and

final legal dues have been sent to her. The petitioner had not completed 240 days in any calendar

year and that vide Ex. RW-1/N, she applied for withdrawal of her provident fund which was

contributed by them. In cross-examination, he admitted that the petitioner had fallen ill on 4.6.2011

and she remained admitted in ESI hospital till 8.6.2011. He denied that the supervisor misbehaved

with the petitioner and thereafter she was thrown out of the factory. He further denied that she had

again come to the factory to join her duties but she was not allowed to join. He admitted that

neither any chargesheet was issued to the petitioner nor any enquiry was conducted against her. He

denied that the petitioner had submitted reply to all show cause notices on 29.6.2011. He admitted

that on Ex. RW-1/N, the date of joining of the petitioner has been given as 1.4.2011 and date of her

leaving is given as 15.6.2011 and that on 14.6.2011 many juniors to the petitioner were working.

12. RW-2 Shri Kirti Singh Gosai, HR Manager has stated that the detail of working days

of the petitioner is Ex. RW-2/A, attendance register is Ex. RW-2/B and adult works register is Ex.

RW-1/C. In cross-examination, he admitted that the wages of 29 days were given in the month of

August, 2010 and that total number of working days is marked by way of entry in pencil with

respect to the petitioner. He further admitted that on Ex. RW-2/B, neither the presence nor the

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absence of the petitioner is marked on 16th and 26th October, 2010, 22 and 26th November, 2010.

He denied that the attendance of the petitioner for the entire month is marked in one day. He also

admitted that on Ex. RW-2/B neither the presence nor the absence of the petitioner is marked on 1st

Feb., 2011, 6th May and 25th May, 2011 and that there is over writing in the month of April dated

12 and 13 on Ex. RW-2/B. He also admitted that the workers from serial number 262 to 1255 of

adult workers register are juniors to the petitioner.

13. I have closely scrutinized the entire evidence on record, and from the closer scrutiny

thereof, it has become clear that the petitioner had worked with the respondent as helper from

27.7.2010 and vide letter dated 25.6.2011 Ex. RW-1/J, her services were terminated by the

respondent by drawing a presumption that the petitioner had abandoned the employment of her own

accord w.e.f. 25.6.2011. Now the question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to

whether the petitioner had abandoned the job at her own accord. The case of the petitioner is that

she had fallen ill on 4.6.2011 and she was admitted in the ESI Hospital and remained under

treatment till 8.6.2011 and she was discharged from the hospital on 8.6.2011 vide discharge slip Ex.

P-1. She also tendered in evidence the certificate of fitness Ex. P-2 and resumed her duties on

14.6.2011. This fact has also been admitted by RW-1 in his crossexamination that the petitioner had

fallen ill and she remained admitted in the ESI hospital Nalagarh till 8.6.2011. Further the case of

the petitioner is that she had again fallen ill and had taken the treatment from Civil Hospital

Nalagarh since 16.6.2011 and she was advised rest till recovery from illness and after recovery she

went to join her duties on 21.6.2011 but her entry was stopped at the gate. She had also tendered in

evidence the OPD treatment slip Ex. P-4, issued by Civil Hospital Nalagarh. Therefore, it has

become clear that the petitioner remained absent from duties on medical grounds and it cannot be

said that she had abandoned the job at her own accord. Abandonment of service has not been

defined in the Act. In a case titled as G.T Lad and others Vs. Chemicals and Fibers India Ltd.

reported in AIR 1979 SC 582, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that to constitute abandonment,

there must be total or complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an intention not to resume the

same. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:

“From the connotations reproduced above it clearly follows that to constitute

abandonment, there must be total or complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an

intention not to resume the same.

In Buckingham Co. v. Venkatiah (1964) 4 SC R 265: (AIR 1964 SC 1272), it was

observed by this Court that under common law an inference that an employee has

abandoned or relinquished service is not easily drawn unless from the length of

absence and from other surrounding circumstances an inference to that effect can be

legitimately drawn and it can be assumed that the employee intended to abandon

service. Abandonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention,

and normally, such an intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate

evidence in that behalf. Thus whether there has been a voluntary abandonment of

service or not is a question of fact which has to be determined in the light of the

surrounding circumstances of each case.”

It is also well settled that once, it is admitted that the workman had been in service of the

management, the burden of proving that he himself abandoned the job lies on the management as

has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s Nicks (India) Tools Vs. Ram Surat reported in

2004 (103) FLR 102. Thus, voluntarily abandonment of job can only be proved by the

respondent/management by bringing on record evidence of absence of employee along-with his

intention not to join back. However, in the present case, there is no iota of evidence on record

which could go to show that the petitioner had left the job on her own as no material regarding

abandonment of the job by the petitioner is placed on record by the respondent. Therefore, in the

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absence of any material on record, inference cannot be drawn that the petitioner had voluntarily

abandoned the job on her own, rather as observed earlier the absence of the petitioner was on

medical grounds.

14. The case of the respondent is that the petitioner had not completed 240 days and in this

respect the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the attendance detail of the petitioner

Ex. RW-2/A and attendance register Ex. RW-2/B. The perusal of the attendance detail Ex. RW-2/A

shows that the actual working days of the petitioner has been mentioned as 237 whereas the

petitioner remained on leave for 8 days. The perusal of the attendance register Ex. RW-2/B shows

that neither the presence nor the absence of the petitioner was marked for the period of seven days

i.e on 16th October and 26th October, 22nd November and 26th November, 2010, 1st Feb.,2011,

6th May and 25th May 2011. This fact has also been admitted by RW-2 in his cross-examination.

However, he has not given any explanation as to why neither the presence nor the absence of the

petitioner was marked on the aforesaid days. Therefore, in the absence of any explanation on

record, it cannot be said that the petitioner remained absent on the aforesaid days. Since, according

to the respondent itself the actual working days of the petitioner were 237 days and neither the

presence nor the absence of the petitioner was marked for the period of seven days and she

remained on leave for 8 days, therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner had not completed 240

days in the preceding twelve months prior to her termination as submitted by the learned counsel

for the respondent.

15. It has also come on record that show cause notices were issued to the petitioner. As per

show cause notice dated 18.6.2011 Ex. RW-1/A, the petitioner had misbehaved with her senior

incharge and abused him with most vulgar, abusive and defamatory language and also that the

petitioner remained absent from duty without prior permission resulting in willful insubordination

and gross negligence of duties which is a major misconduct. As per show cause notice dated

23.6.2011 Ex. RW- 1/E, the petitioner remained absent from duties w.e.f. 15.6.2011 without prior

permission from the concerned authority and she was advised to give explanation in writing within

48 hours. The petitioner had submitted explanation to both the show cause notices vide letter dated

29.6.2011 Ex. P-10. However, admittedly neither any chargesheet was issued to the petitioner nor

any enquiry was held regarding her alleged misbehavior and absenteeism. It is a settled legal

proposition that a workman against whom the misconduct is alleged cannot be dismissed unless a

proper domestic enquiry is held against him in respect of the alleged misconduct. Even, if there is a

proved misconduct against the workman, he cannot be discharged or dismissed from service unless

he has been afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard before initiating any action against him

by the employer/respondent. In the present case admittedly neither any chargesheet was issued to

the petitioner nor any domestic enquiry was held before terminating her from service. In D. K

Yadav Vs. M/s J.M A Industries Ltd. as reported in 1993-1 Supreme Court Service Law Judgments

-221, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:

“Reasonable opportunity be given to the employee concerned to put forth his case and

proper enquiry be held before terminating his service.”

In a recent judgment of our Hon’ble High Court in ILR-XLV (VI) 938 titled as Gurcharan

Singh Deceased through his LR’s Vs. State of HP and ors. the workman was arrested and was

convicted of the offence punishable under section 324 of the IPC and he was terminated without

conducting any enquiry. The Hon’ble High Court has held that his termination could not have been

ordered without conducting any enquiry as the workman had completed 240 days and was therefore

entitled to the enquiry. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:

“8. The moot question is whether termination can be ordered without conducting any

inquiry? The answer is in the negative for the following reasons:

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……………………………………..

10. While going through the impugned award and the writ petition, one comes to an

inescapable conclusion that the termination of deceased Gurcharan Singh was made without

following the mandate of law.

11. ……………………………………..

12. …………………………………….

13. In the instant case, deceased Gurcharan Singh had completed 240 days in a calendar

year, as discussed and held by the Labour Court, after scanning the evidence, the inquiry

was required, not to speak of only issuance of the notice.

In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner had worked continuously with the respondent

from 27.7.2010 and her services had been terminated vide letter dated 25.6.2011 Ex. RW-1/J.

Therefore, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have conducted the enquiry against the

petitioner prior to her termination. However, the petitioner was never asked to answer any charges

as no chargesheet was issued to her and no enquiry was held before terminating her services, on the

basis of the alleged misconduct. Hence, the termination of the services of the petitioner without

conducting any enquiry and without affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the

petitioner is in utter violation of the principles of natural justice.

16. As observed earlier, since the petitioner had completed 240 days in twelve calendar

months preceding her termination, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have complied with the

provisions of section 25-F of the Act. At this juncture, it would be relevant to re-produce section

25-F of the Act, which reads as under:

25-F. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO RETRENCHMENT OF WORKMEN.- No

workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year

under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-

(a) the workman has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for

retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in

lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;

(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be

equivalent of fifteen days’ average pay (for every completed year of continuous

service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and

authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the

Official Gazette.)

17. The provisions of section 25-F of the Act lay down certain conditions precedent to the

retrenchment of a workman (workmen) and requires the employer to comply with those conditions

as per clauses (a) to (c) which are mandatory in nature. However, in the present case, the perusal of

the record shows that the respondent has not complied with the conditions of section 25-F as

enumerated in clause (b) & (c), precedent to the retrenchment of petitioner. In (2015) 4 SCC 544,

Mackinnon Mackenzie and Company Ltd., Vs. Mackinnon employees Union, the Hon’ble Apex

Court has held as under:

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“34. ………………….The Industrial Court after examining the facts and evidence on

record has rightly answered the question of breach of Section 25F clause (b) in the negative

since no evidence has been produced by the respondent-Union to prove the same and further

no calculation is brought to our notice as to the amount received by way of retrenchment

compensation and also the actual amount sought to have been paid to the retrenched

workmen. Further, with regard to the provision of Section 25F clause (c), the appellant-

Company has not been able to produce cogent evidence that notice in the prescribed manner

has been served by it to the State Government prior to the retrenchment of the concerned

workmen. Therefore, we have to hold that the appellant-Company has not complied with

the conditions precedent to retrenchment as per Section 25F clauses (a) and (c) of the I.D.

Act which are mandatory in law.”

18. In the present case also no evidence has been produced by the respondent to prove that

the petitioner has been paid retrenchment compensation equivalent to the fifteen days’ average pay

(for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months as per

clause (b) of section 25-F. Further, with regard to the provisions of clause (c) of the section 25-F,

the respondent has failed to produce any evidence which could go to show that the notice was

served in the prescribed manner on the appropriate government. The learned counsel for the

respondent contended that the services of the petitioner were terminated while giving her three

months prior salary with all her financial dues. RW-1 deposed before the Court that the respondent

sent full & final legal dues to the petitioner vide cheque mark RG. However, the petitioner has

denied in her cross-examination that she had received the aforesaid cheque mark RG. No evidence

has been led by the respondent to prove that the petitioner had actually received the aforesaid

cheque mark RG. Moreover, admittedly, the services of the petitioner were terminated on

25.6.2011 and the cheque mark RG was issued to her after a period of more than one year i.e on

21.12.2012 as such it cannot be said that the respondent had complied with the provisions of

section 25-F of the Act. Therefore, it has become clear that the respondent has not complied with

the conditions prescribed in section 25-F, which are mandatory in nature as such the termination of

the services of the petitioner by the respondent is illegal and unjustified.

19. The AR for the petitioner also contended that the juniors to the petitioner are still

working with the respondent whereas her services have been terminated without following the

mandatory provisions of section 25-G of the Act. Even, RW-1 has admitted in cross-examination

that on 14.6.2011 many juniors to the petitioner were working and RW-2 admitted in cross-

examination that the workers from serial no. 262 to 1255 of adult workers register are juniors to the

petitioner. Hence, from the aforesaid admission, it is clear that after the termination of the services

of the petitioner, the respondent had retained the persons juniors to her in violation of section 25-G

of the Act.

20. Therefore, in view of my forgoing discussion, I have no hesitation in holding that the

services of the petitioner have been terminated illegally without conducting any enquiry and

without following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Hence, this issue is decided in

favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

Issue no.2.

21. Since, I have held under issue no.1 above that the termination of services of the

petitioner by the respondent without complying with the provisions of the Act is improper, illegal

and unjustified, hence, the petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in service with seniority and

continuity.

22. Now, the question which arises for consideration, before this Court is as to whether the

petitioner is entitled to full back wages as contended by the AR for the petitioner. In (2009) 1 SCC

20, Kanpur Electricity Supply Company Limited Vs. Shamim Mirza, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

5876

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has held that once the order of termination of services of an employee is set-aside, ordinarily, the

relief of reinstatement is available to him. However, the entitlement of an employee to get

reinstated does not necessarily result in payment of full or partial back-wages, which is independent

of reinstatement. It has further been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2010 (1) SLJ S.C 70,

M/s Ritu Marbals Vs. Prabhakant Shukla that full back wages cannot be granted mechanically,

upon an order of termination be declared illegal. It is further held that reinstatement must not be

accompanied by payment of full back wages even for the period when the workman remained out

of service and contributed little or nothing to the Industry.

23. Moreover, the petitioner was under an obligation to prove by leading cogent evidence

that she was not gainfully employed after the termination of her services. The initial burden is on

the workman/employee to show that he was not gainfully employed as held by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 363 titled as Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and another

Vs. S.C Sharma that:

“16…………..When, the question of determining the entitlement of a person to back-wages

is concerned, the employee has to show that he was not gainfully employed. The initial

burden is on him. After and if he places materials in that regard, the employer can bring on

record materials to rebut the claim…………..”

24. In the present case, the petitioner has only stated in her affidavit Ex. PA that she is

unemployed. Except for her bald statement, no other evidence has been led by the petitioner to

prove that she was not gainfully employed. The petitioner has failed to discharge her burden by

placing any concrete material on record and by leading any cogent and satisfactory evidence that

she was not gainfully employed after her termination/disengagement. Therefore, in view of the

entire evidence, on record, coupled with the rulings (supra), I have no hesitation in holding that the

petitioner is not entitled to any back-wages. Accordingly, issue no.2 is partly decided in favour of

the petitioner and against the respondent.

Issue no.3.

25. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondent which could go to

show that as to how this petition is not maintainable especially when the same was filed by the

petitioner pursuant to reference sent by the appropriate government to this Court for adjudication.

Therefore, by holding it to be maintainable, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent.

Relief.

As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issues no.1 to 3, the claim of the

petitioner succeeds and is hereby allowed with the result, the petitioner is ordered to be reinstated

in service forth-with with seniority and continuity. However, the petitioner is not entitled to any

back-wages and as such the reference is ordered to be answered in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for

publication in the official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned to records.

Announced in the open Court today on this 21st day of October, 2016.

(SUSHIL KUKREJA),

Presiding Judge,

Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla.

Camp at Nalagarh.

5877

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HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA-171 001

NOTIFICATION

Dated, the 24^th November, 2016

No. HHC/Admn. 3(236)/86-I.—06 days earned leave on and w.e.f. 28.11.2016 to

03.12.2016, withpermission to affix Sundays falling on 27.11.2016 and 4.12.2016 is hereby

sanctioned, in favour of Shri Durgesh Chand Sharma, Assistant Registrar of this Registry.

Certified that Shri Durgesh Chand Sharma, Assistant Registrar is likely to join the same

post and at the same station from where he proceeds on leave after the expiry of the above leave

period.

Certified that Shri Durgesh Chand Sharma would have continued to officiate the same post

of Assistant Registrar, but for his proceeding on leave.

By order,

Sd/-

Registrar General.

___________

HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA- 171 001

NOTIFICATION

Dated, the 28^th November, 2016

No. HHC/Admn.3 (331)/92-I.—02 days earned leave for 05.12.2016 & 06.12.2016, with

permission to prefix Sunday falling on 04.12.2016, is hereby sanctioned, infavour of Shri Davinder

Chopra, Additional Registrar of this Registry.

Certified that Shri Davinder Chopra is likely to join the same post and at the same station

from where he proceeds on leave after the expiry of the above leave period.

Certified that Shri Davinder Chopra would have continued to officiate the same post of

Additional Registrar but for his proceeding on leave.

By order,

Sd/-

Registrar General.

__________

HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA- 171 001

NOTIFICATION

Dated, the 28^th November, 2016

No. HHC/Admn. 3(242)/86-I.—12 days earned leave on and w.e.f. 08.12.2016 to

19.12.2016 is hereby sanctioned, in favour of Shri. O.P. Sharma, Court Master of this Registry.

5878

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

Certified that Shri. O.P.Sharma is likely to join the same post and at the same station from

where he proceeds on leave after the expiry of the above leave period.

Certified that Shri. O.P.Sharma would have continued to officiate the same post of Court

Master but for his proceeding on leave.

By order,

Sd/-

Registrar General.

___________

HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA- 171 001

NOTIFICATION

Dated, the 28^th November, 2016

No. HHC/Admn.3(399)/95-I.—06 days earned leave on and w.e.f. 28.11.2016 to

03.12.2016 with permission to affix Sundays falling on 27.11.2016 and 04.12.2016 is hereby

sanctioned in favour of Shri Beer Singh Sharma, Secretary of this Registry.

Certified that Shri Beer Singh Sharma is likely to join the same post and at the same station

from where he proceeds on leave after the expiry of the above leave period.

Certified that Shri Beer Singh Sharma would have continued to officiate the same post of

Secretary but for his proceeding on leave.

By order,

Sd/-

Registrar General.

__________

HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA - 171 001

NOTIFICATION

Shimla, the 29^th November, 2016

No. HHC/Admn.16 (15)74-V.—Hon’ble the Chief Justice has been pleased to cancel the

appointment of Smt. Nisha , Advocate as Oath Commissioner, Kasauli, Distt. Solan, H.P. appointed

vide this Registry Notification No. HHC/Admn.16(15)74-V-16401-08-68, dated 9.10.6.2015 with

immediate effect.

By order,

Sd/-

Registrar General.

5879

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HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA-171 001

NOTIFICATION

Shimla, the 28^th November, 2016

No. HHC/GAZ/14-361/2015.—Hon’ble the Chief Justice has been pleased to grant ex-post

facto sanction of 02 days commuted leave for 08.11.2016 and 09.11.2016 in favour of Ms. Sonal

Thama, Civil Judge (Junior Division)-JMIC (VIII), Shimla, H.P.

Certified that Ms. Sonal Thama has joined the same post and at the same station from where

she proceeded on leave, after expiry of the above period of leave.

Also certified that Ms. Sonal Thama would have continued to hold the post of Civil Judge

(Junior Division)-cum-JMIC(VIII), Shimla, H.P., but for her proceeding on leave for the above

period.

By order,

Sd/-

Registrar General.

____________

HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA-171001

NOTIFICATION

Shimla, the 1^st December, 2016

No. HHC/Admn. 6 (23)/74-XV.—Hon’ble the Chief Justice in exercise of the powers

vested in him under Rule 2(32) of Chapter 1 of H.P. Financial Rules, 2009 has been pleased to

declare Civil Judge (Senior Division)-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba, H.P. as Drawing

and Disbursing Officer in respect of the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-JMIC,

Chamba, H.P. and also the Controlling Officer for the purpose of salary, T.A. etc. in respect of the

official of aforesaid court under Major head “2014 Administration of Justice” w.e.f. 17.11.2016 to

11.12.2016.

By order,

Sd/-

Registrar General.

_________

HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA-171001

NOTIFICATION

Shimla, the 2^nd December, 2016

No. HHC/Admn. 6 (23)/74-XV.—Hon’ble the Chief Justice in exercise of the powers

vested in him under Rule 2(32) of Chapter 1 of H.P. Financial Rules, 2009 has been pleased to

declare Additional District and Sessions Judge-II, Una, H.P. as Drawing and Disbursing Officer in

respect of the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge-1, Una, H.P. and also the Controlling

5880

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

Officer for the purpose of salary, T.A. etc. in respect of the establishment attached aforesaid court

under Major head “2014 Administration of Justice” with immediate effect till the posting of new

Presiding officer in that Court.

By order,

Sd/-

Registrar General.

____________

c vnkyr Jh cPpu flag ¼fg0 iz0 ls0½] mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh] pEck] ftyk pEck] fg0 iz0

vfuy 'kekZ iq= izse dqekj 'kekZ] xkao fo;kMk] rglhy ikyeiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k ¼fg0 iz0½

cuke

vke turk ,oa dk;Zdkjh vf/kdkjh] uxj ifj"kn~ pEck

fo"k;-&&uke n#Lrh lEcU/khA

bl vnkyr esa vfuy 'kekZ iq= izse dqekj 'kekZ] xkao fo;kMk] rglhy ikyeiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k

¼fg0 iz0½ us ,d nj[okLr nsdj vuqjks/k fd;k gS fd mlds iq= dk lgh uke vouh'k 'kekZ gS ijUrq uxj

ifj"kn~ pEck ds fjdkMZ esa vkd"kZ 'kekZ ntZ gS ftls og n#Lr djokuk pkgrk gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k turk dks b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vfuy 'kekZ iq= izse dqekj 'kekZ]

xkao fo;kMk] rglhy ikyeiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k ¼fg0 iz0½ ds iq= ds uke dks uxj ifj"kn~ pEck ds vfHkys[k

esa n#Lrh ntZ djus ij vxj fdlh dks fdlh Hkh izdkj dh dksbZ vkifŸk gS rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru

viuh vkifŸk bl vnkyr esa b'rgkj ds izdk'ku ds ,d ekg ds Hkhrj&Hkhrj lqcg 10 cts ls lk;a 5-00

cts rd ntZ djok ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa vkifŸk u vkus dh lwjr esa izkFkhZ ds iq= ds uke n#Lrh

djus ds vkns'k lEcfU/kr LFkkuh; jftLVªkj tUe ,oa e`R;q uxj ifj"kn~ pEck dks ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA

vkt fnukad 17&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr lfgr tkjh gq;sA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh]

pEck] ftyk pEck ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh cPpu flag ¼fg0 iz0 ls0½] mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh] pEck] ftyk pEck] fg0 iz0

nsoks mQZ nsoh flag iq= epyw] xkao dysjk] Mkd?kj xSgjk] rglhy pEck

cuke

vke turk ,oa xzke lHkk] xzke iapk;r xSgjk] fodkl [k.M eSgyk

fo"k;-&&uke n#Lrh lEcU/khA

bl vnkyr esa nsoks mQZ nsoh flag iq= epyw] xkao dysjk] Mkd?kj xSgjk] rglhy pEck us ,d

nj[okLr nsdj vuqjks/k fd;k gS fd mldk lgh uke nsoks mQZ nsoh flag gS ijUrq mldk uke xzke iapk;r

fi;wgjk esa nsoks ntZ gS tks fd xyr gSA izkFkhZ us xzke iapk;r xSgjk ds vfHkys[k esa nsoks ds ctk;s nsoks mQZ

nsoh flag ntZ djus dk vuqjks/k fd;k gSA

5881

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

vr% loZlk/kkj.k turk dks b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd nsoks mQZ nsoh flag iq= epyw]

xkao dysjk] Mkd?kj xSgjk] rglhy pEck ds uke n#Lrh ckjs vxj fdlh dks fdlh Hkh izdkj dh dksbZ

vkifŸk gS rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru viuh vkifŸk bl vnkyr esa b'rgkj ds izdk'ku ds ,d ekg ds

Hkhrj&Hkhrj lqcg 10 cts ls lk;a 5-00 cts rd ntZ djok ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa vkifŸk u vkus

dh lwjr esa izkFkhZ ds uke dks n#Lr djus ds vkns'k lEcfU/kr LFkkuh; jftLVªkj tUe ,oa e`R;q xzke

iapk;r xSgjk dks ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA

vkt fnukad 15&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr lfgr tkjh gq;sA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh]

pEck] ftyk pEck ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh cPpu flag ¼fg0 iz0 ls0½] mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh] pEck] ftyk pEck] fg0 iz0

izk;e nsoh iRuh teZ flag] xkao HkdjsM+k] ijxuk jktuxj] rglhy pEck

cuke

vke turk ,oa xzke lHkk] xzke iapk;r fl<+dqaM] fodkl [k.M pEck

fo"k;-&&uke n#Lrh lEcU/khA

bl vnkyr esa izk;e nsoh iRuh teZ flag] xkao HkdjsM+k] ijxuk jktuxj] rglhy pEck us ,d

nj[okLr nsdj vuqjks/k fd;k gS fd mldk lgh uke izk;e nsoh gS ijUrq mldk uke xzke iapk;r fl<+dqaM

esa izse nsoh ntZ gS tks fd xyr gSA izkfFkZu us xzke iapk;r fl<+dqaM ds vfHkys[k esa izse nsoh ds ctk;s

izk;e nsoh uke ntZ djus dk vuqjks/k fd;k gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k turk dks b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izk;e nsoh iRuh teZ flag] xkao

HkdjsM+k] ijxuk jktuxj] rglhy pEck ds uke n#Lrh ckjk vxj fdlh dks fdlh Hkh izdkj dh dksbZ

vkifŸk gS rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru viuh vkifŸk bl vnkyr esa b'rgkj ds izdk'ku ds ,d ekg ds

Hkhrj&Hkhrj lqcg 10 cts ls lk;a 5-00 cts rd ntZ djok ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa vkifŸk u vkus

dh lwjr esa izkfFkZu ds uke dks n#Lr djus ds vkns'k lEcfU/kr LFkkuh; jftLVªkj tUe ,oa e`R;q xzke

iapk;r fl<+dqaM dks ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA

vkt fnukad 15&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr lfgr tkjh gq;sA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh]

pEck] ftyk pEck ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh cPpu flag ¼fg0 iz0 ls0½] mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh] pEck] ftyk pEck] fg0 iz0

fd'ku flag iq= Jh lkgc flag] fuoklh xkao dqikgMk] Mkd?kj el:M] rglhy pEck

cuke

5882

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

vke turk ,oa xzke lHkk] xzke iapk;r el:M] fodkl [k.M pEck

fo"k;-&&tUe frfFk iathdj.k lEcU/khA

bl vnkyr esa fd'ku flag iq= Jh lkgc flag] fuoklh xkao dqikgMk] Mkd?kj el:M] rglhy

pEck us ,d nj[okLr nh gS fd mlds iq= uked vfer flag dh tUe frfFk 20&4&1999 gS ysfdu tUe

ls lEcfU/kr ?kVuk xzke iapk;r el:M] fodkl [k.M pEck esa ntZ u gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k turk dks b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd fd'ku flag iq= Jh lkgc flag]

fuoklh xkao dqikgMk] Mkd?kj el:M] rglhy pEck ds iq= dh tUe frfFk dks xzke iapk;r el:M]

fodkl [k.M pEck ds tUe vfHkys[k esa ntZ djus ij vxj fdlh dks fdlh Hkh izdkj dh dksbZ vkifŸk gS

rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru viuh vkifŸk bl vnkyr esa b'rgkj ds izdk'ku ds ,d ekg ds

Hkhrj&Hkhrj lqcg 10 cts ls lk;a 5-00 cts rd ntZ djok ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa vkifŸk u vkus

dh lwjr esa izkFkhZ ds iq= dh tUe frfFk dks ntZ djus ds vkns'k lEcfU/kr LFkkuh; jftLVªkj tUe ,oa e`R;q

xzke iapk;r el:M] fodkl [k.M pEck dks ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA

vkt fnukad 15&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr lfgr tkjh gq;sA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh]

pEck] ftyk pEck ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh cPpu flag ¼fg0 iz0 ls0½] mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh] pEck] ftyk pEck] fg0 iz0

nso jkt iq= iqUuw jke] fuoklh duksx] Mkd?kj eSgyk] rglhy o ftyk pEck

cuke

vke turk ,oa xzke lHkk] xzke iapk;r pM+h] fodkl [k.M eSgyk

fo"k;-&&uke n#Lrh lEcU/khA

bl vnkyr esa nso jkt iq= iqUuw jke] fuoklh duksx] Mkd?kj eSgyk] rglhy o ftyk pEck us

,d nj[okLr nsdj vuqjks/k fd;k gS fd mldk lgh uke nso jkt gS ijUrq mldk uke xzke iapk;r pMh

esa t; jke ntZ gS tksfd xyr ntZ gS izkFkhZ us xzke iapk;r pMh ds vfHkys[k esa t; jke ds ctk;s nso

jkt uke ntZ djus dk vuqjks/k fd;k gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k turk dks b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd nso jkt iq= iqUuw jke] fuoklh

duksx] Mkd?kj eSgyk] rglhy o ftyk pEck ds uke dh n#Lrh ckjk vxj fdlh dks fdlh Hkh izdkj dh

dksbZ vkifŸk gS rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru viuh vkifŸk bl vnkyr esa b'rgkj ds izdk'ku ds ,d

ekg ds Hkhrj&Hkhrj lqcg 10 cts ls lk;a 5-00 cts rd ntZ djok ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa vkifŸk u

vkus dh lwjr esa izkFkh ds uke dks n#Lr djus ds vkns'k lEcfU/kr LFkkuh; jftLVªkj tUe ,oa e`R;q xzke

iapk;r pMh dks ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA

vkt fnukad 15&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr lfgr tkjh gq;sA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh]

pEck] ftyk pEck ¼fg0 iz0½A

5883

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

c vnkyr Jh cPpu flag ¼fg0 iz0 ls0½] mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh] pEck] ftyk pEck] fg0 iz0

izse yky iq= gal jkt] fuoklh T;ksfr] Mkd?kj dqusM] rglhy o ftyk pEck

cuke

vke turk ,oa xzke lHkk] xzke iapk;r dqusM] fodkl [k.M eSgyk

fo"k;-&&e`R;q lEcfU/kr frfFk iathdj.k lEcU/khA

bl vnkyr esa izse yky iq= gal jkt] fuoklh T;ksfr] Mkd?kj dqusM] rglhy o ftyk pEck us

,d nj[okLr nsdj vuqjks/k fd;k gS fd mudh ekrk uked uSuks nsoh dh e`R;q frfFk 17&4&2004 gS ysfdu

e`R;q ls lEcfU/kr ?kVuk xzke iapk;r dqusM] fodkl [k.M eSgyk] ftyk pEck esa ntZ u gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k turk dks b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izse yky iq= gal jkt] fuoklh

T;ksfr] Mkd?kj dqusM] rglhy o ftyk pEck dh ekrk dh e`R;q frfFk dks xzke iapk;r dqusM] fodkl [k.M

eSgyk ds e`R;q vfHkys[k esa ntZ djus ij vxj fdlh dks fdlh Hkh izdkj dh dksbZ vkifŸk gS rks og

vlkyru ;k odkyru viuh vkifŸk bl vnkyr esa b'rgkj ds izdk'ku ds ,d ekg ds Hkhrj&Hkhrj

lqcg 10 cts ls lk;a 5-00 cts rd ntZ djok ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa vkifŸk u vkus dh lwjr esa

izkFkhZ dh ekrk dh e`R;q frfFk dks ntZ djus ds vkns'k lEcfU/kr LFkkuh; jftLVªkj tUe ,oa e`R;q xzke

iapk;r dqusM] fodkl [k.M eSgyk dks ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA

vkt fnukad 15&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr lfgr tkjh gq;sA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh]

pEck] ftyk pEck ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh cPpu flag ¼fg0 iz0 ls0½] mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh] pEck] ftyk pEck] fg0 iz0

v;wc iq= Jh usd eqgEen] xkao #dMsM] Mkd?kj tMsjk] rglhy pEck

cuke

vke turk ,oa xzke lHkk] xzke iapk;r tMsjk] fodkl [k.M pEck

fo"k;-&&tUe frfFk iathdj.k lEcU/khA

bl vnkyr esa v;wc iq= Jh usd eqgEen] xkao #dMsM] Mkd?kj tMsjk] rglhy pEck us ,d

nj[okLr nh gS fd mlds cPpksa Øe'k% 'kQh tUe frfFk 1&3&2008 o eq'rkd tUe frfFk 7&1&2010 gS

ysfdu tUe ls lEcfU/kr ?kVuk xzke iapk;r tMsjk] fodkl [k.M pEck esa ntZ u gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k turk dks b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd v;wc iq= Jh usd eqgEen] xkao

#dMsM] Mkd?kj tMsjk] rglhy pEck ds cPpksa dh tUe frfFk dks xzke iapk;r tMsjk] fodkl [k.M pEck

ds tUe vfHkys[k esa ntZ djus ij vxj fdlh dks fdlh Hkh izdkj dh dksbZ vkifŸk gS rks og vlkyru ;k

odkyru viuh vkifŸk bl vnkyr esa b'rgkj ds izdk'ku ds ,d ekg ds Hkhrj&Hkhrj lqcg 10 cts ls

lk;a 5-00 cts rd ntZ djok ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa vkifŸk u vkus dh lwjr esa izkFkhZ ds cPpksa dh

tUe frfFk dks ntZ djus ds vkns'k lEcfU/kr LFkkuh; jftLVªkj tUe ,oa e`R;q xzke iapk;r tMsjk] fodkl

[k.M pEck dks ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA

5884

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

vkt fnukad 15&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr lfgr tkjh gq;sA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh]

pEck] ftyk pEck ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh cPpu flag ¼fg0 iz0 ls0½] mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh] pEck] ftyk pEck] fg0 iz0

Hkkuk jke iq= fQUQw jke] xkao /kkaMy] Mkd?kj lkp] rglhy pEck

cuke

vke turk ,oa xzke iapk;r vksMk] fodkl [k.M pEck

fo"k;-&tUe frfFk n#Lrh lEcU/khA

bl vnkyr esa Hkkuk jke iq= fQUQw jke] xkao /kkaMy] Mkd?kj lkp] rglhy pEck us ,d nj[okLr

nsdj vuqjks/k fd;k gS fd mldh tUe frfFk 3&3&1966 gS ysfdu tUe ls lEcfU/kr ?kVuk xzke iapk;r

vksMk] fodkl [k.M pEck esa ntZ u gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k turk dks b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd Hkkuk jke iq= fQUQw jke] xkao

/kkaMy] Mkd?kj lkp] rglhy pEck dh tUe frfFk dks xzke iapk;r vksMk] fodkl [k.M pEck ds tUe

vfHkys[k esa ntZ djus ij vxj fdlh dks fdlh Hkh izdkj dh dksbZ vkifŸk gS rks og vlkyru ;k

odkyru viuh vkifŸk bl vnkyr esa b'rgkj ds izdk'ku ds ,d ekg ds Hkhrj&Hkhrj lqcg 10 cts ls

lk;a 5-00 cts rd ntZ djok ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa vkifŸk u vkus dh lwjr esa izkFkhZ dh tUe

frfFk dks ntZ djus ds vkns'k lEcfU/kr LFkkuh; jftLVªkj tUe ,oa e`R;q xzke iapk;r vksMk] fodkl [k.M

pEck dks ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA

vkt fnukad 15&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr lfgr tkjh gq;sA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh]

pEck] ftyk pEck ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh cPpu flag ¼fg0 iz0 ls0½] mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh] pEck] ftyk pEck] fg0 iz0

jftanj flag iq= pSuks] xkao FkYyk] Mkd?kj jtsjk] rglhy pEck

cuke

vke turk ,oa xzke iapk;r jtsjk] fodkl [k.M eSgyk

fo"k;-&tUe frfFk n#Lrh lEcU/khA

bl vnkyr esa jftanj flag iq= pSuks] xkao FkYyk] Mkd?kj jtsjk] rglhy pEck us ,d nj[okLr

nsdj vuqjks/k fd;k gS fd mldh tUe frfFk 19&10&1995 gS ysfdu tUe ls lEcfU/kr ?kVuk xzke iapk;r

jtsjk] fodkl [k.M eSgyk esa ntZ u gSA

5885

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

vr% loZlk/kkj.k turk dks b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd jftanj flag iq= pSuks] xkao

FkYyk] Mkd?kj jtsjk] rglhy pEck dh tUe frfFk dks xzke iapk;r jtsjk] fodkl [k.M eSgyk ds tUe

vfHkys[k esa ntZ djus ij vxj fdlh dks fdlh Hkh izdkj dh dksbZ vkifŸk gS rks og vlkyru ;k

odkyru viuh vkifŸk bl vnkyr esa b'rgkj ds izdk'ku ds ,d ekg ds Hkhrj&Hkhrj lqcg 10 cts ls

lk;a 5-00 cts rd ntZ djok ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa vkifŸk u vkus dh lwjr esa izkFkhZ dh tUe

frfFk dks ntZ djus ds vkns'k lEcfU/kr LFkkuh; jftLVªkj tUe ,oa e`R;q xzke iapk;r jtsjk] fodkl [k.M

eSgyk dks ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA

vkt fnukad 15&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr lfgr tkjh gq;sA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh]

pEck] ftyk pEck ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh cPpu flag ¼fg0 iz0 ls0½] mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh] pEck] ftyk pEck] fg0 iz0

foØe Bkdqj iq= cgknqj flag] xkao cgh ckx] Mkd?kj dksVh] rglhy pEck

cuke

vke turk ,oa xzke iapk;r izkguoh] fodkl [k.M pEck

fo"k;-&tUe frfFk n#Lrh lEcU/khA

bl vnkyr esa foØe Bkdqj iq= cgknqj flag] xkao cgh ckx] Mkd?kj dksVh] rglhy pEck us ,d

nj[okLr nsdj vuqjks/k fd;k gS fd mldh tUe frfFk 3&6&1989 gS ysfdu tUe ls lEcfU/kr ?kVuk xzke

iapk;r izkguoh] fodkl [k.M pEck esa ntZ u gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k turk dks b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd foØe Bkdqj iq= cgknqj flag]

xkao cgh ckx] Mkd?kj dksVh] rglhy pEck dh tUe frfFk dks xzke iapk;r izkguoh] fodkl [k.M pEck ds

tUe vfHkys[k esa ntZ djus ij vxj fdlh dks fdlh Hkh izdkj dh dksbZ vkifŸk gS rks og vlkyru ;k

odkyru viuh vkifŸk bl vnkyr esa b'rgkj ds izdk'ku ds ,d ekg ds Hkhrj&Hkhrj lqcg 10 cts ls

lk;a 5-00 cts rd ntZ djok ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa vkifŸk u vkus dh lwjr esa izkFkhZ dh tUe

frfFk dks ntZ djus ds vkns'k lEcfU/kr LFkkuh; jftLVªkj tUe ,oa e`R;q xzke iapk;r izkguoh] fodkl

[k.M pEck dks ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA

vkt fnukad 15&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr lfgr tkjh gq;sA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh]

pEck] ftyk pEck ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh cPpu flag ¼fg0 iz0 ls0½] mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh] pEck] ftyk pEck] fg0 iz0

gjizhr dkSj iRuh ftrsUnz flag] fuoklh eqgYyk gjnkliqj] rglhy pEck

cuke

vke turk ,oa uxj ifj"kn~ pEck

5886

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

fo"k;-&uke n#Lrh lEcU/khA

bl vnkyr esa gjizhr dkSj iRuh ftrsUnz flag] fuoklh eqgYyk gjnkliqj] rglhy pEck us ,d

nj[okLr nsdj vuqjks/k fd;k gS fd mldh iq=h dk lgh uke ekfgjk flag o mldk uke gjizhr dkSj gS

ijUrq mldh iq=h ds tUe izek.k&i= ij iq=h dk uke ekyfodk o mldk uke liuk xyr ntZ gS ftls

og viuh iq=h dk uke ekfgjk flag o viuk uke gjizhr dkSj n#Lr djokuk pkgrh gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k turk dks b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd gjizhr dkSj iRuh ftrsUnz flag]

fuoklh eqgYyk gjnkliqj] rglhy pEck dh iq= ds tUe izek.k i= esa mldk o mldh iq=h ds uke dk

uxj ifj"kn~ pEck ds vfHkys[k esa n#Lr ntZ djus ij vxj fdlh dks fdlh Hkh izdkj dh dksbZ vkifŸk gS

rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru viuh vkifŸk bl vnkyr esa b'rgkj ds izdk'ku ds ,d ekg ds

Hkhrj&Hkhrj lqcg 10 cts ls lk;a 5-00 cts rd ntZ djok ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa vkifŸk u vkus

dh lwjr esa izkfFkZu dh iq=h ds tUe izek.k i= esa izkfFkZu o mldh iq=h dk uke n#Lr djus ds vkns'k

lEcfU/kr LFkkuh; jftLVªkj tUe ,oa e`R;q uxj ifj"kn~ pEck dks ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA

vkt fnukad 15&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr lfgr tkjh gq;sA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh]

pEck] ftyk pEck ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh cPpu flag ¼fg0 iz0 ls0½] mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh] pEck] ftyk pEck] fg0 iz0

uhye 'kekZ iRuh ftrsUnz izlkn 'kekZ] fuoklh eqgYyk [k#M+k] rglhy pEck

cuke

vke turk ,oa uxj ifj"kn~ pEck

fo"k;-&tUe frfFk iathdj.k lEcU/khA

bl vnkyr esa uhye 'kekZ iRuh ftrsUnz izlkn 'kekZ] fuoklh eqgYyk [k#M+k] rglhy pEck us ,d

nj[okLr nsdj vuqjks/k fd;k gS fd mlds iq= uked vafdr 'kekZ dh tUe frfFk 1&9&1988 gS ysfdu

tUe ls lEcfU/kr ?kVuk uxj ifj"kn~ pEck esa ntZ u gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k turk dks b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd uhye 'kekZ iRuh ftrsUnz izlkn

'kekZ] fuoklh eqgYyk [k#M+k] rglhy pEck ds iq= dh tUe frfFk dks uxj ifj"kn~ pEck ds tUe vfHkys[k

esa ntZ djus ij vxj fdlh dks fdlh Hkh izdkj dh dksbZ vkifŸk gS rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru viuh

vkifŸk bl vnkyr esa b'rgkj ds izdk'ku ds ,d ekg ds Hkhrj&Hkhrj lqcg 10 cts ls lk;a 5-00 cts

rd ntZ djok ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa vkifŸk u vkus dh lwjr esa izkfFkZu ds iq= dh tUe frfFk dks

ntZ djus ds vkns'k lEcfU/kr LFkkuh; jftLVªkj tUe ,oa e`R;q uxj ifj"kn~ pEck dks ikfjr dj fn,

tk;saxsA

vkt fnukad 15&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr lfgr tkjh gq;sA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh]

pEck] ftyk pEck ¼fg0 iz0½A

5887

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

c vnkyr Jh cPpu flag ¼fg0 iz0 ls0½] mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh] pEck] ftyk pEck] fg0 iz0

xksiky flag iq= tSlh] xkao eqdySuh] Mkd?kj HkfM;kdksBh] rglhy o ftyk pEck

cuke

vke turk ,oa xzke lHkk] xzke iapk;r HkfM;k] fodkl [k.M pEck

fo"k;-&&uke n#Lrh lEcU/khA

bl vnkyr esa xksiky flag iq= tSlh] xkao eqdySuh] Mkd?kj HkfM;kdksBh] rglhy o ftyk pEck us

,d nj[okLr ns dj vuqjks/k fd;k gS fd mldk lgh uke xksiky flag gS ijUrq mldk uke xzke iapk;r

HkfM;k] fodkl [k.M pEck esa xqykc flag ntZ gS tksfd xyr ntZ gS izkFkhZ us xzke iapk;r HkfM;k] fodkl

[k.M pEck ds vfHkys[k esa xqykc flag ds ctk;s xksiky flag uke ntZ djus dk vuqjks/k fd;k gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k turk dks b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd xksiky flag iq= tSlh] xkao

eqdySuh] Mkd?kj HkfM;kdksBh] rglhy o ftyk pEck ds uke dh n#Lrh ckjk vxj fdlh dks fdlh Hkh

izdkj dh dksbZ vkifŸk gS rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru viuh vkifŸk bl vnkyr esa b'rgkj ds izdk'ku

ds ,d ekg ds Hkhrj&Hkhrj lqcg 10 cts ls lk;a 5-00 cts rd ntZ djok ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa

vkifŸk u vkus dh lwjr esa izkFkh ds uke dks n#Lr djus ds vkns'k lEcfU/kr LFkkuh; jftLVªkj tUe ,oa

e`R;q xzke iapk;r HkfM;k] fodkl [k.M pEck dks ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA

vkt fnukad 15&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr lfgr tkjh gq;sA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh]

pEck] ftyk pEck ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh cPpu flag ¼fg0 iz0 ls0½] mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh] pEck] ftyk pEck] fg0 iz0

v'ouh dqekj iq= lar jke] xkao gjksBk] Mkd?kj pusM] rglhy pEck

cuke

vke turk ,oa xzke lHkk] xzke iapk;r Hkuksrk] fodkl [k.M pEck

fo"k;-&&uke n#Lrh lEcU/khA

bl vnkyr esa v'ouh dqekj iq= lar jke] xkao gjksBk] Mkd?kj pusM] rglhy pEck us ,d

nj[okLr nsdj vuqjks/k fd;k gS fd mlds iq= dk lgh uke 'kqce 'kekZ gS ijUrq mldk uke xzke iapk;r

Hkuksrk esa 'kqHke 'kekZ ntZ gS tksfd xyr ntZ gS izkFkhZ us xzke iapk;r Hkuksrk ds vfHkys[k esa 'kqHke 'kekZ ds

ctk;s 'kqce 'kekZ uke ntZ djus dk vuqjks/k fd;k gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k turk dks b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd v'ouh dqekj iq= lar jke] xkao

gjksBk] Mkd?kj pusM] rglhy pEck ds iq= ds uke dh n#Lrh ckjk vxj fdlh dks fdlh Hkh izdkj dh

dksbZ vkifŸk gS rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru viuh vkifŸk bl vnkyr esa b'rgkj ds izdk'ku ds ,d

ekg ds Hkhrj&Hkhrj lqcg 10 cts ls lk;a 5-00 cts rd ntZ djok ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa vkifŸk u

vkus dh lwjr esa izkFkh ds iq= ds uke dks n#Lr djus ds vkns'k lEcfU/kr LFkkuh; jftLVªkj tUe ,oa e`R;q

xzke iapk;r Hkuksrk dks ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA

5888

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

vkt fnukad 15&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr lfgr tkjh gq;sA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh]

pEck] ftyk pEck ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh] pEck] ftyk pEck] fg0 iz0

tehr flag iq= Kku pUn] fuoklh xkao dqjkag] Mkd?kj eSgyk] rglhy o ftyk pEck] fg0 iz0

cuke

vke turk

fo"k;-&cPpksa ds tUe iathdj.k ds lUnHkZ esaA

Jh tehr flag iq= Kku pUn] fuoklh xkao dqjkag] Mkd?kj eSgyk] rglhy o ftyk pEck us bl

vnkyr esa izkFkZuk&i= xqtkj dj fuosnu fd;k gS fd mlds fuEufyf[kr cPpksa dk uke iathdj.k xzke

iapk;r vfHkys[k xkxyk ds vfHkys[k esa ntZ ugha gqvk gS] ftlds iathdj.k gsrq izkFkZuk dh gS%&

Øe la[;k

uke

firk dk uke

ekrk dk uke

tUe frfFk

cohrk nsoh

tehr flag

iq"ik nsoh

5&8&1998

jkgqy

tehr flag

iq"ik nsoh

26&8&2001

jk[kh

tehr flag

iq"ik nsoh

30&9&2003

bl b'rgkj ds ek/;e ls loZlk/kkj.k turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vxj fdlh O;fDr dks

mijksDr cPpksa ds tUe iathdj.k ckjs fdlh Hkh izdkj dk mtj ;k ,rjkt gks rks og bl vnkyr esa

b'rgkj izdk'ku ds ,d ekg i'pkr~ vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vk dj iSjoh eqdíek djsa A blds

i'pkr~ fdlh Hkh izdkj dk mtj o ,rjkt dkcys lek;r u gksxk rFkk mijksDr cPpksa ds tUe iathdj.k

ckjs vkns'k vnkyr ls tkjh dj fn;s tk,axsA

vkt fnukad 17&10&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr vnkyr ls tkjh gq;sA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

mi&e.My n.Mkf/kdkjh]

pEck] ftyk pEck ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh deZ flag] uk;c rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] dqYyw] ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0

dsl uEcj % 67/B.E./T/2016

rkjh[k is'kh % 15&12&2016

cuke

loZlk/kkj.k ,oa vke turk

fo"k;-&&izkFkZuk&i= vf/kfu;e /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-

5889

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

Jh /keZ iky iq= Jh dkyh jke] fuoklh fl;quhiqy] Mk0 jk;lu] rglhy o ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0 us

bl dk;kZy; esa izkFkZuk&i= fn;k gS fd mlds yM+ds lquhy dqekj dk tUe fnukad 20&12&1998 dks gqvk

gS ijUrq mldh tUe frfFk dk bUnzkt fdlh dkj.ko'k xzke iapk;r f'kj<+ ds vfHkys[k esa ntZ u gqvk gSA

vr% bl b'rgkj gtk }kjk loZlk/kkj.k dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks lquhy

dqekj dh tUe frfFk ntZ djokus ckjs dksbZ vkifŸk gks rks og fnukad 15&12&2016 dks lqcg 10-00 cts

;k blls iwoZ vlkyru o odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuk mtj o ,rjkt ntZ djok ldrk gS

blds mijkUr dksbZ Hkh mtj@,rjkt lek;r u gksxk rFkk fu;ekuqlkj tUe frfFk ntZ djokus ds vkns'k

lEcfU/kr iapk;r dks ikfjr dj fn, tk,axsA

vkt fnukad 16&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

deZ flag]

uk;c rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]

dqYyw] ftyk dqYyw ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh deZ flag] uk;c rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] dqYyw] ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0

dsl uEcj % 68/B.E./T/2016

rkjh[k is'kh % 15&12&2016

cuke

loZlk/kkj.k ,oa vke turk

fo"k;-&&izkFkZuk&i= vf/kfu;e /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-

Jh /keZ iky iq= Jh dkyh jke] fuoklh fl;quhiqy] Mk0 jk;lu] rglhy o ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0 us

bl dk;kZy; esa izkFkZuk&i= fn;k gS fd mlds yM+ds 'kqHke dk tUe fnukad 23&01&1998 dks gqvk gS

ijUrq mldh tUe frfFk dk bUnzkt fdlh dkj.ko'k xzke iapk;r f'kj<+ ds vfHkys[k esa ntZ u gqvk gSA

vr% bl b'rgkj gtk }kjk loZlk/kkj.k dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks 'kqHke

dh tUe frfFk ntZ djokus ckjs dksbZ vkifŸk gks rks og fnukad 15&12&2016 dks lqcg 10-00 cts ;k blls

iwoZ vlkyru o odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuk mtj o ,rjkt ntZ djok ldrk gS blds

mijkUr dksbZ Hkh mtj@,rjkt lek;r u gksxk rFkk fu;ekuqlkj tUe frfFk ntZ djokus ds vkns'k

lEcfU/kr iapk;r dks ikfjr dj fn, tk,axsA

vkt fnukad 16&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

deZ flag]

uk;c rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]

dqYyw] ftyk dqYyw ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh osn izdk'k 'kekZ] rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] dqYyw] ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0

dsl uEcj % 59/M.E./T/2016

rkjh[k is'kh % 22&12&2016

1- Jh pUns jke iq= Jh vkRek jke] xkao oSUph] Mk0 jk;lu] rglhy o ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0

5890

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2- Jherh yktoUrh iq=h Jh eku flag] fuoklh xkao o Mk0 vjN.M+h] rglhy o ftyk dqYyw]

fg0 iz0

- - izkFkhZx.kA

cuke

vke turk

- - izfroknhx.kA

fo"k;-&&izkFkZuk&i= tsj /kkjk 5¼4½ fg0 iz0 jftLVªhdj.k fu;e] 2004 fookg iathdj.k ckjsA

mijksDr ekeyk esa izkFkhZx.k mijksDr us fnukad 18&11&2016 dks bl vnkyr esa izkFkZuk&i= is'k

fd;k gS fd mUgksaus fnukad 12&08&2014 dks fgUnw jhfr&fjokt ds vuqlkj LFkku oSUph esa 'kknh dj yh gS

vkSj rc ls ifr&iRuh ds :i esa jgrs pys vk jgs gSaA ijUrq izkFkhZx.k }kjk viuh 'kknh dk bUnzkt lEcfU/kr

iapk;r esa ugha djok;k gSA

vr% loZlk/kkj.k dks o vke turk dks bl b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd fdlh Hkh O;fDr

dks mijksDr izkFkhZx.kksa dh 'kknh dks lEcfU/kr iapk;r ds vfHkys[k esa ntZ djus ckjs dksbZ mtj o ,rjkt

gks rks og fnukad 22&12&2016 dks lqcg 10-00 cts ;k blls iwoZ vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr

is'k gksdj viuk mtj o ,rjkt is'k dj ldrk gSA blds mijkUr dksbZ Hkh mtj o ,rjkt izkIr u gksus

dh lwjr esa fu;ekuqlkj 'kknh ntZ djus ds vkns'k ikfjr dj fn, tk,axsA

vkt fnukad 21&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

osn izdk'k 'kekZ]

rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]

dqYyw] ftyk dqYyw ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&&

[c vnkyr Jh osn izdk'k 'kekZ] rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] dqYyw] ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0

dsl uEcj % 69/B.E./T/2016

rkjh[k is'kh % 22&12&2016

cuke

loZlk/kkj.k ,oa vke turk

fo"k;-&&izkFkZuk&i= vf/kfu;e /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-

Jh ysl jke iq= Jh ujir] fuoklh ekfg'k] Mk0 okjh] rglhy o ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0 us bl

dk;kZy; esa izkFkZuk&i= fn;k gS fd mldh yM+dh lkfu;k dk tUe fnukad 2&6&2010 dks gqvk gS ijUrq

mldh tUe frfFk dk bUnzkt fdlh dkj.ko'k xzke iapk;r pulkjh ds vfHkys[k esa ntZ u gqvk gSA

vr% bl b'rgkj gtk }kjk loZlk/kkj.k dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks

lkfu;k dh tUe frfFk ntZ djokus ckjs dksbZ vkifŸk gks rks og fnukad 22&12&2016 dks lqcg 10-00 cts

;k blls iwoZ vlkyru o odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuk mtj o ,rjkt ntZ djok ldrk gS

blds mijkUr dksbZ Hkh mtj@,rjkt lek;r u gksxk rFkk fu;ekuqlkj tUe frfFk ntZ djokus ds vkns'k

lEcfU/kr iapk;r dks ikfjr dj fn, tk,axsA

5891

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

vkt fnukad 21&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

osn izdk'k 'kekZ]

rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]

dqYyw] ftyk dqYyw ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh osn izdk'k 'kekZ] rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] dqYyw] ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0

dsl uEcj % 70/B.E./T/2016

rkjh[k is'kh % 22&12&2016

cuke

loZlk/kkj.k ,oa vke turk

fo"k;-&&izkFkZuk&i= vf/kfu;e /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-

Jh jkt dqekj iq= Jh d`".k cgknqj] fuoklh pySyh] Mk0 pksyFkjk] rglhy ljdk?kkV] ftyk e.Mh]

fg0 iz0 gky fuoklh okMZ ua0 10] Mk0 <+kyiqj] rglhy o ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0 us bl dk;kZy; esa

izkFkZuk&i= fn;k gS fd mldk tUe fnukad 20&06&1987 dks dqYyw esa gqvk gS ijUrq mldh tUe frfFk dk

bUnzkt fdlh dkj.ko'k uxj ifj"kn~ dqYyw ds vfHkys[k esa ntZ u gqvk gSA

vr% bl b'rgkj gtk }kjk loZlk/kkj.k dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks jkt

dqekj dh tUe frfFk ntZ djokus ckjs dksbZ vkifŸk gks rks og fnukad 22&12&2016 dks lqcg 10-00 cts

;k blls iwoZ vlkyru o odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuk mtj o ,rjkt ntZ djok ldrk gS

blds mijkUr dksbZ Hkh mtj@,rjkt lek;r u gksxk rFkk fu;ekuqlkj tUe frfFk ntZ djokus ds vkns'k

lEcfU/kr iapk;r dks ikfjr dj fn, tk,axsA

vkt fnukad 21&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

osn izdk'k 'kekZ]

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dqYyw] ftyk dqYyw ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh osn izdk'k 'kekZ] rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] dqYyw] ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0

dsl uEcj % 71/B.E./T/2016

rkjh[k is'kh % 22&12&2016

cuke

loZlk/kkj.k ,oa vke turk

fo"k;-&&izkFkZuk&i= vf/kfu;e /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-

Jh lqnu flag liq= Jh rkjk pUn] fuoklh oUny] Mk0 iwbZn] rglhy o ftyk dqYyw] fg0 iz0 us

bl dk;kZy; esa izkFkZuk&i= fn;k gS fd mldh ekrk touk nsoh dh e`R;q fnukad 25&04&2011 dks gqbZ gS

ijUrq mldh e`R;q frfFk dk bUnzkt fdlh dkj.ko'k xzke iapk;r iwbZn ds vfHkys[k esa ntZ u gqvk gSA

5892

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

vr% bl b'rgkj gtk }kjk loZlk/kkj.k dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks touk

nsoh dh e`R;q frfFk ntZ djokus ckjs dksbZ vkifŸk gks rks og fnukad 22&12&2016 dks lqcg 10-00 cts ;k

blls iwoZ vlkyru o odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuk mtj o ,rjkt ntZ djok ldrk gS blds

mijkUr dksbZ Hkh mtj@,rjkt lek;r u gksxk rFkk fu;ekuqlkj e`R;q frfFk ntZ djokus ds vkns'k

lEcfU/kr iapk;r dks ikfjr dj fn, tk,axsA

vkt fnukad 22&11&2016 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

osn izdk'k 'kekZ]

rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]

dqYyw] ftyk dqYyw ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&

In the Court of H. R. Bairwa (IAS), Special Marriage Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate,

Manali, District Kullu, H.P.

In the matter of :

Nawang Tenzin aged 26 years son of Shri Thakar Lal, r/o Lessani Padder, P.O. Atholi,

Tehsil Machale, District Kishtwar, J & K at present residing at VPO Bahang, Tehsil Manali,

District Kullu, H.P.

Smt. Geeta Devi aged 26 years d/o Shri Thakar Lal, r/o Village and P.O. Bahang, Tehsil

Manali, District Kullu, H.P.

Versus

General Public

An application for registration of marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954.

Whereas Nawang Tenzin aged 26 years son of Shri Thakar Lal, r/o Lessani Padder, P.O.

Atholi, Tehsil Machale, District Kishtwar, J & K at present residing at VPO Bahang, Tehsil Manali,

District Kullu, H.P. and Smt. Geeta Devi aged 26 years d/o Shri Thakar Lal, r/o Village and P.O.

Bahang, Tehsil Manali, District Kullu, H.P. has presented an application on 2-9-2016 in this court

for the registration of marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954. Hence this proclamation is

hereby issued for the information of general public that if any persons have any objection for the

registration of the above marriage can appear in this court on 19-12-2016 at 2.00 P.M. to object

registration of above marriage personally or through an authorized agent failing which this

marriage will be registered under this Act, 1954 accordingly.

Given under my hand and seal of the court 19^th day of November, 2016.

Seal.

Sd/-

Special Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Manali, District Kullu, H.P.

5893

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

In the Court of Shri Hemis Negi, H.A.S., Sub Divisional Magistrate Shimla (Urban),

District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh

Miss Tenzin Dolma d/o Shri Dorjee Kalsang, r/o House No. 25, Tibetan Nursery Day School,

IGMC Boys Hostel Road Sanjauli, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P.

. . Applicant.

Versus

General Public

.. Respondent.

Application under section 13(3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.

Whereas Miss Tenzin Dolma d/o Shri Dorjee Kalsang, r/o House No. 25, Tibetan Nursery

Day School, IGMC Boys Hostel Road Sanjauli, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P. has preferred an

application to the undersigned for registration the name and date of birth of her (DOB 27-5-1986)

in the record of Municipal Corporation Shimla, District Shimla, H.P.

Therefore, this proclamation, the General Public is hereby informed that any person having

and objection for entry as to date of birth mentioned above, may submit his objection in writing in

this court on or before 22-12-2016 failing which no objection will be entertained after expiry of

date and will be decided accordingly.

Given under my hand and seal of the Court on this 21st day of November, 2016.

Seal.

HEMIS NEGI,

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Shimla (Urban).

____________

In the Court of Shri Hemis Negi, H.A.S., Sub Divisional Magistrate Shimla (Urban),

District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh

Shri Dorjee Damdul s/o Late Shri Tashi, r/o House No. 27, New Building, Tibetan Colony,

Shimla, Panthaghati, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P.

. . Applicant.

Versus

General Public

.. Respondent.

Application under section 13(3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.

Whereas Shri Dorjee Damdul s/o Late Shri Tashi, r/o House No. 27, New Building, Tibetan

Colony, Shimla, Panthaghati, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P. has preferred an application to the

undersigned for registration the name and date of birth of his son namely Tenzin Tsering (DOB

15-8-2006) in the record of Municipal Corporation Shimla, District Shimla, H.P.

Therefore, this proclamation, the General Public is hereby informed that any person having

and objection for entry as to date of birth mentioned above, may submit his objection in writing in

5894

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

this court on or before 22-12-2016 failing which no objection will be entertained after expiry of

date and will be decided accordingly.

Given under my hand and seal of the Court on this 21st day of November, 2016.

Seal.

HEMIS NEGI,

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Shimla (Urban).

____________

In the Court of Shri Hemis Negi, H.A.S., Sub Divisional Magistrate Shimla (Urban),

District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh

Shri Tsewang Tenzin s/o Shri Dorjee Damdul, r/o House No. 27, New Building, Tibetan

Colony, Shimla, Panthaghati, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P.

. . Applicant.

Versus

General Public

.. Respondent.

Application under section 13(3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.

Whereas Shri Tsewang Tenzin s/o Late Shri Dorjee Damdul, r/o House No. 27, New

Building, Tibetan Colony, Shimla, Panthaghati, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P. has preferred an

application to the undersigned for registration the name and date of birth of his (DOB 30-1-1993) in

the record of Municipal Corporation Shimla, District Shimla, H.P.

Therefore, this proclamation, the General Public is hereby informed that any person having

and objection for entry as to date of birth mentioned above, may submit his objection in writing in

this court on or before 22-12-2016 failing which no objection will be entertained after expiry of

date and will be decided accordingly.

Given under my hand and seal of the Court on this 21st day of November, 2016.

Seal.

HEMIS NEGI,

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Shimla (Urban).

____________

In the Court of Shri Hemis Negi, H.A.S., Sub Divisional Magistrate Shimla (Urban),

District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh

Shri Sonam Tsering s/o Shri Lobsang Dega, r/o House No. C-34, New Building, Tibetan

Colony, Shimla, Panthaghati, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P.

. . Applicant.

Versus

5895

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

General Public

.. Respondent.

Application under section 13(3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.

Whereas Shri Sonam Tsering s/o Shri Lobsang Dega, r/o House No. C-34, New Building,

Tibetan Colony, Shimla, Panthaghati, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P. has preferred an application

to the undersigned for registration the name and date of birth of his (DOB 3-3-1975) in the record

of Municipal Corporation Shimla, District Shimla, H.P.

Therefore, this proclamation, the General Public is hereby informed that any person having

and objection for entry as to date of birth mentioned above, may submit his objection in writing in

this court on or before 22-12-2016 failing which no objection will be entertained after expiry of

date and will be decided accordingly.

Given under my hand and seal of the Court on this 21st day of November, 2016.

Seal.

HEMIS NEGI,

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Shimla (Urban).

____________

In the Court of Shri Hemis Negi, H.A.S., Sub Divisional Magistrate Shimla (Urban),

District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh

Shri Thinley Wangchuk s/o Shri Rich Tsering, r/o Nabha House, Tibetan Colony, Shimla,

Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P.

. . Applicant.

Versus

General Public

.. Respondent.

Application under section 13(3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.

Whereas Shri Thinley Wangchuk s/o Shri Rich Tsering, r/o Nabha House, Tibetan Colony,

Shimla, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P. has preferred an application to the undersigned for

registration the name and date of birth of his (DOB 23-3-1972) in the record of Municipal

Corporation Shimla, District Shimla, H.P.

Therefore, this proclamation, the General Public is hereby informed that any person having

and objection for entry as to date of birth mentioned above, may submit his objection in writing in

this court on or before 22-12-2016 failing which no objection will be entertained after expiry of

date and will be decided accordingly.

Given under my hand and seal of the Court on this 21st day of November, 2016.

Seal.

HEMIS NEGI,

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Shimla (Urban).

5896

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 7 fnlEcj] 2016@16 vxzgk;.k] 1938

In the Court of Shri Gian Sagar Negi, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Shimla (R),

District Shimla (H. P.)

Smt. Pema Dolma w/o Shri Comphel, r/o MD-22, Tibetan Handicraft Society, Sarswati

Garden Estate, P.O. Kasumpti, Panthaghati, Tehsil & District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh.

Versus

General Public

. . Respondent.

Whereas Smt. Pema Dolma w/o Shri Comphel, r/o MD-22, Tibetan Handicraft Society,

Sarswati Garden Estate, P.O. Kasumpti, Panthaghati, Tehsil & District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh

has filed an application along with affidavit in the court of undersigned under section 13(3) of the

Births & Deaths Registration Act, 1969 to enter date of birth of her Niece named—Ms. Tenzin

Wangmo d/o Shri Tsering Dhundup, r/o Tibetan Handicraft Society, Sarswati Garden Estate, P.O.

Kasumpti, Panthaghati, Tehsil & District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh in the record of Secy., Birth

and Death, Municipal Corporation, Shimla.

Sl.

No.

Name of the family member

Relation

Date of Birth

Ms. Tenzin Wangmo

Niece

28-01-1995

Hence, this proclamation is issued to the general public if they have any objection/claim

regarding entry of the name and date of birth of above named in the record of Municipal

Corporation, Shimla may file their claims/objections on or before one month of publication of this

notice in Govt. Gazette in this court, failing which necessary orders will be passed.

Issued today 02-12-2016 under my signature and seal of the court.

Seal.

GIAN SAGAR NEGI,

Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Shimla (R), District Shimla.

__________

CHANGE OF NAME

I, Sheetal Verma age 36 years, wife of Late Shri Devinder Nath, r/o Old Power House,

Lakkar Bazar, Shimla, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P. do hereby solemnly affirm and declare that

after my marriage my name has been changed from Malti Devi to Sheetal Verma. My name be

entered/changed in all records for all purposes as Sheetal Verma.

SHEETAL VERMA,

wife of Late Shri Devinder Nath,

r/o Old Power House, Lakkar Bazar, Shimla,

Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P.

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