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ohjokj] 14 fnlEcj] 2017@23 ekxZ'kh"kZ] 1939
fgekpy izns'k ljdkj
LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla, the 8th August, 2017
No: Shram (A) 6-3/2017 (Awards).—In exercise of the powers vested under section 17 (1)
of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order the
publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court
189&jkti=@2017&14&12&2017
¼8775½
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Shimla on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment Government of Himachal
Pradesh:—
Sr.
No.
Reference/Ap
plication
Title
Section
1.
Ref.18/2016
Sh. Rajeev Kumar V/s Jai Parkash Power Ventures Ltd.
10
2.
Ref.99/2016
Sh.Het Ram V/s XEN IPH Kasumpti.
10
3.
Ref.04/2017
Sh. Het Ram V/S -do-
10
4.
Ref.110/2016 Sh. Uttam Singh V/s XEN HPSEB Rampur Bushar.
10
5.
Ref.02/2017
Sh.Narender Sharma V/s XEN HPSEB Shimla-2.
10
6.
Ref.41/2016
Smt. Nirmala Chauhan V/s MD HP Agro Packing Shimla.
10
7.
Ref.60/2016
Sh. Mohan Lal V/s XEN HPSEB Charli Villa Shimla.
10
8.
Ref.58/2011
Sh. Raj Kumar & Ors V/S M/S Emmbros Auto Comp Ltd.
10
9.
Ref.41/2014
Smt. Kanta Devi V/s The Secy. Himachal Khadi Ashram
Shimla.
10
10.
Ref.33/2017
Sh. Shyamanand V/s MD H.P. Transport Corp. Shimla.
10
11.
Ref.78/2015
Sh. Dalesh Kumar V/s MD HRTC Shimla.
10
12.
Ref.72/2014
Sh. Anil Kumar V/S Director Ayurveda kasumpti Shimla.
10
13.
Ref.71/2014
Sh. Nishant Kaul V/S -do-
10
14.
Ref.10/2006
Sh. Harbans Singh V/s M/S Alembic Ltd. Parwanoo.
10
15.
Ref.84/2005
Sh. Pawan Kumar Ors V/s The XEN HPSEB Parwanoo.
10
16.
Ref.88/2010
Asian Electronices Ltd. Kamgar Sangh Chambaghat, Solan V/s
Factory Manager M/S Asian Electronices Ltd. Chambaghat
District Solan, H.P.
10
By order,
R. D. DHIMAN, IAS,
Pr. Secretary ( Lab. & Emp.).
_________
6.6.2017.
Present: None for the petitioner.
Shri Prateek Kumar, Advocate vice Shri Rahul Mahajan, Advocate for respondent.
Case called repeatedly in pre and post lunch sessions but none appeared on behalf of
petitioner. For today, the case has been listed for filing of claim on behalf of the petitioner but
neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared before this Court in order to file the statement of
claim. The record reveals that this reference is being adjourned for filing of claim since 26.4.2016
i.e for more than a year and the petitioner has availed as many as ten opportunities to file the claim
but despite repeated opportunities, the petitioner has failed to file the statement of claim which
clearly shows that the petitioner is not interested to pursue his claim arising out of the reference.
Hence, this Court is left with no other alternative but to decide the reference on the basis of
material whichever is available on file.
The following reference has been received from appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of the services of Rajeev Kumar S/O Sh. Hardyal Singh, Village
Kandeli (Jalie), P.O. Surad, Tehsil Rampur, Distt. Shimla, H.P. w.e.f. 15.7.2014 by the
management of Jai Parkash Power Ventures Ltd. Sholtu, P.O. Tapri, Teshil Nichar,
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Distt. Kinnaur, H.P. (Now M/s Himachal Baspa Power Venture Limited. Site office at
Shimla, P.O. Tapri Tehsil Nichar, Distt. Kinnaur, H.P.) without complying with the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what relief
including reinstatement, back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation
the above aggrieved worker is entitled to from the above employer/management?”
From the aforesaid reference is the clear that the petitioner has alleged his termination w.e.f.
15.7.2014 to be illegal and unjustified but despite affording repeated opportunities in order to file
the claim, none appeared on behalf of petitioner which seems that the petitioner is not interested to
pursue the present claim arising out of reference. Therefore, in the absence of any material on
record, it cannot be said that the services of the petitioner had been illegally terminated by the
respondent w.e.f. 15.7.2014. Hence, the reference is answered against the petitioner and the award
is passed accordingly. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for
publication in official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records.
(SUSHIL KUKREJA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
_______
12.6.2017.
Present: None for the petitioner.
Ms. Reena Chauhan, Dy. DA for respondent.
Before, I proceed further, it is important to mention here that the appropriate government
had sent two references with respect to the present petitioner Shri Het Ram and while receiving the
references, both were registered separately as reference no. 99 of 2016 and reference no. 4 of 2017
and notices were also issued separately. In both the references the common issue regarding
termination of services of petitioner during July/August, 1986 is involved. Since, the petitioner has
failed to appear and file any statement of claim in both the references despite repeated
opportunities, hence, I have left with no alternate but to dispose of both the references with a
common order.
The cases were called repeatedly but none appeared on behalf of petitioner. For today, both
the cases have been listed for the filing of claim petition on behalf of the petitioner. The record
reveals that after the receipt of both references, notices have been issued to both the parties and
thereafter various opportunities have been granted to the petitioner in order to file the claim but
today, neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared before this Court and to file statement of
claim which means that the petitioner is not interested to pursue his claim arising out of both the
references. Hence, this Court is left with no other alternative but to decide both the references on
the basis of material whichever is available on file.
The terms of reference in reference no. 99 of 2016 are reproduced as under:
“Whether alleged termination of services of Sh. Het Ram S/O Sh. Hira Dass R/O
Village Bog, P.O. Mashobra, Tehsil & Distt. Shimla, H.P. during July, 1986 by the
Executive Engineer, I & PH Division No.1, Kasumpti, Shimla-9, who had worked as
beldar on daily wages with above employer and has raised his industrial dispute after
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about 27 years, allegedly without complying with the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view the delay of about 27
years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past
service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
The terms of reference in reference no. 04 of 2017 are reproduced as under:
“Whether alleged termination of services of Sh. Het Ram s/o Sh. Hira Dass r/o Village
Bog, P.O. Mashobra, Tehsil & Distt. Shimla, H.P. during August, 1986 by the
Executive Engineer, I & PH Division No.1, Kasumpti, Shimla-9, who had worked for
100 days during 1986 and raised his industrial dispute after about 27 years, allegedly
without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and
justified? If not, keeping in view the working period of 100 days only during 1986 and
delay of about 27 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to
from the above employer?”
From both the aforesaid references it is clear that the petitioner has alleged his termination
during July/August, 1986 to be illegal and unjustified but despite affording repeated opportunities
to file the statement of claim, the petitioner has failed to appear before this Court and to file
statement of claim in support of his case arising out of both the references. The aforesaid references
also make it clear that the petitioner had raised the present dispute after about 27 years which seems
that the petitioner is not interested to pursue the present claim arising out of reference. Therefore, in
the absence of any material on record, it cannot be said that the services of the petitioner had been
illegally terminated by the respondent during July, 1986. Hence, both the references are answered
against the petitioner and the awards are passed accordingly. Let a copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate government for publication in official gazette. It is further ordered that an authenticated
copy of this order be also placed on record in reference no. 4 of 2017. Both the files, after
completion be consigned to records.
(SUSHIL KUKREJA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
________
12.6.2017.
Present: None for the petitioner.
Ms. Reena Chauhan, Dy. DA for respondent.
Before, I proceed further, it is important to mention here that the appropriate government
had sent two references with respect to the present petitioner Shri Het Ram and while receiving the
references, both were registered separately as reference no. 99 of 2016 and reference no. 4 of 2017
and notices were also issued separately. In both the references the common issue regarding
termination of services of petitioner during July/August, 1986 is involved. Since, the petitioner has
failed to appear and file any statement of claim in both the references despite repeated
opportunities, hence, I have left with no alternate but to dispose of both the references with a
common order.
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The cases were called repeatedly but none appeared on behalf of petitioner. For today, both
the cases have been listed for the filing of claim petition on behalf of the petitioner. The record
reveals that after the receipt of both references, notices have been issued to both the parties and
thereafter various opportunities have been granted to the petitioner in order to file the claim but
today, neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared before this Court and to file statement of
claim which means that the petitioner is not interested to pursue his claim arising out of both the
references. Hence, this Court is left with no other alternative but to decide both the references on
the basis of material whichever is available on file.
The terms of reference in reference no. 99 of 2016 are reproduced as under:
“Whether alleged termination of services of Sh. Het Ram S/O Sh. Hira Dass R/O
Village Bog, P.O. Mashobra, Tehsil & Distt. Shimla, H.P. during July, 1986 by the
Executive Engineer, I & PH Division No.1, Kasumpti, Shimla-9, who had worked as
beldar on daily wages with above employer and has raised his industrial dispute after
about 27 years, allegedly without complying with the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view the delay of about 27
years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past
service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
The terms of reference in reference no. 04 of 2017 are reproduced as under:
“Whether alleged termination of services of Sh. Het Ram s/o Sh. Hira Dass r/o Village
Bog, P.O. Mashobra, Tehsil & Distt. Shimla, H.P. during August, 1986 by the
Executive Engineer, I & PH Division No.1, Kasumpti, Shimla-9, who had worked for
100 days during 1986 and raised his industrial dispute after about 27 years, allegedly
without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and
justified? If not, keeping in view the working period of 100 days only during 1986 and
delay of about 27 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to
from the above employer?”
From both the aforesaid references it is clear that the petitioner has alleged his termination
during July/August, 1986 to be illegal and unjustified but despite affording repeated opportunities
to file the statement of claim, the petitioner has failed to appear before this Court and to file
statement of claim in support of his case arising out of both the references. The aforesaid references
also make it clear that the petitioner had raised the present dispute after about 27 years which seems
that the petitioner is not interested to pursue the present claim arising out of reference. Therefore, in
the absence of any material on record, it cannot be said that the services of the petitioner had been
illegally terminated by the respondent during July, 1986. Hence, both the references are answered
against the petitioner and the awards are passed accordingly. Let a copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate government for publication in official gazette. It is further ordered that an authenticated
copy of this order be also placed on record in reference no. 4 of 2017. Both the files, after
completion be consigned to records.
(SUSHIL KUKREJA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
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17.6.2017.
Present: None for the petitioner.
Shri Ramakant Sharma, Advocate for respondent.
Case called repeatedly in pre and post lunch sessions but neither the petitioner nor his
counsel appeared before this Court. For today, the case has been listed for filing of claim. The
record reveals that after the receipt of reference from the appropriate government, the notices were
issued to the parties to appear before this Court and on 13.12.2016, Shri Vasu Sood, Advocate
appeared for petitioner and Shri Sudhir Negi, Advocate for respondent before this Court and
thereafter the case was adjourned for 12.1.2017 for filing of claim but despite affording various
opportunities to file the claim, the petitioner has failed to file any claim and even today, none
appeared on behalf of the petitioner which clearly shows that at present the petitioner is not
interested to pursue his claim arising out of the reference. Hence, this Court is left with no other
alternative but to decide the reference on the basis of material whichever is available on file.
The following reference has been received from appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Uttam singh s/o Sh. Chain Ram, r/o
Village-Batoona, P.O. Nogli, Tehsil Rampur, Distt. Shimla, H.P. during April, 1998 by
the Executive Engineer, Electrical Division, H.P.S.E.B. Limited, Rampur Bushahar,
Distt. Shimla, H.P., who had worked for 23 days only during the year 1998 and has
raised his industrial dispute after more than 14 years, allegedly without complying
with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not,
keeping in view the working period of 23 days only in 1998 and delay of more than 14
years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority past
service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
From the aforesaid reference is the clear that the petitioner has alleged his termination
during April, 1998 to be illegal and unjustified but despite affording repeated opportunities to file
the claim, none appeared today on behalf of petitioner. The aforesaid reference also makes it clear
that the petitioner had worked only for 23 days during the year, 1998 and raised the present dispute
after more than 14 years. It appears that the petitioner is not interested to pursue the present claim
arising out of reference. Therefore, in the absence of any material on record, it cannot be said that
the services of the petitioner had been illegally terminated by the respondent during April, 1998.
Hence, the reference is answered against the petitioner and the award is passed accordingly. Let a
copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in official gazette. File,
after completion be consigned to records.
(SUSHIL KUKREJA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
________
1.3.2017.
Present: None for the petitioner.
Ms. Reena Chauhan, Dy. DA for respondent.
This case is being listed for the service of the petitioner w.e.f. 3.9.2016 and thereafter as
many as five times the notices were issued/sent for the service of the petitioner on the address given
by the office of Labour Commissioner on reference itself. However, despite that the petitioner has
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failed to appear before this Court. It is relevant to mention here that the Labour Commissioner has
also informed the petitioner about the present reference by sending a copy of this reference to him
as such the petitioner is having knowledge that the reference has been sent to this Court by the
Labour Commissioner for adjudication. Thus, he could have himself appeared before this Court in
order to file his claim.
In the light of aforesaid facts, it appears that the petitioner is not interested to pursue his
claim. Therefore, to further adjourn the case would be a futile exercise. The following reference
qua the termination of services of petitioner was received from appropriate government for
adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Narender Singh S/o Late Shri
Mandass R/o Village Jajehar, P.O Gumma, Tehsil & District Shimla, HP during June,
1988 by the Executive Engineer, I&PH Division No.II District Shimla, HP who had
worked as beldar on daily wages only for 21 days in the year, 1988 and has raised his
industrial dispute more than 24 years allegedly without complying with the provisions
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? IF not, keeping view of
working period of 21 days in the years, 1988 and delay of more than 24 years in
raising the industrial dispute what amount of back wages, seniority, past service
benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
From the reference, it is clear that the petitioner has alleged his termination during June,
1988 to be illegal and unjustified. However, for the failure of the petitioner to have appeared before
this Court in order to file statement of claim and to lead evidence, it cannot be held that his services
were wrongly and illegally terminated by the respondent. Moreover, from the reference it is also
clear that the petitioner had worked only for 21 days in the year, 1988 and raised his dispute after a
lapse of more than 24 years which shows that he is not serious about the dispute raised by him.
Hence, in the absence of any material on record, the reference is answered against the petitioner
and the award is passed accordingly. However, the petitioner is at liberty to revive this reference by
moving an appropriate application. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government
for publication in official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records.
(SUSHIL KUKREJA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court, Shimla.
_________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, HP INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA
Ref no.
:
41 of 2016.
Instituted on
:
2.5.2016.
Decided on
:
19.6.2017.
Nirmala Chauhan W/o Shri Hemant Kumar Verma R/o Verma Bhawan, Nav Bahar Shimla,
HP.
. .Petitioner.
VS.
The Managing Director, HP Agro Packaging Nigam Vihar Shimla-2
. .Respondent.
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Reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner
: Shri Raj Kumar, Advocate.
For respondent
: Ex-parte.
AWARD
The reference for adjudication, sent by the appropriate government, is as under:
“Whether alleged termination of services of Smt. Nirmala Chauhan W/O Sh. Hemant
Kumar Verma, R/O Verma Bhawan, Nav Bhaar, shimla171002, H.P. during
December, 1994 by the Managing Director, H.P. Agro Packaging Industries Ltd.,
Shimla-171002, H.P., who had worked as Clerk on daily wages during July, 1994 to
December, 1998 and has raised her industrial dispute after about 16 years, allegedly
without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and
justified? If not, keeping in view the delay of about 16 years in raising the industrial
dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation
the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that initially she was engaged as clerk on daily
wages basis in July, 1994 by the respondent and she worked as such till December, 1998 and
completed more than 240 days in a calendar year but she was orally asked by the respondent that
she need not to come for duties due to non-availability of work though number of junior persons
namely Shana Devi and Smt. Uma Kanwar were allowed to continue and they are still in service
with the respondent and had been given all kind of benefits. It is further stated that no notice as
required under section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act) was
issued to the petitioner and her services had been terminated without complying with the provisions
of sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It is also stated that the respondent had engaged many
juniors to the petitioner and even engaged fresh persons. Against this back-drop a prayer has been
made that she be reinstated in service with all the consequential service benefits including back-
wages.
3.
Before, I proceed further, it is important to mention here that vide order dated
12.4.2017, the respondent was proceeded against ex-parte.
4.
The petitioner appeared into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered in evidence her
affidavit Ex. PW-1/A wherein she reiterated almost all the averments as made in the claim petition.
She also tendered in evidence the receipt of courier Ex. PW-1/B and letters to MD mark PX-1 to
mark PX-3.
5.
Besides having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, I have also gone through
the record of the case carefully. The first question which arises for consideration before this Court
is as to whether the reference is stale and highly belated. According to the petitioner herself, she
was engaged as clerk on daily wages basis in July, 1994 and her services were terminated in
December, 1998. Undisputedly, the petitioner had raised the industrial dispute after a period of
about 16 years meaning thereby that she remained silent for about sixteen years. In (2013) 14 SCC
543, titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub Division
Kota Vs. Mohan Lal, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that though the Limitation Act is
not applicable to the reference made under the I.D Act but delay in raising industrial Dispute is an
important circumstance for exercise of judicial discretion in determining relief that is to be granted.
The relevant portion of aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
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“19. We are clearly of the view that though the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the
reference made under the ID Act but delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an
important circumstance which the Labour Court must keep in view at the time of exercise of
discretion irrespective of whether or not such objection has been raised by the other side.
The legal position laid down by this Court in Gitam Singh that before exercising its judicial
discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and
manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which
termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of
relief in an industrial dispute, must be invariably followed.”
6.
In UP State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Ram Singh and another (2008) 17
SCC 627, the termination was dated 15.3.1973 and the reference was dated 15.6.1986 and there
was a delay of about 13 years in making the reference. The reference was dismissed on the ground
of delay. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:
“ 7. We are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court erred
in not setting aside the award of the Labour Court. Apart from the unacceptable manner in
which the appellant was denied the opportunity of participating in the proceedings,
including being debarred from cross-examining the respondent, the Labour Court could not
have entertained the industrial dispute given the enormous delay. This Court has in several
decisions has held that while delay cannot by itself be sufficient reason to reject an
industrial dispute, never the less the delay cannot be un-reasonable. The decision in Prakash
Chander Sahu has reaffirmed this principal. The reason for diligence and promptness lies in
the fact that the records pertaining to an employee might have been destroyed and it would
be difficult to obtain witnesses who would be competent to give evidence so many years
later if the Labour Court wishes to hold a further enquiry into the matter. In the present
case, the delay of 13 years is unreasonable. The mere fact that the respondent was making
repeated representations would not justify his raising the issue before the Labour Court after
13 years. In any event, the last representation was made in 1983 and the industrial dispute
was admittedly raised in 1986. The lack of diligence on the part of the respondent is
apparent. “
Keeping in view the aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the facts of
this case are required to be seen. The services of the petitioner were stated to be terminated
during December, 1998. In her affidavit by way of evidence Ex. PW-1/A, the petitioner
deposed that for number of times she approached the respondent personally and wrote
number of letters but she was not reinstated in service. She has also placed on record the
representations which are mark PX-1 to mark PX-3. However, no credence can be attached
to these representations as the same are not the original and these are only the copies and
nothing can be inferred from the perusal of these representations that the same were duly
received by the respondent. All these representations are of the years 1999/2000 and appear
to be an afterthought. Moreover, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the mere fact
that the workman was making repeated representations is not sufficient to explain the delay.
The burden of proof was upon the petitioner to show that the dispute was raised within a
reasonable time and to offer an explanation to the satisfaction of this Court for the delay of
16 years caused in seeking reference but the petitioner has failed to discharge her burden as
such no relief can be granted to the petitioner. The reference is therefore stale and is liable
to be rejected on the ground of delay in raising the dispute.
8.
On merits, the claim of the petitioner is that she was engaged as clerk on daily wages
basis in July, 1994 by the respondent and she worked as such till December, 1998 and had
completed more than 240 days in a calendar year. However, the petitioner has failed to produce any
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documentary evidence on record which could go to show that the petitioner had completed 240
working days in any calendar year and in twelve calendar months preceding her termination. In
2009 (120) FLR 1007 incase titled as Relip Nagarpalika Vs. Babuji Gabhaji Thakore and others
, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“The burden of proof lies on the workman to show that he had worked continuously for
240 days for the preceding one year and it is for the workman to adduce evidence apart
from examining himself to prove the factum of being in employment of the employer.”
In AIR 2006 S.C. 110 case titled as Surindernagar District Panchyat V/s Dayabhai Amar
Singh, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:-
“Incase workman claims to have worked for more than 10 years as daily wager. Apart
from oral evidence workman has not produced any evidence to prove fact that he has
worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that
regard was produced: no co-worker was examined; muster roll produced by employer has
not been contradicted. Workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in
employment for 240 days during preceding 12 months of date of termination of his
service. Workman not entitled for protection of Section 25-F before his service was
terminated.”
A bare perusal of the extract of the judgment re-produced, hereinabove, shows that the
burden to prove completion of 240 days service lies on the workman and this burden is discharged
on workman stepping in the witness box and adducing cogent evidence. However, in the instant
case, the petitioner has failed to place any documentary evidence on record that she had put in 240
days in twelve calendar months preceding her termination. There is no iota of evidence which could
go to show that the petitioner had completed 240 working days in twelve calendar months
preceding her termination. Hence, the case of the petitioner does not fall under section 25-F of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such no protection of section 25-F can be granted to the
petitioner.
9.
The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that at the time of the termination
of the petitioner, the respondent had retained her juniors who are still working as such the
respondent had violated the principles of “last come first go”. In her evidence by way of affidavit
Ex. PW-1/A, the petitioner has stated that some junior persons namely Shana Devi, Smt. Uma
Kanwar, Kuldeep Bhatia and Hem Raj etc. have been retained by the respondent, who are still
working with the respondent. However, to prove this plea, no specific evidence has been led by the
petitioner which could go to show that the persons named by the petitioner in her affidavit Ex. PW-
1/A are junior to her and have been retained by the respondent. Moreover, our own Hon'ble High
Court while deciding CWP no. 4515/2012 on 13.6.2012, titled as Suraj Mani Vs. HPSEB held that
the petitioners cannot claim equal treatment after about two decades with the juniors who have
allegedly been retained. In the instant case, since, the petitioner had raised the demand notice after
a period of 16 years as such there is no question of consideration of equal treatment with the
alleged juniors. The petitioner who slept for a long period of 16 years is not entitled to claim any
relief on the ground of equal treatment. Since, the reference has been proved to be stale and belated
as such the protection of sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act cannot be granted to the petitioner. If
the alleged termination of petitioner was either illegal or unjustified, she would not have kept silent
for a period of 16 years.
10. Therefore, in view of my foregoing discussion, the reference is answered against the
petitioner being stale and belated and as such no relief can be granted to her. Let a copy of this
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award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in official gazette. File, after
completion be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 19th Day of June, 2017.
(PARVEEN)
(SUSHIL KUKREJA)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
_________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, HP INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA
Ref no.
:
60 of 2016.
Instituted on
:
1.1.2016.
Decided on
:
20.6.2017.
Mohan Lal S/o Late Sh. Tikkam Dass alias Jattu R/O Village Nehra, P.O. Rajhana, Tehsil &
Distt. Shimla, H.P
. . Petitioner.
VS.
The Executive Engineer, Division No.1, HPSEB, Charlie Villa, Shimla-171002
. . Respondent.
Reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner : Shri R.K Khidtta, Advocate.
For respondent : Shri Sudhir Negi, Advocate vice Shri
Ramakant Sharma, Advocate.
AWARD
The reference for adjudication, sent by the appropriate government, is as under:
“Whether alleged termination of services of Sh. Mohan Lal S/o Late Sh. Tikkam Dass
alias Jattu R/O Village Nehra, P.O. Rajhana, Tehsil & Distt. Shimla, H.P. during
November, 1997 by the Executive Engineer, Division No.1, HPSEB, Charlie Villa,
Shimla-171002, who had worked for 84 days only during 1997 and has raised his
industrial dispute after about 16 years, allegedly without complying with the
provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in
view the working period of 84 days only and delay of about 16 years in raising the
industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that w.e.f. 1.1.1997, he was engaged as
beldar/worker by the respondent and worked continuously till 31.12.1997 and his services had been
terminated without assigning any reason and without complying the mandatory provisions of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act) as well as the Standing Orders of the
HPSEB and after his termination, he visited the office of respondent number of times for his
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reengagement but despite assurance given by the officials of the respondent, he was not re-engaged
and even the officials of the board, refused to accept his representation and since, he was not
reengaged, he was forced to file demand notice on 6.12.2013 and due to the adamant attitude of the
respondent, the conciliation proceedings failed and on the report of the Conciliation Officer, his
reference was not sent to this Court by the Labour Commissioner. It is further stated that the
petitioner challenged the order passed by the Labour Commissioner before the Hon'ble High Court
by filing CWP no. 168/2016 in which the Labour Commissioner was directed to consider the case
of the petitioner and ultimately his case was sent to this Court for adjudication. It is also stated that
neither any notice was issued to the petitioner nor any compensation was paid to him as required
under the law which is clear cut violation of section 25-F of the Act as the work and conduct of the
petitioner remained up to the satisfaction of the official of the respondent and even he had
completed more than 240 days in a calendar year preceding his termination. That the respondent
has also engaged new persons and the petitioner was not called back and even junior persons
namely S/Shri Molak Ram, Dhan Bahadur, Prem Singh, Narender Singh, Om Prakash, Bhim Sen,
Devi Ram and Mohinder etc. are still working with the respondent in violation of the provisions of
last come first go. Against this back-drop a prayer has been made that the termination order of the
petitioner passed in December, 1997 be quashed and set aside and the respondent be directed to
reinstate the petitioner in service on the same post w.e.f. 1.1.1998 with all the consequential service
benefits including back-wages.
3.
By filing reply, the respondent contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections have been taken that the claim petition is false and vexatious in nature,
maintainability, suppression of material facts, claim is barred by time, abandonment etc. On merits,
it has been asserted that the petitioner was engaged as beldar on daily wages basis for specific
work, who had worked for a brief spells since 26.8.1997 to 25.11.1997 for a period of 84 days and
he had left the work of his own without any intimation to the respondent, hence, there is no
violation of section 25-B, 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It is further asserted that since, the
petitioner had left the job at his own, hence, no notice under section 25-F of the Act was required to
be issued to him and that no junior persons were engaged by the respondent expect those who were
re-engaged on daily wages on specific judicial orders of competent court. The respondent prayed
for the dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed his allegations by denying those of the
respondent.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed on 6.1.2017.
1.
Whether the termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during
November, 1997 without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 is illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what relief of service benefits the
petitioner is entitled
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable as alleged?
. .OPR.
4.
Whether the petition is barred by time as alleged?
. .OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner has abandoned the job as alleged?
6.
Relief.
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6.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record
of the case carefully including the written arguments filed by the petitioner.
7.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
No.
Issue no.2
Becomes redundant.
Issue no.3
No.
Issue no.4
Yes.
Issue no.5
Decided accordingly.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner per
operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issues no.1, 4 & 5.
8.
Being interlinked and correlated, all these issues are taken up together for decision.
9.
The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the services of the petitioner had
been terminated by the respondent illegally without serving him any notice as required under
section 25-F of the Act especially when he had completed more than 240 days in each calendar
year. He further contended that the junior persons to the petitioner are still working with the
respondent department and fresh workers have been engaged in violation of the provisions of
section 25-G and 25-H of the Act.
10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the claim of the
petitioner is highly belated and stale. He further contended that the services of the petitioner had
never been terminated by the respondent who had left the job at his own and even he had not
completed 240 days in any calendar year. He also contended that no junior to the petitioner had
been retained and no fresh hands had been engaged by the respondent, hence, he is not entitled to
any relief.
11. To prove issue no.1, the petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered
in evidence his affidavit Ex. PW-1/A wherein he reiterated almost all the averments as stated in the
claim petition. He also tendered in evidence the copy of representations given to the respondent Ex.
PW-1/B and Ex. PW-1/C and copy of demand notice Ex, PW-1/D. In crossexamination, he
admitted that he was engaged in the month of September, 1997 as beldar and his services were
terminated on 31.1.1998. He denied that he had not completed 240 days and that he had left the job
at his own. He further denied that the persons named in para-7 of his affidavit Ex.PW-1/A were
appointed as T-mate and not as beldars. He also denied that no junior person was retained by the
Board and that no fresh hands were engaged after his termination. He admitted that he raised the
industrial dispute after about 16 years. He further admitted that he had worked for 84 days during
the year, 1997. He denied that his juniors were retained on the orders passed by the courts.
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12. PW-2 Sh. Sanjay Kumar, Sr. Assistant Electric Division No.1 has stated that Mohinder
Singh joined with the respondent as daily wager on 3.9.1992, Devi Ram on 4.9.1992, Mulak Ram
26.6.1993 and Prem Chand was engaged on 26.12.1998 and Prem Chand still working with the
respondent. He further stated that the detail of worker engaged by the respondent is Ex.PW-2/A. In
cross-examination, he admitted that neither any junior has been retained nor any person has been
engaged by the respondent.
13. The respondent has examined one Shri Pratap Singh, Assistant Executive Engineer as
RW-1, who deposed that the petitioner was engaged on 25.8.1997 and as per mandays chart Ex.
RW-1/A, he had worked only for 84 days and no junior to the petitioner was retained by the Board
except on the orders of the Court. In cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner was engaged
on 1.1.1997 and he worked continuously till 31.12.1997. He admitted that neither any notice was
issued to the petitioner nor any compensation was paid to him and that no notice was issued to him
for resumption of duties. He denied that fresh hands were engaged by the Board after August, 1997.
He admitted that after 31.12.1997, fresh hands have been engaged as per the criteria fixed by the
Government and some of them are still working with the Board. He had no knowledge as to
whether the petitioner had submitted representations Ex. PW-1/B and Ex. PW1/ C to the Board
after his termination. He admitted that Shri Mohinder Singh Joined on 3.9.1992,Devi Ram joined
on 4.9.1992, Molak Ram joined on 26.6.1993 and Prem Chand joined on 26.12.1998 as daily
wagers and they are still working with the Board but volunteered that all of them have been
engaged on the orders of the Court.
14. I have closely scrutinized the entire evidence, on record, and from the closer scrutiny
thereof, it has become clear that the petitioner had worked only for 84 days as daily waged beldar
with the respondent. Now, the question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to
whether the reference is stale and highly belated. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended
that under the Industrial Disputes, no limitation is prescribed and the provision of Article 137 of the
Limitation Act 1963 is not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and the relief under the
Industrial Disputes Act cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. In this
respect, he has placed reliance upon the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (1999) 6 SCC
82, titled as Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing – cum- processing Service Society
Limited and Another.
15. Undisputedly, the petitioner had raised his industrial dispute after a period of about 16
years. According to the petitioner he was terminated in the month of December, 1997. The demand
notice was raised by the petitioner on 6.12.2013 and even he has admitted in crossexamination that
he had raised the industrial dispute after about 16 years. Therefore, the position of law in respect of
a stale claim is required to be seen. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing –cum-
processing Service Society Limited and Another (supra), the services of the workman were
terminated on 16.7.1974. He had raised the demand notice on 18.12.1981 and the reference was
sent to the Labour Court on 19.3.1982. Thus, there was a delay of about seven years in seeking the
reference. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not
applicable to the proceedings of the reference and the relief under the Industrial Disputes cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The relevant portion of the aforesaid
judgment is reproduced as under:
“18. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are
not applicable to the proceedings under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be
denied merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is
required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a
merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally
questioned on the ground of delay alone”
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On facts, it was held that the plea of delay was not raised before the Labour Court and if
that plea had been raised, the workman would have been in a position to show the circumstances
preventing him in approaching the Court at an early stage or even to satisfy the Court that such a
plea was not sustainable after the reference was made by the Government. It was further held that
the workman was justified in complaining that in the absence of any plea on behalf of the
management and any evidence regarding delay, he could not be deprived of the benefits under the
Act merely on the technicalities of law.
16. In Assistant Executive Engineer, Karnataka Vs. Shivalinga reported in (2002) 10
SCC 167, the services of the employee were terminated on 25.5.1985 and he approached the
Labour Officer on 17.3.1995 and then the reference was made by the Government to the Labour
Court. There was a delay of more than nine years in approaching the Labour Officer. In para 6 of
the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the judgment of Ajayab Singh's
case (supra) and held as under:
“Learned counsel for the appellant strongly relied on the reasoning of the Labour Court and
contended that the view of the High Court would not advance the cause of justice. Learned
counsel for the respondent relied upon two decisions of this Court in Ajaib Singh vs.
Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum- Processing Service Society Ltd. (1999) 6 SCC 82 and Sapan
Kumar Pandit vs. U.P. SEB (2001) 6 SCC 222 to contend that there is no period of
limitation prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act to raise the dispute and it is open to a
party to approach the Court even belatedly and the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal
can properly mould the relief by refusing or awarding part-payment of back wages. It is no
doubt true that in appropriate cases, as held by this Court in the aforesaid two decisions,
such steps could be taken by the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may
be, where there is no such dispute to relationship between the parties as employer and
employee. In cases where there is a serious dispute, or doubt in such relationship and
records of the employer become relevant, the long delay would come in the way of
maintenance of the same. In such circumstances to make them available to a Labour Court
or the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate the dispute appropriately will be impossible. A
situation of that nature would render the claim to have become stale. That is exactly the
situation arising in this case. In that view of the matter, we think the two decisions relied
upon by the learned counsel have no application to the case on hand.”
Thus, it has been held that in case there is a serious dispute or doubt in such relationship and
the records of the employer become relevant, the long delay would come in the way of maintenance
of the same. It was held that in such a situation the decision of Ajayab Singh’s case is not
applicable.
17. In Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank Vs. Neelam reported in (2005) 5
SCC 91, the employee was discontinued from service w.e.f. 30.5.1986 and he raised the demand
notice on 30.9.1993 and thereafter the reference was sent to the Labour court by the appropriate
government. The Labour Court passed an order answering the reference against the employee
holding that the claim was belated. Thereafter, a writ petition was filed before the Hon'ble High
Court which was allowed and the employee was directed to be reinstated in service with continuity
of service but without back-wages relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of
Ajayab Singh (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and
restored the judgment of the Labour Court as a result the reference stood answered against the
workman. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered its earlier judgment in the case of Ajayab
Singh (Supra). The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
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13. “In Ajaib Singh (supra), the management did not raise any plea of delay. The Court
observed that had such plea been raised, the workman would have been in a position to
show the circumstances which prevented him in approaching the Court at an earlier stage or
even to satisfy the Court that such a plea was not sustainable after the reference was made
by the Government. In that case, the Labour Court granted the relief, but the same was
denied to the workman only by the High Court. The Court referred to the purport and object
of enacting Industrial Disputes Act only with a view to find out as to whether the provisions
of the Article 137 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable or
not. Although, the Court cannot import a period of limitation when the statute does not
prescribe the same, as was observed in Ajaib Singh (supra), but it does not mean that
irrespective of facts and circumstances of each case, a stale claim must be entertained by the
appropriate Government while making a reference or in a case where such reference is
made the workman would be entitled to the relief at the hands of the Labour Court.”
14. “The decision of Ajaib Singh (supra) must be held to have been rendered in the fact
situation obtaining therein and no ratio of universal application can be culled out therefrom.
A decision, as is well-known, is an authority of what it decides and not what can logically
be deduced therefrom Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. Vs. Uttam Manohar Nakate, JT 2005 (1) SC
303], and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav & Anr. para 42.”
15” In Balbir Singh vs. Punjab Roadways and Another [(2001) 1 SCC 133], as regard
Ajaib Singh (supra), this Court observed :
5.” The learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that the Tribunal
committed error in denying relief to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The
learned counsel submitted that in industrial dispute delay should not be taken as a
ground for denying relief to the workman if the order/orders under challenge are found
to be unsustainable in law. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case
of Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd.
((1999) 6 SCC 82 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1054 : JT (1999) 3 SC 38).
6. “We have carefully considered the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the
petitioner. We have also perused the aforementioned decision. We do not find that any
general principle as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner has been laid
down in that decision. The decision was rendered on the facts and circumstances of the
case, particularly the fact that the plea of delay was not taken by the management in
the proceeding before the Tribunal. In the case on hand the plea of delay was raised
and was accepted by the Tribunal. Therefore, the decision cited is of little help in the
present case. Whether relief to the workman should be denied on the ground of delay
or it should be appropriately moulded is at the discretion of the Tribunal depending on
the facts and circumstances of the case. No doubt the discretion is to be exercised
judicially."
16. “Yet again in Assistant Executive Engineer, Karnataka vs. Shivalinga [(2002) 10 SCC
167], a Bench of this Court observed :
“6. Learned counsel for the appellant strongly relied on the reasoning of the Labour
Court and contended that the view of the High Court would not advance the cause of
justice. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon two decisions of this Court in
Ajaib Singh vs. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. (1999)
6 SCC 82 and Sapan Kumar Pandit vs. U.P. SEB (2001) 6 SCC 222 to contend that
there is no period of limitation prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act to raise the
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dispute and it is open to a party to approach the Court even belatedly and the Labour
Court or the Industrial Tribunal can properly mould the relief by refusing or awarding
part-payment of back wages. It is no doubt true that in appropriate cases, as held by
this Court in the aforesaid two decisions, such steps could be taken by the Labour
Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, where there is no such dispute to
relationship between the parties as employer and employee. In cases where there is a
serious dispute, or doubt in such relationship and records of the employer become
relevant, the long delay would come in the way of maintenance of the same. In such
circumstances to make them available to a Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to
adjudicate the dispute appropriately will be impossible. A situation of that nature
would render the claim to have become stale. That is exactly the situation arising in
this case. In that view of the matter, we think the two decisions relied upon by the
learned counsel have no application to the case on hand."
17. “In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. (supra), a Bench of this Court, where S. Saghir Ahmad was a
member [His Lordship was also a member in Ajaib Singh (supra), opined :
“6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise
its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any
point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be
exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational
basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse
of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time
reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been
apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference
under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it
appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of
the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was
no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made."
(Emphasis supplied).
18. In (2006) 5 SCC 433 in case titled as UP State Road Transport Corporation Vs.
Babu Ram, the termination was dated 19.9.1983 and the reference was made on 29.8.1998. The
Labour Court has held the termination as un-valid without considering the question of delay. The
Hon'ble High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that no
material was placed on record to show that the dispute was raised within reasonable time and the
employee was not responsible for delay. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced as under:
“10. It is to be noted that the High Court has very cryptically disposed of the writ petition.
The workman has not placed any material to show that it had raised dispute within a
reasonable time, and/or that he was not responsible for delayed decision if any in the
conciliation proceedings. It was for him to show that the dispute was raised within a
reasonable time and that he was not responsible for any delay. The High Court, on a
hypothetical basis has assumed that the dispute might have been raised promptly but
delayed by the State Government and he cannot be penalized for delay in finalizing the
conciliation proceedings and the reference. But neither the Labour Court nor the High Court
has even noted the factual position. The conclusion was based on surmises and
conjectures.”
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19. In Assistant Engineer, CAD Kota Vs. Dhan Kunwar reported in (2006) 5 SCC
481, the delay was of about eight years in raising the dispute. The Labour Court granted
reinstatement with 30 % back-wages. The writ petition and writ appeal filed by the employer were
dismissed. However, the Hon'ble Apex Court set aside the judgments of Hon'ble High Court and
the Labour Court and held that no relief should have been granted. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein under:
“9. In the background of what has been stated above, the Labour Court should not have
granted relief. Unfortunately, learned Single Judge and the Division Bench did not
consider the issues in their proper perspective and arrived at abrupt conclusions
without even indicating justifiable reasons…………………..
20. In UP State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Ram Singh and another (2008) 17
SCC 627, the termination was dated 15.3.1973 and the reference was dated 15.6.1986 and there
was a delay of about 13 years in making the reference. The reference was dismissed on the ground
of delay. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:
“ 7. We are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court erred
in not setting aside the award of the Labour Court. Apart from the unacceptable manner in
which the appellant was denied the opportunity of participating in the proceedings,
including being debarred from cross-examining the respondent, the Labour Court could not
have entertained the industrial dispute given the enormous delay. This Court has in several
decisions has held that while delay cannot by itself be sufficient reason to reject an
industrial dispute, never the less the delay cannot be un-reasonable. The decision in Prakash
Chander Sahu has reaffirmed this principal. The reason for diligence and promptness lies in
the fact that the records pertaining to an employee might have been destroyed and it would
be difficult to obtain witnesses who would be competent to give evidence so many years
later if the Labour Court wishes to hold a further enquiry into the matter. In the present
case, the delay of 13 years is unreasonable. The mere fact that the respondent was making
repeated representations would not justify his raising the issue before the Labour Court after
13 years. In any event, the last representation was made in 1983 and the industrial dispute
was admittedly raised in 1986. The lack of diligence on the part of the respondent is
apparent. “
21. In (2009) 13 SCC 746, State of Karnataka Vs. Ravi Kumar the Hon'ble Supreme
Court dismissed the reference on the ground of delay and it was held that the person supervising
could not be expected to prove after 14 years that the employee did not work or that he did not
work for 240 days or he voluntarily left the job. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment
reads as under:
“9. It is not possible to expect the Asstt. Executive Engineer to prove after 14 years that the
daily wager did not work or that he did not work for 240 days in a year or that the daily
wager voluntarily left the work…………
22. In view of the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is clear that
though the Court cannot import the period of limitation and the reference cannot be dismissed
merely on the ground of delay, it does not mean that irrespective of the facts and circumstances of
the case, a stale claim must be entertained and the relief should be granted. In the case of delay, no
formula of universal application can be laid down and it would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material
evidence relevant to the adjudication being lost and rendered unavailable. The onus of showing that
the dispute was raised within a reasonable time is upon the workman and it is for the workman to
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explain the delay by furnishing the acceptable explanation to the satisfaction of the Court that he
was not responsible for the delay caused. The fact that the workman was making repeated
representations is not sufficient to explain the delay.
23. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the
facts of this case are required to be seen. The services of the petitioner were stated to be terminated
during December, 1997 and he raised the demand notice on 6.12.2013 i.e after about a period of 16
years. In his affidavit by way of evidence Ex. PW-1/A, the petitioner deposed that he visited the
office of respondent number of times after his illegal termination for his reinstatement but despite
assurance given by the officials of the respondent, he was not reinstated. However, except for his
bald statement there is no other evidence on record to suggest as to when he visited the respondent
for his reinstatement. The petitioner also deposed that he had given representations to the
respondent Board but the officials refused to accept his representations on one pretext or the other
and he has also placed on record two of his representations which are Ex. PW-1/B and Ex. PW-1/C.
However, no credence can be attached to these representations as the same are only the photocopies
and nothing can be inferred from the perusal of these representations that the same were refused to
be accepted by the officials of the respondent. Both the representations appear to be an
afterthought. Moreover, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court the fact that the workman was
making repeated representations is not sufficient to explain the delay. In the opinion of this Court,
the explanation furnished by the petitioner for not raising the demand notice within a reasonable
period cannot be accepted. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned
counsel for the petitioner in Ajayab Singh's case was rendered in the facts and circumstances of that
case and the ratio of the said judgment cannot be made applicable in the facts and circumstances of
the present case. In Ajayab Singh's case the plea of delay was not raised before the Labour Court
whereas the plea of delay has been raised in the present case by the respondent at the very first
instance in the reply filed before this Court and the petitioner was well within a position to show
the circumstances preventing him in approaching the Court at an early stage. The burden of proof
was upon the petitioner to show that the dispute was raised within a reasonable time and to offer an
explanation to the satisfaction of this Court for the delay of 16 years caused in seeking reference
but the petitioner has failed to discharge his burden. The reference is therefore stale and is liable to
be rejected on the ground of delay in raising the dispute.
24. On merits, the claim of the petitioner is that he was engaged as daily waged beldar by
the respondent on 1.1.1997 but he has failed to produce any record which could go to show that he
was actually engaged by the respondent on 1.1.1997. From the mandays chart Ex. RW-1/A, it is
clear that the petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar by the respondent on 26.8.1997 and he
worked as such till 25.11.1997. The petitioner has failed to prove on record that he had worked for
240 days in preceding twelve months prior to his termination. There is no material on record which
could show that the petitioner has completed 240 working days in twelve calendar months
preceding his termination. The perusal of mandays chart Ex. RW-1/A goes to show that the
petitioner had worked only for 84 days with the respondent. In 2009 (120) FLR 1007 incase titled
as Relip Nagarpalika Vs. Babuji Gabhaji Thakore and others , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
held as under:
“The burden of proof lies on the workman to show that he had worked continuously for
240 days for the preceding one year and it is for the workman to adduce evidence apart
from examining himself to prove the factum of being in employment of the employer.”
In AIR 2006 S.C. 110 case titled as Surindernagar District Panchyat V/s Dayabhai Amar
Singh, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:-
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“Incase workman claims to have worked for more than 10 years as daily wager. Apart
from oral evidence workman has not produced any evidence to prove fact that he has
worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that
regard was produced: no co-worker was examined; muster roll produced by employer has
not been contradicted. Workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in
employment for 240 days during preceding 12 months of date of termination of his
service. Workman not entitled for protection of Section 25-F before his service was
terminated.”
A bare perusal of the extract of the judgment re-produced, hereinabove, shows that the
burden to prove completion of 240 days service lies on the workman and this burden is discharged
on workman stepping in the witness box and adducing cogent evidence. However, in the instant
case, the petitioner has failed to prove on record that he had put in 240 days in twelve calendar
months preceding his termination. There is no iota of evidence which could go to show that the
petitioner had completed 240 working days in twelve calendar months preceding his termination.
Hence, the case of the petitioner does not fall under section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and as such no protection of section 25-F can be granted to the petitioner.
25. The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the respondent has taken the
plea of abandonment in their reply but it has totally failed to establish on record by placing any
document on record and also failed to prove any enquiry held against the petitioner. He further
submitted that the plea of abandonment taken by the respondent has not been proved on record and
in this respect he has also placed reliance upon judgments reported in 2014 LLR 696 titled as M/s
Economic Transport Organization Vs. Dharmendra Mishra and other rendered by the Hon'ble
High Court of Delhi and judgment of our own Hon'ble High Court reported in Latest HLJ 2007
(HP) 903, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and others Vs. Bhatag Ram and another As
pointed out earlier, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the delay would certainly be fatal if it
has resulted in material evidence relevant to the adjudication being lost and rendered unavailable. It
has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the person supervising cannot be expected to
prove after long delay that the employee/workman did not work for 240 days in a year or that he
voluntarily left the job. It is difficult for the employer to obtain witness/es who would be competent
to give evidence so many years later. It has further been held that lapse of time results in losing the
remedy and the right as well and the delay in seeking the reference causes prejudice to both the
employer and employee. In the present case also it would not be expected from the respondent to
lead evidence and to bring witnesses or to place documents on record to prove after 16 years that
the petitioner had abandoned the job at his own. Moreover, the petitioner had only worked for 84
days during his entire service and in such a situation the question of holding an enquiry to prove the
plea of abandonment does not arise at all. Hence, the ratio of the judgments relied upon by the
learned counsel for the petitioner have no application in the facts and circumstances of the present
case where the reference is proved to be stale.
26. The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that at the time of the termination
of the petitioner, the respondent had retained his juniors who are still working as such the
respondent had violated the principles of “last come first go”. In his evidence by way of affidavit
Ex. PW-1/A, the petitioner has stated that some junior persons have been retained by the
respondent board who are still working with the respondent. However, PW-2 has specifically
deposed that Mohinder Singh was engaged on 3.9.1992, Devi Ram on 4.9.1992 and Molak Ram on
26.6.1993 as daily wagers. Since, the petitioner was allegedly engaged on 1.1.1997, therefore, it
cannot be said that the aforesaid persons were junior to the petitioner. The petitioner has failed to
prove on record that any junior to him has been retained. PW-2 further deposed that Prem Chand
was engaged on 26.12.1998 as daily wager. However, RW-1 specifically deposed that he was
engaged on the basis of the orders of the Court. Our own Hon'ble High Court while deciding CWP
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no. 4515/2012 on 13.6.2012, titled as Suraj Mani Vs. HPSEB held that the petitioners cannot claim
equal treatment after about two decades with the juniors who have allegedly been retained. In the
instant case, since, the petitioner had raised the demand notice after a period of 16 years as such
there is no question of consideration of equal treatment with the said Prem Chand, who had been
engaged on 26.12.1998 that too upon the orders of the Court. The petitioner who slept for a long
period of 16 years is not entitled to claim any relief on the ground of equal treatment. The
judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be made applicable to the facts and
circumstances of the present case in view of the fact that the reference has been proved to be stale
and belated as such the protection of sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act cannot be granted to the
petitioner. If the alleged termination of petitioner was either illegal or unjustified, he would not
have kept silent for a period of 16 years. Accordingly, all these issues are decided in favour of the
respondent and against the petitioner.
Issue no.2.
28. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issues no.1, 4 & 5, above, this issue becomes
redundant.
Issue no.3.
29. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondent. However, the
petitioner has filed this claim petition pursuant to the reference made by the appropriate
government to this Court for adjudication and I find nothing wrong with this petition which is
perfectly maintainable. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
Relief.
As a sequel to my findings on the aforesaid issues, the claim of the petitioner fails and is
hereby dismissed. Consequently, the reference stands answered against the petitioner and in favour
of the respondent. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in
official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 20th Day of June, 2017.
(PARVEEN)
(SUSHIL KUKREJA)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-,
Labour Court, Shimla.
_________
Raj Kumar & Ors V/S M/S Emmbros Auto Comp Ltd.
Ref. No. 58/2011
23.06.2017
Present: Petitoners with Sh. J.C. Bhardwaj Ar. Sh. Rajiv Sharma, Advocate with Shri
Harish Mehta, Chairman of respondents Company.
At this stage, it has been stated by the petitioners S/Sh. Surinder Singh, Hans Raj, Vinay
kumar, karam Singh and Vikas Sharma and Sh. J.C. Bhardwaj, Authorized Representative on
behalf of the legal heirs of deceased Raj Kumar and Brahm Dass that they have entered into a
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compromise with the respondent Management and as per the compromise the legal heirs of
petitioner No. 1 Shri Raj Kumar, legal heirs of petitioner No. 7 Shr. Brahm Dass, Surinder Singh,
Hans Raj, Karam Singh and Vikas Sharma are ready to accept a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rs. One
lakh fifty thousand only) whereas petitioner Shri Vinay kumar is ready to accept Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rs.
One lakh only) as their full and final legal dues from the respondent management with respect to
their claim arising out of reference No. 58 of 2011 and they shall have no claim against the
respondent hereinafter with respect to their service benefits from the respondent in any manner. All
the petitioners have prayed that the reference petition be decided accordingly. To this effect the
statements of Shri J.C. Bhardwaj, AR, petitioner Surinder Singh, petitioner Vinay Kumar,
petitioner Karam Singh, petitioner Hans Raj and petitioner Vikas Sharma recorded separately.
Vide separate statements recorded today, it has been stated by Sh. Harish Mehta, Chairman
of respondent company that the respondent is ready and willing to pay the aforesaid amount to the
petitioners as their full & final legal dues with respect to their claim arising out of reference No. 58
of 2011. He further stated that the said amount shall be paid to the petitioners within a period of one
month from today through demand draft.
Therefore, keeping in view of the aforesaid statements of the parties, I am of the view that a
lawful compromise has been effected between the parties. Hence, the reference sent by the
appropriate government for adjudication is answered in terms of the aforesaid statements of the
parties, which shall form a part of this order/award. Let a copy of this award/order be sent to the
appropriate government for publication in the official gazette. File, after, completion, be consigned
to record.
(SUSHIL KUKREJA),
Presiding Judge,
H.P.Industrial Tribunal-cum-,
Labour Court, Shimla.
________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, HP INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA
Ref no.
:
41 of 2014.
Instituted on
:
20.5.2014.
Decided on
:
29.6.2017.
Kanta Devi W/o late Shri Umachand R/o Village Magri, P.O Karsog, Tehsil Kasrsog,
District Mandi, HP.
. . Petitioner.
VS.
1.
State of HP through Secretary Khadi and Village Industries Board.
2.
The Secretary, Himachal Khadi Ashram Green Filed Building near ICE Skating Ringh
Lakkar Bazar Shimla.
3.
The Manager Shri Suresh Sahrma Hiamchal Khadi, Ashram The Mall Shimla.
. . Respondents.
Reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
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For petitioner : Shri R.K Chava, Advocate.
For respondent : Shri Vikas Shyam, Advocate.
AWARD
The reference for adjudication, sent by the appropriate government, is as under:
“Whether termination of the services of Smt. Kanta Devi, W/O Late Shri Uma Chand,
R/O Village Magri, P.O. Karsog, Tehsil Karsog, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 06-06-2013
by the Secretary, Himachal Khadi Ashram, Green Field Building, Near Ice Skating
Ring, Lakkar Bazar, Shimla, H.P., without complying the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority,
past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
In nutshell the case of the petitioner is that on 18.4.2011, she had been engaged as
salesman at the shop complex situated at Mall Road Shimla under the name and style of Himachal
Khadi Ashram Shimla and remained working as such till 5.6.2013 and she was getting ` 4000/- per
month as salary. It is further stated that the petitioner used to sell articles displayed for sale and also
used to maintain the stock register. She worked in the shop and office with sincerity and honesty
but the respondents started humiliating her with a view to retrench her services and as such the
respondent refused to mark her presence after 1.6.2013 despite her being present on duty upto
5.6.2013. It is further stated that the petitioner was working since 18.4.2011 whereas the respondent
no.2 has allowed three junior workers namely Smt. Pushpa, Smt. Kamla and Smt. Asha and some
juniors to her have been regularized by the respondents whereas the services of the petitioner have
been retrenched in violation of the Industrial Dispute 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act). Against
this back-drop a prayer has been made that she be reinstated in service along-with all consequential
benefits including seniority, regularization and payment of arrears with interest @ 15%.
3.
By filing reply, the respondents contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections have been taken qua maintainability, estoppel and that this Court has no
jurisdiction to try the claim petition. On merits, it has been denied that the petitioner was working
as salesman with the respondents. It is submitted that the petitioner was appointed verbally for part
time period with the clear understating that her services would be discontinued at any time and no
service conditions were fixed at the time of her appointment. It is denied that the petitioner used to
sell articles displayed for sale and was maintaining stock register and that at the end of the day sales
summary was prepared by her and the cash was handed over to the respondents. It is asserted that
the petitioner was working only as helper and used to pass articles from one place to other place
and some time used to clean the counter, shelves etc. and even from the date of her appointment,
the petitioner never marked her presence in the attendance register. It is further asserted that Smt.
Pushpa, Kamla and Asha have been appointed on compassionate ground as their husbands had died
during the job, hence, the petitioner cannot claim at par with the aforesaid workers and even Shri
Ashwani Kumar is not under the employment of respondents. The respondent prayed for the
dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed his allegations by denying those of the
respondents.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed on 15.9.2015.
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7.
Whether the termination of the services of Smt. Kanta Devi without complying with
the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is illegal and unjustified?
OPP……..
8.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what relief of service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
OPP……….
9.
Whether the petition is not maintainable as alleged?
OPR……….
10. Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the present petition due to her own acts
and deeds as alleged?
OPR………..
11. Whether this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try the present petition as alleged?
12. Relief.
6.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record
of the case carefully.
7.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
No.
Issue no.2
Becomes redundant.
Issue no.3
No.
Issue no.4
No.
Issue no.5
No.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the respondents and against the petitioner
per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issues no.1,
8.
The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the services of the petitioner had
been terminated by the respondents illegally without serving her any notice as required under
section 25-F of the Act especially when she had completed more than 240 days in each calendar
year. He further contended that the junior persons to the petitioner are still working with the
respondents and fresh workers have been engaged in violation of the provisions of section 25-G
and 25-H of the Act.
9.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the petitioner
was appointed as helper on part time basis with the understanding that her services would be
discontinued at any time verbally and that she had not completed 240 days in any calendar year. He
also contended that no junior to the petitioner had been retained and no fresh hands had been
engaged by the respondents and the persons named by the petitioner were engaged on
compassionate grounds as their husbands had died during service, hence, he is not entitled to any
relief.
10. To prove issue no.1, the petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and tendered
in evidence her affidavit Ex. PW-1/A wherein she reiterated almost all the averments as stated in
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the claim petition. In cross-examination, she admitted that there is no appointment letter regarding
her appointment as salesman at the shop situated at Shimla. She further admitted that no attendance
was ever marked by her. She denied that she had been verbally/orally appointed as a part time
worker purely on temporary basis for time being. She further denied that she had been working as
helper only and used to pass articles from one place to another and that she also used to clean the
counter and shelf etc. She admitted that husbands of Smt. Pushpa, Kamla and Asha Devi had
worked with the respondents and they (husbands) had died during the job. She also admitted that all
the aforesaid three females have been appointed on compassionate grounds. She denied that
Ashwani Kumar is not under the employment of respondents. She further denied that she was only
part time employee.
11. PW-2 Sh. Surya Dutt, Manager has brought the salary registers the relevant extracts of
which are Ex. PW-2/A to Ex. PW-2/F and stated that Kant Devi was paid the salary w.e.f. Aril,
2011 to November, 2012. In cross-examination, he admitted that the petitioner was not the regular
employee of the respondent and that she was engaged on part time basis and she was working as
helper at counter.
12. The respondent has examined one Shri Kamal Goel, Salesman as RW-1, who deposed
that vide authority letter Ex. RW-1/A, he was authorized to depose before this Court. He further
stated that there are 14 regular employees at Khadi Ashram, The Mall Shimla who are appointed by
the Secretary Himachal Khadi Ashram by giving them appointment letters. The petitioner was
working on temporary basis at their show room at The Mall Shimla and she being the part time
employee was working only for one and half hour per day and she used to clean the counter and
pass over the files. He also stated that Pushpa, Kamla and Asha have been given appointment on
compassionate ground. In cross-examination, he denied that the services of the petitioner were
illegally terminated on 5.6.2013 and that fresh hands have been engaged after the termination of the
petitioner.
13. I have closely scrutinized the entire evidence, on record, and from the closer scrutiny
thereof, it has become clear that the petitioner was engaged on temporary basis as a part time
worker by the respondents at their show room at The Mall Shimla. The case of the petitioner is that
she had worked w.e.f. 18.4.2011 till 5.6.2013 continuously but she has failed to produce on record
any documentary evidence which could go to show that she had completed 240 working days in
twelve calendar months preceding her termination. There is no material on record which could
show that the petitioner has completed 240 working days in any calendar year and in twelve
calendar months preceding her termination. In 2009 (120) FLR 1007 incase titled as Relip
Nagarpalika Vs. Babuji Gabhaji Thakore and others , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as
under:
“The burden of proof lies on the workman to show that he had worked continuously for
240 days for the preceding one year and it is for the workman to adduce evidence apart
from examining himself to prove the factum of being in employment of the employer.”
14. In AIR 2006 S.C. 110 case titled as Surindernagar District Panchyat V/s Dayabhai
Amar Singh, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:—
“Incase workman claims to have worked for more than 10 years as daily wager. Apartn
from oral evidence workman has not produced any evidence to prove fact that he has
worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that
regard was produced: no co-worker was examined; muster roll produced by employer has
not been contradicted. Workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in
employment for 240 days during preceding 12 months of date of termination of his
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service. Workman not entitled for protection of Section 25-F before his service was
terminated.”
A bare perusal of the extract of the judgment re-produced, hereinabove, shows that the
burden to prove completion of 240 days service lies on the workman and this burden is discharged
on workman stepping in the witness box and adducing cogent evidence. However, the petitioner
has failed to prove on record any evidence that she had put in 240 days in any calendar year and in
twelve calendar months preceding her termination. Hence, the case of the petitioner does not fall
under section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such no protection of section 25-F
can be granted to the petitioner.
15. It is also the case of the petitioner that the junior persons to her namely Pushpa, Kamla
and Asha have been appointed in violation of the provisions of sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act.
However, RW-1 has specifically deposed that the aforesaid three persons were appointed on
compassionate grounds as their husbands had died during the service. Therefore, the petitioner
cannot claim equal treatment with the aforesaid persons who had been appointed on compassionate
grounds. Hence, no protection of sections 25-G and 25-H can be granted to the petitioner.
16. The further case of the petitioner is that she had been working as a salesman at the
show room of the respondent at The Mall Shimla w.e.f. 18.4.2011 till 5.6.2013 at the gross salary of
` 4000/- per month. However, to substantiate her case no evidence has been produced on record by
the petitioner. In cross-examination, she admitted that no appointment letter was issued to her
regarding her appointment as salesman at the shop at The Mall Shimla. She also admitted that no
attendance was ever marked by her. Though, she stated that she used to put her signatures on cash
memos and sales register. However, she admitted that she had not annexed any record regarding
her signatures on cash memos and sales register. The initial burden was upon the petitioner to
establish by leading cogent evidence on record that she had been engaged as a salesman. However,
she has failed to discharge her burden by producing any documentary evidence on record in this
respect. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence on record, it cannot be said that the petitioner
was working as salesman at the show room of the respondent at The Mall Shimla under the name
and style Himachal Khadi Ashram. The perusal of the record shows that the services of the
petitioner had been engaged by the respondents on part time basis. In 2006 LLR 1233 SC in case
titled as Vidya Vardhaka Sangha & Anr. V. Y.D Deshpande &Ors, it has been held that:—
“The appointment made on probation/ad-hoc basis for a specific period of time comes to
an end by efflux of time and the person on such post can have no right to continue on the
post. When after having accepted the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment
letter and allowed, the period for which they were appointed has been elapsed by efflux of
time, they cannot be permitted to challenge the validity of their termination.
It was also held in (2006) 6 SCC 221, case titled as Reserve Bank of India V. Gopinath
Sharma & Anr. that workman not appointed to any regular post but engaged on the basis of need
of work on day to day basis, had no right to the post.
17. In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner was engaged purely on part time/
temporary basis for a specific period. Thus, on the basis of the above cited rulings and also having
regard to the entire evidence on record, it can safely be concluded that the petitioner had no right to
the post and she was not retrenched within the meaning of section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947. The case of the petitioner falls within the exception as provided under section 2(oo)(bb)
of the Act as such the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Act would not apply.
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18. Therefore, in view of the law laid down supra and also in view of my foregoing
discussion, it can safely be held that the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 6.6.2013
is not illegal and unjustified. Consequently, this issue is decided in favour of the respondents and
against the petitioner.
Issue no.2.
19. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1, this issue becomes redundant.
Issue no.3 & 5.
20. In support of these issues, no evidence was led by the respondents which could go to
show that as to how the petition is not maintainable and that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try
the present petition. Moreover, the petitioner has filed the present petition pursuant to the reference
sent by the appropriate government to this Court for adjudication, hence, I find nothing wrong with
this petition which is perfectly maintainable and this Court has got the jurisdiction to try the present
petition. Accordingly, both these issues are decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
Issue no.4.
21. During the course of arguments, this issue was not pressed by the learned counsel for
the respondents. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issue no.1 to 5, the claim of the
petitioner fails and is hereby dismissed with the result the reference is answered against the
petitioner and in favour of respondents. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
government for publication in official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 29th Day of June, 2017.
(PRAVEEN),
(SUSHIL KUKREJA),
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNALCUM- LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P)
Ref. No.
:
33 of 2016.
Instituted on.
:
11.4.2016.
Decided on
:
30.6.2017.
Shayamanand S/o Shri Dila Ram R/o Village Alu Randal, P.O Rampur, Tehsil Nirmand,
District Shimla, HP.
. .Petitioner.
8802
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Vs.
1.
Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Shimla, H.P through its Managing Director.
2.
The Regional manager, Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Rampur Bushehr,
District Shimla, HP.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner : Shri Manohar Lal Sharma, Advocate.
For respondent : Shri Dheeraj Kanwar, Advocate.0
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Shyamanand s/o Shri Dila Ram, r/o
Village Alu Randal, P.O. Rampur, Tehsil Nirmand, District Kullu, H.P. w.e.f.
18.4.2001 by the (1) The Managing Director, Himachal Pradesh Transport
Corporation, H.P. Shimla. (2) Regional Manager, H.R.T.C. Rampur, District Shimla,
H.P., who had worked as Motor Mechanic only for 191 days during the year, 2000 and
has raised his industrial dispute after more than 12 years vide demand notice dated
25.9.2013, without complying the provisions of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 is
legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of working period of 191 days during the
year, 2000 and delay of more than 12 years in raising the industrial dispute, what
amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above
exworker is entitled to from the above employer/management?”
2.
In nutshell, the case of the petitioner is that after doing the course from industrial
training institute Rampur Bushehr, District Shimla in the trade of mechanic motor vehicle, the
petitioner was initially engaged by the respondent as motor mechanic (helper) on 6.6.2000 for 89
days and after the completion of 89 days he was re-engaged for further 89 days and this process
remain continued upto 17.4.2001 when his services had been terminated orally without issuing any
notice. After obtaining information under RTI, the petitioner came to know that the respondents
have appointed many persons as motor mechanics on piecemeal basis after the termination of his
services and now their services have been brought on contract basis, hence, the termination of the
services of the petitioner is totally illegal and the posts are still lying vacant with the respondent
and the petitioner is ready and willing to work with respondent and that he had completed 240 days
in each calendar year and as such his termination is in violation of the provisions of section 25-F of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as to Act) as neither any notice was given to
him nor he was paid compensation and that before terminating his services, no opportunity was
afforded to him. That even giving fictional breaks after the completion of 89 days amounts to unfair
labour practice on the part of the respondent. It is also stated that after the termination of the
services of the petitioner many persons have been appointed against the post of motor mechanic,
hence, the action on the part of the respondents is in violation of section 25-G and 25-H of the Act.
Against this back-drop a prayer has been made for reinstatement along-with all consequential
benefits including back-wages by quashing order dated 17.4.2001.
3.
By filing reply, the respondents contested the claim of the petitioner wherein it has
been asserted that the petitioner was engaged only on day to day basis on the leave vacancy of
regular staff during 2000 w.e.f. 6.6.2000 in motor mechanic trade on a monthly remuneration of
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` 2000/- but he was not engaged for 89 days. It is denied that the petitioner was reengaged after 89
days but it is asserted that he left the job without giving any notice to the department. It is further
asserted that the petitioner had appeared in the interview for the post of motor mechanic but he
could not qualify due to less marks. It is denied that the posts are still lying vacant with the
respondent and that he had completed 240 days in each calendar year. The respondent prayed for
the dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed his allegations by denying those of the
respondent.
5. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
2.11.2016.
1.
Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 18.4.2001 by the
respondents without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 is illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Relief.
6.
Besides having heard the Learned Counsel for the parties, I have also gone through the
record of the case carefully.
7.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
No.
Issue no.2
Becomes redundant.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner
per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issue no.1.
8.
The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner was engaged as a
motor mechanic for a period of 89 days on 6.6.2000 and the period of 89 days was extended from
time to time after a gap of 89 days till 17.4.2001 and thereafter, the services of the petitioner had
been terminated orally without assigning any reason and without the compliance of mandatory
provisions of law. He also contended that junior persons to the petitioner have been retained. He
further contended that since the petitioner had completed 240 days in preceding twelve calendar
months, hence, his termination without complying with the provisions of the Act is illegal.
9.
On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the respondent contended that the since the
petitioner had been engaged for specific work on day to day basis against the leave vacancy of
regular staff on a monthly remuneration of ` 2000/-, hence, he is not entitled to any relief. He
further contended that the claim of the petitioner is highly belated and stale.
10. The petitioner while appearing into the witness box as PW-1 has tendered in evidence
his affidavit Ex. PW-1/A, wherein he reiterated almost all the averments as made in the claim
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petition. In cross-examination he denied that before appearing in the interview, he also worked on
leave vacancy with respondent and that he was conveyed by the HRTC about nonselection in the
interview. He further denied that his appointment was on co-terminus basis against leave vacancy.
He also denied that he had not completed more than 89 days and he used to proceed on leave. He
admitted that he remained under treatment for longer period initially at Rampur and thereafter at
IGMC Shimla and then at PGI Chandigarh. He denied that he had not completed 240 days in any
calendar year. He admitted that after his termination, he had not made any representation for his re-
engagement to respondent and that he had worked only for 191 days in the year 2000.
11. On the other hand, the respondent examined RW-1 Shri Praveen Sharma, Senior
Assistant, who deposed that the petitioner was engaged as motor mechanic against the leave
vacancy of regular staff w.e.f. 6.6.2000 to 17.4.2001 at a monthly salary of ` 2000 and on
17.4.2001, he left the job at his own without any intimation and on 26.5.2015, he applied for piece
meal worker purely on out-sourcing basis but he could not qualify the interview and thereafter, he
raised the industrial dispute and vide order dated 5.5.2015 Ex. RW-1/A, the dispute was referred to
this Court for adjudication being raised after more than 12 years. In cross-examination, he denied
that the petitioner was engaged against the leave vacancy and that the petitioner had not left the job
at his own. He admitted that no notice was issued to the petitioner for resumption of his duties. He
admitted that Ex. PX-1 is the order passed by the Hon'ble High Court of HP in CWP no.
4160/2015. He denied that the petitioner had completed 240 days in a calendar year.
12. I have closely scrutinized the entire evidence on record and from the closer scrutiny
thereof, it has become clear that the petitioner had worked with the respondent as motor mechanic
only for 191 days and raised his industrial dispute after more than 12 years vide demand notice
dated 25.9.2013. Now, the first question which arises for consideration before this Court is as to
whether the reference is stale and highly belated. Undisputedly, the petitioner had raised the
industrial dispute after a period of about 12 years meaning thereby that he remained silent for about
twelve years. In (2013) 14 SCC 543, titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan State Agriculture
Marketing Board, Sub Division Kota Vs. Mohan Lal, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex
Court that though the Limitation Act is not applicable to the reference made under the I.D Act but
delay in raising industrial Dispute is an important circumstance for exercise of judicial discretion in
determining relief that is to be granted. The relevant portion of aforesaid judgment is reproduced as
under:
“19. We are clearly of the view that though the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the
reference made under the ID Act but delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an
important circumstance which the Labour Court must keep in view at the time of exercise of
discretion irrespective of whether or not such objection has been raised by the other side.
The legal position laid down by this Court in Gitam Singh that before exercising its judicial
discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and
manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which
termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of
relief in an industrial dispute, must be invariably followed.”
13. In UP State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Ram Singh and another (2008) 17
SCC 627, the termination was dated 15.3.1973 and the reference was dated 15.6.1986 and there
was a delay of about 13 years in making the reference. The reference was dismissed on the ground
of delay. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:
“ 7. We are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court erred
in not setting aside the award of the Labour Court. Apart from the unacceptable manner in
which the appellant was denied the opportunity of participating in the proceedings,
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including being debarred from cross-examining the respondent, the Labour Court could not
have entertained the industrial dispute given the enormous delay. This Court has in several
decisions has held that while delay cannot by itself be sufficient reason to reject an
industrial dispute, never the less the delay cannot be un-reasonable. The decision in Prakash
Chander Sahu has reaffirmed this principal. The reason for diligence and promptness lies in
the fact that the records pertaining to an employee might have been destroyed and it would
be difficult to obtain witnesses who would be competent to give evidence so many years
later if the Labour Court wishes to hold a further enquiry into the matter. In the present
case, the delay of 13 years is unreasonable. The mere fact that the respondent was making
repeated representations would not justify his raising the issue before the Labour Court after
13 years. In any event, the last representation was made in 1983 and the industrial dispute
was admittedly raised in 1996. The lack of diligence on the part of the respondent is
apparent. “
Keeping in view the aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the facts of
this case are required to be seen. The services of the petitioner were stated to be terminated w.e.f.
18.4.2001. There is nothing on record which could go to show that after his termination, the
petitioner approached the respondent for his reinstatement. The burden of proof was upon the
petitioner to show that the dispute was raised within a reasonable time and to offer an explanation
to the satisfaction of this Court for the delay of 12 years caused in seeking reference but the
petitioner has failed to discharge his burden as such no relief can be granted to the petitioner. The
reference is therefore stale and is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay in raising the dispute.
14. On merits, also it has become clear that the petitioner was engaged w.e.f. 6.6.2000 in
motor mechanic trade on day to day basis. The petitioner himself has stated in his affidavit Ex. PW-
1/A that initially he was engaged for 89 days and thereafter again after the completion of 89 days,
he was re-engaged for further 89 days and the said process continued upto 17.4.2001. Therefore, in
view of the admission of the petitioner himself, it cannot be said that the petitioner was engaged by
the respondent against a regular post. RW-1 specifically stated in his deposition before this Court
that the petitioner had worked as a motor mechanic against the leave vacancy of regular staff w.e.f.
6.6.2000 on a monthly salary of ` 2000/- and in cross-examination, he specifically stated that the
petitioner was not a regular worker. In 2006 LLR 1233 SC in case titled as Vidya Vardhaka
Sangha & Anr. V. Y.D Deshpande &Ors, it has been held that:—
“The appointment made on probation/ad-hoc basis for a specific period of time comes to
an end by efflux of time and the person on such post can have no right to continue on the
post. When after having accepted the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment
letter and allowed, the period for which they were appointed has been elapsed by efflux of
time, they cannot be permitted to challenge the validity of their termination.
It was also held in (2006) 6 SCC 221, case titled as Reserve Bank of India V. Gopinath
Sharma & Anr. that workman not appointed to any regular post but engaged on the basis of need
of work on day to day basis, had no right to the post.
15. In the instant case also admittedly, the petitioner was engaged on day to day basis
against the leave vacancy and was not appointed to any regular post as such he had no right to the
post in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
16. The further case of the petitioner is that after his termination, the respondent had
retained his juniors who are still working and besides this even fresh persons have been engaged by
the respondent as such the respondent had violated the principles of “last come first go”. However,
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no evidence has been led by the petitioner to prove that the persons junior to him have been
retained and fresh persons have been engaged. Hence, in the absence of any cogent and satisfactory
evidence on record, the case of the petitioner does not fall under section 25-G andb 25-H of the
Act. Consequently, the petitioner has failed to prove that his services were terminated by the
respondent in violation of the provisions of the Act and as such the issue is decided in favour of the
respondent and against the petitioner.
Issue no.2.
17. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1, above, this issue becomes
redundant.
Relief.
As a sequel to my findings on the aforesaid issues, the claim of the petitioner fails and is
hereby dismissed. Consequently, the reference stands answered against the petitioner and in favour
of the respondents. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication
in official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records. Announced in the open Court
today on this 30th Day of June, 2017.
(PARVEEN),
(SUSHIL KUKREJA),
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
_______
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNALCUM- LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P)
Ref. No.
:
78 of 2015.
Instituted on.
:
19.11.2015.
Decided on
:
30.6.2017.
Dalesh Kumar S/o Shri Manphool Singh R/o House no. 145, Manphool NIwas, Ward no.13,
Cleangaon, Tehsil & District Solan, HP.
. . Petitioner.
Vs.
3.
Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Shimla, H.P through its Managing Director.
4.
The Regional manager, Himachal Road Transport Corporation, Solan, District Solan,
HP.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner : Shri Manohar Lal Sharma, Advocate.
For respondent : Shri Dheeraj Kanwar, Advocate.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
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“Whether termination of services of Sh. Dalesh Kumar s/o Sh. Manphool Singh, r/o
H.No. 145, Manphool Niwas, Ward No.13, Cleangaon, Tehsil & Distt. Solan, H.P.
during October, 2012 by i) The Managing Director, HRTC, Shimla-3, H.P. ii) The
Regional Manager, HRTC Solan, H.P. without complying with the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as alleged by workman is legal and justified? If not, to
what amount of back wages, past service benefits, seniority, compensation and other
service benefits the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above
employer/management?”
2.
In nutshell, the case of the petitioner is that on 12.5.1999, he was engaged as sweeper
by the respondent on monthly remuneration of ` 1000/- on contract basis and he was working
honestly and to the entire satisfaction of his superiors and even after the date of his appointment,
one or two days notional/fictional breaks were given to him and in the month of May, 2000, his
salary was enhanced from ` 1000/- to ` 2000/- per month. It is further stated that the petitioner was
working with respondent no.2 continuously upto October, 2012 but his salary w.e.f. June, 2012 to
October, 2012 was not given to him by saying that the same would be paid to him after necessary
sanction from the competent authority. It is also stated that the services of the petitioner were
terminated w.e.f. October, 2012 when he requested to regularize his services. That the posts are still
lying vacant with the respondent corporation and the petitioner is ready and willing to work and
that he had completed 240 days in each calendar year, hence, his termination without complying
with the provisions of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as to
Act) is illegal as no notice or compensation was given to him before terminating his services.
Against this back-drop a prayer has been made that the services of the petitioner be reinstated
along-with all the consequential service benefits including back-wages, seniority, regularization
and salary for four months w.e.f. June, 2012 to October, 2012 by quashing order dated
October, 2012.
3.
By filing reply, the respondents contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections have been raised qua maintainability, cause of action, that the petitioner has
no locus standi to file the present petition etc. On merits it has been denied that the petitioner
worked continuously upto June, 2012. It is asserted that the petitioner himself used to take a break
from service for 2 to 3 days every month. It is also asserted that the respondent had floated a tender
in the year, 2003 and the same was allotted to the petitioner for sweeping and cleaning the unit @
monthly sum of ` 2000/- for a period of 11 months and after 31.5.2012, the petitioner stopped
sending his employee engaged for sweeping the premises of respondents. The recommendations of
Board of Directors is not applicable in the case of the petitioner as he had left the service and
assumed the charge of a contractor by participating in the tender and since the petitioner
participated in the tender floated by the respondents, hence, the question of termination does not
arise. The respondent prayed for the dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed his allegations by denying those of the
respondent.
5.
Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
5.8.2016.
4.
Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner during October, 2012 by the
respondents without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 is illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
5.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
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6.
Whether the petition is not maintainable?
. .OPR.
7.
Relief.
6.
Besides having heard the Learned Counsel for the parties, I have also gone through the
record of the case carefully.
7.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
No.
Issue no.2
Becomes redundant.
Issue no 3
No.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the respondents and against the petitioner
per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issue no.1.
8.
The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner being safai
karmachari having been engaged by the respondents on 12.5.1999 and his termination w.e.f.
October, 2012 especially when he had completed more than 240 days in every calendar year
without complying with the provisions of the Act is illegal and unjustified.
9.
On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the respondents contended that the petitioner was
initially engaged as a part time sweeper by the respondents but thereafter he had worked as a
contractor with effect from the year, 2003 onwards for sweeping and cleaning the premises of the
respondent as such he is not entitled to any relief.
10. The petitioner while appearing into the witness box as PW-1 has tendered in evidence
his affidavit Ex. PW-1/A, wherein he reiterated almost all the averments as made in the claim
petition. In cross-examination, he stated that initially he was engaged as a part time sweeper by the
respondents on 12.5.1999 and he used to work for 8 hours per day as a daily wager and he was
getting wages @ ` 2000/- per month. He denied that as a part time worker, he used to attend the
office irregularly and that he participated in the tender floated by the respondents in the year, 2012
for outsourcing the job of sweeper. He further denied that the tender was given to him by the
respondents and he used to work as contractor. He also denied that he had worked for less than 90
days at a stretch and that his services were never terminated and he left the job at his own. He
denied that he had never completed 240 days in any calendar year.
11. On the other hand, the respondent examined RW-1 Shri Bhagat Ram, Superintendent,
who deposed that the petitioner was working as safai karamchari and he used to work 2 to 3 hours
per day and they used to pay him ` 1000/- initially and thereafter the wages were enhanced to
` 2000/- per month and he used to do his duties regularly. He further deposed that as per Ex. RW-
1/A, the petitioner had worked as contractor w.e.f. the year, 2003 and every time the contract
period was for 11 months which used to be renewed from time to time. The petitioner used to do
the work himself and prior to the year, 2003 wages to him were paid from contingency funds. In
cross-examination, he admitted that the name of the petitioner was recommended for regularization
by the committee. He denied that the services of the petitioner were terminated when he made a
request for his regularization in October, 2012. He further denied that the salary of the petitioner
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was withheld from June, 2012 to October, 2012. He also denied that the petitioner was an employee
and not a contractor.
12. I have closely scrutinized the entire evidence on record and from the closer scrutiny
thereof, it has become clear that initially the petitioner was engaged on 12.5.1999 as a part time
sweeper by the respondents but thereafter he had worked as a contractor w.e.f. the year, 2003 for
sweeping and cleaning the premises of the respondents for a period of eleven months and the said
contract was continuously renewed from time to time. The copies of the agreements have been
tendered in evidence as Ex. RW-1/A. The perusal of the aforesaid agreements shows that the
petitioner had signed the agreements as a contractor. No evidence to the contrary has been placed
on record by the petitioner. It is not the case of the petitioner that he has not signed the agreements
Ex. RW-1/A. Therefore, the perusal of the entire evidence on record shows that the work of
sweeping and cleaning of the premises had been awarded to the petitioner by the respondents from
the year, 2003 onwards and the contract was being renewed from time to time as such it cannot be
said that the petitioner was engaged on any regular post by the respondents.
13. Hence, in view of the entire evidence on record, it can safely be concluded that the
petitioner was working as a contractor and his services were never terminated by the respondents.
Hence, it cannot be said that the termination of the services of the petitioner during October, 2012
by the respondents is illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the
respondent and against the petitioner.
Issue no. 2.
14. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1, above, this issue becomes
redundant.
Issue no. 3.
15. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondents. However, the
petitioner has filed this claim petition pursuant to the reference made by the appropriate
government to this Court for adjudication and I find nothing wrong with this petition which is
perfectly maintainable. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.
Relief.
As a sequel to my findings on the aforesaid issues, the claim of the petitioner fails and is
hereby dismissed. Consequently, the reference stands answered against the petitioner and in favour
of the respondents. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication
in official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records. Announced in the open Court
today on this 30th Day of June, 2017.
(PARVEEN),
(SUSHIL KUKREJA),
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
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IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNALCUM- LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P)
Ref. No.
:
72 of 2014.
Instituted on.
:
4.9.2014.
Decided on
:
30.6.2017.
Anil Kumar S/o Shri Bhadur Singh R/o Village Daka, P.O Kando Bhatnol, Tehsil Shillai,
District Sirmour, HP.
. .Petitioner.
Vs.
Director-cum-Chairman (Board of Ayurveda and Unani System of Medicines, HP) having
its office at Block no.26, SDA Complex, Kasumpati Shimla, 171009.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner : Shri Sandeep Dutta, Advocate.
For respondent : Shri Swaran Sharma, Advocate.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of the services of Shri Anil Kumar, s/o Shri Bhadur Singh, r/o Village
Daka, P.O. Kando Bhatnol, Tehsil Shillai, District Sirmour, H.P. w.e.f. 01-06-2013 by the
(i) Director of Ayurveda Block No.26, SDA Complex Kasumpti, Shimla-9, H. P.
(ii) Registrar, Board of Ayurveda and Unani System of Medicines, H.P., without complying
the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what
amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker
is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that he was engaged on contract basis for disposal
of pending works of registration/renewal of Ayurvedic Medical Officer/Ayurvedic Pharmacist vide
office order dated 29.7.2011 initially for two months and after which the contract was supposed to
be seized and thereafter the services of the petitioner were renewed by the respondent and he
worked till 30.9.2011 and then a short break was given to him and again he was engaged to work in
the office of respondent w.e.f. 1.11.2011 and he continued as such till 31.5.2013. It is further stated
that vide letter dated 21.12.2011, the respondent requested the Secretary Ayurveda for the
necessary approval of Government to fill up two posts of clerks on outsource basis and the Under
Secretary vide its letter dated 31.1.2012, allowed one post of Data Operator on outsource basis. It is
also stated that the petitioner had worked continuously without any break for more than 240 days in
one calendar year and that to the utter shock and surprise of the petitioner, on 1.6.2013, his services
were discontinued orally without issuing any notice, chargesheet, conducting enquiry, hence, the
dismissal of his services is in violation of section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter referred as to Act). Against this back-drop a prayer has been made that the services of
the petitioner be re-engaged with all consequential service benefits including back-wages.
3.
By filing reply, the respondent contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections have been taken that the petitioner has not come to this Court with clean
hands, estoppel, that the reference is without jurisdiction, reference is bad for non-joinder of
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necessary parties and that there is no relation of master and servant between the parties. On merits,
it has been asserted that the engagement of the petitioner was purely on contract basis for a specific
period and for a specific work and his services were engaged just to streamline the pending work of
the board without following the due process of law and procedure and his services were not
engaged in accordance with the R&P Rules. It is further asserted that the petitioner was engaged by
the Board as a stop gap arrangement. It is denied that the petitioner worked upto 31.5.2013 without
any break. It is also asserted that vide letter dated 21.11.2011, the board took up the matter with the
government and sought permission for filling up the required posts in the Board and the
Government vide letter dated 31.1.2012 gave its approval for filling of one post of data operator on
outsource basis with the condition that the Board will meet its expenses. The government in view
of the illegality and irregularities in the appointment of the petitioner, directed the Board to issue
show cause notice to him but before issuance of show cause notice w.e.f. 1.6.2013, the petitioner
himself is absent from his duties. It is denied that the petitioner worked continuously for 240 days.
The respondent prayed for the dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed his allegations by denying those of the
respondent.
5.
Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
18.1.2016.
1.
Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 1.6.2013 by the
respondent without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
is illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether this petition is not maintainable as alleged?
. .OPR.
4.
Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as alleged?
. .OPR.
5.
Relief.
6.
Besides having heard the Learned Counsel for the parties, I have also gone through the
record of the case carefully.
7.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
No.
Issue no.2
Becomes redundant.
Issue no.3
No.
Issue no.4
Not pressed.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the respondent andb against the petitioner
per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issue no.1.
8.
The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the services of the petitioner were
engaged by the respondent on contract basis for disposal of works of registration/renewal of
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Ayurvedic Medical Officer/Ayurvedic Pharmacist w.e.f. 29.7.2011 initially for two months and he
continued as such till 31.5.2013 and thereafter his services were orally terminated without issuing
any notice and without paying any compensation. He further contended that since the petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding twelve calendar months, hence, his termination without
complying with the provisions of the Act is illegal.
9.
On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the respondent contended that the since the
petitioner had been engaged purely on contract basis for a specific period and for specific work,
hence, he is not entitled to any relief.
10. The petitioner while appearing into the witness box as PW-1 has tendered in evidence
his affidavit Ex. PW-1/A, wherein he reiterated almost all the averments as made in the claim
petition. He also tendered in evidence the copy of office order dated 29.7.2011 mark A-1, copy of
joining letter dated 1.11.2011 mark A-2, copy of letter dated 21.12.2011 mark A-3, copy of letter
dated 31.1.2012 mark A-4, copy of office order dated 7.1.2013 mark A-5 and copy of attendance
register mark A-6. In cross-examination he admitted that he was engaged for specific work for
three months only to stream line the particular work. He denied that his appointment was a stop gap
arrangement and that breaks were given during his period of service. He denied that on coming to
know about the issuance of show cause notice, he had himself voluntarily left the job w.e.f.
1.6.2013. He further denied that he had not completed 240 days in any calendar year.
11. PW-2 Dr. Dinesh Kumar OSD Ayurved-cum-Registrar State Ayurved and Unani
Board, deposed that the petitioner was engaged in their department vide order dated 29.7.2011 Ex.
PW-2/A and his joining letter dated 1.8.2011 is Ex. PW-2/B. He further stated that the department
vide letter dated 21.12.2012 Ex. PW-2/C asked for necessary permission from HP Government to
fill up two posts on outsource basis and vide letter dated 31.1.2012 Ex. PW-2/D, the Under
Secretary allowed one post of data operator on outsource basis. Ex. PW-2/E is office order dated
7.1.2013 and the petitioner had worked w.e.f. 1.11.2011 till 31.5.2013 for more than 20 months. In
cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner was engaged on contract basis but volunteered that
he was engaged for a specific period to complete the pending work of the board relating with data.
He admitted that after a period of 20 months, the petitioner had left the job at his own and that no
representation was received in writing from the petitioner.
12. On the other hand, the respondent examined RW-1 Shri Jagir Singh, Senior Assistant,
who deposed that in the year, 2011, the respondent department engaged the petitioner purely on
temporary basis and his appointment was done without following the R&P Rules, just to stream
line the pending work of the board and he was given fictional breaks from time to time as and when
his services were not required. He further deposed that the petitioner was engaged by the
department as a stop gap arrangement and he worked till June, 2013 and thereafter he left the job at
his own on 1.6.2013 without any intimation. He also deposed that the petitioner has not completed
240 days in any calendar year. In cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner was appointed on
contract basis on 29.7.2011. He admitted that the petitioner was engaged vide office order Ex. PW-
2/A. He denied that the petitioner had worked continuously till 30.9.2011 and that the contract was
renewed vide office order dated 29.7.2011 Ex. PW-2/A. He admitted that vide letter Ex. PW-2/C,
the respondent had written to the Secretary Ayurveda for creation of two posts of clerks on
outsource basis and that one post of data operator on outsource basis was created vide letter Ex.
PW-2/D. He denied that the services of the petitioner were terminated orally on 1.6.2013. He
further denied that the petitioner had completed 240 days in each calendar year and that no proper
procedure was followed prior to the termination of his services.
13. I have closely scrutinized the entire evidence on record and from the closer scrutiny
thereof, it has become clear that initially the petitioner was engaged on contract basis for doing
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specific work for a period of two months vide office order dated 29.7.2011 Ex. PW-2/A. It has also
become clear that the respondent board took up the matter with the Government and sought
permission for filling up two posts of data operator on outsource basis vide letter Ex. PW-2/C and
vide letter dated 31.1.2012 Ex. PW-2/D, the Government conveyed its approval for filling up one
post of data operator on outsource basis. Therefore, from the perusal of the entire evidence n record
it has become clear that the petitioner was never appointed by following R&P rules and was only
engaged for doing specific work for specific period to stream line the pending work of the Board.
The petitioner while appearing in the witness box as PW-1 also admitted that he was engaged for
specific work initially for three months only to stream line the particular work.
14. Hence, from the perusal of the entire evidence on record coupled with the admission of
petitioner, it stands duly proved on record that the petitioner had been engaged by the respondent
purely on contractual basis for a specific period for specific work only to stream line the pending
work. In 2006 LLR 1233 SC in case titled as Vidya Vardhaka Sangha & Anr. V. Y.D Deshpande
&Ors, it has been held that:—
“The appointment made on probation/ad-hoc basis for a specific period of time comes to
an end by efflux of time and the person on such post can have no right to continue on the
post. When after having accepted the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment
letter and allowed, the period for which they were appointed has been elapsed by efflux of
time, they cannot be permitted to challenge the validity of their termination.
It was also held in (2006) 6 SCC 221, case titled as Reserve Bank of India V. Gopinath
Sharma & Anr. that workman not appointed to any regular post but engaged on the basis of need
of work on day to day basis, had no right to the post.
In 2006 (2) SCC 794 in case titled as Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board V.
Subhash Chand & Anr. the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“11. The question as to whether Chapter V-A of the Act will apply or not would be
dependent on the issue as to whether an order of retrenchment comes within the
purview of Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Act or not. If the termination of service in
view of the exception contained in clauses (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act is not a
’retrenchment’, the question of applicability of Chapter V-A thereof would not
arise.
12. Central Bank of India Vs. S. Stayam whereupon reliance was placed by Mr.
Singh, is itself an authority for the proposition that the definition of
'retrenchment' as contained in the said provision is wide. Once it is held that
having regard to the nature of termination of services it would not come within
the purview of the said definition, the question of applicability of Section 25-G of
the Act does not arise.”
15. In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner was engaged purely on contractual basis
for a specific period to do the specific work and was not appointed to any regular post. Thus, on the
basis of the above cited rulings and also having regard to the entire evidence on record, it can safely
be concluded that the petitioner had been engaged purely on contractual basis, who was not
retrenched within the meaning of section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The case of the
petitioner falls within the exception as provided under section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act as such the
provisions of Chapter V-A of the Act would not apply. Consequently, the petitioner has failed to
prove that his services were terminated by the respondent in violation of the provisions of the Act
and the issue is decided in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner.
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Issue no.2.
16. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1, above, this issue becomes
redundant.
Issue no.3.
17. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondent which could go to
show as to why the petition is not maintainable. Moreover, the petitioner has filed the present claim
pursuant to the reference sent by the appropriate government to this Court for adjudication.
Therefore, I find nothing wrong with this claim petition which is perfectly maintainable in the
present form. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
Issue no.4.
18. The onus to prove this issue was on the respondent, however, during the course of
arguments, the same has not been pressed by the learned counsel for the respondent. Therefore, this
issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief.
As a sequel to my findings on the aforesaid issues, the claim of the petitioner fails and is
hereby dismissed. Consequently, the reference stands answered against the petitioner and in favour
of the respondent. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in
official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 30th Day of June, 2017.
(PARVEEN)
(SUSHIL KUKREJA)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNALCUM- LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P.)
Ref. No.
:
71 of 2014.
Instituted on.
:
4.9.2014.
Decided on
:
30.6.2017.
Nishant Kaul S/o late Shri Vimal Kaul R/o Village & Post ffice Nadaun, Tehsil Nadaun
District Hamirpur, HP.
. .Petitioner.
Vs.
Director-cum-Chairman (Board of Ayurveda and Unani System of Medicines, HP) having
its office at Block no.26, SDA Complex, Kasumpati Shimla, 171009.
. .Respondent.
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Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner : Shri Sandeep Dutta, Advocate.
For respondent : Shri Swaran Sharma, Advocate.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
“Whether termination of the services of Shri Nishant Kaul, s/o Late Shri Vimal Kaul, r/o
V.P.O. Nadaun, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P. w.e.f. 01-06-2013 by the (i)
Director of Ayurveda Block No.26, SDA Complex Kasumpti, Shimla-9, H.P. (ii) Registrar,
Board of Ayurveda and Unani System of Medicines, H.P., without complying the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled
to from the above employer?”
2.
Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that he was engaged on contract basis for disposal
of pending works of registration/renewal of Ayurvedic Medical Officer/Ayurvedic Pharmacist vide
office order dated 21.4.2011 initially for two months and after which the contract was supposed to
be seized and thereafter the services of the petitioner were renewed by the respondent vide office
order dated 29.7.2011 without any break and he worked till 21.9.2011 and then a short break was
given to him and again he was engaged to work in the office of respondent w.e.f. 1.10.2011 and he
continued as such till 31.5.2013. It is further stated that vide letter dated 21.12.2011, the respondent
requested the Secretary Ayurveda for the necessary approval of Government to fill up two posts of
clerks on outsource basis and the Under Secretary vide its letter dated 31.1.2012, allowed one post
of Data Operator on outsource basis. It is also stated that the petitioner had worked continuously
without any break for more than 240 days in one calendar year and that to the utter shock and
surprise of the petitioner, on 1.6.2013, his services were discontinued orally without issuing any
notice, chargesheet, conducting enquiry, hence, the dismissal of his services is in violation of
section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as to Act). Against this back-
drop a prayer has been made that the services of the petitioner be re-engaged with all consequential
service benefits including back-wages.
3.
By filing reply, the respondent contested the claim of the petitioner wherein
preliminary objections have been taken that the petitioner has not come to this Court with clean
hands, estoppel, that the reference is without jurisdiction, reference is bad for non-joinder of
necessary parties and that there is no relation of master and servant between the parties. On merits,
it has been asserted that the engagement of the petitioner was purely on contract basis for a specific
period and for a specific work and his services were engaged just to streamline the pending work of
the board without following the due process of law and procedure and his services were not
engaged in accordance with the R&P Rules. It is further asserted that the petitioner was engaged by
the Board as a stop gap arrangement. It is denied that the petitioner worked upto 31.5.2013 without
any break. It is also asserted that vide letter dated 21.11.2011, the board took up the matter with the
government and sought permission for filling up the required posts in the Board and the
Government vide letter dated 31.1.2012 gave its approval for filling of one post of data operator on
outsource basis with the condition that the Board will meet its expenses. The government in view
of the illegality and irregularities in the appointment of the petitioner, directed the Board to issue
show cause notice to him but before issuance of show cause notice w.e.f. 1.6.2013, the petitioner
himself is absent from his duties. It is denied that the petitioner worked continuously for 240 days.
The respondent prayed for the dismissal of the claim petition.
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4.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed his allegations by denying those of the
respondent.
5.
Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
18.1.2016.
1.
Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 1.6.2013 by the
respondent without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
is illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether this petition is not maintainable as alleged?
. .OPR.
4.
Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as alleged?
. .OPR.
5.
Relief.
6.
Besides having heard the Learned Counsel for the parties, I have also gone through the
record of the case carefully.
7.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1
No.
Issue no.2
Becomes redundant.
Issue no.3
No.
Issue no.4
Not pressed.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner per
operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issue no.1.
8.
The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the services of the petitioner were
engaged by the respondent on contract basis for disposal of works of registration/renewal of
Ayurvedic Medical Officer/Ayurvedic Pharmacist w.e.f. 21.4.2011 initially for two months and he
continued as such till 31.5.2013 and thereafter his services were orally terminated without issuing
any notice and without paying any compensation. He further contended that since the petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding twelve calendar months, hence, his termination without
complying with the provisions of the Act is illegal.
9.
On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the respondent contended that the since the
petitioner had been engaged purely on contract basis for a specific period and for specific work,
hence, he is not entitled to any relief.
10. The petitioner while appearing into the witness box as PW-1 has tendered in evidence
his affidavit Ex. PW-1/A, wherein he reiterated almost all the averments as made in the claim
petition. He also tendered in evidence the copy of office order dated 21.4.2012 mark A, copy of
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office order dated 29.7.2011 mark A-1, copy of joining letter dated 1.10.2011 mark A-2, copy of
letter dated 21.12.2011 mark A-3, copy of letter dated 31.1.2012 mark A-4, copy of office order
dated 7.1.2013 mark A-5 and copy of attendance register mark A-6. In cross-examination he
admitted that he was engaged for specific work for three months only to stream line the particular
work. He denied that his appointment was a stop gap arrangement and that breaks were given
during his period of service. He denied that on coming to know about the issuance of show cause
notice, he had himself voluntarily left the job w.e.f. 1.6.2013. He further denied that he had not
completed 240 days in any calendar year.
11. PW-2 Dr. Dinesh Kumar OSD Ayurved-cum-Registrar State Ayurved and Unani
Board, deposed that the petitioner was engaged in their department vide order dated 21.4.2011 Ex.
PW-2/A and his services were re-engaged vide office order dated 29.7.2011 Ex. PW-2/B and Ex.
PW-3/C is joining letter. He further stated that the department vide letter dated 21.12.2012 Ex. PW-
2/D asked for necessary permission from HP Government to fill up two posts on outsource basis
and vide letter dated 31.1.2012 Ex. PW-2/E, the Under Secretary allowed one post of data operator
on outsource basis. Ex. PW-2/F is office order dated 7.1.2013 and the petitioner had worked w.e.f.
1.10.2011 till 31.5.2013 for more than 20 months. In crossexamination, he denied that the petitioner
was engaged on contract basis but volunteered that he was engaged for a specific period to
complete the pending work of the board relating with data. He admitted that after a period of 20
months, the petitioner had left the job at his own and that no representation was received in writing
from the petitioner.
12. On the other hand, the respondent examined RW-1 Shri Jagir Singh, Senior Assistant,
who deposed that in the year, 2011, the respondent department engaged the petitioner purely on
temporary basis and his appointment was done without following the R&P Rules, just to stream
line the pending work of the board and he was given fictional breaks from time to time as and when
his services were not required. He further deposed that the petitioner was engaged by the
department as a stop gap arrangement and he worked till June, 2013 and thereafter he left the job at
his own on 1.6.2013 without any intimation. He also deposed that the petitioner has not completed
240 days in any calendar year. In cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner was appointed on
contract basis on 21.4.2011. He admitted that the petitioner was engaged vide office order Ex. PW-
2/A. He denied that the petitioner had worked continuously till 21.9.2011 and that the contract was
renewed vide office order dated 29.7.2011 Ex. PW-2/B. He admitted that vide letter Ex. PW-2/D,
the respondent had written to the Secretary Ayurveda for creation of two posts of clerks on
outsource basis and that one post of data operator on outsource basis was created vide letter Ex.
PW-2/E. He denied that the services of the petitioner were terminated orally on 1.6.2013. He
further denied that the petitioner had completed 240 days in each calendar year and that no proper
procedure was followed prior to the termination of his services.
13. I have closely scrutinized the entire evidence on record and from the closer scrutiny
thereof, it has become clear that initially the petitioner was engaged on contract basis for doing
specific work for a period of two months vide office order dated 21.4.2011 Ex. PW-2/A and
thereafter vide office order dated 29.7.2011 Ex. PW-2/B, he was engaged on contract basis for a
period of one month for doing specific work. It has also become clear that the respondent board
took up the matter with the Government and sought permission for filling up two posts of data
operator on outsource basis vide letter Ex. PW-2/D and vide letter dated 31.1.2012 Ex. PW-2/E, the
Government conveyed its approval for filling up one post of data operator on outsource basis.
Therefore, from the perusal of the entire evidence n record it has become clear that the petitioner
was never appointed by following R&P rules and was only engaged for doing specific work for
specific period to stream line the pending work of the Board. The petitioner while appearing in the
witness box as PW-1 also admitted that he was engaged for specific work initially for three months
only to stream line the particular work.
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14. Hence, from the perusal of the entire evidence on record coupled with the admission of
petitioner, it stands duly proved on record that the petitioner had been engaged by the respondent
purely on contractual basis for a specific period for specific work only to stream line the pending
work. In 2006 LLR 1233 SC in case titled as Vidya Vardhaka Sangha & Anr. V. Y.D Deshpande
&Ors, it has been held that:—
“The appointment made on probation/ad-hoc basis for a specific period of time comes to
an end by efflux of time and the person on such post can have no right to continue on the
post. When after having accepted the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment
letter and allowed, the period for which they were appointed has been elapsed by efflux of
time, they cannot be permitted to challenge the validity of their termination.
It was also held in (2006) 6 SCC 221, case titled as Reserve Bank of India V. Gopinath
Sharma & Anr. that workman not appointed to any regular post but engaged on the basis of need
of work on day to day basis, had no right to the post.
In 2006 (2) SCC 794 in case titled as Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board V.
Subhash Chand & Anr. the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“11. The question as to whether Chapter V-A of the Act will apply or not would be
dependent on the issue as to whether an order of retrenchment comes within the
purview of Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Act or not. If the termination of service in
view of the exception contained in clauses (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act is not a
’retrenchment’, the question of applicability of Chapter V-A thereof would not
arise.
12. Central Bank of India Vs. S. Stayam whereupon reliance was placed by Mr.
Singh, is itself an authority for the proposition that the definition of
’retrenchment’ as contained in the said provision is wide. Once it is held that
having regard to the nature of termination of services it would not come within
the purview of the said definition, the question of applicability of Section 25-G of
the Act does not arise.”
15. In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner was engaged purely on contractual basis
for a specific period to do the specific work and was not appointed to any regular post. Thus, on the
basis of the above cited rulings and also having regard to the entire evidence on record, it can safely
be concluded that the petitioner had been engaged purely on contractual basis, who was not
retrenched within the meaning of section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The case of the
petitioner falls within the exception as provided under section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act as such the
provisions of Chapter V-A of the Act would not apply. Consequently, the petitioner has failed to
prove that his services were terminated by the respondent in violation of the provisions of the Act
and the issue is decided in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner.
Issue no.2.
16. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1, above, this issue becomes
redundant.
Issue no.3.
17. In support of this issue, no evidence has been led by the respondent which could go to
show as to why the petition is not maintainable. Moreover, the petitioner has filed the present claim
8819
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pursuant to the reference sent by the appropriate government to this Court for adjudication.
Therefore, I find nothing wrong with this claim petition which is perfectly maintainable in the
present form. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
Issue no.4.
18. The onus to prove this issue was on the respondent, however, during the course of
arguments, the same has not been pressed by the learned counsel for the respondent. Therefore, this
issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief.
As a sequel to my findings on the aforesaid issues, the claim of the petitioner fails and is
hereby dismissed. Consequently, the reference stands answered against the petitioner and in favour
of the respondent. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate government for publication in
official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 30th Day of June, 2017.
(PARVEEN)
(SUSHIL KUKREJA)
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Shimla.
________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, HP INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA
Ref no.
:
10 of 2006.
Instituted on
:
10.2.2006.
Decided on.
:
30.6.2017.
Harbans Singh S/o Shri Dhani Ram R/o Village, Nain P.O Luharwin, Tehsil Ghumarwin,
District Bilaspur, HP.
. .Petitioner.
VS.
M/s Alembic Ltd., through its General Manager, Baddi, Tehsil Nalagarh, District Solan,
HP.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner: Shri P.S Chandel, Advocate.
For respondent: Shri Rahul Mahajan, Advocate.
AWARD
The following reference has been sent by the appropriate government for adjudication:
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“Whether the termination of services of Sh. Harbans Singh S/O Shri Dhani Ram by
the M/S Alembic Limited, Baddi, Tehsil Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P. without
conducting any domestic enquiry w.e.f. 8.9.2004 is proper and justified? If not, what
relief of service benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved workman is
entitled to?”
2.
Briefly, the case of the petitioner is that the respondent had employed him in its unit at
Baddi and he was performing his duties to the best of his abilities and was being paid a monthly
wages of `4500/-. That he had objected to the non deduction of the amount of GPF and ESI from
the wages, marking attendance in the attendance register regularly and non issuance of identity card
to the workmen upon which the respondent company terminated his services on 4.8.2004 without
any notice and without conducting any domestic enquiry. It is further stated that the petitioner
approached the respondent for his re-engagement but of no avail. Against this backdrop the
petitioner claims wages from 8.9.2004 to 8.6.2006 @ ` 4500/- per month, house rent paid by him
w.e.f. 8.9.2004 to 8.6.2006 at Baddi @ 2000/- per month, bus fair ` 1200, costs of litigation `
5000/- and pains, suffering and mental harassment ` 50,000/- along-with interest @ 12%.
3.
The claim of petitioner has been resisted and contested by the respondent on filing
reply wherein various preliminary objections have been raised that the claim petition is neither
competent nor maintainable, that the petitioner had not completed 240 days of continuous service
in terms of section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act), that
the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, that there is no relationship between the
petitioner and respondent and that the petitioner is gainfully employed. On merits, it has been
asserted that the petitioner is not a workman and there is no employer-employee relationship
between the petitioner and respondent as he was never an employee of respondent and he was only
deputed/assigned by its employer i.e M/s Olympus personal Allied Pvt. Ltd. as a casual worker and
he worked only for six days as a casual worker through contractor in the month of October, 2004. It
is denied that the petitioner was performing his duties to the best of his abilities and drawing a
monthly salary of ` 4500/-. It is further asserted that proper identity cards have been issued to all
the workers which have been duly signed and countersigned by the Labour Department and there is
no violation of the Act and since, the petitioner was never the worker of the respondent, hence, the
question of his termination does not arise. The respondent prayed for the dismissal of the claim
petition.
4.
By filing rejoinder, the petitioner reaffirmed his allegations by denying those of the
respondent.
5.
Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were struck on
26.10.2009.
1.
Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent without
conducting any domestic enquiry w.e.f. 8.9.2004 is improper and unjustified as
alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue no.1 is proved, to what relief of service benefits and amount of compensation,
the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim is neither competent nor maintainable?
. .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?
. .OPR.
5.
Relief.
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6.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record
of the case carefully.
7.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination,
my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under.
Issue no.1.
No.
Issue no.2.
Becomes redundant.
Issue no.3.
No.
Issue no.4.
Not pressed.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner,
per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issue no.1.
8.
The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner was employed by
the respondent company in its unit at Baddi in the year, 2003 at the monthly wages of `4500/-. He
further contended that the respondent had terminated the services of the petitioner on 4.8.2004
without any notice and without conducting any domestic enquiry.
9.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the petitioner was
never the employee of the respondent rather he was an employee of M/s Olympus personal Allied
Pvt. Ltd. who had deputed him as a casual worker with the respondent company and he had only
worked for six days as a casual worker. He further contended that the petitioner had never
completed 240 days of continuous service as such he is not entitled for any relief.
10. The petitioner Harbans Singh appeared in the witness box as PW-1 on 5.7.2016 and he
stated that initially he was engaged by the respondent as a store supervisor in the year, 2003 and
thereafter every two months, ten days break in service was given for a period of ten days, and
ultimately on 9.10.2004 his services were terminated. He was getting ` 4500/- per month. He
further stated that the company had not issued any identity card to him despite repeated requests
and on the next day when the matter of identity card was reported in the press media he was not
allowed to enter inside the factory and the respondent closed the gate. He is unemployed and
prayed that he be re-instated in service along-with all consequential benefits. It is pertinent to
mention here that after his examination-in-chief, the petitioner had refused to subject himself for
cross-examination as per his separate statement recorded by this Court and therefore an adverse
inference has to be drawn against him.
11. PW-2 Shri Rajesh Panghaniya, Labour Officer, Solan has stated that in the year, 2004,
he was working as Labour Inspector at Nalagarh and there was no factory under the name of
Alembic Ltd. at Nalagarh. He further deposed that vide Ex. PW-2/A, the failure report of
conciliation proceedings held between petitioner and respondent before the Labour-cum-
Conciliation Officer Solan was referred to Labour Commissioner Shimla. In cross-examination, he
stated that vide Ex. RX, the respondent company filed the reply to demand notice before the Labour
Officer Solan.
12. PW-3 Surender singh Bisht, Labour Inspector Baddi has brought the record of the
petitioner for the year, 2005 and stated that there is no record of petitioner pertaining to year, 2003-
2004. He further stated that the petitioner had given a letter mark A to the respondent company, the
copy of which was also given in the office of Labour Inspector, Baddi upon which the Labour
8822
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Inspector Baddi has initiated proceedings vide Ex. PW-3/A. In cross-examination, he stated that the
respondent had filed reply to the letter mark A vide Ex. RY. He admitted that the letter mark A was
not inconsonance with section 2-A of the Act.
13. PW-4, Shri Ranbir Singh, DGM with respondent company has brought the adult
worker register pertaining to the petitioner. He deposed that he has not brought the leave register,
over time register and payment of wages register pertaining to the petitioner as he was not the
employee of the company. In cross-examination, he stated that the petitioner was engaged through
contractor M/s Olympus personal Allied Pvt. Ltd. and the record of the contract employee is being
maintained by the contractor. He further deposed that the name of the petitioner is not mentioned in
the adult workers register of the company.
14. On the other hand, the respondent examined RW-1 Shri Ranbir Singh Thakur, General
Manager, HR who tendered in evidence his affidavit Ex. RW-1/A wherein he reiterated almost all
the averments as stated in the reply. He also tendered in evidence the authority letter Ex. RW-1/B,
the copy of factory licence Mark A, copy of certificate of registration under Contract Labour Act
Mark B and copy of commencement of commercial production certificate Mark C. In cross-
examination, he admitted that in Ex. RW-1/B, no specific authorization has been given to depose
before the Court.
15. RW-2 Shri Sunil Kumar Manager HR with Olympus, SCO 85, 2nd floor, Sector- 38-C
Chandigarh, appeared into the witness box to depose that vide authority letter Ex. Rw-1/A, he has
been authorized to depose before this Court and Ex. RW-2/B is the certified copy of the resolution.
He further deposed that their company had entered into a contract with M/s Alembic Ltd., to supply
the labour under the Contract labour Act, 1970 and the petitioner had been deployed by them with
the respondent company, who worked only for six days in October, 2004 and thereafter he left the
job at his own. The petitioner never worked on the rolls of M/s Alembic Ltd. In cross-examination,
he admitted that they maintain the record of the workers. He denied that he was deposing at the
instance of the company. He further denied that no agreement was entered with M/s Alembic Ltd.
16. I have considered the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the
parties including the written arguments filed on behalf of the petitioner and also scrutinized the
entire evidence on record.
17. The learned counsel for the petitioner first contended that the power of attorney given
to the learned Advocate by the respondent has not been given by an authorized person as the copy
of resolution passed by the Board of Directors of the respondent company in the year, 2006,
nowhere authorize the person namely Ranbir Singh Thakur to appoint any Advocate on behalf of
the company. However, this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner deserves to be
rejected as the perusal of the power of attorney filed on 4.12.2006 by Shri Rahul Mahajan,
Advocate shows that he has been engaged as counsel by Shri Prem Singh Bhardwaj on behalf of
the respondent company who has been authorized by the respondent company by means of
resolution dated 27.11.2006 wherein he has been specifically authorized to engage counsel, pleader
to defend and institute cases and proceedings before the various Courts including the Labour Court.
18. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that since RW-1 was not
authorized by the respondent to depose on its behalf, therefore, his statement cannot be read in
evidence. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner deserves to be accepted because
in cross-examination, RW-1 has admitted that no authority letter has been given in his favour by
the respondent to depose before this Court. Though, he produced the authority letter Ex. RW-1/B
but in cross-examination he admitted that in Ex. RW-1/B, no specific authorization has been given
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to depose before this Court. I have perused the authority letter Ex. RW-1/B and from the perusal
thereof it has become clear that no specific authorization has been given by the respondent
company to RW-1 Shri Ranvir Singh Thakur to depose before this Court in the present case.
Therefore, in view of the aforesaid back-ground, the statement given by RW-1 Shri Ranvir Singh
Thakur cannot be read in evidence. However, in the opinion of this Court even if the statement of
RW-1 is removed from the evidence, the petitioner has to stand on his own legs and has to prove
his case by leading satisfactory evidence. It is a settled law that when there is a burden upon a party
to establish a fact so as to invite a decision in its favour, it has to lead evidence. The obligation to
lead evidence to establish an averment by a party is on the party making the averment. The test
would be as to who would fail if no evidence is led. The party making the allegations and seeking
the redressal must seek an opportunity to lead evidence. After the closer scrutiny of the record, it
has become clear that the petitioner has not been able to establish that he was on the roll of the
respondent company and that his termination is in violation of the provisions of the Act. PW-4, has
brought on record the adult workers register of the respondent company, however, in cross-
examination, he admitted that the name of the petitioner is not mentioned in the same. The burden
was upon the petitioner to bring on record the cogent and satisfactory evidence about his
appointment with the respondent, however he has failed to discharge his burden. The petitioner,
admittedly has not adduced in evidence any such appointment letter or document to warrant such
inference thereby making it evident that he was the employee of respondent company. Except for
the bald statement of the petitioner there is no evidence on record to suggest that he was the
employee of the respondent. Moreover, the petitioner has refused to subject himself for cross-
examination by the respondent, therefore also an adverse inference has to be drawn against him and
due to the refusal of the petitioner for crossexamination, his statement before this court cannot be
taken into consideration and read in evidence. The case of the petitioner is that he was engaged in
the year, 2003 by the respondent. However, to substantiate his contention, no documentary
evidence has been produced on record by the petitioner. The further case of the petitioner is that
since he had objected to the non deduction of the amount from the wages to the EPF and ESI and
also to the non issuance of identity card etc. his services were terminated on 9.10.2004. However,
no evidence has been produced in this respect by the petitioner. Therefore, in the absence of any
evidence on record, the version of the petitioner cannot be accepted.
19. The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the respondent had not
issued the identity card and also exploited the petitioner and had not maintained any record of
attendance, working hours, over time work and record of contractors. However, to substantiate
these allegations no evidence has been led by the petitioner. Therefore, in the absence of any
evidence on record, it cannot be said that the respondent had exploited the petitioner as contended.
20. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the petitioner has been
repeatedly terminated and re-engaged in the job during the period of twelve calendar months from
1.11.2003 to 8.10.2004 and despite repeated breaks, he had worked for 250 days in preceding
twelve calendar months. However, to substantiate his contention, no documentary evidence has
been placed on record by the petitioner. The petitioner has not produced any evidence to suggest
that he has completed 240 days in twelve calendar months preceding his termination. Rather the
case of the respondent is that the petitioner had only worked for six days in the month of October,
2004 when he was deputed by the contractor to the industrial establishment of the respondent. In
2009 (120) FLR 1007 incase titled as Relip Nagarpalika Vs. Babuji Gabhaji Thakore and others,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“The burden of proof lies on the workman to show that he had worked continuously for
240 days for the preceding one year and it is for the workman to adduce evidence apart
from examining himself to prove the factum of being in employment of the employer.”
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In AIR 2006 S.C. 110 case titled as Surindernagar District Panchyat V/s Dayabhai Amar
Singh, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:—
“Incase workman claims to have worked for more than 10 years as daily wager. Apart
from oral evidence workman has not produced any evidence to prove fact that he has
worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that
regard was produced: no co-worker was examined; muster roll produced by employer has
not been contradicted. Workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in
employment for 240 days during preceding 12 months of date of termination of his
service. Workman not entitled for protection of Section 25-F before his service was
terminated.”
A bare perusal of the extract of the judgment re-produced, hereinabove, shows that the
burden to prove completion of 240 days service lies on the workman and this burden is discharged
on workman stepping in the witness box and adducing cogent evidence. However, in the instant
case, the petitioner has failed to prove on record that he had put in 240 days in twelve calendar
months preceding his termination. There is no iota of evidence which could go to show that the
petitioner had completed 240 working days in twelve calendar months preceding his termination.
Hence, the case of the petitioner does not fall under section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and as such no protection of section 25-F can be granted to the petitioner.
21. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the respondent had
terminated the services of the petitioner on 8.10.2004 without any notice and without issuing any
chargesheet and without conducting an enquiry. However, this contention of the learned counsel for
the petitioner cannot be accepted because as observed earlier, the petitioner has failed to prove on
record that he was the employee of the respondent company and had completed 240 days of
continuous service with the respondent.
22. Therefore, keeping in view the entire evidence on record, it cannot be said that the
termination of services of the petitioner w.e.f. 8.9.2004 by the respondent is illegal and unjustified.
Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner.
Issue no.2
23. Since, the petitioner has failed to prove issue no.1, this issue becomes redundant.
Issue no.3
24. Consequent upon the reference, made to this Court by the appropriate government, the
petitioner had filed the claim petition which cannot be said to be not maintainable. Thus, by holding
the claim petition to be maintainable, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondent.
Issue no.4.
25. During the course of arguments, this issue was not pressed by the learned counsel for
the respondent. Hence, the same is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief.
As a sequel to my findings on the aforesaid issues, the claim petition filed by the petitioner
deserves to be dismissed and accordingly, the same is dismissed with the result, this reference is
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decided against him and in favour of the respondent. Let a copy of this award be sent to the
appropriate government for publication in official gazette. File, after completion be consigned to
records.
Announced in the open court today on this 30th day of June, 2017.
(PARVEEN),
(SUSHIL KUKREJA),
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-,
Labour Court, Shimla.
__________
IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNALCUM- LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA, (H.P.)
Ref no.
:
No. 84 of 2005.
Re-registered after remand on. :
17.4.2017.
Decided after remand on
:
30.6.2017.
1.
Pawan Kumar, S/O Shri Baldev singh R/O Village Bidhinaseri, P.O. Badhouni Ghat,
Tehsil Kasauli, District Solan, H.P.
2.
Beer Singh S/o Shri Baldev Singh R/o Village Bidhinaseri, P.O Badhouni Ghat, Tehsil
Kasauli, District Solan, HP.
3.
Heera Pal S/o Shri Ram Saran R/o Village Bidhinaseri, P.O Badhouni Ghat, Tehsil
Kasauli, District Solan, HP.
4.
Raj Kumar S/O Shri Mullu Ram R/O Village Bidhinaseri, P.O. Badhouni Ghat, Tehsil
Kasauli, District Solan, H.P.
. .Petitioners.
VERSUS
The Executive Engineer, HPSEB Electrical Division, Parwanoo, District Solan, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioners : Shri Rakesh Manta, Advocate.
For respondent : Shri Ramakant Sharma, Advocate.
AWARD
The following reference has been received from appropriate government by this court for
adjudication:
“Whether the termination of the services of 1 Shri Pawan Kumar S/o Shri Baldev
Singh 2. Beer Singh s/o Shri Baldev Singh 3. Shri Heera Pal S/o Shri Ram Saran and
Shri Raj Kumar s/o Shri Mullu Ram workmen by the Executive Engineer, HPSEB,
Electrical Division Parwanoo, District Solan w.e.f. 20.8.1999, 20.8.1999, 20.12.1999 and
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20.2.2000 without complying with the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is
proper and justified? If not, what relief of service benefits and amount of
compensation, the above aggrieved workmen are entitled to?”
2.
Before, I proceed further, it is important to mention here that no claim on behalf of
petitioner Heera Pal has been filed on record. The other petitioners have filed the statement of
claim.
3.
Briefly, the case of the remaining petitioners is that the respondent is only licensee to
supply the Electrical Power to various agencies and had employed around 50-60,000 workmen,
hence, the subject matter falls under chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter
referred to as Act) and that the respondent is also the state of H.P. under article 12 of constitution of
India. It is further stated that in the month of April, 1990, the petitioners were engaged with the
HPSEB as beldars at Barotiwala and Baddi Electrical Station and their services have been
terminated on 1st July, 2001 illegally by way of a trickiness programme which was constituted by
the some bureaucrats on 30.6.2001 at 5.00 PM and the Junior Engineer told the petitioners that new
muster roll has not been sent by the Divisional Management. It is also stated that the petitioners are
the workmen under section 2(s) of the Act and that all the petitioners enjoyed the continuity of
service with more than 240 days in each and every calendar year and that the petitioners have
become unemployed since the date of their illegal termination from service which falls under
section 2-(oo) of the Act and the retrenchment of the petitioners from service is null, void and
inoperative as the respondents have failed to follow the provisions of section 25F and 25N of the
Act. Against this back-drop a prayer has been made that the award be passed in their favour along
with cost.
4.
By filing reply, the respondents contested the claim of the petitioners wherein
preliminary objections qua, enforceable cause of action, that no legal or vested right of the
petitioners having been infringed or violated by the respondent, claim is hit by the vice of delay and
latches and time barred. On merits, it is contended that the petitioners s/Shri Pawan Kumar, Beer
Singh and Raj Kumar were initially engaged w.e.f 26.1.1991, 1.4.1990 and 26.5.1990 respectively
in the first instance with certain interruptions/breaks and then they abandoned their jobs and
thereafter they again approached the respondents for their reinstatement after a long spell of time
upon which they were re-engaged and worked upto 20.8.1999, 20.8.1999 and 20.2.2000
respectively and then again they left the job at their own and did not turn up w.e.f. 21.8.1999,
21.8.1999 and 21.2.2000 respectively. It is further asserted that the petitioners had not completed
240 days continuous service in the preceding twelve calendar months and thus they have not
acquired the status of temporary workmen and that since the petitioners had abandoned the job at
their own, who were not retrenched by the respondents, hence they are not entitled to any relief.
5.
Rejoinder not filed. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed
by this Court on 16.3.2007.
1.
Whether the services of the petitioners were illegally terminated by the respondent
without complying with the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? If so, its
effect?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what relief, the petitioners are entitled to?. .OPP.
3.
Whether the petition in the present form is not maintainable as the petitioners have no
cause of action?
. .OPR.
4.
Whether the petition is barred by limitation?
. .OPR.
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5.
Relief.
6.
I have heard the Ld. Counsels for the parties and have gone through the record of the
case.
7.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for
determination, my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under:
Issue no.1
No.
Issue no.2
Becomes redundant.
Issue no.3
No.
Issue no.4
Yes.
Relief
Reference answered in favour of the respondent and against the petitioners
per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
Issues no:1 & 4.
8.
Being interlinked and correlated both these issues are taken up and discussed together.
Before, I proceed further, it is important to mention here that this case was decided by my learned
predecessor vide award dated 13.7.2009 but feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the award, the
petitioners S/Shri Pawan Kumar and Raj Kumar approached the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP
nos. 847 and 848 of 2011 which were decided by the Hon'ble High Court vide order dated
22.3.2017 by setting aside the award passed by this Court and the reference was remanded back to
this Court with the direction to decide the same afresh on or before 31.12.2017. The Hon'ble High
Court observed as under:
“Accordingly, in view of my findings returned above, these two writ petitions are
allowed and the award passed by learned Labour Court in Reference No. 84 of 2005
decided on 13.07.2009 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to learned Labour
Court to adjudicate upon the Reference afresh. It is jointly submitted by learned
counsel representing the parties that as the matter is being remanded back, in the
interest of justice, the claimants as well as respondent Board be given an opportunity
to produce additional evidence in case so required. Accordingly, it is directed that in
either the claimants/petitioners or the respondent Board make request before learned
Labour Court to give them an opportunity to lead additional evidence then one
opportunity be accordingly provided. Parties through their learned counsel are
directed to appear before learned Labour Court on 17.04.2017. Taking into
consideration the fact that the Reference is of the year 2005, this Court hopes and
expects that learned Labour Court shall adjudicate upon the Reference on or before
31.12.2017”.
9.
Before remand of the case, the petitioners have examined two PWs in order to prove
issue no.1. PW-1, Shri Pawan Kumar has stated that he was engaged as beldar by the respondents
in 1990 where he worked till 30.6.2001, He further stated that he was removed from service
without any notice or compensation and that he requested the JE in July, 2001 for his re-
engagement but nothing has been done. He also stated that he worked for 240 days in one year. No
duty card or pay slip has been issued to him and he is having no attendance record with him. In
cross-examination, he denied that he was engaged on 26.1.1999. He expressed ignorance that
whether he worked for 240 days and that whether he worked for 90 days in 1991, 94 days in 1992,
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45 days in 1998 and 42 days in 1999. He denied that he abandoned the job himself. He further
denied that he never worked from 1992 to 1998 and remained absent for 6 years.
10. PW-2 Shri Raj Kumar has stated that he was engaged as beldar in 1990 and served
with respondent till 30.6.2001. He further stated that he was removed from service without notice
or compensation and he had completed 240 days in each calendar year. He further stated that he
visited the office of JE and SDO for his reengagement twice and thrice but nothing has been done
and as such he prayed for his reinstatement. In cross-examination, he denied that he had not
completed 240 days in one year. He further denied that he had worked for 127 days in the year
1991, 180 days in 1992, 101 days in 1993, 46 days in 1994, 42 days in 1996, 46 days in 1998, 48
days in 1999 and 7 days in 2000. He also denied that he had not worked in 1994 and 1995. He
denied that he had abandoned the job.
11. On the other hand, the respondent had examined one Shri J.S Rana as RW-1, who
stated the petitioners were engaged as beldars on daily wages with the respondent and petitioner
Pawan Kumar was engaged on 26.1.1991 and he continued as such till 20.8.1999 whereas Shri Bir
Singh petitioner was engaged on 1.4.1990 and continued as such till 20.8.1999 and petitioner Shri
Raj Kumar was engaged on 26.5.1990 and continued as such till 20.2.2000 with fictional breaks.
He further stated that the petitioners have abandoned the job at their own and they were never
terminated by the respondents and none of the petitioners have completed 240 working days in any
calendar year preceding their termination. He also placed on record the mandays charts of the
petitioners Ex. RA, Ex. RB and Ex. RC. In cross-examination, he denied that he has intentionally
withheld the muster rolls record as the petitioners have put 240 working days in a calendar year
preceding their termination. He further denied that the abstract of total working days has not been
prepared as per the record.
12. After the remand of the case to this Court, the petitioners have examined one Shri
Ashok Kumar as PW-3, who deposed that the record summoned by this Court pertaining to
petitioners Pawan Kumar and Raj Kumar was lying at Electrical Division Parwanoo but vide letter
Ex. PW-3/B, they have refused to produce the record.
13. The respondent examined two RWs. RW-2 Shri Rahul Verma, deposed that the muster
rolls and seniority list could not be traced in the office of Senior Executive Engineer, Electrical
Division Parwanoo as the aforesaid office is the custodian of their record and in this respect a letter
was also addressed to their office on 25.5.2017 Ex. RW-2/A and vide endorsement Ex. RW-2/B,
they deputed one Shri Ashok Kumar clerk to trace out the record from Parwanoo office but again
the record could not be traced. In cross-examination, he denied that the record is available but the
same is not being produced intentionally. He expressed his ignorance that many junior persons to
the petitioners have been retained by the respondents.
14. RW-3 Shri Sanjeev Kumar, Senior Assistant in the Electrical Division Parwanoo has
deposed that the muster roll of the petitioners and seniority list is not available in their office. In
cross-examination, he admitted that the electrical sub division Barotiwala was under Parwanoo
electrical division at the time when the petitioners were working. He denied that the record has
been deliberately withheld by their office.
15. I have closely scrutinized the entire evidence, on record, and from the closer scrutiny
thereof, It has become clear that the petitioner Pawan Kumar was engaged w.e.f. 26.1.1991 and he
worked till 20.8.1999 and had completed 82 days in the year, 1991, 54 days in the year, 1992, 45
days in the year, 1998 and 42 days in the year, 1999 as per mandays chart Ex. R-A. It has also
become clear from the mandays chart Ex. RC that petitioner Raj Kumar was engaged on 26.5.1990
and worked as such till 20.2.2000 and completed 47 days in 1990, 107 days in 1991, 180 days in
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1992, 101 days in 1993, 46 days in 1996, 42 days in 1997, 46 days in 1998, 48 days in 1999 and 7
days in the year, 2000. No doubt, the case of the petitioners is that they have completed more than
240 days in each calendar year and in twelve months preceding their termination but they have
failed to lead any evidence in support of their case which could go to show that they have
completed 240 days in twelve calendar months preceding their termination. From the mandays
charts Ex. RA & Ex. RC, it has become clear that the petitioners have not completed 240 working
days in twelve calendar months preceding their termination. Though the petitioners had examined
PW-3 Shri Ashok Kumar, Clerk Electric Sub Division Barotiwala who stated that when he visited
Electric Division Parwanoo on 9.5.2017, they have refused to produce the record vide letter Ex.
PW-3/B. However, in his evidence before this Court, RW-2 deposed that thereafter, vide letter Ex.
RW-2/A, they were requested by Electrical Division Parwanoo to depute the official for the
purpose of tracing the record and vide endorsement Ex. RW-2/B, the aforesaid Ashok Kumar again
visited the Electrical Division Parwanoo but the record could not be traced. RW-3 categorically
deposed that the muster rolls and seniority list of the petitioners were not available in their office.
There is no material on record which could show that the petitioners have completed 240 working
days in any calendar year and in twelve calendar months preceding their termination. In 2009 (120)
FLR 1007 incase titled as Relip Nagarpalika Vs. Babuji Gabhaji Thakore and others, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held as under:
“The burden of proof lies on the workman to show that he had worked continuously for
240 days for the preceding one year and it is for the workman to adduce evidence apart
from examining himself to prove the factum of being in employment of the employer.”
16. In AIR 2006 S.C. 110 case titled as Surindernagar District Panchyat V/s Dayabhai
Amar Singh, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:—
“Incase workman claims to have worked for more than 10 years as daily wager. Apart
from oral evidence workman has not produced any evidence to prove fact that he has
worked for 240 days. No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that
regard was produced: no co-worker was examined; muster roll produced by employer has
not been contradicted. Workman has failed to discharge his burden that he was in
employment for 240 days during preceding 12 months of date of termination of his
service. Workman not entitled for protection of Section 25-F before his service was
terminated.”
A bare perusal of the extract of the judgments re-produced, hereinabove, shows that the
burden to prove completion of 240 days service lies on the workman and this burden is discharged
on workman stepping in the witness box and adducing cogent evidence. However, the petitioners
have failed to prove on record by leading any satisfactory evidence that they had put in 240 days in
any calendar year and in twelve calendar months preceding their termination. Hence, the case of the
petitioners does not fall under section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such no
protection of section 25-F can be granted to the petitioner.
17. The further case of the respondent is that the petitioners have voluntarily abandoned
their job. But the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that no notice was issued to the
petitioners by the respondent for their alleged abandonment of the job as such it cannot be said that
the petitioners have abandoned their job at their own. However, I am not inclined to accept this
contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners in view of the overwhelming evidence on
record which goes to show that the services of the petitioners had not been terminated by the
respondent rather they themselves had abandoned their job. In Nagar Parishad Bilaspur Vs. Bone
Ram reported in 2005 (1) Shim. LC 79, our own Hon'ble High Court has held that where the
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conduct of the workman is such that he had abandoned his job, his services would stand
automatically terminated in law. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:
“10……… In this background, the only inference which can be drawn from the
conduct of the workman is that he abandoned his job and his services stood
automatically terminated in law. Such an automatic termination of services, caused by
workman himself and not by the Employer, would not fall within the definition of
“retrenchment”.
18. Furthermore, It has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in (2013) 10 Supreme
Court Cases 253 titled as Vijay S. Sathaye Vs. Indian Airlines Limited and Ors. that absence
from duty in the beginning may be a mis-conduct but when absence is for a long period, it may
amount to voluntary abandonment of service. The relevant paras 12 to 14 are reproduced as under:
“12. It is a settled law that an employee cannot be termed as a slave, he has a right to
abandon the service any time voluntarily by submitting his resignation and alternatively, not
joining the duty and remaining absent for long. Absence from duty in the beginning may be
a misconduct but when absence is for a very long period, it may amount to voluntarily
abandonment of service and in that eventuality, the bonds of service come to an end
automatically without requiring any order to be passed by the employer.”
“13. In Jeewanlal (1929) Ltd., Calcutta v. Its Workmen, this Court held as under (AIR p.
1570 para 6):
“......there would be the class of cases where long unauthorized absence may
reasonably give rise to an inference that such service is intended to be abandoned by
the employee.”
(See also: Shahoodul Haque v. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies,
“14. For the purpose of termination, there has to be positive action on the part of the
employer while abandonment of service is a consequence of unilateral action on behalf of
the employee and the employer has no role in it. Such an act cannot be termed as
„retrenchment from service. (See: State of Haryana v. Om Prakash)”.
19. In the instant case also the services of the petitioner Pawan Kumar were terminated on
21.8.1999 and the services of petitioner Raj Kumar were terminated on 21.2.2000. Admittedly, the
demand notice was raised in the year, 2005. There is no material on record to suggest as to whet
steps were taken by the aforesaid petitioners after their alleged termination. In their deposition
before this Court, both the petitioners had stated that they requested the JE/SDO for their re-
engagement but nothing has been done. However, except for their bald statements, there is no
evidence on record to suggest that they had ever visited the office of the respondent for their
reinstatement. Neither any letter nor any representation has been placed on record by the petitioners
to prove that they have requested the respondent for their reinstatement. The petitioners have not
explained as to why they have not done so. Therefore, such conduct on the part of the petitioners
gives rise to inference that they intended to abandon their job voluntarily and their case would not
fall within the definition of retrenchment as such there is no question of violation of any provision
of the Act.
20. Moreover, it is the admitted case of the petitioners that they have raised the industrial
dispute after a lapse of about five years meaning thereby that they remained silent for about five
years. In (2013) 14 SCC 543, titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan State Agriculture
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Marketing Board, Sub Division Kota Vs. Mohan Lal, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex
Court that though the Limitation Act is not applicable to the reference made under the I.D Act but
delay in raising industrial Dispute is an important circumstance for exercise of judicial discretion in
determining relief that is to be granted. The relevant portion of aforesaid judgment is reproduced as
under:
“19. We are clearly of the view that though the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the
reference made under the ID Act but delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an
important circumstance which the Labour Court must keep in view at the time of exercise of
discretion irrespective of whether or not such objection has been raised by the other side.
The legal position laid down by this Court in Gitam Singh that before exercising itsn
judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the
mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on
which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant
of relief in an industrial dispute, must be invariably followed.”
21. In Assistant Executive Engineer, Karnataka Vs. Shivalinga reported in (2002) 10
SCC 167, the services of the employee were terminated on 25.5.1985 and he approached the
Labour Officer on 17.3.1995 and then the reference was made by the Government to the Labour
Court. There was a delay of more than nine years in approaching the Labour Officer. In para 6 of
the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the judgment of Ajayab Singh Vs.
Sirhind Co-operative Marketing –cum- processing Service Society Limited and Another reported
in (1999) 6 SCC 82 and held as under:
“Learned counsel for the appellant strongly relied on the reasoning of the Labour Court and
contended that the view of the High Court would not advance the cause of justice. Learned
counsel for the respondent relied upon two decisions of this Court in Ajaib Singh vs. Sirhind
Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. (1999) 6 SCC 82 and Sapan Kumar
Pandit vs. U.P. SEB (2001) 6 SCC 222 to contend that there is no period of limitation
prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act to raise the dispute and it is open to a party to
approach the Court even belatedly and the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal can
properly mould the relief by refusing or awarding part-payment of back wages. It is no
doubt true that in appropriate cases, as held by this Court in the aforesaid two decisions,
such steps could be taken by the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may
be, where there is no such dispute to relationship between the parties as employer and
employee. In cases where there is a serious dispute, or doubt in such relationship and
records of the employer become relevant, the long delay would come in the way of
maintenance of the same. In such circumstances to make them available to a Labour Court
or the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate the dispute appropriately will be impossible. A
situation of that nature would render the claim to have become stale. That is exactly the
situation arising in this case. In that view of the matter, we think the two decisions relied
upon by the learned counsel have no application to the case on hand.”
Thus, it has been held that in case there is a serious dispute or doubt in such relationship and
the records of the employer become relevant, the long delay would come in the way of
maintenance of the same. It was held that in such a situation the decision of Ajayab Singh’s
case is not applicable.
22. In Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank Vs. Neelam reported in (2005) 5
SCC 91, the employee was discontinued from service w.e.f. 30.5.1986 and he raised the demand
notice on 30.9.1993 and thereafter the reference was sent to the Labour court by the appropriate
government. The Labour Court passed an order answering the reference against the employee
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holding that the claim was belated. Thereafter, a writ petition was filed before the Hon'ble High
Court which was allowed and the employee was directed to be reinstated in service with continuity
of service but without back-wages relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of
Ajayab Singh (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and
restored the judgment of the Labour Court as a result the reference stood answered against the
workman. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered its earlier judgment in the case of Ajayab
Singh (Supra). The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
13. “In Ajaib Singh (supra), the management did not raise any plea of delay. The Court
observed that had such plea been raised, the workman would have been in a position to
show the circumstances which prevented him in approaching the Court at an earlier stage or
even to satisfy the Court that such a plea was not sustainable after the reference was made
by the Government. In that case, the Labour Court granted the relief, but the same was
denied to the workman only by the High Court. The Court referred to the purport and object
of enacting Industrial Disputes Act only with a view to find out as to whether the provisions
of the Article 137 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable or
not. Although, the Court cannot import a period of limitation when the statute does not
prescribe the same, as was observed in Ajaib Singh (supra), but it does not mean that
irrespective of facts and circumstances of each case, a stale claim must be entertained by the
appropriate Government while making a reference or in a case where such reference is
made the workman would be entitled to the relief at the hands of the Labour Court.”
14. “The decision of Ajaib Singh (supra) must be held to have been rendered in the fact
situation obtaining therein and no ratio of universal application can be culled out therefrom.
A decision, as is well-known, is an authority of what it decides and not what can logically
be deduced therefrom Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. Vs. Uttam Manohar Nakate, JT 2005 (1) SC
303], and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav & Anr. para 42.”
15” In Balbir Singh vs. Punjab Roadways and Another [(2001) 1 SCC 133], as regard Ajaib
Singh (supra), this Court observed :
5.” The learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that the Tribunal
committed error in denying relief to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The
learned counsel submitted that in industrial dispute delay should not be taken as a
ground for denying relief to the workman if the order/orders under challenge are found
to be unsustainable in law. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case
of Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd.
((1999) 6 SCC 82 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1054 : JT (1999) 3 SC 38).
6. “We have carefully considered the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the
petitioner. We have also perused the aforementioned decision. We do not find that any
general principle as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner has been laid
down in that decision. The decision was rendered on the facts and circumstances of the
case, particularly the fact that the plea of delay was not taken by the management in
the proceeding before the Tribunal. In the case on hand the plea of delay was raised
and was accepted by the Tribunal. Therefore, the decision cited is of little help in the
present case. Whether relief to the workman should be denied on the ground of delay
or it should be appropriately moulded is at the discretion of the Tribunal depending on
the facts and circumstances of the case. No doubt the discretion is to be exercised
judicially."
16. “Yet again in Assistant Executive Engineer, Karnataka vs. Shivalinga [(2002) 10 SCC
167], a Bench of this Court observed :
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“6. Learned counsel for the appellant strongly relied on the reasoning of the Labour
Court and contended that the view of the High Court would not advance the cause of
justice. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon two decisions of this Court in
Ajaib Singh vs. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. (1999)
6 SCC 82 and Sapan Kumar Pandit vs. U.P. SEB (2001) 6 SCC 222 to contend that
there is no period of limitation prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act to raise the
dispute and it is open to a party to approach the Court even belatedly and the Labour
Court or the Industrial Tribunal can properly mould the relief by refusing or awarding
part-payment of back wages. It is no doubt true that in appropriate cases, as held by
this Court in the aforesaid two decisions, such steps could be taken by the Labour
Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, where there is no such dispute to
relationship between the parties as employer and employee. In cases where there is a
serious dispute, or doubt in such relationship and records of the employer become
relevant, the long delay would come in the way of maintenance of the same. In such
circumstances to make them available to a Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to
adjudicate the dispute appropriately will be impossible. A situation of that nature
would render the claim to have become stale. That is exactly the situation arising in
this case. In that view of the matter, we think the two decisions relied upon by the
learned counsel have no application to the case on hand."
17. “In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. (supra), a Bench of this Court, where S. Saghir Ahmad was a
member [His Lordship was also a member in Ajaib Singh (supra) , opined :
“6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise
its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any
point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be
exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational
basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse
of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time
reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been
apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference
under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it
appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of
the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was
no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made."
(Emphasis supplied).
23. In (2009) 13 SCC 746, State of Karnataka Vs. Ravi Kumar the Hon'ble Supreme
Court dismissed the reference on the ground of delay and it was held that the person supervising
could not be expected to prove after 14 years that the employee did not work or that he did not
work for 240 days or he voluntarily left the job. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment
reads as under:
“9. It is not possible to expect the Asstt. Executive Engineer to prove after 14 years that the
daily wager did not work or that he did not work for 240 days in a year or that the daily
wager voluntarily left the work…………
24. In view of the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is clear that
though the Court cannot import the period of limitation and the reference cannot be dismissed
merely on the ground of delay, it does not mean that irrespective of the facts and circumstances of
8834
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the case, a stale claim must be entertained and the relief should be granted. In the case of delay, no
formula of universal application can be laid down and it would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material
evidence relevant to the adjudication being lost and rendered unavailable. The onus of showing that
the dispute was raised within a reasonable time is upon the workman and it is for the workman to
explain the delay by furnishing the acceptable explanation to the satisfaction of the Court that he
was not responsible for the delay caused.
25. In the present case, the services of the petitioner Pawan Kumar were terminated w.e.f.
20.8.1999 and the services of petitioner Raj Kumar were terminated w.e.f. 20.2.2000. Admittedly,
they raised demand notice in the year, 2005 i.e after a period of about five years. No explanation
has been furnished by the petitioners for not raising the demand notice within a reasonable period.
Even, in their statements before this Court, the petitioners have not uttered even a single word for
not raising the demand notice within a reasonable period. The burden of proof was upon the
petitioners to show that the dispute was raised within a reasonable time and to offer an explanation
to the satisfaction of this Court for the delay of about five years caused in seeking the reference but
the petitioners have failed to discharge their burden. Moreover, the delay in the present case is
certainly fatal because the material evidence relevant to the adjudication of the present reference is
not available with the respondent. The reference is therefore stale and is liable to be rejected on the
ground of delay in raising the dispute.
26. Thus, keeping in view the above cited rulings and the material fact that the petitioners
had raised the industrial dispute after lapse of about five years and remained silent during this
period without any plausible explanation as such no relief can be granted to them as the evidence
on record clearly shows that they themselves have abandoned their job. Hence, it cannot be said
that the termination of the services of the petitioners is illegal and unjustified. Consequently, these
issues are answered accordingly.
Issue no.2.
27. Since, the petitioners have failed to prove issue no.1, this issue becomes redundant.
Issue no.3.
28. In support of this issue, no evidence was led by the respondent which could go to show
that as to how the petition is not maintainable in the present form. Moreover, the petitioners have
filed the present petition pursuant to the reference sent by the appropriate government to this Court
for adjudication, hence, I find nothing wrong with this petition which is perfectly maintainable in
the present form. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioners and against the
respondent.
Relief.
As a sequel to my above discussion and findings on issue no.1 to 4, the claim of the
petitioners fails and is hereby dismissed with the result the reference is answered against the
petitioners and in favour of respondent. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate
government for publication in official gazette. File, after completion, be consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 30th Day of June, 2017.
(PRAVEEN),
(SUSHIL KUKREJA),
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-,
Labour Court, Shimla.
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IN THE COURT OF SUSHIL KUKREJA, PRESIDING JUDGE, HP INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, SHIMLA
Ref no.
:
88 of 2010.
Instituted on
:
15.7.2010.
Decided on
:
27.6.2017.
Asian
Electronics
Ltd.,
Kamgar
Sangh
Chambaghat
Solan,
HP
through
its
President/General Secretary C/o Shri J.C Bhardwaj, President HPAITUC, HQ Sasproon Solan, HP.
. .Petitioner.
VS.
M/s Asian Electronics Ltd., Plot no. 2nd Floor, Industrial Estate, Chambaghat, District
Solan, HP through its Factory Manager.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For petitioner : Shri J.C Bhardwaj, AR.
For respondent : Ex-parte.
AWARD
The reference for adjudication, sent by the appropriate government, is as under:
”Whether the demands raised vide demand notice dated 19.1.2009 (copy enclosed) by the
President/General Secretary, Asian Electronics ltd., Kamgar Sangh, Chambaghat Solan,
HP before the General Factory Manager M/s Asian Electronics Ltd., Plot no.1, 2nd
Floor, Industrial Estate Chambaghat Solan. HP are legal and justified? If yes, to what
wages and other service benefits and relief the workmen of the factory are entitled to as
per demand notice dated 19.1.2009 of the workmen union?”
2.
Briefly, the case of the petitioner union is that it is a registered union. The present
dispute is the result of unfair labour practice, non-co-operation and due to adamant attitude of the
respondent management as the management has failed to consider the legitimate demands of the
workmen and has indulged in unfair labour practice. The management has been taking the work of
skilled workmen from the workers but making the payments of wages as applicable to the unskilled
workmen and as such the workmen union has no other alternative but to raise the demand notice
under section 2-K of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as Act) and the
respondent management had never shown any intention for accepting the legitimate demands of the
union but on the other hand declared closure of the factory during the pendency of the conciliation
proceedings in order to teach the lesson to the workers for raising demand notice dated 19.1.2009
and that too without paying sufficient retrenchment compensation as per section 25-F of the Act. It
is further stated that the respondent has failed to seek the permission for terminating the services of
the workmen during the pendency of demand notice which is totally illegal. The workmen had
worked with the respondent for considerable period at lowest wages and even the respondent
management had not implemented the wage structure as the workmen were being paid less than the
minimum wages in violation of the notification dated 28.5.2008 regarding minimum wages which
was made applicable retrospectively w.e.f. 1.1.2008. The following demands have been raised vide
demand charter dated 19.1.2009:
1.
Categorization of workmen to be declared.
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2.
Increase wages after categorization of workmen.
3.
Introduction of promotion policy and fixation of wage pattern as per designation of
workmen.
4.
House Rent Allowance.
5.
Dearness Allowance.
6.
Demand for implementation of Statutory Rules and Misc. Service Benefits.
Against this back-drop a prayer has been made that the respondent be directed to reinstate
all those workmen who were terminated/retrenched during the pendency of demand notice dated
19.1.2009 with continuity in service, seniority including full back-wages and also award all the
justified demands explained above in favour of the union.
3.
By filing reply, the respondent contested the claim of the petitioner union wherein
preliminary objections have been taken qua maintainability, that the respondent company suffered
huge losses and under compelling circumstances had to close down the factory and that there is no
unfair labour practice adopted by the respondent management as the company has been complying
with all the statutory provisions, the workers have been categorized and are being paid category
wise wages since the date of their appointments and even the respondent had paid full and final
compensation on account of closure of the factory which was received by all the workers through
cheque without any objection. The demand notice is an afterthought and just to extract money out
of litigation. On merits, it has been asserted that the respondent had to close the factory because of
huge losses incurred and intimation to which effect was made to the Government of Himachal
Pradesh, the Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer and the workers working with the respondent. It is
denied that the workmen were not paid sufficient compensation under section 25-F of the Act. It is
asserted that all the workers have been categorized according to their qualification and as per the
requirement of recruitment policy of the management and all the workers were being paid wages as
per the prevailing law. The respondent prayed for the dismissal of the claim petition.
4.
Rejoinder not filed. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed
on 11.11.2011.
1.
Whether the demands raised vide demand notice dated 19.1.2009 by the
President/General Secretary Asian Electronics Ltd., Kamgar Sangh Chambaghat Solan
before the management of respondent is legal and justified?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner union
entitled to?
. .
3.
Relief.
5.
I have heard the AR for the petitioner and have also gone through the record of thecase
carefully.
6.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing issues for determination my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as under:
Issue no.1
Decided accordingly.
Issue no.2
Entitled to compensation as per the provisions of section 25-FFF of the Act.
Relief.
Reference answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent
per operative part of award.
Reasons for findings.
8837
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Issues no.1.
7.
Before, I proceed further, it is important to mention here that on 2.7.2014, the
petitioner closed the evidence and thereafter the case was being listed for the evidence of
respondent but on 15.9.2015, the respondent had failed to appear before this Court and to lead
evidence, hence, vide order dated 15.9.2015 the respondent was proceeded against ex-parte.
8.
To prove issue no.1, the petitioner union examined one Shri Surender as PW-1 who
has stated that he was the Secretary of the workers union and Ex. PA is the registration certificate
of the union. Vide settlement Ex. PB, the respondent company recognized the petitioner union and
after the expiry of settlement, the workers union had raised demand charter Ex. PC and vide Ex. PD
the conciliation proceedings were going on with Labour Officer Solan but instead of considering
the demands of the union, the respondent company retrenched all the workers without paying any
compensation under section 25-F of the Act. Ex. PE is the list the workers supplied by the
management to the union according to which all the workers were skilled workers but at the time of
retrenchment, they have been paid the wages of unskilled workers. The minimum wages of
operator is as per Ex. PF. The workers have been terminated without any permission during the
pendency of demand charter dated 19.1.2009. All the demands raised vide demand charter dated
19.1.2009 are legal. In cross-examination, he denied that all the workers have been paid full and
final compensation as per entitlement.
9.
The AR for the petitioner contended that the workers union had raised the demand
charter Ex. PC and the conciliation proceedings were going on with the Labour Officer Solan, but
instead of considering the demands of the union, the respondent had retrenched all the workers
without paying any compensation under section 25-F of the Act and without seeking any
permission during the pendency of the demand charter dated 19.1.2009. However, in the reply, the
stand of the respondent is that the management had always addressed to the legitimate demands of
the workers from time to time and since the respondent had suffered huge losses, it has to close
down its factory under compelling circumstances and the respondent had paid all the dues to which
the workers were entitled on closure of the factory. It has been admitted by the petitioner union in
the claim petition that the respondent had closed its unit. Though, the case of the respondent is that
they have paid all the dues to the workers on closure for which they were entitled, however, there is
no evidence on record to suggest that all the workers have been paid legal dues for which they were
entitled on closure. As per the list Ex. PE, 81 workers were employed by the company at its unit at
Chambaghat Solan. Section 25-FFF of the Act deals with the compensation to workmen in case of
closing down of the undertaking for any reason whatsoever which indicates that where an
undertaking is closed down, for any reason whatsoever, every workman who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year in that undertaking immediately before such closure
shall, subject to the provisions of sub section (2) be entitled to notice and compensation in
accordance with the provisions of section 25-F, as if the workman had been retrenched. At this
stage, it would be relevant to reproduce section 25-FFF which reads as under:
“25FFF. Compensation to workmen in case of closing down of undertakings.—
(1) Where an undertaking is closed down for any reason whatsoever, every workman
who has been in continuous service for not less than one year in that undertaking
immediately before such closure shall, subject to the provisions of sub- section
(2), be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of
section 25F, as if the workman had been retrenched:
Provided that where the undertaking is closed down on account of unavoidable
circumstances beyond the control of the employer, the compensation to be paid to
the workman under clause (b) of section 25F shall not exceed his average pay for
three months.
8838
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Therefore, the perusal of the aforesaid section would show that when an undertaking is
closed down, the workman is entitled to compensation in terms of section 25-FFF of the Act. When
it is an admitted fact that the unit had been closed, the question of accepting of the demands raised
in the demand charter Ex. PC does not arise at all. Similarly, the prayer of the petitioner union for
reinstatement of the workers whose services have allegedly been terminated during the pendency of
the demand notice dated 19.1.2009, with continuity, seniority and full back wages cannot be
accepted, once it has been admitted that the unit has been closed. The workers are only entitled for
the compensation to be paid in terms of section 25-FFF of the Act. In Hondaram Ramchandra
Vs. Yashwant Mahadev Kadam, (2007) 14 SCC 277, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court that if the undertaking had been closed down, the workmen are entitled to compensation only
in terms of section 25-FFF of the Act and relief of back wages cannot be granted. The relevant
portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:
“13. From the records, it appears that the sales office of the appellant had been closed
down. We have noticed heretobefore that there exists a dispute as to whether the said
closure, for all intent and purport, was effected in 1983 or 1991. The High Court
evidently committed an error in not taking into consideration the factum of closure of
the business from the premises of the appellant, for the purpose of grant of relief. If
the undertaking of the appellant had been closed down, the workmen were entitled to
compensation only in terms of Section 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and
not the relief of reinstatement with back wages”.
From the perusal of the judgment hereinabove, it has become clear that in case of the
closure of the undertaking, the workers are only entitled for compensation in terms of section
25-FFF of the Act. Therefore, in the present case also, the workers who were on the rolls of the
respondent company at its unit at Chambaghat District Solan at the time of closure of the unit and
who had been in continuous service for not less than one year in that unit immediately before such
closure shall be entitled to compensation in terms of section 25-FFF of the Act. Both these issues
are decided accordingly.
Relief.
As a sequel to my findings on the aforesaid issues, the claim of the petitioner succeeds and
is hereby partly allowed with the result that the respondent is directed to pay compensation in terms
of section 25-FFF of the Act to the workers of the petitioner union who were on the rolls of the
respondent company at its unit at Chambaghat, District Solan at the time of closure of the unit and
who had been in continuous service for not less than one year in that unit immediately before such
closure within a period of three months from today failing which it shall be open for the petitioner
union to take appropriate proceedings to recover the amount. Consequently, the reference stands
answered in favour of the petitioner union and against the respondent. Let a copy of this award be
sent to the appropriate government for publication in official gazette. File, after completion be
consigned to records.
Announced in the open Court today on this 27th Day of June, 2017.
(PARVEEN),
(SUSHIL KUKREJA),
Presiding Judge,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-,
Labour Court, Shimla.
8839
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ELEMENTARY EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla-2, the 11th October, 2017
No. EDN-C-B(15)-27/2011.—In supersession of this department's notification of even No.
dated 21st July, 2017 and in exercise of the powers vested in him under Section 34 of the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to identify
following posts for 4% reservation to disabled persons in the Elementary Education Department as
under :—
Sl.
No.
Name of the
post
Class
Physical Requirement
Classification
1. TGT (Arts)
III
S, ST, RW, C, H.
VI (B-LV)
OH (OA, OL, OAL, BL) HI
(Deaf not more than 60 %).
2. TGT (NM)
III
S, ST, RW, SE, MF, W, C, H
OH (OA, OL, OAL, BL) HI
(Deaf not more than 60 %).
3. TGT (Med.)
III
S, ST, RW, SE, MF, W, C, H
OH (OA, OL, OAL, BL) HI
(Deaf not more than 60 %).
4. Shastri
III
S, ST, RW, SE, MF, W, C, H
VI (B-LV)
OH (OA, OL, OAL, BL) HI
(Deaf not more than 60 %).
5. LT
III
S, ST, R, W, H, W, C
VI (LV)
OH (OA, OL, OAL, BL) HI
(Deaf not more than 60 %).
6. DM
III
S, ST, R, W, SE, MF, W, C, H
OH (OA, OL, OAL, BL) HI
(Deaf not more than 60 %).
7. Home
Science
III
S, ST, R, W, SE, MF, W, C
OH (OA, OL, OAL, BL) VI
(LV) HI (Deaf not more than
60 %).
8. Yoga
Teacher
III
S, BN, ST, RW, SE, MF, W,
C, H
VI (LV) HI (Deaf not more
than 60 %).
9. PET
III
S, ST, RW, SE, MF, W, C, H
VI (LV) HI (Deaf not more
than 60 %).
10. Music
Teacher
III
S, ST, MF, C, H
OH (OL, BL) VI (B, LV)
11. JBT
III
S, ST, RW, C, H
VI (B, LV) OH (OA, OL,
OAL, BL) HI (Deaf not more
than 60 %).
By order,
SANJAY GUPTA, IAS,
Principal Secretary (Edu.).
8840
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(B)-6/82-GAC-II, fnukad 27&4&2017 }kjk lsok foLrkj dh vof/k fnukad 30&4&2018 dks iw.kZ gksus ij]
v/;{k egksn;] fgekpy izns'k fo/kku lHkk lg"kZ vksn'k nsrs gSa fd Jh lqUnj flag oekZ] lfpo] fgekpy
izns'k fo/kku lHkk fnukad 30&4&2018 ¼vijkའdks ,Q0 vkj0 56 ds micU/kksa ds vUrxZr lsokfuo`Ùk gksaxsA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lfpo]
fgekpy izns'k fo/kku lHkkA
&&&&&&&&
In the Court of Shri Ajit Bhardwaj, HPAS., Sub Divisional Magistrate Shimla (Urban),
District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh
Sh. Vinod Kumar s/o Sh. Hari Nand, r/o VPO Ghanahatti, Tehsil Shimla (Rural), District
Shimla, H.P.
. . Applicant.
Versus
General Public
.. Respondent.
Application under section 13(3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.
Whereas Sh. Vinod Kumar s/o Sh. Hari Nand, r/o VPO Ghanahatti, Tehsil Shimla (Rural),
District Shimla, H.P has preferred an application to the undersigned for registration of date of birth
of his daughter namely NISHTHA (DOB 24-11-2014) at above address in the record of Municipal
Corporation, Shimla.
Therefore, this proclamation, the General Public is hereby informed that any person having
any objection for entry as to date of birth mentioned above, may submit his objection in writing in
this court on or before 07-01-2018 failing which no objection will be entertained after expiry of
date and will be decided accordingly.
Given under my hand and seal of the Court on this 8th day of December, 2017.
Seal.
AJIT BHARDWAJ, HPAS,
Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Shimla (Urban), District Shimla, H.P.
8841
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 14 fnlEcj] 2017@23 ekxZ'kh"kZ] 1939
c vnkyr lgk;d lekgrkZ ¼f}rh; Js.kh½] mi&rglhy /kkeh] ftyk f'keyk]
fgekpy izns'k
nj[okLr la[;k % 01@2017
rkjh[k et#vk % 01@12@2017
Jh Hkqi jke iq= Lo0 Jh Hkxr jke 'kekZ] fuoklh ekStk egkiq.kk] Mkd?kj /kkeh] ftyk f'keyk]
fgekpy izns'kA
cuke
¼1½ vke turk]
¼2½ iz/kku xzke iapk;r gyksx /kkehA
fo"k;-&&izkFkhZ ds cPps dk uke o tUe&frfFk xzke iapk;r gyksx /kkeh ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ
djok, tkus ckjs dh v/khu /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oe~ e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr
tUe iathdj.k djokus ckjsA
gj [kkl o vke turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd izkFkhZ Jh Hkqi jke us
v/kksgLrk{kjh ds U;k;ky; esa ,d vkosnu&i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mlus vius cPps dk uke o tUe frfFk
xzke iapk;r gyksx /kkeh ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ ugha djok;k gSA vc izkFkhZ vius cPps dk uke
o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r gyksx /kkeh ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djokuk pkgrk gS] tks fd bl
izdkj ls gS %&
Øe la[;k
uke
lacU/k
tUe frfFk
1-
nus'k 'kekZ
iq=
21&12&1994
vr% xzke iapk;r gyksx mi&rglhy /kkeh dh turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS
fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks mijksDr tUe iathdj.k ckjs dksbZ vkifÙk gks rks rkjh[k 31&12&2017 dks ;k
blls iwoZ vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuh vkifÙk izLrqr djs vU;Fkk vkosnu&i= ij
tUe iathdj.k vkns'k ikfjr djds lfpo xzke iapk;r gyksx /kkeh dks vkxkeh dk;kZUo;u gsrq Hkst fn;k
tk;sxkA
vkt fnukad 08&12&2017 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr vnkyr ls tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ ¼f}rh; Js.kh½]
mi&rglhy /kkeh] ftyk f'keyk ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&
In the Court of Shri Ajit Bhardwaj (H.P.A.S), Sub Divisional Magistrate, Shimla (Urban),
District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh
Smt. Kalawatu w/o Shri Suresh Kumar, r/o Village Kanswala, P.O. Parnoo, Tehsil Arki,
District Solan, H.P.
. . Applicant.
Versus
General Public
.. Respondent.
8842
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 14 fnlEcj] 2017@23 ekxZ'kh"kZ] 1939
Application under section 13(3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.
Whereas Smt. Kalawatu w/o Shri Suresh Kumar, r/o Village Kanswala, P.O. Parnoo, Tehsil
Arki, District Solan, H.P. has preferred an application to the undersigned for registration of date of
birth of her son namely DISHANT (DOB 10-12-2005) at above address in the record of Municipal
Corporation Shimla.
Therefore, this proclamation, the general public is hereby informed that any person having
any objection for entry as to date of birth mentioned above, may submit his objection in writing in
this court on or before 04-01-2018 failing which no objection will be entertained after expiry of
date and will be decided accordingly.
Given under my hand and seal of the Court on this 05th day of December, 2017.
Seal.
AJIT BHARDWAJ,
Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Shimla (Urban), District Shimla.
fu;U=d] eqnz.k rFkk ys[ku lkexzh] fgekpy izns'k] f'keyk&5 }kjk eqfnzr rFkk izdkf'kr
bysDVªkWfud gLrk{kfjr jkti=] oSclkbV http://rajpatrahimachal.nic.in ij miyC/k gS ,oe~ vkWuykbu lR;kfir fd;k tk ldrk gS