jkti=] fgekpy izns'k
fgekpy izns'k jkT; 'kklu }kjk izdkf'kr
lkseokj] 16 tqykbZ] 2018@25 vk"kk<+] 1940
fgekpy izns'k ljdkj
LAW DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla-2, the 3rd July, 2018
No. LLR-E(9)-1/2018.—In continuation of this Department’s Notifications of even number
dated 7th March, 2018 and 17th March, 2018, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order
to appoint Sh. Akshay Amritanshu, Advocate, (D/1004/2014) C41, Jangpura Extension, New
Delhi-110014 (Phone:+91 99312-82222), as panel Advocate to represent the State of Himachal
Pradesh before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil/Criminal cases with immediate effect.
80&jkti=@2018&16&07&2018
¼3081½
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2. This engagement is purely at the pleasure of the State Government and can be
withdrawn at any stage without assigning any reasons thereof.
3. The other terms and conditions as contained in the Notification of this Department No.
LLR-E(9)1/88-III (Loose) dated 28th May, 2012 and 31st July, 2012 would continue to apply to the
said panel Advocate.
4. All the Departments are requested that whenever they need the services of any
Advocate in the particular Civil/Criminal case or in cases of vital importance to the State, they may
engage above Advocate with the prior approval of the Law Department and in consultation with the
Advocate General, Himachal Pradesh.
By order
Sd/-
LR-cum-Pr. Secretary (Law).
_________
LAW DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla-2, the 3rd July, 2018
No. LLR-E(9)-2/2018.—In supersession of the previous Notification(s) issued from time to
time with regard to empanelment of Advocates to defend the Revenue Cases in Kangra District, the
Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to make a new panel of the following Advocates to
represent the State of Himachal Pradesh in Board/Bank/Trust/Committee/Corporation and Revenue
Cases pending before the various Courts in District Kangra with immediate effect:—
Sl.
No.
Name & Address
of Advocate
S/Sh./Smt.
Name of Institution
Terms and Conditions
of fee for Revenue
Courts
Nurpur Court
1.
Ajay Pathania
NHAI, KCC Bank, UHF Nauni
Rs. 1500/- (Rupees One
Thousand Five hundred)
per case + Rs.
200/- as miscellaneous
expenses including
typing expenses.
2.
Arun Jarial
HRTC & SDM Court Nurpur
-do-
3.
Sonu Pundra
H.P. Electricity Board Tehsildar/Naib
Tehsildar Court.
-do-
4.
Aditya Sharma
Civil
Supplies
Corpn.
HPKV
Palampur.
-do-
5.
Sachit Sharma
Forest Corporation
-do-
6.
Udhaybir Singh
Education Board, M.C.Nurpur
-do-
7.
Naresh Dhiman
H.P. Pollution CB
-do-
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8.
Shekhar Gupta
Forest Corporation
-do-
Indora Court
1.
Ashwani Mahant
HRTC, SDM Court Nurpur
-do-
2.
Rohit Minhas
Tehsildar & Naib Tehsildar Court
-do-
3.
Sanjeev Kumar
Pollution Control Board and Civil
Supplies Corpn.
-do-
4.
Shyam Dadwal
SDM & Tehsil Court
-do-
5.
Sourav Sharma
HPSEB & H.P. Education Board,
KCC Bank and Forest Corpn.
-do-
6.
Prashant Katoch
Forest Corporation
-do-
Palampur Court
1.
D.S. Parmar
CSKHPKV, KCC Bank & HRTC
-do-
2.
Manoj Sharma
HRTC, KCC Bank & H.P. Road &
Infrastructure.
-do-
3.
Arvind Vashist
H.P. Agro Ind. HPSEB, KCC Bank
-do-
4.
Arvind Mehta
HPSEB, HPHIM Fed, KCC Bank
-do-
5.
Adarsh Sood
Him Urja, H.P. State Education,
HPSEB.
-do-
6.
Hitesh Nag
KCC
Bank,
Civil
Supplies
Corporation.
-do-
7.
Mahesh Sharma
H.P. Emp. W/W Board, KCC Bank,
HPPCL.
-do-
8.
Bhanu Udai Singh
KCC Bank, HPMC, RKS Palampur
-do-
9.
Vikas Sapehiya
Kangra Mortgage Bank HPGIC
-do-
10.
Binder Kapoor
H.P. Wool Federation, Naib Tehsildar
Court Palampur.
-do-
11.
Gagan Katoch
Tehsildar Court Palampur Standing
Counsel.
-do-
12.
Kapil Chaudhary
OBC Commission Kangra
-do-
13.
Hema Bhat
H.P. SC ST Corpn.
-do-
14.
Bhawana Thakur
H.P. Women Child Welfare Board
-do-
15.
Vishal Sood
UHF Nauni, HPSEDC
-do-
16.
Kush Patiyal
H.P. Polluction Control Board
-do-
17.
Shabbir Katoch
MC Palampur
-do-
18.
Ripu Daman Singh
MC Palampur/ HPMC/ HP Polluction
Control Board.
-do-
19.
Sanjay
Amtril
Gopal.
SDM Palampur
-do-
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20.
Arvind Sood
SDM Dehra
-do-
21.
Manu Bharti
Bhawarna/Chamunda Temple
-do-
22.
Ravinder
Ranout,
Palampur.
HP Forest Corporation
-do-
23.
Sushil
Nag
Palampur.
Him Urja/Forest Corporation
-do-
24.
Milap Chand Rana
Nagar Parishad
-do-
25.
Sanjeev Paddiar
HRTC
-do-
Baijnath Court
1.
Sanjay Goswami
HPSEB/KCC Bank
-do-
2.
Santosh Sharma
MC Baijnath/SDM B/Nath
-do-
3.
Vijay Kumar
HPPOL/HRTC
-do-
4.
Lakesh Sharma
HPTCL
-do-
5.
Rajesh Verma
Tehsil Office B/Nath
-do-
6.
Rakesh Kumar
Tehsildar/Naib. Tehsildar Baijnath
-do-
7.
Neeru Vij
HP Civil Supplies Corpn.
-do-
8.
Vinod K. Sajwel
HP Forest Corporation
-do-
9.
Vijay
Kumar
Makkar
HP Forest Corporation
-do-
Dehra Court
1.
Abhishek Padha
HRTC, KCC Bank, NP Jawalamukhi
& SDM J/Mukhi.
-do-
2.
Arvind Dhiman
KCC Bank & H.P. Civil Supplies
Corpn.
-do-
3.
Nitin Thakur
SC, ST, Corpn., Him Fed/MC Dehra
-do-
4.
Rajdeep Chauhan
SDM Dehra
-do-
5.
Arvind
Kumar
Sharma.
SDM Dehra
-do-
6.
Ajay Thakur
KCC Bank
-do-
7.
Amit Rana
Jawalamukhi Temple Trust
-do-
8.
Arvind Prabhakar
Pollution Control Board
-do-
9.
Bhavnesh Prashar
H.P. State Edu. Board
-do-
10.
Atul Rajyal
SDM Jawalamukhi
-do-
11.
Rajnath Bhatia
HPSEBL
-do-
12.
Amit Rana
Dehra
-do-
Dharamshala Court
1.
Anand Sharma
HPSEB/NHAI
-do-
2.
Arvind Kumar
H.P. State Civil Supply/HPFC, KCC
Bank/NHAI
-do-
3.
Varun Sharma
CSKAU Palampur/HPFC for HPAT
-do-
4.
Sumesh Raj Dogra
HRTC/HPSSC
-do-
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5.
Tarun Sharma
Division Commissioner
-do-
6.
Madan Thakur
HPU/HPTU
-do-
7.
Umesh Dhiman
KCC Bank
-do-
8.
Aman Kapoor
HPMC
-do-
9.
Manish Chaudhary
Him Urja
-do-
10.
Vinod Kumar
DC & Tehsil Office
-do-
11.
Surinder Kaundal
H.P. Road and other Infrastructure
-do-
12.
Munish Kumar
UHF Nauni
-do-
13.
Sarita Chaudhary
H.P. Women & Child Welfare
-do-
14.
Latika Thakur
Wool Federation
-do-
15.
Ishant Guleria
H.P. Road and other Infrastructure
-do-
16.
Bobby Maratha
HPU(Regional Centre)
-do-
17.
Tevich Sanghoi
Land Mortgage Bank
-do-
18.
Ajay Thakur
H.P. Milk Federation
-do-
19.
Sandeep Kumar
Tehsil Office Dharamshala
-do-
20.
Sanjeev Sundhu
Tehsil Offie Dharamshala
-do-
21.
Manohar Thakur
HP GIC
-do-
22.
Rahul Sharma
MC D/Shala, KCC Bank
-do-
23.
Sudarshna
KCC Bank
-do-
24.
Narayan Thakur
H.P. Edu. Board
-do-
25.
Vivek Vashisth
Him Fed
-do-
26.
KS Thakur
Him Fed
-do-
27.
Mohit Sharma
KCC Bank
-do-
28.
Rakesh Mehra
HPFC
-do-
29.
Vishav
Chakshu
Puri.
MC D/Shala
-do-
30.
Rohit Planchkarn
KCC Bank
-do-
31.
Rajeev Azad
OBC Commission
-do-
32.
Chander Bhanu
MC Dharamshala
-do-
33.
Vishal Avasthi
KCC Bank
-do-
34.
Manoj Rana
KCC Bank
-do-
35.
Shisher Attri
SDM Shahpur/Indora
-do-
36.
Sanjeev Kumar
H.P.
Public
Service
Commission
Shimla
-do-
37.
Vishal Sharma
SDM D/Shala
-do-
38.
Rajender
Chaudhary.
SDM Nagrota Bagwan
-do-
39.
Ravinder
Chaudhary
Chamunda Temple
-do-
40.
Jaswinder Kaur
State
Handicraft
and
Handloom
Corporation.
-do-
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41.
Himali Thapa
Khadi Board
-do-
42.
Rakesh
Mehra,
Dharamshala.
District Court(Revenue Court)
-do-
43.
Deepak Dogra
Session Court (Revenue cases)
-do-
44.
Ram Lal Narayan
District Court (Revenue cases), Forest
Corporation.
-do-
45.
Shirish Bassi
KCC Bank
-do-
Kangra Court
1.
Vipin Kumar
HPSEBL
-do-
2.
Anuj Gupta
HRTC
-do-
3.
Suresh Dhiman
State Civil Supplies Corpn.
-do-
4.
Vijay Gupta
Tehsildar/SDM Kangra
-do-
5.
Tarun Sharma
H.P. Forest Corpn.
-do-
6.
Suneet Kohli
NP Kangra/Temple Brajeshwari
-do-
Jawali Court
1.
Prittam Singh Rana
KCC Bank/HRTC/HPSEB/HPFC
-do-
2.
Kalpana Thakur
Distt. Court Jawali, HPU
-do-
3.
Gurnam
Singh
Bharti
State Civil Supplies Corpn, OBC
Commission, Sub Tehsil Nagrota
Surian.
-do-
4.
Surinder Guleria
H.P. Edu.Board
-do-
5.
Tilak Repotra
NP Jawali, HRTC
-do-
6.
Basant Lal Sood
H..P Edu. Board
-do-
Dharamshala HP Administrative Tribunal Bench
1.
Anand Sharma
MC D/Shala
-do-
2.
Arvind Kumar
H.P. State Civil Supply/HPFC, KCC
Bank.
-do-
3.
Varun Sharma
CSKAU Palampur
-do-
4.
Sumesh Raj Dogra
HRTC/HPSSC/HPPSC
-do-
5.
Rohit Dutta
H.P. Electricity Board
-do-
6.
Arvind Vashist
NP P/pur, B/Nath, Nagrota, HPSEB
-do-
7.
Madan Thakur
HPU/HPTU
-do-
8.
Umesh Dhiman
KCC Bank, NP Kangra/Jawalamukhi/
Dehra.
-do-
9.
Aman Kapoor
H.P. MC
-do-
10.
Manish Chaudhary
Him Urja
-do-
11.
Surinder Kaundal
H.P. Road and other Infrastructure
-do-
12.
Munish Kumar
UHF Nauni
-do-
13.
Sarita Chaudhary
H.P. Women & Child Welfare
-do-
14.
Latika Thakur
Wool Federation
-do-
15.
Ishant Guleria
H.P. Road and other Infrastructure/all
RKS Kangra & P/pur
-do-
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16.
Bobby Maratha
HPU/Chamunda Temple Trust
-do-
17.
Taviech Sanghoi
Land Mortgage Bank
-do-
18.
Ajay Thakur
HP Milk Fed
-do-
19.
Manohar Thakur
HP GIC
-do-
20.
Rahul Sharma
NP Jawali/Nurpur & Him Fed,
KCC Bank.
-do-
21.
Sudarshna
KCC Bank
-do-
22.
Narayan Thakur
H.P. Edu. Board
-do-
23.
Vivek Vashisth
HPFC
-do-
This engagement is purely at the pleasure of the State Government and can be withdrawn at
any stage without assigning any reasons thereof.
The Deputy Commissioner is requested that whenever there is a need of service of any
Advocate in the Revenue cases pertaining to the State, he may engage Advocate from the aforesaid
panel. Further where more than one Advocate is empanelled for the same Revenue Court, the
Deputy Commissioner will distribute the cases in rotation.
The expression “Revenue Cases” shall include all matters/proceedings relating to
encroachment cases, correction cases or any other case where interest of the State Government is
required to be protected before the Court.
By order,
Sd/-
LR-cum-Pr. Secretary (Law).
__________
PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Shimla-171002, the 10th July, 2018
No. PBW(B)F(7)3/2009-II.—In continuation of this department's notification of even
number dated 14th May, 2018, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to declare the 'Pallingi
to Nichar via Gramang' road in District Kinnaur having a length of 21.200 kms as Major District
Road no. 97 at Sl. No. 88. Accordingly the total length of Major District Roads in District Kinnaur
will be 21.200 km and in the State will be 4152.570 kms.
Sd/-
(MANISHA NANDA)
Addl. Chief Secretary (PW).
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LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
D/Shala, the 02nd November, 2017
No. Shram (A) 6-2/2014 (Awards).—In exercise of the powers vested under Section 17(1)
of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order the
publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court
D/Shala on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment Government of Himachal
Pradesh:—
Sl.
No.
Ref. No.
Petitioner
Respondent
Date of
Award/Order
1.
370/15
Sanjeet Kumar
D.F.O. Palampur
05-09-2017
2.
173/14
Subhash Chand
Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur
08-09-2017
3.
176/14
Sudershan Kumar
Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur
08-09-2017
4.
178/14
Ramesh Chand
Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur
08-09-2017
5.
198/14
Vinod Kumar
Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur
08-09-2017
6.
218/14
Madan Lal
Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur
08-09-2017
7.
190/14
Kuldeep Kumar
Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur
08-09-2017
8.
207/14
Ashok Kumar
Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur
08-09-2017
9.
210/14
Vipan Kumar
Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur
08-09-2017
10.
212/14
Punnu Ram
Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur
08-09-2017
11.
217/14
Ashok Kumar
Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur
08-09-2017
12
690/16
Rama Sharma
Chairman, State Social Welfare
Board
11-09-2017
13.
576/15
Dhani Ram
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
14.
573/15
Gian Chand
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
15.
532/15
Devi Singh
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
16.
531/15
Dharam Pal
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
17.
569/15
Gurdev
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
18.
562/15
Dhano
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
19.
575/15
Roop Dass
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
20.
524/15
Khem Ram
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
21.
20/16
Tul Dei
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
22.
508/15
Des Raj
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
23.
568/15
Kishan Dei
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
24.
451/15
Chandro
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
25.
529/15
Janam Singh
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
26.
578/15
Yuvraj
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
27.
574/15
Devi Singh
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
3089
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28.
521/15
Sarita
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
29.
522/15
Suman Kumari
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
30.
581/15
Dhuri Devi
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
31.
526/15
Amar Dei
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
32.
558/15
Basant Singh
E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar
18-09-2017
33.
109/17
Dinesh Singh
Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur
23-09-2017
34.
103/15
Kaman Singh
E.E. HPPWD, Killar
04-09-2017
35.
155/15
Bhag Chand
E.E. HPPWD, Killar
04-09-2017
36.
377/15
Abdul Sitar
Dy. Director Horticulture
20-09-2017
37.
378/15
Kirpa Ram
Dy. Director Horticulture
20-09-2017
By order,
R. D. DHIMAN, IAS
Pr. Secretary ( Lab. & Emp.).
______________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. 370/ 2015
Shri Sanjeet Kumar s/o Shri Pritam Chand, r/o Village and P.O. Chachian, Tehsil
Palampur, Distt. Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division Palampur, Distt. Kangra, H.P. . .Respondent.
05-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.30 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
______________
05-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent.
3090
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Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It
is 2.35 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is
indicative of the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference
is disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action /publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
05-09-2017
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
______________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. 173/ 2014
Shri Subhash Chand s/o Sh. Hari Krishan, r/o V.P.O. Parour, Tehsil Palampur, District
Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi
Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.33 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
(K. K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
______________
08-09-2017 Present:None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.36 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of
the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
3091
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Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
08-09-2017
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. 176/ 2014
Shri Sudershan Kumar, s/o Shri Partap Chand, r/o Village Toran, P.O. Tikkar, Tehsil
Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi
Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.32 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
______________
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.37 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. Authorised Representative today is indicative of
the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
3092
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Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
08-09-2017
(K. K.SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
______________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. 178/ 2014
Shri Ramesh Chand s/o Sh. Kirpa Ram, r/o Village Ram Nagar, P.O. Tathail, Tehsil
Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi
Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.30 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
(K. K.SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
______________
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.35 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. Authorised Representative today is indicative of
the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
3093
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Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
08-09-2017
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
________________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. 198/ 2014
Shri Vinod Kumar s/o Shri Amar Singh, r/o Village & P.O. Arla, Tehsil Palampur, District
Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi
Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.34 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.37 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of
the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
3094
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Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
08-09-2017
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref : No. 218/ 2014
Shri Madan Lal s/o Shri Rajinder Kumar, r/o V.P.O. Ustehar, Tehsil Baijnath, District
Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi
Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.35 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.38 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of
the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
3095
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Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
08-09-2017
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. 190/ 2014
Shri Kuldeep Kumar s/o Sh. Jodha Ram, r/o Village-Dargil, P.O. Deogran, Tehsil
Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi
Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.36 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.39 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of
the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
3096
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Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
08-09-2017
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref: No. 207/ 2014
Shri Ashok Kumar s/o Shri Tara Chand, r/o Village Bhatpura, P.O. Thandol, Tehsil
Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi
Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.38 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.41 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of
the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
3097
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 16 tqykbZ] 2018@25 vk"kk<+] 1940
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
08-09-2017
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref: No. 210/ 2014
Shri Vipan Kumar s/o Shri Malaha Singh, r/o V.P.O. Massal Tehsil & District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi
Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.40 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.42 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of
the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
3098
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 16 tqykbZ] 2018@25 vk"kk<+] 1940
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
08-09-2017
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. 212/ 2014
Shri Punnu Ram s/o Shri Gatto Ram, r/o V.P.O. Jhikli Bheth, Tehsil Baijnath, District
Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi
Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.42 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.43 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of
the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
3099
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 16 tqykbZ] 2018@25 vk"kk<+] 1940
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
08-09-2017
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref.: No. 217/ 2014
Shri Ashok Kumar s/o Sh. Sher Singh, r/o V.P.O. Dadh (Takka Khater), Tehsil
Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi
Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.44 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.44 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of
the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
3100
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 16 tqykbZ] 2018@25 vk"kk<+] 1940
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
08-09-2017
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR
COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No. : 690/2016
Date of Institution : 03-10-2016
Date of Decision : 11-9-2017
Smt. Rama Sharma d/o Smt. Subhadra Devi Sharma, r/o Ward No.3, Village and Post
Office Old Kangra, Tehsil and District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Chairman, State Social Welfare Board, Thakur Vatika Khalini, Shimla-2
2.
The Chairperson, Family and Child Welfare Project Society, Near Purani Chungi,
Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
ORDER/AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the termination of the services of Smt. Rama Sharma d/o Smt. Subhadra Devi
Sharma, r/o Ward No.-3, Village and P.O. Old Kangra, Tehsil and District Kangra, H.P.
by the (1) The Chairman, State Social Welfare Board, Thakur Vatika Khalini, Shimla-2
(2) The Chairperson, Family and Child Welfare Project Society, Near Purani Chungi,
Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. during September, 2014 without complying with the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount
of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and amount of compensation the above
aggrieved worker is entitled to from the above employers/Management?”
11.9.2017 Present: Miss Sarita Chaudhary, Adv. with petitioner Smt. Rama Sharma.
3101
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Smt. Rajni Vyas, Chairperson/President, Family and Child Welfare Project
Society, Rait, Tehsil Shahpur, District Kangra, H.P. in person.
Smt. Shail Bharti and Smt. Latika Thakur, Adv. Csl. for the respondents.
Case taken up for conciliation as a result of which parties have amicably resolved
their dispute qua present reference no.690/2016.
2.
Smt. Rajni Vyas, Chairperson/President, Family and Child Welfare Project Society,
Rait, Tehsil Shahpur, District Kangra, H.P. has testified on oath to have entered into compromise
with petitioner according to which petitioner would be appointed as teacher on monthly salary of
Rs.3,000/- (Rupees three thousand only) per month within a month after sanction from
government. She has further stated that a sum of Rs. 22,000/- being arrears of salary from
February 2014 to August, 2014 is to be paid to the petitioner/claimant out of which first
installment of Rs. 11,000/- (Rupees eleven thousand only) has been paid to the
claimant/petitioner today vide cheque No.057303 and remaining amount of Rs.11,000/
(Rupees eleven thousand only) would be paid to her before 31st October, 2017. Admitting
correctness of statement of respondent No.2 aforestated, petitioner/claimant has prayed for
disposal of claim petition. She has further acknowledged to have received a cheque of
Rs.11,000/- (Rupees eleven thousand only) i.e. first installment from respondent No. 2 today in
the Court. In view of the separate statement made by both the parties, this reference is
disposed as compromised. The parties shall however be bound by their statement recorded
today.
3.
The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
4.
A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
5.
File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open
Court today this 11th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
__________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No. : 576/2015
Date of Institution : 04-12-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017
Shri Dhani Ram s/o Shri Ram Saran, r/o Village Kulal, P.O. Mindhal, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
. . Petitioner.
Versus
3102
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The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba,
H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Dhani Ram s/o Shri Ram
Saran, r/o Village Kulal, P.O. Mindhal, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
vide demand notice dated 06-12-2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of
service during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether
termination of services of Shri Dhani Ram s/o Shri Ram Saran, r/o Village Kulal,
P.O. Mindhal, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar
Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004,
without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and
justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1995 who continuously worked till October, 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in
the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil, District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/
artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required
to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability
of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had
terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's
notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation
was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that
respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the
services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income
besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time
and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of
petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman
from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go'
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had
continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who appointed
in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash
3103
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Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Dhani Ram in 2004. The claimant/petitioner claimed
that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline
or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been
served upon him and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The
petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the
year 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully
employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have
committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays
for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2004. He
further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2004 along-with back wages, seniority
including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his
illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks
given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1995 to 2004 be counted 160
days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having
completed 10 years of service and as per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by
Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till
2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required
for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the
petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in
para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job
at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating
its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and
the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle
of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he
would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner
is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended
that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of
issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no
necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended
that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back
wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list
Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,
3104
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HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy
of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
06.12.2011 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent
suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. . OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Discussed
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,20,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
ISSUES NO.1 TO 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged Beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written
order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that
no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is
dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident
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from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked
from 1996 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1995 to
October, 2004. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding
documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that
petitioner had been factually engaged in the year 1996 and not in 1995.
Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks
but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted
facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if
petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past
service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1995 to October, 2004. He has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and
thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2004 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he
had
served
respondent
with
due
diligence
and
had
spotless
service
record
as
respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him
but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has
also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before
this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and
petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a
failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for
industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by
filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which
delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever
he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or
omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making
correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand
taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The
petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used
to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit
breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner
so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable
evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of
abandonment.
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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 58 days in the year 1996, 59 days in 1997, 186 days in 1998, 145 days in 1999, 89
days in 2000, 121.5 days in 2001, 89 days in 2002, 127 days in 2003 and 103 days in 2004 and thus
a total of his service in 1996 to 2004 in 09 years he had worked for 977.5 days in his entire
service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1996, 1997 and 1999 to 2004 petitioner had
worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner,
Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to
alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the
petitioner had merely worked for 103 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months
from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to
meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all
required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As
such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this
document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to
petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was
called upon to join for service at any time after 2004 even at the time when junior persons were
reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of
the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas
petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and
even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work
which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has
placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419
in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of
the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in
case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement
junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.
On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 01.10.2015
of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against
respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the
petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled him for
regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004,
he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for
full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the
State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he
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had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained
not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he
had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as
daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North
East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in
which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had
held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom
income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self
employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use
being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the
petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to
maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated
here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court
was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture
income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had
income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not
gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing
discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between
petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of
Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it
may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not
entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
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power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of
material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
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a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly
referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a
delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour
Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after
6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
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Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief ”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for
claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash
Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that
a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be
based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a
situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire
shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to
discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he have lost confidence of the
management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts
which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that
has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement
should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the
petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations
when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has
certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four
situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of
reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be
appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that
petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave
notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra)
even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only
compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,
Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex
Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to
rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State
on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this
case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR
2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation
would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1)
Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by
ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which
provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3)
Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that
claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches.
That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner
cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding
relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the
claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by
reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize &
Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has
held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed
which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal
entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon
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Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was
involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the
department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although
subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by
respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made
applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important
aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.
20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to
keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation
awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by
the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances
is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation
within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors
which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09 years and
actually worked for 977.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner
were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute
by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on
06.12.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble
Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back
wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139)
FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay
and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined
on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as
Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also
the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous
judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which
are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the
ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in
judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director
Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals reference
under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High
Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged
on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government
in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be
attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made
in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was
working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled
worker. For the above said reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of
petitioner.
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23. I n view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,20,000/-
(Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner
is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that
amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award
failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till
its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.4
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs. 1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in
lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9%
per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open
Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_______________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR
COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No. : 573/2015
Date of Institution : 04-12-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017
Shri Gian Chand s/o Shri Labh Singh, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
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Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Gian Chand s/o Shri Labh
Singh, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi) District Chamba, H.P. vide
demand notice dated 25-01-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services
during September, 2001 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of
services of Shri Gian Chand S/O Shri Labh Singh, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H.
Killar (Pangi) District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2001, without complying the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount
of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved
workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage Beldar on muster roll basis in
the year 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made
in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as
the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil, District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/
artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required
to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability
of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had
terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's
notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation
was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that
respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the
services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income
besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time
and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of
petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman
from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go'
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had
continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who appointed
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in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash
Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Gian Chand in 2004. The claimant/petitioner claimed
that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline
or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been
served upon him and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The
petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the
year 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully
employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have
committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays
for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2005. He
further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2005 along-with back wages, seniority
including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his
illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks
given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1996 to October, 2005 be
counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.
01.01.2004 having completed 10 years of service and as per the policy of HP Govt. in
pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On
merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather
clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1996 who remained
engaged till 2001 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work
at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically
pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year
as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to
the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned
in para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job
at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating
its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and
the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle
of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2001 he
would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner
is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended
that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of
issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no
necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended
that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back
wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list
Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D, copy of Notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the
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evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex.
RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
25.01.2012 qua his termination of service during September, 2001 by respondent
suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2001 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. . OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Discussed
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.80,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged Beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written
order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that
no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute
with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from
mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from
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1996 till 2001 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1996 to October,
2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary
evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had
been factually engaged till the year 2001 and not upto October, 2005. Admittedly, the reference
of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to
petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record,
claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for
relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and
compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and
thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he
had
served
respondent
with
due
diligence
and
had
spotless
service
record
as
respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him
but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has
also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before
this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and
petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a
failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for
industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by
filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which
delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever
absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on
the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence
calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the
respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the
other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in
between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been
deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did
not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of
Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by
respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 165.5 days in the year 1996, 122 days in 1997, 111 days in 1998, 123 days in 1999,
132 days in 2000 and 121 days in 2001 and thus a total of his service in 1996 to 2001 in 06
years he had worked for 774.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the
years 1997 to 2001 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference
from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine
its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B that in the year 2001 the petitioner had merely worked for 121 days and thus
immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had
not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous
service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice
envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated
the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this
document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to
petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was
called upon to join for service at any time after 2001 even at the time when junior persons were
reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of
the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas
petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and
even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work
which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has
placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419
in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of
the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in
case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement
junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.
On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 01.10.2015
of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against
respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the
petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him for
regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2001, he
had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full
back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State
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has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had
cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not
gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had
maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as
daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North
East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in
which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had
held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom
income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self
employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use
being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the
petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to
maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated
here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court
was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture
income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had
income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not
gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing
discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner
and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G
and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus,
applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to
hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the
period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
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Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of
material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-Cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the Conciliation Officer and the State Government to
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make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the
order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the
appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the
dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government
had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that
there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to
the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2001 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section
5-Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Labaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calender year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D. Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6
years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant- employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
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Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for claimant/
petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash Kumar Paul
vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may
pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on
justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation
where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and
no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge
duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to
discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may
justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that has to be
supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be
followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the
aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker may be
awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly
appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are
illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not
mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding
compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the
job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining
of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met
requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation
which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment
of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak
Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs.
General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments
652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner
on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has
relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through
regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of
petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal
of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of
Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner
interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of
Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652
(SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied
relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it
was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the
court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not
be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by
ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373
titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned,
the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come
First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and
retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the
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facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former
closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no
closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without
following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when
there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of
Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important
aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.
20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to
keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though
compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be
enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and
circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum
of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 06
years and actually worked for 774.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of
petitioner were disengaged in 2001 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised
industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about eleven years i.e. demand notice was
given on 25.01.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments
of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or
for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment
2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter
of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely
declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in
2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this
judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through
these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to
the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex
Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon
the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint
Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals
reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble
High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been
challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the
Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment
would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation
qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person
who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate
unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim
of petitioner.
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23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees
eighty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts
and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing
which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its
realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so
awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per
annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
______________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No. : 532/2015
Date of Institution : 21-11-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017
Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Sukh Dayal, r/o Village and Post Office Mouch, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
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The Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Sukh
Dayal, r/o Village and Post Office Mouch, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P. vide demand notice dated 06.10.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of
services during October, 2002 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether
termination of services of Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Sukh Dayal, r/o Village and Post Office
Mouch, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D.
Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2002, without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If
not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the
above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage Beldar on muster roll basis in
the year 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2002 with the respondent. Averments made
in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as
the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/
artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required
to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing
one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment
compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is
contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while
disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of
income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the
respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when
the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of
new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come,
First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department
had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who
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appointed in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000,
Prakash Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Devi Singh in 2004. The claimant/petitioner
claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of
indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-
sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been
afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal
termination from month of October, 2002 till the date of institution of present claim petition who
had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section
25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution
of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the
respondent in the month of October, 2002. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f.
month of October, 2002 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as
petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has
also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service
of petitioner between 1996 to October, 2002 be counted 160 days continuous service and
regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2004 having completed 10 years of
service and as per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of
H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On
merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather
clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1996 who remained
engaged till 2002 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work
at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically
pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year
as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent
to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner
mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and
no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job
at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating
its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and
the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle
of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2002 he
would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner
is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also
contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,
question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,
there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It
is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled
for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/
proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.
PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
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PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy
of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
06.10.2011 qua his termination of service during October, 2002 by respondent
suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,
2002 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Discussed
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,50,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged Beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis in the year 1996 continuously worked till October, 2002 with the
respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no
written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the
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reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to
petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim
of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for
relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and
compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to October, 2002. He has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and
thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2002 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he
had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/
department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even
while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also
explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this
Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and
petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a
failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for
industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by
filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which
delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even
after October, 2002. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission
on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making
correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken
by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,
on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the
job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had
been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that
petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable
evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of
abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 177 days in the year 1996, 166 days in 1997 170 days in 1998, 150 days in 1999, 125
days in 2000, 133 days in 2001 and 125 days in 2002 and thus a total of his service in 1996 to
2002 in 07 years he had worked for 1046 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that
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except the years 1999 to 2002 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no
reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is
to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from
mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2002 the petitioner had merely worked for 125 days
and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner
had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous
service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice
envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the
provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this
document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were
junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that
petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time
when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the
affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined
service in 1996 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity
to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of
the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs.
S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of
Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have
worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement
junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.
On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 22.09.2015
of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against
respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the
petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 07 years which entitled him for
regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in
October, 2002, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was
entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A.
for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted
that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having
remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in
which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been
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working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex
Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10
SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas
Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment
wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment
or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,
the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case
since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were
sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be
it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour
Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture
income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had
income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not
gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing
discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner
and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G
and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus,
applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to
hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the
period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/
Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the
employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
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14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra) 1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of
material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-Cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if
raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real
prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay
in shown to be existing, the tribunal, Labour Court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly
referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a
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delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour
Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2002 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section
5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after
6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief.
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21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for
claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash
Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that
a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be
based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a
situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire
shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to
discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the
management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts
which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that
has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement
should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the
petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations
when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has
certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four
situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of
reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be
appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that
petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave
notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra)
even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only
compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,
Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex
Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to
rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on
the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon‟ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow
University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR
2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was
not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC
supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be
sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R.
502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for
petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that
Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court
Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner
cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the
law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied
relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in
hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably
indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR
2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees
Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company
principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial
Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling
petitioner for retrenchment
compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case
in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this
court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged
petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of
work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was
engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.
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22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/
circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and
21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as
Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh
provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep
in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation
awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by
the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances
is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation
within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors
which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 07 years and
actually worked for 1046 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner
were disengaged in October, 2002 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial
dispute by issuance of demand notice after about nine years i.e. demand notice was given on
06.10.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble
Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back
wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139)
FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay
and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined
on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as
Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also
the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous
judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which
are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the
ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in
judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director
Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals reference
under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High
Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged
on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government
in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be
attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made
in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was
working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled
worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of
petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/-
(Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is
entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear
that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award
failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till
its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
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Issue No.4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the
compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of
the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so
awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum
on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_______________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR
COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 531/2015
Date of Institution
: 21-11-2015
Date of Decision
: 18-9-2017
Shri Dharampal s/o Shri Charan Dass, r/o Village and Post Office Kumar, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
. . Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
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For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Dharampal s/o Shri Charan
Dass, r/o Village and Post Office Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P. vide demand notice dated 06.10.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of
services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether
termination of the services of Shri Dharampal s/o Shri Charan Dass, r/o Village and Post
Office Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Engineer, I.&P.H./
H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September,
2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal
and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in
the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/
artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required
to be counted as 'continuous service' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability
of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had
terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's
notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation
was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that
respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the
services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income
besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time
and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of
petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman
from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go'
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had
continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who appointed
in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000,
Prakash
Chand
in
2001,
Budhi
Ram in
2003
and
Dharam
Pal
in
2004.
The
claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted
for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal
termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity
of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained
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unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of
institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus
entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of
statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral
order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. He further
prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2005 alongwith back wages,
seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of
his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks
given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1996 to October, 2005 be counted
160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2004
having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law
settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On
merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather
clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1996 who remained
engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work
at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically
pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year
as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to
the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned
in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the
job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.
Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own
sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per
direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not
violated the principle of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been
terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that
after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and
laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the
respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the
same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his
termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus
not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/
proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.
PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy
of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
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8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
06.10.2011 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent
suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. . OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No. 1
: Discussed
Issue No. 2
: Yes
Issue No. 3
: Discussed
Issue No. 4
: No
Relief
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,10,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3 :
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged Beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written
order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that
no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute
with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from
mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from
1996 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1996 to October,
2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary
evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had
been factually engaged w.e.f. 1996 to 2004 and not for 1996 to October, 2005. Admittedly, the
reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to
petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim
of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for
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relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and
compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub-Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and
thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he
had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/
department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even
while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also
explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this
Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and
petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a
failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for
industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by
filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which
delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever
he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on
the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence
calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the
respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the
other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in
between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been
deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did
not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of
Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by
respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 82.5 days in the year 1996, 140 days in 1997, 160 days in 1998, 140 days in 1999,
106 days in 2000, 116 days in 2001, 111 in 2002, and 108 days in 2004 and thus a total of his
service in 1996 to 2004 in 08 years he had worked for 963.5 days in his entire service period.
Be it noticed that except the years 1996, 1997 and 1999 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more
than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of
artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal
termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner
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had merely worked for 108 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from
the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet
requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required
from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such,
the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this
document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to
petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was
called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior
persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of
Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No. 10 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,
1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-
G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked
for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement
junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.
On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 22.09.2015
of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against
respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the
petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 07 years which entitled him for
regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in
September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such
was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy.
D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has
admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of
having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-
examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as
he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M.
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Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.
Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also
include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from
employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources
from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment
of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual
pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was
gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case
has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent
was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment.
Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated
that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view
of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it
may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not
entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
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14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of
material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, Labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly
referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a
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delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour
Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D. Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after
6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
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21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for
claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash
Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that
a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be
based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a
situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire
shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to
discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the
management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts
which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that
has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement
should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the
petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations
when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has
certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four
situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of
reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be
appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that
petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave
notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra)
even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only
compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,
Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex
Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to
rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State
on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this
case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR
2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would
be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R.
502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for
petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that
Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court
Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner
cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the
law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied
relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in
hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably
indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR
2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees
Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of
'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and
retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since
the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former
closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no
closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without
following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when
there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of
Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.
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22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important
aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.
20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to
keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though
compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be
enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and
circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum
of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 08
years and actually worked for 963.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of
petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised
industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand notice was
given on 06.10.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments
of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or
for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment
2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter
of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely
declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in
2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this
judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through
these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to
the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex
Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon
the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint
Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals
reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble
High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been
challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the
Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment
would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of
observation qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found
to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the
petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches
would not eclipse claim of petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,10,000/-
(Rupees one lakh ten thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is
entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear
that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award
failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till
its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
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Issue No. 4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,10,000/- (Rupees one lakh ten thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu
of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation
so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum
on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No. : 569/2015
Date of Institution : 04.12.2015
Date of Decision : 18.9.2017
Shri Gurudev w/o Shri Deena Nath, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Gurudev s/o Shri Deena Nath,
r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi) District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice
dated 25-01-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during
September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of services
of Shri Gurudev s/o Shri Deena Nath, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi),
District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004, without complying the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled
to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1993 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in
the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way
of
intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks
are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing
one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment
compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is
contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while
disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source
of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the
respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when
the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of
new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come
First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department
had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Gurdev who
appointed in 1994, Sher Singh in 1996, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Baldev in 2000,
Trilok Chand in 2002 and Hari Ram in 2003. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless
service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his
conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him
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and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner
also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the year
2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully
employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have
committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays
for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2005. He
further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2005 along-with back wages, seniority
including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his
illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given
time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1993 to 2005 be counted 160 days
continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having
completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by
Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till
2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required
for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the
petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in
para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job
at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating
its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and
the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle
of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he
would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner
is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended
that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of
issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no
necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended
that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back
wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/
proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.
PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D, Copy of notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the
evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex.
RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
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8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
25.01.2012 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent
suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. . OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No. 1
: Discussed
Issue No. 2
: Yes
Issue No. 3
: Discussed
Issue No. 4
: No
Relief
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,50,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3 :
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written
order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that
no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is
dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident
from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked
from 1994 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1993 to
October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding
documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that
petitioner had been factually engaged w.e.f. 1994 to 2004 and not from 1993 to October, 2005.
Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only
with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on
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record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is
entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service
benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1993 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and
thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he
had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/
department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even
while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also
explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this
Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and
petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a
failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for
industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by
filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which
delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever
he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on
the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence
calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the
respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the
other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in
between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been
deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did
not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of
Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by
respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 31 days in the year 1994, 138 days in 1995, 137 days in 1996, 30 days in 1997, 119
days in 1998, 108 days in 1999, 146 days in 2000, 117.5 days in 2001, 120 days in 2002, 112
days in 2003 and 82 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2004 in 11 years he
had worked for 1140.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not
worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner,
Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to
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alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the
petitioner had merely worked for 82 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months
from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet
requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all
required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As
such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this
document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to
petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was
called upon to join for service at any time after 2004 even at the time when junior persons were
reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of
the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas
petitioner was senior from these co- workers having joined service in 1994 was terminated and
even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work
which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has
placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419
in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of
the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in
case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify
engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by
Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order
dated 01.10.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as
against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour
of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner
is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled him
for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004, he
had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full
back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State
has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had
cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not
gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had
maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as
daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North
East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in
which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had
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held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom
income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self
employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use
being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the
petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to
maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated
here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court
was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture
income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had
income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not
gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing
discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner
and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section
25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment.
Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be
erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
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14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or
unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay
in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for
adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming
rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, Labour Court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly
referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a
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delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour
Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon‟ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963-Section
5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in celendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after
6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
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21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for
claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash
Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that
a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be
based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a
situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire
shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to
discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the
management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts
which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that
has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement
should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the
petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations
when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has
certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four
situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of
reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be
appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that
petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave
notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 supra)
even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only
compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,
Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex
Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to
rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State
on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this
case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR
2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would
be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R.
502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for
petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that
Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court
Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner
cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the
law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied
relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in
hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably
indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR
2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees
Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of
'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and
retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts
of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of
unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of
company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of
the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no
closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon
Machenize cannot be made applicable.
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22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important
aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.
20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to
keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation
awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by
the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances
is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation
within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors
which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 11 years and
actually worked for 1140.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner
were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute
by issuance of demand notice after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on 25.01.2012.
Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex
Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back
wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013
(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of
delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely
declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in
2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this
judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through
these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the
petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid
down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the
judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint
Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals
reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble
High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been
challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the
Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not
be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts
made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who
was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled
worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of
petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/-
(Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is
entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear
that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award
failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till
its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
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Issue No.4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu
of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation
so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum
on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
________________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR
COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No. : 562/2015
Date of Institution : 04.12.2015
Date of Decision : 18.9.2017
Shri Dhano s/o Shri Man Singh, r/o Village Kuthah, P.O. Dharwas, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
. . Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H. Killar (Pangi), District
Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Dhano s/o Shri Man Singh,
r/o Village Kuthah, P.O. Dharwas, Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
vide demand notice dated 28-05-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of
services during October, 1997 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether
termination of services of Shri Dhano s/o Shri Man Singh, r/o Village Kuthah, P.O.
Dharwas, Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division,
H.P.P.W.D./I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during October, 1997, without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not,
what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above
aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1991 who continuously worked till October, 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in
the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/
artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required
to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability
of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had
terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's
notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation
was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that
respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the
services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income
besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time
and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of
petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman
from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go'
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had
continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Gurdev who appointed
in 1994, Sher Singh in 1996, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Baldev in 2000, Trilok
Chand in 2002, and Hari Ram in 2003. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless
service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his
conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him
and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner
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also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month
of October, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere
gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to
have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner
prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month
of October, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2004
alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained
unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period
of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between
1991 to October, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of
petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2001 having completed 10 years of service and a s per the policy of HP
Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is
entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1991 who remained engaged till
1997 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required
for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the
petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in
para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job
at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating
its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and
the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle
of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1997 he
would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner
is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended
that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of
issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no
necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended
that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back
wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/
proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.
PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy
of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
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8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
28.5.2012 qua his termination of service during October, 1997 by respondent
suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,
1997 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No. 1: : Discussed
Issue No. 2 : : Yes
Issue No. 3: : Discussed
Issue No. 4: : No
Relief: : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.35,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3 :
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written
order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that
no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is
dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident
from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked
from 1991 till 1997 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1991 to
October, 2004. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding
documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that
petitioner had been factually engaged till 1997 and not upto 2004. Admittedly, the reference of
appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's
termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner
requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement
and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
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12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub-Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1991 to October, 2004. He has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and
thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2004 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he
had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/
department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even
while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also
explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this
Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and
petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a
failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for
industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by
filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which
delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever
he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on
the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence
calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the
respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the
other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in
between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been
deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did
not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of
Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by
respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 90 days in the year 1991, 47 days in 1993, 31 days in 1994, 10 days in 1995, 20
days in 1996 and 80 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1991 to 1997 in 06 years he
had worked for 278 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not
worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla
on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged
illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1997 the
petitioner had merely worked for 80 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months
from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet
requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required
from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such,
the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
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15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for
the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document
have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner.
Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called
upon to join for service at any time after October, 1997 even at the time when junior persons were
reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G
of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No. 10 of the affidavit were retained
whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,
1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked
for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement
junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.
On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 05.10.2015
of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against
respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the
petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 06 years which entitled him for
regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in
October, 1997, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such
was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld.
Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has
admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of
having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-
examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as
he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M.
Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.
Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also
include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from
employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources
from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment
of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual
pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner
was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s
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case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the
respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful
employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it
cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full
back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and
employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched
without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully
employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
(2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus
would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the
respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S. M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
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employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of
material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as
gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief
from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, Labour Court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly
referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a
delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour
Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
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by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1997 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section
5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after
6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for
claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon‟ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash
Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that
a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be
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based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a
situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire
shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to
discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the
management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts
which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that
has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement
should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the
petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations
when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has
certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four
situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of
reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be
appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that
petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave
notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra)
even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only
compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,
Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex
Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to
rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State
on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this
case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR
2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation
would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1)
Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by
ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which
provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3)
Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that
claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches.
That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner
cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding
relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the
claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by
reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize &
Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held
on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated
Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for
retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are
different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in
case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of
HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to
funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent
which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important
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aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.
20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to
keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though
compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be
enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and
circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum
of Rs.1 lakh alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 06
years and actually worked for 278 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of
petitioner were disengaged in October, 1997 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised
industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about fifteen years i.e. demand notice was
given on 28.5.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments
of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in
view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for
petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner
could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.
I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not
declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of
Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents
has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as
Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the
judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has
been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when
reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference
made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said
judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of
observation qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an
educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is
an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not
eclipse claim of petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 35,000/-
(Rupees thirty five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is
entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that
amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award
failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award
till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
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Issue No.4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs. 35,000/- (Rupees thirty five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so
awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per
annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_______________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No. : 575/2015
Date of Institution : 04-12-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017
Shri Roop Dass s/o Shri Mangal Dass, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Roop Dass s/o Shri Mangal
Dass, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide
demand notice dated 25-01-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services
during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, whether termination of
services of Shri Roop Dass s/o Shri Mangal Dass, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H.
Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004, without complying the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount
of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved
workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1994 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in
the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way
of
intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks
are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing
one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment
compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is
contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while
disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source
of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the
respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when
the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of
new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come
First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department
had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who
appointed in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000,
Prakash Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Gurdev in 1994. The claimant/petitioner
claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of
indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-
sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been
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afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his
illegal termination in the year 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had
been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section
25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution
of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the
respondent in the year 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2005
along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained
unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of
intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between
1994 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service
of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP
Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner
is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On
merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather
clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained
engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work
at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically
pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year
as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to
the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned
in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job
at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating
its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and
the persons mentioned in para no.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour
Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last
come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would
have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is
stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended
that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of
issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no
necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended
that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back
wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list
Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D, copy of Notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the
evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex.
RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
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8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
25.01.2012 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent
suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. . OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No. 1
: Discussed
Issue No. 2
: Yes
Issue No. 3
: Discussed
Issue No. 4
: No
Relief
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3 :
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written
order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that
no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute
with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from
mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from
1997 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1994 to October,
2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary
evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had
been factually engaged w.e.f. 1997 till 2004 and not from 1994 to October, 2005. Admittedly, the
reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to
petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim
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of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for
relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and
compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1994 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and
thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he
had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/
department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even
while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also
explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this
Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and
petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a
failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for
industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by
filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which
delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever
he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on
the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence
calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the
respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the
other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in
between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been
deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did
not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of
Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by
respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 81 days in the year 1997, 169 days in 1998, 106 days in 1999, 146 days in 2000,
117.5 days in 2001, 120 days in 2002, 142 days in 2003 and 104 days in 2004 and thus a total of
his service in 1997 to 2004 in 08 years he had worked for 985.5 days in his entire service period.
Be it noticed that except the years 1997 and 1999 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160
days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of
artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal
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termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner
had merely worked for 104 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from
the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet
requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required
from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such,
the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this
document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to
petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was
called upon to join for service at any time after 2001 even at the time when junior persons were
reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of
the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas
petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1997 was terminated and
even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work
which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has
placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419
in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of
the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in
case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement
junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.
On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 01.10.2015
of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against
respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the
petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him for
regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004, he
had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full
back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State
has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had
cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not
gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had
maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as
daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North
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East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in
which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had
held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom
income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self
employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use
being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the
petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to
maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated
here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court
was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture
income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had
income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not
gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing
discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner
and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G
and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus,
applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to
hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the
period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the Learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
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Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court). In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of
material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the
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criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the
workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman
approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour
Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the
respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he
approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered
to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication.
Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute
and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been
held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial
Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section
5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6
years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
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of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for claimant/
petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash Kumar Paul
vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may
pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on
justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation
where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and
no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge
duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to
discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may
justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that has to be
supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be
followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the petitioner with the
aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker may be
awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly
appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are
illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not
mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding
compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the
job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining
of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met
requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation
which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment
of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak
Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs.
General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgments
652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner
on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has
relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through
regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of
petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal
of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of
Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner
interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of
Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652
(SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied
relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it
was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the
court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not
be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by
ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373
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titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned,
the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment
was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of
case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of
unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of
company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of
the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no
closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon
Machenize cannot be made applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important
aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.
20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to
keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though
compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be
enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and
circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum
of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 08
years and actually worked for 985.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of
petitioner were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised
industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about 7½ years i.e. demand notice was
given on 25.01.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to
judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in
view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for
petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner
could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of
the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I
have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not
declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of
Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents
has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as
Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the
judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has
been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when
reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference
made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said
judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of
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observation qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an
educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is
an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not
eclipse claim of petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-
(Rupees one lakh only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the
facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which
the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its
realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so
awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per
annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. : 524/2015
Date of Institution : 21-11-2015
Date of Decision : 18-09-2017
Shri Khem Ram s/o Shri Sant Ram, r/o Village Kironi Mouch, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
. . Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Khem Ram s/o Shri Sant
Ram, r/o Village Kironi Mouch, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
before the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 06.10.2011 regarding his alleged illegal
termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not,
whether termination of services of Shri Khem Ram s/o Shri Sant Ram, r/o Village Kironi
Mouch, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer,
I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during
September, 2004, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits
and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1991 who continuously worked till October, 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in
the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
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Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way
of
intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks
are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing
one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment
compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is
contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while
disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source
of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the
respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when
the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of
new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come
First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department
had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Tek Chand who
appointed in 1999, Baldev in 2000, Trilok Chand in 2002 and Hari Ram in 2003. The claimant/
petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any
act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no
charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since
his illegal termination in the year 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who
had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly
alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section
25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of
Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/
retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service
in the year 2004 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as
petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has
also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire
service of petitioner between 1991 to October, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service
and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2001 having completed 10 years of
service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1991 who remained engaged till
2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required
for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the
petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in
para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job
at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating
its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and
the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle
of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he
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would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner
is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended
that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of
issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no
necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended
that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back
wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/
proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.
PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy
of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
06.10.2011 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent
suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. . OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. . OPP.
3.
If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No. 1
: Discussed
Issue No. 2
: Yes
Issue No. 3
: Discussed
Issue No. 4
: No
Relief
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,20,000/-
per operative part of award.
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REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3 :
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis in the year 1991 continuously worked till September, 2004 with the
respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no
written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the
reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to
petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim
of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for
relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and
compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1991 to September, 2004. He has also stated on
oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating
his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him
and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004
by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H
of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served
respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had
never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching
petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not
approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there
existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved
before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was
submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by
petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where
direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred
and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even
after September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission
on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making
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correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken
by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,
on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the
job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had
been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that
petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable
evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of
abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 58 days in the year 1991, 154 days in 1992, 25 days in 1994, 121 days in 1999, 148
days in 2000, 119 days in 2001, 169 days in 2002, 156 days in 2003 and 119 days in 2004 and
thus a total of his service in 1991 to 2004 in 09 years he had worked for 1069 days in his entire
service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1991, 1992, 1994, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 and
2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour
Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings
only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B
that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 119 days and thus immediately in
preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service
of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it
was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the
Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this
document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to
petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was
called upon to join for service at any time after 2001 even at the time when junior persons were
reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of
the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas
petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1991 was terminated and
even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work
which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has
placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419
in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of
the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in
case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement
junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.
On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 22.9.2015
of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against
respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the
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petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him
for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
16. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004,
he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for
full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the
State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he
had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained
not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he
had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as
daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North
East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in
which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had
held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom
income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self
employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use
being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the
petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to
maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated
here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court
was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture
income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had
income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not
gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing
discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between
petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of
Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it
may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not
entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court). In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of
material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the
criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the
workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman
approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour
Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the
respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he
approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered
to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication.
Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute
and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the
Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred
to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost
important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at
large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been
held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial
Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section
5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6
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years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for claimant/
petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash Kumar Paul
vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may
pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on
justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation
where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and
no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge
duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to
discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may
justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that has to be
supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be
followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the petitioner with the
aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker may be
awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly
appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are
illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not
mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding
compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the
job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining
of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met
requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation
which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment
of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak
Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs.
General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments
652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner
on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has
relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through
regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of
petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal
of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of
Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner
interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of
Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652
(SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied
relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it
was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the
court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not
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be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by
ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373
titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned,
the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come
First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and
retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts
of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of
unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of
company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without
following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when
there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of
Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/
circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and
21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as
Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh
provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep
in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though
compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be
enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and
circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum
of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09
years and actually worked for 1069 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of
petitioner were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised
industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand notice was
given on 06.10.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments
of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or
for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment
2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter
of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely
declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014
titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this
judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through
these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to
the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex
Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon
the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint
Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals
reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble
High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been
challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the
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Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment
would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation
qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person
who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate
unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim
of petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/-
(Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner
is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that
amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award
failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till
its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in
lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9%
per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No. : 20/2016
Date of Institution : 20-1-2016
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017
Smt. Tul Dei w/o Shri Shiv Dass, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
. . Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District
Chamba, H.P.
. . Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the termination of services of Smt. Tul Dei w/o Shri Shiv Dass, r/o Village
Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer,
Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during August,
2004, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and
justified? If not, keeping in view the delay of more than 7 years in raising the industrial
dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation
the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1995 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in
the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way
of
intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks
are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that
respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally
without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no
retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated.
It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act
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while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no
source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the
respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when
the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of
new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come
First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department
had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who
appointed in 1996, Balwant in 1996, Prakash Chand in 2001, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in
2004, Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she
had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or
negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had
been served upon her and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded
to him. The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal
termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition
who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages.
Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-
F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of
Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/
retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. She further prayed for
reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including
continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal
termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time
and again during entire service of petitioner between 1995 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days
continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having
completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by
Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On
merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather
clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained
engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work
at her own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been
categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each
calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given
by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to
petitioner mentioned in para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour
Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On
the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had
left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.
Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own
sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per
direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not
violated the principle of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been
terminated in 2004 she would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that
after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and
laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the
respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the
same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her
termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus
not entitled for back wages.
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5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1
tendered/proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list
Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D, copy of notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the
evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex.
RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 19.12.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by respondent during August,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of
petitioner as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief:
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Discussed
Issue No.3
: No
Issue No.4
: Discussed
Relief
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.90,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1, 2 and 4 :
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written
order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that
no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own
and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is
dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident
from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked
from 1997 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1995 to
October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding
documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that
petitioner had been factually engaged w.e.f. 1997 to 2004 and not from 1995 to October, 2005.
Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but
only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts
on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is
entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service
benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1995 to October, 2005. She has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25- F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and
thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she
had
served
respondent
with
due
diligence
and
had
spotless
service
record
as
respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but
even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also
explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this
Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner
had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure
report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial
dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing
CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which
delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever
she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or
omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making
correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand
taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The
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petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used
to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit
breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so
that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable
evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea
of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 102 days in the year 1997, 59 days in 1998, 156 days in 1999, 129 days in 2000, 45
days in 2001, 117 days in 2002, 122 days in 2003 and 82 days in 2004 and thus a total of her
service in 1997 to 2004 in 08 years she had worked for 812 days in her entire service period. Be
it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference
from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine
its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 82 days and thus
immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had
not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous
service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice
envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated
the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this
document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to
petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was
called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2004 even at the time when junior
persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of
Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1997
was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,
1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked
for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement
junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.
On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 19.11.2015
of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against
respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the
petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled her for
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regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in August,
2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled
for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the
State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she
had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not
gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had
maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as well as she has been working as
daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North
East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in
which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had
held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income
is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self
employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use
being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the
petitioner was earning from her agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to
maintain her and her family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here
that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was
not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income,
she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from
agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully
employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it
is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and
respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and
Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus,
applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold
that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period
she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the Learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court). In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal
case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability
of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal.
The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages
instead of full back wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,
since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had
rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there
was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the
Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon‟ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been
held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial
Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section
5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
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during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after
6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for
claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash
Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that
a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be
based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a
situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire
shortly and no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to
discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the
management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts
which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that
has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement
should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the
petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations
when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has
certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four
situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of
reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be
appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that
petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave
notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra)
even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only
compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,
Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex
Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to
rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State
on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this
case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR
2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation
would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1)
Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by
ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which
provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3)
Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that
claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches.
That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner
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cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding
relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the
claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by
reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize &
Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has
held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed
which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling
petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case
are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas
in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department
of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject
to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent
which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made
applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important
aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.
20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to
keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation
awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by
the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances
is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation
within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors
which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 08 years and
actually worked for 812 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner
were disengaged in August, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial
dispute by issuance of demand notice after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on
25.3.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of
Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement
or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of
judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on
the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be
solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in
this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through
these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the
petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid
down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the
judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint
Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals
reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble
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High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been
challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the
Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not
be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts
made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who
was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled
worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of
petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 90,000/-
(Rupees ninety thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in
the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing
which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its
realization. Issues No. 1, 2 and 4 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.3:
23. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.90,000/- (Rupees ninety thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so
awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per
annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No.
: 508/2015
Date of Institution
: 09-11-2015
Date of Decision
: 18-9-2017
Shri Des Raj s/o Shri Shiv Lal, r/o Village Bishthow, P.O. Luj, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District
Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Des Raj s/o Shri Shiv Lal, r/o
Village Bishthow, P.O. Luj, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
vide demand notice dated 30-12-2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services
during year, 2000 suffers from delay and laches? If not, whether termination of services
of Shri Des Raj s/o Shri Shiv Lal, r/o Village Bishthow, P.O. Luj, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Killar
(Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during year, 2000, without complying the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled
to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in
the year 1984 who continuously worked till 2000 with the respondent. Averments made in the
petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way
of
intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks
are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing
one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment
compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is
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contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while
disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source
of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the
respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when
the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of
new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come
First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department
had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Suraj Ram who
appointed in 1997, Chunku Ram in 2000, Budhi Ram in 2003, and Dev Raj in 2007. The
claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted
for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal
termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity
of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained
unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the year 2001 till the date of institution of present
claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back
wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of
Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14
and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/
retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2000. He further prayed for reinstatement in service
in the year 2000 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as
petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has
also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire
service of petitioner between 1984 to 2000 be counted 160 days continuous service and
regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.1994 having completed 10 years of service
and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to
any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till
2000 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required
for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the
petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in
para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job
at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating
its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and
the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle
of 'Last come First go. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2000 he
would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner
is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended
that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of
issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no
necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended
that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back
wages.
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5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/
proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of demand notice dated Ex.
PW1/B, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/C, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/D1 and D2
and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,
respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD
Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of
mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 29.4.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
30.12.2011 qua his termination of service during year, 2000 by respondent suffers
from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during year, 2000
is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief:
9.
For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Discussed
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.50,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3 :
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written
order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that
no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is
dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident
from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked
from 1996 till 2000 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1984 to
2000. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary
evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had
been factually engaged in the year 1996 and not in 1984. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate
govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from
service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be
adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1984 to 2000. He has also stated on oath that no
notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service
and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus
his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in 2000 by oral order had
engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,
the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus
respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was
obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent
with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called
any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner
from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching
the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road
between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour
Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the
Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the
petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for
making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was
satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever
he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on
the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence
calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the
respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the
other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in
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between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been
deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did
not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of
Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by
respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 22 days in the year 1996, 36 days in 1997, 184 days in 1998, 137 days in 1999 and
60 days in 2000 and thus a total of his service in 1996 to 2000 in 05 years he had worked for 439
days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000
petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour
Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only
with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in
the year 2000 the petitioner had merely worked for 60 days and thus immediately in preceding 12
calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160
days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was
not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of
the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of
the Act.
15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document
have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner.
Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called
upon to join for service at any time after 2000 even at the time when junior persons were
reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of
the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas
petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and
even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work
which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has
placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419
in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of
the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in
case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement
junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.
On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/C the order dated 27.8.2015
of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against
respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the
petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 05 years which entitled him for
regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
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it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2000, he
had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full
back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State
has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had
cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not
gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had
maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as
daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North
East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in
which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had
held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom
income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self
employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use
being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the
petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to
maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated
here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court
was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture
income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had
income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not
gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing
discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner
and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section
25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment.
Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be
erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the Learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra) 1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court). In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or
unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay
in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for
adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming
rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if
raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real
prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay
in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly
referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a
delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour
Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2000 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been
held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial
Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section
5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
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during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6
years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for
claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash
Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that
a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be
based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a
situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire
shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to
discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the
management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts
which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that
has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement
should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the
petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations
when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has
certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four
situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of
reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be
appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that
petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave
notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 supra)
even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only
compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,
Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex
Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to
rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State
on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this
case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR
2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation
would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1)
Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by
ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which
provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3)
Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that
claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches.
That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner
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cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding
relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the
claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by
reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize &
Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has
held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed
which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal
entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon
Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was
involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the
department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although
subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by
respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made
applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important
aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.
20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to
keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation
awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by
the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances
is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation
within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which
have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 05 years and actually
worked for 439 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were
disengaged in 2000 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by
issuance of demand notice after about eleven years i.e. demand notice was given on
30.12.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of
Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement
or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of
judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on
the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be
solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in
this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through
these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the
petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid
down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the
judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint
Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals
reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble
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High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been
challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the
Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not
be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts
made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who
was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled
worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of
petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees
fifty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts
and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing
which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its
realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so
awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per
annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref . No. : 568/2015
Date of Institution : 04-12-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017
Smt. Kishan Dei w/o Shri Naveen Kumar d/o Shri Madho Lal, r/o Village Thandal, P.O.
Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I&PH Killar (Pangi) District Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Kishan Dei w/o Shri Naveen
Kumar d/o Shri Madho Lal, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi),
District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 28-02-2012 regarding her alleged illegal
termination of services during October, 2003 suffers from delay and latches? If not,
whether termination of services of Smt. Kishan Dei w/o Shri Naveen Kumar d/o
Shri Madho Lal, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by
the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
during October, 2003, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past
service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the
above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1997 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in
the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way
of
intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks
are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing
one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment
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compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is
contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while
disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source
of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the
respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when
the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of
new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come,
First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department
had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Prakash Chand who
appointed in 2001, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004, Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj
Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who
never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even
at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and the at the
same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that
she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 2005
till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed
and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed
violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting
aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005.
She further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2005 along-with back
wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the
date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional
breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1997 to October, 2005
be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.
01.01.2005 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to
law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1998 who remained engaged till
2003 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required
for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the
petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in
para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job
at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating
its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and
the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour
Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last
come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2003 she would have
definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to
be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since
the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of
notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for
charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner
was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
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5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/
proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.
PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy
of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil
received on 28.2.2012 qua her termination of service during October, 2003 by
respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,
2003 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Discussed
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.30,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3 :
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written
order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that
no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own
and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is
dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident
from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked
from 1998 till 2003 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1997 to
October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding
documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that
petitioner had been factually engaged w.e.f. 1998 to 2003 and not from 1997 to October, 2005.
Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only
with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on
record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is
entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service
benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1997 to October, 2005. She has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and
thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she
had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/
department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while
retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason
for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there
existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before
the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted
and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by
petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where
direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had
occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever
she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or
omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making
correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand
taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The
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petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used
to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit
breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so
that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable
evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea
of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 26 days in the year 1998, 26 days in 1999, 11 days in 2000, 53.5 days in 2001, 27
days in 2002 and 29 days in 2003 and thus a total of her service in 1998 to 2003 in 06 years she
had worked for 172.5 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked
for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the
point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal
termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2003 the petitioner had
merely worked for 29 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month
of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of
law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent
to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is
held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1998 or thereafter. Some of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document
have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner.
Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called
upon to join for service at any time after October, 2003 even at the time when junior persons were
reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G
of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained
whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,
1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked
for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement
junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.
On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 01.10.2015
of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against
respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the
petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 05 years which entitled her for
regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
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accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in
October, 2003, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such
was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy.
D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has
admitted that she had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of
having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-
examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as
well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the
judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs.
M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.
Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also
include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from
employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely
because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged
in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her
livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be
entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of
workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was
illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although
remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully
employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being
terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the Learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/
Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the
employer.
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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court). In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal
case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability
of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal.
The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages
instead of full back wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,
since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had
rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there
was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the
Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon‟ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been
held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial
Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section
5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
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during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after
6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for
claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash
Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that
a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be
based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a
situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire
shortly and no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to
discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the
management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts
which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that
has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement
should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the
petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations
when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has
certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four
situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of
reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be
appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that
petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave
notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra)
even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only
compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,
Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex
Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to
rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State
on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this
case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR
2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation
would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1)
Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by
ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which
provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3)
Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that
claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches.
That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner
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cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding
relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/
petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement.
In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.
vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure
of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated
Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for
retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are
different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in
case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of
HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to
funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent
which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important
aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.
20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to
keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though
compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be
enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and
circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum
of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about
06 years and actually worked for 172.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services
of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2003 who worked as non skilled worker and had
raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about 8 ½ years i.e. demand notice
was given on 28.2.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to
judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in
view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for
petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment
of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the
rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate
as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant
Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan
Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case
as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the
basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A.
representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in
AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.
I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction
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under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate
unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in
challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and
circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra,
claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in
case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the above said
reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees
thirty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts
and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing
which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its
realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.4:
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so
awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per
annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No.
: 451/2015
Date of Institution
: 29-10-2015
Date of Decision
: 18-9-2017
Smt. Chandro w/o Shri Baldev, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, I&PH/HPPWD Division, Killar Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Chandro w/o Shri Baldev, r/o
Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
vide demand notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of
services during October 2005 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination
of the services of Smt. Chandro w/o Shri Baldev, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division,
Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October 2005 without complying the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what
amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above
aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in
the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/
artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required
to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability
of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had
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terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's
notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation
was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that
respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the
services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income
besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the respondent time
and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of
petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman
from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go'
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had
continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Chuni Lal who
appointed in 1997, Tek Chand in 1999, Bhag Dei in 2000, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004,
Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had
spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or
negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been
served upon her and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him.
The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination
from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been
nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging
respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and
Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India,
the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/ retrenchment by the respondent
in the month of October, 2005. She further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of
October, 2005 along with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has
remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed
that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner
between 1996 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the
service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2004 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy
of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief
petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till
2005 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required
for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the
petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in
para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job
at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating
its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and
the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour
Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last
come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 she would
have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is
stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended
that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of
issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no
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necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended
that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back
wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1
tendered/proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of demand notice
dated Ex. PW1/B, copy of order dated 27.8.15 Ex. PW1/C and closed evidence. On the other
hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R.
Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays
chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the
evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 16.2.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
2.2.2012 qua her termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent
suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,
2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Discussed
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,30,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3 :
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10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis in the year 1996 continuously worked till October, 2005 with the
respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no
written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own
and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the
reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to
petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim
of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for
relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and
compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to October, 2005. She has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25- F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and
thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she
had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/
department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while
retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason
for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there
existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before
the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted
and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by
petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where
direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had
occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even
after October, 2005. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission
on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making
correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken
by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,
on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the
job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks
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had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so
that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also
for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable
evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of
abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 105 days in the year 1996, 168 days in 1997, 170 days in 1998, 149 days in 1999, 80
days in 2000, 111 days in 2001, 96 days in 2002, 107 days in 2003, 106 days in 2004 and 73 days
in 2005 and thus a total of her service in 1996 to 2005 in 10 years she had worked for 1165
days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1996 and 1999 to 2005
petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour
Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only
with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the
year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 73 days and thus immediately in preceding 12
calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160
days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was
not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the
Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the
Act.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. Some of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this
document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to
petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was
called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when junior
persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of
Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit
were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in
1996 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to
petitioner for re-employment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the
Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs.
S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of
Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have
worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement
junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.
On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/C the order dated 26.8.2015
of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against
respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the
petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled her for
regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
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accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in
October, 2005, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such
was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy.
D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has
admitted that she had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of
having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-
examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as
well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the
judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs.
M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.
Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also
include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from
employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely
because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged
in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her
livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be
entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of
workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was
illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although
remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully
employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being
terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/
Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the
employer.
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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal
case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability
of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal.
The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages
instead of full back wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,
since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had
rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there
was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the
Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963-Section
5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
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during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after
6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of
service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for
claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash
Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that
a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be
based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a
situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire
shortly and no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to
discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the
management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts
which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that
has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement
should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the
petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations
when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has
certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four
situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of
reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be
appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that
petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave
notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra)
even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only
compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,
Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex
Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to
rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State
on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case
was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015
SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be
sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R.
502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for
petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that
Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court
Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner
cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the
law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied
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relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in
hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably
indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR
2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees
Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company
principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial
Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling
petitioner for retrenchment
compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in
hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this
court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had
engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability
of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was
engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/
circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and
21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as
Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh
provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep
in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though
compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be
enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and
circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum
of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 10
years and actually worked for 1165 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of
petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised
industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand notice was
given on 02.02.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments
of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or
for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment
2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the
matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be
solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in
this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through
these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to
the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex
Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon
the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint
Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals
reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble
High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been
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challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the
Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment
would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation
qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person
who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate
unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim
of petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,30,000/-
(Rupees one lakh thirty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner
is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that
amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award
failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till
its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees one lakh thirty thousand only) to the petitioner in
lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9%
per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. : 529/2015
Date of Institution : 21-11-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017
Shri Janam Singh s/o Shri Moti Ram, r/o Village Kawas, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
. . Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Janam Singh s/o Shri Moti
Ram, r/o Village Kawas, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated-nil-received on 15.05.2012 regarding his alleged
illegal termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If
not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Janam Singh s/o Shri Moti Ram, r/o
Village Kawas, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive
Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
during September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past
service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the
above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1997 who continuously worked till October, 2003 with the respondent. Averments made in
the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way
of
intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks
are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that
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respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally
without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no
retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated.
It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act
while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no
source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the
respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when
the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of
new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come
First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department
had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Suraj Ram who
appointed in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram
in 2003, Janam Singh in 2004 and Dev Raj in 2007. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had
spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence
or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served
upon him and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The
petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination
in the year 2003 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere
gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to
have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner
prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2003.
He further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2003 alongwith back wages,
seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of
his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks
given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1997 to October, 2003 be
counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.
01.01.2005 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to
law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till
2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required
for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the
petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in
para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job
at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating
its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and
the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle
of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he
would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner
is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended
that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of
issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no
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necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended
that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back
wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/
proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.
PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy
of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil
qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from
the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. . OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No. 1
: Discussed
Issue No. 2
: Yes
Issue No. 3
: Discussed
Issue No. 4
: No
Relief
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,10,000/-
per operative part of award.
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REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3 :
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis in the year 1996 continuously worked till September, 2004 with the
respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no
written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the
reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to
petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim
of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for
relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and
compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and
thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004
by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H
of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served
respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never
called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner
from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not
approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there
existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved
before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was
submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by
petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where
direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred
and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even
after September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission
on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making
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correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken
by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,
on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the
job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had
been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that
petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable
evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of
abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 84 days in the year 1996, 135 days in 1997, 116 days in 1998, 115 days in 1999, 115
days in 2000, 114 days in 2001, 164 days in 2002, 108 days in 2003 and 109 days in 2004 and
thus a total of his service in 1996 to 2004 in 09 years he had worked for 1060 days in his entire
service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1996 to 2001 and 2003 to 2004 petitioner had
worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour
Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only
with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the
year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 109 days and thus immediately in preceding 12
calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of
160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it
was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of
the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of
the Act.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this
document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to
petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was
called upon to join for service at any time after 2001 even at the time when junior persons were
reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of
the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No. 10 of the affidavit were retained whereas
petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and
even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for re-employment for work
which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has
placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419
in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of
the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in
case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement
junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.
On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 22.09.2015
of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against
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respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the
petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him for
regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004,
he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for
full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the
State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he
had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained
not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he
had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as
daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North
East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in
which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had
held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom
income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self
employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use
being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the
petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to
maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated
here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court
was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture
income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had
income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not
gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing
discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner
and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G
and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus,
applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to
hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the
period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd
issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case.
The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the
catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically
held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to
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make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for
adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of
material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
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appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly
referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a
delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour
Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the
Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred
to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost
important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at
large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon‟ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing- cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6
years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of
service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for
claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash
Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that
a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be
based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a
situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire
shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to
discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the
management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts
which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that
has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement
should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the
petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations
when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has
certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four
situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of
reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be
appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that
petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave
notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra)
even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only
compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,
Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex
Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to
rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State
on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh vs. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this
case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR
2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would
be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R.
502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for
petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that
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Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court
Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner
cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the
law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied
relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in
hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably
indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR
2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees
Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company
principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial
Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling
petitioner for retrenchment
compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case
in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand
before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD
which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and
availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the
petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important
aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.
20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to
keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation
awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by
the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances
is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation
within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors
which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09 years and
actually worked for 1060 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner
were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute
by issuance of demand notice after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on 15.5.2012.
Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex
Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back
wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013
(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of
delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely
declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in
2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this
judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through
these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the
petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid
down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the
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judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint
Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals
reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble
High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been
challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the
Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not
be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts
made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who
was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled
worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of
petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,10,000/-
(Rupees one lakh ten thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is
entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear
that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award
failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till
its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,10,000/- (Rupees one lakh ten thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu
of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation
so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum
on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No.
: 578/2015
Date of Institution
: 04-12-2015
Date of Decision
: 18-09-2017
Shri Yuvraj s/o Shri Tika Ram, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Yuvraj s/o Shri Tika Ram, r/o
Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, Killar Division H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide
demand notice dated 25-03-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services
during August, 2003, suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of
services of worker Shri Yuvraj s/o Shri Tika Ram, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar
(Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during August, 2003, without complying the provisions of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back
wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is
entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in
the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/
artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required
to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability
of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had
terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's
notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation
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was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that
respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the
services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income
besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time
and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of
petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman
from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go' envisaged
under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously
retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who appointed in 1996,
Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash Chand in
2001, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Dev Raj in 2007. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had
spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence
or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served
upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The
petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the
year 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully
employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have
committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays
for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2005. He
further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2005 alongwith back wages, seniority
including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his
illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given
time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1996 to October, 2005 be counted
160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2004
having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled
by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till
2003 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required
for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the
petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in
para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job
at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating
its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and
the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle
of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2003 he
would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner
is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended
that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of
issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no
necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended
that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back
wages.
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5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/
proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.
PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D, copy of notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the
evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex.
RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
25.03.2012 qua his termination of service during August, 2003 by respondent
suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,
2003 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Discussed
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3 :
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written
order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that
no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is
dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident
from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked
from 1996 till 2003 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1996 to
October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding
documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that
petitioner had been factually engaged till 2003 and not upto October, 2005. Admittedly, the
reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to
petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim
of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for
relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and
compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and
thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he
had
served
respondent
with
due
diligence
and
had
spotless
service
record
as
respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him
but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has
also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before
this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and
petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a
failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for
industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by
filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which
delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner
whenever he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or
omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making
correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken
by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,
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on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the
job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had
been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that
petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable
evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of
abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 166 days in the year 1996, 172 days in 1997, 148 days in 1998, 137 days in 1999, 109
days in 2000, 83 days in 2001, 85 days in 2002 and 97 days in 2003 and thus a total of his
service in 1996 to 2003 in 08 years he had worked for 997 days in his entire service period. Be it
noticed that except the years 1998 to 2003 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and
as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks,
this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident
from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2003 the petitioner had merely worked for 119
days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of
petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having
continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued
a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not
violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document
have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner.
Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called
upon to join for service at any time after 2001 even at the time when junior persons were
reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of
the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas
petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and
even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work
which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has
placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419
in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of
the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in
case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify
engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by
Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order
dated 05.10.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as
against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour
of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner
is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him
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for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2003,
he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for
full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the
State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he
had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained
not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he
had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as
daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North
East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in
which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had
held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom
income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self
employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use
being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the
petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to
maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated
here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court
was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture
income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had
income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not
gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing
discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner
and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-
G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment.
Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be
erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back
wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/
Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the
employer.
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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or
unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay
in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for
adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming
rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly
referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a
delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour
Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
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during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6
years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/
petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash Kumar Paul
vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may
pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on
justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation
where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and
no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge
duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to
discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may
justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that has to be
supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be
followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the
aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker may be
awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly
appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are
illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not
mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding
compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the
job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining
of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met
requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation
which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the
judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak
Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs.
General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments
652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner
on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has
relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh vs. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through
regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of
petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal
of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of
Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner
interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of
Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652
(SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied
relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it
was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the
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court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not
be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by
ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373
titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned,
the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come
First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and
retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the
facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former
closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no
closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without
following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when
there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of
Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/
circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and
21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as
Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh
provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep
in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation
awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by
the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances
is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs. 1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation
within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which
have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 08 years and actually
worked for 997 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were
disengaged in 2003 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by
issuance of demand notice after about nine years i.e. demand notice was given on 25.3.2012.
Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex
Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back
wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013
(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of
delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely
declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014
titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this
judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through
these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the
petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid
down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the
judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint
Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals
reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble
High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged
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on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in
this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in
the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in
judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was
working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled
worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of
petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/-
(Rupees one lakh only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the
facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which
the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its
realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so
awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per
annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 574/2015
Date of Institution
: 04-12-2015
Date of Decision
: 18-9-2017
Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Duni Chand, r/o VPO Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Duni
Chand, r/o V.P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide demand
notice dated nil received in the Labour Office Chamba on dated 08-05-2012 regarding
his alleged illegal termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay
and laches? If not, Whether termination of services of Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Duni
Chand, r/o V.P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer,
Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004,
without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and
justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1998 who continuously worked till October, 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in
the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way
of
intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks
are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing
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one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment
compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is
contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while
disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source
of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the
respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when
the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of
new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come,
First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department
had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Jai Dass who
appointed in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram
in 2003, Devi Singh in 2004, Sher singh in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2003. The claimant/
petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any
act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no
charge-sheet had been served upon him and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been
afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his
illegal termination from month of October, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim
petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages.
Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-
F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of
Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment
by the respondent in the month of October, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service
w.e.f. month of October, 2004 alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as
petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has
also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service
of petitioner between 1998 to October, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and
regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2006 having completed 10 years of
service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of
H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1998 who remained engaged till
2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required
for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the
petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in
para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the
job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.
Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own
sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per
direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not
violated the principle of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been
terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after
seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and
laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the
respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the
same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his
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termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus
not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/
proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.
PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D, copy of notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the
evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex.
RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D. A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil
qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from
the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. . OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Discussed
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.70,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 To 3 :
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10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis in the year 1998 continuously worked till September, 2004 with the
respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no
written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the
reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to
petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim
of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for
relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and
compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1998 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and
thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004
by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H
of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served
respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never
called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner
from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not
approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there
existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved
before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was
submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by
petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where
direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred
and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even
after September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission
on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making
correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken
by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,
on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the
job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had
been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that
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petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable
evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of
abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 28 days in the year 1998, 82 days in 1999, 45 days in 2000, 90.5 days in 2001, 113
days in 2002, 110 days in 2003 and 88 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1998 to 2004
in 07 years he had worked for 556.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner
had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour
Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only
with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in
the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 88 days and thus immediately in preceding 12
calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160
days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was
not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of
the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of
the Act.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this
document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to
petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was
called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior
persons were re-engaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of
Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998
was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
re-employment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,
1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-
G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked
for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement
junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.
On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 16.04.2015
of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against
respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the
petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 07 years which entitled him for
regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
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17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in
September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such
was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy.
D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has
admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of
having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-
examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as
he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of
Hon'ble
Apex
Court
North
East
Karnataka
Road
Transport
Corporation
vs.
M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.
Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also
include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from
employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources
from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment
of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual
pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was
gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case
has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent
was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment.
Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated
that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view
of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed
between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance
of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it
may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not
entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
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appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of
material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
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the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly
referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a
delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour
Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the
Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred
to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost
important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at
large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D. Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after
6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
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Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of
service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for
claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash
Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that
a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be
based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a
situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire
shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to
discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the
management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts
which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that
has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement
should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the
petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations
when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has
certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four
situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of
reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be
appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that
petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave
notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra)
even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only
compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,
Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex
Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to
rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State
on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh vs. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this
case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR
2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would
be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R.
502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for
petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that
Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court
Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner
cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the
law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied
relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in
hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably
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indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR
2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees
Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company
principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial
Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation.
Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in
former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court,
there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged
petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work.
As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged,
judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/
circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and
21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as
Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh
provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep
in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation
awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by
the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances
is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation
within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors
which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 07 years and
actually worked for 556.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner
were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial
dispute by issuance of demand notice after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on
08.5.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble
Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back
wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139)
FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay
and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined
on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as
Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also
the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous
judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which
are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the
ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in
judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director
Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals reference
under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High
Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged
on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government
in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be
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attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made
in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was
working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled
worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of
petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 70,000/-
(Rupees seventy thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is
entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that
amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award
failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award
till its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainble could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.70,000/- (Rupees seventy thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so
awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per
annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No.
: 521/2015
Date of Institution
: 21-11-2015
Date of Decision
: 18-9-2017
Ms. Sarita d/o Shri Kewal Ram, r/o V.P.O. Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, HPPWD Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Ms. Sarita d/o Shri Kewal Ram, r/o
V.P.O. Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer,
Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice
dated 03-04-2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of services during August, 1998
suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of services of Ms. Sarita
d/o Shri Kewal Ram, r/o V.P.O. Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the
Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
during August, 1998, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service
benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1994 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in
the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/
artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required
to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability
of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had
terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's
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notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation
was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that
respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the
services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income
besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the respondent time
and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of
petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman
from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go' envisaged
under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously
retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Chuni Lal who appointed in 1997,
Tek Chand in 1999, Bhag Dei in 2000, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004, Bameshwar Dutt in
2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record
who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and
even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and at the
same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that
she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 2005
till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed
and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed
violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for
setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October,
2005. She further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2005 along-with
back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed
since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of
intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994
to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of
petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP
Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is
entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till
1998 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required
for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the
petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in
para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job
at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating
its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and
the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour
Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last
come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1998 she would have
definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to
be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since
the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of
notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for
charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner
was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.
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5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of''Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/
proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.
PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy
of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 16.2.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
3.4.2012 qua her termination of service during August, 1998 by respondent suffers
from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,
1998 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief:
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Discussed
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.30,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3 :
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written
order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that
no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own
and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is
dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident
from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked
from 1996 till 1998 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1994 to
October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding
documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that
petitioner had been factually engaged w.e.f. 1996 to 1998 and not from 1994 to October, 2005.
Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but
only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts
on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is
entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits
and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1994 to October, 2005. She has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and
thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she
had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/
department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while
retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason
for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there
existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before
the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted
and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by
petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where
direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had
occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever
she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or
omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making
correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand
taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The
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petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used
to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit
breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so
that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable
evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea
of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 125 days in the year 1996, 106 days in 1997 and 61 days in 1998 and thus a total of her
service in 1996 to 1998 in 03 years she had worked for 292 days in her entire service period.
Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no
reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is
to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays
chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1998 the petitioner had merely worked for 61 days and thus
immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had
not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous
service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice
envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the
provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. Some of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this
document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to
petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was
called upon to join for service at any time after August, 1998 even at the time when junior
persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of
Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996
was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
re-employment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,
1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section
25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked
for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify
engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by
Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order
dated 22.9.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as
against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour
of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner
is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled her
for regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
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accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in August,
1998, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled
for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the
State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she
had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained
not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross- examination in which
she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as well as she has been
working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex
Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10
SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas
Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom
income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from
self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end
use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the
petitioner was earning from her agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to
maintain her and her family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here
that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was
not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income,
she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from
agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully
employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it
is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and
respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G
and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus,
applying the ratio of judgment of Hon‟ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to
hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the
period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal
case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability
of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal.
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The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages
instead of full back wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,
since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had
rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there
was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the
Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1998 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon‟ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6
years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of
service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for
claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash
Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that
a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be
based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a
situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire
shortly and no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to
discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the
management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts
which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that
has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement
should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the
petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations
when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has
certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four
situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of
reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be
appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that
petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave
notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 supra)
even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only
compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,
Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex
Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to
rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State
on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this
case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR
2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation
would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1)
Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by
ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which
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provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3)
Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that
claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches.
That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner
cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding
relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the
claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by
reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize &
Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held
on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated
Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling
petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s
case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved
whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the
department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although
subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by
respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made
applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important
aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.
20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to
keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation
awarded by Single Judge of the Hon‟ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by
the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances
is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation
within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors
which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 03 years and
actually worked for 292 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner
were disengaged in August, 1998 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial
dispute by issuance of demand notice after about fourteen years i.e. demand notice was given
on 03.04.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of
Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or
for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment
2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the
matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be
solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in
this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through
these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to
the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex
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Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon
the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint
Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals
reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble
High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been
challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the
Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment
would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation
qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person
who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate
unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim
of petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.30,000/-
(Rupees thirty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in
the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing
which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its
realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so
awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per
annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. : 522/2015
Date of Institution : 21-11-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017
Ms. Suman Kumari d/o Shri Mahatam Chand, r/o Village Kuffa, P.O. Killar, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, HPPWD, Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Ms. Suman Kumari d/o Shri
Mahatam Chand, r/o Village Kuffa, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before
the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
vide demand notice dated 13-06-2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of
services during September, 1998 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether
termination of the services of Ms. Suman Kumari d/o Shri Mahatam Chand, r/o Village
Kuffa, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar
Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 1998,
without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and
justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1992 who continuously worked till October, 1998 with the respondent. Averments made in
the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/
artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required
to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability
of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had
terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's
notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation
was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that
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respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the
services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income
besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the respondent time
and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of
petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman
from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go'
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had
continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Chuni Lal who
appointed in 1997, Tek Chand in 1999, Bhag Dei in 2000, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004,
Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had
spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or
negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been
served upon her and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him.
The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination
from month of October, 1998 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had
been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging
respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and
Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India,
the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/ retrenchment by the respondent
in the month of October, 1998. She further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of
October, 1998 alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has
remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed
that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner
between 1992 to October, 1998 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the
service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy
of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief
petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till
1998 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required
for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the
petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in
para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job
at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating
its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and
the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour
Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last
come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1998 she would
have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is
stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended
that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of
issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no
necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended
that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back
wages.
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5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1
tendered/proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list
Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy
of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
13.6.2012 qua her termination of service during September, 1998 by respondent
suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
1998 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. . OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief:
9.
For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Discussed
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.60,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3 :
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written
order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that
no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own
and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is
dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident
from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked
from 1994 till 1998 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1992 to
October, 1998. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding
documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that
petitioner had been factually engaged in the year 1994 and not in 1992.
Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks
but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted
facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if
petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past
service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1992 to October, 1998. She has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and
thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 1998 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she
had
served
respondent
with
due
diligence
and
had
spotless
service
record
as
respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but
even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also
explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this
Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner
had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure
report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial
dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing
CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which
delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever
she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or
omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making
correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand
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taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The
petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used
to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit
breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so
that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable
evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea
of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 49 ½ days in the year 1994, 135 ½ days in 1995, 196 days in 1996, 153 days in 1997
and 123 days in 1998 and thus a total of her service in 1994 to 1998 in 05 years she had worked
for 657 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1994, 1995, 1997
and 1998 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the
Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its
findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B that in the year 1998 the petitioner had merely worked for 123 days and thus
immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had
not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous
service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice
envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated
the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. Some of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this
document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to
petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was
called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when junior persons
were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section
25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994
was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,
1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-
G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked
for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify
engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by
Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/C the order
dated 22.9.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as
against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour
of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner
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is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 04 years which entitled her
for regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in
September, 1998, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such
was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy.
D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has
admitted that she had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of
having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-
examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as
well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the
judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M.
Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.
Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also
include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from
employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely
because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged
in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her
livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be
entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of
workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was
illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although
remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully
employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being
terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
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Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal
case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability
of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
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appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal.
The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages
instead of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,
since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had
rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there
was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the
Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the
State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal
principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the
Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench
of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without
examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government
under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing
industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial
peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the
same would affect the public interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1998 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing- cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon‟ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6
years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of
service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for
claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash
Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that
a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be
based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a
situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire
shortly and no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to
discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the
management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts
which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that
has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement
should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the
petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations
when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has
certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four
situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of
reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be
appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that
petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave
notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 supra)
even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only
compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,
Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex
Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to
rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State
on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,
Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh vs. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this
case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR
2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation
would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1)
Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by
ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which
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provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3)
Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that
claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches.
That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner
cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding
relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the
claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by
reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize &
Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has
held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed
which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling
petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s
case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved
whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the
department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure
although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit
by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be
made applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/
circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and
21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as
Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh
provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep
in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation
awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by
the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances
is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation
within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors
which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 05 years and
actually worked for 657 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner
were disengaged in September, 1998 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised
industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about fourteen years i.e. demand notice
was given on 13.06.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to
judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for
reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in
view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for
petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the
petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment
of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the
rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate
as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant
Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan
Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case
as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the
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basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A.
representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in
AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.
I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate
unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in
challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and
circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment (2016)
supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas
in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid
reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees
sixty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts
and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing
which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its
realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No. 4:
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs. 60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so
awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per
annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No.
: 581/2015
Date of Institution
: 04.12.2015
Date of Decision
: 18.9.2017
Smt. Dhuri Devi w/o Shri Devi Singh, r/o V.P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
. . Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar
Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Dhuri Devi w/o Shri Devi
Singh, r/o V.P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide
demand notice dated nil received in the Labour Office Chamba on dated 08-05-2012
regarding her alleged illegal termination of services during August, 2005 suffers from
delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Smt. Dhuri Devi w/o Shri
Devi Singh, r/o V.P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive
Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during
August, 2005 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is
legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 2000 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in
the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way
of
intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks
are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that
respondent/department had terminated/ disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally
without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no
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retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated.
It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act
while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no
source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the
respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the
services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new
workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First
go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had
continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Prakash Chand who
appointed in 2001, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004, Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj
Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who
never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even
at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and at the same
time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that she
has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 2005
till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed
and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed
violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting
aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005.
She further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2005 along-with back
wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the
date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional
breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1996 to October, 2005
be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.
01.01.2008 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to
law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 2003 who remained engaged till
2005 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required
for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the
petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in
para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job
at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating
its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and
the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle
of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 she
would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner
is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended
that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of
issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no
necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended
that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back
wages.
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5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1
tendered/proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list
Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy
of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil
qua her termination of service during August, 2005 by respondent suffers from the vice
of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,
2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No. 1
: Discussed
Issue No. 2
: Yes
Issue No. 3
: Discussed
Issue No. 4
: No
Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.40,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3 :
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written
order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that
no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own
and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is
dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident
from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked
from 2003 till 2005 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 2000 to
October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding
documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that
petitioner had been factually engaged in the year 2003 and not in 2000.
Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks
but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted
facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if
petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past
service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 2000 to October, 2005. She has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and
thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she
had
served
respondent
with
due
diligence
and
had
spotless
service
record
as
respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but
even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also
explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this
Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner
had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure
report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial
dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing
CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which
delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever
she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or
omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making
correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand
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taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The
petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used
to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that
intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of
petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area
and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and
reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 122 days in the year 2003, 91 days in 2004 and 75 days in 2005 and thus a total of her
service in 2003 to 2005 in 03 years she had worked for 288 days in her entire service period.
Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no
reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is
to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays
chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 75 days and thus
immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had
not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous
service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice
envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated
the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter. Some of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document
have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner.
Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called
upon to join for service at any time after August, 2005 even at the time when junior persons were
re-engaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G
of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained
whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 2003 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,
1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-
G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked
for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify
engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by
Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order
dated 01.10.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as
against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour
of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner
is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled her
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for regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in August,
2005, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled
for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the
State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she
had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained
not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she
had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as well as she has been working
as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC
765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir
had held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom
income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from
self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end
use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the
petitioner was earning from her agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to
maintain her and her family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here
that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was
not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income,
she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from
agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully
employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it
is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and
respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G
and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus,
applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold
that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period
she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal
case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability
of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal.
The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages
instead of full back wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,
since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had
rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there
was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the
Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section
5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
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during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6
years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of
service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/
petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash Kumar Paul
vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may
pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on
justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation
where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and
no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge
duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the management to
discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may
justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that has to be
supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be
followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the
aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker may be
awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly
appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are
illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not
mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding
compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the
job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining
of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met
requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation
which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the
judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak
Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs.
General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments
652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner
on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has
relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh vs. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through
regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of
petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal
of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of
Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner
interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of
Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652
(SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied
relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it
was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the
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court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not
be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by
ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373
titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned,
the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come
First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and
retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts
of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of
unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure
of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without
following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when
there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of
Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important
aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.
20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to
keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial
dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded
by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the
Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is
not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-
with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within
six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have
weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 03 years and actually worked
for 288 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in
August, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of
demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on 08.05.2012. Taking into
consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to
above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum
compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The
judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more
or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of
delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir
Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble
Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in
the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-
Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which are not
attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground
of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of
2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex
Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture
Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under
Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can
intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the
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ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this
case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in
the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made
in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was
working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled
worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of
petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.40,000/-
(Rupees forty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in
the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing
which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its
realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No. 4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so
awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per
annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No.
: 526/2015
Date of Institution
: 21-11-2015
Date of Decision
: 18-9-2017
Smt. Amar Dei w/o Shri Thakur Chand, r/o Village Sagli, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
. . Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Amar Dei w/o Shri Thakur
Chand, r/o Village Sagli, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 06.10.2011 regarding her alleged illegal
termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not,
Whether termination of the services of Smt. Amar Dei w/o Shri Thakur Chand, r/o
Village Sagli, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive
Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
during September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past
service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the
above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1991 who continuously worked till October, 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in
the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way
of
intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks
are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/
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department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing
one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment
compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is
contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while
disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source
of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the
respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the
services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new
workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First
go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had
continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Chuni Lal who
appointed in 1997, Tek Chand in 1999, Bhag Dei in 2000, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004,
Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had
spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or
negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been
served upon her and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him.
The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination
from month of October, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had
been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging
respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and
Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India,
the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/ retrenchment by the respondent
in the month of October, 2004. She further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of
October, 2004 alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has
remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed
that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner
between 1991 to October, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the
service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2001 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy
of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief
petitioner is entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1998 who remained engaged till
2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required
for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the
petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in
para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job
at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating
its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and
the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle
of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 she
would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner
is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended
that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of
issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no
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necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended
that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back
wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/
proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.
PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy
of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
06.10.2011 qua her termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent
suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Discussed
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.70,000/- per
operative part of award.
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REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3 :
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written
order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that
no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own
and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is
dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident
from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked
from 1998 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1991 to
October, 2004. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding
documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that
petitioner had been factually engaged in the year 1998 and not in 1991. Admittedly, the reference
of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's
termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of
petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief
of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as
claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1991 to October, 2004. She has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and
thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2004 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she
had
served
respondent
with
due
diligence
and
had
spotless
service
record
as
respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but
even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also
explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this
Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner
had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure
report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial
dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing
CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which
delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart
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Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever
she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or
omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making
correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand
taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The
petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used
to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit
breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so
that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for
applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable
evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea
of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 28 days in the year 1998, 55 ½ days in 1999, 104 days in 2000, 57 days in 2001, 119
days in 2002, 126 days in 2003 and 108 days in 2004 and thus a total of her service in 1998 to
2004 in 07 years she had worked for 597.5 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that
petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour
Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only
with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in
the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 108 days and thus immediately in preceding
12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160
days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was
not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the
Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the
Act.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. Some of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this
document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to
petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was
called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior
persons were re-engaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of
Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were
retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for re-
employment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel
for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5)
SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and
25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240
days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
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16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement
junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.
On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 22.9.2015
of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against
respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the
petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 07 years which entitled her for
regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in
September, 2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such
was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy.
D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has
admitted that she had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of
having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-
examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as
well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the
judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs.
M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.
Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also
include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from
employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and
manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely
because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged
in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her
livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be
entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of
workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was
illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although
remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully
employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being
terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
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factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal
case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability
of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
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“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal.
The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages
instead of full back wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,
since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had
rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there
was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the
Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing- cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
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20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section
5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labaur Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act- Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6
years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of
service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/
petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash Kumar Paul
vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may
pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on
justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation
where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and
no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge
duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the management to
discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may
justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that has to be
supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be
followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the
aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker may be
awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly
appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are
illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not
mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding
compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the
job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining
of duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met
requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation
which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the
judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak
Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs.
General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments
652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner
on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has
relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,
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Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.
It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through
regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of
petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal
of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of
Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner
interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of
Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652
(SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied
relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it
was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the
court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not
be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by
ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373
titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned,
the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come
First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and
retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts
of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of
unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure
of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without
following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when
there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of
Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/
circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and
21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as
Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh
provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep
in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation
awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by
the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances
is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation
within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors
which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 07 years and
actually worked for 597.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner
were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial
dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on
06.10.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble
Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back
wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139)
FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay
and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined
on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as
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Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also
the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous
judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which
are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the
ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in
judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director
Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals reference
under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High
Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged
on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government
in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be
attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made
in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was
working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled
worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of
petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 70,000/- (Rupees
seventy thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the
facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which
the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its
realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief:
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs. 70,000/- (Rupees seventy thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the
reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so
awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per
annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
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Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. : 558/2015
Date of Institution : 04-12-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017
Shri Basant Singh s/o Shri Puran Chand, r/o VPO Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./ I.&P.H., Killar (Pangi), District
Chamba, H.P.
. . Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Basant Singh s/o Shri Puran
Chand, r/o V.P.O. Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive
Engineer, Killar Division, I.P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide
demand notice dated 08-12-2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services
during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of
services of worker Shri Basant Singh s/o Shri Puran Chand, r/o V.P.P. Kumar, Tehsil
Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.P.H./
H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004, without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not,
what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above
aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above
named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the
year 1994 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in
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the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the
criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for
continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the
petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/
artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required
to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability
of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had
terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's
notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation
was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that
respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the
services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income
besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time
and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of
petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman
from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go'
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had
continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Gurdev who appointed
in 1994, Sher Singh in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku
Ram in 2000, Prakash Chand in 2001 and Budhi Ram in 2003. The claimant/petitioner
claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of
indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-
sheet had been served upon him and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been
afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his
illegal termination in the year 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had
been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging
respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and
Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India,
the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent
in the year 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2005 alongwith
back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed
since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of
intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994
to 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner
w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in
pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is
entitled.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by
stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till
2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own
sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by
the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required
for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the
petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in
para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other
juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of
termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the
job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.
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Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own
sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per
direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not
violated the principle of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been
terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that
after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and
laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the
respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the
same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his
termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus
not entitled for back wages.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/
proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.
PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.
PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,
HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy
of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 18.5.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
08.12.2011 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent
suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. . OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Discussed
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
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Issue No.4
: No
Relief
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,25,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 to 3 :
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written
order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that
no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute
with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from
mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from
1994 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1994 to October,
2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary
evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had
been factually engaged till 2004 and not upto 2005. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate
govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination
from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to
be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back
wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.
12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1994 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and
thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he
had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/
department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even
while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also
explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this
Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and
petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a
failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for
industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by
filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which
delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
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13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever
he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on
the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence
calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the
respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the
other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in
between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been
deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did
not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of
Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by
respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.
14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 61 days in the year 1994, 146.5 days in 1995, 27.5 days in 1996, 118 days in 1997,
111 days in 1998, 53 days in 1999, 77 days in 2000, 118 days in 2001, 125 days in 2002 and
105 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2004 in 10 years he had worked
for 942 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more
than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of
artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal
termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner
had merely worked for 105 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from
the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet
requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required
from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such,
the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of
workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained
in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'
was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was
terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged
workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of
these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division
HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in
those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll
for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document
have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner.
Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called
upon to join for service at any time after 2004 even at the time when junior persons were
reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of
the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No. 10 of the affidavit were retained whereas
petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was terminated and
even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work
which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has
placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419
in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of
the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in
case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
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16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement
junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.
On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 05.10.2015
of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against
respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the
petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him
for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,
it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004,
he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for
full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the
State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he
had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained
not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he
had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as
daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North
East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in
which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had
held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom
income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self
employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use
being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the
petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to
maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated
here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court
was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture
income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had
income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not
gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing
discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between
petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of
Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his
retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it
may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not
entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
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2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of
material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
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cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly
referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a
delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour
Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
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20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section
5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D. Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after
6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of
service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for
claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash
Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that
a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be
based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a
situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire
shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to
discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the
management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts
which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that
has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement
should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the
petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations
when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has
certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four
situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of
reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be
appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that
petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave
notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra)
even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only
compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,
Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex
Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to
rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State
on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,
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Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported
in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case
was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015
SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be
sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R.
502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for
petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that
Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court
Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner
cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the
law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied
relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in
hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably
indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR
2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees
Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company
principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial
Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment
compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case
in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand
before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD
which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and
availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the
petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important
aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.
20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to
keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though
compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be
enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and
circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum
of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 10
years and actually worked for 942 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of
petitioner were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial
dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on
08.12.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of
Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement
or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of
judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on
the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be
solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
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in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in
this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through
these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the
petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid
down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the
judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint
Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals
reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble
High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged
on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this
case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the
facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment
(2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as
Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the
abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,25,000/-
(Rupees one lakh twenty five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the
petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made
clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of
Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of
Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,25,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty five thousand only) to the petitioner
in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of
compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from
the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9%
per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA ( H.P.)
Ref. No. 109/ 2017
Shri Dinesh Singh s/o Sh. Chatter Singh, r/o Village Agoger, P.O. Andreta, Tehsil
Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Vice Chancellor, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishav
Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur District Kangra, H.P.
2.
The Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishav Vidyalya
(CSKHPKV), Palampur District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondents.
23-09-2017 Present:
None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondents.
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
service. It is 11.30 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
23-09-2017 Present:
None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondents.
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It
is 2.30 P.M. None appearance of petitioner today is indicative of the fact that he is not interested
to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
23-09-2017
(K.K.Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. : 103/2015
Date of Institution : 04-3-2015
Date of Decision : 04-9-2017
Shri Kaman Singh s/o Shri Daulat Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Shahli, Tehsil Pangi,
District Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar District Chamba, H.P. . .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Kaman Singh s/o Shri Daulat
Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Shahli, Tehsi Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand
notice dated 18.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service w.e.f.
October, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the
services of Shri Kaman Singh s/o Shri Daulat Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Shahli,
Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division,
Killar, District Chamba, H.P. w.e.f. 18.08.2010 without complying the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back
wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is
entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On 21st January, 2017 the corrigendum had been received from the appropriate
Government whereby the reference has been partly modified in the aforesaid terms:
“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 24-02-
2015, the date of termination of workman Shri Kaman Singh s/o Shri Daulat Ram may
be read as 'October, 2005' instead of '18-08-2010', which was inadvertently recorded in
the said notification”.
3.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
4.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner
above named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll
basis in the month of June, 1997 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the
respondent/department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had
worked for 160 days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District
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Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of
Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for
brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted
by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as
such breaks are required to be counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of
160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner
remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage
service in the end of October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other
co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of
respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of
daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/
retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of
'Last come First go' had not been followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named
27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st May, 1998 to 1st September,
2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by
way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time,
one month's wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason
termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/
petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act
of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no
charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since
his illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim
petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages.
Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section
25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16
of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/
retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. He further prayed for
reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2005 alongwith back wages, seniority including
continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal
termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given
time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1997 to October, 2005 be counted
160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2005
having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is
entitled.
5.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On
merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather
clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained
engaged till 2005 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work
at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically
pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year
as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to
the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned
at serial Nos. 1 to 25 in para No. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour
Court and at serial Nos. 26 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of
petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore
serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has
maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned
in para No. 4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial
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Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated
in 2005, he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years
petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is
also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the
respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the
same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his
termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus
not entitled for back wages.
6.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
7.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L
mandays charts of junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the
evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman the then Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex.
RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of
orders/awards and closed the evidence.
8.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
9.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 7.7.2015 and issue
No.1 recasted and was framed on 01.09.2017 for determination which are as under:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. October, 2005
is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the
petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
Relief :
10. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Discussed
Issue No.3
: No
Issue No.4
: Discussed
Relief
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,40,000/-
per operative part of award.
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REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1, 2 and 4 :
11. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
12. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis in the year 1997 who continuously worked till 2005 with the respondent/
department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or
settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no
written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the
reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to
petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim
of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for
relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and
compensation as claimed by him.
13. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1997 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and
thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by
oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and
25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he
had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/
department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even
while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also
explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this
Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent
upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make
reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble
High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court
due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
14. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even
after October, 2005. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission
on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making
correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken
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by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,
on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the
job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks
had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so
that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also
for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable
evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of
abandonment.
15. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 132 days in the year 1997, 160 days in 1998, 157 days in 1999, 119 days in 2000, 174.5
days in 2001, 151.5 days in 2002, 96 days in 2003, 65.5 days in 2004 and 65 days in 2005 and
thus a total of his service in 1997 to 2005 in 08 years he had worked for 1120 days in his
entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1997, 1999, 2000 and 2002 to 2005
petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour
Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only
with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the
year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 56 days and thus immediately in preceding 12
calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160
days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was
not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the
Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the
Act.
16. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that
large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to
07.9.1999 and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of
petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were
retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason.
Ex. PW1/B, Ex. PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who
were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex.
PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers
shown in Ex. PW1/E the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar
were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more
than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole
month. Ex. PW1/E also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked
for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently,
there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for
service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That
being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the
juniors workers mentioned in para No.3 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was
senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1997 was terminated and even
thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for re-employment for work
which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for
petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5)
SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H
of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in
case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
17. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of
orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as
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reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through
which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/
petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons
were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22
were primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status
of these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him
for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that
respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
18. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's
termination in October, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld.
Authorized Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through
cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also
worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been
earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance
has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural
and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because
the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in
gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his
livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not
be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of
workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was
illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although
remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully
employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being
terminated by the respondent.
19. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways,
Hissar reported in 2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced
below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
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factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd
issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case.
The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the
catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically
held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to
make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for
adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of
material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
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cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to
make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the
order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the
appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the
dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government
had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that
there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to
the Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
20. Ld. Counsel representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
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21. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon
the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture
Marketing Board, Sub- Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant
para of the judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-
Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and his termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6
years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.
one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of
service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as
ld. Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon'ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep
in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the
delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days
and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and
he raised industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though
compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to
be enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts
and circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum
of Rs.1 lakh alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this
court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09
years and actually worked for 1120 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services
of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and had
raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about five years i.e. demand notice
was given on 18.8.2010. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on the date of filing
claim petition was ageing 35 years who has sufficient spell of life to work and earn his livelihood.
Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex
Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but
compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR
25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter
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of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely
declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014
titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this
judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was
reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow
University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in
AIR 2015 SC 3473. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment
of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar vs. Joint Director
Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals
reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that
Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been
challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the
Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment
would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation
qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person
who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate
unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim
of petitioner.
22. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,40,000/-
(Rupees one lakh forty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is
entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear
that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award
failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award
and its realization. Issues No. 1, 2 and 4 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.3 :
23. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
24. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,40,000/- (Rupees one lakh forty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu
of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so
awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum
on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
25. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
26. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
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28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
______________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. : 155/2015
Date of Institution : 04-4-2015
Date of Decision : 04-9-2017
Shri Bhag Chand s/o Shri Laxmi Chand, r/o Village and P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District
Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, Killar District
Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Bhag Chand s/o Shri Laxmi
Chand, r/o Village and P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P. vide demand notice dated 18.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of
services w.e.f. August, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination
of the services of Shri Bhag Chand s/o Shri Laxmi Chand, r/o Village and P.O. Rei,
Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division,
H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. w.e.f. August, 2004 without
complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If
not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the
above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On 9th February, 2017, the corrigendum had been received from the appropriate
Government whereby the reference has been partly modified in the aforesaid terms:
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“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated
24-02-2015, the date of termination of workman Shri Bhag Chand s/o Shri Laxmi
Chand may be read as 'September, 2004' instead of 'August, 2004', which was
inadvertently recorded in the said notification”.
3.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
4.
Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner
above named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll
basis in the month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the
respondent/department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had
worked for 160 days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil
District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions
of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for
brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted
by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as
such breaks are required to be counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of
160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner
remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage
service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other
co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of
respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of
daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/
retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of
'Last come First go' had not been followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named
27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st May, 1998 to 1st September,
2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by
way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time,
one month's wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason
termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/
petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act
of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no
charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had
been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since
his illegal termination from month of September, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim
petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages.
Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section
25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16
of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/
retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004. He further prayed for
reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 alongwith back wages, seniority
including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his
illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks
given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994 to September, 2004 be
counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.
01.01.2002 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to
judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief
petitioner is entitled.
5. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On
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merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather
clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained
engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work
at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically
pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year
as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to
the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned
at serial Nos. 1 to 24 and 26 in para No. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of
Labour Court and at serial Nos. 25 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service
of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will
therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent
has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons
mentioned in para No.4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-
Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been
terminated in 2004, he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after
ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and
laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by
the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at
the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his
termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus
not entitled for back wages.
6.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality
besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.
7.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L
mandays charts of junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the
evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then
Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner
Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy
of orders/awards and closed the evidence.
8.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
9.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.8.2015 and issue
No.1 recasted and was framed on 01.09.2017 for determination which are as under:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. September,
2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. . OPP.
2.
If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the
petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
Relief :
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10. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as
follows:—
Issue No.1
: Yes
Issue No.2
: Discussed
Issue No.3
: No
Issue No.4
: Discussed
Relief
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,50,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1, 2 and 4 :
11. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
12. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent
on muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2004 with the
respondent/department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written
order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that
no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent
remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own
and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the
reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to
petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim
of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for
relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and
compensation as claimed by him.
13. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and
reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to
have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division
Chamba District and remained engaged from 1994 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath
that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his
service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and
thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service
with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further
alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004
by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in
service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been
regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H
of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served
respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never
called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner
from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not
approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner
had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure
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report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial
dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing
CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay
had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.
14. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has
specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.
RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even
after September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission
on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making
correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken
by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,
on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the
job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks
had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so
that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also
for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable
evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of
abandonment.
15. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had
worked for 163 days in the year 1994, 111 days in 1995, 180 days in 1996, 96 days in 1997, 109
days in 1998, 140 days in 1999, 137 days in 2000, 73.5 days in 2001, 62 days in 2002, 84 days in
2003 and 78 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2004 in 11 years he had
worked for 1233.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1995 and
1997 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the
Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its
findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 56 days and thus
immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not
rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one
year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under
Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of
Section 25-F of the Act.
16. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that
large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to
07.9.1999 and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of
petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were
retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason.
Ex. PW1/B, Ex. PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who
were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex.
PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the mandays chart of other co-workers. All of these co-workers
shown in Ex. PW1/E the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar
were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more
than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole
month. Ex. PW1/E also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked
for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently,
there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join
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for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior persons were
reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G
of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.3 of the affidavit were retained
whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was
terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for
reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.
Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of
India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the
applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner
to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
17. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile
attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of
orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as
reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through
which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/
petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons
were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22
were primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status
of these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is
proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him
for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its
accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that
respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
18. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's
termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything
thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld.
Authorized Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through
cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and
also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied
admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been
earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance
has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural
and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because
the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in
gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his
livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not
be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of
workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was
illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although
remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully
employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being
terminated by the respondent.
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19. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways,
Hissar reported in 2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced
below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd
issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case.
The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the
catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically
held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to
make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for
adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
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raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of
material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....”
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,
the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a
reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly
referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a
delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour
Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
20. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent/department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Dy. D.A., ld.
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AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
21. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon
the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture
Marketing Board, Sub- Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant
para of the judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and his termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6
years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable.
[Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of
service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as
ld. Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon'ble Apex Court in various judgments
referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important
circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of
judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)
titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam
Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep
in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the
delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days
and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and
he raised industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though
compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to
be enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts
and circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum
of Rs.1 lakh alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of
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compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court
factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 11 years and
actually worked for 1233.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of
petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had
raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e. demand notice
was given on 18.8.2010. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on the date of filing
claim petition was ageing 39 years who has sufficient spell of life to work and earn his livelihood.
Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex
Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but
compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR
25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter
of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely
declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014
titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this
judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State
Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was
reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow
University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in
AIR 2015 SC 3473. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment
of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director
Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals
reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that
Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been
challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the
Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment
would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation
qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person
who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate
unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim
of petitioner.
22. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,50,000/-
(Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is
entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear
that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award
failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award
and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.3 :
23. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
24. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu
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of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so
awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum
on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
25. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
26. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
27. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
______________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No.
: 377/2015
Date of Institution
: 18-8-2015
Date of decision
: 20-9-2017
Shri Abdul Sitar s/o Shri Ramjan, r/o Village and Post Office Rajpura, Tehsil
Chamba, District Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Deputy Director of Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Abdul Sitar s/o Shri Ramjan,
r/o Village and Post Office Rajpura, Tehsil Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. before the
Deputy Director of Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, vide demand notice dated
12.12.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during year, 2003 suffers
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from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Abdul Sitar s/o
Shri Ramjan, r/o Village and Post Office Rajpura, Tehsil Chamba, District Chamba, H.P.
by the Deputy Director of Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. during year, 2003
without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and
justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim before this court.
3.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner was engaged as
daily waged labourer on muster roll basis with the respondent department in PCDO Rajpura
w.e.f. 03.01.1992 who worked continuously with intermittent/artificial breaks. In the year 2003,
the respondent had orally terminated services of petitioner without any reason whereas the
workers junior to petitioner had been retained and their services have been regularized
however service of petitioner was terminated in the year 2003. It is further alleged that
when the services of petitioner were illegally terminated orally on 2003 it was assured that
petitioner would be engaged on contract basis but when petitioner requested with the
officers/officials of respondent/department not to change his service condition from daily wage to
contract but it was of no avail. It is alleged that petitioner had given short term/spell of 10-15
days on contract basis in a year just to deprive the petitioner from continuity and seniority which
is unfair labour practice within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act whereas the respondent
had retained junior workers continuously on muster roll basis who were consequently regularized.
It is further alleged that respondent had not followed the relevant provisions of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called as 'the Act' for brevity) and had also not taken any prior
approval from the appropriate government as well as written consent from petitioner. As
respondent in gross violation of statutory provisions of law had changed service conditions of
petitioner due to which he could not complete criteria of 240 days in each calendar year by
which petitioner was deprived from benefit of regularization. It is further averred that the
respondent had appointed/engaged many daily waged junior to the petitioner namely Amar
Nath, Khairati Ram, Om Prakash, Roshan Lal, Dharam Chand, Narain Singh, Suresh Kumar,
Ghinder Dutt, Hans Raj, Joginder Singh, Dharam Chand, Jodh Singh, Devi Parshad, Jagat Ram,
Man Singh, Mukesh Kumari, Punam, Shakuntla, Sushil Kumar, Kartar Chand, Devinder,
Kaushalya, Sudarshna Devi and Bachan Singh who were appointed in the years 1997, 1998,
1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004 respectively and their service have been regularized. It is also
averred that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-G of 'the Act' while
engaging the services of abovestated juniors on muster roll but changed the service condition of
petitioner. It is further alleged that respondent had given spotless services to the respondent/
department who had never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline, negligence of work or
misconduct however petitioner had worked with full devotion. It is alleged that respondent had
committed gross violation of statutory provision of Sections 25-B, 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the
Act in malafide, arbitrary, unconstitutional, illegal and unjustified manner besides violating
principle of natural justice which was to 'unfair labour practice' within the meaning of Industrial
Disputes Act. The petitioner thus prayed that oral orders of illegal termination/retrenchment from
daily waged services during year 2003 be set aside being illegal, malafide, arbitrary and unjustified
and petitioner be engaged on daily waged basis because juniors workmen engaged after him had
been working continuously on daily waged basis with the respondent. It is further prayed that the
petitioner be reinstated along with full back wages, seniority, continuity in service as the
petitioner remained unemployed from the date of his illegal retrenchment/termination. It is
prayed that the period of intermittent/fictional breaks which has been given to the petitioner
during period from 3.1.1992 onward for calculation of continuous service of 240 days in each
year under Section 25-B of the Act and regularize the service of petitioner w.e.f. 1.1.2002 as per
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Govt. regularization policy framed in view of Hon'ble Apex Court decision in Mool Raj
Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and others and from the date of regularization of juniors of
petitioner along-with all consequential service benefits.
4.
The respondent contested the claim petition filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections qua maintainability, claim of the petitioner being bad on account of delay and
laches. On merits, admitted that the petitioner was initially engaged as daily waged labourer to
carryout seasonal and occasional work in the year 1992 subject to work and funds besides stated
that he had not completed 240 days in any calendar year since his initial engagement was as
intermittent worker for seasonal work and the petitioner had worked with the respondent as per
his own convenience and sweet will. It is further stated that petitioner had worked with the
respondent/department upto the year 2003 and thereafter 'abandoned' the job at his own sweet will
and convenience and never reported for work after 2003. It is alleged that petitioner had never
worked with the respondent/department during the years 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and
1999. It is, however, denied that the services of the petitioner had been terminated by the
respondent and that junior workmen had been retained by respondent continuously and not
violated provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. It is denied that respondent had intentionally
provided work to petitioner for short term/spell of 10-15 days however no assurance was given
to petitioner to engage him on contract basis. It is also denied that respondent had changed the
service condition of petitioner who is opted to have never completed 240 days of work in each
calendar year since petitioner did not come for work with the respondent after the year 2003. It is
averred that only those workers had been regularized by the respondent/department who had
completed the requisite criteria for regularization as per the government policy and as such the
respondent had not violated any principle of 'Last come First go'. It is stated that the services of
petitioner were engaged by the respondent intermittently for seasonal work which was already
known to petitioner and no fictional breaks were ever given to petitioner by the respondent. It is
contended that no new/fresh workmen/labourers had been engaged by respondent and as such
there was no violation of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The respondent thus
alleges claim petition to be devoid of merit which was accordingly sought to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to reply filed by respondent, reiterated his stand as
maintained in the claim petition.
6.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/A, seniority list Ex. PW1/B to Ex. PW1/D, copy
of order dated 19.5.2011 Ex. PW1/E, copy of order dated 11.8.2015 Ex. PW1/F and closed
evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondent had
examined Shri K. L. Sharma, Deputy Director, Horticulture, Chamba as RW1 who tendered/proved
his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. RW1/B copy of mandays chart of petitioner, Ex.
RW1/C letter No.15-80/79-Horticulture, copy of certificate dated 3.9.2011 Ex. RW1/D and
closed evidence.
7.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
12.12.2011 qua his termination of service during year, 2003 by respondent suffers
from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during year
2003 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
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4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
8.
I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel as well as Ld. Dy. D.A. for
respondent gone through evidence on record carefully relevant for disposal of the present
reference.
9.
For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No.1
: Discussed
Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.75,000/- per
operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1 to 3:
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. It is admitted case of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged by
respondent on 3.1.1992 who worked as daily wage labourer intermittently till 2003. Be it
noticed that the respondent had not placed/exhibited on record any document evidencing that the
services of the petitioner used to be engaged for specific period or for short spell of 10-15
days to knowledge of peittioner. The case of the petitioner remains that he was engaged as beldar
by the respondent in the year 1992 and worked till 2003 on which date his services were illegally
terminated and that he had completed 240 days continuously preceding 12 months from date of
termination On the other hand, it remains the plea of the respondent that the petitioner was
engaged as casual labourer in the year 1992 who had not completed 240 days in any calendar
year since his initial engagement as petitioner is alleged to have abandoned the job of his own
sweet will and convenience during year 2003. However, there is nothing on record to establish
that the petitioner had completed 240 days in the 12 calendar months preceding his termination
except bald statement of the petitioner. On the other hand, the mandays chart of the petitioner
which has been placed on record as Ex. RW1/B by the respondent establish that the petitioner
has factually not completed 240 days in 12 calendar months preceding his termination. The perusal
of mandays chart of the petitioner Ex. RW1/B shows that petitioner had worked only for 45
days during the year 1992, 08 days in 1995, 21 days in 2000, 222 days in 2001, 177 days in
2002 and 83 days in 2003. In view of mandays chart referred to above plea of petitioner having
completed 240 days in 12 calendar months preceding his termination cannot be accepted and thus
retrenchment of petitioner cannot be said to be in violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the
Act.
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12. It is also remains the plea of the petitioner that the services of Shakuntla Devi
and Kaushalya Devi and others as mentioned in his affidavit have been regularized despite the
fact that they were appointed much after petitioner however such plea of the petitioner has
been denied by the respondent. On the other hand, plea of the respondent remains that persons
figuring at serial Nos. 17 to 24 in the seniority list Ex. PW1/D were re-engaged as per orders of
the Hon'ble High Court and they were not junior to the petitioner. It further the plea of respondent
that services of workmen at serial No. 17 to 24 have been regularized as they had completed 240
days in each calendar year which was only the criteria for regularization of daily wagers.
13. The plea of the petitioner remains that service of petitioner was illegally
terminated by the respondent by verbal order in the year 2003 which had been denied by
respondent. On the contrary, it is the plea of the respondent that the petitioner had left the job of
his own accord and free volition. To support the plea of the abandonment, the respondent had
examined Shri K.L.Sharma, Deputy Director, Horticulture, Chamba as RW1 who has deposed
that the services of petitioner were engaged in the year 1992 who worked upto 2003. It is
admitted case of respondent/department to have engaged petitioner on muster roll basis
however denied services of petitioner were retrenched. It is admitted case of respondent that neither
notice nor compensation in lieu of notice was ever given to petitioner. It is admitted that no
approval was taken from the government at the time of retrenchment of the service of
petitioner. It is denied that department had not followed principle of 'Last come First go'. It is
admitted that when respondent/department had given work to petitioner he always remained
present for the work. It was denied that petitioner was not kept on seasonal work. There is nothing
on record to remotely suggest that any notice was served upon the petitioner for his willful
and unauthorized absence from the duty. There is also no documentary evidence on record to
show that some correspondence worth the name in this behalf had been addressed to the
petitioner. Nothing except the bald statement of RW-1, the respondent in this case there is
nothing to show that the petitioner had in fact abandoned the job. It is well settled preposition of
law that the 'abandonment' has to be established by leading evidence and it is a 'question of fact'
which has to be determined in the light of surrounding circumstances of each case, as has been
held by our own Hon'ble High Court in a case titled State of H.P. vs. Bhatag Ram and Anr.
(2007 Latest HLJ 903). Absence from duty is a serious misconduct and admittedly no disciplinary
proceedings was ever initiated against the petitioner by the respondent for his alleged willful
absence from duty. In view of same, bald and uncorroborated statement of RW-1 cannot be
relied upon qua allegation of abandonment of job by petitioner moreso when there is no iota of
evidence on record of respondent establishing that any notice was issued which was served
upon petitioner and there being no record of initiation of disciplinary proceedings and thus for
want of such specific evidence inference of abandonment could not be drawn and thus it is held
that petitioner had not abandoned the job.
14. It also remains plea of the petitioner that the persons junior to him namely Devi
Parkash, Jagat Ram, Man Singh and others have been retained in service which was in
violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. It is not disputed by the respondent that
the abovestated workmen were engaged as daily waged labourers who were still continuously
working with the respondent/department. This fact also finds support from seniority list Ex.
PW1/D, which establishes that workmen mentioned in serial Nos. 17 to 24 were initially
engaged during the years 1998, 1999, 2000 & 2001 respectively who were junior to the
petitioner and admittedly engaged during January, 1992 and have still been retained in service by
the respondent/department. In his cross-examination, RW1 has specifically admitted when
petitioner and other workers were retrenched in the year 2003 and that some of the workers had
been re-engaged by the respondent/department except the petitioner and their services had been
regularized. In view of foregoing, the respondent can be safely held to have violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act which is mandatory in nature and non-compliance of the said
provision vitiates retrenchment entitling petitioner for relief claimed.
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15. It is by now well settled that for seeking the protection of Sections 25-G of the Act,
the requirement of having completed 240 days is not a condition precedent as has been held by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 and
Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, AIR 2010 SC 1116. In HP
State Electricity Board vs. Shri Charan Dass 2012(1) Him. L.R. (DB) 320. It has come in the
evidence that respondent failed to establish that the petitioner has abandoned the job of his own
free will as discussed in foregoing paras and the respondent retained the daily waged labourer who
were junior to the petitioner in service whereas case of the respondent remains that no person
junior to the petitioner save and except those who were ordered to be reinstated by the Court,
were retained in service. In such circumstances, it was held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
that the plea of the respondent itself reveals that the persons junior to the petitioner have been
retained in service and as such the respondent is held to have violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and that completion of 240 days by the workman in a calendar
year is not required for seeking the protection under Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act in view of
law laid down in judgments (supra). Thus, in view of such settled preposition of law even if
the petitioner has not completed the requisite number of days in the 12 calendar months
preceding his termination, the respondent was still bound to follow the principle of 'last come
first go', which has not been done in the present case while engaging junior persons. Thus,
the termination of the services of the petitioner is illegal being against the mandatory
provisions of Sections 25-G of the Act.
16. On perusal of the statement of claim as filed by the petitioner and his statement on
oath while appearing as PW1, it is clear that the petitioner has not uttered a single word that he
was not gainfully employed during the period of his retrenchment till filing of the claim rather
admitted that petitioner had cultivable land from which he could have his livelihood. In view of
this, the petitioner has failed to discharge the initial onus that during the period of his
retrenchment till filing of the claim, he was not gainfully employed. The petitioner while
appearing as PW1 has stated his age as 42 years and it can be safely assumed that a young man
like the petitioner would not have sat ideally at home during the period despite the fact
that he was out of the job. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that
after petitioner's termination in the year 2003, he had remained unemployed and was not earning
anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld.
Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of
the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private
labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied from admission of
petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from
agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural
and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because
the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in
gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his
livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not
be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of
workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was
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illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although
remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully
employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being
terminated by the respondent.
17. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/
Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the
employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
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industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of
material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his
employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly
referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a
delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour
Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
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18. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute was
raised after eight years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld. AR for
the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High
Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may
be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even
longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High
Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar
view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that
the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act.
19. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6
years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination
of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
20. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/
petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash Kumar Paul
vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has held that a
Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be
based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a
situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire
shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to
discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the
management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts
which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that has to
be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should
be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the
aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker may
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be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment certainly not correctly
appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are
illustrative in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that
does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding
compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the
job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of
duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met requirement,
cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be
appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex
Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)
and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager,
Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652. I have gone
through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of
reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon
the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar
Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been
contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode
of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for
reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance
of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal
Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of
Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did
not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view
was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for
merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground
of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to
consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous
to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering
compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as
Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the
Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First
go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment
was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation.
21. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/
circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and
21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as
Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh
provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep
in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial
dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial
dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded
by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the
Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is
not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-
with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within
six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have
weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 06 years and actually worked
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for 556 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in
2003 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of
demand notice after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on 12.12.2011. Taking
into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court
referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but
a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25
(SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is
more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground
of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir
Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the
Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous
judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which
are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground
of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of 2013.
22. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees
seventy five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in
the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of
compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which
the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its
realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No.4 :
23. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
24. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of
the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so
awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum
on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
25. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
26. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
27. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No.
: 378/2015
Date of Institution
: 18-8-2015
Date of decision
: 20-9-2017
Shri Kirpa Ram s/o Shri Rasalu, r/o Village Salla, P.O. Mani, Tehsil and District Chamba,
H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Deputy Director of Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Ld. Dy.D.A.
AWARD
The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Kirpa Ram s/o Shri Rasalu, r/o
Village Salla, P.O. Mani, Tehsil and District Chamba, H.P. before the Deputy Director of
Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 12.12.2011
regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during year, 2003 suffers from delay and
laches? If not, Whether termination of the service of Shri Kirpa Ram s/o Shri Rasalu Ram,
r/o Village Salla, P.O. Mani, Tehsil and District Chamba, H.P. by the Deputy Director
of Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. during year, 2003 without complying the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount
of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved
workman is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 20th February,
2016 was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:
“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 05-08-
2015, the date of termination of services of Shri Kirpa Ram s/o Shri Rasalu, r/o Village
Salla, P.O. Mani, Tehsil and District Chamba, H.P. may be read as "21-06-2005"
instead of "year, 2003", which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification”.
3.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the
parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim before this court.
4.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner was engaged as
daily waged labourer on muster roll basis with the respondent department in PCDO Rajpura
w.e.f. 01.01.1992 who worked continuously with intermittent/artificial breaks. On 21.6.2005,
the respondent had orally terminated services of petitioner without any reason whereas the
workers junior to petitioner had been retained and their services have been regularized
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however service of petitioner was terminated on 21.6.2005. It is further alleged that when the
services of petitioner were illegally terminated orally on 21.5.2006 it was assured that
petitioner would be engaged on contract basis but when petitioner requested with the officers/
officials of respondent/department not to change his service condition from daily wage to contract
but it was of no avail. It is alleged that petitioner had given short term/spell of 10-15 days on
contract basis in a year just to deprive the petitioner from continuity and seniority which is unfair
labour practice within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act whereas the respondent had
retained junior workers continuously on muster roll basis who were consequently regularized. It is
further alleged that respondent had not followed the relevant provisions of Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter called as 'the Act' for brevity) and had also not taken any prior approval
from the appropriate government as well as written consent from petitioner. As respondent in
gross violation of statutory provisions of law had changed service conditions of petitioner due
to which he could not complete criteria of 240 days in each calendar year by which petitioner
was deprived from benefit of regularization. It is further averred that the respondent had
appointed/engaged many daily waged junior to the petitioner namely Amar Nath, Khairati Ram,
Om Prakash, Roshan Lal, Dharam Chand, Narain Singh, Suresh Kumar, Ghinder Dutt, Hans
Raj, Joginder Singh, Dharam Chand, Jodh Singh, Devi Parshad, Jagat Ram, Man Singh, Mukesh
Kumari, Punam, Shakuntla, Sushil Kumar, Kartar Chand, Devinder, Kaushalya, Sudarshna Devi
and Bachan Singh who were appointed in the years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004
respectively and their service have been regularized. It is also averred that respondent had not
followed the provisions of Section 25-G of 'the Act' while engaging the services of abovestated
juniors on muster roll but changed the service condition of petitioner. It is further alleged that
respondent had given spotless services to the respondent/department who had never been charge-
sheeted for any act of indiscipline, negligence of work or misconduct however petitioner had
worked with full devotion. It is alleged that respondent had committed gross violation of
statutory provision of Sections 25-B, 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act in malafide, arbitrary,
unconstitutional, illegal and unjustified manner besides violating principle of natural justice which
was to 'unfair labour practice' within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner thus
prayed that oral orders of illegal termination/retrenchment from daily waged services from
21.6.2005 be set aside being illegal, malafide, arbitrary and unjustified and petitioner be engaged
on daily waged basis because juniors workmen engaged after him had been working
continuously on daily waged basis with the respondent. It is further prayed that the petitioner be
reinstated along with full back wages, seniority, continuity in service as the petitioner remained
unemployed from the date of his illegal retrenchment/termination. It is prayed that the period of
intermittent/fictional breaks which has been given to the petitioner during period from 1.1.1992
onward for calculation of continuous service of 240 days in each year under Section 25-B of the
Act and regularize the service of petitioner w.e.f. 1.1.2002 as per Govt. regularization policy
framed in view of Hon'ble Apex Court decision in Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and
others and from the date of regularization of juniors of petitioner alongwith all consequential
service benefits.
5.
The respondent contested the claim petition filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections qua maintainability, claim of the petitioner being bad on account of delay and
laches. On merits, admitted that the petitioner was initially engaged as daily waged labourer to
carryout seasonal and occasional work in the year 1992 subject to work and funds besides stated
that he had not completed 240 days in any calendar year since his initial engagement was as
intermittent worker for seasonal work and the petitioner had worked with the respondent as
per his own convenience and sweet will. It is further stated that petitioner had worked with the
respondent/department upto the year 2005 and thereafter 'abandoned' the job at his own sweet will
and convenience and never reported for work after 2005. It is alleged that petitioner had never
worked with the respondent/department during the years 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998. It is,
however, denied that the services of the petitioner had been terminated by the respondent and that
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junior workmen had been retained by respondent continuously and not violated provisions of
Section 25-G of the Act. It is denied that respondent had intentionally provided work to
petitioner for short term/spell of 10-15 days however no assurance was given to petitioner to
engage him on contract basis. It is also denied that respondent had changed the service
condition of petitioner who is opted to have never completed 240 days of work in each calendar
year since petitioner did not come for work with the respondent after the year 2005. It is averred
that only those workers had been regularized by the respondent/department who had completed
the requisite criteria for regularization as per the government policy and as such the respondent
had not violated any principle of 'Last come First go'. It is stated that the services of petitioner
were engaged by the respondent intermittently for seasonal work which was already known to
petitioner and no fictional breaks were ever given to petitioner by the respondent. It is contended
that no new/fresh workmen/labourers had been engaged by respondent and as such there was no
violation of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The respondent thus alleges claim
petition to be devoid of merit which was accordingly sought to be dismissed.
6.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to reply filed by respondent, reiterated his stand as
maintained in the claim petition.
7.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/A, seniority list Ex. PW1/B to Ex. PW1/D, copy
of order dated 19.5.2011 Ex. PW1/E, copy of order dated 11.8.2015 Ex. PW1/F and closed
evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondent had
examined Shri K. L. Sharma, Deputy Director, Horticulture, Chamba as RW1 who tendered/proved
his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. RW1/B copy of mandays chart of petitioner, Ex.
RW1/C letter No.15-80/79-Horticulture, copy of certificate dated 3.9.2011 Ex. RW1/D and
closed evidence.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 24.10.2016 for
determination:
1.
Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated
12.12.2011 qua his termination of service w.e.f. 21.6.2005 by respondent suffers
from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during
21.6.2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is
entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief:
9.
I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel as well as Ld. Dy. D.A. for
respondent gone through evidence on record carefully relevant for disposal of the present
reference.
10. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No.1
: Discussed
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Issue No.2
: Yes
Issue No.3
: Discussed
Issue No.4
: No
Relief
: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,60,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1 to 3 :
11. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
12. It is admitted case of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged by
respondent on 1992 who worked as daily wage labourer intermittently till 21.6.2005. Be it noticed
that the respondent had not placed/exhibited on record any document evidencing that the services
of the petitioner used to be engaged for specific period or for short spell of 10-15 days to
knowledge of peittioner. The case of the petitioner remains that he was engaged as beldar by the
respondent in the year 1992 and worked till 21.6.2005 on which date his services were
illegally terminated and that he had completed 240 days continuously preceding 12 months from
date of termination On the other hand, it remains the plea of the respondent that the petitioner
was engaged as casual labourer in the year 1992 who had not completed 240 days in any
calendar year since his initial engagement as petitioner is alleged to have abandoned the job of his
own sweet will and convenience in the month of June, 2005. However, there is nothing on record
to establish that that the petitioner had completed 240 days in the 12 calendar months preceding
his termination except bald statement of the petitioner. On the other hand, the mandays chart of
the petitioner which has been placed on record as Ex. RW1/B by the respondent establish
that the petitioner has factually not completed 240 days in 12 calendar months preceding his
termination. The perusal of mandays chart of the petitioner Ex. RW1/B shows that petitioner had
worked only for 29 days during the year 1992, 08 days in 1994, 194 days in 1999, 229 days in
2000, 230 days in 2001, 158 days in 2002, 216 days in 2003, 211 days in 2004 and 81 days in 2005.
In view of mandays chart referred to above plea of petitioner having completed 240 days in 12
calendar months preceding his termination cannot be accepted and thus retrenchment of
petitioner cannot be said to be in violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.
13. It is also remains the plea of the petitioner that the services of Shakuntla Devi
and Kaushalya Devi and others as mentioned in his affidavit have been regularized despite the
fact that they were appointed much after petitioner however such plea of the petitioner has
been denied by the respondent. On the other hand, plea of the respondent remains that persons
figuring at serial Nos. 17 to 24 in the seniority list Ex. PW1/D were re-engaged as per orders of
the Hon'ble High Court and they were not junior to the petitioner. It further the plea of respondent
that services of workmen at serial No. 17 to 24 have been regularized as they had completed 240
days in each calendar year which was only the criteria for regularization of daily wagers.
14. The plea of the petitioner remains that service of petitioner was illegally
terminated by the respondent by verbal order in June, 2005 which had been denied by
respondent. On the contrary, it is the plea of the respondent that the petitioner had left the job of
his own accord and free volition. To support the plea of the abandonment, the respondent had
examined Shri K. L. Sharma, Deputy Director, Horticulture, Chamba as RW1 who has
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deposed that the services of petitioner were engaged in the year 1992 who worked upto 2005.
It is admitted case of respondent/department to have engaged petitioner on muster roll basis
however denied services of petitioner were retrenched. It is admitted case of respondent that neither
notice nor compensation in lieu of notice was ever given to petitioner. It is admitted that no
approval was taken from the government at the time of retrenchment of the service of
petitioner. It is denied that department had not followed principle of 'Last come First go'. It is
admitted that when respondent/department had given work to petitioner he always remained
present for the work. It was denied that petitioner was not kept on seasonal work. There is nothing
on record to remotely suggest that any notice was served upon the petitioner for his willful
and unauthorized absence from the duty. There is also no documentary evidence on record to
show that some correspondence worth the name in this behalf had been addressed to the
petitioner. Nothing except the bald statement of RW-1, the respondent in this case there is
nothing to show that the petitioner had in fact abandoned the job. It is well settled preposition of
law that the 'abandonment' has to be established by leading evidence and it is a 'question of fact'
which has to be determined in the light of surrounding circumstances of each case, as has been
held by our own Hon'ble High Court in a case titled State of H.P. vs. Bhatag Ram and Anr.
(2007 Latest HLJ 903). Absence from duty is a serious misconduct and admittedly no disciplinary
proceedings was ever initiated against the petitioner by the respondent for his alleged willful
absence from duty. In view of same, bald and uncorroborated statement of RW-1 cannot be
relied upon qua allegation of abandonment of job by petitioner moreso when there is no iota of
evidence on record of respondent establishing that any notice was issued which was served
upon petitioner and there being no record of initiation of disciplinary proceedings and thus for
want of such specific evidence inference of abandonment could not be drawn and thus it is held
that petitioner had not abandoned the job.
15. It also remains plea of the petitioner that the persons junior to him namely Devi
Parkash, Jagat Ram, Man Singh and others have been retained in service which was in
violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. It is not disputed by the respondent that
the abovestated workmen were engaged as daily waged labourers who were still continuously
working with the respondent/department. This fact also finds support from seniority list Ex.
PW1/D, which establishes that workmen mentioned in serial Nos. 17 to 24 were initially
engaged during the years 1998, 1999, 2000 & 2001 respectively who were junior to the
petitioner and admittedly engaged during January, 1992 and have still been retained in service by
the respondent/department. In his cross-examination, RW1 has specifically admitted when
petitioner and other workers were retrenched in the year 2005 and that some of the workers had
been reengaged by the respondent/department except the petitioner and their services had been
regularized. In view of foregoing, the respondent can be safely held to have violated the provisions
of Section 25-G of the Act which is mandatory in nature and non-compliance of the said
provision vitiates retrenchment entitling petitioner for relief claimed.
16. It is by now well settled that for seeking the protection of Sections 25- G of the Act,
the requirement of having completed 240 days is not a condition precedent as has been held
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419
and Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, AIR 2010 SC 1116. In HP
State Electricity Board vs. Shri Charan Dass 2012(1) Him. L.R. (DB) 320. It has come in the
evidence that respondent failed to establish that the petitioner has abandoned the job of his own
free will as discussed in foregoing paras and the respondent retained the daily waged labourer who
were junior to the petitioner in service whereas case of the respondent remains that no person
junior to the petitioner save and except those who were ordered to be reinstated by the Court,
were retained in service. In such circumstances, it was held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
that the plea of the respondent itself reveals that the persons junior to the petitioner have been
retained in service and as such the respondent is held to have violated the provisions of
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Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and that completion of 240 days by the workman in a calendar
year is not required for seeking the protection under Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act in view of
law laid down in judgments (supra). Thus, in view of such settled preposition of law even if
the petitioner has not completed the requisite number of days in the 12 calendar months
preceding his termination, the respondent was still bound to follow the principle of 'last come
first go', which has not been done in the present case while engaging junior persons. Thus,
the termination of the services of the petitioner is illegal being against the mandatory
provisions of Sections 25-G of the Act.
17. On perusal of the statement of claim as filed by the petitioner and his statement on
oath while appearing as PW1, it is clear that the petitioner has not uttered a single word that he
was not gainfully employed during the period of his retrenchment till filing of the claim rather
admitted that petitioner had cultivable land from which he could have his livelihood. In view of
this, the petitioner has failed to discharge the initial onus that during the period of his
retrenchment till filing of the claim, he was not gainfully employed. The petitioner while
appearing as PW1 has stated his age as 36 years and it can be safely assumed that a young man
like the petitioner would not have sat ideally at home during the period despite the fact
that he was out of the job. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that
after petitioner's termination in June, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning
anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld.
Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of
the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private
labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied from admission of
petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from
agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been
placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of
Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment
would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either
from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the
sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of
judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural
and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that
petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because
the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in
gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his
livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not
be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of
workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was
illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although
remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully
employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being
terminated by the respondent.
18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is
inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the
other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court
titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab
IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:
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“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the
Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be
applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court
has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant
factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the
2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the
case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason
the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no
application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the
appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court
is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the
Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon
Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the
Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of
delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the
dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.
We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has
resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the
industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court
to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a
reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had
assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.
Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in
raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of
material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely
erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his
employer.
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15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be
denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—
“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation
Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it
cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised
by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice
and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be
generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in
shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can
appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the
date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The
Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead
of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case
that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in
the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance
given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal
case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make
a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of
dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant
and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since
the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly
referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a
delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour
Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the
additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by
the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed
by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters
Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the
power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of
the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties
referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the
foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public
interest at large.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with
vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been
pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute
was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble
High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute
may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments
even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu
Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon‟ble
High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.
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Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative
Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has
been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the
Industrial Disputes Act.
20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of
petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments
advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing
Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the
judgment are produced below for reference:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-
Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had
completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section
25-F of the I.D. Act-Wokrman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days
during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6
years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-
Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement
of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of
Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six
weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of
service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to
reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an
important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting
relief”.
21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for
claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash
Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has
held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same
has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be
granted in a situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going
to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in
capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of
the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on
facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that
has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement
should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner
with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a
worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment certainly not
correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which
are illustrative in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that
does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding
compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the
job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of
duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met requirement,
cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be
appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex
Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)
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and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager,
Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652. I have gone
through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of
reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon
the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar
Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been
contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode
of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for
reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance
of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal
Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of
Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did
not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view
was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for
merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground
of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to
consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous
to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering
compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as
Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the
Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First
go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment
was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation.
22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it
can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/
circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and
21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as
Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh
provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep
in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of
employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in
raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised
industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised
industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation
awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by
the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances
is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh
along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation
within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors
which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09 years and
actually worked for 1356 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner
were disengaged in June, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute
by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e. demand notice was given on 12.12.2011.
Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex
Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back
wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139)
FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and
laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the
ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as
Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also
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the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e.Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture
Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these
judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the
petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid
down in judgment of 2013.
23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,60,000/-
(Rupees one lakh sixty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is
entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear
that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award
failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till
its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
Issue No. 4 :
24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs.1,60,000/- (Rupees one lakh sixty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu
of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation
so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of
receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum
on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in
the official gazette.
28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 29th day of September, 2017.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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INDUSTRIES DEPARTMENT
A-Section
NOTIFICATION
Shimla-2,the 12th July, 2018
No. Ind-A(B)8-4/2017.—On the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion
Committee, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order the promotion of Shri Pranav
Kumar, Industrial Promotion Officer to the post of Manager, DIC (Class-II, Gazetted) in the pay
scale of `10300-34800+`4400 Grade pay in the Department of Industries, H.P. with immediate
effect.
The Governor, Himachal Pradesh is further pleased to order the posting of Shri Pranav
Kumar, Manager at DIC Kangra against vacant post, with immediate effect, in public interest.
The officer shall remain on probation for a period of two years. He will also exercise option
for fixation of pay under the provisions of FR-22, within a period of one month from the date of
issue of this Notification.
The above Officer is directed to join his duties within 10 days and submit his joining report
to this Department through the Director of Industries, H.P., failing which the promotion orders will
automatically be treated as withdrawn.
By order,
R. D. DHIMAN, IAS,
Principal Secretary (Inds.).
__________
In the Court of Shri Chander Mohan Thakur, Executive Magistrate (Naib-Tehsildar)
Solan, District Solan, H. P.
In the matter of :
Ms. Poonam Thapa d/o Sh. Sher Singh, r/o Village & P.O. Basal, Tehsil & District Solan,
Himachal Pradesh
. . Applicant.
Versus
General Public
. . Respondent.
Application under section 13(3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.
Ms. Poonam Thapa d/o Sh. Sher Singh, r/o Village & P.O. Basal, Tehsil & District Solan,
Himachal Pradesh has moved an application before the undersigned under section 13(3) of Birth &
Death Registration Act, 1969 alongwith affidavit and other documents for enter her birth in the
record of Gram Panchayat Basal, she was born on 08-08-1981 at Village Basal, Tehsil & District
Solan, but her birth could not be entered in the record of Gram Panchayat Basal, Tehsil & District
Solan.
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Therefore, by this proclamation, the general public is hereby informed that any person
having any objection for the delayed registration of birth of Poonam Thapa d/o Sh. Sher Singh may
submit their objection in writing or appear in person in this court on or before 18-07-2018 at 10.00
A.M. failing which no objection will be entertained after expiry of date.
Given under my hand and seal of the court on this 9th day of June, 2018.
Seal.
CHANDER MOHAN THAKUR,
Executive Magistrate (Tehsildar),
Solan, District Solan, H. P.
___________
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In the Court of Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bangana, District Una,
Himachal Pradesh
In the matter of :
1.
Shri Dinesh Kumar age 27 years s/o Shri Chain Singh, Village Paproli, P.O. Nahri
Devi Singh, Tehsil Bangana, District Una, Himachal Pradesh.
3367
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 16 tqykbZ] 2018@25 vk"kk<+] 1940
2. Baby age 34 years d/o Sh. Rattan Chand, Village Salasi, Tehsil Sujanpur & District
Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh
.. Applicants.
Versus
General Public
Subject .—Application for registration of marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954.
Whereas a application under section 15 of the Special Marriage Act has been received on
20-06-2018 by the undersigned from (1) Shri Dinesh Kumar age 27 years s/o Shri Chain Singh,
Village Paproli, P.O. Nahri Devi Singh, Tehsil Bangana, District Una, Himachal Pradesh (2) Baby
age 34 years d/o Sh. Rattan Chand, Village Salasi, Tehsil Sujanpur & District Hamirpur, Himachal
Pradesh for the registration of their marriage. Hence, this proclamation is hereby issued for the
information of general public that if any person has any objection for the registration of the above
marriage, he/she can appear in this Court on or before 27-07-2018 to object registration of marriage
either personally or through an authorized agent failing which marriage will be registered under this
Act, accordingly.
Issued today on 29-06-2018 under my hand and seal of the court.
Seal.
Sd/-
Marriage Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate,
Bangana,District Una (H.P.).
_____________
CHANGE OF NAME
I, Aruna Kumari (d/o Shri Jagir Singh) w/o Shri Kulbhushan Singh Thakur, Village
Surajpur, P.O. Dhaliara, Tehsil Dehra, Distt. Kangra, H.P., employed in Govt. Primary School
Badhal Noun, Elementary Education Block Dadasiba in H.P. Department of Elementary Education,
has changed my name from Aruna Kumari to Aruna Thakur. All concerned to note please.
ARUNA THAKUR,
(d/o Jagir Singh ) w/o Shri Kulbhushan Singh Thakur,
Village Surajpur, P.O. Dhaliara,
Tehsil Dehra, Distt. Kangra, H.P.
3368
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 16 tqykbZ] 2018@25 vk"kk<+] 1940
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