jkti=] fgekpy izns'k

fgekpy izns'k jkT; 'kklu }kjk izdkf'kr

ohjokj] 18 tuojh] 2018@28 ikS"k] 1939

fgekpy izns'k ljdkj

LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Dated: the 11th September, 2017

No: Shram (A) 6-2/2014 (Awards) D/Shala.—In exercise of the powers vested under

section 17(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased to

order the publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer, Labour

217&jkti=@2017&18&01&2018

¼9773½

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Court D/Shala on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment Government of

Himachal Pradesh:—

Sr.

No.

Ref. No.

Petitioner

Respondent

Date of Award/

Order

1.

563/16

Bhag Singh

E.E. HPPWD, Dharampur &

others

20-07-2017

2.

567/16

Kali Dass

E.E. HPPWD, Dharampur &

others

20-07-2017

3.

568/16

Bimla Devi

E.E. HPPWD, Dharampur &

others

20-07-2017

4.

622/16

Amar Chand

E.E. HPPWD, Dharampur &

others

20-07-2017

5.

608/16

Panjku Ram

En-in-Chief & others

20-07-2017

6.

610/16

Malka Devi

En-in-Chief & others

20-07-2017

7.

611/16

Veena Devi

En-in-Chief & others

20-07-2017

8.

612/16

Rajinder Kumar

En-in-Chief & others

20-07-2017

9.

613/16

Jamuna Devi

En-in-Chief & others

20-07-2017

10.

605/16

Badamu Devi

En-in-Chief & others

20-07-2017

11.

668/16

Amriti Devi

En-in-Chief & others

20-07-2017

12

211/16

Leela Devi

E.E., HPPWD, Dharampur

27-07-2017

13.

602/15

Satyawar

E.E., HPPWD, Killar

28-07-2017

14.

08/16

Bargat Raj

E.E., HPPWD, Killar

28-07-2017

15.

13/16

Ajeet Kumar

E.E., HPPWD, Killar

28-07-2017

16.

15/16

Sher Singh

E.E., HPPWD, Killar

28-07-2017

17.

67/16

Jagdish Kumar

E.E., HPPWD, Killar

28-07-2017

18.

68/16

Prem Raj

E.E., HPPWD, Killar

28-07-2017

19.

510/15

Bhag Singh

E.E., HPPWD, Killar

28-07-2017

20.

493/15

Dev Raj

E.E., HPPWD, Killar

28-07-2017

21.

495/15

Chaman Singh

E.E., HPPWD, Killar

28-07-2017

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22.

497/15

Devki

E.E., HPPWD, Killar

28-07-2017

23.

488/15

Shakuntla

E.E., HPPWD, Killar

28-07-2017

24.

512/15

Laxmi Devi

E.E., HPPWD, Killar

28-07-2017

25.

491/15

Rajinder Singh

E.E., HPPWD, Killar

28-07-2017

26.

500/15

Dev Raj

E.E., HPPWD, Killar

28-07-2017

27.

128/16

Guddi

E.E., I&PH/HPPWD, Killar

31-07-2017

By order,

Sd/-

R. D. DHIMAN, IAS,

Pr. Secretary ( Lab. & Emp.).

_______________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 563/2016

Date of Institution : 24.08.2016

Date of Decision : 20.07.2017

Shri Bhag Singh s/o Shri Saktiya Ram, r/o Village & P.O. Dhawali, Tehsil

Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Engineer-in-Chief, HPPWD, US Club, Shimla

2.

The Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

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“Whether alleged termination of services of Sh. Bhag Singh S/o Sh. Saktiya Ram Village &

P.O. Dhawali, Tehsil, Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. during 11/2001. by (1) the Engineer-

in-Chief HPPWD, Nirman Bhawan, Shimla, (2) the Executive Engineer, HPPWD,-

Division Dharampur, Distt. Mandi, H.P. who had worked as beldar on daily wages basis

during 9/1998 to 11/2001, only for 1004 days, and has raised his industrial dispute

vide demand notice dated 2.3.2015 after 14 years, allegedly without complying with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in

view of working period as above and delay of more than 16 years in raising the industrial

dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation

the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employers & management?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition revealed that petitioner had been

engaged by respondent on daily waged basis on muster roll as beldar w.e.f. September, 1998

where he continued to work upto November, 2005 who had completed 240 days. Averments

made in the claim petition further revealed that services of the petitioner had been terminated by

the respondent vide verbal order w.e.f. November, 2005 without notice pay as well as

retrenchment compensation under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

(hereinafter referred to as "the Act‟ for brevity). It is alleged that respondent had violated the

provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. Not only this, the principle of "Last come First go‟ was not

followed by the respondent as some juniors namely S/Sh. Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Mamta Devi

(6.4.2000), Roshani Devi (4.7.1999) and Inder Singh (1.1.2000) were retained in service whereas

the service of petitioner had been terminated. The grievance of petitioner further remains that

after termination of services of petitioner so many new hands had been engaged by the

respondent/department, whose names were Pradeep Kumar on 02.05.2008, Vipin Kumar on

1.7.2008, Lekh Raj on 25.8.2008 and Ruma Devi on 25.5.2014 but petitioner had not been

given any opportunity of reemployment by the respondent prior to appointing above named

workers establishing violation of provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Feeling aggrieved the

action of respondent in terminating the services of petitioner an industrial dispute was raised vide

demand notice dated 4.3.2015 copy of the same was forwarded to Labour Officer, Mandi for

further necessary action. It is alleged that Labour Officer, Mandi could not resolve the dispute

who submitted failure report under Section 12(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the matter was

referred to appropriate government i.e. Labour Commissioner, Shimla who declined to refer the

case of petitioner for adjudication in pursuance to which the petitioner had approached Hon‟ble

High Court of H.P. by filing CWP no.8315/2012 which had been decided on 20.12.2012 directing

the Labour Commissioner Shimla to make reference to the Labour Court. The dispute stated to

have been not filed on account of delay and moreover Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has

condoned the delay of eight years in case of Rajneet Singh vs. State of H.P. & Ors. reported in

2015 (145) FLR 722. The petitioner alleges that respondent in terminating the services of

petitioner w.e.f. 2005 without compliance with mandatory provision of Industrial Disputes Act

was illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, prayer has been made to set aside the illegal

termination order of petitioner directing the respondent to reinstate the petitioner with full back

wages, seniority and continuity in service with all consequential benefits.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, delay and laches. On merits admitted that petitioner was engaged

as daily wager on 9/1998 who intermittently worked upto 11/2001. It is alleged that petitioner

has abandoned the job of his own who had not completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is

alleged that petitioner had left the job of his own sweet will and respondent/department had not

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violated any provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The plea of respondent further remained that

petitioner had left the job at his own sweet will. Moreover there exist inordinate delay in raising

industrial dispute. It is alleged that petitioner had left the job of his own sweet will who was never

terminated by the respondent. It is alleges that question of termination of the services of petitioner

by the respondent does not arise. Delay in filing the claim petition is stated to be fatal to the case

of petitioner and the petitioner raised his claim when other workers raised demand notice and that

petitioner was gainfully employed as an agriculturist after leaving the job. Accordingly,

petition was sought to be dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6.

To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A, Ex. PW1/B copy of RTI information dated

13.11.2013, Ex. PW1/C copy of mandays chart of Sh. Shashi Kant, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/D, copy of letter dated 18.3.2015 Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Kashyap,

the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur as RW1 tendered/proved his affidavit

Ex. RW1/A, mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative/counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of

this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.01.2017 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the claimant/petitioner by the respondents during

11/2001 and raised his industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 4.3.2015 is/was

illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

. .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged.

If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.50,000/- per

operative part of award.

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REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. It is pertinent to mention here that claim petition before this Court was filed by

petitioner in which he has prayed for setting aside the retrenchment order w.e.f. November, 2001

qua his illegal termination and sought direction to the effect that services of petitioner be treated as

continuous service till date with full back wages. It has further been prayed that services of

petitioner be regularized after completion of eight years of service on the basis of policy

framed by the State Govt. with all consequential benefits. Not only this, petitioner also prayed

that his case may also be considered for engagement in service as per policy framed by the State

Govt. and to another relief petitioner is entitled.

12. A bare glance at claim petition would reveal that petitioner was appointed as daily

wage basis with the respondent in the month of September, 1998 on muster roll basis as

beldar who continued to work till November, 2001 when his services were terminated in

violation of Section 25-F of the Act as it is unclear from evidence if compensation under Section

25-F was factually received by petitioner. While retrenching the services of petitioner principle of

'Last come First go' was not followed as Prabhu Ram (1.8.1998), Shasi Pal (6.4.1999),

Roshani Devi (4.7.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Inder Singh (1.1.2000) and Hans Raj

(6.4.2000) were retained in service and thus the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not

followed by the respondent. Mandays chart Ex. RW1/B on record reveals that petitioner had

worked for 115 days in the year 1998, 263 days in 1999, 303 days in 2000 and 323 days in

2001. Even if we look at the mandays chart, this would show that immediately preceding his

termination in 2001, petitioner has factually worked for 303 days in 2000 and 323 days in 2001

aggregating to 626 days prior to termination. A bare glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B

would reveal that petitioner had worked for more than 240 days ever since September, 1998 till

November, 2001 immediately prior to his retrenchment as stated above. A bare glance at the

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal petitioner had worked for more than 240 days ever

since September, 1998 till November, 2001 immediately prior to his retrenchment as stated

above. Be it noticed that Pardeep Kumar, Lekh Raj & Satya Devi had been appointed in 2007,

2004 and 2011 respectively. It is pertinent to mention to state here that when persons

mentioned in para no. 2 of the affidavit Ex. PW1/A were engaged petitioner was factually not

given offer for reemployment which manifestly violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the

Act. From evidence, it is evidently clear that after termination of petitioner he was available

for job who was not appointed however some persons fresh were allowed to join in service.

As such, action of respondent in doing so clearly violates Section 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty, respondent had issued any notice or

letter. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner

abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental

inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after November, 2001. No reason whatsoever has

been assigned for such an action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any

departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This

prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any

9779

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other fact in issue. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that

large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers

have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle

of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner

despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/D is the seniority list of

daily wages beldar in respect of Dharampur Division who had completed eight years of as on

31.3.2008 and some of them were junior to the petitioner and had joined after termination of the

services of petitioner. Some of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/D the seniority list details of

workers of Division HPPWD Dharampur were certainly junior to petitioner figured at serial nos.

646 and 652 respectively who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 240

days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month.

Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called

upon to join for service at any time after September, 1999 even at the time when junior persons

were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G

of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was

senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was terminated and even thereafter

respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also

violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel/AR for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that petitioner be

treated in continuous service for eight years and for said reason the left period after November,

2001 be treated as regular period. It is not understood as to how petitioner could claim such

benefit as petitioner never worked with the respondent/department after his termination as well as

there is no adequate evidence on record suggesting that petitioner had represented the

respondent/department after his termination, although petitioner had issued demand notice i.e.

4.3.2015 after about fourteen years and thus judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in

2012 (132) FLR 528 (SC) titled as H.S. Rajashekara and State Bank of Mysore and

another does not come to the rescue of the petitioner. Therefore, the entire period cannot be

treated in service. As stated above that petitioner remained out of job after his termination but

there is nothing authenticated in evidence suggesting that he remained without earning moreso

when he himself admitted in cross-examination that he had cultivable land and also earned by

working as labourer. It is maintained if, he did not get any government job however petitioner

has revealed in cross-examination that he had not been given notice as well as retrenchment

compensation as required to be paid. In view of foregoing discussions, respondent is held to have

violated the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

16. Ld. Authorized Representative/counsel for petitioner has placed reliance of

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 titled as Rashtriya

Colliery Mazdoor Sangh and Employers in Relation to Management of Kenduahih

Colliery of M/S BCCL and Ors., in which Hon'ble Apex Court has awarded compensation of

Rs.4 lakh to each workman. Similarly, reliance has placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court

of Punjab & Haryana reported in 2014 LLR 967 titled as Deshsewak Foundry vs. Presiding

Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur & Ors., in which compensation of Rs.5 lakh was

awarded. In another judgment of Hon‟ble High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench reported in 2017

(152) FLR 206, titled as Youth Co-ordinator, Nehru Yuva Kendra and Labour Court

No.2, Jaipur and Anr. in which compensation of Rs.2 lakh was granted to the workman

who had merely worked for two years. Thus, above said judgments disclosing awarding larger

amount of compensation which the claimant/petitioner has prayed for. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

has relied upon judgment of Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and

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another vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), in which various criteria

to be looked by Labour Court in awarding compensation. It has been held that before

exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors

including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the

ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute

before grant of relief in an industrial dispute and in this judgment Hon'ble Apex Court had

awarded compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- only in lieu of reinstatement and consequential

benefits to a retrenched employee who had issued demand notice after about six years.

17. Since no straight-jacket formula can be applied for determining compensation as it is

to be awarded on the basis of facts of case. In 2014 LLR 967 Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &

Haryana had awarded compensation of Rs.5 lac to claimant petitioner who was litigating for

past 30 years. Similarly, in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 Hon'ble Apex Court awarded compensation

to each worker of Rs.4 lacs. It was observed that many of the workmen were at age of retirement

and that nearly 27 years had elapsed since the time of retrenchment. Moreover, the workers

who were awarded compensation of Rs.4 lac belonged to skilled category of Tyndals. As such,

judgment relied upon by ld. counsel/Authorized Representative for petitioner does not apply to

present case rather applying the criteria laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Geetam Singh’s

case 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) has to be followed and applied.

18. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on November, 2001 and the industrial

dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel,

ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903

Hon’ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising

dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other

judgments even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another

vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned

besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the

industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs.

Sirhind Co- operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6

SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the

proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. has representing State/respondents has vehemently contended that

claimant/petitioner is not entitled for any relief either by way of reinstatement or compensation

in view of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as

Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. Relying upon the aforesaid

judgment, it has been contended that while making reference to the Labour Court by the

Government, the competent authority has to see that there is existence of an industrial dispute

or apprehension of an industrial dispute and if there is no live dispute or if dispute was no

longer existing reference could not be made at belated stage. On the other hand, ld. Authorized

Representative for the petitioner has contended that the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court referred

to above does not come to the rescue to the respondents moreso when government itself made

reference and has not challenged the correctness of reference before the Hon'ble High Court. I

have carefully gone through the judgment referred to above and of the view that the contention

of the ld. Dy. D.A. is fallacious. It would be relevant to refer to para 7 of the judgment in which

the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that the issue which fell for determination is

whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. It was further observed that order of

reference cannot be made mechanically without forming an opinion as referred to in the other

9781

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paragraphs of the judgment and order of making reference is open to judicial review if it is shown

that the appropriate government had no material before it or it has not applied its mind to the

material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have

taken into consideration. In paragraph 23 Sub para (8) of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

which it has been specially observed that the High Court can exercise its powers under Article

226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It

was submitted before the Hon'ble Apex Court that once a reference has been made under Section

10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in

writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court which was found be not

correct proposition but certainly correctness of reference under Section 10 of Industrial

Disputes Act is not in challenge before this Court. Reliance has been made on another

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2000) 1 SCC 371, National Engg. Industries

Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan in judgment of 2016 (supra). In Sapan Kumar Pandit’s (2000),

case it was held that the period of making of reference is co- extensive with the existence of

dispute, meaning thereby that the dispute should be alive on the day when the decision was taken

to make a reference or to refuse to make reference. Although, Hon'ble Apex Court has made

elaborated discussions qua consideration before making reference which is not issue before this

Court. The judgment referred in 2016 primarily reveals guidelines how reference under Section

10 of Industrial Disputes Act is to be made by competent authority under the Industrial Disputes

Act. In the judgment, there is no stipulation of violation of any other provisions of Industrial

Disputes Act in which had been denied either for relief of reinstatement or compensation. As such,

this judgment of (2016) does not apply to the present case which deals primarily with reference

under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act and not for wrongful termination under Section

25 of Industrial Disputes Act. Moreover, the facts of case before the Hon'ble Apex Court are altogether

different from case in hand as in case before Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was educated person

working as clerk whereas the claimant before this Court is uneducated unskilled labourer besides

being an illiterate villager who had been engaged as labourer to manual work by respondents. On

this score also facts of case are different. Not only this, law of limitation is held to be not

applicable in view of observation made in para (18) of judgment (2016) supra. Accordingly, it is

held that judgment of 2016 does not apply to the present case having different facts as well as law.

20. Applying the ratio of aforesaid judgments more specifically judgment reported in

2013 (136) FLR 893 SC (supra) and that petitioner had rendered total service for four years

who was non-skilled worker ageing 55 years when his services were illegally terminated who

is not likely to get government job at this age and had factually worked for 1004 days in four

years when he had already completed 240 days entitling him protection envisaged under

Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act irrespective of fact that demand notice was issued after

a period of nine years by the petitioner, but keeping in view peculiar facts and

circumstances as stated above a lump-sum compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand

only) would be appropriate relief to the petitioner in lieu of back wages, seniority, past service

benefits as well as other consequential service benefits. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

21. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

9782

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maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

22. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as the other consequential service benefits.

Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four

months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondents shall be liable to pay

the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its

realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

23. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

24. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

25. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 567/2016

Date of Institution : 24.08.2016

Date of Decision : 20.07.2017

Shri Kali Dass s/o Shri Hari Singh, r/o Village Dedhal, P.O. Sidhpur, Tehsil

Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD, Nirman Bhawan, Shimla.

2.

The Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District

Mandi, H.P. . .Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

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For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Sh. Kali Dass S/o Sh. Hari Singh Vill.

Dedhal, PO Sidhpur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. during 11/2005 by (1) the

Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD, Nirman Bhawan, Shimla, (2) the Executive Engineer,

HPPWD,-Division Dharampur, Distt. Mandi, H.P. who had worked as beldar on daily

wages basis during 5/1998 to 11/2005 only for 2641 days, and has raised his industrial

dispute vide demand notice dated 19.12.2014 after 9 years, allegedly without complying

with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not,

keeping in view of working period as above and delay of more than 9 years in raising

the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employers/management?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition revealed that petitioner had been

engaged by respondent on daily waged basis on muster roll as beldar w.e.f. May, 1998 where

he continued to work upto November, 2005 who had completed 240 days. Averments made in

the claim petition further revealed that services of the petitioner had been terminated by the

respondent vide verbal order w.e.f. November, 2005 without notice pay as well as retrenchment

compensation under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as

'the Act' for brevity). It is alleged that respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the

Act. Not only this, the principle of "Last come First go" was not followed by the respondent as

some juniors namely S/Sh. Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Roshani Devi (4.7.1999)

and Inder Singh (1.1.2000) were retained in service whereas the service of petitioner had been

terminated. The grievance of petitioner further remains that after termination of services of

petitioner so many new hands had been engaged by the respondent/department, whose names

were Pradeep Kumar on 02.05.2008, Vipin Kumar on 1.7.2008, Lekh Raj on 25.8.2008 and Ruma

Devi on 25.5.2014 but petitioner had not been given any opportunity of reemployment by the

respondent prior to appointing above named workers establishing violation of provisions of

Section 25-H of the Act. Feeling aggrieved the action of respondent in terminating the services of

petitioner an industrial dispute was raised vide demand notice dated 19.12.2014 copy of the same

was forwarded to Labour Officer, Mandi for further necessary action. It is alleged that Labour

Officer, Mandi could not resolve the dispute who submitted failure report under Section 12(4) of

the Industrial Disputes Act and the matter was referred to appropriate government i.e. Labour

Commissioner, Shimla who declined to refer the case of petitioner for adjudication in pursuance

to which the petitioner had approached Hon'ble High Court of H.P. by filing CWP

no.8315/2012 which had been decided on 20.12.2012 directing the Labour Commissioner

Shimla to make reference to the Labour Court. The dispute stated to have been not filed on account

of delay and moreover Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has condoned the delay of eight years in case of

Rajneet Singh vs. State of H.P. & Ors. reported in 2015 (145) FLR 722. The petitioner alleges

that respondent in terminating the services of petitioner w.e.f. 2005 without compliance with

mandatory provision of Industrial Disputes Act was illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, prayer

has been made to set aside the illegal termination order of petitioner directing the respondent

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to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages, seniority and continuity in service with all

consequential benefits.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, delay and laches. On merits admitted that petitioner was engaged

as daily wager on 5/1998 who intermittently worked upto 11/2005. It is alleged that petitioner

has abandoned the job of his own who had not completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is

alleged that petitioner had left the job of his own sweet will and respondent/department had not

violated any provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The plea of respondent further remained that

petitioner had left the job at his own sweet will. Moreover there exist inordinate delay in raising

industrial dispute. It is alleged that petitioner had left the job of his own sweet will who was never

terminated by the respondent. It is alleges that question of termination of the services of petitioner

by the respondent does not arise. Delay in filing the claim petition is stated to be fatal to the case

of petitioner and the petitioner raised his claim when other workers raised demand notice and

that petitioner was gainfully employed as an agriculturist after leaving the job. Accordingly,

petition was sought to be dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6.

To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A, Ex. PW1/B copy of RTI information dated

13.11.2013, Ex. PW1/C copy of mandays chart of Sh. Shashi Kant, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/D, copy of letter dated 18.3.2015 Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Kashyap,

the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur as RW1 tendered/proved his affidavit

Ex. RW1/A, mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative/counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of

this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.01.2017 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the claimant/petitioner by the respondents during

11/2005 and raised his industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 19.12.2014

is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

. .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged.

If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:-

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Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,50,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. It is pertinent to mention here that claim petition before this Court was filed by

petitioner in which he has prayed for setting aside the retrenchment order w.e.f. November, 2005

qua his illegal termination and sought direction to the effect that services of petitioner be treated as

continuous service till date with full back wages. It has further been prayed that services of

petitioner be regularized after completion of eight years of service on the basis of policy

framed by the State Govt. with all consequential benefits. Not only this, petitioner also prayed that

his case may also be considered for engagement in service as per policy framed by the State Govt.

and to another relief petitioner is entitled.

12. A bare glance at claim petition would reveal that petitioner was appointed as daily

wage basis with the respondent in the month of May, 1998 on muster roll basis as beldar who

continued to work till November, 2005 when his services were terminated in violation of

Section 25-F of the Act as it is unclear from evidence if compensation under Section 25-F

was factually received by petitioner. While retrenching the services of petitioner principle of "Last

come First go‟ was not followed as Prabhu Ram (1.8.1998), Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Roshani Devi

(4.7.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Inder Singh (1.1.2000) and Hans Raj (6.4.2000) were

retained in service and thus the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not followed by the

respondent. Mandays chart Ex. RW1/B on record reveals that petitioner had worked for 186

days in the year 1998, 348 days in 1999, 357 days in 2000, 348 days in 2001, 363 days in

2002, 360 days in 2003, 364 days in 2004 and 315 days in 2005. Even if we look at the mandays

chart, this would show that immediately preceding his termination in 2005, petitioner has

factually worked for 364 days in 2004 and 315 days in 2005 aggregating to 679 days prior to

termination. A bare glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for more than 240 days ever since May, 1998 till November, 2005 immediately prior to

his retrenchment as stated above. A bare glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal

petitioner had worked for more than 240 days ever since May, 1998 till November, 2005

immediately prior to his retrenchment as stated above. Be it noticed that Pardeep Kumar, Lekh Raj

& Satya Devi had been appointed in 2007, 2004 and 2011 respectively. It is pertinent to mention to

state here that when persons mentioned in para no. 2 of the affidavit Ex. PW1/A were engaged

petitioner was factually not given offer for reemployment which manifestly violates the provisions

of Section 25-H of the Act. From evidence, it is evidently clear that after termination of

petitioner he was available for job who was not appointed however some persons fresh were

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allowed to join in service. As such, action of respondent in doing so clearly violates Section 25-H of

the Industrial Disputes Act.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty, respondent had issued any notice or

letter. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner

abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental

inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after November, 2005. No reason whatsoever has

been assigned for such an action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any

departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This

prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any

other fact in issue. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that

large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers

have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle

of "Last come First go" was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner

despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/D is the seniority list of

daily wages beldar in respect of Dharampur Division who had completed eight years of as on

31.3.2008 and some of them were junior to the petitioner and had joined after termination of the

services of petitioner. Some of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/D the seniority list details of

workers of Division HPPWD Dharampur were certainly junior to petitioner figured at serial nos.

646 and 652 respectively who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 240

days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month.

Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called

upon to join for service at any time after September, 1999 even at the time when junior persons

were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G

of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was

senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was terminated and even thereafter

respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also

violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel/AR for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that petitioner be

treated in continuous service for eight years and for said reason the left period after November,

2005 be treated as regular period. It is not understood as to how petitioner could claim such

benefit as petitioner never worked with the respondent/department after his termination as well as

there is no adequate evidence on record suggesting that petitioner had represented the

respondent/department after his termination, although petitioner had issued demand notice

i.e. 19.12.2014 after about nine years and thus judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2012

(132) FLR 528 (SC) titled as H.S. Rajashekara and State Bank of Mysore and another does

not come to the rescue of the petitioner. Therefore, the entire period cannot be treated in

service. As stated above that petitioner remained out of job after his termination but there is

nothing authenticated in evidence suggesting that he remained without earning moreso when he

himself admitted in cross-examination that he had cultivable land and also earned by working as

labourer. It is maintained if, he did not get any government job however petitioner has revealed

in cross-examination that he had not been given notice as well as retrenchment compensation as

required to be paid. In view of foregoing discussions, respondent is held to have violated the

provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

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16. Ld. Authorized Representative/counsel for petitioner has placed reliance of

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 titled as Rashtriya

Colliery Mazdoor Sangh and Employers in Relation to Management of Kenduahih

Colliery of M/S BCCL and Ors., in which Hon'ble Apex Court has awarded compensation of

Rs.4 lakh to each workman. Similarly, reliance has placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court

of Punjab & Haryana reported in 2014 LLR 967 titled as Deshsewak Foundry vs. Presiding

Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur & Ors., in which compensation of Rs.5 lakh was

awarded. In another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench reported in 2017

(152) FLR 206, titled as Youth Co-ordinator, Nehru Yuva Kendra and Labour Court

No.2, Jaipur and Anr. in which compensation of Rs.2 lakh was granted to the workman

who had merely worked for two years. Thus, above said judgments disclosing awarding larger

amount of compensation which the claimant/petitioner has prayed for. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

has relied upon judgment of Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and

another vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), in which various criteria

to be looked by Labour Court in awarding compensation. It has been held that before

exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors

including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the

ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute

before grant of relief in an industrial dispute and in this judgment Hon'ble Apex Court had

awarded compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- only in lieu of reinstatement and consequential

benefits to a retrenched employee who had issued demand notice after about six years.

17. Since no straight-jacket formula can be applied for determining compensation as it is

to be awarded on the basis of facts of case. In 2014 LLR 967 Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &

Haryana had awarded compensation of Rs.5 lac to claimant petitioner who was litigating for

past 30 years. Similarly, in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 Hon'ble Apex Court awarded compensation

to each worker of Rs.4 lacs. It was observed that many of the workmen were at age of retirement

and that nearly 27 years had elapsed since the time of retrenchment. Moreover, the workers

who were awarded compensation of Rs.4 lac belonged to skilled category of Tyndals. As such,

judgment relied upon by ld. counsel/Authorized Representative for petitioner does not apply to

present case rather applying the criteria laid down by Hon‟ble Apex Court in Geetam Singh’s

case 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) has to be followed and applied.

18. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on November, 2005 and the industrial

dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel,

ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903

Hon’ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising

dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other

judgments even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another

vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned

besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the

industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs.

Sirhind Co- operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6

SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the

proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. has representing State/respondents has vehemently contended that

claimant/petitioner is not entitled for any relief either by way of reinstatement or compensation

in view of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as

Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. Relying upon the aforesaid

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judgment, it has been contended that while making reference to the Labour Court by the

Government, the competent authority has to see that there is existence of an industrial dispute

or apprehension of an industrial dispute and if there is no live dispute or if dispute was no

longer existing reference could not be made at belated stage. On the other hand, ld. Authorized

Representative for the petitioner has contended that the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court referred

to above does not come to the rescue to the respondents moreso when government itself made

reference and has not challenged the correctness of reference before the Hon'ble High Court. I

have carefully gone through the judgment referred to above and of the view that the

contention of the ld. Dy. D.A. is fallacious. It would be relevant to refer to para 7 of the judgment

in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that the issue which fell for determination is

whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. It was further observed that order of

reference cannot be made mechanically without forming an opinion as referred to in the other

paragraphs of the judgment and order of making reference is open to judicial review if it is shown

that the appropriate government had no material before it or it has not applied its mind to the

material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have

taken into consideration. In paragraph 23 Sub para (8) of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

which it has been specially observed that the High Court can exercise its powers under Article

226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It

was submitted before the Hon'ble Apex Court that once a reference has been made under Section

10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in

writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court which was found be not

correct proposition but certainly correctness of reference under Section 10 of Industrial

Disputes Act is not in challenge before this Court. Reliance has been made on another

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2000) 1 SCC 371, National Engg. Industries

Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan in judgment of 2016 (supra). In Sapan Kumar Pandit’s

(2000), case it was held that the period of making of reference is co- extensive with the

existence of dispute, meaning thereby that the dispute should be alive on the day when the

decision was taken to make a reference or to refuse to make reference. Although, Hon‟ble Apex

Court has made elaborated discussions qua consideration before making reference which is not

issue before this Court. The judgment referred in 2016 primarily reveals guidelines how

reference under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act is to be made by competent authority under

the Industrial Disputes Act. In the judgment, there is no stipulation of violation of any other

provisions of Industrial Disputes Act in which had been denied either for relief of reinstatement or

compensation. As such, this judgment of (2016) does not apply to the present case which deals

primarily with reference under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act and not for wrongful

termination under Section 25 of Industrial Disputes Act. Moreover, the facts of case before the

Hon'ble Apex Court are altogether different from case in hand as in case before Hon'ble Apex Court

petitioner was educated person working as clerk whereas the claimant before this Court is

uneducated unskilled labourer besides being an illiterate villager who had been engaged as

labourer to manual work by respondents. On this score also facts of case are different. Not only

this, law of limitation is held to be not applicable in view of observation made in para (18) of

judgment (2016) supra. Accordingly, it is held that judgment of 2016 does not apply to the present

case having different facts as well as law.

20. Applying the ratio of aforesaid judgments more specifically judgment reported in

2013 (136) FLR 893 SC (supra) and that petitioner had rendered total service for eight years

who was non-skilled worker ageing 52 years when his services were illegally terminated who is

not likely to get government job at this age and had factually worked for 2641 days in eight

years when he had already completed 240 days entitling him protection envisaged under

Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act irrespective of fact that demand notice was issued after

a period of nine years by the petitioner, but keeping in view peculiar facts and

circumstances as stated above a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty

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thousand only) would be appropriate relief to the petitioner in lieu of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits as well as other consequential service benefits. It is further made clear that

amount of compensation shall be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of

Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of

Award till its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

21. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

22. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as the other consequential service

benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner

within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondents shall be

liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of

its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

23. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

24. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

25. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of July, 2017.

(K .K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 568/2016

Date of Institution : 24.08.2016

Date of Decision : 20.07.2017

Smt. Bimla Devi w/o Shri Narain Singh, r/o Village Strehar, P.O. Dharampur, Tehsil

Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

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2.

The Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD, Nirman Bhawan, Shimla.

3.

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat,

District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Smt. Bimla Devi W/o Sh. Narain Singh Vill.

Strehar, PO Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. during 9/1999. by (1) The

Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD, Nirman Bhavan, Shimla-2, (2) the Executive Engineer,

HPPWD, - Division Dharampur, Distt. Mandi, H.P. who had worked as beldar on daily

wages basis during 11/1998 to 9/1999, only for 285.5 days and has raised her industrial

dispute vide demand notice dated 29.5.2015 after more than 16 years allegedly without

complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and

justified? If not, keeping in view of working period stated as above and delay of more

than 16 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above

employer/management?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition revealed that petitioner had been

engaged by respondent on daily waged basis on muster roll as beldar w.e.f. 11/1998 where she

continued to work upto 9/1999 who had completed 240 days. Averments made in the claim

petition further revealed that services of the petitioner had been terminated by the respondent

vide verbal order w.e.f. 9/1999 without notice pay as well as retrenchment compensation under

the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity).

It is alleged that respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. Not only this,

the principle of "Last come First go" was not followed by the respondent as some juniors

namely S/Sh. Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Roshani Devi (4.7.1999) and Inder

Singh (1.1.2000) were retained in service whereas the service of petitioner had been terminated.

The grievance of petitioner further remains that after termination of services of petitioner so

many new hands had been engaged by the respondent/department, whose names were Pradeep

Kumar on 02.05.2008, Vipin Kumar on 1.7.2008, Lekh Raj on 25.8.2008 and Ruma Devi on

25.5.2014 but petitioner had not been given any opportunity of reemployment by the respondent

prior to appointing above named workers establishing violation of provisions of Section 25-H of

the Act. Feeling aggrieved the action of respondent in terminating the services of petitioner

an industrial dispute was raised vide demand notice dated 21.2.2015 copy of the same was

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forwarded to Labour Officer, Mandi for further necessary action. It is alleged that Labour Officer,

Mandi could not resolve the dispute who submitted failure report under Section 12(4) of the

Industrial Disputes Act and the matter was referred to appropriate government i.e. Labour

Commissioner, Shimla who declined to refer the case of petitioner for adjudication in

pursuance to which the petitioner had approached Hon'ble High Court of H.P. by filing CWP

no.8315/2012 which had been decided on 20.12.2012 directing the Labour Commissioner

Shimla to make reference to the Labour Court. The dispute stated to have been not filed on account

of delay and moreover Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has condoned the delay of eight years in

case of Rajneet Singh vs. State of H.P. & Ors. reported in 2015 (145) FLR 722. The

petitioner alleges that respondent in terminating the services of petitioner w.e.f. 1999 without

compliance with mandatory provision of Industrial Disputes Act was illegal and unjustified.

Accordingly, prayer has been made to set aside the illegal termination order of petitioner directing

the respondent to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages, seniority and continuity in service

with all consequential benefits.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, delay and laches. On merits admitted that petitioner was engaged

as daily wager on 11/1998 who intermittently worked upto 9/1999. It is alleged that petitioner

has abandoned the job of her own who had not completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is

alleged that petitioner had left the job of her own sweet will and respondent/department had not

violated any provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The plea of respondent further remained that

petitioner had left the job at her own sweet will. Moreover there exist inordinate delay in

raising industrial dispute. It is alleged that petitioner had left the job of her own sweet will who

was never terminated by the respondent. It is alleges that question of termination of the services

of petitioner by the respondent does not arise. Delay in filing the claim petition is stated to be

fatal to the case of petitioner and the petitioner raised her claim when other workers raised

demand notice and that petitioner was gainfully employed as an agriculturist after leaving the job.

Accordingly, petition was sought to be dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6.

To prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A, Ex. PW1/B copy of RTI information dated

13.11.2013, Ex. PW1/C copy of mandays chart of Sh. Shashi Kant, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/D, copy of letter dated 18.3.2015 Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Kashyap,

the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur as RW1 tendered/proved her affidavit

Ex. RW1/A, mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative/counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of

this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.01.2017 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the claimant/petitioner by the respondents during

09/1999 and raised her industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 29.5.2015

is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

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2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

. .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged.

If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.50,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. It is pertinent to mention here that claim petition before this Court was filed by

petitioner in which she has prayed for setting aside the retrenchment order w.e.f. 9/1999 qua her

illegal termination and sought direction to the effect that services of petitioner be treated as

continuous service till date with full back wages. It has further been prayed that services of

petitioner be regularized after completion of eight years of service on the basis of policy

framed by the State Govt. with all consequential benefits. Not only this, petitioner also prayed that

her case may also be considered for engagement in service as per policy framed by the State Govt.

and to another relief petitioner is entitled.

12. A bare glance at claim petition would reveal that petitioner was appointed as daily

wage basis with the respondent in the month of November, 1998 on muster roll basis as beldar

who continued to work till September, 1999 when her services were terminated in violation of

Section 25-F of the Act as it is unclear from evidence if compensation under Section 25-F was

factually received by petitioner. While retrenching the services of petitioner principle of "Last come

First go" was not followed as Prabhu Ram (1.8.1998), Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Roshani Devi

(4.7.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Inder Singh (1.1.2000) and Hans Raj (6.4.2000) were

retained in service and thus the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not followed by the

respondent. Mandays chart Ex. RW1/B on record reveals that petitioner had worked for 47 ½

days in the year 1998 and 238 days in 1999. Even if we look at the mandays chart, this would

show that immediately preceding her termination in 1999, petitioner has factually worked for 47 ½

days in 1998 and 238 days in 1999 aggregating to 285 ½ days prior to termination. A bare

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glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for more

than 240 days ever since November, 1998 till September, 1999 immediately prior to her

retrenchment as stated above. A bare glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal

petitioner had worked for more than 240 days ever since November, 1998 till September, 1999

immediately prior to her retrenchment as stated above. Be it noticed that Pardeep Kumar, Lekh

Raj & Satya Devi had been appointed in 2007, 2004 and 2011 respectively. It is pertinent to

mention to state here that when persons mentioned in para no. 2 of the affidavit Ex. PW1/A were

engaged petitioner was factually not given offer for reemployment which manifestly violates the

provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. From evidence, it is evidently clear that after termination

of petitioner she was available for job who was not appointed however some persons fresh were

allowed to join in service. As such, action of respondent in doing so clearly violates Section 25-H

of the Industrial Disputes Act.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty, respondent had issued any notice or

letter. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner

abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental

inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 1999. No reason whatsoever has

been assigned for such an action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any

departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This

prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any

other fact in issue. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that

large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers

have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that

principle of "Last come First go‟ was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of

petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/D is the

seniority list of daily wages beldar in respect of Dharampur Division who had completed eight

years of as on 31.3.2008 and some of them were junior to the petitioner and had joined after

termination of the services of petitioner. Some of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/D the

seniority list details of workers of Division HPPWD Dharampur were certainly junior to

petitioner figured at serial nos. 646 and 652 respectively who were given sufficient work

existing in those years more than 240 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not

given muster roll for the whole month. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent

establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 1999

even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly

violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in the

affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service

in 1998 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner

for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that petitioner be

treated in continuous service for eight years and for said reason the left period after September,

1999 be treated as regular period. It is not understood as to how petitioner could claim such

benefit as petitioner never worked with the respondent/department after her termination as well

as there is no adequate evidence on record suggesting that petitioner had represented the

respondent/department after her termination, although petitioner had issued demand notice i.e.

29.5.2015 after about sixteen years and thus judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in

2012 (132) FLR 528 (SC) titled as H.S. Rajashekara and State Bank of Mysore and

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another does not come to the rescue of the petitioner. Therefore, the entire period cannot be

treated in service. As stated above that petitioner remained out of job after her termination but

there is nothing authenticated in evidence suggesting that she remained without earning moreso

when she herself admitted in cross-examination that she had cultivable land and also earned by

working as labourer. It is maintained if, she did not get any government job however petitioner has

revealed in cross-examination that she had not been given notice as well as retrenchment

compensation as required to be paid. In view of foregoing discussions, respondent is held to have

violated the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

16. Ld. Authorized Representative/counsel for petitioner has placed reliance of

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 titled as Rashtriya

Colliery Mazdoor Sangh and Employers in Relation to Management of Kenduahih

Colliery of M/S BCCL and Ors., in which Hon'ble Apex Court has awarded compensation of

Rs.4 lakh to each workman. Similarly, reliance has placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court

of Punjab & Haryana reported in 2014 LLR 967 titled as Deshsewak Foundry vs. Presiding

Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur & Ors., in which compensation of Rs.5 lakh was

awarded. In another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench reported in 2017

(152) FLR 206, titled as Youth Co-ordinator, Nehru Yuva Kendra and Labour Court

No.2, Jaipur and Anr. in which compensation of Rs.2 lakh was granted to the workman

who had merely worked for two years. Thus, above said judgments disclosing awarding larger

amount of compensation which the claimant/petitioner has prayed for. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

has relied upon judgment of Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and

another vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), in which various criteria

to be looked by Labour Court in awarding compensation. It has been held that before

exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors

including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the

ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute

before grant of relief in an industrial dispute and in this judgment Hon'ble Apex Court had

awarded compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- only in lieu of reinstatement and consequential

benefits to a retrenched employee who had issued demand notice after about six years.

17. Since no straight-jacket formula can be applied for determining compensation as it is

to be awarded on the basis of facts of case. In 2014 LLR 967 Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &

Haryana had awarded compensation of Rs.5 lac to claimant petitioner who was litigating for

past 30 years. Similarly, in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 Hon'ble Apex Court awarded compensation

to each worker of Rs.4 lacs. It was observed that many of the workmen were at age of retirement

and that nearly 27 years had elapsed since the time of retrenchment. Moreover, the workers

who were awarded compensation of Rs.4 lac belonged to skilled category of Tyndals. As such,

judgment relied upon by ld. counsel/Authorized Representative for petitioner does not apply to

present case rather applying the criteria laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Geetam Singh’s

case 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) has to be followed and applied.

18. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on September, 1999 and the industrial

dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel,

ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903

Hon’ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising

dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other

judgments even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another

vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned

besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the

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industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs.

Sirhind Co- operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6

SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the

proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. has representing State/respondents has vehemently contended that

claimant/petitioner is not entitled for any relief either by way of reinstatement or compensation

in view of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as

Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. Relying upon the aforesaid

judgment, it has been contended that while making reference to the Labour Court by the

Government, the competent authority has to see that there is existence of an industrial dispute

or apprehension of an industrial dispute and if there is no live dispute or if dispute was no

longer existing reference could not be made at belated stage. On the other hand, ld. Authorized

Representative for the petitioner has contended that the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court referred

to above does not come to the rescue to the respondents moreso when government itself made

reference and has not challenged the correctness of reference before the Hon‟ble High Court. I

have carefully gone through the judgment referred to above and of the view that the

contention of the ld. Dy. D.A. is fallacious. It would be relevant to refer to para 7 of the judgment

in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that the issue which fell for determination is

whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. It was further observed that order of

reference cannot be made mechanically without forming an opinion as referred to in the other

paragraphs of the judgment and order of making reference is open to judicial review if it is shown

that the appropriate government had no material before it or it has not applied its mind to the

material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have

taken into consideration. In paragraph 23 Sub para (8) of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

which it has been specially observed that the High Court can exercise its powers under Article

226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It

was submitted before the Hon'ble Apex Court that once a reference has been made under Section

10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in

writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court which was found be not

correct proposition but certainly correctness of reference under Section 10 of Industrial

Disputes Act is not in challenge before this Court. Reliance has been made on another

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2000) 1 SCC 371, National Engg. Industries

Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan in judgment of 2016 (supra). In Sapan Kumar Pandit’s

(2000), case it was held that the period of making of reference is co- extensive with the

existence of dispute, meaning thereby that the dispute should be alive on the day when the

decision was taken to make a reference or to refuse to make reference. Although, Hon'ble Apex

Court has made elaborated discussions qua consideration before making reference which is not

issue before this Court. The judgment referred in 2016 primarily reveals guidelines how

reference under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act is to be made by competent authority under

the Industrial Disputes Act. In the judgment, there is no stipulation of violation of any other

provisions of Industrial Disputes Act in which had been denied either for relief of reinstatement or

compensation. As such, this judgment of (2016) does not apply to the present case which deals

primarily with reference under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act and not for wrongful

termination under Section 25 of Industrial Disputes Act. Moreover, the facts of case before the

Hon'ble Apex Court are altogether different from case in hand as in case before Hon'ble Apex Court

petitioner was educated person working as clerk whereas the claimant before this Court is

uneducated unskilled labourer besides being an illiterate villager who had been engaged as

labourer to manual work by respondents. On this score also facts of case are different. Not only

this, law of limitation is held to be not applicable in view of observation made in para (18) of

judgment (2016) supra. Accordingly, it is held that judgment of 2016 does not apply to the present

case having different facts as well as law.

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20. Applying the ratio of aforesaid judgments more specifically judgment reported in

2013 (136) FLR 893 SC (supra) and that petitioner had rendered total service for two years who

was non-skilled worker ageing 48 years when her services were illegally terminated who is not

likely to get government job at this age and had factually worked for 285 ½ days in two years

when she had already completed 240 days entitling her protection envisaged under Section 25-F of

Industrial Disputes Act irrespective of fact that demand notice was issued after a period of

sixteen years by the petitioner, but keeping in view peculiar facts and circumstances as stated

above a lump-sum compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) would be

appropriate relief to the petitioner in lieu of back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well

as other consequential service benefits. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall

be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

21. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

22. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as the other consequential service benefits.

Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four

months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondents shall be liable to pay

the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its

realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

23. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

24. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

25. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

______________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 622/2016

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Date of Institution : 01.09.2016

Date of Decision : 20.07.2017

Shri Amar Chand s/o Shri Ram Singh, r/o Village Banehardi, P.O. Pehad, Tehsil

Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District

Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Amar Chand S/O Shri Ram Singh, R/O

Village Banehardi, P.O. Pehad, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. during year 2000

by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P., who

had worked on daily wages and has raised his industrial dispute after more than 12 years

vide demand notice dated 28.01.2013, without complying the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of delay of more than

12 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above

employer/management?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition revealed that petitioner had been

engaged by respondent on daily waged basis on muster roll as beldar w.e.f. June, 1999 where

he continued to work upto 2000 who had completed 240 days. Averments made in the claim

petition further revealed that services of the petitioner had been terminated by the respondent

vide verbal order in the year 2000 without notice pay as well as retrenchment

compensation under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as

"the Act" for brevity). It is alleged that respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25- F of

the Act. Not only this, the principle of "Last come First go" was not followed by the respondent as

some juniors namely S/Sh. Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Roshani Devi (4.7.1999)

and Inder Singh (1.1.2000) were retained in service whereas the service of petitioner had been

terminated. The grievance of petitioner further remains that after termination of services of

petitioner so many new hands had been engaged by the respondent/department, whose names

were Pradeep Kumar on 02.05.2008, Vipin Kumar on 1.7.2008, Lekh Raj on 25.8.2008 and Ruma

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Devi on 25.5.2014 but petitioner had not been given any opportunity of reemployment by the

respondent prior to appointing above named workers establishing violation of provisions of

Section 25-H of the Act. Feeling aggrieved the action of respondent in terminating the

services of petitioner an industrial dispute was raised vide demand notice dated 28.1.2013

copy of the same was forwarded to Labour Officer, Mandi for further necessary action. It is

alleged that Labour Officer, Mandi could not resolve the dispute who submitted failure report

under Section 12(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the matter was referred to appropriate

government i.e. Labour Commissioner, Shimla who declined to refer the case of petitioner for

adjudication in pursuance to which the petitioner had approached Hon'ble High Court of H.P.

by filing CWP no.8315/2012 which had been decided on 20.12.2012 directing the Labour

Commissioner Shimla to make reference to the Labour Court. The dispute stated to have been no

filed on account of delay and moreover Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has condoned the delay of

eight years in case of Rajneet Singh vs. State of H.P. & Ors. reported in 2015 (145) FLR

722. The petitioner alleges that respondent in terminating the services of petitioner in the year

2000 without compliance with mandatory provision of Industrial Disputes Act was illegal and

unjustified. Accordingly, prayer has been made to set aside the illegal termination order of

petitioner directing the respondent to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages, seniority and

continuity in service with all consequential benefits.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, delay and laches. On merits admitted that petitioner was engaged

as daily wager on 7/1999 who intermittently worked upto 12/1999. It is alleged that petitioner

has abandoned the job of his own who had not completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is

alleged that petitioner had left the job of his own sweet will and respondent/department had not

violated any provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The plea of respondent further remained that

petitioner had left the job at his own sweet will. Moreover there exist inordinate delay in raising

industrial dispute. It is alleged that petitioner had left the job of his own sweet will who was never

terminated by the respondent. It is alleges that question of termination of the services of petitioner

by the respondent does not arise. Delay in filing the claim petition is stated to be fatal to the case

of petitioner and the petitioner raised his claim when other workers raised demand notice and that

petitioner was gainfully employed as an agriculturist after leaving the job. Accordingly,

petition was sought to be dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6.

To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A, Ex. PW1/B copy of RTI information dated

13.11.2013, Ex. PW1/C copy of mandays chart of Sh. Shashi Kant, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/D, copy of letter dated 18.3.2015 Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Kashyap,

the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur as RW1 tendered/proved his affidavit

Ex. RW1/A, mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative/counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of

this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 21.01.2017 for

determination:

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1.

Whether termination of services of the claimant/petitioner by the respondents during

year, 2000 and raised his industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 28.1.2013

is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. . OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

. .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged. If

so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.40,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. It is pertinent to mention here that claim petition before this Court was filed by

petitioner in which he has prayed for setting aside the retrenchment order in the year 2000 qua his

illegal termination and sought direction to the effect that services of petitioner be treated as

continuous service till date with full back wages. It has further been prayed that services of

petitioner be regularized after completion of eight years of service on the basis of policy

framed by the State Govt. with all consequential benefits. Not only this, petitioner also prayed

that his case may also be considered for engagement in service as per policy framed by the State

Govt. and to another relief petitioner is entitled.

12. A bare glance at claim petition would reveal that petitioner was appointed as daily

wage basis with the respondent in the month of June, 1999 on muster roll basis as beldar who

continued to work till 2000 when his services were terminated in violation of Section 25-F of

the Act as it is unclear from evidence if compensation under Section 25-F was factually

received by petitioner. While retrenching the services of petitioner principle of "Last come First go"

was not followed as Prabhu Ram (1.8.1998), Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Roshani Devi (4.7.1999),

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Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Inder Singh (1.1.2000) and Hans Raj (6.4.2000) were retained in

service and thus the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not followed by the respondent.

Mandays chart Ex. RW1/B on record reveals that petitioner had worked for 147 days in 1999.

Even if we look at the mandays chart, this would show that immediately preceding his

termination in 2000, petitioner has factually worked for 147 days in 1999 prior to termination. A

bare glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had not worked for

more than 240 days ever since June, 1999 till December, 1999 immediately prior to his

retrenchment as stated above. A bare glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal

petitioner had not worked for more than 240 days ever since June, 1999 till December, 1999

immediately prior to his retrenchment as stated above. Be it noticed that Pardeep Kumar, Lekh

Raj & Satya Devi had been appointed in 2007, 2004 and 2011 respectively. It is pertinent to

mention to state here that when persons mentioned in para no. 2 of the affidavit Ex. PW1/A were

engaged petitioner was factually not given offer for reemployment which manifestly violates the

provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. From evidence, it is evidently clear that after termination

of petitioner he was available for job who was not appointed however some persons fresh were

allowed to join in service. As such, action of respondent in doing so clearly violates Section 25-H

of the Industrial Disputes Act.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty, respondent had issued any notice or

letter. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner

abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental

inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after November, 2001. No reason whatsoever has

been assigned for such an action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any

departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This

prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any

other fact in issue. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that

large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers

have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle

of "Last come First go" was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner

despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/D is the seniority list of

daily wages beldar in respect of Dharampur Division who had completed eight years of as on

31.3.2008 and some of them were junior to the petitioner and had joined after termination of the

services of petitioner. Some of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/D the seniority list details of

workers of Division HPPWD Dharampur were certainly junior to petitioner figured at serial no.

652 who was given sufficient work existing in those years more than 240 days in a year

whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Evidently, there is no

iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service

at any time after September, 1999 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That

being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the

juniors workers mentioned in the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these

co-workers having joined service in 1998 was terminated and even thereafter respondent

omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the

provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel/AR for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that petitioner be

treated in continuous service for eight years and for said reason the left period after 2000 be

treated as regular period. It is not understood as to how petitioner could claim such benefit as

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petitioner never worked with the respondent/department after his termination as well as there is no

adequate

evidence

on

record

suggesting

that

petitioner

had

represented

the

respondent/department after his termination, although petitioner had issued demand notice i.e.

28.1.2013 after about twelve years and thus judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in

2012 (132) FLR 528 (SC) titled as H.S. Rajashekara and State Bank of Mysore and

another does not come to the rescue of the petitioner. Therefore, the entire period cannot be

treated in service. As stated above that petitioner remained out of job after his termination but

there is nothing authenticated in evidence suggesting that he remained without earning moreso

when he himself admitted in cross-examination that he had cultivable land and also earned by

working as labourer. It is maintained if, he did not get any government job however petitioner

has revealed in cross-examination that he had not been given notice as well as retrenchment

compensation as required to be paid. In view of foregoing discussions, respondent is held to have

violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

16. Ld. Authorized Representative/counsel for petitioner has placed reliance of

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 titled as Rashtriya

Colliery Mazdoor Sangh and Employers in Relation to Management of Kenduahih

Colliery of M/S BCCL and Ors., in which Hon'ble Apex Court has awarded compensation of

Rs.4 lakh to each workman. Similarly, reliance has placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court

of Punjab & Haryana reported in 2014 LLR 967 titled as Deshsewak Foundry vs. Presiding

Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur & Ors., in which compensation of Rs.5 lakh was

awarded. In another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench reported in 2017

(152) FLR 206, titled as Youth Co-ordinator, Nehru Yuva Kendra and Labour Court

No.2, Jaipur and Anr. in which compensation of Rs.2 lakh was granted to the workman

who had merely worked for two years. Thus, above said judgments disclosing awarding larger

amount of compensation which the claimant/petitioner has prayed for. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

has relied upon judgment of Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and

another vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), in which various criteria

to be looked by Labour Court in awarding compensation. It has been held that before

exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors

including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the

ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute

before grant of relief in an industrial dispute and in this judgment Hon'ble Apex Court had

awarded compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- only in lieu of reinstatement and consequential

benefits to a retrenched employee who had issued demand notice after about six years.

17. Since no straight-jacket formula can be applied for determining compensation as it is

to be awarded on the basis of facts of case. In 2014 LLR 967 Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &

Haryana had awarded compensation of Rs.5 lac to claimant petitioner who was litigating for

past 30 years. Similarly, in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 Hon'ble Apex Court awarded compensation

to each worker of Rs.4 lacs. It was observed that many of the workmen were at age of retirement

and that nearly 27 years had elapsed since the time of retrenchment. Moreover, the workers

who were awarded compensation of Rs.4 lac belonged to skilled category of Tyndals. As such,

judgment relied upon by ld. counsel/Authorized Representative for petitioner does not apply to

present case rather applying the criteria laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Geetam Singh’s

case 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) has to be followed and applied.

18. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2000 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

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High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. has representing State/respondents has vehemently contended that

claimant/petitioner is not entitled for any relief either by way of reinstatement or compensation

in view of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as

Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. Relying upon the aforesaid

judgment, it has been contended that while making reference to the Labour Court by the

Government, the competent authority has to see that there is existence of an industrial dispute

or apprehension of an industrial dispute and if there is no live dispute or if dispute was no

longer existing reference could not be made at belated stage. On the other hand, ld. Authorized

Representative for the petitioner has contended that the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

referred to above does not come to the rescue to the respondents moreso when government itself

made reference and has not challenged the correctness of reference before the Hon'ble High Court.

I have carefully gone through the judgment referred to above and of the view that the

contention of the ld. Dy. D.A. is fallacious. It would be relevant to refer to para 7 of the judgment

in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that the issue which fell for determination is

whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. It was further observed that order of

reference cannot be made mechanically without forming an opinion as referred to in the other

paragraphs of the judgment and order of making reference is open to judicial review if it is shown

that the appropriate government had no material before it or it has not applied its mind to the

material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have

taken into consideration. In paragraph 23 Sub para (8) of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

which it has been specially observed that the High Court can exercise its powers under Article

226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It

was submitted before the Hon'ble Apex Court that once a reference has been made under Section

10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in

writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court which was found be not

correct proposition but certainly correctness of reference under Section 10 of Industrial

Disputes Act is not in challenge before this Court. Reliance has been made on another

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2000) 1 SCC 371, National Engg. Industries

Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan in judgment of 2016 (supra). In Sapan Kumar Pandit’s

(2000), case it was held that the period of making of reference is co-extensive with the

existence of dispute, meaning thereby that the dispute should be alive on the day when the

decision was taken to make a reference or to refuse to make reference. Although, Hon'ble Apex

Court has made elaborated discussions qua consideration before making reference which is not

issue before this Court. The judgment referred in 2016 primarily reveals guidelines how

reference under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act is to be made by competent authority under

the Industrial Disputes Act. In the judgment, there is no stipulation of violation of any other

provisions of Industrial Disputes Act in which had been denied either for relief of reinstatement or

compensation. As such, this judgment of (2016) does not apply to the present case which deals

primarily with reference under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act and not for wrongful

termination under Section 25 of Industrial Disputes Act. Moreover, the facts of case before the

Hon'ble Apex Court are altogether different from case in hand as in case before Hon'ble Apex Court

petitioner was educated person working as clerk whereas the claimant before this Court is

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uneducated unskilled labourer besides being an illiterate villager who had been engaged as

labourer to manual work by respondents. On this score also facts of case are different. Not only

this, law of limitation is held to be not applicable in view of observation made in para (18) of

judgment (2016) supra. Accordingly, it is held that judgment of 2016 does not apply to the present

case having different facts as well as law.

20. Applying the ratio of aforesaid judgments more specifically judgment reported in

2013 (136) FLR 893 SC (supra) and that petitioner had rendered total service for one year who

was non-skilled worker ageing 50 years when his services were illegally terminated who is not

likely to get government job at this age and had factually worked for 147 days in a year

irrespective of fact that demand notice was issued after a period of nine years by the petitioner, but

keeping in view peculiar facts and circumstances as stated above a lump-sum compensation of

Rs.40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) would be appropriate relief to the petitioner in lieu

of back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as other consequential service benefits. It

is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months and from

the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per

annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

21. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

22. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as the other consequential service benefits.

Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four

months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondents shall be liable to pay

the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its

realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

23. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

24. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

25. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 608/2016

Date of Institution : 26.08.2016

Date of Decision : 20.07.2017

Shri Panjku Ram s/o Shri Bhagat Ram, r/o Village Tayog, P.O. Sidhpur, Tehsil Sarkaghat,

District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

2.

The Engineer-in-Chief, HPPWD, US Club, Shimla-1

2. The Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District

Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Panjku Ram S/O Shri Bhagat Ram, R/O

Village Tayog P.O. Sidhpur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. during 02/2004 by the

Engineer-in-Chief, HPPWD, Us Club, Shimla-1, & the Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P. who has worked as beldar on daily wages basis

and has raised his industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 19/12/2014 after more than

10 years, allegedly without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of working period of 50, 303.5,

252.5, 270, 264 and 35 days during years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004

respectively and delay of more than 10 years in raising the industrial dispute, what

amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-

worker is entitled to from the above employer/management?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition revealed that petitioner had been

engaged by respondent on daily waged basis on muster roll as beldar in the year 1999 where he

continued to work upto February, 2004 who had completed 240 days. Averments made in the

claim petition further revealed that services of the petitioner had been terminated by the

9805

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respondent vide verbal order w.e.f. February, 2004 without notice pay as well as retrenchment

compensation under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as

"the Act" for brevity). It is alleged that respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the

Act. Not only this, the principle of "Last come First go" was not followed by the respondent as

some juniors namely S/Sh. Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Roshani Devi (4.7.1999)

and Inder Singh (1.1.2000) were retained in service whereas the service of petitioner had been

terminated. The grievance of petitioner further remains that after termination of services of

petitioner so many new hands had been engaged by the respondent/department, whose names

were Pradeep Kumar on 02.05.2008, Vipin Kumar on 1.7.2008, Lekh Raj on 25.8.2008 and Ruma

Devi on 25.5.2014 but petitioner had not been given any opportunity of reemployment by the

respondent prior to appointing above named workers establishing violation of provisions of

Section 25-H of the Act. Feeling aggrieved the action of respondent in terminating the services of

petitioner an industrial dispute was raised vide demand notice dated 19.12.2014 copy of the same

was forwarded to Labour Officer, Mandi for further necessary action. It is alleged that Labour

Officer, Mandi could not resolve the dispute who submitted failure report under Section 12(4) of

the Industrial Disputes Act and the matter was referred to appropriate government i.e. Labour

Commissioner, Shimla who declined to refer the case of petitioner for adjudication in pursuance

to which the petitioner had approached Hon'ble High Court of H.P. by filing CWP

no.8315/2012 which had been decided on 20.12.2012 directing the Labour Commissioner

Shimla to make reference to the Labour Court. The dispute stated to have been not filed on account

of delay and moreover Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has condoned the delay of eight years in case of

Rajneet Singh vs. State of H.P. & Ors. reported in 2015 (145) FLR 722. The petitioner alleges

that respondent in terminating the services of petitioner w.e.f. 2004 without compliance with

mandatory provision of Industrial Disputes Act was illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, prayer

has been made to set aside the illegal termination order of petitioner directing the respondent

to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages, seniority and continuity in service with all

consequential benefits.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, delay and laches. On merits admitted that petitioner was engaged

as daily wager on 11/1999 who intermittently worked upto 02/2004. It is alleged that petitioner

has abandoned the job of his own who had not completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is

alleged that petitioner had left the job of his own sweet will and respondent/department had not

violated any provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The plea of respondent further remained that

petitioner had left the job at his own sweet will. Moreover there exist inordinate delay in raising

industrial dispute. It is alleged that petitioner had left the job of his own sweet will who was never

terminated by the respondent. It is alleges that question of termination of the services of petitioner

by the respondent does not arise. Delay in filing the claim petition is stated to be fatal to the case

of petitioner and the petitioner raised his claim when other workers raised demand notice and that

petitioner was gainfully employed as an agriculturist after leaving the job. Accordingly,

petition was sought to be dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6.

To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A, Ex. PW1/B copy of RTI information dated

13.11.2013, Ex. PW1/C copy of mandays chart of Sh. Shashi Kant, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/D, copy of letter dated 18.3.2015 Ex. PW1/E, copy of notice dated 23.1.2004 Ex.

PW1/F and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,

respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Kashyap, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Dharampur as RW1 tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, mandays chart of

petitioner Ex. RW1/B and closed the evidence.

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7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative/counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of

this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 21.01.2017 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the claimant/petitioner by the respondents during

02/2004 and raised his industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 19.12.2014

is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

. .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged.

If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.90,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. It is pertinent to mention here that claim petition before this Court was filed by

petitioner in which he has prayed for setting aside the retrenchment order w.e.f. February, 2004

qua his illegal termination and sought direction to the effect that services of petitioner be treated

as continuous service till date with full back wages. It has further been prayed that services of

petitioner be regularized after completion of eight years of service on the basis of policy

framed by the State Govt. with all consequential benefits. Not only this, petitioner also prayed

that his case may also be considered for engagement in service as per policy framed by the State

Govt. and to another relief petitioner is entitled.

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12. A bare glance at claim petition would reveal that petitioner was appointed as daily

wage basis with the respondent in the year 1999 on muster roll basis as beldar who continued to

work till February, 2004 when his services were terminated in violation of Section 25-F of the Act

as it is unclear from evidence if compensation under Section 25-F was factually received by

petitioner. While retrenching the services of petitioner principle of "Last come First go" was not

followed as Prabhu Ram (1.8.1998), Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Roshani Devi (4.7.1999), Mamta Devi

(6.4.2000), Inder Singh (1.1.2000) and Hans Raj (6.4.2000) were retained in service and thus

the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not followed by the respondent. Mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B on record reveals that petitioner had worked for 50 days in the year 1999, 303 ½

days in 2000, 252 ½ days in 2001, 270 days in 2002, 264 days in 2003 and 35 days in 2004.

Even if we look at the mandays chart, this would show that immediately preceding his

termination in 2004, petitioner has factually worked for 264 days in 2003 and 35 days in 2004

aggregating to 299 days prior to termination. A bare glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B

would reveal that petitioner had worked for more than 240 days ever since 1999 till February,

2004 immediately prior to his retrenchment as stated above. A bare glance at the mandays

chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal petitioner had worked for more than 240 days ever since 1999

till February, 2004 immediately prior to his retrenchment as stated above. Be it noticed that

Pardeep Kumar, Lekh Raj & Satya Devi had been appointed in 2007, 2004 and 2011

respectively. It is pertinent to mention to state here that when persons mentioned in para no. 2

of the affidavit Ex. PW1/A were engaged petitioner was factually not given offer for

reemployment which manifestly violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. From

evidence, it is evidently clear that after termination of petitioner he was available for job who

was not appointed however some persons fresh were allowed to join in service. As such, action

of respondent in doing so clearly violates Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty, respondent had issued any notice or

letter. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner

abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental

inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after February, 2004. No reason whatsoever has

been assigned for such an action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any

departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This

prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any

other fact in issue. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that

large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers

have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle

of "Last come First go" was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner

despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/D is the seniority list of

daily wages beldar in respect of Dharampur Division who had completed eight years of as on

31.3.2008 and some of them were junior to the petitioner and had joined after termination of the

services of petitioner. But after close scrutiny of Ex. PW1/D the seniority list details of workers

of Division HPPWD Dharampur were certainly senior to petitioner who were joined in

service with the department before the joining of petitioner. That being so the respondent had

not violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act

15. Ld. counsel/AR for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that petitioner be

treated in continuous service for eight years and for said reason the left period after February,

2004 be treated as regular period. It is not understood as to how petitioner could claim such

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benefit as petitioner never worked with the respondent/department after his termination as well

as there is no adequate evidence on record suggesting that petitioner had represented the

respondent/department after his termination, although petitioner had issued demand notice i.e.

19.12.2014 after about ten years and thus judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2012 (132)

FLR 528 (SC) titled as H.S. Rajashekara and State Bank of Mysore and another does not

come to the rescue of the petitioner. Therefore, the entire period cannot be treated in service.

As stated above that petitioner remained out of job after his termination but there is nothing

authenticated in evidence suggesting that he remained without earning moreso when he himself

admitted in cross-examination that he had cultivable land and also earned by working as labourer.

It is maintained if, he did not get any government job however petitioner has revealed in cross-

examination that he had not been given notice as well as retrenchment compensation as required

to be paid. In view of foregoing discussions, respondent is held to have violated the

provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.

16. Ld. Authorized Representative/counsel for petitioner has placed reliance of

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 titled as Rashtriya

Colliery Mazdoor Sangh and Employers in Relation to Management of Kenduahih

Colliery of M/S BCCL and Ors., in which Hon'ble Apex Court has awarded compensation of

Rs.4 lakh to each workman. Similarly, reliance has placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court

of Punjab & Haryana reported in 2014 LLR 967 titled as Deshsewak Foundry vs. Presiding

Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur & Ors., in which compensation of Rs.5 lakh was

awarded. In another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench reported in 2017

(152) FLR 206, titled as Youth Co-ordinator, Nehru Yuva Kendra and Labour Court

No.2, Jaipur and Anr. in which compensation of Rs.2 lakh was granted to the workman

who had merely worked for two years. Thus, above said judgments disclosing awarding larger

amount of compensation which the claimant/petitioner has prayed for. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

has relied upon judgment of Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and

another vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), in which various criteria

to be looked by Labour Court in awarding compensation. It has been held that before

exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors

including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the

ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute

before grant of relief in an industrial dispute and in this judgment Hon'ble Apex Court had

awarded compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- only in lieu of reinstatement and consequential

benefits to a retrenched employee who had issued demand notice after about six years.

17. Since no straight-jacket formula can be applied for determining compensation as it is

to be awarded on the basis of facts of case. In 2014 LLR 967 Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &

Haryana had awarded compensation of Rs.5 lac to claimant petitioner who was litigating for

past 30 years. Similarly, in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 Hon'ble Apex Court awarded compensation

to each worker of Rs.4 lacs. It was observed that many of the workmen were at age of retirement

and that nearly 27 years had elapsed since the time of retrenchment. Moreover, the workers

who were awarded compensation of Rs.4 lac belonged to skilled category of Tyndals. As such,

judgment relied upon by ld. counsel/Authorized Representative for petitioner does not apply to

present case rather applying the criteria laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Geetam Singh’s

case 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) has to be followed and applied.

18. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on February, 2004 and the industrial

dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel,

ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903

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Hon’ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising

dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other

judgments even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another

vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned

besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the

industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs.

Sirhind Co- operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6

SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the

proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. has representing State/respondents has vehemently contended that

claimant/petitioner is not entitled for any relief either by way of reinstatement or compensation

in view of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as

Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. Relying upon the aforesaid

judgment, it has been contended that while making reference to the Labour Court by the

Government, the competent authority has to see that there is existence of an industrial dispute

or apprehension of an industrial dispute and if there is no live dispute or if dispute was no

longer existing reference could not be made at belated stage. On the other hand, ld. Authorized

Representative for the petitioner has contended that the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court referred

to above does not come to the rescue to the respondents moreso when government itself made

reference and has not challenged the correctness of reference before the Hon'ble High Court. I

have carefully gone through the judgment referred to above and of the view that the

contention of the ld. Dy. D.A. is fallacious. It would be relevant to refer to para 7 of the judgment

in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that the issue which fell for determination is

whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. It was further observed that order of

reference cannot be made mechanically without forming an opinion as referred to in the other

paragraphs of the judgment and order of making reference is open to judicial review if it is shown

that the appropriate government had no material before it or it has not applied its mind to the

material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have

taken into consideration. In paragraph 23 Sub para (8) of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

which it has been specially observed that the High Court can exercise its powers under Article

226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It

was submitted before the Hon'ble Apex Court that once a reference has been made under Section

10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in

writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court which was found be not

correct proposition but certainly correctness of reference under Section 10 of Industrial

Disputes Act is not in challenge before this Court. Reliance has been made on another

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2000) 1 SCC 371, National Engg. Industries

Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan in judgment of 2016 (supra). In Sapan Kumar Pandit’s (2000),

case it was held that the period of making of reference is co- extensive with the existence of

dispute, meaning thereby that the dispute should be alive on the day when the decision was taken

to make a reference or to refuse to make reference. Although, Hon'ble Apex Court has made

elaborated discussions qua consideration before making reference which is not issue before this

Court. The judgment referred in 2016 primarily reveals guidelines how reference under Section

10 of Industrial Disputes Act is to be made by competent authority under the Industrial Disputes

Act. In the judgment, there is no stipulation of violation of any other provisions of Industrial

Disputes Act in which had been denied either for relief of reinstatement or compensation. As such,

this judgment of (2016) does not apply to the present case which deals primarily with reference

under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act and not for wrongful termination under Section

25 of Industrial Disputes Act. Moreover, the facts of case before the Hon'ble Apex Court are altogether

different from case in hand as in case before Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was educated person

working as clerk whereas the claimant before this Court is uneducated unskilled labourer besides

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being an illiterate villager who had been engaged as labourer to manual work by respondents. On

this score also facts of case are different. Not only this, law of limitation is held to be not

applicable in view of observation made in para (18) of judgment (2016) supra. Accordingly, it is

held that judgment of 2016 does not apply to the present case having different facts as well as law.

20. Applying the ratio of aforesaid judgments more specifically judgment reported in

2013 (136) FLR 893 SC (supra) and that petitioner had rendered total service for six years who

was non-skilled worker ageing 58 years when his services were illegally terminated who is not

likely to get government job at this age and had factually worked for 1175 days in six years

when he had already completed 240 days entitling him protection envisaged under Section

25-F of Industrial Disputes Act irrespective of fact that demand notice was issued after a period

of nine years by the petitioner, but keeping in view peculiar facts and circumstances as

stated above a lump-sum compensation of Rs.90,000/- (Rupees ninety thousand only) would be

appropriate relief to the petitioner in lieu of back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as

other consequential service benefits. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be

paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization.

Issues no. 1, 2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

21. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

22. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.90,000/- (Rupees ninety thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as the other consequential service benefits.

Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four

months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondents shall be liable to pay

the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its

realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

23. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

24. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

25. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 610/2016

Date of Institution : 26.08.2016

Date of Decision : 20.07.2017

Smt. Malka Devi w/o Shri Om Prakash, r/o Village Richali, P.O. Dhawali, Tehsil

Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. . .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD, US Club, Shimla.

2.

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent(s) : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Smt. Malka Devi W/o Sh. Om Prakash Vill.

Richali P.O. Dhawali, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. from 6/2000, by (1) the

Engineer- in-Chief HPPWD, Nirman Bhawan, Shimla- (2) Executive Engineer, HPPWD,-

Division Dharampur, Distt. Mandi, H.P. who had worked as beldar on daily wages

basis during the 01/1999 to 6/2000, only for 434.5 days, and has raised her industrial

dispute vide demand notice dated 4.5.2015 after 15 years, allegedly without complying

with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not,

keeping in view of working period stated as above and delay of more than 15 years in

raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits

and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employer/management?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition revealed that petitioner had been

engaged by respondent on daily waged basis on muster roll as beldar w.e.f. 1/1999 where she

continued to work upto 6/2000 who had completed 240 days. Averments made in the claim

petition further revealed that services of the petitioner had been terminated by the respondent

vide verbal order w.e.f. 6/2000 without notice pay as well as retrenchment compensation under

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the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). It

is alleged that respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. Not only this, the

principle of "Last come First go" was not followed by the respondent as some juniors namely

S/Sh. Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Roshani Devi (4.7.1999) and Inder Singh

(1.1.2000) were retained in service whereas the service of petitioner had been terminated. The

grievance of petitioner further remains that after termination of services of petitioner so many

new hands had been engaged by the respondent/department, whose names were Pradeep Kumar

on 02.05.2008, Vipin Kumar on 1.7.2008, Lekh Raj on 25.8.2008 and Ruma Devi on 25.5.2014

but petitioner had not been given any opportunity of reemployment by the respondent prior to

appointing above named workers establishing violation of provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.

Feeling aggrieved the action of respondent in terminating the services of petitioner an

industrial dispute was raised vide demand notice dated 21.2.2015 copy of the same was

forwarded to Labour Officer, Mandi for further necessary action. It is alleged that Labour Officer,

Mandi could not resolve the dispute who submitted failure report under Section 12(4) of the

Industrial Disputes Act and the matter was referred to appropriate government i.e. Labour

Commissioner, Shimla who declined to refer the case of petitioner for adjudication in

pursuance to which the petitioner had approached Hon'ble High Court of H.P. by filing CWP

no.8315/2012 which had been decided on 20.12.2012 directing the Labour Commissioner Shimla

to make reference to the Labour Court. The dispute stated to have been not filed on account of

delay and moreover Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has condoned the delay of eight years in case of

Rajneet Singh vs. State of H.P. & Ors. reported in 2015 (145) FLR 722. The petitioner

alleges that respondent in terminating the services of petitioner w.e.f. 1999 without compliance

with mandatory provision of Industrial Disputes Act was illegal and unjustified. Accordingly,

prayer has been made to set aside the illegal termination order of petitioner directing the respondent

to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages, seniority and continuity in service with all

consequential benefits.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, delay and laches. On merits admitted that petitioner was engaged

as daily wager on 1/1999 who intermittently worked upto 6/2000. It is alleged that petitioner has

abandoned the job of her own who had not completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is

alleged that petitioner had left the job of her own sweet will and respondent/department had not

violated any provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The plea of respondent further remained that

petitioner had left the job at her own sweet will. Moreover there exist inordinate delay in

raising industrial dispute. It is alleged that petitioner had left the job of her own sweet will who

was never terminated by the respondent. It is alleges that question of termination of the services

of petitioner by the respondent does not arise. Delay in filing the claim petition is stated to be

fatal to the case of petitioner and the petitioner raised her claim when other workers raised

demand notice and that petitioner was gainfully employed as an agriculturist after leaving the job.

Accordingly, petition was sought to be dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6.

To prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A, Ex. PW1/B copy of RTI information dated

13.11.2013, Ex. PW1/C copy of mandays chart of Sh. Shashi Kant, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/D, copy of letter dated 18.3.2015 Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Kashyap,

the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur as RW1 tendered/proved her affidavit

Ex. RW1/A, mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B and closed the evidence.

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7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative/counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of

this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 21.01.2017 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the claimant/petitioner by the respondents from

6/2000 and raised her industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 4.5.2015 is/was

illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

. .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged.

If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.60,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. It is pertinent to mention here that claim petition before this Court was filed by

petitioner in which she has prayed for setting aside the retrenchment order w.e.f. 6/2000 qua her

illegal termination and sought direction to the effect that services of petitioner be treated as

continuous service till date with full back wages. It has further been prayed that services of

petitioner be regularized after completion of eight years of service on the basis of policy

framed by the State Govt. with all consequential benefits. Not only this, petitioner also prayed that

her case may also be considered for engagement in service as per policy framed by the State Govt.

and to another relief petitioner is entitled.

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12. A bare glance at claim petition would reveal that petitioner was appointed as daily

wage basis with the respondent in the month of January, 1999 on muster roll basis as beldar

who continued to work till June, 2000 when her services were terminated in violation of

Section 25-F of the Act as it is unclear from evidence if compensation under Section 25-F

was factually received by petitioner. While retrenching the services of petitioner principle of "Last

come First go" was not followed as Prabhu Ram (1.8.1998), Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Roshani Devi

(4.7.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Inder Singh (1.1.2000) and Hans Raj (6.4.2000) were

retained in service and thus the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not followed by the

respondent. Mandays chart Ex. RW1/B on record reveals that petitioner had worked for 310 ½

days in the year 1999 and 124 days in 2000. Even if we look at the mandays chart, this would

show that immediately preceding her termination in 2000, petitioner has factually worked for

310 ½ days in 1999 and 124 days in 2000 aggregating to 434 ½ days prior to termination. A bare

glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for more than

240 days ever since January, 1999 till June, 2000 immediately prior to her retrenchment as

stated above. A bare glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal petitioner had worked

for more than 240 days ever since January, 1999 till June, 2000 immediately prior to her

retrenchment as stated above. Be it noticed that Pardeep Kumar, Lekh Raj & Satya Devi had been

appointed in 2007, 2004 and 2011 respectively. It is pertinent to mention to state here that when

persons mentioned in para no. 2 of the affidavit Ex. PW1/A were engaged petitioner was factually

not given offer for reemployment which manifestly violates the provisions of Section 25-H of

the Act. From evidence, it is evidently clear that after termination of petitioner she was available

for job who was not appointed however some persons fresh were allowed to join in service. As

such, action of respondent in doing so clearly violates Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty, respondent had issued any notice or

letter. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner

abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental

inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after June, 2000. No reason whatsoever has been

assigned for such an action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any

departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This

prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any

other fact in issue. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that

large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers

have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle

of "Last come First go‟ was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner

despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/D is the seniority list of

daily wages beldar in respect of Dharampur Division who had completed eight years of as on

31.3.2008 and some of them were junior to the petitioner and had joined after termination of the

services of petitioner. Some of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/D the seniority list details of

workers of Division HPPWD Dharampur were certainly junior to petitioner figured at serial nos.

646 and 652 respectively who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 240

days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month.

Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called

upon to join for service at any time after June, 2000 even at the time when junior persons were

reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G

of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was

senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was terminated and even thereafter

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respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also

violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that petitioner be

treated in continuous service for eight years and for said reason the left period after June, 2000

be treated as regular period. It is not understood as to how petitioner could claim such benefit as

petitioner never worked with the respondent/department after her termination as well as there

is no adequate evidence on record suggesting that petitioner had represented the

respondent/department after her termination, although petitioner had issued demand notice i.e.

4.5.2015 after about fifteen years and thus judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2012 (132)

FLR 528 (SC) titled as H.S. Rajashekara and State Bank of Mysore and another does not

come to the rescue of the petitioner. Therefore, the entire period cannot be treated in service.

As stated above that petitioner remained out of job after her termination but there is nothing

authenticated in evidence suggesting that she remained without earning moreso when she

herself admitted in cross-examination that she had cultivable land and also earned by working as

labourer. It is maintained if, she did not get any government job however petitioner has revealed in

cross-examination that she had not been given notice as well as retrenchment compensation as

required to be paid. In view of foregoing discussions, respondent is held to have violated the

provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

16. Ld. Authorized Representative/counsel for petitioner has placed reliance of

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 titled as Rashtriya

Colliery Mazdoor Sangh and Employers in Relation to Management of Kenduahih

Colliery of M/S BCCL and Ors., in which Hon'ble Apex Court has awarded compensation of

Rs.4 lakh to each workman. Similarly, reliance has placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court

of Punjab & Haryana reported in 2014 LLR 967 titled as Deshsewak Foundry vs. Presiding

Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur & Ors., in which compensation of Rs. 5 lakh was

awarded. In another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench reported in 2017

(152) FLR 206, titled as Youth Co-ordinator, Nehru Yuva Kendra and Labour Court

No.2, Jaipur and Anr. in which compensation of Rs.2 lakh was granted to the workman

who had merely worked for two years. Thus, above said judgments disclosing awarding larger

amount of compensation which the claimant/petitioner has prayed for. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

has relied upon judgment of Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and

another vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), in which various criteria

to be looked by Labour Court in awarding compensation. It has been held that before

exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors

including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the

ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute

before grant of relief in an industrial dispute and in this judgment Hon'ble Apex Court had

awarded compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- only in lieu of reinstatement and consequential

benefits to a retrenched employee who had issued demand notice after about six years.

17. Since no straight-jacket formula can be applied for determining compensation as it is

to be awarded on the basis of facts of case. In 2014 LLR 967 Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &

Haryana had awarded compensation of Rs.5 lac to claimant petitioner who was litigating for

past 30 years. Similarly, in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 Hon'ble Apex Court awarded compensation

to each worker of Rs.4 lacs. It was observed that many of the workmen were at age of retirement

and that nearly 27 years had elapsed since the time of retrenchment. Moreover, the workers

who were awarded compensation of Rs.4 lac belonged to skilled category of Tyndals. As such,

judgment relied upon by ld. counsel/Authorized Representative for petitioner does not apply to

present case rather applying the criteria laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Geetam Singh’s

case 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) has to be followed and applied.

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18. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on June, 2000 and the industrial

dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel,

ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903

Hon’ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising

dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other

judgments even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another

vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned

besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the

industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs.

Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6

SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the

proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. has representing State/respondents has vehemently contended that

claimant/petitioner is not entitled for any relief either by way of reinstatement or compensation

in view of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as

Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. Relying upon the aforesaid

judgment, it has been contended that while making reference to the Labour Court by the

Government, the competent authority has to see that there is existence of an industrial dispute

or apprehension of an industrial dispute and if there is no live dispute or if dispute was no

longer existing reference could not be made at belated stage. On the other hand, ld. Authorized

Representative for the petitioner has contended that the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

referred to above does not come to the rescue to the respondents moreso when government itself

made reference and has not challenged the correctness of reference before the Hon'ble High Court.

I have carefully gone through the judgment referred to above and of the view that the

contention of the ld. Dy. D.A. is fallacious. It would be relevant to refer to para 7 of the judgment

in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that the issue which fell for determination is

whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. It was further observed that order of

reference cannot be made mechanically without forming an opinion as referred to in the other

paragraphs of the judgment and order of making reference is open to judicial review if it is shown

that the appropriate government had no material before it or it has not applied its mind to the

material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have

taken into consideration. In paragraph 23 Sub para (8) of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

which it has been specially observed that the High Court can exercise its powers under Article

226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It

was submitted before the Hon'ble Apex Court that once a reference has been made under Section

10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in

writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court which was found be not

correct proposition but certainly correctness of reference under Section 10 of Industrial

Disputes Act is not in challenge before this Court. Reliance has been made on another

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2000) 1 SCC 371, National Engg. Industries

Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan in judgment of 2016 (supra). In Sapan Kumar Pandit’s

(2000), case it was held that the period of making of reference is co- extensive with the

existence of dispute, meaning thereby that the dispute should be alive on the day when the

decision was taken to make a reference or to refuse to make reference. Although, Hon'ble Apex

Court has made elaborated discussions qua consideration before making reference which is not

issue before this Court. The judgment referred in 2016 primarily reveals guidelines how

reference under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act is to be made by competent authority under

the Industrial Disputes Act. In the judgment, there is no stipulation of violation of any other

provisions of Industrial Disputes Act in which had been denied either for relief of reinstatement or

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compensation. As such, this judgment of (2016) does not apply to the present case which deals

primarily with reference under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act and not for wrongful

termination under Section 25 of Industrial Disputes Act. Moreover, the facts of case before the

Hon'ble Apex Court are altogether different from case in hand as in case before Hon'ble Apex Court

petitioner was educated person working as clerk whereas the claimant before this Court is

uneducated unskilled labourer besides being an illiterate villager who had been engaged as

labourer to manual work by respondents. On this score also facts of case are different. Not only

this, law of limitation is held to be not applicable in view of observation made in para (18) of

judgment (2016) supra. Accordingly, it is held that judgment of 2016 does not apply to the present

case having different facts as well as law.

20. Applying the ratio of aforesaid judgments more specifically judgment reported in

2013 (136) FLR 893 SC (supra) and that petitioner had rendered total service for two years who

was non-skilled worker ageing 43 years when her services were illegally terminated who is not

likely to get government job at this age and had factually worked for 434 ½ days in two years

when she had already completed 240 days entitling her protection envisaged under Section 25-F of

Industrial Disputes Act irrespective of fact that demand notice was issued after a period of

fifteen years by the petitioner, but keeping in view peculiar facts and circumstances as stated

above a lump-sum compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand only) would be

appropriate relief to the petitioner in lieu of back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well

as other consequential service benefits. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall

be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

21. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

22. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as the other consequential service benefits.

Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four

months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondents shall be liable to pay

the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its

realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

23. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

24. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

25. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

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Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 611/2016

Date of Institution : 26.08.2016

Date of Decision : 20.07.2017

Smt. Veena Devi w/o Shri Sita Ram, r/o Village Strehar, P.O. Dharampur, Tehsil

Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD, Nirman Bhavan, Shimla.

2.

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Smt. Veena Devi W/o Sh. Sita Ram Vill.

Strehar, PO Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. during 9/1999 by (1)

the Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD, Nirman Bhawan, Shimla02, (2) the Executive Engineer,

HPPWD,-Division Dharampur, Distt. Mandi, H.P. who had worked as beldar on daily

wages basis during the 11/1998 to 9/1999, only for 202.5 days and has raised her

industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 29.5.2015 after 15 years, without complying

with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not,

keeping in view of working period as above and delay of more than 15 years in raising

the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employers/management?”

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2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition revealed that petitioner had been

engaged by respondent on daily waged basis on muster roll as beldar w.e.f. 11/1998 where she

continued to work upto 9/1999 who had completed 240 days. Averments made in the claim

petition further revealed that services of the petitioner had been terminated by the respondent

vide verbal order w.e.f. 9/1999 without notice pay as well as retrenchment compensation under

the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). It

is alleged that respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. Not only this, the

principle of "Last come First go" was not followed by the respondent as some juniors namely

S/Sh. Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Roshani Devi (4.7.1999) and Inder Singh

(1.1.2000) were retained in service whereas the service of petitioner had been terminated. The

grievance of petitioner further remains that after termination of services of petitioner so many

new hands had been engaged by the respondent/department, whose names were Pradeep Kumar

on 02.05.2008, Vipin Kumar on 1.7.2008, Lekh Raj on 25.8.2008 and Ruma Devi on 25.5.2014

but petitioner had not been given any opportunity of reemployment by the respondent prior to

appointing above named workers establishing violation of provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.

Feeling aggrieved the action of respondent in terminating the services of petitioner an

industrial dispute was raised vide demand notice dated 21.2.2015 copy of the same was

forwarded to Labour Officer, Mandi for further necessary action. It is alleged that Labour Officer,

Mandi could not resolve the dispute who submitted failure report under Section 12(4) of the

Industrial Disputes Act and the matter was referred to appropriate government i.e. Labour

Commissioner, Shimla who declined to refer the case of petitioner for adjudication in

pursuance to which the petitioner had approached Hon'ble High Court of H.P. by filing CWP

no.8315/2012 which had been decided on 20.12.2012 directing the Labour Commissioner Shimla

to make reference to the Labour Court. The dispute stated to have been not filed on account of

delay and moreover Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has condoned the delay of eight years in case of

Rajneet Singh vs. State of H.P. & Ors. reported in 2015 (145) FLR 722. The petitioner

alleges that respondent in terminating the services of petitioner w.e.f. 1999 without compliance

with mandatory provision of Industrial Disputes Act was illegal and unjustified. Accordingly,

prayer has been made to set aside the illegal termination order of petitioner directing the respondent

to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages, seniority and continuity in service with all

consequential benefits.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, delay and laches. On merits admitted that petitioner was engaged

as daily wager on 11/1998 who intermittently worked upto 9/1999. It is alleged that petitioner has

abandoned the job of her own who had not completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is

alleged that petitioner had left the job of her own sweet will and respondent/department had not

violated any provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The plea of respondent further remained that

petitioner had left the job at her own sweet will. Moreover there exist inordinate delay in

raising industrial dispute. It is alleged that petitioner had left the job of her own sweet will who

was never terminated by the respondent. It is alleges that question of termination of the services

of petitioner by the respondent does not arise. Delay in filing the claim petition is stated to be

fatal to the case of petitioner and the petitioner raised her claim when other workers raised

demand notice and that petitioner was gainfully employed as an agriculturist after leaving the job.

Accordingly, petition was sought to be dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

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6.

To prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A, Ex. PW1/B copy of RTI information dated

13.11.2013, Ex. PW1/C copy of mandays chart of Sh. Shashi Kant, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/D, copy of letter dated 18.3.2015 Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Kashyap,

the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur as RW1 tendered/proved her affidavit

Ex. RW1/A, mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative/counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of

this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 21.01.2017 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the claimant/petitioner by the respondents during

09/1999 and raised her industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 29.5.2015

is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

. .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged.

If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.50,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. It is pertinent to mention here that claim petition before this Court was filed by

petitioner in which she has prayed for setting aside the retrenchment order w.e.f. 9/1999 qua her

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illegal termination and sought direction to the effect that services of petitioner be treated as

continuous service till date with full back wages. It has further been prayed that services of

petitioner be regularized after completion of eight years of service on the basis of policy

framed by the State Govt. with all consequential benefits. Not only this, petitioner also prayed that

her case may also be considered for engagement in service as per policy framed by the State Govt.

and to another relief petitioner is entitled.

12. A bare glance at claim petition would reveal that petitioner was appointed as daily

wage basis with the respondent in the month of November, 1998 on muster roll basis as beldar

who continued to work till September, 1999 when her services were terminated in violation of

Section 25-F of the Act as it is unclear from evidence if compensation under Section 25-F was

factually received by petitioner. While retrenching the services of petitioner principle of "Last come

First go" was not followed as Prabhu Ram (1.8.1998), Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Roshani Devi

(4.7.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Inder Singh (1.1.2000) and Hans Raj (6.4.2000) were

retained in service and thus the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not followed by the

respondent. Mandays chart Ex. RW1/B on record reveals that petitioner had worked for 49 days

in the year 1998 and 153 ½ days in 1999. Even if we look at the mandays chart, this would

show that immediately preceding her termination in 1999, petitioner has factually worked for 49

days in 1998 and 153 ½ days in 1999 aggregating to 202 ½ days prior to termination. A bare

glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had not worked for more

than 240 days ever since November, 1998 till September, 1999 immediately prior to her

retrenchment as stated above. A bare glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal

petitioner had not worked for more than 240 days ever since November, 1998 till September, 1999

immediately prior to her retrenchment as stated above. Be it noticed that Pardeep Kumar, Lekh Raj

& Satya Devi had been appointed in 2007, 2004 and 2011 respectively. It is pertinent to

mention to state here that when persons mentioned in para no. 2 of the affidavit Ex. PW1/A were

engaged petitioner was factually not given offer for reemployment which manifestly violates the

provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. From evidence, it is evidently clear that after termination

of petitioner she was available for job who was not appointed however some persons fresh were

allowed to join in service. As such, action of respondent in doing so clearly violates Section 25-H

of the Industrial Disputes Act.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty, respondent had issued any notice or

letter. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner

abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental

inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 1999. No reason whatsoever has

been assigned for such an action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any

departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This

prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any

other fact in issue. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that

large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers

have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle

of "Last come First go" was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner

despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/D is the seniority list of

daily wages beldar in respect of Dharampur Division who had completed eight years of as on

31.3.2008 and some of them were junior to the petitioner and had joined after termination of the

services of petitioner. Some of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/D the seniority list details of

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workers of Division HPPWD Dharampur were certainly junior to petitioner figured at serial nos.

646 and 652 respectively who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 240

days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month.

Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called

upon to join for service at any time after September, 1999 even at the time when junior persons

were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G

of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was

senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was terminated and even thereafter

respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also

violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that petitioner be

treated in continuous service for eight years and for said reason the left period after September,

1999 be treated as regular period. It is not understood as to how petitioner could claim such

benefit as petitioner never worked with the respondent/department after her termination as well

as there is no adequate evidence on record suggesting that petitioner had represented the

respondent/department after her termination, although petitioner had issued demand notice i.e.

29.5.2015 after about sixteen years and thus judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in

2012 (132) FLR 528 (SC) titled as H.S. Rajashekara and State Bank of Mysore and

another does not come to the rescue of the petitioner. Therefore, the entire period cannot be

treated in service. As stated above that petitioner remained out of job after her termination but

there is nothing authenticated in evidence suggesting that she remained without earning moreso

when she herself admitted in cross-examination that she had cultivable land and also earned by

working as labourer. It is maintained if, she did not get any government job however petitioner has

revealed in cross-examination that she had not been given notice as well as retrenchment

compensation as required to be paid. In view of foregoing discussions, respondent is held to have

violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

16. Ld. Authorized Representative/counsel for petitioner has placed reliance of

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 titled as Rashtriya

Colliery Mazdoor Sangh and Employers in Relation to Management of Kenduahih

Colliery of M/S BCCL and Ors., in which Hon'ble Apex Court has awarded compensation of

Rs.4 lakh to each workman. Similarly, reliance has placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court

of Punjab & Haryana reported in 2014 LLR 967 titled as Deshsewak Foundry vs. Presiding

Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur & Ors., in which compensation of Rs.5 lakh was

awarded. In another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench reported in 2017

(152) FLR 206, titled as Youth Co-ordinator, Nehru Yuva Kendra and Labour Court

No.2, Jaipur and Anr. in which compensation of Rs.2 lakh was granted to the workman

who had merely worked for two years. Thus, above said judgments disclosing awarding larger

amount of compensation which the claimant/petitioner has prayed for. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

has relied upon judgment of Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and

another vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), in which various criteria

to be looked by Labour Court in awarding compensation. It has been held that before

exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors

including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the

ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute

before grant of relief in an industrial dispute and in this judgment Hon'ble Apex Court had

awarded compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- only in lieu of reinstatement and consequential

benefits to a retrenched employee who had issued demand notice after about six years.

17. Since no straight-jacket formula can be applied for determining compensation as it is

to be awarded on the basis of facts of case. In 2014 LLR 967 Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &

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Haryana had awarded compensation of Rs.5 lac to claimant petitioner who was litigating for

past 30 years. Similarly, in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 Hon'ble Apex Court awarded compensation

to each worker of Rs.4 lacs. It was observed that many of the workmen were at age of retirement

and that nearly 27 years had elapsed since the time of retrenchment. Moreover, the workers

who were awarded compensation of Rs.4 lac belonged to skilled category of Tyndals. As such,

judgment relied upon by ld. counsel/Authorized Representative for petitioner does not apply to

present case rather applying the criteria laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Geetam Singh’s

case 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) has to be followed and applied.

18. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on September, 1999 and the industrial

dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel,

ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903

Hon’ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising

dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other

judgments even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another

vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned

besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the

industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs.

Sirhind Co- operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6

SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not

apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. has representing State/respondents has vehemently contended that

claimant/petitioner is not entitled for any relief either by way of reinstatement or compensation

in view of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as

Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. Relying upon the aforesaid

judgment, it has been contended that while making reference to the Labour Court by the

Government, the competent authority has to see that there is existence of an industrial dispute

or apprehension of an industrial dispute and if there is no live dispute or if dispute was no

longer existing reference could not be made at belated stage. On the other hand, ld. Authorized

Representative for the petitioner has contended that the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court referred

to above does not come to the rescue to the respondents moreso when government itself made

reference and has not challenged the correctness of reference before the Hon'ble High Court. I

have carefully gone through the judgment referred to above and of the view that the

contention of the ld. Dy. D.A. is fallacious. It would be relevant to refer to para 7 of the judgment

in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that the issue which fell for determination

is whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. It was further observed that order of

reference cannot be made mechanically without forming an opinion as referred to in the other

paragraphs of the judgment and order of making reference is open to judicial review if it is shown

that the appropriate government had no material before it or it has not applied its mind to the

material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have

taken into consideration. In paragraph 23 Sub para (8) of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

which it has been specially observed that the High Court can exercise its powers under Article

226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It

was submitted before the Hon'ble Apex Court that once a reference has been made under Section

10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in

writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court which was found be not

correct proposition but certainly correctness of reference under Section 10 of Industrial

Disputes Act is not in challenge before this Court. Reliance has been made on another

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2000) 1 SCC 371, National Engg. Industries

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Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan in judgment of 2016 (supra). In Sapan Kumar Pandit’s

(2000), case it was held that the period of making of reference is co- extensive with the

existence of dispute, meaning thereby that the dispute should be alive on the day when the

decision was taken to make a reference or to refuse to make reference. Although, Hon'ble Apex

Court has made elaborated discussions qua consideration before making reference which is not

issue before this Court. The judgment referred in 2016 primarily reveals guidelines how

reference under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act is to be made by competent authority under

the Industrial Disputes Act. In the judgment, there is no stipulation of violation of any other

provisions of Industrial Disputes Act in which had been denied either for relief of reinstatement or

compensation. As such, this judgment of (2016) does not apply to the present case which deals

primarily with reference under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act and not for wrongful

termination under Section 25 of Industrial Disputes Act. Moreover, the facts of case before the

Hon'ble Apex Court are altogether different from case in hand as in case before Hon'ble Apex Court

petitioner was educated person working as clerk whereas the claimant before this Court is

uneducated unskilled labourer besides being an illiterate villager who had been engaged as

labourer to manual work by respondents. On this score also facts of case are different. Not only

this, law of limitation is held to be not applicable in view of observation made in para (18) of

judgment (2016) supra. Accordingly, it is held that judgment of 2016 does not apply to the present

case having different facts as well as law.

20. Applying the ratio of aforesaid judgments more specifically judgment reported in

2013 (136) FLR 893 SC (supra) and that petitioner had rendered total service for two years who

was non-skilled worker ageing 48 years when her services were illegally terminated who is not

likely to get government job at this age and had factually worked for 202 ½ days in two years

irrespective of fact that demand notice was issued after a period of sixteen years by the

petitioner, but keeping in view peculiar facts and circumstances as stated above a lump-sum

compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) would be appropriate relief to the

petitioner in lieu of back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as other consequential

service benefits. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within

four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4

are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

21. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

22. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as the other consequential service benefits.

Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four

months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondents shall be liable to pay

the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its

realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

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23. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

24. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

25. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 612/2016

Date of Institution : 26.08.2016

Date of Decision : 20.07.2017

Shri Rajinder Kumar s/o Shri Duni Chand, r/o Village Banehardi, P.O. Hyun Pehad,

Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

. . Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD, Nirman Bhawan, Shimla.

2.

Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District

Mandi, H.P. . .Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Sh. Rajinder kumar S/o Sh. Duni Chand Vill.

Banehadi, PO Hyun Pehad, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. from 1/2000 by (1) the

Engineer- in-Chief HPPWD, Nirman Bhawan, Shimla, (2) the Executive Engineer,

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HPPWD,- Division Dharampur, Distt. Mandi, H.P. who had worked as beldar on daily

wages basis during 11/1999 to 12/1999, only for 56 days, and has raised his industrial

dispute vide demand notice dated 13.4.2015 after 16 years, without complying with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in

view of working period as above and delay of more than 16 years in raising the industrial

dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the

above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employers/management?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition revealed that petitioner had been

engaged by respondent on daily waged basis on muster roll as beldar w.e.f. November, 1999

where he continued to work upto December, 1999 who had completed 240 days. Averments

made in the claim petition further revealed that services of the petitioner had been terminated by

the respondent vide verbal order in the year 2000 without notice pay as well as retrenchment

compensation under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as

"the Act" for brevity). It is alleged that respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the

Act. Not only this, the principle of "Last come First go" was not followed by the respondent as

some juniors namely S/Sh. Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Roshani Devi (4.7.1999)

and Inder Singh (1.1.2000) were retained in service whereas the service of petitioner had been

terminated. The grievance of petitioner further remains that after termination of services of

petitioner so many new hands had been engaged by the respondent/department, whose names

were Pradeep Kumar on 02.05.2008, Vipin Kumar on 1.7.2008, Lekh Raj on 25.8.2008 and Ruma

Devi on 25.5.2014 but petitioner had not been given any opportunity of reemployment by the

respondent prior to appointing above named workers establishing violation of provisions of

Section 25-H of the Act. Feeling aggrieved the action of respondent in terminating the services of

petitioner an industrial dispute was raised vide demand notice dated 13.4.2015 copy of the same

was forwarded to Labour Officer, Mandi for further necessary action. It is alleged that Labour

Officer, Mandi could not resolve the dispute who submitted failure report under Section 12(4) of

the Industrial Disputes Act and the matter was referred to appropriate government i.e. Labour

Commissioner, Shimla who declined to refer the case of petitioner for adjudication in pursuance

to which the petitioner had approached Hon'ble High Court of H.P. by filing CWP

no.8315/2012 which had been decided on 20.12.2012 directing the Labour Commissioner

Shimla to make reference to the Labour Court. The dispute stated to have been not filed on account

of delay and moreover Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has condoned the delay of eight years in case of

Rajneet Singh vs. State of H.P. & Ors. reported in 2015 (145) FLR 722. The petitioner alleges

that respondent in terminating the services of petitioner in the year 2000 without compliance

with mandatory provision of Industrial Disputes Act was illegal and unjustified. Accordingly,

prayer has been made to set aside the illegal termination order of petitioner directing the

respondent to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages, seniority and continuity in service with

all consequential benefits.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, delay and laches. On merits admitted that petitioner was engaged

as daily wager on 11/1999 who intermittently worked upto 12/1999. It is alleged that petitioner

has abandoned the job of his own who had not completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is

alleged that petitioner had left the job of his own sweet will and respondent/department had not

violated any provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The plea of respondent further remained that

petitioner had left the job at his own sweet will. Moreover there exist inordinate delay in raising

industrial dispute. It is alleged that petitioner had left the job of his own sweet will who was never

terminated by the respondent. It is alleges that question of termination of the services of petitioner

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by the respondent does not arise. Delay in filing the claim petition is stated to be fatal to the case

of petitioner and the petitioner raised his claim when other workers raised demand notice and

that petitioner was gainfully employed as an agriculturist after leaving the job. Accordingly,

petition was sought to be dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6.

To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A, Ex. PW1/B copy of RTI information dated

13.11.2013, Ex. PW1/C copy of mandays chart of Sh. Shashi Kant, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/D, copy of letter dated 18.3.2015 Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Kashyap,

the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur as RW1 tendered/proved his affidavit

Ex. RW1/A, mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative/counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of

this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 21.01.2017 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the claimant/petitioner by the respondents from

01/2000 and raised his industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 13.4.2015

is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

. .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged.

If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.40,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

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10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. It is pertinent to mention here that claim petition before this Court was filed by

petitioner in which he has prayed for setting aside the retrenchment order in month of January,

2000 qua his illegal termination and sought direction to the effect that services of petitioner be

treated as continuous service till date with full back wages. It has further been prayed that

services of petitioner be regularized after completion of eight years of service on the basis of

policy framed by the State Govt. with all consequential benefits. Not only this, petitioner also

prayed that his case may also be considered for engagement in service as per policy framed by the

State Govt. and to another relief petitioner is entitled.

12. A bare glance at claim petition would reveal that petitioner was appointed as daily

wage basis with the respondent in the month of November, 1999 on muster roll basis as beldar

who continued to work till December, 1999 when his services were terminated in violation of

Section 25-F of the Act as it is unclear from evidence if compensation under Section 25-F was

factually received by petitioner. While retrenching the services of petitioner principle of "Last come

First go" was not followed as Prabhu Ram (1.8.1998), Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Roshani Devi

(4.7.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Inder Singh (1.1.2000) and Hans Raj (6.4.2000) were

retained in service and thus the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not followed by the

respondent. Mandays chart Ex. RW1/B on record reveals that petitioner had worked for 56

days in 1999. Even if we look at the mandays chart, this would show that immediately

preceding his termination in 2000, petitioner has factually worked for 56 days in 1999 prior to

termination. A bare glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had not

worked for more than 240 days ever since November, 1999 till December, 1999 immediately

prior to his retrenchment as stated above. A bare glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would

reveal petitioner had not worked for more than 240 days ever since November, 1999 till

December, 1999 immediately prior to his retrenchment as stated above.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty, respondent had issued any notice or

letter. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner

abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental

inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after January, 2000. No reason whatsoever has been

assigned for such an action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any

departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This

prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any

other fact in issue. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment. In view of

foregoing, it is held that petitioner has failed to prove his claim for under Section 25-F of the

Industrial Disputes Act. As far as violation of Section 25-H is concerned, Pardeep Kumar, Sunita

Devi & Chanchla Devi are shown to have been appointed in 2008, 2009 and 2011 respectively.

It is pertinent to mention to state here that when persons mentioned in para no.(2) of the

affidavit Ex. PW1/A were engaged, petitioner was factually not given offer for reemployment

which manifestly violates mandate of Section 25-H of the Act. From evidence, it is evidently

clear that after termination of petitioner he was available for job who was not appointed however

some persons who joined later were allowed to join in service. As such, action of respondent in

doing so clearly violates Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

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14. In so far as violation of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, the principle of

"Last come First go‟ was not followed by the respondent in this case. It would be relevant to refer to

mandays chart Ex. PW1/C as well as seniority list Ex. PW1/D of Shashi Kant. The claim of

petitioner remains that said Shashi Kant had joined in the year 2000 and was junior to him in

service and after petitioner's illegal termination from service before engaging Shashi Kant,

petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of being given reemployment. Ld. Dy. D.A. for the

State has not disputed seniority list of daily waged beldar Ex. PW1/D which shows that Shashi

Kant had joined in the year 1999 and thus continues to be senior to him in service who figured

at serial no.646 of seniority list Ex. PW1/D. Ex. RW1/B mandays chart relating to the

petitioner reveals that he had joined in November, 1999. Thus, a controversy has arisen if Shashi

Kant factually joined earlier to him or later than him. Be it noticed that respondent had not

led any document to controvert the facts contains in Ex. PW1/C. Mandays chart of Shashi Kant

clearly shows that he had joined in January, 2000. It is admittedly not the case of the

respondents that the document Ex. PW1/C in incomplete document rather it strengthening the

plea of petitioner in which the petitioner has claimed to have been appointed earlier to said

Shashi Kant. Thus, when no evidence has been led by the respondent except the seniority list

referred to above and that RW1 has not disputed correctness of the contents of Ex. PW1/C

relating to Shashi Kant. As such, the controversy qua joining of different dates of said Shashi

Kant as stated above has to be interpreted in favour of the petitioner by holding that said Shashi

Kant had joined in the year 2000 and after termination of services of petitioner in December,

1999, he was never offered any opportunity of reemployment which clearly shows that the

respondent had violated the mandate of provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. As such, it is held

that while retrenching the services of petitioner and engaging services of said Shashi Kant,

respondents had clearly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. On this score

petitioner is entitled for relief as sought for.

15. Ld. counsel/AR for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that petitioner be

treated in continuous service for eight years and for said reason the left period after 2000 be

treated as regular period. It is not understood as to how petitioner could claim such benefit as

petitioner never worked with the respondent/department after his termination as well as there is no

adequate

evidence

on

record

suggesting

that

petitioner

had

represented

the

respondent/department after his termination, although petitioner had issued demand notice i.e.

13.4.2015 after about twelve years and thus judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in

2012 (132) FLR 528 (SC) titled as H.S. Rajashekara and State Bank of Mysore and

another does not come to the rescue of the petitioner. Therefore, the entire period cannot be

treated in service. As stated above that petitioner remained out of job after his termination but

there is nothing authenticated in evidence suggesting that he remained without earning moreso

when he himself admitted in cross-examination that he had cultivable land and also earned by

working as labourer. It is maintained if, he did not get any government job however petitioner

has revealed in cross-examination that he had not been given notice as well as retrenchment

compensation as required to be paid. In view of foregoing discussions, respondent is held to have

violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

16. Ld. Authorized Representative/counsel for petitioner has placed reliance of

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 titled as Rashtriya

Colliery Mazdoor Sangh and Employers in Relation to Management of Kenduahih

Colliery of M/S BCCL and Ors., in which Hon'ble Apex Court has awarded compensation of

Rs.4 lakh to each workman. Similarly, reliance has placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court

of Punjab & Haryana reported in 2014 LLR 967 titled as Deshsewak Foundry vs. Presiding

Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur & Ors., in which compensation of Rs.5 lakh was

awarded. In another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench reported in 2017

(152) FLR 206, titled as Youth Co-ordinator, Nehru Yuva Kendra and Labour Court

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No.2, Jaipur and Anr. in which compensation of Rs.2 lakh was granted to the workman

who had merely worked for two years. Thus, above said judgments disclosing awarding larger

amount of compensation which the claimant/petitioner has prayed for. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

has relied upon judgment of Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and

another vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), in which various criteria

to be looked by Labour Court in awarding compensation. It has been held that before

exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors

including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the

ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute

before grant of relief in an industrial dispute and in this judgment Hon‟ble Apex Court had

awarded compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- only in lieu of reinstatement and consequential

benefits to a retrenched employee who had issued demand notice after about six years.

17. Since no straight-jacket formula can be applied for determining compensation as it is

to be awarded on the basis of facts of case. In 2014 LLR 967 Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &

Haryana had awarded compensation of Rs.5 lac to claimant petitioner who was litigating for

past 30 years. Similarly, in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 Hon'ble Apex Court awarded compensation

to each worker of Rs.4 lacs. It was observed that many of the workmen were at age of retirement

and that nearly 27 years had elapsed since the time of retrenchment. Moreover, the workers

who were awarded compensation of Rs.4 lac belonged to skilled category of Tyndals. As such,

judgment relied upon by ld. counsel/Authorized Representative for petitioner does not apply to

present case rather applying the criteria laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Geetam Singh’s

case 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) has to be followed and applied.

18. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2000 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. has representing State/respondents has vehemently contended that

claimant/petitioner is not entitled for any relief either by way of reinstatement or compensation

in view of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as

Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. Relying upon the aforesaid

judgment, it has been contended that while making reference to the Labour Court by the

Government, the competent authority has to see that there is existence of an industrial dispute

or apprehension of an industrial dispute and if there is no live dispute or if dispute was no

longer existing reference could not be made at belated stage. On the other hand, ld. Authorized

Representative for the petitioner has contended that the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court referred

to above does not come to the rescue to the respondents moreso when government itself made

reference and has not challenged the correctness of reference before the Hon'ble High Court. I

have carefully gone through the judgment referred to above and of the view that the

contention of the ld. Dy. D.A. is fallacious. It would be relevant to refer to para 7 of the judgment

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in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that the issue which fell for determination

is whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. It was further observed that order of

reference cannot be made mechanically without forming an opinion as referred to in the other

paragraphs of the judgment and order of making reference is open to judicial review if it is shown

that the appropriate government had no material before it or it has not applied its mind to the

material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have

taken into consideration. In paragraph 23 Sub para (8) of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

which it has been specially observed that the High Court can exercise its powers under Article

226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It

was submitted before the Hon'ble Apex Court that once a reference has been made under Section

10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in

writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court which was found be not

correct proposition but certainly correctness of reference under Section 10 of Industrial

Disputes Act is not in challenge before this Court. Reliance has been made on another

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2000) 1 SCC 371, National Engg. Industries

Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan in judgment of 2016 (supra). In Sapan Kumar Pandit’s (2000),

case it was held that the period of making of reference is co- extensive with the existence of

dispute, meaning thereby that the dispute should be alive on the day when the decision was taken

to make a reference or to refuse to make reference. Although, Hon'ble Apex Court has made

elaborated discussions qua consideration before making reference which is not issue before this

Court. The judgment referred in 2016 primarily reveals guidelines how reference under Section

10 of Industrial Disputes Act is to be made by competent authority under the Industrial Disputes

Act. In the judgment, there is no stipulation of violation of any other provisions of Industrial

Disputes Act in which had been denied either for relief of reinstatement or compensation. As such,

this judgment of (2016) does not apply to the present case which deals primarily with reference

under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act and not for wrongful termination under Section

25 of Industrial Disputes Act. Moreover, the facts of case before the Hon'ble Apex Court are altogether

different from case in hand as in case before Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was educated person

working as clerk whereas the claimant before this Court is uneducated unskilled labourer besides

being an illiterate villager who had been engaged as labourer to manual work by respondents. On

this score also facts of case are different. Not only this, law of limitation is held to be not

applicable in view of observation made in para (18) of judgment (2016) supra. Accordingly, it is

held that judgment of 2016 does not apply to the present case having different facts as well as law.

20. Applying the ratio of aforesaid judgments more specifically judgment reported in

2013 (136) FLR 893 SC (supra) and that petitioner had rendered total service for one year who

was non-skilled worker ageing 35 years when his services were illegally terminated who is not

likely to get government job at this age and had factually worked for 56 days in a year

irrespective of fact that demand notice was issued after a period of fifteen years by the petitioner,

but keeping in view peculiar facts and circumstances as stated above a lump-sum compensation of

Rs.40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) would be appropriate relief to the petitioner in lieu of

back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as other consequential service benefits. It is

further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months and from the

date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per

annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

21. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

9832

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maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

22. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as the other consequential service benefits.

Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four

months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondents shall be liable to pay

the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its

realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

23. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

24. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

25. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 613/2016

Date of Institution : 26.08.2016

Date of Decision : 20.07.2017

Smt. Jamuna Devi w/o Shri Bidhi Chand, r/o Village Strehar, P.O. Dharampur, Tehsil

Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD, Nirman Bhavan, Shimla.

2.

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

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For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Smt. Jamuna Devi W/o Sh. Bidhi Chand Vill.

Strehar, PO Dharampur, Tehsil, Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. during 9/1999 by (1) the

Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD, Nirman Bhawan, Shimla, (2) the Executive Engineer,

HPPWD, -Division Dharampur, Distt. Mandi, H.P. who had worked as beldar on daily

wages basis during 11/1998 to 12/1998 & 1/1999 to 9/1999 only for 210.5 days, and has

raised her industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 15.6.2015 after more than 15

years, without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal

and justified? If not, keeping in view of working period as above and delay of more

than 15 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority,

past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above

employers/management?"

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition revealed that petitioner had been

engaged by respondent on daily waged basis on muster roll as beldar w.e.f. 11/1998 where she

continued to work upto 9/1999 who had completed 240 days. Averments made in the claim

petition further revealed that services of the petitioner had been terminated by the respondent

vide verbal order w.e.f. 9/1999 without notice pay as well as retrenchment compensation under

the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). It

is alleged that respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. Not only this, the

principle of "Last come First go" was not followed by the respondent as some juniors namely

S/Sh. Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Roshani Devi (4.7.1999) and Inder Singh

(1.1.2000) were retained in service whereas the service of petitioner had been terminated. The

grievance of petitioner further remains that after termination of services of petitioner so many

new hands had been engaged by the respondent/department, whose names were Pradeep Kumar

on 02.05.2008, Vipin Kumar on 1.7.2008, Lekh Raj on 25.8.2008 and Ruma Devi on 25.5.2014

but petitioner had not been given any opportunity of reemployment by the respondent prior to

appointing above named workers establishing violation of provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.

Feeling aggrieved the action of respondent in terminating the services of petitioner an

industrial dispute was raised vide demand notice dated 21.2.2015 copy of the same was

forwarded to Labour Officer, Mandi for further necessary action. It is alleged that Labour Officer,

Mandi could not resolve the dispute who submitted failure report under Section 12(4) of the

Industrial Disputes Act and the matter was referred to appropriate government i.e. Labour

Commissioner, Shimla who declined to refer the case of petitioner for adjudication in

pursuance to which the petitioner had approached Hon'ble High Court of H.P. by filing CWP

no.8315/2012 which had been decided on 20.12.2012 directing the Labour Commissioner Shimla

to make reference to the Labour Court. The dispute stated to have been not filed on account of

delay and moreover Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has condoned the delay of eight years in case of

Rajneet Singh vs. State of H.P. & Ors. reported in 2015 (145) FLR 722. The petitioner

alleges that respondent in terminating the services of petitioner w.e.f. 1999 without compliance

with mandatory provision of Industrial Disputes Act was illegal and unjustified. Accordingly,

prayer has been made to set aside the illegal termination order of petitioner directing the respondent

9834

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to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages, seniority and continuity in service with all

consequential benefits.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, delay and laches. On merits admitted that petitioner was engaged

as daily wager on 11/1998 who intermittently worked upto 9/1999. It is alleged that petitioner has

abandoned the job of her own who had not completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is

alleged that petitioner had left the job of her own sweet will and respondent/department had not

violated any provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The plea of respondent further remained that

petitioner had left the job at her own sweet will. Moreover there exist inordinate delay in

raising industrial dispute. It is alleged that petitioner had left the job of her own sweet will who

was never terminated by the respondent. It is alleges that question of termination of the services

of petitioner by the respondent does not arise. Delay in filing the claim petition is stated to be

fatal to the case of petitioner and the petitioner raised her claim when other workers raised

demand notice and that petitioner was gainfully employed as an agriculturist after leaving the job.

Accordingly, petition was sought to be dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6.

To prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A, Ex. PW1/B copy of RTI information dated

13.11.2013, Ex. PW1/C copy of mandays chart of Sh. Shashi Kant, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/D, copy of letter dated 18.3.2015 Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Kashyap,

the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur as RW1 tendered/proved her affidavit

Ex. RW1/A, mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative/counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of

this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 21.01.2017 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the claimant/petitioner by the respondents during

09/1999 and raised her industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 29.5.2015

is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

. .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged.

If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

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Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.50,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. It is pertinent to mention here that claim petition before this Court was filed by

petitioner in which she has prayed for setting aside the retrenchment order w.e.f. 9/1999 qua her

illegal termination and sought direction to the effect that services of petitioner be treated as

continuous service till date with full back wages. It has further been prayed that services of

petitioner be regularized after completion of eight years of service on the basis of policy

framed by the State Govt. with all consequential benefits. Not only this, petitioner also prayed that

her case may also be considered for engagement in service as per policy framed by the State Govt.

and to another relief petitioner is entitled.

12. A bare glance at claim petition would reveal that petitioner was appointed as daily

wage basis with the respondent in the month of November, 1998 on muster roll basis as beldar

who continued to work till September, 1999 when her services were terminated in violation of

Section 25-F of the Act as it is unclear from evidence if compensation under Section 25-F was

factually received by petitioner. While retrenching the services of petitioner principle of "Last come

First go" was not followed as Prabhu Ram (1.8.1998), Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Roshani Devi

(4.7.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Inder Singh (1.1.2000) and Hans Raj (6.4.2000) were

retained in service and thus the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not followed by the

respondent. Mandays chart Ex. RW1/B on record reveals that petitioner had worked for 49 days

in the year 1998 and 161 ½ days in 1999. Even if we look at the mandays chart, this would

show that immediately preceding her termination in 1999, petitioner has factually worked for 49

days in 1998 and 161 ½ days in 1999 aggregating to 210 ½ days prior to termination. A bare

glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had not worked for more

than 240 days ever since November, 1998 till September, 1999 immediately prior to her

retrenchment as stated above. A bare glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal

petitioner had not worked for more than 240 days ever since November, 1998 till September, 1999

immediately prior to her retrenchment as stated above. Be it noticed that Pardeep Kumar, Lekh Raj

& Satya Devi had been appointed in 2007, 2004 and 2011 respectively. It is pertinent to

mention to state here that when persons mentioned in para no. 2 of the affidavit Ex. PW1/A were

engaged petitioner was factually not given offer for reemployment which manifestly violates the

provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. From evidence, it is evidently clear that after termination

of petitioner she was available for job who was not appointed however some persons fresh were

allowed to join in service. As such, action of respondent in doing so clearly violates Section 25-H

of the Industrial Disputes Act.

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13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty, respondent had issued any notice or

letter. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner

abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental

inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 1999. No reason whatsoever has

been assigned for such an action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any

departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This

prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any

other fact in issue. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that

large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers

have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle

of "Last come First go" was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner

despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/D is the seniority list of

daily wages beldar in respect of Dharampur Division who had completed eight years of as on

31.3.2008 and some of them were junior to the petitioner and had joined after termination of the

services of petitioner. Some of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/D the seniority list details of

workers of Division HPPWD Dharampur were certainly junior to petitioner figured at serial nos.

646 and 652 respectively who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 240

days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month.

Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called

upon to join for service at any time after September, 1999 even at the time when junior persons

were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G

of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was

senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was terminated and even thereafter

respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also

violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that petitioner be

treated in continuous service for eight years and for said reason the left period after September,

1999 be treated as regular period. It is not understood as to how petitioner could claim such

benefit as petitioner never worked with the respondent/department after her termination as well

as there is no adequate evidence on record suggesting that petitioner had represented the

respondent/department after her termination, although petitioner had issued demand notice i.e.

15.6.2015 after about sixteen years and thus judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in

2012 (132) FLR 528 (SC) titled as H.S. Rajashekara and State Bank of Mysore and

another does not come to the rescue of the petitioner. Therefore, the entire period cannot be

treated in service. As stated above that petitioner remained out of job after her termination but

there is nothing authenticated in evidence suggesting that she remained without earning moreso

when she herself admitted in cross-examination that she had cultivable land and also earned by

working as labourer. It is maintained if, she did not get any government job however petitioner has

revealed in cross-examination that she had not been given notice as well as retrenchment

compensation as required to be paid. In view of foregoing discussions, respondent is held to have

violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

16. Ld. Authorized Representative/counsel for petitioner has placed reliance of

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 titled as Rashtriya

Colliery Mazdoor Sangh and Employers in Relation to Management of Kenduahih

Colliery of M/S BCCL and Ors., in which Hon'ble Apex Court has awarded compensation of

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Rs.4 lakh to each workman. Similarly, reliance has placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court

of Punjab & Haryana reported in 2014 LLR 967 titled as Deshsewak Foundry vs. Presiding

Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur & Ors., in which compensation of Rs.5 lakh was

awarded. In another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench reported in 2017

(152) FLR 206, titled as Youth Co-ordinator, Nehru Yuva Kendra and Labour Court

No.2, Jaipur and Anr. in which compensation of Rs.2 lakh was granted to the workman

who had merely worked for two years. Thus, above said judgments disclosing awarding larger

amount of compensation which the claimant/petitioner has prayed for. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

has relied upon judgment of Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and

another vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), in which various criteria

to be looked by Labour Court in awarding compensation. It has been held that before

exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors

including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the

ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute

before grant of relief in an industrial dispute and in this judgment Hon'ble Apex Court had

awarded compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- only in lieu of reinstatement and consequential

benefits to a retrenched employee who had issued demand notice after about six years.

17. Since no straight-jacket formula can be applied for determining compensation as it is

to be awarded on the basis of facts of case. In 2014 LLR 967 Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &

Haryana had awarded compensation of Rs.5 lac to claimant petitioner who was litigating for

past 30 years. Similarly, in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 Hon'ble Apex Court awarded compensation

to each worker of Rs.4 lacs. It was observed that many of the workmen were at age of retirement

and that nearly 27 years had elapsed since the time of retrenchment. Moreover, the workers

who were awarded compensation of Rs.4 lac belonged to skilled category of Tyndals. As such,

judgment relied upon by ld. counsel/Authorized Representative for petitioner does not apply to

present case rather applying the criteria laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Geetam Singh’s

case 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) has to be followed and applied.

18. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on September, 1999 and the industrial

dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel,

ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903

Hon’ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising

dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other

judgments even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another

vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned

besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the

industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs.

Sirhind Co- operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6

SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not

apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. has representing State/respondents has vehemently contended that

claimant/petitioner is not entitled for any relief either by way of reinstatement or compensation

in view of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as

Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. Relying upon the aforesaid

judgment, it has been contended that while making reference to the Labour Court by the

Government, the competent authority has to see that there is existence of an industrial dispute

or apprehension of an industrial dispute and if there is no live dispute or if dispute was no

longer existing reference could not be made at belated stage. On the other hand, ld. Authorized

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Representative for the petitioner has contended that the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court referred

to above does not come to the rescue to the respondents moreso when government itself made

reference and has not challenged the correctness of reference before the Hon'ble High Court. I

have carefully gone through the judgment referred to above and of the view that the

contention of the ld. Dy. D.A. is fallacious. It would be relevant to refer to para 7 of the judgment

in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that the issue which fell for determination is

whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. It was further observed that order of

reference cannot be made mechanically without forming an opinion as referred to in the other

paragraphs of the judgment and order of making reference is open to judicial review if it is shown

that the appropriate government had no material before it or it has not applied its mind to the

material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have

taken into consideration. In paragraph 23 Sub para (8) of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

which it has been specially observed that the High Court can exercise its powers under Article

226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It

was submitted before the Hon'ble Apex Court that once a reference has been made under Section

10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in

writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court which was found be not

correct proposition but certainly correctness of reference under Section 10 of Industrial

Disputes Act is not in challenge before this Court. Reliance has been made on another

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2000) 1 SCC 371, National Engg. Industries

Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan in judgment of 2016 (supra). In Sapan Kumar Pandit’s

(2000), case it was held that the period of making of reference is co-extensive with the

existence of dispute, meaning thereby that the dispute should be alive on the day when the

decision was taken to make a reference or to refuse to make reference. Although, Hon'ble Apex

Court has made elaborated discussions qua consideration before making reference which is not

issue before this Court. The judgment referred in 2016 primarily reveals guidelines how

reference under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act is to be made by competent authority under

the Industrial Disputes Act. In the judgment, there is no stipulation of violation of any other

provisions of Industrial Disputes Act in which had been denied either for relief of reinstatement or

compensation. As such, this judgment of (2016) does not apply to the present case which deals

primarily with reference under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act and not for wrongful

termination under Section 25 of Industrial Disputes Act. Moreover, the facts of case before the

Hon'ble Apex Court are altogether different from case in hand as in case before Hon'ble Apex Court

petitioner was educated person working as clerk whereas the claimant before this Court is

uneducated unskilled labourer besides being an illiterate villager who had been engaged as

labourer to manual work by respondents. On this score also facts of case are different. Not only

this, law of limitation is held to be not applicable in view of observation made in para (18) of

judgment (2016) supra. Accordingly, it is held that judgment of 2016 does not apply to the present

case having different facts as well as law.

20. Applying the ratio of aforesaid judgments more specifically judgment reported in

2013 (136) FLR 893 SC (supra) and that petitioner had rendered total service for two years who

was non-skilled worker ageing 46 years when her services were illegally terminated who is not

likely to get government job at this age and had factually worked for 210 ½ days in two years

irrespective of fact that demand notice was issued after a period of sixteen years by the

petitioner, but keeping in view peculiar facts and circumstances as stated above a lump-sum

compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) would be appropriate relief to the

petitioner in lieu of back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as other consequential

service benefits. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within

four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be

entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4

are answered accordingly.

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ISSUE NO.3

21. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

22. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as the other consequential service benefits.

Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four

months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondents shall be liable to pay

the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its

realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

23. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

24. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

25. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL,KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 605/2016

Date of Institution : 26.08.2016

Date of Decision : 20.07.2017

Smt. Badamu Devi w/o Shri Sohan Singh, r/o Village Strehar, P.O. Dharampur, Tehsil

Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD, Nirman Bhavan, Shimla.

2. The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondents.

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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Smt. Badamu Devi W/o Sh. Sohan Singh Vill.

Strehar, PO Dharampur, Tehsil Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi, H.P. during 9/1999 by (1) the

Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD, Nirman Bhawan, Shimla-2, (2) the Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Dharampur, Distt. Mandi, H.P. who had worked as beldar on daily

wages basis during the 11/1998 to 9/1999, only for 291 days, and has raised her industrial

dispute vide demand notice dated 16.3.2015 after 15 years, without complying with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping

in view of working period as above and delay of 15 years in raising the industrial

dispute,

what

amount

of

back wages,

seniority,

past

service

benefits

and

compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employers/management?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition revealed that petitioner had been

engaged by respondent on daily waged basis on muster roll as beldar w.e.f. 11/1998 where she

continued to work upto 9/1999 who had completed 240 days. Averments made in the claim

petition further revealed that services of the petitioner had been terminated by the respondent

vide verbal order w.e.f. 9/1999 without notice pay as well as retrenchment compensation under

the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). It

is alleged that respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. Not only this,

the principle of "Last come First go" was not followed by the respondent as some juniors

namely S/Sh. Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Roshani Devi (4.7.1999) and

Inder Singh (1.1.2000) were retained in service whereas the service of petitioner had been

terminated. The grievance of petitioner further remains that after termination of services of

petitioner so many new hands had been engaged by the respondent/department, whose names

were Pradeep Kumar on 02.05.2008, Vipin Kumar on 1.7.2008, Lekh Raj on 25.8.2008 and Ruma

Devi on 25.5.2014 but petitioner had not been given any opportunity of reemployment by the

respondent prior to appointing above named workers establishing violation of provisions of

Section 25-H of the Act. Feeling aggrieved the action of respondent in terminating the

services of petitioner an industrial dispute was raised vide demand notice dated 21.2.2015

copy of the same was forwarded to Labour Officer, Mandi for further necessary action. It is

alleged that Labour Officer, Mandi could not resolve the dispute who submitted failure report

under Section 12(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the matter was referred to appropriate

government i.e. Labour Commissioner, Shimla who declined to refer the case of petitioner for

adjudication in pursuance to which the petitioner had approached Hon'ble High Court of H.P.

by filing CWP no.8315/2012 which had been decided on 20.12.2012 directing the Labour

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Commissioner Shimla to make reference to the Labour Court. The dispute stated to have been not

filed on account of delay and moreover Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has condoned the delay of

eight years in case of Rajneet Singh vs. State of H.P. & Ors. reported in 2015 (145) FLR

722. The petitioner alleges that respondent in terminating the services of petitioner w.e.f. 1999

without compliance with mandatory provision of Industrial Disputes Act was illegal and

unjustified. Accordingly, prayer has been made to set aside the illegal termination order of

petitioner directing the respondent to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages, seniority and

continuity in service with all consequential benefits.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, delay and laches. On merits admitted that petitioner was engaged

as daily wager on 11/1998 who intermittently worked upto 9/1999. It is alleged that petitioner

has abandoned the job of her own who had not completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is

alleged that petitioner had left the job of her own sweet will and respondent/department had not

violated any provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The plea of respondent further remained that

petitioner had left the job at her own sweet will. Moreover there exist inordinate delay in

raising industrial dispute. It is alleged that petitioner had left the job of her own sweet will who

was never terminated by the respondent. It is alleges that question of termination of the services

of petitioner by the respondent does not arise. Delay in filing the claim petition is stated to be

fatal to the case of petitioner and the petitioner raised her claim when other workers raised

demand notice and that petitioner was gainfully employed as an agriculturist after leaving the job.

Accordingly, petition was sought to be dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6.

To prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A, Ex. PW1/B copy of RTI information dated

13.11.2013, Ex. PW1/C copy of mandays chart of Sh. Shashi Kant, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/D, copy of letter dated 18.3.2015 Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Kashyap,

the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur as RW1 tendered/proved her affidavit

Ex. RW1/A, mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative/counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of

this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 21.01.2017 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the claimant/petitioner by the respondents during

09/1999 and raised her industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 16.3.2015

is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

. .OPR.

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4.

Whether the claim petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged.

If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.50,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 4

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. It is pertinent to mention here that claim petition before this Court was filed by

petitioner in which she has prayed for setting aside the retrenchment order w.e.f. 9/1999 qua her

illegal termination and sought direction to the effect that services of petitioner be treated as

continuous service till date with full back wages. It has further been prayed that services of

petitioner be regularized after completion of eight years of service on the basis of policy

framed by the State Govt. with all consequential benefits. Not only this, petitioner also prayed that

her case may also be considered for engagement in service as per policy framed by the State Govt.

and to another relief petitioner is entitled.

12. A bare glance at claim petition would reveal that petitioner was appointed as daily

wage basis with the respondent in the month of November, 1998 on muster roll basis as beldar

who continued to work till September, 1999 when her services were terminated in violation of

Section 25-F of the Act as it is unclear from evidence if compensation under Section 25-F was

factually received by petitioner. While retrenching the services of petitioner principle of "Last come

First go" was not followed as Prabhu Ram (1.8.1998), Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Roshani Devi

(4.7.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Inder Singh (1.1.2000) and Hans Raj (6.4.2000) were

retained in service and thus the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not followed by the

respondent. Mandays chart Ex. RW1/B on record reveals that petitioner had worked for 47 days

in the year 1998 and 244 days in 1999. Even if we look at the mandays chart, this would show

that immediately preceding her termination in 1999, petitioner has factually worked for 47 days in

1998 and 244 days in 1999 aggregating to 291 days prior to termination. A bare glance at the

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for more than 240 days

ever since November, 1998 till September, 1999 immediately prior to her retrenchment as stated

above. A bare glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal petitioner had worked for

more than 240 days ever since November, 1998 till September, 1999 immediately prior to her

retrenchment as stated above. Be it noticed that Pardeep Kumar, Lekh Raj & Satya Devi had been

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appointed in 2007, 2004 and 2011 respectively. It is pertinent to mention to state here that when

persons mentioned in para no. 2 of the affidavit Ex. PW1/A were engaged petitioner was factually

not given offer for reemployment which manifestly violates the provisions of Section 25-H of

the Act. From evidence, it is evidently clear that after termination of petitioner she was available

for job who was not appointed however some persons fresh were allowed to join in service. As

such, action of respondent in doing so clearly violates Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty, respondent had issued any notice or

letter. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner

abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental

inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 1999. No reason whatsoever has

been assigned for such an action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any

departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This

prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any

other fact in issue. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that

large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers

have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle

of "Last come First go" was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner

despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/D is the seniority list of

daily wages beldar in respect of Dharampur Division who had completed eight years of as on

31.3.2008 and some of them were junior to the petitioner and had joined after termination of the

services of petitioner. Some of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/D the seniority list details of

workers of Division HPPWD Dharampur were certainly junior to petitioner figured at serial nos.

646 and 652 respectively who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 240

days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month.

Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called

upon to join for service at any time after September, 1999 even at the time when junior persons

were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G

of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was

senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was terminated and even thereafter

respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also

violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that petitioner be

treated in continuous service for eight years and for said reason the left period after September,

1999 be treated as regular period. It is not understood as to how petitioner could claim such

benefit as petitioner never worked with the respondent/department after her termination as well

as there is no adequate evidence on record suggesting that petitioner had represented the

respondent/department after her termination, although petitioner had issued demand notice i.e.

16.3.2015 after about sixteen years and thus judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in

2012 (132) FLR 528 (SC) titled as H.S. Rajashekara and State Bank of Mysore and

another does not come to the rescue of the petitioner. Therefore, the entire period cannot be

treated in service. As stated above that petitioner remained out of job after her termination but

there is nothing authenticated in evidence suggesting that she remained without earning moreso

when she herself admitted in cross-examination that she had cultivable land and also earned by

working as labourer. It is maintained if, she did not get any government job however petitioner has

revealed in cross-examination that she had not been given notice as well as retrenchment

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compensation as required to be paid. In view of foregoing discussions, respondent is held to have

violated the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

16. Ld. Authorized Representative/counsel for petitioner has placed reliance of

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 titled as Rashtriya

Colliery Mazdoor Sangh and Employers in Relation to Management of Kenduahih

Colliery of M/S BCCL and Ors., in which Hon‟ble Apex Court has awarded compensation of

Rs.4 lakh to each workman. Similarly, reliance has placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court

of Punjab & Haryana reported in 2014 LLR 967 titled as Deshsewak Foundry vs. Presiding

Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur & Ors., in which compensation of Rs.5 lakh was

awarded. In another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench reported in 2017

(152) FLR 206, titled as Youth Co-ordinator, Nehru Yuva Kendra and Labour Court

No.2, Jaipur and Anr. in which compensation of Rs.2 lakh was granted to the workman

who had merely worked for two years. Thus, above said judgments disclosing awarding larger

amount of compensation which the claimant/petitioner has prayed for. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

has relied upon judgment of Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and

another vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), in which various criteria

to be looked by Labour Court in awarding compensation. It has been held that before

exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors

including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the

ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute

before grant of relief in an industrial dispute and in this judgment Hon'ble Apex Court had

awarded compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- only in lieu of reinstatement and consequential

benefits to a retrenched employee who had issued demand notice after about six years.

17. Since no straight-jacket formula can be applied for determining compensation as it is

to be awarded on the basis of facts of case. In 2014 LLR 967 Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &

Haryana had awarded compensation of Rs.5 lac to claimant petitioner who was litigating for

past 30 years. Similarly, in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 Hon'ble Apex Court awarded compensation

to each worker of Rs.4 lacs. It was observed that many of the workmen were at age of retirement

and that nearly 27 years had elapsed since the time of retrenchment. Moreover, the workers

who were awarded compensation of Rs.4 lac belonged to skilled category of Tyndals. As such,

judgment relied upon by ld. counsel/Authorized Representative for petitioner does not apply to

present case rather applying the criteria laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Geetam Singh’s

case 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) has to be followed and applied.

18. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on September, 1999 and the industrial

dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel,

ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903

Hon’ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising

dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other

judgments even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another

vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned

besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the

industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs.

Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6

SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the

proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

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19. Ld. Dy. D.A. has representing State/respondents has vehemently contended that

claimant/petitioner is not entitled for any relief either by way of reinstatement or compensation

in view of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as

Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. Relying upon the aforesaid

judgment, it has been contended that while making reference to the Labour Court by the

Government, the competent authority has to see that there is existence of an industrial dispute

or apprehension of an industrial dispute and if there is no live dispute or if dispute was no

longer existing reference could not be made at belated stage. On the other hand, ld. Authorized

Representative for the petitioner has contended that the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court referred

to above does not come to the rescue to the respondents moreso when government itself made

reference and has not challenged the correctness of reference before the Hon'ble High Court. I

have carefully gone through the judgment referred to above and of the view that the

contention of the ld. Dy. D.A. is fallacious. It would be relevant to refer to para 7 of the judgment

in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that the issue which fell for determination is

whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. It was further observed that order of

reference cannot be made mechanically without forming an opinion as referred to in the other

paragraphs of the judgment and order of making reference is open to judicial review if it is shown

that the appropriate government had no material before it or it has not applied its mind to the

material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have

taken into consideration. In paragraph 23 Sub para (8) of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

which it has been specially observed that the High Court can exercise its powers under Article

226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It

was submitted before the Hon'ble Apex Court that once a reference has been made under Section

10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in

writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court which was found be not

correct proposition but certainly correctness of reference under Section 10 of Industrial

Disputes Act is not in challenge before this Court. Reliance has been made on another

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2000) 1 SCC 371, National Engg. Industries

Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan in judgment of 2016 (supra). In Sapan Kumar Pandit’s (2000),

case it was held that the period of making of reference is co- extensive with the existence of

dispute, meaning thereby that the dispute should be alive on the day when the decision was taken

to make a reference or to refuse to make reference. Although, Hon'ble Apex Court has made

elaborated discussions qua consideration before making reference which is not issue before this

Court. The judgment referred in 2016 primarily reveals guidelines how reference under Section

10 of Industrial Disputes Act is to be made by competent authority under the Industrial Disputes

Act. In the judgment, there is no stipulation of violation of any other provisions of Industrial

Disputes Act in which had been denied either for relief of reinstatement or compensation. As such,

this judgment of (2016) does not apply to the present case which deals primarily with reference

under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act and not for wrongful termination under Section

25 of Industrial Disputes Act. Moreover, the facts of case before the Hon'ble Apex Court are altogether

different from case in hand as in case before Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was educated person

working as clerk whereas the claimant before this Court is uneducated unskilled labourer besides

being an illiterate villager who had been engaged as labourer to manual work by respondents. On

this score also facts of case are different. Not only this, law of limitation is held to be not

applicable in view of observation made in para (18) of judgment (2016) supra. Accordingly, it is

held that judgment of 2016 does not apply to the present case having different facts as well as law.

20. Applying the ratio of aforesaid judgments more specifically judgment reported in

2013 (136) FLR 893 SC (supra) and that petitioner had rendered total service for two years who

was non-skilled worker ageing 52 years when her services were illegally terminated who is not

likely to get government job at this age and had factually worked for 291 days in two years

when she had already completed 240 days entitling her protection envisaged under Section 25-F

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of Industrial Disputes Act irrespective of fact that demand notice was issued after a period of

sixteen years by the petitioner, but keeping in view peculiar facts and circumstances as stated

above a lump-sum compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) would be

appropriate relief to the petitioner in lieu of back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well

as other consequential service benefits. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall

be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.3

21. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

22. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as the other consequential service benefits.

Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four

months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondents shall be liable to pay

the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its

realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

23. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

24. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

25. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 668/2016

Date of Institution : 17.09.2016

Date of Decision : 20.07.2017

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Smt. Amriti Devi w/o Shri Ravi Kumar, r/o V.P.O. Longni, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District

Mandi, H.P.

. . Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD, Nirman Bhawan, Shimla.

2.

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Smt. Amriti Devi W/O Shri Ravi Kumar, R/O

V.P.O. Longni, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. during 10/2001 by (i) the

Engineer-in- Chief HPPWD, Nirman Bhawan, Shimla (ii) the Executive Engineer,

H.P.P.W.D. Division, Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P. who has worked as beldar on

daily wages basis and has raised her industrial dispute vide demand notice dated

04/05/2015 after more than 14 years, allegedly without complying with the provisions of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of

working period of 288, 356 and 256 days during years 199, 2000 and 2001 and delay of

more than 14 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to

from the above employer/management?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition revealed that petitioner had been

engaged by respondent on daily waged basis on muster roll as beldar w.e.f. March, 1999

where she continued to work upto October, 2001 who had completed 240 days. Averments

made in the claim petition further revealed that services of the petitioner had been terminated by

the respondent vide verbal order w.e.f. November, 2001 without notice pay as well as

retrenchment compensation under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter

referred to as "the Act" for brevity). It is alleged that respondent had violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act. Not only this, the principle of "Last come First go" was not followed by

the respondent as some juniors namely S/Sh. Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Roshani

Devi (4.7.1999) and Inder Singh (1.1.2000) were retained in service whereas the service of

petitioner had been terminated. The grievance of petitioner further remains that after

termination of services of petitioner so many new hands had been engaged by the

respondent/department, whose names were Pradeep Kumar on 02.05.2008, Vipin Kumar on

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1.7.2008, Lekh Raj on 25.8.2008 and Ruma Devi on 25.5.2014 but petitioner had not been given

any opportunity of reemployment by the respondent prior to appointing above named

workers establishing violation of provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Feeling aggrieved the

action of respondent in terminating the services of petitioner an industrial dispute was raised vide

demand notice dated 4.5.2015 copy of the same was forwarded to Labour Officer, Mandi for

further necessary action. It is alleged that Labour Officer, Mandi could not resolve the dispute

who submitted failure report under Section 12(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the matter was

referred to appropriate government i.e. Labour Commissioner, Shimla who declined to refer the

case of petitioner for adjudication in pursuance to which the petitioner had approached Hon'ble

High Court of H.P. by filing CWP no.8315/2012 which had been decided on 20.12.2012

directing the Labour Commissioner Shimla to make reference to the Labour Court. The dispute

stated to have been not filed on account of delay and moreover Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has

condoned the delay of eight years in case of Rajneet Singh vs. State of H.P. & Ors. reported in

2015 (145) FLR 722. The petitioner alleges that respondent in terminating the services of

petitioner w.e.f. 1999 without compliance with mandatory provision of Industrial Disputes Act

was illegal and unjustified. Accordingly, prayer has been made to set aside the illegal

termination order of petitioner directing the respondent to reinstate the petitioner with full back

wages, seniority and continuity in service with all consequential benefits.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, delay and laches. On merits admitted that petitioner was engaged

as daily wager on 3/1999 who intermittently worked upto 10/2001. It is alleged that petitioner

has abandoned the job of her own who had not completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is

alleged that petitioner had left the job of her own sweet will and respondent/department had not

violated any provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The plea of respondent further remained that

petitioner had left the job at her own sweet will. Moreover there exist inordinate delay in

raising industrial dispute. It is alleged that petitioner had left the job of her own sweet will who

was never terminated by the respondent. It is alleges that question of termination of the services

of petitioner by the respondent does not arise. Delay in filing the claim petition is stated to be

fatal to the case of petitioner and the petitioner raised her claim when other workers raised

demand notice and that petitioner was gainfully employed as an agriculturist after leaving the job.

Accordingly, petition was sought to be dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6.

To prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A, Ex. PW1/B copy of RTI information dated

13.11.2013, Ex. PW1/C copy of mandays chart of Sh. Shashi Kant, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/D, copy of letter dated 18.3.2015 Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Kashyap,

the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Dharampur as RW1 tendered/proved her affidavit

Ex. RW1/A, mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative/counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy.

D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of

this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 27.02.2016 for

determination:

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1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

04.5.2015 qua her termination of service during October, 2001 by respondents

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,

2001 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form? . .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1 : No

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.70,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. It is pertinent to mention here that claim petition before this Court was filed by

petitioner in which she has prayed for setting aside the retrenchment order w.e.f. October, 2001

qua her illegal termination and sought direction to the effect that services of petitioner be treated

as continuous service till date with full back wages. It has further been prayed that services of

petitioner be regularized after completion of eight years of service on the basis of policy

framed by the State Govt. with all consequential benefits. Not only this, petitioner also prayed that

her case may also be considered for engagement in service as per policy framed by the State Govt.

and to another relief petitioner is entitled.

12. A bare glance at claim petition would reveal that petitioner was appointed as daily

wage basis with the respondent in the month of March, 1999 on muster roll basis as beldar who

continued to work till October, 2001 when her services were terminated in violation of Section

25-F of the Act as it is unclear from evidence if compensation under Section 25-F was

factually received by petitioner. While retrenching the services of petitioner principle of "Last come

First go" was not followed as Prabhu Ram (1.8.1998), Shasi Pal (6.4.1999), Roshani Devi

(4.7.1999), Mamta Devi (6.4.2000), Inder Singh (1.1.2000) and Hans Raj (6.4.2000) were

retained in service and thus the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not followed by the

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respondent. Mandays chart Ex. RW1/B on record reveals that petitioner had worked for 288 days

in the year 1999, 356 days in 2000 and 256 days in 2001. Even if we look at the mandays chart,

this would show that immediately preceding her termination in 2001, petitioner has factually

worked for 356 days in 2000 and 256 days in 2001 aggregating to 612 days prior to

termination. A bare glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for more than 240 days ever since March, 1999 till October, 2001 immediately prior to her

retrenchment as stated above. A bare glance at the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal

petitioner had worked for more than 240 days ever since March, 1999 till October, 2001

immediately prior to her retrenchment as stated above. Be it noticed that Pardeep Kumar, Lekh

Raj & Satya Devi had been appointed in 2007, 2004 and 2011 respectively. It is pertinent to

mention to state here that when persons mentioned in para no. 2 of the affidavit Ex. PW1/A were

engaged petitioner was factually not given offer for reemployment which manifestly violates the

provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. From evidence, it is evidently clear that after termination

of petitioner she was available for job who was not appointed however some persons fresh were

allowed to join in service. As such, action of respondent in doing so clearly violates Section 25-H

of the Industrial Disputes Act.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty, respondent had issued any notice or

letter. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner

abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental

inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2001. No reason whatsoever has been

assigned for such an action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any

departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This

prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any

other fact in issue. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that

large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers

have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle

of "Last come First go" was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner

despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/D is the seniority list of

daily wages beldar in respect of Dharampur Division who had completed eight years of as on

31.3.2008 and some of them were junior to the petitioner and had joined after termination of the

services of petitioner. Some of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/D the seniority list details of

workers of Division HPPWD Dharampur were certainly junior to petitioner figured at serial nos.

646 and 652 respectively who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 240

days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month.

Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called

upon to join for service at any time after September, 1999 even at the time when junior persons

were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G

of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was

senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1999 was terminated and even thereafter

respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also

violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that petitioner be

treated in continuous service for eight years and for said reason the left period after October,

2001 be treated as regular period. It is not understood as to how petitioner could claim such

benefit as petitioner never worked with the respondent/department after her termination as

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well as there is no adequate evidence on record suggesting that petitioner had represented

the respondent/department after her termination, although petitioner had issued demand notice

i.e. 4.5.2015 after about fourteen years and thus judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported

in 2012 (132) FLR 528 (SC) titled as H.S. Rajashekara and State Bank of Mysore

and another does not come to the rescue of the petitioner. Therefore, the entire period cannot

be treated in service. As stated above that petitioner remained out of job after her termination but

there is nothing authenticated in evidence suggesting that she remained without earning moreso

when she herself admitted in cross-examination that she had cultivable land and also earned by

working as labourer. It is maintained if, she did not get any government job however petitioner has

revealed in cross-examination that she had not been given notice as well as retrenchment

compensation as required to be paid. In view of foregoing discussions, respondent is held to have

violated the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

16. Ld. Authorized Representative/counsel for petitioner has placed reliance of

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 titled as Rashtriya

Colliery Mazdoor Sangh and Employers in Relation to Management of Kenduahih

Colliery of M/S BCCL and Ors., in which Hon'ble Apex Court has awarded compensation of

Rs.4 lakh to each workman. Similarly, reliance has placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court

of Punjab & Haryana reported in 2014 LLR 967 titled as Deshsewak Foundry vs. Presiding

Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur & Ors., in which compensation of Rs.5 lakh was

awarded. In another judgment of Hon‟ble High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench reported in 2017

(152) FLR 206, titled as Youth Co-ordinator, Nehru Yuva Kendra and Labour Court

No.2, Jaipur and Anr. in which compensation of Rs.2 lakh was granted to the workman

who had merely worked for two years. Thus, above said judgments disclosing awarding larger

amount of compensation which the claimant/petitioner has prayed for. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

has relied upon judgment of Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and

another vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), in which various criteria

to be looked by Labour Court in awarding compensation. It has been held that before

exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors

including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the

ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute

before grant of relief in an industrial dispute and in this judgment Hon'ble Apex Court had

awarded compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- only in lieu of reinstatement and consequential

benefits to a retrenched employee who had issued demand notice after about six years.

17. Since no straight-jacket formula can be applied for determining compensation as it is

to be awarded on the basis of facts of case. In 2014 LLR 967 Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &

Haryana had awarded compensation of Rs.5 lac to claimant petitioner who was litigating for

past 30 years. Similarly, in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 Hon'ble Apex Court awarded compensation

to each worker of Rs.4 lacs. It was observed that many of the workmen were at age of retirement

and that nearly 27 years had elapsed since the time of retrenchment. Moreover, the workers

who were awarded compensation of Rs.4 lac belonged to skilled category of Tyndals. As such,

judgment relied upon by ld. counsel/Authorized Representative for petitioner does not apply to

present case rather applying the criteria laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Geetam Singh’s

case 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) has to be followed and applied.

18. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on October, 2001 and the industrial

dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel,

ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903

Hon’ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising

9852

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dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other

judgments even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another

vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned

besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the

industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs.

Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6

SCC 82 in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the

proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. has representing State/respondents has vehemently contended that

claimant/petitioner is not entitled for any relief either by way of reinstatement or compensation

in view of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as

Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. Relying upon the aforesaid

judgment, it has been contended that while making reference to the Labour Court by the

Government, the competent authority has to see that there is existence of an industrial dispute

or apprehension of an industrial dispute and if there is no live dispute or if dispute was no

longer existing reference could not be made at belated stage. On the other hand, ld. Authorized

Representative for the petitioner has contended that the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court referred

to above does not come to the rescue to the respondents moreso when government itself made

reference and has not challenged the correctness of reference before the Hon'ble High Court. I

have carefully gone through the judgment referred to above and of the view that the

contention of the ld. Dy. D.A. is fallacious. It would be relevant to refer to para 7 of the judgment

in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that the issue which fell for determination is

whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. It was further observed that order of

reference cannot be made mechanically without forming an opinion as referred to in the other

paragraphs of the judgment and order of making reference is open to judicial review if it is shown

that the appropriate government had no material before it or it has not applied its mind to the

material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have

taken into consideration. In paragraph 23 Sub para (8) of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

which it has been specially observed that the High Court can exercise its powers under Article

226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It

was submitted before the Hon'ble Apex Court that once a reference has been made under Section

10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in

writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court which was found be not

correct proposition but certainly correctness of reference under Section 10 of Industrial

Disputes Act is not in challenge before this Court. Reliance has been made on another

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2000) 1 SCC 371, National Engg. Industries

Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan in judgment of 2016 (supra). In Sapan Kumar Pandit’s (2000),

case it was held that the period of making of reference is co- extensive with the existence of

dispute, meaning thereby that the dispute should be alive on the day when the decision was taken

to make a reference or to refuse to make reference. Although, Hon'ble Apex Court has made

elaborated discussions qua consideration before making reference which is not issue before this

Court. The judgment referred in 2016 primarily reveals guidelines how reference under Section

10 of Industrial Disputes Act is to be made by competent authority under the Industrial Disputes

Act. In the judgment, there is no stipulation of violation of any other provisions of Industrial

Disputes Act in which had been denied either for relief of reinstatement or compensation. As such,

this judgment of (2016) does not apply to the present case which deals primarily with reference

under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act and not for wrongful termination under Section

25 of Industrial Disputes Act. Moreover, the facts of case before the Hon'ble Apex Court are altogether

different from case in hand as in case before Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was educated person

working as clerk whereas the claimant before this Court is uneducated unskilled labourer besides

being an illiterate villager who had been engaged as labourer to manual work by respondents. On

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this score also facts of case are different. Not only this, law of limitation is held to be not

applicable in view of observation made in para (18) of judgment (2016) supra. Accordingly, it is

held that judgment of 2016 does not apply to the present case having different facts as well as law.

20. Applying the ratio of aforesaid judgments more specifically judgment reported in

2013 (136) FLR 893 SC (supra) and that petitioner had rendered total service for three years

who was non-skilled worker ageing 41 years when her services were illegally terminated who is

not likely to get government job at this age and had factually worked for 900 days in three

years when she had already completed 240 days entitling her protection envisaged under Section

25-F of Industrial Disputes Act irrespective of fact that demand notice was issued after a period

of fourteen years by the petitioner, but keeping in view peculiar facts and circumstances as

stated above a lump-sum compensation of Rs.70,000/- (Rupees seventy thousand only) would be

appropriate relief to the petitioner in lieu of back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as

other consequential service benefits. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be

paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner

would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues no. 1,

2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

21. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

22. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.70,000/- (Rupees seventy thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

back wages, seniority, past service benefits as well as the other consequential service benefits.

Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four

months and from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondents shall be liable to pay

the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its

realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

23. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

24. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

25. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref: No. : 211/2016

Smt. Leela Devi w/o Sh. Hem Singh, Village Bandhardi, P.O. Pehad, Tehsil Sarkaghat,

Distt. Mandi, H.P. . .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division Dharampur, Distt. Mandi, H.P. . .Respondent.

27-07-2017 Present: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, A.R. for the petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.

No PW is present. Heard. Authorised representative for the petitioner has made statement

for withdrawal of reference pending before this Court. Statement recorded and placed on file. In

view of the statement so made by the authorised representative for the petitioner as stated

above, the reference no. 211/16 is hereby dismissed as withdrawn.

1.

Ordered accordingly. The parties to bear their own costs.

2.

The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

3.

A copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and

further necessary action /publication at its end.

4.

The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM -

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 602/2015

Date of Institution : 19.12.2015

Date of Decision : 28.7.2017

Shri Satyawar s/o Shri Mahesh Dass, r/o Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. . .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District

Chamba, H.P. . .Respondent.

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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Satyawar, s/o Shri Mahesh Dass,

r/o Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide demand

notice dated 18-08-2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during

August, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of services of

Shri Satyawar S/O Shri Mahesh Dass, R/O Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, KIllar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar

(Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during August, 2004, without complying the provisions of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is

entitled to from the above employer?"

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner

above named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll

basis in the month of May, 1997 who continuously worked till August, 2004 with the

respondent/department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had

worked for 160 days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District

Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of

Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for

brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by

way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such

breaks are required to be counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160

days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains

that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the

end of August, 2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who

were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of

respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of

daily

wage

workers

working

under

the respondent

had

not

been

circulated

till

termination/retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even

principle of "Last come First go‟ had not been followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner

has named 28 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st May, 1998 to 1st

September, 2007. In the end of month of August, 2004 when the services of petitioner were

terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the

same time, one month's wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and for said

reason termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The

claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for

any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal

termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity

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of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained

unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of August, 2004 till the date of

institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus

entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral

order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of August, 2004. He further

prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of August, 2004 along-with back wages,

seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of

his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional

breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1997 to August, 2004

be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.

01.01.2005 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief

petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained engaged till

2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at

serial nos. 1 to 25 in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour

Court and at serial nos. 26 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of

petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore

serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has

maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in

para no.7 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal

Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004,

he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is

stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also

contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,

question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,

there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It

is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled

for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of "Last come First go‟ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of

junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, Ex.

RW1/C1 to Ex. RW1/C22 copy of orders/awards and closed the evidence.

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7.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 05.12.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

18.8.2010 qua his termination of service during August, 2004 by respondent suffers

from vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.75,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1, 2 AND 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1997 who continuously worked till 2004 with the

respondent/department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim

of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief

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of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1997 to August, 2004. He has also stated on oath that

no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2004 by oral

order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service.

Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in

service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the

Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served

respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had

never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching

petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not

approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner

had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure

report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial

dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP

where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had

occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even

after August, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission

on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken

by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on

the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job

in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had

been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that

petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence

led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 154 days in the year 1997, 146.5 days in 1998, 144 days in 1999, 96 days in 2000, 93

days in 2001, 107.5 days in 2002, 116 days in 2003 and 56 days in 2004 and thus a total of his

service in 1997 to 2004 in 08 years he had worked for 913 days in his entire service period. Be it

noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference

from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to

confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays

chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 56 days and thus

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immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not

rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one

year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that

large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to

07.9.1999 and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of

petitioner remains that principle of "Last come First go" was not followed as the juniors were

retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason.

Ex. PW1/B, Ex. PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who

were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex.

PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers

shown in Ex. PW1/E the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar

were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more

than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole

month. Ex. PW1/E also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked

for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently,

there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for

service at any time after August, 2004 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That

being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the

juniors workers mentioned in para no.3 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior

from these co-workers having joined service in 1997 was terminated and even thereafter

respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also

violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner

has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC

419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the

Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of

provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

reflected in Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex RW1/C22. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which

revealed

that

respondent

had

wrongly

terminated

the

services

of

those

claimant/petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that

persons were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. Rw1/C1 to Ex.

RW1/C22 were primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner

as status of these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when

petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which

entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not

absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is

held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's

termination in August, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter

as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized

Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-

examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

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admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been

earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately.

Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road

Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench

comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that "term

gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated.

It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment

merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the

same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was

earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him

and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that

Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not

justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he

cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from

agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully

employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it

is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and

respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and

Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus,

applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold

that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period

he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other

hand, ld. Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble

Apex Court titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar

reported in 2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for

reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan

State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned Additional

Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the

fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously

rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case

particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the

reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of

this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the

provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by

the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of

existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

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Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within

a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of

material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

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dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing- cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon

the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture

Marketing Board, Sub- Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant

para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section

5-Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and his termination was in violation o section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during

employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of

termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court- Judicial

discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the

workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac

directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks

failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

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Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as

ld. Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon'ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep

in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the

delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by

the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days

and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and

he raised industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to

be enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts

and circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-

sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment

of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 08 years

and actually worked for 913 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner

were disengaged in August, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial

dispute by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e. demand notice was given on

18.8.2010. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition

was ageing 41 years who has sufficient spell of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into

consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court

petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a

lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The

judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and

laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on

the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as

Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also

the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous

judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon‟ble

Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. Ld. Dy.

D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported

in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and

another. I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ

jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate

unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in

challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and

circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra,

claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case

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before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea

of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

21. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees

seventy five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and

its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

22. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

23. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of

the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months and from the date

of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

24. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

25. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

26. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 08/2016

Date of Institution : 02.01.2016

Date of Decision : 28.07.2017

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Shri Bargat Raj, s/o Shri Laxmi Chand, r/o Village and Post Office Punto, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

.

.Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, I.P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. . .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Bargat Raj S/O Shri Laxmi

Chand, R/O Village and Post Office Punto, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before

the Executive Engineer, I.P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P. vide demand notice dated 2.6.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service

during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the

services of Shri Bargat Raj S/O Shri Laxmi Chand, R/O Village and Post Office Punto,

Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.P.H./H.P.P.W.D.

Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004

without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and

justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been appointed on daily wage basis on muster roll in the month of

August, 1995 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent. Averments

made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar

year as per the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). Averments made

in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as "continuous services" for the purposes of calculation of 160 days

for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally

without issuing one month's notice in writing stipulating therein reason for retrenchment besides

no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally

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terminated. It is also alleged that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-

F of the Act while disengaging petitioner from service. The grievance of petitioner further

revealed that during years 2003 to 2005, respondent/department had disengaged the services of

more than 500 daily waged workmen in different Divisions of HPPWD and IPH. It is stated

that it has came to the knowledge to the petitioner from reliable sources that

respondent/department had engaged more than 200 contractors during 2003 onwards. It is stated

that after termination of the services of petitioner, petitioner had approached the respondent

time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the

services of petitioner had been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of

new workman from time to time and while doing so, respondent had not followed the principle of

"Last come, First go" envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that

respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service

namely Jai Dass who appointed in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Baldev in 2000, Amar Nath in

2000, Balak Chand in 2000, Shyam Lal in 2000, Prakash Chand in 2001, Sucheta Ram in 2001,

Trilok Chand in 2002, Hari in 2003, Hari Ram in 2003, Ram Dei in 2003 and Budhi Ram in 2003.

The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-

sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal

termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity

of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained

unemployed ever since his illegal termination from year of 2004 till the date of institution of

present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for

full back wages. Feeling aggrieved the action of respondent in terminating the services of

petitioner an industrial dispute was raised vide demand notice dated 02.6.2012 copy of the

same was forwarded to Labour Officer, Chamba for further necessary action. It is alleged that

Labour Officer, Chamba could not resolve the dispute and failure report under Section 12(4) of the

Industrial Disputes Act and the matter was referred to appropriate government i.e. Labour

Commissioner, Shimla who declined to refer the case of petitioner for adjudication in pursuance

to which the petitioner had approached the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. by filing CWP

no.4412/2015 which had been decided on 23.11.2015 and order of the Labour Commissioner,

Shimla has been setting aside. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 and thus petitioner prays for setting aside illegal termination of petitioner by the

respondent/department in September, 2004 as well as period of intermittent/fictional breaks

deliberately given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1995 to 2004. He

further prayed for reinstatement in service along-with full back wages, seniority including

continuity in service and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply, inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1995 who remained engaged till

2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. The allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been specifically denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner

mentioned in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no

other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. It is further stated

that name of person Sham Lal and Gautam Singh had been engaged on harness case and as

such there was no violation of the principle of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its

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stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour

Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of

"Last come, First go". It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would

have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated

to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that

since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of

notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for

charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that

petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of "Last come First go" was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1

tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list

Ex. PW1/B, copy of RTI information dated 13.11.2013 Ex. PW1/C and closed evidence. On the

other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R.

Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved

mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of orders/Awards Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex. RW1/C9

and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.10.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

02.6.2012 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

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Issue No.4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.60,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1994 continuously worked till September, 2004 with the

respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of

petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief

of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1994 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time, no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with

full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004

by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H

of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served

respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never

called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner

from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not

approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there

existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and petitioner had moved

before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was

submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by

petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon‟ble High Court by filing CWP where

direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred

and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

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Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent

as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand,

as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and

attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately

given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not

complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section

25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 53 days in the year 1994, 75 days in 1995, 39 days in 1998, 89 days in 1999, 23

days in 2000, 101 days in 2001, 49 days in 2002, 102 days in 2003 and 101 days in 2004 and thus

a total of his service in 1994 to 2004 in 09 years he had worked for 632 days in his entire service

period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no

reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to

confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays

chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 101 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had

not rendered service of 160 days. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the

provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld.

counsel/Authorized

Representative

for

petitioner

has

contended with

vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and

these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains

that principle of "Last come First go" was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of

petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B is the year-

wise seniority/mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined

in the year 1999 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. PW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years

although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent

establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September,

2004 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had

certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in

para no.4 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having

joined service in 1994 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford

opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section

25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank

of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon‟ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

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reflected in Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex RW1/C9. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which

revealed

that

respondent

had

wrongly

terminated

the

services

of

those

claimant/petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that

persons were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex

RW1/C9 were primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner

as status of these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when

petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 9 years which

entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not

absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is

held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A.

for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted

that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having

remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross- examination in

which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been

working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex

Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10

SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas

Kabir had held that "term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since

the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated

here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court

was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner

had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was

not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner

and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Sections 25-G

and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus,

applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to

hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the

period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan

State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned Additional

Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the

fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously

rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case

particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the

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reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of

this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions

of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the

appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing

industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent

had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay

in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability

of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

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cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,

since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had

rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there

was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the

Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised

after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

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20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section

25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based

on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the petitioner

with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker

may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been

correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met requirement,

cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be

appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex

Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)

and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager,

Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652. I have gone

through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of

reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon

the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

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Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been

contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode

of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for

reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance

of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal

Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of

Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did

not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view

was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for

merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground

of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to

consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous

to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering

compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as

Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the

Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of "Last come First

go" was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment

was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of

Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of

company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of

company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work but in the case in

hand petitioner had abandoned the job who never reported for duty. As such, when there is no

closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon

Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the

Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is

not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-

with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors

which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09 years and

actually worked for 632 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner

were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised

industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about eight years i.e. demand notice was

given on 02.6.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments

of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or

for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment

2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter

of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely

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declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through

these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to

the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex

Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon

the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v.

Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which

deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that

Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has

been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by

the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment

would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation

qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person

who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate

unskilled worker. For the above-said reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim

of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees

sixty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months and from the date

of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

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Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 13/2016

Date of Institution : 04.01.2016

Date of Decision : 28.07.2017

Shri Ajeet Kumar s/o Shri Gian Chand, r/o Village Parghwal, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Division Killar, H.P.P.W.D., Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. . .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Ajeet Kumar S/O Shri Gian

Chand, R/O Village Parghwal, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 23.4.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during

October, 2002 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services

of Shri Ajeet Kumar S/O Shri Gian Chand, R/O Village Parghwal, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar,

Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2002 without complying the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of

back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved

workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

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2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been appointed on daily wage basis on muster roll in the month of

April, 1997 who continuously worked till 2002 with the respondent. Averments made in the

petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as per the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). Averments made in the petition

revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial

breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted

as "continuous services" for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section

25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had

terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's

notice in writing stipulating therein reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation

was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is also alleged that

respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging

petitioner from service. The grievance of petitioner further revealed that during years 2003 to

2005, respondent/department had disengaged the services of more than 500 daily waged workmen

in different Divisions of HPPWD and IPH. It is stated that it has came to the knowledge to the

petitioner from reliable sources that respondent/department had engaged more than 200

contractors during 2003 onwards. It is stated that after termination of the services of petitioner,

petitioner had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of

petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner had been terminated,

respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and while

doing so, respondent had not followed the principle of "Last come, First go" envisaged under Section

25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior

to petitioner who are still in service namely Janto Devi who appointed in 2001, Jeet Singh in

1997, Gijja Ram in 1999, Laxmi Devi in 1999 and Gian Chand in 1997. The

claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination,

no charge- sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of

hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed

ever since his illegal termination from year of 2002 till the date of institution of present claim

petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages.

Feeling aggrieved the action of respondent in terminating the services of petitioner an industrial

dispute was raised vide demand notice dated 23.4.2011 copy of the same was forwarded to

Labour Officer, Chamba for further necessary action. It is alleged that Labour Officer,

Chamba could not resolve the dispute and failure report under Section 12(4) of the Industrial

Disputes Act and the matter was referred to appropriate government i.e. Labour Commissioner,

Shimla who declined to refer the case of petitioner for adjudication in pursuance to which the

petitioner had approached the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. by filing CWP no.8315/2012 which had

been decided on 20.12.2012 and order of the Labour Commissioner, Shimla has been setting aside.

Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section

25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus petitioner prays

for setting aside illegal termination of petitioner by the respondent/department in October, 2002

as well as period of intermittent/fictional breaks deliberately given time and again during entire

service of petitioner between 1997 to 2002. He further prayed for reinstatement in service along-

with full back wages, seniority including continuity in service and to any other relief petitioner is

entitled.

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4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply, inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained engaged till

2002 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. The allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been specifically denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner

mentioned in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no

other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. It is further stated

that name of person Sham Lal and Gautam Singh had been engaged on harness case and as

such there was no violation of the principle of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its

stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour

Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of

"Last come, First go". It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2002 he would

have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated

to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that

since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of

notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for

charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that

petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of "Last come First go‟ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1

tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list

Ex. PW1/B, copy of RTI information dated 13.11.2013 Ex. PW1/C and closed evidence. On the

other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R.

Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays

chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of orders/Awards Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex. RW1/C9 and closed

the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.10.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

23.4.2011 qua his termination of service during October, 2002 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

October, 2002 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

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3.

If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.75,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1997 continuously worked till October, 2002 with the

respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of

petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief

of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1997 to October, 2002. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25- F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time, no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2002 by

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oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he

had served

respondent

with

due

diligence

and

had

spotless

service

record

as

respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him

but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has

also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before

this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and

petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a

failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for

industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by

filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

October, 2002. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent

as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand,

as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and

attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately

given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not

complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section

25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 202 days in the year 1997, 197 days in 1998, 165 days in 1999, 176 days in 2000, 173

days in 2001 and 150 days in 2002 and thus a total of his service in 1997 to 2002 in 06 years he

had worked for 1063 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had worked

for more than 160 except the year 2002 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only

with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in

the year 2002 the petitioner had merely worked for 150 days and thus immediately in preceding

12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had rendered service of 160 days

so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was at all

required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As

such, the respondent is held to have violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld.

counsel/Authorized

Representative

for

petitioner

has

contended with

vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and

these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains

that principle of "Last come First go" was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of

petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B is the year-

wise seniority/mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined

in the year 1999 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

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mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. PW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years

although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent

establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2002

even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly

violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.4

of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having

joined service in 1997 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford

opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section

25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank

of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

reflected in Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex RW1/C9. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which

revealed

that

respondent

had

wrongly

terminated

the

services

of

those

claimant/petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that

persons were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex

RW1/C9 were primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner

as status of these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when

petitioner is proved to have worked for more than 160 days in preceding 6 years which entitled

him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from

its accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that

respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

October, 2002, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A.

for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted

that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having

remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross- examination in

which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been

working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex

Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10

SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas

Kabir had held that "term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since

the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated

here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court

was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner

had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was

not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

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discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner

and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Sections 25-F,

25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may

not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled

for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitieonr relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case.

The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the

catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically

held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to

make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for

adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

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legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent

had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay

in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability

of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,

since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had

rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there

was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the

Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

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important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2002 and the industrial dispute was raised

after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon‟ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section

25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant- employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

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has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the petitioner

with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker

may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been

correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met requirement,

cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be

appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex

Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)

and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager,

Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652. I have gone

through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of

reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been

contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode

of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for

reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance

of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal

Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of

Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did

not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view

was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for

merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground

of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to

consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous

to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering

compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as

Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the

Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of "Last come First

go" was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment

was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of

Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of

company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of

company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work but in the case in

hand petitioner had abandoned the job who never reported for duty. As such, when there is no

closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon

Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

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raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the

Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is

not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-

with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within

six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have

weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 06 years and actually worked

for 1063 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were

disengaged in October, 2002 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute

by issuance of demand notice after about nine years i.e. demand notice was given on

23.4.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble

Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back

wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139)

FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay

and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined

on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled

as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment

also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture

Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these

judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the

petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court

laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint

Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals

reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble

High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been

challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by

the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment

would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation

qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person

who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate

unskilled worker. For the above-said reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim

of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees

seventy five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

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maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of

the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months and from the date

of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 15/2016

Date of Institution : 20.01.2016

Date of Decision : 28.07.2017

Shri Sher Singh s/o Shri Bazir Chand, r/o Village and Post Office Dharwas, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

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AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Sher Singh S/O Shri Bazir Chand,

R/O Village and Post Office Dharwas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 6.10.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during

October, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the

services of Shri Sher Singh S/O Shri Bazir Chand, R/O Village and Post Office

Dharwas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D.

Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2005 without

complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not,

what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above

aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been appointed on daily wage basis on muster roll in the month of

November, 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments

made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar

year as per the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became

eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). Averments made

in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as "continuous services" for the purposes of calculation of 160 days

for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally

without issuing one month's notice in writing stipulating therein reason for retrenchment besides

no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally

terminated. It is also alleged that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-

F of the Act while disengaging petitioner from service. The grievance of petitioner further

revealed that during years 2003 to 2005, respondent/department had disengaged the services of

more than 500 daily waged workmen in different Divisions of HPPWD and IPH. It is stated

that it has came to the knowledge to the petitioner from reliable sources that

respondent/department had engaged more than 200 contractors during 2003 onwards. It is stated

that after termination of the services of petitioner, petitioner had approached the respondent

time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the

services of petitioner had been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of

new workman from time to time and while doing so, respondent had not followed the principle of

"Last come, First go" envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that

respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service

namely Janto Devi who appointed in 2001, Jeet Singh in 1997, Gijja Ram in 1999, Laxmi Devi in

1999 and Gian Chand in 1997. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service

record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct

and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at

the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges

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that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from year of 2005 till the

date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was

thus entitled for full back wages. Feeling aggrieved the action of respondent in terminating the

services of petitioner an industrial dispute was raised vide demand notice dated 6.10.2011

copy of the same was forwarded to Labour Officer, Chamba for further necessary action. It is

alleged that Labour Officer, Chamba could not resolve the dispute and failure report under Section

12(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the matter was referred to appropriate government i.e.

Labour Commissioner, Shimla who declined to refer the case of petitioner for adjudication in

pursuance to which the petitioner had approached the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. by filing

CWP no.4410/2015 which had been decided on 24.11.2015 and order of the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla has been setting aside. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed

violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 and thus petitioner prays for setting aside illegal termination of petitioner by

the respondent/department in October, 2005 as well as period of intermittent/fictional breaks

deliberately given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1996 to 2005. He

further prayed for reinstatement in service along-with full back wages, seniority including

continuity in service and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply, inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till

2005 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. The allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been specifically denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner

mentioned in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no

other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. It is further stated

that name of person Sham Lal and Gautam Singh had been engaged on harness case and as

such there was no violation of the principle of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its

stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour

Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of

"Last come, First go". It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 he would

have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated

to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that

since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of

notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for

charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that

petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of "Last come First go" was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1

tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list

Ex. PW1/B, copy of RTI information dated 13.11.2013 Ex. PW1/C and closed evidence. On the

other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R.

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Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved

mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of orders/Awards Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex. RW1/C9

and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.10.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

6.10.2011 qua his termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

October, 2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.65,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1996 continuously worked till October, 2005 with the

respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

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written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of

petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief

of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25- F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time, no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he

had served

respondent

with

due

diligence

and

had

spotless

service

record

as

respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him

but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has

also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before

this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and

petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a

failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for

industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by

filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

October, 2005. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent

as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand,

as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and

attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately

given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not

complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section

25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 74 days in the year 1996, 125 days in 2001, 136 days in 2002, 127 ½ days in 2003,

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102 days in 2004 and 88 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 1996 to 2005 in 06 years

he had worked for 652 ½ days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not

worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner,

Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to

alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the

petitioner had merely worked for 88 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months

from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days. As such, the

respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld.

counsel/Authorized

Representative

for

petitioner

has

contended with

vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and

these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains

that principle of "Last come First go" was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of

petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B is the year-

wise seniority/mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined

in the year 1999 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. PW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years

although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent

establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005

even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly

violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.4

of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having

joined service in 1996 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford

opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section

25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank

of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

reflected in Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex RW1/C9. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/

petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons

were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex RW1/C9 were

primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of

these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have worked for more than 160 days in preceding 6 years which entitled him for

regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that

respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

October, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A.

for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted

that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having

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remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in

which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been

working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex

Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10

SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas

Kabir had held that "term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since

the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated

here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court

was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had

income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not

gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner

and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Sections 25-F,

25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may

not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled

for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan

State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned Additional

Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the

fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously

rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case

particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the

reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of

this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the

provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by

the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of

existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

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Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of

material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

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dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised

after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant- employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

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Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based

on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the petitioner

with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker

may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been

correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met requirement,

cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be

appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex

Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)

and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager,

Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652. I have gone

through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of

reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been

contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode

of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for

reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance

of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal

Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of

Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did

not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view

was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for

merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground

of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to

consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous

to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering

compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as

Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the

Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of "Last come First

go" was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment

was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of

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Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of

company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of

company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work but in the case in

hand petitioner had abandoned the job who never reported for duty. As such, when there is no

closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon

Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of

Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 06

years and actually worked for 652 ½ days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised

industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e. demand notice was

given on 06.10.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments

of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or

for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment

2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter

of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely

declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through

these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to

the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex

Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon

the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v.

Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which

deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that

Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has

been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by

the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment

would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation

qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person

who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate

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unskilled worker. For the above-said reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim

of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.65,000/- (Rupees

sixty five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.65,000/- (Rupees sixty five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months and from the date

of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 67/2016

Date of Institution : 20.02.2016

Date of Decision : 28.07.2017

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Shri Jagdish Kumar s/o Shri Ram Lal, r/o Village Findru, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, I.P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Jagdish Kumar S/O Shri Ram

Lal, R/O Village Findru, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, I.P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P. vide demand notice dated 23.1.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of

service during June, 2003 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of

the services of Shri Jagdish Kumar S/O Shri Ram Lal, R/O Village Findru, P.O. Sach,

Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.P.H./H.P.P.W.D.

Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during June, 2003 without

complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If

not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the

above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been appointed on daily wage basis on muster roll in the month of

May, 1995 who continuously worked till June, 2003 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as per

the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as "continuous services" for the purposes of calculation of 160 days

for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally

without issuing one month's notice in writing stipulating therein reason for retrenchment besides

no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally

terminated. It is also alleged that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-

F of the Act while disengaging petitioner from service. It is stated that after termination of the

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services of petitioner, petitioner had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail.

The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner had been

terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time

and while doing so, respondent had not followed the principle of "Last come, First go" envisaged

under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously

retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Jeet Singh who appointed in 1997,

Geeta Ram in 1998, Laxmi Devi in 1999, Baldev in 2000, Prakash Chand in 2001, Trilok Chand in

2002, Hari Ram in 2003 and Smt. Rama Dei in 2003. The claimant/petitioner claimed that

he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or

negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been

served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him.

The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal

termination from year of 2003 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been

nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Feeling aggrieved the

action of respondent in terminating the services of petitioner an industrial dispute was raised

vide demand notice dated 23.1.2012 copy of the same was forwarded to Labour Officer,

Chamba for further necessary action. It is alleged that Labour Officer, Chamba could not resolve

the dispute and failure report under Section 12(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the matter was

referred to appropriate government i.e. Labour Commissioner, Shimla who declined to refer the

case of petitioner for adjudication in pursuance to which the petitioner had approached the

Hon'ble High Court of H.P. by filing CWP no.4396/2015 which had been decided on

21.11.2015 and order of the Labour Commissioner, Shimla has been setting aside. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-

G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus petitioner prays for setting

aside illegal termination of petitioner by the respondent/department in June, 2003 as well as period

of intermittent/fictional breaks deliberately given time and again during entire service of

petitioner between 1995 to 2003. He further prayed for reinstatement in service along-with full

back wages, seniority including continuity in service and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply, inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1995 who remained engaged till

2003 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. The allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been specifically denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner

mentioned in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no

other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. It is further stated

that name of person Sham Lal and Gautam Singh had been engaged on harness case and as

such there was no violation of the principle of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its

stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour

Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of

"Last come, First go". It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2003 he would

have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated

to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of

issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

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necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is

contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for

back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of "Last come First go‟ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy

of RTI information dated 13.11.2013 Ex. PW1/C and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the

then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of

petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of orders/Awards Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex. RW1/C9 and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.10.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

23.1.2012 qua his termination of service during June, 2003 by respondent suffers

from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent during June,

2003 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.40,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

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10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1995 continuously worked till June, 2003 with the respondent is

not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of

terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was

passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not

retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate

govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1995 to June, 2003. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time, no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his

termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with

full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged

on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in June, 2003 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with

due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from

service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the

authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road

between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon‟ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was

satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

June, 2003. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part

of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling

upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as

abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as

PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and

attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately

given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not

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complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section

25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 168 days in the year 1995, 98.5 days in 1996, 20 days in 2002 and 29 days in 2003 and

thus a total of his service in 1995 to 2003 in 04 years he had worked for 315 ½ days in his

entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had worked for more than 160 except the

years 1996 and 2002 & 2003 and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla

on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged

illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2003 the

petitioner had merely worked for 29 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months

from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days. As such, the

respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld.

counsel/Authorized

Representative

for

petitioner

has

contended with

vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and

these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains

that principle of "Last come First go" was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of

petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B is the year-

wise seniority/mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined

in the year 1999 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. PW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years

although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent

establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after June, 2003

even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly

violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para

no.4 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers

having joined service in 1995 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford

opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section

25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank

of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

reflected in Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex RW1/C9. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which

revealed

that

respondent

had

wrongly

terminated

the

services

of

those

claimant/petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that

persons were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex

RW1/C9 were primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner

as status of these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when

petitioner is proved to have worked for more than 160 days in preceding 6 years which entitled

him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from

its accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that

respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

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17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

June, 2003, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was

entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for

the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that

he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having

remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross- examination in

which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been

working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex

Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10

SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas

Kabir had held that "term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same". Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case

since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were

sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be

it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the

Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving

agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the

petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that

petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of

the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Sections 25-F, 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed

after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra),

it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not

entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan

State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned Additional

Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the

fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously

rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case

particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the

reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of

this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions

of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the

appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing

industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

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Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised

its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or

unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay

in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for

adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming

rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

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the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute was raised

after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing- cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon‟ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section

25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

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Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant- employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

27. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based

on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the petitioner

with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker

may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been

correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met requirement,

cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be

appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex

Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)

and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager,

Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652. I have gone

through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of

reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been

contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode

of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for

reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance

of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal

Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of

Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did

not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view

was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for

merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground

of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to

consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous

to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering

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compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as

Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the

Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of "Last come First

go" was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment

was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of

Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of

company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of

company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work but in the case in

hand petitioner had abandoned the job who never reported for duty. As such, when there is

no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of

Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by

the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances

is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which

have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 04 years and actually

worked for 315 ½ days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were

disengaged in June, 2003 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by

issuance of demand notice after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on 23.1.2012.

Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex

Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back

wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139)

FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and

laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the

ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as

Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also

the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture

Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these

judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the

petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid

down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment

of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director

Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals reference

under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court

can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the

ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case

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is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts

and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment (2016)

supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk

whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the above-

said reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees

forty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUENO.4

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months and from the date

of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 68/2016

Date of Institution : 20.02.2016

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Date of Decision : 28.07.2017

Shri Prem Raj s/o Shri Paras Ram, r/o Village Parghwal, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Prem Raj S/O Shri Paras

Ram, R/O Village Parghwal, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

vide demand notice dated 06-06-2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of

services during October, 2002 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination

of services of Shri Prem Raj S/O Shri Paras Ram, R/O Village Parghwal, P.O. Karyas,

Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D.

Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2002, without complying the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of

back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved

workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been appointed on daily wage basis on muster roll in the year 1997

who continuously worked till October, 2002 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition

further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as per the criteria

prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous

service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that

the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by

the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as "continuous

services" for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the

Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged

petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing stipulating

therein reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner

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when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is also alleged that respondent had not

followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging petitioner from service.

The grievance of petitioner further revealed that during years 2003 to 2005, respondent/department

had disengaged the services of more than 500 daily waged workmen in different Divisions of

HPPWD and IPH. It is stated that it has came to the knowledge to the petitioner from reliable

sources that respondent/department had engaged more than 200 contractors during 2003 onwards.

It is stated that after termination of the services of petitioner, petitioner had approached the

respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that

when the services of petitioner had been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged

number of new workman from time to time and while doing so, respondent had not followed

the principle of "Last come, First go" envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged

that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in

service namely Janto Devi who appointed in 2001, Jeet Singh in 1997, Gijja Ram in 1999,

Laxmi Devi in 1999 and Gian Chand in 1997. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence

or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge- sheet had been served upon

him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The

petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from

year of 2002 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully

employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Feeling aggrieved the action of respondent in

terminating the services of petitioner an industrial dispute was raised vide demand notice dated

6.6.2011 copy of the same was forwarded to Labour Officer, Chamba for further necessary action.

It is alleged that Labour Officer, Chamba could not resolve the dispute and failure report under

Section 12(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the matter was referred to appropriate government

i.e. Labour Commissioner, Shimla who declined to refer the case of petitioner for adjudication in

pursuance to which the petitioner had approached the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. by filing

CWP no.4413/2015 which had been decided on 24.11.2015 and order of the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla has been setting aside. Accordingly alleging respondent to have

committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus petitioner prays for setting aside illegal termination of

petitioner by

the respondent/department

in

October,

2002

as

well

as

period

of

intermittent/fictional breaks deliberately given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between 1997 to 2002. He further prayed for reinstatement in service along-with full back wages,

seniority including continuity in service and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply, inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1998 who remained engaged till

2002 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. The allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been specifically denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner

mentioned in para no. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no

other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. It is further stated

that name of person Sham Lal and Gautam Singh had been engaged on harness case and as

such there was no violation of the principle of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its

stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para no.4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour

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Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of

"Last come, First go". It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2002 he would

have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated

to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that

since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of

notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for

charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that

petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of "Last come First go" was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy

of RTI information dated 13.11.2013 Ex. PW1/C and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the

then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of

petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of orders/Awards Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex. RW1/C9 and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.10.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

6.6.2011 qua his termination of service during October, 2002 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent during

October, 2002 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

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Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.70,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1998 continuously worked till October, 2002 with the

respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim

of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief

of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1998 to October, 2002. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25- F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time, no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2002 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he

had served

respondent

with

due

diligence

and

had

spotless

service

record

as

respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him

but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has

also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before

this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and

petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a

failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for

industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by

filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

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RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

October, 2002. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent

as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand,

as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and

attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately

given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not

complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section

25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 178.5 days in the year 1998, 166 days in 1999, 177 days in 2000, 171 days in 2001

and 150 days in 2002 and thus a total of his service in 1998 to 2002 in 56 years he had worked for

842 ½ days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had worked for more than

160 except the year 2002 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner,

Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to

alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2002 the

petitioner had merely worked for 150 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar

months from the month of termination of petitioner had rendered service of 160 days so as to

meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the

respondent is held to have violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld.

counsel/Authorized

Representative

for

petitioner

has

contended with

vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and

these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains

that principle of "Last come First go‟ was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of

petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B is the year-

wise seniority/mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined

in the year 1999 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/C the year-wise

mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were

given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner

had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. PW1/C also established that all the co-

workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years

although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent

establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2002

even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly

violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.4

of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having

joined service in 1997 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford

opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section

25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank

of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon‟ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

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reflected in Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex RW1/C9. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/petitioner

and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed

to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ex. RW1/C1 to Ex RW1/C9 were primarily on

the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person

being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to

have worked for more than 160 days in preceding 6 years which entitled him for

regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that

respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

October, 2002, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A.

for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted

that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having

remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross- examination in

which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been

working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex

Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10

SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas

Kabir had held that "term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since

the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated

here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court

was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had

income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not

gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner

and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Sections 25-F,

25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may

not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled

for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan

State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned Additional

Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the

fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously

rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case

particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the

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reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of

this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions

of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the

appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing

industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent

had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay

in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability

of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

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cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,

since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had

rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there

was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the

Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2002 and the industrial dispute was raised

after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon‟ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

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20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section

25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant- employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based

on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the petitioner

with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker

may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been

correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met requirement,

cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be

appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex

Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)

and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager,

Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652. I have gone

through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of

reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

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Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been

contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode

of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for

reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance

of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal

Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of

Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did

not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view

was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for

merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground

of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to

consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous

to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering

compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as

Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the

Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of "Last come First

go" was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment

was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of

Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of

company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of

company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work but in the case in

hand petitioner had abandoned the job who never reported for duty. As such, when there is no

closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon

Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court

in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon‟ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by

the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances

is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon‟ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which

have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 05 years and actually

worked for 842 ½ days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were

disengaged in October, 2002 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute

by issuance of demand notice after about nine years i.e. demand notice was given on

6.6.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble

Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back

wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139)

FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay

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and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined

on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled

as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment

also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture

Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these

judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the

petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court

laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint

Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals

reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble

High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been

challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the

Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment

would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation

qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person

who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate

unskilled worker. For the above-said reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim

of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.70,000/- (Rupees

seventy thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.70,000/- (Rupees seventy thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months and from the date

of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

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27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM -

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 510/2015

Date of Institution : 09.11.2015

Date of Decision : 28.07.2017

Shri Bhag Singh s/o Shri Devou Ram, r/o Village Shagli, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.& P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi) District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. Rajeev Dharmani, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Bhag Singh S/O Shri Devou

Ram, R/O Village Shagli, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District

Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated nil received in the Labour Office Chamba on

dated 31-10-2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during August,

2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of services of Shri Bhag

Singh S/O Shri Devou Ram, R/O Village Shagli, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Killar

(Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during August, 2004, without complying the provisions

of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back

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wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman

is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in

the year 1995 who continuously worked till 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in the

petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as per the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as "continuous services" for the purposes of calculation of 160 days

for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally

without issuing one month's notice in writing stipulating therein reason for retrenchment

besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been

illegally terminated. It is also alleged that respondent had not followed the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging petitioner from service. It is stated that petitioner is

very poor who has no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner,

petitioner had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of

petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner had been terminated,

respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and while

doing so, respondent had not followed the principle of "Last come, First go" envisaged under Section

25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to

petitioner who are still in service namely Suraj Ram who appointed in 1997, Chunku Ram in

2000, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Dev Raj in 2007. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence

or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served

upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The

petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from

year of 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere

gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to

have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section

25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus petitioner prays for setting aside oral

order of termination/retrenchment of respondent in the year 2005. He further prayed for

reinstatement in service w.e.f. year 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity

in service as petitioner as he had remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination.

The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks deliberately given

time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1991 to 2005 be counted 160 days

continuous service and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till

2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

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for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. The allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been specifically denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner

mentioned in para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and

no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea

of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the

job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.

Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own

sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction

of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the

principle of "Last come, First go". It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004

he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after thirteen years

petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also

contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,

question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,

there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It

is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled

for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of "Last come First go" was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of demand notice Ex. PW1/B, copy

of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/C, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/D1 and D2 and

closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,

respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, Ex.

RW1/C copy of mandays chart of co-workers, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D4 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 29.04.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil

qua his termination of service during August, 2004 by respondent suffers from the vice

of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

August, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

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Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.85,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1996 continuously worked till August, 2004 with the

respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of

petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief

of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to August, 2004. He has also stated on oath that

no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in August, 2004 by oral

order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service.

Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in

service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the

Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served

respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had

never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching

petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not

approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner

had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure

report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial

dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP

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where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had

occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

August, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent

as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand,

as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and

attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately

given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not

complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section

25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 138 days in the year 1996, 101 days in 1997, 68 days in 1998, 111 days in 1999, 162

days in 2000, 57 days in 2001, 88 days in 2002, 124 days in 2003 and 77 days in 2004 and thus a

total of his service in 1996 to 2004 in 09 years he had worked for 926 days in his entire service

period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no

reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to

confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays

chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 77 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not

rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one

year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of "Last come First go"

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2004 even at the time when junior persons

were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section

25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.10 of the affidavit were retained

whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

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counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,

1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-

G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for

240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D4. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which

revealed

that

respondent

had

wrongly

terminated

the

services

of

those

claimant/petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that

persons were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. RW1/D1 to Ex.

RW1/D4 were primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner

as status of these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when

petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which

entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not

absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is

held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

August, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was

entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for

the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that

he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having

remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross- examination in

which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been

working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex

Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10

SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas

Kabir had held that "term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since

the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated

here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court

was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had

income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not

gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner

and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and

Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus,

applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to

hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the

period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitieonr relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

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titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan

State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned Additional

Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the

fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously

rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case

particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the

reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of

this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions

of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the

appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing

industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within

a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent

had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay

in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability

of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

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erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised

after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

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longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing- cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant- employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon‟ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based

on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the petitioner

with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker

may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been

correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

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of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met requirement,

cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be

appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex

Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)

and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager,

Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652. I have gone

through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of

reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon

the judgment of Hon‟ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been

contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of

recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for

reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance

of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal

Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of

Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did

not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view

was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for

merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground

of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to

consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous

to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering

compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as

Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the

Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of "Last come First

go" was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment

was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of

Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of

company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of

company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work but in the case in

hand petitioner had abandoned the job who never reported for duty. As such, when there is no

closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon

Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of

Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

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court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09

years and actually worked for 926 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in August, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised

industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand notice

was given on 31.10.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to

judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view

of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner

on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could

not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex

Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner

as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble

Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan

State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone

through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining

relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble

Apex Court laid down in judgment of 2013 as referred to above. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing

State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon‟ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984

titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone

through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in

which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226

when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the

reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said

judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of

observation qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an

educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is

an illiterate unskilled worker. For the above-said reasons, plea of delay and laches would not

eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.85,000/- (Rupees

eighty five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award

till its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.85,000/- (Rupees eighty five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of

the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months and from the date

of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

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annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this28th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. Sharma),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 493/2015

Date of Institution : 09.11.2015

Date of Decision : 28.07.2017

Shri Dev Raj s/o Shri Hukam Chand, r/o Village Bishthow, P.O. Luj, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi) District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. Rajeev Dharmani, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Devi Raj S/O Shri Hukam

Chand, R/O Village Bishthow, P.O. Luj, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before

the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba,

H.P. vide demand notice dated 19-12-2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of

services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether

termination of services of Shri Devi Raj S/O Shri Hukam Chand, R/O Village Bishthow,

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P.O. Luj, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar

Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004,

without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and

justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in

the year 1997 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in the

petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as per the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as "continuous services" for the purposes of calculation of 160 days

for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally

without issuing one month's notice in writing stipulating therein reason for retrenchment besides

no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally

terminated. It is also alleged that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-

F of the Act while disengaging petitioner from service. It is stated that petitioner is very poor

who has no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, petitioner

had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner

further remains that when the services of petitioner had been terminated, respondent/

department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and while doing so,

respondent had not followed the principle of "Last come, First go" envisaged under Section 25-G of

the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to

petitioner who are still in service namely Suraj Ram who appointed in 1997, Chunku Ram in

2000, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Dev Raj in 2007. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence

or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served

upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The

petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from

year of 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere

gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to

have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section

25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus petitioner prays for setting aside oral

order of termination/retrenchment of respondent in the year 2004. He further prayed for

reinstatement in service w.e.f. year 2004 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity

in service as petitioner as he had remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination.

The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks deliberately given

time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1997 to 2004 be counted 160 days

continuous service and regularization of the services of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2004 under 10

years regularization policy and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On

merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather

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clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1998 who remained

engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work

at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically

pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year

as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. The allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent

to the petitioner have been specifically denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to

petitioner mentioned in para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour

Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On

the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had

left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.

Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own

sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction

of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the

principle of "Last come, First go". It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004

he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years

petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also

contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,

question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,

there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It

is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled

for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of "Last come First go" was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of demand notice Ex. PW1/B, copy

of order of Hon‟ble High Court Ex. PW1/C, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/C1 and C2 and

closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,

respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, Ex.

RW1/C copy of mandays chart of co-workers, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D4 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 29.04.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

19.12.2011 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

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4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.90,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1998 continuously worked till September, 2004 with the

respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim

of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief

of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1998 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with

full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004

by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H

of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served

respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never

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called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner

from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not

approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there

existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and petitioner had moved

before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was

submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by

petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where

direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred

and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent

as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand,

as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and

attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately

given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not

complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section

25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 168 days in the year 1998, 130 days in 1999, 147 days in 2000, 112 days in 2001, 148

days in 2002, 127 days in 2003 and 104 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1998 to

2004 in 07 years he had worked for 936 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that

petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only

with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in

the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 104 days and thus immediately in preceding

12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160

days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was

not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the

Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the

Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of "Last come First go"

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

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petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior

persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of

Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.10 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,

1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-

G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for

240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D4. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/

petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons

were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D4 were

primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of

these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him

for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that

respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy.

D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has

admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of

having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-

examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as

he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M.

Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.

Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that "term gainfully employment would also

include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from

employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources

from which income is generated, the end use being the same". Applying the ratio of judgment

of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual

pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was

gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case

has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent

was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment.

Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated

that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view

of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it

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may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not

entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan

State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned Additional

Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the

fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously

rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case

particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the

reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of

this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions

of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the

appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing

industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At

the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by

it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate government in

exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute,

between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as

interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State

Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the

points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by

this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

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assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or

unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay

in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for

adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming

rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

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19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised

after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon‟ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon‟ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section

25-F of the I.D. Act-Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant- employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based

on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

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should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the petitioner

with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker

may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been

correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met requirement,

cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be

appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex

Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)

and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager,

Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652. I have gone

through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of

reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the

judgment of Hon‟ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been

contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode

of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for

reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance

of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal

Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of

Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did

not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view

was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for

merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground

of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to

consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous

to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering

compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as

Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the

Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of "Last come First

go" was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment

was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of

Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of

company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of

company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work but in the case in

hand petitioner had abandoned the job who never reported for duty. As such, when there is no

closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon

Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court

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in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of

Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 07

years and actually worked for 936 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had

raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand

notice was given on 19.12.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance

to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in

view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for

petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment

of Hon‟ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the

rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate

as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant

Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan

Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as

this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of

guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of 2013 as referred to above. Ld.

Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon‟ble Apex Court reported

in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department

and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ

jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate

unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge

before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of

the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra,

claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in

case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the above-said

reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.90,000/- (Rupees

ninety thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till

its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

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maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.90,000/- (Rupees ninety thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months and from the date

of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 495/2015

Date of Institution : 09.11.2015

Date of Decision : 28.07.2017

Shri Chaman Singh s/o Shri Sher Chand, r/o Village Ghangeet, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi) District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. Rajeev Dharmani, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

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AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Chaman Singh S/O Shri Sher

Chand, R/O Village Ghangeet, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District

Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 21- 12-2011 regarding his alleged illegal

termination of services during September, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not,

Whether termination of services of Shri Chaman Singh S/O Shri Sher Chand, R/O Village

Ghangeet, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer,

Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September,

2005, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and

justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in

the year 1999 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in the

petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as per the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as "continuous services" for the purposes of calculation of 160 days

for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally

without issuing one month's notice in writing stipulating therein reason for retrenchment besides

no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally

terminated. It is also alleged that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-

F of the Act while disengaging petitioner from service. It is stated that petitioner is very poor

who has no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, petitioner

had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner

further

remains

that

when

the

services

of

petitioner

had

been

terminated,

respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and while

doing so, respondent had not followed the principle of "Last come, First go‟ envisaged under

Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained

junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Chunku Ram who appointed in 2000, Budhi

Ram in 2003 and Dev Raj in 2007. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service

record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and

even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at

the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges

that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from year of 2004 till the date

of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus

entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

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statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 and thus petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment of

respondent in the year 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. year 2004

along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner as he had remained

unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period

of intermittent/fictional breaks deliberately given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between 1999 to 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the

services of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2006 under 8 years regularization policy and to any other relief

petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1999 who remained engaged till

2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. The allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been specifically denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner

mentioned in para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and

no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea

of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the

job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.

Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own

sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction

of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the

principle of "Last come, First go". It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004

he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years

petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also

contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,

question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,

there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It

is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled

for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of "Last come First go" was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of demand notice Ex. PW1/B, copy

of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/C, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/D1 and D2 and

closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,

respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, Ex.

RW1/C copy of mandays chart of co-workers, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D4 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

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8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 29.04.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

21.12.2011 qua his termination of service during September, 2005 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

September, 2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.75,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1999 continuously worked till September, 2004 with the

respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of

petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief

of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

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12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1999 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with

full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004

by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H

of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served

respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never

called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner

from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not

approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there

existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and petitioner had moved

before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was

submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by

petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where

direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred

and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent

as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand,

as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and

attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately

given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not

complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section

25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 139 ½ days in the year 1999, 130 days in 2000, 139 days in 2001, 152 days in 2002,

141 days in 2003 and 95 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1999 to 2004 in 06 years

he had worked for 796 ½ days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not

worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner,

Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to

alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the

petitioner had merely worked for 95 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months

from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet

requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

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from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such,

the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of "Last come First go"

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior

persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of

Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.10 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1999

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,

1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon‟ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked

for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D4. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/

petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons

were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D4 were

primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of

these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him

for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that

respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy.

D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has

admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of

having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-

examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as

he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M.

Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.

Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also

include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from

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employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources

from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment

of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual

pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was

gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case

has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent

was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment.

Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated

that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view

of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may

not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled

for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case.

The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the

catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically

held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to

make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for

adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

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“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within

a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent

had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay

in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability

of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

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17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised

after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing- cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section

25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant- employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

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21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the petitioner

with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker

may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been

correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met requirement,

cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be

appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex

Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)

and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager,

Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652. I have gone

through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of

reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been

contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode

of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for

reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance

of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal

Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of

Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did

not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view

was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for

merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground

of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to

consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous

to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering

compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as

Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the

Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of "Last come First

go" was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment

was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of

Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of

company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of

company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work but in the case in

hand petitioner had abandoned the job who never reported for duty. As such, when there is no

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closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon

Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the

Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is

not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-

with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which

have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 06 years and actually

worked for 796 ½ days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were

disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute

by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e. demand notice was given on 21.12.2011.

Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court

referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a

lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25

(SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches

is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the

ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as

Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also

the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous

judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which

are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the

ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in

judgment of 2013 as referred to above. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied

upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v.

Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment

which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held

that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has

been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by

the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would

not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts

made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who

was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled

worker. For the above-said reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of

petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees

seventy five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

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compensation shall be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award

till its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of

the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months and from the date

of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

___________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 497/2015

Date of Institution : 09.11.2015

Date of Decision : 28.07.2017

Ms. Devki d/o Shri Ram Dyal, r/o Village Hugal, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi) District

Chamba, H.P. . .Respondent.

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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. Rajeev Dharmani, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Ms. Devki D/O Shri Ram Dyal, R/O

Village Hugal, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 18-01-2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of services

during August, 1999 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of

services of Ms. Devki D/O Shri Ram Dyal, R/O Village Hugal, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division,

H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during August, 1999, without

complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If

not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the

above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in

the year 1992 who continuously worked till 1999 with the respondent. Averments made in the

petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as per the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as "continuous services" for the purposes of calculation of 160 days

for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally

without issuing one month's notice in writing stipulating therein reason for retrenchment besides

no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally

terminated. It is also alleged that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-

F of the Act while disengaging petitioner from service. It is stated that petitioner is very poor

who has no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, petitioner

had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner

further remains that when the services of petitioner had been terminated, respondent/

department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and while doing so,

respondent had not followed the principle of "Last come, First go‟ envisaged under Section 25-G of

the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to

petitioner who are still in service namely Suraj Ram who appointed in 1997, Chunku Ram in

2000, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Dev Raj in 2007. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence

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or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon

her and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner

also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from year of 1999

till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and

was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed

violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of

termination/retrenchment of respondent in the year 1999. she further prayed for reinstatement in

service w.e.f. year 1999 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as

petitioner as she had remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The

petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks deliberately given time and

again during entire service of petitioner between 1992 to 1999 be counted 160 days continuous

service and regularization of the services of petitioner w.e.f. 1.1.2001 under 10 years

regularization policy and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till

1999 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. The allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been specifically denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner

mentioned in para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and

no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea

of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the

job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.

Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own

sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction

of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the

principle of "Last come, First go". It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in

1999 she would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after thirteen years

petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also

contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,

question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,

there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It

is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled

for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of „Last

come First go" was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved

her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B copy of demand notice, Ex.

PW1/C copy of order of Hon'ble High Court, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/D1 and D2 and closed

evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent

examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as

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RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, Ex. RW1/C copy of mandays

chart of co-workers, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D4 copy of orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 29.04.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

18.1.2012 qua her termination of service during August, 1999 by respondent suffers

from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

August, 1999 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.65,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1992 continuously worked till August, 1999 with the

respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her

own and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

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petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of

petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief

of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1992 to August, 1999. she has also stated on oath that

no notice under Section 25- F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and

thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in August, 1999 by oral

order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service.

Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in

service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the

Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served

respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had

never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching

petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not

approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed

no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and petitioner had moved before the

Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and

as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner,

the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was

passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same

was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

August, 1999. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the

respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the

other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in

between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had

been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that

petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence

led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 198 ½ days in the year 1994, 164 days in 1995, 164 days in 1996, 292 days in 1997, 116

days in 1998 and 61 ½ days in 1999 and thus a total of her service in 1992 to 1999 in 06 years

she had worked for 906 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not

worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner,

Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to

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alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1999 the

petitioner had merely worked for 61 ½ days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months

from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet

requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such,

the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of "Last come First

go" was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after August, 1999 even at the time when junior persons

were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section

25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.10 of the affidavit were retained

whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,

1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-

G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for

240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D4. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/

petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons

were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D4 were

primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of

these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled her

for regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that

respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

August, 1999, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy.

D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has

admitted that she had cultivatable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of

having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-

examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as

well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the

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judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M.

Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.

Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that "term gainfully employment would also

include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from

employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held

that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali

Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely

because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in

gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood

it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full

back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman

and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally

retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained

gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex

Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus

would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the

respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan

State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned Additional

Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the

fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously

rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case

particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the

reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of

this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions

of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the

appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of

existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

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14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within

a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent

had assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the

criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the

delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or

unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay

in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for

adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming

rightful relief from her employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal.

The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages

instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,

since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had

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rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there

was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the

Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1999 and the industrial dispute was raised

after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant- employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

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Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for claimant/

petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash Kumar Paul

vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may

pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on

justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation

where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and

no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge

duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the management to

discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may

justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that has to be

supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be

followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the petitioner with the

aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker may be

awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly

appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met requirement,

cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be

appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex

Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)

and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager,

Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652. I have gone

through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of

reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been

contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode

of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for

reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance

of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal

Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of

Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did

not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view

was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for

merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground

of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to

consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous

to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering

compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as

Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the

Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of "Last come First

go" was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment

was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of

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Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of

company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of

company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work but in the case in

hand petitioner had abandoned the job who never reported for duty. As such, when there is no

closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon

Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of

Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 06

years and actually worked for 906 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in August, 1999 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised

industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about twelve years i.e. demand notice was

given on 18.1.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to

judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in

view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for

petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner

could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon‟

ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the

petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by

the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I

have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not

declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of

Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of 2013 as referred to above. Ld. Dy. D.A.

representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in

AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.

I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial

Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction

under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate

unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in

challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and

circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra,

claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case

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before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the above-said reasons,

plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.65,000/- (Rupees

sixty five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.65,000/- (Rupees sixty five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months and from the date

of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

______________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM -

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 488/2015

Date of Institution : 09.11.2015

Date of Decision : 28.07.2017

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Ms. Shakuntla d/o Shri Panchi Lal, r/o Village Dhanwas, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi) District

Chamba, H.P. . . Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. Rajeev Dharmani, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial raised by the worker Ms. Shakuntla D/O Shri Panchi Lal, R/O

Village Dhanwas, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated nil received in Labour Office Chamba on dated 31-10-2011

regarding her alleged illegal termination of services during October, 2000 suffers from

delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of services of Ms. Shakuntla D/O Shri

Panchi Lal, R/O Village Dhanwas, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by

the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba,

H.P. during October, 2000, without complying the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority,

past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from

the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in

the year 1990 who continuously worked till 2000 with the respondent. Averments made in the

petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as per the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as "continuous services" for the purposes of calculation of 160

days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally

without issuing one month's notice in writing stipulating therein reason for retrenchment

besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been

illegally terminated. It is also alleged that respondent had not followed the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging petitioner from service. It is stated that petitioner is

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very poor who has no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner,

petitioner had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of

petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner had been terminated,

respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and while

doing so, respondent had not followed the principle of "Last come, First go" envisaged under

Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained

junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Suraj Ram who appointed in 1997, Chunku

Ram in 2000, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Dev Raj in 2007. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she

had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or

negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been

served upon her and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him.

The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination

from year of 2000 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere

gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent

to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section

25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus petitioner prays for setting aside oral

order of termination/retrenchment of respondent in the year 2000. She further prayed for

reinstatement in service w.e.f. year 2000 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity

in service as petitioner as she had remained unemployed since the date of her illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks

deliberately given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1990 to 2000 be

counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the services of petitioner w.e.f.

1.1.1999 under 10 years regularization policy and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1992 who remained engaged till

2000 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. The allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been specifically denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner

mentioned in para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and

no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea

of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the

job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.

Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own

sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction

of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the

principle of "Last come, First go". It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2000

she would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after thirteen years

petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also

contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,

question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,

there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It

is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled

for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of "Last come First go" was specifically denied.

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6.

In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1

tendered/proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B copy of

demand notice, Ex. PW1/C copy of order of Hon'ble High Court, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/D1 and D2 and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

Ex. RW1/C copy of mandays chart of co-workers, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D4 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 29.04.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

31.10.2011 qua her termination of service during October, 2000 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent during

October, 2000 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.80,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1992 continuously worked till October, 2000 with the

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respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her

own and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of

petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief

of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1992 to October, 2000. She has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and

thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with

full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2000 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service.

Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in

service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act

which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent

with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any

explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service,

no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the

authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road

between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was

passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was

satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

October, 2000. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent

as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand,

as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and

attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been

deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that

petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence

led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 28 days in the year 1992, 186 days in 1994, 160 ½ days in 1995, 191 ½ days in

1996, 199 days in 1997, 165 days in 1998, 124 days in 1999 and 138 days in 2000 and thus a

total of her service in 1992 to 1999 in 08 years she had worked for 1191 days in her entire

service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is

no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is

to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2000 the petitioner had merely worked for 138 days

and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner

had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous

service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice

envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the

provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of "Last come First

go" was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2000 even at the time when junior persons

were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section

25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.10 of the affidavit were retained

whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1992 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,

1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-

G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for

240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D4. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which

revealed

that

respondent

had

wrongly

terminated

the

services

of

those

claimant/petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that

persons were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. RW1/D1 to Ex.

RW1/D4 were primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner

as status of these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when

petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which

entitled her for regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not

absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is

held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

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17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

October, 2000, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy.

D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has

admitted that she had cultivatable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of

having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-

examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as

well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M.

Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.

Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that "term gainfully employment would also

include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from

employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same". Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held

that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali

Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely

because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in

gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood

it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full

back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman

and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally

retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained

gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex

Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus

would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the

respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the

catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically

held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to

make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for

adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

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appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District

Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability

of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal.

The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages

instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,

since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2000 and the industrial dispute was raised

after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section

25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

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during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant- employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based

on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the petitioner

with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker

may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been

correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of

duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met requirement,

cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be

appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex

Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)

and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager,

Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652. I have gone

through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of

reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been

contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode

of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for

reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance

of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal

Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of

Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did

not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view

was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for

merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground

of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to

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consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous

to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering

compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as

Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the

Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of "Last come First

go" was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment

was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of

Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of

company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of

company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work but in the case in

hand petitioner had abandoned the job who never reported for duty. As such, when there is no

closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon

Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon‟ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum

of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 08

years and actually worked for 1191 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in October, 2000 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised

industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about ten years i.e. demand notice was

given on 31.10.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments

of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or

for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment

2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter

of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely

declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through

these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to

the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex

Court laid down in judgment of 2013 as referred to above. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing

State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984

titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone

through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in

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which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226

when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the

reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said

judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of

observation qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an

educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is

an illiterate unskilled worker. For the above-said reasons, plea of delay and laches would not

eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees

eighty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months and from the date

of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 512/2015

Date of Institution : 09.11.2015

Date of Decision : 28.07.2017

Smt. Laxmi Dei w/o Shri Ram Chand, r/o V.P.O. Punto, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi) District

Chamba, H.P. . .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. Rajeev Dharmani, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Laxmi Dei W/O Shri Ram

Chand, R/O V.P.O. PUnto, Thesil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 03-02-2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of services

during October, 2002 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of

services of Smt. Laxmi Dei W/O Shri Ram Chand, R/O V.P.O. PUnto, Thesil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D.,

Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2002, without complying the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what

amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above

aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in

the year 1992 who continuously worked till 2002 with the respondent. Averments made in the

petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as per the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of

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intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as "continuous services" for the purposes of calculation of 160 days

for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally

without issuing one month's notice in writing stipulating therein reason for retrenchment

besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been

illegally terminated. It is also alleged that respondent had not followed the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging petitioner from service. It is stated that petitioner is

very poor who has no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner,

petitioner had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of

petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner had been terminated,

respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and while

doing so, respondent had not followed the principle of "Last come, First go" envisaged under Section

25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to

petitioner who are still in service namely Suraj Ram who appointed in 1997, Chunku Ram in

2000, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Dev Raj in 2007. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence

or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon

her and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner

also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from year of 2002

till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and

was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed

violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of

termination/retrenchment of respondent in the year 2002. she further prayed for reinstatement in

service w.e.f. year 2002 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as

petitioner as she had remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The

petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks deliberately given time and

again during entire service of petitioner between 1992 to 2002 be counted 160 days continuous

service and regularization of the services of petitioner w.e.f. 2000 under 8 years regularization

policy and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1992 who remained engaged till

2002 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. The allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been specifically denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner

mentioned in para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and

no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea

of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the

job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.

Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own

sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction

of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the

principle of "Last come, First go". It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2002

she would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years

petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also

contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,

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question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,

there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It

is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled

for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of "Last come First go" was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved

her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B copy of order of Hon'ble High

Court, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/C1 and C2 and closed evidence. On the other hand,

repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the

then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of

petitioner Ex. RW1/B, Ex. RW1/C copy of mandays chart of co-workers, Ex. RW1/D1 to

Ex. RW1/D4 copy of orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 29.04.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

3.2.2012 qua her termination of service during October, 2002 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

October, 2002 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

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Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.80,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1992 continuously worked till October, 2002 with the

respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her

own and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim

of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief

of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1992 to October, 2002. she has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25- F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and

thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2002 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had

served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/

department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while

retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason

for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there

existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and petitioner had moved before

the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted

and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by

petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where

direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had

occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

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RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

October, 2002. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent

as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand,

as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and

attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been

deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that

petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence

led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 14 days in the year 1992, 142 days in 1994, 77 days in 1995, 56 days in 1996, 51

days in 1998, 127 days in 1999, 102 days in 2000, 102 days in 2001 and 111 days in 2002 and

thus a total of her service in 1992 to 2002 in 09 years she had worked for 782 days in her entire

service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is

no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is

to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2002 the petitioner had merely worked for 104 days

and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner

had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service

of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged

under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions

of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of "Last come First go"

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2002 even at the time when junior persons

were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section

25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.10 of the affidavit were retained

whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1992 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,

1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-

G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for

240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

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reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D4. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/

petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons

were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D4 were

primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of

these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled her

for regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that

respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

October, 2002, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was

entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A.

for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted

that she had cultivatable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having

remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross- examination in

which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as well as she has

been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon‟ble

Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007)

10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice

Altamas Kabir had held that "term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an

establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which

income is generated, the end use being the same". Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007

(supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and manual pursuits,

the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that petitioner was

gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case

has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent

was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment.

Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot be stated

that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In

view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer

existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without

compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed

after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon‟ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it

may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled

for back wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has

erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

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issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case.

The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the

catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically

held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to

make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for

adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives herself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability

of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

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cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal.

The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages

instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,

since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had

rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there

was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the

Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2002 and the industrial dispute was raised

after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing- cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

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20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon‟ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section

25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant- employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the petitioner

with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker

may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been

correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met requirement,

cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be

appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex

Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)

and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager,

Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652. I have gone

through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of

reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

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Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been

contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode

of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for

reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance

of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal

Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of

Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did

not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view

was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for

merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground

of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to

consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous

to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering

compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as

Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the

Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of "Last come First

go" was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment

was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of

Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of

company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of

company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work but in the case in

hand petitioner had abandoned the job who never reported for duty. As such, when there is no

closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon

Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum

of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09

years and actually worked for 782 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in October, 2002 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised

industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about 9 ½ years i.e. demand notice was

given on 3.2.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to

judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in

view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for

petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner

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could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue

of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as

given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I

have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not

declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of

Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of 2013 as referred to above. Ld. Dy. D.A.

representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in

AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.

I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial

Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction

under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate

unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in

challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and

circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra,

claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case

before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the above-said reasons,

plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees

eighty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till

its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months and from the date

of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

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Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 491/2015

Date of Institution : 09.11.2015

Date of Decision : 28.07.2017

Shri Rajinder Singh s/o Shri Suni Ram, r/o Village Gosti, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi) District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. Rajeev Dharmani, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Rajinder S/O Shri Suni Ram,

R/O Village Gosti, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

vide demand notice dated nil received in the Labour Office Chamba on 29-5-2012

regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during October, 1999 suffers from

delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of services of Shri Rajinder S/O Shri Suni

Ram, R/O Village Gosti, P.O. Karyas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

during October, 1999, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from

the above employer?"

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2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in

the year 1992 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in the

petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as per the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as "continuous services" for the purposes of calculation of 160 days

for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally

without issuing one month's notice in writing stipulating therein reason for retrenchment

besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been

illegally terminated. It is also alleged that respondent had not followed the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging petitioner from service. It is stated that petitioner is

very poor who has no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner,

petitioner had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of

petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner had been terminated,

respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and while

doing so, respondent had not followed the principle of "Last come, First go" envisaged under Section

25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to

petitioner who are still in service namely Suraj Ram who appointed in 1997, Chunku Ram in

2000, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Dev Raj in 2007. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence

or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served

upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The

petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from

year of 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere

gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to

have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section

25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus petitioner prays for setting aside oral

order of termination/retrenchment of respondent in the year 2004. He further prayed for

reinstatement in service w.e.f. year 2004 along-with back wages, seniority including

continuity in service as petitioner as he had remained unemployed since the date of his illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks

deliberately given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1992 to 2004 be

counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the services of petitioner w.e.f.

01.01.2001 under 10 years regularization policy and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till

1999 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. The allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been specifically denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner

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mentioned in para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and

no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea

of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the

job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.

Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own

sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction

of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the

principle of "Last come, First go". It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1999

he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after thirteen years

petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also

contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,

question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,

there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It

is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled

for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of "Last come First go" was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1

tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of demand notice

Ex. PW1/B, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/C, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/D1

and D2 and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B,

Ex. RW1/C copy of mandays chart of co-workers, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D4 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 29.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil

qua his termination of service during October, 1999 by respondent suffers from

the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

October, 1999 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

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Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.75,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1994 continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent is not in

dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms

and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed

while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not

retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work

intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate

govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1994 to 2004. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus

his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in 2004 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent

with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called

any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner

from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching

the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved

before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was

submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by

petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction

was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same

was satisfactorily explained.

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13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

October, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent

as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand,

as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and

attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately

given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not

complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section

25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 165 days in the year 1994, 153 days in 1995, 166 days in 1996, 146 days in 1997, 128

days in 1998 and 121 days in 1999 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 1999 in 06 years he

had worked for 879 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked

for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the

point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal

termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1999 the petitioner

had merely worked for 121 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from

the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet

requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such,

the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of "Last come First go"

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after October, 1999 even at the time when junior persons

were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section

25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.10 of the affidavit were retained

whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,

1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-

G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for

240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

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16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D4. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/

petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons

were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D4 were

primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of

these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him

for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that

respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

October, 1999, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A.

for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted

that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having

remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in

which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been

working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex

Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007)

10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice

Altamas Kabir had held that „term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since

the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated

here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court

was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had

income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not

gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner

and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and

Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus,

applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to

hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the

period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitieonr relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan

State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned Additional

Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the

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fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously

rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case

particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the

reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of

this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions

of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the

appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of

existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within

a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent

had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay

in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability

of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:-

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“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1999 and the industrial dispute was raised

after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon‟ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

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20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section

25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant- employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the

petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations

when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has

certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four

situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of

reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be

appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that

petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave

notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra)

even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only

compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon

the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,

Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex

Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to

rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on

the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow

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University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR

2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was

not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC

supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be

sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R.

502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for

petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that

Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court

Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner

cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the

law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied

relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in

hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably

indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR

2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union

is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of

"Last come First go" was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act

and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the

facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former

closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is

no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner

without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work but in the

case in hand petitioner had abandoned the job who never reported for duty. As such, when there

is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon

Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of

Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 06

years and actually worked for 879 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in October, 1999 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised

industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about twelve years i.e. demand notice was

given on 29.5.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to

judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in

view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for

petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner

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could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue

of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as

given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I

have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not

declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of

Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of 2013 as referred to above. Ld. Dy. D.A.

representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in

AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.

I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial

Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction

under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate

unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in

challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and

circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra,

claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case

before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the above-said reasons,

plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees

seventy five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award

till its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of

the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months and from the date

of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

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Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref No. : 500/2015

Date of Institution : 09.11.2015

Date of Decision : 28.07.2017

Shri Dev Raj s/o Shri Ram Lal, r/o Village Thamoh, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi) District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

For the Petitioner : Sh. Rajeev Dharmani, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Dev Raj S/O Shri Ram Lal, R/O

Village Thamoh, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi) District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated nil received in the Labour Office Chamba on dated 11.6.2012

regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during October, 2004 suffers from

delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of services of Shri Dev Raj S/O Shri

Ram Lal, R/O Village Thamoh, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by

the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi) District Chamba,

H.P. during October, 2004, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the

above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

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3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in

the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in the

petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as per the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as "continuous services" for the purposes of calculation of 160 days

for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally

without issuing one month's notice in writing stipulating therein reason for retrenchment besides

no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally

terminated. It is also alleged that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-

F of the Act while disengaging petitioner from service. It is stated that petitioner is very poor

who has no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, petitioner

had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner

further remains that when the services of petitioner had been terminated, respondent/

department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and while doing so,

respondent had not followed the principle of "Last come, First go" envisaged under Section 25-G of

the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to

petitioner who are still in service namely Suraj Ram who appointed in 1997, Chunku Ram in

2000, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Dev Raj in 2007. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence

or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served

upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The

petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from

year of 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere

gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to

have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section

25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus petitioner prays for setting aside oral

order of termination/retrenchment of respondent in the year 2004. He further prayed for

reinstatement in service w.e.f. year 2004 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity

in service as petitioner as he had remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination.

The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks deliberately given

time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1997 to 2004 be counted 160 days

continuous service and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till

2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. The allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been specifically denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner

mentioned in para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and

no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea

of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the

job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.

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Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own

sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction

of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the

principle of "Last come, First go". It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004

he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years

petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also

contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,

question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,

there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It

is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled

for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of "Last come First go‟ was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved

his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of demand notice Ex. PW1/B, copy

of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/C, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/D1 and D2 and

closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,

respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, Ex.

RW1/C copy of mandays chart of co-workers, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D4 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 29.04.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil

qua his termination of service during October, 2004 by respondent suffers from

the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

October, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

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Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.60,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1994 continuously worked till October, 2004 with the

respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of

petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief

of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1994 to October, 2004. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25- F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2004 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he

had served

respondent

with

due

diligence

and

had

spotless

service

record

as

respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him

but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has

also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before

this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2012 and

petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a

failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for

industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by

filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

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Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after

October, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent

as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand,

as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and

attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately

given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not

complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section

25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it

would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 108 days in the year 1994, 129 days in 2003 and 109 days in 2004 and thus a total

of his service in 1994 to 2004 in 03 years he had worked for 346 days in his entire service

period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no

reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to

confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 109 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had

not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous

service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice

envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the

provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of "Last come First go‟

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2004 even at the time when junior persons

were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section

25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para no.10 of the affidavit were retained

whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,

1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-

G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked

for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

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orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D4. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which

revealed

that

respondent

had

wrongly

terminated

the

services

of

those

claimant/petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that

persons were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. RW1/D1 to Ex.

RW1/D4 were primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner

as status of these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when

petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which

entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not

absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is

held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

October, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A.

for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted

that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having

remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in

which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been

working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex

Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007)

10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice

Altamas Kabir had held that "term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since

the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated

here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court

was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had

income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not

gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner

and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and

Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus,

applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to

hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the

period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitieonr relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan

State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned Additional

Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the

fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously

rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case

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particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the

reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision

has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of

this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions

of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the

appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing

industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

24. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising

the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the

appellants. We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India

and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by

the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time

results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if

it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour

Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within

a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent

had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay

in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability

of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

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“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence

that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that

termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised

after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High Court

of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be

considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

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20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Lboaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation o section

25-F of the I.D.Act- Wrokman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant- employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F- Termination

of service- Industrial dispute raised after six years- Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based

on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the petitioner

with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker

may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been

correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met requirement,

cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be

appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex

Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)

and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager,

Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652. I have gone

through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of

reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

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Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been

contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode

of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for

reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance

of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal

Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of

Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did

not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view

was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for

merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground

of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to

consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous

to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering

compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as

Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the

Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of "Last come First

go" was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment

was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of

Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of

company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of

company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work but in the case in

hand petitioner had abandoned the job who never reported for duty. As such, when there is no

closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon

Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the

Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is

not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-

with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which

have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 03 years and actually

worked for 346 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were

disengaged in October, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute

by issuance of demand notice after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on 11.6.2012.

Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble

Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for

back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013

(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay

and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on

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the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as

Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also

the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture

Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these

judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the

petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid

down in judgment of 2013 as referred to above. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has

relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as

Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the

judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has

been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when

reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the

reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the

above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in

view of observation qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be

an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is

an illiterate unskilled worker. For the above-said reasons, plea of delay and laches would not

eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees

sixty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months and from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till

its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO.4

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

RELIEF

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months and from the date

of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

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Announced in the open Court today this 28th day of July, 2017.

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref: No. : 128/2016

Smt. Guddi W/O Sh. Budhi Ram, r/o Village and P.O. Minhal, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./HPPWD, Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Respondent.

31-07-2017 Present:

Sh. I.S. Jaryal, A.R. for the petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.

Case if fixed for proper orders today. Heard. Authorised representative for the petitioner

has made statement for withdrawal of reference pending before this Court. Statement recorded

and placed on file. In view of the statement so made by the authorised representative for the

petitioner as stated above, the reference no. 128/16 is hereby dismissed as withdrawn.

2.

Ordered accordingly. The parties to bear their own costs.

3.

The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

4.

A copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and

further necessary action /publication at its end.

5.

The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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