jkti=] fgekpy izns'k

fgekpy izns'k jkT; 'kklu }kjk izdkf'kr

lkseokj] 16 tqykbZ] 2018@25 vk"kk<+] 1940

fgekpy izns'k ljdkj

LAW DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Shimla-2, the 3rd July, 2018

No. LLR-E(9)-1/2018.—In continuation of this Department’s Notifications of even number

dated 7th March, 2018 and 17th March, 2018, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order

to appoint Sh. Akshay Amritanshu, Advocate, (D/1004/2014) C41, Jangpura Extension, New

Delhi-110014 (Phone:+91 99312-82222), as panel Advocate to represent the State of Himachal

Pradesh before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil/Criminal cases with immediate effect.

80&jkti=@2018&16&07&2018

¼3081½

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2. This engagement is purely at the pleasure of the State Government and can be

withdrawn at any stage without assigning any reasons thereof.

3. The other terms and conditions as contained in the Notification of this Department No.

LLR-E(9)1/88-III (Loose) dated 28th May, 2012 and 31st July, 2012 would continue to apply to the

said panel Advocate.

4. All the Departments are requested that whenever they need the services of any

Advocate in the particular Civil/Criminal case or in cases of vital importance to the State, they may

engage above Advocate with the prior approval of the Law Department and in consultation with the

Advocate General, Himachal Pradesh.

By order

Sd/-

LR-cum-Pr. Secretary (Law).

_________

LAW DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Shimla-2, the 3rd July, 2018

No. LLR-E(9)-2/2018.—In supersession of the previous Notification(s) issued from time to

time with regard to empanelment of Advocates to defend the Revenue Cases in Kangra District, the

Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to make a new panel of the following Advocates to

represent the State of Himachal Pradesh in Board/Bank/Trust/Committee/Corporation and Revenue

Cases pending before the various Courts in District Kangra with immediate effect:—

Sl.

No.

Name & Address

of Advocate

S/Sh./Smt.

Name of Institution

Terms and Conditions

of fee for Revenue

Courts

Nurpur Court

1.

Ajay Pathania

NHAI, KCC Bank, UHF Nauni

Rs. 1500/- (Rupees One

Thousand Five hundred)

per case + Rs.

200/- as miscellaneous

expenses including

typing expenses.

2.

Arun Jarial

HRTC & SDM Court Nurpur

-do-

3.

Sonu Pundra

H.P. Electricity Board Tehsildar/Naib

Tehsildar Court.

-do-

4.

Aditya Sharma

Civil

Supplies

Corpn.

HPKV

Palampur.

-do-

5.

Sachit Sharma

Forest Corporation

-do-

6.

Udhaybir Singh

Education Board, M.C.Nurpur

-do-

7.

Naresh Dhiman

H.P. Pollution CB

-do-

3083

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8.

Shekhar Gupta

Forest Corporation

-do-

Indora Court

1.

Ashwani Mahant

HRTC, SDM Court Nurpur

-do-

2.

Rohit Minhas

Tehsildar & Naib Tehsildar Court

-do-

3.

Sanjeev Kumar

Pollution Control Board and Civil

Supplies Corpn.

-do-

4.

Shyam Dadwal

SDM & Tehsil Court

-do-

5.

Sourav Sharma

HPSEB & H.P. Education Board,

KCC Bank and Forest Corpn.

-do-

6.

Prashant Katoch

Forest Corporation

-do-

Palampur Court

1.

D.S. Parmar

CSKHPKV, KCC Bank & HRTC

-do-

2.

Manoj Sharma

HRTC, KCC Bank & H.P. Road &

Infrastructure.

-do-

3.

Arvind Vashist

H.P. Agro Ind. HPSEB, KCC Bank

-do-

4.

Arvind Mehta

HPSEB, HPHIM Fed, KCC Bank

-do-

5.

Adarsh Sood

Him Urja, H.P. State Education,

HPSEB.

-do-

6.

Hitesh Nag

KCC

Bank,

Civil

Supplies

Corporation.

-do-

7.

Mahesh Sharma

H.P. Emp. W/W Board, KCC Bank,

HPPCL.

-do-

8.

Bhanu Udai Singh

KCC Bank, HPMC, RKS Palampur

-do-

9.

Vikas Sapehiya

Kangra Mortgage Bank HPGIC

-do-

10.

Binder Kapoor

H.P. Wool Federation, Naib Tehsildar

Court Palampur.

-do-

11.

Gagan Katoch

Tehsildar Court Palampur Standing

Counsel.

-do-

12.

Kapil Chaudhary

OBC Commission Kangra

-do-

13.

Hema Bhat

H.P. SC ST Corpn.

-do-

14.

Bhawana Thakur

H.P. Women Child Welfare Board

-do-

15.

Vishal Sood

UHF Nauni, HPSEDC

-do-

16.

Kush Patiyal

H.P. Polluction Control Board

-do-

17.

Shabbir Katoch

MC Palampur

-do-

18.

Ripu Daman Singh

MC Palampur/ HPMC/ HP Polluction

Control Board.

-do-

19.

Sanjay

Amtril

Gopal.

SDM Palampur

-do-

3084

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20.

Arvind Sood

SDM Dehra

-do-

21.

Manu Bharti

Bhawarna/Chamunda Temple

-do-

22.

Ravinder

Ranout,

Palampur.

HP Forest Corporation

-do-

23.

Sushil

Nag

Palampur.

Him Urja/Forest Corporation

-do-

24.

Milap Chand Rana

Nagar Parishad

-do-

25.

Sanjeev Paddiar

HRTC

-do-

Baijnath Court

1.

Sanjay Goswami

HPSEB/KCC Bank

-do-

2.

Santosh Sharma

MC Baijnath/SDM B/Nath

-do-

3.

Vijay Kumar

HPPOL/HRTC

-do-

4.

Lakesh Sharma

HPTCL

-do-

5.

Rajesh Verma

Tehsil Office B/Nath

-do-

6.

Rakesh Kumar

Tehsildar/Naib. Tehsildar Baijnath

-do-

7.

Neeru Vij

HP Civil Supplies Corpn.

-do-

8.

Vinod K. Sajwel

HP Forest Corporation

-do-

9.

Vijay

Kumar

Makkar

HP Forest Corporation

-do-

Dehra Court

1.

Abhishek Padha

HRTC, KCC Bank, NP Jawalamukhi

& SDM J/Mukhi.

-do-

2.

Arvind Dhiman

KCC Bank & H.P. Civil Supplies

Corpn.

-do-

3.

Nitin Thakur

SC, ST, Corpn., Him Fed/MC Dehra

-do-

4.

Rajdeep Chauhan

SDM Dehra

-do-

5.

Arvind

Kumar

Sharma.

SDM Dehra

-do-

6.

Ajay Thakur

KCC Bank

-do-

7.

Amit Rana

Jawalamukhi Temple Trust

-do-

8.

Arvind Prabhakar

Pollution Control Board

-do-

9.

Bhavnesh Prashar

H.P. State Edu. Board

-do-

10.

Atul Rajyal

SDM Jawalamukhi

-do-

11.

Rajnath Bhatia

HPSEBL

-do-

12.

Amit Rana

Dehra

-do-

Dharamshala Court

1.

Anand Sharma

HPSEB/NHAI

-do-

2.

Arvind Kumar

H.P. State Civil Supply/HPFC, KCC

Bank/NHAI

-do-

3.

Varun Sharma

CSKAU Palampur/HPFC for HPAT

-do-

4.

Sumesh Raj Dogra

HRTC/HPSSC

-do-

3085

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5.

Tarun Sharma

Division Commissioner

-do-

6.

Madan Thakur

HPU/HPTU

-do-

7.

Umesh Dhiman

KCC Bank

-do-

8.

Aman Kapoor

HPMC

-do-

9.

Manish Chaudhary

Him Urja

-do-

10.

Vinod Kumar

DC & Tehsil Office

-do-

11.

Surinder Kaundal

H.P. Road and other Infrastructure

-do-

12.

Munish Kumar

UHF Nauni

-do-

13.

Sarita Chaudhary

H.P. Women & Child Welfare

-do-

14.

Latika Thakur

Wool Federation

-do-

15.

Ishant Guleria

H.P. Road and other Infrastructure

-do-

16.

Bobby Maratha

HPU(Regional Centre)

-do-

17.

Tevich Sanghoi

Land Mortgage Bank

-do-

18.

Ajay Thakur

H.P. Milk Federation

-do-

19.

Sandeep Kumar

Tehsil Office Dharamshala

-do-

20.

Sanjeev Sundhu

Tehsil Offie Dharamshala

-do-

21.

Manohar Thakur

HP GIC

-do-

22.

Rahul Sharma

MC D/Shala, KCC Bank

-do-

23.

Sudarshna

KCC Bank

-do-

24.

Narayan Thakur

H.P. Edu. Board

-do-

25.

Vivek Vashisth

Him Fed

-do-

26.

KS Thakur

Him Fed

-do-

27.

Mohit Sharma

KCC Bank

-do-

28.

Rakesh Mehra

HPFC

-do-

29.

Vishav

Chakshu

Puri.

MC D/Shala

-do-

30.

Rohit Planchkarn

KCC Bank

-do-

31.

Rajeev Azad

OBC Commission

-do-

32.

Chander Bhanu

MC Dharamshala

-do-

33.

Vishal Avasthi

KCC Bank

-do-

34.

Manoj Rana

KCC Bank

-do-

35.

Shisher Attri

SDM Shahpur/Indora

-do-

36.

Sanjeev Kumar

H.P.

Public

Service

Commission

Shimla

-do-

37.

Vishal Sharma

SDM D/Shala

-do-

38.

Rajender

Chaudhary.

SDM Nagrota Bagwan

-do-

39.

Ravinder

Chaudhary

Chamunda Temple

-do-

40.

Jaswinder Kaur

State

Handicraft

and

Handloom

Corporation.

-do-

3086

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41.

Himali Thapa

Khadi Board

-do-

42.

Rakesh

Mehra,

Dharamshala.

District Court(Revenue Court)

-do-

43.

Deepak Dogra

Session Court (Revenue cases)

-do-

44.

Ram Lal Narayan

District Court (Revenue cases), Forest

Corporation.

-do-

45.

Shirish Bassi

KCC Bank

-do-

Kangra Court

1.

Vipin Kumar

HPSEBL

-do-

2.

Anuj Gupta

HRTC

-do-

3.

Suresh Dhiman

State Civil Supplies Corpn.

-do-

4.

Vijay Gupta

Tehsildar/SDM Kangra

-do-

5.

Tarun Sharma

H.P. Forest Corpn.

-do-

6.

Suneet Kohli

NP Kangra/Temple Brajeshwari

-do-

Jawali Court

1.

Prittam Singh Rana

KCC Bank/HRTC/HPSEB/HPFC

-do-

2.

Kalpana Thakur

Distt. Court Jawali, HPU

-do-

3.

Gurnam

Singh

Bharti

State Civil Supplies Corpn, OBC

Commission, Sub Tehsil Nagrota

Surian.

-do-

4.

Surinder Guleria

H.P. Edu.Board

-do-

5.

Tilak Repotra

NP Jawali, HRTC

-do-

6.

Basant Lal Sood

H..P Edu. Board

-do-

Dharamshala HP Administrative Tribunal Bench

1.

Anand Sharma

MC D/Shala

-do-

2.

Arvind Kumar

H.P. State Civil Supply/HPFC, KCC

Bank.

-do-

3.

Varun Sharma

CSKAU Palampur

-do-

4.

Sumesh Raj Dogra

HRTC/HPSSC/HPPSC

-do-

5.

Rohit Dutta

H.P. Electricity Board

-do-

6.

Arvind Vashist

NP P/pur, B/Nath, Nagrota, HPSEB

-do-

7.

Madan Thakur

HPU/HPTU

-do-

8.

Umesh Dhiman

KCC Bank, NP Kangra/Jawalamukhi/

Dehra.

-do-

9.

Aman Kapoor

H.P. MC

-do-

10.

Manish Chaudhary

Him Urja

-do-

11.

Surinder Kaundal

H.P. Road and other Infrastructure

-do-

12.

Munish Kumar

UHF Nauni

-do-

13.

Sarita Chaudhary

H.P. Women & Child Welfare

-do-

14.

Latika Thakur

Wool Federation

-do-

15.

Ishant Guleria

H.P. Road and other Infrastructure/all

RKS Kangra & P/pur

-do-

3087

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16.

Bobby Maratha

HPU/Chamunda Temple Trust

-do-

17.

Taviech Sanghoi

Land Mortgage Bank

-do-

18.

Ajay Thakur

HP Milk Fed

-do-

19.

Manohar Thakur

HP GIC

-do-

20.

Rahul Sharma

NP Jawali/Nurpur & Him Fed,

KCC Bank.

-do-

21.

Sudarshna

KCC Bank

-do-

22.

Narayan Thakur

H.P. Edu. Board

-do-

23.

Vivek Vashisth

HPFC

-do-

This engagement is purely at the pleasure of the State Government and can be withdrawn at

any stage without assigning any reasons thereof.

The Deputy Commissioner is requested that whenever there is a need of service of any

Advocate in the Revenue cases pertaining to the State, he may engage Advocate from the aforesaid

panel. Further where more than one Advocate is empanelled for the same Revenue Court, the

Deputy Commissioner will distribute the cases in rotation.

The expression “Revenue Cases” shall include all matters/proceedings relating to

encroachment cases, correction cases or any other case where interest of the State Government is

required to be protected before the Court.

By order,

Sd/-

LR-cum-Pr. Secretary (Law).

__________

PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Shimla-171002, the 10th July, 2018

No. PBW(B)F(7)3/2009-II.—In continuation of this department's notification of even

number dated 14th May, 2018, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to declare the 'Pallingi

to Nichar via Gramang' road in District Kinnaur having a length of 21.200 kms as Major District

Road no. 97 at Sl. No. 88. Accordingly the total length of Major District Roads in District Kinnaur

will be 21.200 km and in the State will be 4152.570 kms.

Sd/-

(MANISHA NANDA)

Addl. Chief Secretary (PW).

3088

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LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

D/Shala, the 02nd November, 2017

No. Shram (A) 6-2/2014 (Awards).—In exercise of the powers vested under Section 17(1)

of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order the

publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court

D/Shala on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment Government of Himachal

Pradesh:—

Sl.

No.

Ref. No.

Petitioner

Respondent

Date of

Award/Order

1.

370/15

Sanjeet Kumar

D.F.O. Palampur

05-09-2017

2.

173/14

Subhash Chand

Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur

08-09-2017

3.

176/14

Sudershan Kumar

Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur

08-09-2017

4.

178/14

Ramesh Chand

Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur

08-09-2017

5.

198/14

Vinod Kumar

Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur

08-09-2017

6.

218/14

Madan Lal

Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur

08-09-2017

7.

190/14

Kuldeep Kumar

Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur

08-09-2017

8.

207/14

Ashok Kumar

Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur

08-09-2017

9.

210/14

Vipan Kumar

Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur

08-09-2017

10.

212/14

Punnu Ram

Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur

08-09-2017

11.

217/14

Ashok Kumar

Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur

08-09-2017

12

690/16

Rama Sharma

Chairman, State Social Welfare

Board

11-09-2017

13.

576/15

Dhani Ram

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

14.

573/15

Gian Chand

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

15.

532/15

Devi Singh

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

16.

531/15

Dharam Pal

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

17.

569/15

Gurdev

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

18.

562/15

Dhano

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

19.

575/15

Roop Dass

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

20.

524/15

Khem Ram

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

21.

20/16

Tul Dei

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

22.

508/15

Des Raj

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

23.

568/15

Kishan Dei

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

24.

451/15

Chandro

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

25.

529/15

Janam Singh

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

26.

578/15

Yuvraj

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

27.

574/15

Devi Singh

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

3089

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28.

521/15

Sarita

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

29.

522/15

Suman Kumari

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

30.

581/15

Dhuri Devi

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

31.

526/15

Amar Dei

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

32.

558/15

Basant Singh

E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar

18-09-2017

33.

109/17

Dinesh Singh

Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur

23-09-2017

34.

103/15

Kaman Singh

E.E. HPPWD, Killar

04-09-2017

35.

155/15

Bhag Chand

E.E. HPPWD, Killar

04-09-2017

36.

377/15

Abdul Sitar

Dy. Director Horticulture

20-09-2017

37.

378/15

Kirpa Ram

Dy. Director Horticulture

20-09-2017

By order,

R. D. DHIMAN, IAS

Pr. Secretary ( Lab. & Emp.).

______________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref. No. 370/ 2015

Shri Sanjeet Kumar s/o Shri Pritam Chand, r/o Village and P.O. Chachian, Tehsil

Palampur, Distt. Kangra, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division Palampur, Distt. Kangra, H.P. . .Respondent.

05-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due

knowledge. It is 11.30 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

______________

05-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent.

3090

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Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It

is 2.35 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is

indicative of the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference

is disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and

further necessary action /publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:

05-09-2017

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

______________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref. No. 173/ 2014

Shri Subhash Chand s/o Sh. Hari Krishan, r/o V.P.O. Parour, Tehsil Palampur, District

Kangra, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi

Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Respondent.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due

knowledge. It is 11.33 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

(K. K. Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

______________

08-09-2017 Present:None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is

2.36 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of

the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is

disposed of for non-prosecution.

3091

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Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and

further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:

08-09-2017

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref. No. 176/ 2014

Shri Sudershan Kumar, s/o Shri Partap Chand, r/o Village Toran, P.O. Tikkar, Tehsil

Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi

Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Respondent.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due

knowledge. It is 11.32 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

______________

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is

2.37 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. Authorised Representative today is indicative of

the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is

disposed of for non-prosecution.

3092

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Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and

further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:

08-09-2017

(K. K.SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

______________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref. No. 178/ 2014

Shri Ramesh Chand s/o Sh. Kirpa Ram, r/o Village Ram Nagar, P.O. Tathail, Tehsil

Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi

Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Respondent.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due

knowledge. It is 11.30 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

(K. K.SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

______________

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is

2.35 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. Authorised Representative today is indicative of

the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is

disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

3093

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 16 tqykbZ] 2018@25 vk"kk<+] 1940

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and

further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:

08-09-2017

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

________________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref. No. 198/ 2014

Shri Vinod Kumar s/o Shri Amar Singh, r/o Village & P.O. Arla, Tehsil Palampur, District

Kangra, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi

Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Respondent.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due

knowledge. It is 11.34 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is

2.37 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of

the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is

disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

3094

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Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and

further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:

08-09-2017

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref : No. 218/ 2014

Shri Madan Lal s/o Shri Rajinder Kumar, r/o V.P.O. Ustehar, Tehsil Baijnath, District

Kangra, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi

Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Respondent.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due

knowledge. It is 11.35 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is

2.38 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of

the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is

disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

3095

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Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and

further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:

08-09-2017

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref. No. 190/ 2014

Shri Kuldeep Kumar s/o Sh. Jodha Ram, r/o Village-Dargil, P.O. Deogran, Tehsil

Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi

Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Respondent.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due

knowledge. It is 11.36 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is

2.39 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of

the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is

disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

3096

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 16 tqykbZ] 2018@25 vk"kk<+] 1940

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and

further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:

08-09-2017

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref: No. 207/ 2014

Shri Ashok Kumar s/o Shri Tara Chand, r/o Village Bhatpura, P.O. Thandol, Tehsil

Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi

Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Respondent.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due

knowledge. It is 11.38 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is

2.41 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of

the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is

disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

3097

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 16 tqykbZ] 2018@25 vk"kk<+] 1940

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and

further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:

08-09-2017

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref: No. 210/ 2014

Shri Vipan Kumar s/o Shri Malaha Singh, r/o V.P.O. Massal Tehsil & District Kangra, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi

Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur District Kangra, H.P.

. .Respondent.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due

knowledge. It is 11.40 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is

2.42 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of

the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is

disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

3098

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 16 tqykbZ] 2018@25 vk"kk<+] 1940

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and

further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:

08-09-2017

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref. No. 212/ 2014

Shri Punnu Ram s/o Shri Gatto Ram, r/o V.P.O. Jhikli Bheth, Tehsil Baijnath, District

Kangra, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi

Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Respondent.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due

knowledge. It is 11.42 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is

2.43 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of

the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is

disposed of for non-prosecution.

3099

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 16 tqykbZ] 2018@25 vk"kk<+] 1940

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and

further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:

08-09-2017

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref.: No. 217/ 2014

Shri Ashok Kumar s/o Sh. Sher Singh, r/o V.P.O. Dadh (Takka Khater), Tehsil

Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi

Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Respondent.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due

knowledge. It is 11.44 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is

2.44 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of

the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is

disposed of for non-prosecution.

3100

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 16 tqykbZ] 2018@25 vk"kk<+] 1940

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and

further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:

08-09-2017

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR

COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 690/2016

Date of Institution : 03-10-2016

Date of Decision : 11-9-2017

Smt. Rama Sharma d/o Smt. Subhadra Devi Sharma, r/o Ward No.3, Village and Post

Office Old Kangra, Tehsil and District Kangra, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Chairman, State Social Welfare Board, Thakur Vatika Khalini, Shimla-2

2.

The Chairperson, Family and Child Welfare Project Society, Near Purani Chungi,

Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

ORDER/AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the termination of the services of Smt. Rama Sharma d/o Smt. Subhadra Devi

Sharma, r/o Ward No.-3, Village and P.O. Old Kangra, Tehsil and District Kangra, H.P.

by the (1) The Chairman, State Social Welfare Board, Thakur Vatika Khalini, Shimla-2

(2) The Chairperson, Family and Child Welfare Project Society, Near Purani Chungi,

Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. during September, 2014 without complying with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount

of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and amount of compensation the above

aggrieved worker is entitled to from the above employers/Management?”

11.9.2017 Present: Miss Sarita Chaudhary, Adv. with petitioner Smt. Rama Sharma.

3101

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Smt. Rajni Vyas, Chairperson/President, Family and Child Welfare Project

Society, Rait, Tehsil Shahpur, District Kangra, H.P. in person.

Smt. Shail Bharti and Smt. Latika Thakur, Adv. Csl. for the respondents.

Case taken up for conciliation as a result of which parties have amicably resolved

their dispute qua present reference no.690/2016.

2.

Smt. Rajni Vyas, Chairperson/President, Family and Child Welfare Project Society,

Rait, Tehsil Shahpur, District Kangra, H.P. has testified on oath to have entered into compromise

with petitioner according to which petitioner would be appointed as teacher on monthly salary of

Rs.3,000/- (Rupees three thousand only) per month within a month after sanction from

government. She has further stated that a sum of Rs. 22,000/- being arrears of salary from

February 2014 to August, 2014 is to be paid to the petitioner/claimant out of which first

installment of Rs. 11,000/- (Rupees eleven thousand only) has been paid to the

claimant/petitioner today vide cheque No.057303 and remaining amount of Rs.11,000/

(Rupees eleven thousand only) would be paid to her before 31st October, 2017. Admitting

correctness of statement of respondent No.2 aforestated, petitioner/claimant has prayed for

disposal of claim petition. She has further acknowledged to have received a cheque of

Rs.11,000/- (Rupees eleven thousand only) i.e. first installment from respondent No. 2 today in

the Court. In view of the separate statement made by both the parties, this reference is

disposed as compromised. The parties shall however be bound by their statement recorded

today.

3.

The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

4.

A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

5.

File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open

Court today this 11th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

__________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 576/2015

Date of Institution : 04-12-2015

Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Shri Dhani Ram s/o Shri Ram Saran, r/o Village Kulal, P.O. Mindhal, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. . Petitioner.

Versus

3102

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The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Dhani Ram s/o Shri Ram

Saran, r/o Village Kulal, P.O. Mindhal, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

vide demand notice dated 06-12-2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of

service during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether

termination of services of Shri Dhani Ram s/o Shri Ram Saran, r/o Village Kulal,

P.O. Mindhal, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar

Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004,

without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and

justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1995 who continuously worked till October, 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil, District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/

artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required

to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability

of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had

terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's

notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation

was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that

respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the

services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income

besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time

and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of

petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman

from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go'

envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had

continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who appointed

in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash

3103

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Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Dhani Ram in 2004. The claimant/petitioner claimed

that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline

or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been

served upon him and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The

petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the

year 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully

employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have

committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays

for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2004. He

further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2004 along-with back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his

illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks

given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1995 to 2004 be counted 160

days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having

completed 10 years of service and as per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by

Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till

2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in

para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating

its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle

of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he

would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner

is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of

issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended

that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back

wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1

tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list

Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,

3104

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HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy

of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

06.12.2011 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. . OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Discussed

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,20,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged Beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is

dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident

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from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked

from 1996 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1995 to

October, 2004. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding

documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that

petitioner had been factually engaged in the year 1996 and not in 1995.

Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks

but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted

facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if

petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past

service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1995 to October, 2004. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2004 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he

had

served

respondent

with

due

diligence

and

had

spotless

service

record

as

respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him

but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has

also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before

this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and

petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a

failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for

industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by

filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever

he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or

omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand

taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The

petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used

to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit

breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner

so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable

evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of

abandonment.

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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 58 days in the year 1996, 59 days in 1997, 186 days in 1998, 145 days in 1999, 89

days in 2000, 121.5 days in 2001, 89 days in 2002, 127 days in 2003 and 103 days in 2004 and thus

a total of his service in 1996 to 2004 in 09 years he had worked for 977.5 days in his entire

service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1996, 1997 and 1999 to 2004 petitioner had

worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner,

Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to

alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the

petitioner had merely worked for 103 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months

from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to

meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all

required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As

such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after 2004 even at the time when junior persons were

reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of

the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas

petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and

even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work

which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has

placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419

in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of

the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in

case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement

junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.

On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 01.10.2015

of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against

respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the

petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled him for

regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004,

he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for

full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the

State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he

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had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained

not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he

had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as

daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North

East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in

which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had

held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom

income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self

employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use

being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated

here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court

was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had

income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not

gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between

petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of

Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it

may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not

entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen

and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

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power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of

material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

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a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after

6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

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Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief ”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he have lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the

petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations

when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has

certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four

situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of

reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be

appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that

petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave

notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra)

even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only

compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,

Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex

Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to

rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this

case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR

2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation

would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1)

Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by

ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which

provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3)

Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that

claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches.

That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner

cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding

relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the

claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by

reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize &

Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has

held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed

which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal

entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon

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Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was

involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the

department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although

subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by

respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made

applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by

the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances

is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors

which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09 years and

actually worked for 977.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner

were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute

by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on

06.12.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble

Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back

wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139)

FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay

and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined

on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as

Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also

the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous

judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which

are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the

ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in

judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director

Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals reference

under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High

Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged

on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government

in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be

attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made

in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was

working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled

worker. For the above said reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of

petitioner.

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23. I n view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,20,000/-

(Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner

is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that

amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award

failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till

its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs. 1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in

lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9%

per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the

peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open

Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_______________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR

COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 573/2015

Date of Institution : 04-12-2015

Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Shri Gian Chand s/o Shri Labh Singh, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

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Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Gian Chand s/o Shri Labh

Singh, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi) District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 25-01-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services

during September, 2001 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of

services of Shri Gian Chand S/O Shri Labh Singh, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H.

Killar (Pangi) District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2001, without complying the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount

of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved

workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage Beldar on muster roll basis in

the year 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made

in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as

the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil, District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/

artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required

to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability

of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had

terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's

notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation

was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that

respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the

services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income

besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time

and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of

petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman

from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go'

envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had

continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who appointed

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in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash

Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Gian Chand in 2004. The claimant/petitioner claimed

that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline

or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been

served upon him and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The

petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the

year 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully

employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have

committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays

for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2005. He

further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2005 along-with back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his

illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks

given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1996 to October, 2005 be

counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.

01.01.2004 having completed 10 years of service and as per the policy of HP Govt. in

pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On

merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather

clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1996 who remained

engaged till 2001 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work

at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically

pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year

as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to

the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned

in para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating

its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle

of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2001 he

would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner

is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of

issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended

that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back

wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1

tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list

Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D, copy of Notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the

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evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive

Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex.

RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

25.01.2012 qua his termination of service during September, 2001 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2001 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. . OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Discussed

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.80,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged Beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute

with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from

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1996 till 2001 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1996 to October,

2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary

evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had

been factually engaged till the year 2001 and not upto October, 2005. Admittedly, the reference

of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record,

claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for

relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he

had

served

respondent

with

due

diligence

and

had

spotless

service

record

as

respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him

but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has

also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before

this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and

petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a

failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for

industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by

filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever

absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the

respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the

other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in

between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been

deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did

not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of

Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by

respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

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14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 165.5 days in the year 1996, 122 days in 1997, 111 days in 1998, 123 days in 1999,

132 days in 2000 and 121 days in 2001 and thus a total of his service in 1996 to 2001 in 06

years he had worked for 774.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the

years 1997 to 2001 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference

from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine

its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B that in the year 2001 the petitioner had merely worked for 121 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had

not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous

service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice

envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated

the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after 2001 even at the time when junior persons were

reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of

the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas

petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and

even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work

which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has

placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419

in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of

the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in

case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement

junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.

On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 01.10.2015

of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against

respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the

petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him for

regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2001, he

had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full

back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State

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has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had

cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not

gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had

maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as

daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North

East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in

which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had

held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom

income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self

employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use

being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated

here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court

was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had

income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not

gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner

and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G

and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus,

applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to

hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the

period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen

and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

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Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of

material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the Conciliation Officer and the State Government to

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make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the

order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the

appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the

dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government

had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that

there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to

the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2001 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section

5-Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Labaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calender year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D. Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant- employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

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Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for claimant/

petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash Kumar Paul

vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may

pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on

justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation

where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and

no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge

duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to

discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may

justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that has to be

supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be

followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the

aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker may be

awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly

appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met

requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation

which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment

of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak

Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs.

General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments

652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner

on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has

relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through

regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of

petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal

of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of

Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner

interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of

Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652

(SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied

relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it

was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the

court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not

be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by

ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373

titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned,

the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come

First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and

retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the

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facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former

closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no

closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when

there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of

Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum

of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 06

years and actually worked for 774.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in 2001 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised

industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about eleven years i.e. demand notice was

given on 25.01.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments

of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or

for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment

2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter

of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely

declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through

these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to

the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex

Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon

the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint

Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals

reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble

High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been

challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the

Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment

would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation

qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person

who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate

unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim

of petitioner.

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23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees

eighty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the

peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

______________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 532/2015

Date of Institution : 21-11-2015

Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Sukh Dayal, r/o Village and Post Office Mouch, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

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The Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Sukh

Dayal, r/o Village and Post Office Mouch, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P. vide demand notice dated 06.10.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of

services during October, 2002 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether

termination of services of Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Sukh Dayal, r/o Village and Post Office

Mouch, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D.

Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2002, without

complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If

not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the

above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage Beldar on muster roll basis in

the year 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2002 with the respondent. Averments made

in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as

the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/

artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required

to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing

one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment

compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is

contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while

disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of

income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the

respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when

the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of

new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come,

First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department

had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who

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appointed in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000,

Prakash Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Devi Singh in 2004. The claimant/petitioner

claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of

indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-

sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been

afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal

termination from month of October, 2002 till the date of institution of present claim petition who

had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section

25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution

of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the

respondent in the month of October, 2002. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f.

month of October, 2002 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as

petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has

also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service

of petitioner between 1996 to October, 2002 be counted 160 days continuous service and

regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2004 having completed 10 years of

service and as per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of

H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On

merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather

clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1996 who remained

engaged till 2002 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work

at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically

pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year

as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent

to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner

mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and

no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating

its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle

of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2002 he

would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner

is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also

contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,

question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time,

there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It

is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled

for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/

proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

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PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy

of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

06.10.2011 qua his termination of service during October, 2002 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,

2002 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Discussed

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,50,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged Beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1996 continuously worked till October, 2002 with the

respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

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reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim

of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for

relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to October, 2002. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2002 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he

had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/

department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even

while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also

explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this

Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and

petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a

failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for

industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by

filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even

after October, 2002. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission

on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken

by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,

on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the

job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had

been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that

petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable

evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of

abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 177 days in the year 1996, 166 days in 1997 170 days in 1998, 150 days in 1999, 125

days in 2000, 133 days in 2001 and 125 days in 2002 and thus a total of his service in 1996 to

2002 in 07 years he had worked for 1046 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that

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except the years 1999 to 2002 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no

reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is

to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2002 the petitioner had merely worked for 125 days

and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner

had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous

service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice

envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the

provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were

junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that

petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time

when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the

affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined

service in 1996 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity

to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of

the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs.

S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of

Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have

worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement

junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.

On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 22.09.2015

of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against

respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the

petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 07 years which entitled him for

regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

October, 2002, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was

entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A.

for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted

that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having

remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in

which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been

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working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex

Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10

SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas

Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment

wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment

or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated,

the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case

since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were

sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be

it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour

Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had

income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not

gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner

and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G

and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus,

applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to

hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the

period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/

Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the

employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

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14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra) 1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of

material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if

raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real

prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can

be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay

in shown to be existing, the tribunal, Labour Court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

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delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2002 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section

5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after

6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief.

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21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the

petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations

when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has

certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four

situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of

reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be

appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that

petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave

notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra)

even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only

compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,

Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex

Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to

rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on

the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon‟ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow

University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR

2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was

not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC

supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be

sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R.

502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for

petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that

Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court

Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner

cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the

law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied

relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in

hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably

indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR

2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees

Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company

principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial

Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling

petitioner for retrenchment

compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case

in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this

court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged

petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of

work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was

engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.

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22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/

circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and

21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as

Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh

provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep

in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by

the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances

is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors

which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 07 years and

actually worked for 1046 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner

were disengaged in October, 2002 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial

dispute by issuance of demand notice after about nine years i.e. demand notice was given on

06.10.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble

Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back

wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139)

FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay

and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined

on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as

Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also

the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous

judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which

are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the

ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in

judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director

Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals reference

under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High

Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged

on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government

in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be

attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made

in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was

working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled

worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of

petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/-

(Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is

entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear

that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award

failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till

its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

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Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the

compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of

the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum

on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_______________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR

COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 531/2015

Date of Institution

: 21-11-2015

Date of Decision

: 18-9-2017

Shri Dharampal s/o Shri Charan Dass, r/o Village and Post Office Kumar, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. . Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

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For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Dharampal s/o Shri Charan

Dass, r/o Village and Post Office Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P. vide demand notice dated 06.10.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of

services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether

termination of the services of Shri Dharampal s/o Shri Charan Dass, r/o Village and Post

Office Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Engineer, I.&P.H./

H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September,

2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal

and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/

artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required

to be counted as 'continuous service' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability

of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had

terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's

notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation

was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that

respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the

services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income

besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time

and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of

petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman

from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go'

envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had

continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who appointed

in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000,

Prakash

Chand

in

2001,

Budhi

Ram in

2003

and

Dharam

Pal

in

2004.

The

claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal

termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity

of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained

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unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of

institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus

entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of

statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral

order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. He further

prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2005 alongwith back wages,

seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of

his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks

given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1996 to October, 2005 be counted

160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2004

having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law

settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On

merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather

clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1996 who remained

engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work

at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically

pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year

as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to

the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned

in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the

job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.

Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own

sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per

direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not

violated the principle of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been

terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that

after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and

laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the

respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the

same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his

termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus

not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/

proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy

of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

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8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

06.10.2011 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. . OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief :

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No. 1

: Discussed

Issue No. 2

: Yes

Issue No. 3

: Discussed

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,10,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged Beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute

with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from

1996 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1996 to October,

2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary

evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had

been factually engaged w.e.f. 1996 to 2004 and not for 1996 to October, 2005. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim

of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for

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relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub-Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he

had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/

department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even

while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also

explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this

Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and

petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a

failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for

industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by

filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever

he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the

respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the

other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in

between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been

deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did

not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of

Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by

respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 82.5 days in the year 1996, 140 days in 1997, 160 days in 1998, 140 days in 1999,

106 days in 2000, 116 days in 2001, 111 in 2002, and 108 days in 2004 and thus a total of his

service in 1996 to 2004 in 08 years he had worked for 963.5 days in his entire service period.

Be it noticed that except the years 1996, 1997 and 1999 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more

than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of

artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal

termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner

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had merely worked for 108 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from

the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet

requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such,

the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior

persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of

Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No. 10 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,

1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-

G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked

for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement

junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.

On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 22.09.2015

of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against

respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the

petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 07 years which entitled him for

regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy.

D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has

admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of

having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-

examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as

he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M.

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Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.

Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also

include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from

employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources

from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment

of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual

pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was

gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case

has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent

was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment.

Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated

that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view

of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it

may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not

entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen

and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

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14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of

material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, Labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

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delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D. Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after

6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

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21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the

petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations

when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has

certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four

situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of

reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be

appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that

petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave

notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra)

even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only

compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,

Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex

Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to

rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this

case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR

2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would

be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R.

502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for

petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that

Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court

Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner

cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the

law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied

relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in

hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably

indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR

2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees

Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of

'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and

retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since

the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former

closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no

closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when

there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of

Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.

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22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum

of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 08

years and actually worked for 963.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised

industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand notice was

given on 06.10.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments

of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or

for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment

2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter

of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely

declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through

these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to

the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex

Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon

the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint

Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals

reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble

High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been

challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the

Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment

would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of

observation qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found

to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the

petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches

would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,10,000/-

(Rupees one lakh ten thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is

entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear

that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award

failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till

its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

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Issue No. 4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,10,000/- (Rupees one lakh ten thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation

so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum

on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 569/2015

Date of Institution : 04.12.2015

Date of Decision : 18.9.2017

Shri Gurudev w/o Shri Deena Nath, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Gurudev s/o Shri Deena Nath,

r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi) District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice

dated 25-01-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during

September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of services

of Shri Gurudev s/o Shri Deena Nath, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi),

District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004, without complying the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled

to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1993 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way

of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing

one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment

compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is

contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while

disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source

of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the

respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when

the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of

new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come

First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department

had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Gurdev who

appointed in 1994, Sher Singh in 1996, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Baldev in 2000,

Trilok Chand in 2002 and Hari Ram in 2003. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless

service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his

conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him

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and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner

also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the year

2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully

employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have

committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays

for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2005. He

further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2005 along-with back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his

illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given

time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1993 to 2005 be counted 160 days

continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having

completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by

Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till

2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in

para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating

its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle

of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he

would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner

is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of

issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended

that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back

wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/

proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D, Copy of notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the

evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive

Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex.

RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

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8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

25.01.2012 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. . OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief :

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No. 1

: Discussed

Issue No. 2

: Yes

Issue No. 3

: Discussed

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,50,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is

dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident

from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked

from 1994 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1993 to

October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding

documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that

petitioner had been factually engaged w.e.f. 1994 to 2004 and not from 1993 to October, 2005.

Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only

with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on

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record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is

entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service

benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1993 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he

had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/

department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even

while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also

explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this

Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and

petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a

failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for

industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by

filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever

he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the

respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the

other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in

between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been

deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did

not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of

Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by

respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 31 days in the year 1994, 138 days in 1995, 137 days in 1996, 30 days in 1997, 119

days in 1998, 108 days in 1999, 146 days in 2000, 117.5 days in 2001, 120 days in 2002, 112

days in 2003 and 82 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2004 in 11 years he

had worked for 1140.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not

worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner,

Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to

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alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the

petitioner had merely worked for 82 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months

from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet

requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all

required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As

such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after 2004 even at the time when junior persons were

reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of

the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas

petitioner was senior from these co- workers having joined service in 1994 was terminated and

even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work

which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has

placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419

in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of

the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in

case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify

engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by

Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order

dated 01.10.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as

against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour

of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner

is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled him

for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004, he

had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full

back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State

has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had

cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not

gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had

maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as

daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North

East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in

which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had

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held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom

income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self

employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use

being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated

here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court

was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had

income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not

gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner

and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section

25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment.

Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be

erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen

and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

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14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or

unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay

in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for

adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming

rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, Labour Court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

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delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon‟ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963-Section

5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in celendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after

6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

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21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the

petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations

when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has

certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four

situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of

reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be

appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that

petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave

notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 supra)

even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only

compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,

Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex

Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to

rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this

case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR

2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would

be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R.

502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for

petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that

Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court

Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner

cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the

law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied

relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in

hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably

indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR

2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees

Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of

'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and

retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts

of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of

unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of

company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of

the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no

closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon

Machenize cannot be made applicable.

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22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by

the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances

is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors

which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 11 years and

actually worked for 1140.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner

were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute

by issuance of demand notice after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on 25.01.2012.

Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex

Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back

wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013

(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of

delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely

declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through

these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the

petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid

down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint

Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals

reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble

High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been

challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the

Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not

be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts

made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who

was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled

worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of

petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/-

(Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is

entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear

that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award

failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till

its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

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Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation

so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum

on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

________________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR

COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 562/2015

Date of Institution : 04.12.2015

Date of Decision : 18.9.2017

Shri Dhano s/o Shri Man Singh, r/o Village Kuthah, P.O. Dharwas, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. . Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H. Killar (Pangi), District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Dhano s/o Shri Man Singh,

r/o Village Kuthah, P.O. Dharwas, Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

vide demand notice dated 28-05-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of

services during October, 1997 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether

termination of services of Shri Dhano s/o Shri Man Singh, r/o Village Kuthah, P.O.

Dharwas, Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division,

H.P.P.W.D./I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during October, 1997, without

complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not,

what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above

aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1991 who continuously worked till October, 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/

artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required

to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability

of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had

terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's

notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation

was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that

respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the

services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income

besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time

and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of

petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman

from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go'

envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had

continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Gurdev who appointed

in 1994, Sher Singh in 1996, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Baldev in 2000, Trilok

Chand in 2002, and Hari Ram in 2003. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless

service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his

conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him

and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner

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also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month

of October, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere

gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to

have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H

of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner

prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month

of October, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2004

alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained

unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period

of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between

1991 to October, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of

petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2001 having completed 10 years of service and a s per the policy of HP

Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is

entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1991 who remained engaged till

1997 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in

para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating

its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle

of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1997 he

would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner

is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of

issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended

that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back

wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/

proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy

of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

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8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

28.5.2012 qua his termination of service during October, 1997 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,

1997 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief :

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No. 1: : Discussed

Issue No. 2 : : Yes

Issue No. 3: : Discussed

Issue No. 4: : No

Relief: : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.35,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is

dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident

from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked

from 1991 till 1997 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1991 to

October, 2004. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding

documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that

petitioner had been factually engaged till 1997 and not upto 2004. Admittedly, the reference of

appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's

termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner

requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement

and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

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12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub-Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1991 to October, 2004. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2004 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he

had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/

department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even

while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also

explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this

Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and

petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a

failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for

industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by

filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever

he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the

respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the

other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in

between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been

deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did

not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of

Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by

respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 90 days in the year 1991, 47 days in 1993, 31 days in 1994, 10 days in 1995, 20

days in 1996 and 80 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1991 to 1997 in 06 years he

had worked for 278 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not

worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla

on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged

illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1997 the

petitioner had merely worked for 80 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months

from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet

requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such,

the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

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15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for

the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document

have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner.

Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called

upon to join for service at any time after October, 1997 even at the time when junior persons were

reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G

of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No. 10 of the affidavit were retained

whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,

1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked

for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement

junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.

On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 05.10.2015

of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against

respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the

petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 06 years which entitled him for

regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

October, 1997, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld.

Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has

admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of

having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-

examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as

he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M.

Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.

Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also

include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from

employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources

from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment

of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual

pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner

was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s

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case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the

respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful

employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it

cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full

back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and

employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched

without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully

employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

(2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus

would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the

respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen

and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S. M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

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employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of

material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as

gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief

from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, Labour Court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

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by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1997 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section

5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after

6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon‟ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

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based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the

petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations

when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has

certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four

situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of

reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be

appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that

petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave

notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra)

even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only

compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,

Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex

Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to

rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this

case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR

2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation

would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1)

Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by

ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which

provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3)

Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that

claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches.

That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner

cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding

relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the

claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by

reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize &

Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held

on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated

Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for

retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are

different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in

case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of

HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to

funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent

which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

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aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum

of Rs.1 lakh alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 06

years and actually worked for 278 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in October, 1997 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised

industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about fifteen years i.e. demand notice was

given on 28.5.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments

of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in

view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for

petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner

could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case.

I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not

declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of

Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents

has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as

Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the

judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has

been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when

reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference

made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said

judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of

observation qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an

educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is

an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not

eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 35,000/-

(Rupees thirty five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is

entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that

amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award

failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award

till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

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Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs. 35,000/- (Rupees thirty five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the

peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_______________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 575/2015

Date of Institution : 04-12-2015

Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Shri Roop Dass s/o Shri Mangal Dass, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Roop Dass s/o Shri Mangal

Dass, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 25-01-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services

during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, whether termination of

services of Shri Roop Dass s/o Shri Mangal Dass, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H.

Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004, without complying the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount

of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved

workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1994 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way

of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing

one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment

compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is

contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while

disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source

of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the

respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when

the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of

new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come

First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department

had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who

appointed in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000,

Prakash Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Gurdev in 1994. The claimant/petitioner

claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of

indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-

sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been

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afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination in the year 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had

been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section

25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution

of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the

respondent in the year 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2005

along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained

unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of

intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between

1994 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service

of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP

Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner

is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On

merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather

clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained

engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work

at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically

pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year

as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to

the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned

in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating

its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para no.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour

Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last

come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would

have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is

stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of

issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended

that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back

wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1

tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list

Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D, copy of Notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the

evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive

Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex.

RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

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8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

25.01.2012 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. . OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief :

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No. 1

: Discussed

Issue No. 2

: Yes

Issue No. 3

: Discussed

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute

with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from

1997 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1994 to October,

2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary

evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had

been factually engaged w.e.f. 1997 till 2004 and not from 1994 to October, 2005. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim

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of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for

relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1994 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he

had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/

department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even

while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also

explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this

Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and

petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a

failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for

industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by

filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever

he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the

respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the

other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in

between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been

deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did

not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of

Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by

respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 81 days in the year 1997, 169 days in 1998, 106 days in 1999, 146 days in 2000,

117.5 days in 2001, 120 days in 2002, 142 days in 2003 and 104 days in 2004 and thus a total of

his service in 1997 to 2004 in 08 years he had worked for 985.5 days in his entire service period.

Be it noticed that except the years 1997 and 1999 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160

days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of

artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal

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termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner

had merely worked for 104 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from

the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet

requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such,

the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after 2001 even at the time when junior persons were

reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of

the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas

petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1997 was terminated and

even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work

which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has

placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419

in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of

the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in

case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement

junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.

On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 01.10.2015

of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against

respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the

petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him for

regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004, he

had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full

back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State

has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had

cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not

gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had

maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as

daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North

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East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in

which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had

held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom

income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self

employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use

being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated

here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court

was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had

income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not

gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner

and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G

and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus,

applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to

hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the

period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the Learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen

and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

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Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court). In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of

material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the

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criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the

workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman

approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour

Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the

respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he

approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered

to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication.

Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute

and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been

held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial

Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section

5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

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of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for claimant/

petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash Kumar Paul

vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may

pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on

justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation

where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and

no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge

duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to

discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may

justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that has to be

supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be

followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the petitioner with the

aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker may be

awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly

appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met

requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation

which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment

of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak

Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs.

General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgments

652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner

on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has

relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through

regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of

petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal

of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of

Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner

interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of

Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652

(SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied

relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it

was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the

court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not

be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by

ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373

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titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned,

the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment

was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of

case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of

unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of

company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of

the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no

closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon

Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum

of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 08

years and actually worked for 985.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised

industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about 7½ years i.e. demand notice was

given on 25.01.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to

judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in

view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for

petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner

could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of

the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given

by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer,

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I

have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not

declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of

Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents

has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as

Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the

judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has

been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when

reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference

made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said

judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of

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observation qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an

educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is

an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not

eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-

(Rupees one lakh only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which

the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the

peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 524/2015

Date of Institution : 21-11-2015

Date of Decision : 18-09-2017

Shri Khem Ram s/o Shri Sant Ram, r/o Village Kironi Mouch, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. . Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Khem Ram s/o Shri Sant

Ram, r/o Village Kironi Mouch, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

before the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 06.10.2011 regarding his alleged illegal

termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not,

whether termination of services of Shri Khem Ram s/o Shri Sant Ram, r/o Village Kironi

Mouch, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer,

I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during

September, 2004, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,

is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits

and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1991 who continuously worked till October, 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

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Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way

of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing

one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment

compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is

contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while

disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source

of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the

respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when

the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of

new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come

First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department

had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Tek Chand who

appointed in 1999, Baldev in 2000, Trilok Chand in 2002 and Hari Ram in 2003. The claimant/

petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any

act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no

charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since

his illegal termination in the year 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who

had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly

alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section

25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of

Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/

retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service

in the year 2004 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as

petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has

also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire

service of petitioner between 1991 to October, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service

and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2001 having completed 10 years of

service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P.

and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1991 who remained engaged till

2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in

para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating

its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle

of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he

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would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner

is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of

issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended

that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back

wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/

proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy

of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

06.10.2011 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. . OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. . OPP.

3.

If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief :

9.

For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No. 1

: Discussed

Issue No. 2

: Yes

Issue No. 3

: Discussed

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,20,000/-

per operative part of award.

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REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1991 continuously worked till September, 2004 with the

respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim

of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for

relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1991 to September, 2004. He has also stated on

oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating

his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him

and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004

by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H

of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served

respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had

never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching

petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not

approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there

existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved

before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was

submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by

petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where

direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred

and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even

after September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission

on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

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correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken

by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,

on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the

job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had

been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that

petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable

evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of

abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 58 days in the year 1991, 154 days in 1992, 25 days in 1994, 121 days in 1999, 148

days in 2000, 119 days in 2001, 169 days in 2002, 156 days in 2003 and 119 days in 2004 and

thus a total of his service in 1991 to 2004 in 09 years he had worked for 1069 days in his entire

service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1991, 1992, 1994, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 and

2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings

only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B

that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 119 days and thus immediately in

preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service

of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it

was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the

Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after 2001 even at the time when junior persons were

reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of

the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas

petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1991 was terminated and

even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work

which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has

placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419

in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of

the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in

case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement

junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.

On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 22.9.2015

of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against

respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the

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petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him

for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

16. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004,

he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for

full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the

State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he

had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained

not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he

had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as

daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North

East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in

which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had

held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom

income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self

employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use

being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated

here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court

was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had

income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not

gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between

petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of

Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it

may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not

entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen

and the employer.

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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court). In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of

material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the

criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the

workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman

approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour

Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the

respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he

approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered

to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication.

Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute

and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been

held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial

Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section

5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

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years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for claimant/

petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash Kumar Paul

vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may

pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on

justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation

where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and

no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge

duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to

discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may

justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that has to be

supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be

followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the petitioner with the

aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker may be

awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly

appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met

requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation

which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment

of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak

Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs.

General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments

652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner

on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has

relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through

regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of

petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal

of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of

Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner

interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of

Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652

(SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied

relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it

was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the

court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not

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be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by

ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373

titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned,

the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come

First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and

retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts

of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of

unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of

company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when

there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of

Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/

circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and

21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as

Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh

provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep

in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum

of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09

years and actually worked for 1069 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised

industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand notice was

given on 06.10.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments

of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or

for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment

2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter

of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely

declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014

titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through

these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to

the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex

Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon

the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint

Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals

reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble

High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been

challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the

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Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment

would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation

qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person

who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate

unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim

of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/-

(Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner

is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that

amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award

failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till

its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in

lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9%

per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the

peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 20/2016

Date of Institution : 20-1-2016

Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Smt. Tul Dei w/o Shri Shiv Dass, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. . Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District

Chamba, H.P.

. . Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the termination of services of Smt. Tul Dei w/o Shri Shiv Dass, r/o Village

Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer,

Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during August,

2004, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and

justified? If not, keeping in view the delay of more than 7 years in raising the industrial

dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation

the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1995 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way

of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally

without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no

retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated.

It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act

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while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no

source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the

respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when

the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of

new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come

First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department

had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who

appointed in 1996, Balwant in 1996, Prakash Chand in 2001, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in

2004, Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she

had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or

negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had

been served upon her and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded

to him. The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal

termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition

who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages.

Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-

F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of

Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/

retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. She further prayed for

reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including

continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time

and again during entire service of petitioner between 1995 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days

continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having

completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by

Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On

merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather

clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained

engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work

at her own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been

categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each

calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given

by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to

petitioner mentioned in para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour

Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On

the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had

left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.

Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own

sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per

direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not

violated the principle of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been

terminated in 2004 she would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that

after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and

laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the

respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the

same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her

termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus

not entitled for back wages.

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5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1

tendered/proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list

Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D, copy of notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the

evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive

Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex.

RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 19.12.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by respondent during August,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of

petitioner as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief:

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: Discussed

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.90,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1, 2 and 4 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own

and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is

dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident

from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked

from 1997 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1995 to

October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding

documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that

petitioner had been factually engaged w.e.f. 1997 to 2004 and not from 1995 to October, 2005.

Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but

only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts

on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is

entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service

benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1995 to October, 2005. She has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25- F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and

thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she

had

served

respondent

with

due

diligence

and

had

spotless

service

record

as

respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but

even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also

explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this

Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner

had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure

report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial

dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing

CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever

she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or

omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand

taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The

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petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used

to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit

breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so

that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable

evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea

of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 102 days in the year 1997, 59 days in 1998, 156 days in 1999, 129 days in 2000, 45

days in 2001, 117 days in 2002, 122 days in 2003 and 82 days in 2004 and thus a total of her

service in 1997 to 2004 in 08 years she had worked for 812 days in her entire service period. Be

it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference

from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine

its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 82 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had

not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous

service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice

envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated

the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2004 even at the time when junior

persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of

Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1997

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,

1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked

for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement

junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.

On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 19.11.2015

of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against

respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the

petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled her for

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regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in August,

2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled

for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the

State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she

had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not

gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had

maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as well as she has been working as

daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North

East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in

which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had

held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income

is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self

employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use

being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from her agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain her and her family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here

that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was

not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income,

she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from

agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully

employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it

is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and

respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and

Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus,

applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold

that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period

she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the Learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen

and the employer.

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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court). In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability

of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal.

The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages

instead of full back wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,

since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had

rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there

was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the

Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon‟ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been

held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial

Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section

5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

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during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after

6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the

petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations

when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has

certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four

situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of

reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be

appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that

petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave

notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra)

even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only

compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,

Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex

Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to

rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this

case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR

2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation

would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1)

Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by

ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which

provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3)

Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that

claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches.

That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner

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cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding

relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the

claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by

reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize &

Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has

held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed

which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling

petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case

are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas

in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department

of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject

to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent

which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made

applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by

the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances

is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors

which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 08 years and

actually worked for 812 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner

were disengaged in August, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial

dispute by issuance of demand notice after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on

25.3.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of

Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement

or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of

judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on

the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be

solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in

this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble

Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through

these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the

petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid

down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint

Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals

reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble

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High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been

challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the

Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not

be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts

made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who

was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled

worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of

petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 90,000/-

(Rupees ninety thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in

the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues No. 1, 2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.3:

23. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.90,000/- (Rupees ninety thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the

peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 508/2015

Date of Institution

: 09-11-2015

Date of Decision

: 18-9-2017

Shri Des Raj s/o Shri Shiv Lal, r/o Village Bishthow, P.O. Luj, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Des Raj s/o Shri Shiv Lal, r/o

Village Bishthow, P.O. Luj, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

vide demand notice dated 30-12-2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services

during year, 2000 suffers from delay and laches? If not, whether termination of services

of Shri Des Raj s/o Shri Shiv Lal, r/o Village Bishthow, P.O. Luj, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Killar

(Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during year, 2000, without complying the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled

to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in

the year 1984 who continuously worked till 2000 with the respondent. Averments made in the

petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way

of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing

one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment

compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is

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contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while

disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source

of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the

respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when

the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of

new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come

First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department

had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Suraj Ram who

appointed in 1997, Chunku Ram in 2000, Budhi Ram in 2003, and Dev Raj in 2007. The

claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted

for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal

termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity

of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained

unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the year 2001 till the date of institution of present

claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back

wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of

Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14

and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/

retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2000. He further prayed for reinstatement in service

in the year 2000 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as

petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has

also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire

service of petitioner between 1984 to 2000 be counted 160 days continuous service and

regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.1994 having completed 10 years of service

and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to

any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till

2000 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in

para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating

its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle

of 'Last come First go. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2000 he

would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner

is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of

issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended

that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back

wages.

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5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/

proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of demand notice dated Ex.

PW1/B, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/C, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/D1 and D2

and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner,

respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD

Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of

mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 29.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

30.12.2011 qua his termination of service during year, 2000 by respondent suffers

from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during year, 2000

is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief:

9.

For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Discussed

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.50,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is

dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident

from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked

from 1996 till 2000 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1984 to

2000. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary

evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had

been factually engaged in the year 1996 and not in 1984. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate

govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from

service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be

adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1984 to 2000. He has also stated on oath that no

notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service

and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus

his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in 2000 by oral order had

engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this,

the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus

respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was

obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent

with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called

any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner

from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching

the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road

between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour

Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the

Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the

petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for

making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was

satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever

he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the

respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the

other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in

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between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been

deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did

not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of

Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by

respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 22 days in the year 1996, 36 days in 1997, 184 days in 1998, 137 days in 1999 and

60 days in 2000 and thus a total of his service in 1996 to 2000 in 05 years he had worked for 439

days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000

petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only

with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in

the year 2000 the petitioner had merely worked for 60 days and thus immediately in preceding 12

calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160

days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was

not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of

the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of

the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document

have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner.

Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called

upon to join for service at any time after 2000 even at the time when junior persons were

reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of

the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas

petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and

even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work

which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has

placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419

in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of

the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in

case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement

junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.

On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/C the order dated 27.8.2015

of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against

respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the

petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 05 years which entitled him for

regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

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it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2000, he

had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full

back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State

has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had

cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not

gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had

maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as

daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North

East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in

which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had

held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom

income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self

employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use

being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated

here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court

was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had

income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not

gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner

and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section

25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment.

Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be

erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the Learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen

and the employer.

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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra) 1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court). In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or

unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay

in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for

adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming

rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if

raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real

prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can

be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay

in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2000 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been

held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial

Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section

5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

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during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the

petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations

when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has

certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four

situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of

reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be

appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that

petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave

notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 supra)

even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only

compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,

Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex

Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to

rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this

case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR

2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation

would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1)

Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by

ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which

provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3)

Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that

claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches.

That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner

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cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding

relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the

claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by

reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize &

Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has

held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed

which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal

entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon

Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was

involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the

department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although

subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by

respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made

applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by

the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances

is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which

have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 05 years and actually

worked for 439 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were

disengaged in 2000 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by

issuance of demand notice after about eleven years i.e. demand notice was given on

30.12.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of

Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement

or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of

judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on

the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be

solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in

this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble

Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through

these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the

petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid

down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint

Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals

reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble

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High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been

challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the

Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not

be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts

made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who

was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled

worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of

petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees

fifty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the

peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref . No. : 568/2015

Date of Institution : 04-12-2015

Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Smt. Kishan Dei w/o Shri Naveen Kumar d/o Shri Madho Lal, r/o Village Thandal, P.O.

Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I&PH Killar (Pangi) District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Kishan Dei w/o Shri Naveen

Kumar d/o Shri Madho Lal, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi),

District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 28-02-2012 regarding her alleged illegal

termination of services during October, 2003 suffers from delay and latches? If not,

whether termination of services of Smt. Kishan Dei w/o Shri Naveen Kumar d/o

Shri Madho Lal, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by

the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

during October, 2003, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the

above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1997 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way

of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing

one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment

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compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is

contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while

disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source

of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the

respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when

the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of

new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come,

First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department

had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Prakash Chand who

appointed in 2001, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004, Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj

Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who

never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even

at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and the at the

same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that

she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 2005

till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed

and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed

violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting

aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005.

She further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2005 along-with back

wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the

date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional

breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1997 to October, 2005

be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.

01.01.2005 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to

law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1998 who remained engaged till

2003 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in

para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating

its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour

Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last

come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2003 she would have

definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to

be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since

the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of

notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for

charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner

was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

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5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/

proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy

of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil

received on 28.2.2012 qua her termination of service during October, 2003 by

respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,

2003 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Discussed

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.30,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own

and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is

dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident

from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked

from 1998 till 2003 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1997 to

October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding

documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that

petitioner had been factually engaged w.e.f. 1998 to 2003 and not from 1997 to October, 2005.

Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only

with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on

record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is

entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service

benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1997 to October, 2005. She has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and

thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she

had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/

department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while

retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason

for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there

existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before

the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted

and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by

petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where

direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had

occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever

she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or

omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand

taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The

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petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used

to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit

breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so

that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable

evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea

of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 26 days in the year 1998, 26 days in 1999, 11 days in 2000, 53.5 days in 2001, 27

days in 2002 and 29 days in 2003 and thus a total of her service in 1998 to 2003 in 06 years she

had worked for 172.5 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked

for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the

point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal

termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2003 the petitioner had

merely worked for 29 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month

of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of

law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent

to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is

held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1998 or thereafter. Some of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document

have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner.

Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called

upon to join for service at any time after October, 2003 even at the time when junior persons were

reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G

of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained

whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,

1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked

for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement

junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.

On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 01.10.2015

of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against

respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the

petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 05 years which entitled her for

regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

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accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

October, 2003, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy.

D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has

admitted that she had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of

having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-

examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as

well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs.

M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.

Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also

include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from

employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely

because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged

in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her

livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be

entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of

workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was

illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although

remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully

employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being

terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the Learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/

Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the

employer.

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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court). In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability

of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal.

The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages

instead of full back wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,

since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had

rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there

was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the

Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon‟ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been

held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial

Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section

5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

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during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after

6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the

petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations

when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has

certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four

situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of

reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be

appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that

petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave

notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra)

even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only

compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,

Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex

Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to

rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this

case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR

2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation

would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1)

Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by

ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which

provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3)

Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that

claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches.

That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner

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cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding

relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/

petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement.

In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.

vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure

of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated

Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for

retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are

different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in

case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of

HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to

funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent

which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum

of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about

06 years and actually worked for 172.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services

of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2003 who worked as non skilled worker and had

raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about 8 ½ years i.e. demand notice

was given on 28.2.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to

judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in

view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for

petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment

of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the

rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate

as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant

Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan

Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case

as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the

basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A.

representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in

AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.

I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial

Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction

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under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate

unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in

challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and

circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra,

claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in

case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the above said

reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees

thirty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4:

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the

peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 451/2015

Date of Institution

: 29-10-2015

Date of Decision

: 18-9-2017

Smt. Chandro w/o Shri Baldev, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, I&PH/HPPWD Division, Killar Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Chandro w/o Shri Baldev, r/o

Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

vide demand notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of

services during October 2005 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination

of the services of Smt. Chandro w/o Shri Baldev, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division,

Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October 2005 without complying the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what

amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above

aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/

artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required

to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability

of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had

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terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's

notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation

was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that

respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the

services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income

besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the respondent time

and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of

petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman

from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go'

envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had

continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Chuni Lal who

appointed in 1997, Tek Chand in 1999, Bhag Dei in 2000, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004,

Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or

negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been

served upon her and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him.

The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination

from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been

nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging

respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and

Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India,

the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/ retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of October, 2005. She further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

October, 2005 along with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed

that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between 1996 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the

service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2004 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy

of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief

petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till

2005 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in

para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating

its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour

Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last

come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 she would

have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is

stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of

issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

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necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended

that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back

wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1

tendered/proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of demand notice

dated Ex. PW1/B, copy of order dated 27.8.15 Ex. PW1/C and closed evidence. On the other

hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R.

Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays

chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the

evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 16.2.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

2.2.2012 qua her termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October,

2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief :

9.

For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Discussed

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,30,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

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10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1996 continuously worked till October, 2005 with the

respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own

and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim

of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for

relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to October, 2005. She has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25- F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and

thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she

had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/

department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while

retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason

for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there

existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before

the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted

and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by

petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where

direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had

occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even

after October, 2005. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission

on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken

by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,

on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the

job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks

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had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so

that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also

for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable

evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of

abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 105 days in the year 1996, 168 days in 1997, 170 days in 1998, 149 days in 1999, 80

days in 2000, 111 days in 2001, 96 days in 2002, 107 days in 2003, 106 days in 2004 and 73 days

in 2005 and thus a total of her service in 1996 to 2005 in 10 years she had worked for 1165

days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1996 and 1999 to 2005

petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only

with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the

year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 73 days and thus immediately in preceding 12

calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160

days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was

not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the

Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the

Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. Some of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when junior

persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of

Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit

were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in

1996 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to

petitioner for re-employment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the

Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs.

S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of

Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have

worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement

junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.

On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/C the order dated 26.8.2015

of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against

respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the

petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled her for

regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

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accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

October, 2005, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy.

D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has

admitted that she had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of

having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-

examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as

well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs.

M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.

Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also

include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from

employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely

because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged

in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her

livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be

entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of

workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was

illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although

remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully

employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being

terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/

Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the

employer.

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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability

of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal.

The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages

instead of full back wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,

since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had

rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there

was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the

Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963-Section

5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

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during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after

6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of

service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the

petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations

when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has

certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four

situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of

reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be

appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that

petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave

notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra)

even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only

compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,

Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex

Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to

rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case

was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015

SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be

sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R.

502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for

petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that

Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court

Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner

cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the

law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied

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relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in

hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably

indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR

2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees

Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company

principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial

Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling

petitioner for retrenchment

compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in

hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this

court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had

engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability

of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was

engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/

circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and

21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as

Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh

provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep

in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum

of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 10

years and actually worked for 1165 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised

industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand notice was

given on 02.02.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments

of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or

for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment

2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the

matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be

solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in

this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through

these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to

the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex

Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon

the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint

Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals

reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble

High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been

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challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the

Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment

would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation

qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person

who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate

unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim

of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,30,000/-

(Rupees one lakh thirty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner

is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that

amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award

failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till

its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees one lakh thirty thousand only) to the petitioner in

lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9%

per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the

peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 529/2015

Date of Institution : 21-11-2015

Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Shri Janam Singh s/o Shri Moti Ram, r/o Village Kawas, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. . Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Janam Singh s/o Shri Moti

Ram, r/o Village Kawas, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated-nil-received on 15.05.2012 regarding his alleged

illegal termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If

not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Janam Singh s/o Shri Moti Ram, r/o

Village Kawas, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive

Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

during September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the

above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1997 who continuously worked till October, 2003 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way

of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

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respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally

without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no

retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated.

It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act

while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no

source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the

respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when

the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of

new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come

First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department

had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Suraj Ram who

appointed in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram

in 2003, Janam Singh in 2004 and Dev Raj in 2007. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence

or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served

upon him and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The

petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination

in the year 2003 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere

gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to

have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H

of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner

prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2003.

He further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2003 alongwith back wages,

seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of

his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks

given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1997 to October, 2003 be

counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.

01.01.2005 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to

law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till

2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in

para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating

its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle

of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he

would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner

is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of

issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

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necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended

that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back

wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/

proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy

of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil

qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from

the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. . OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief :

9.

For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No. 1

: Discussed

Issue No. 2

: Yes

Issue No. 3

: Discussed

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,10,000/-

per operative part of award.

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REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1996 continuously worked till September, 2004 with the

respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim

of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for

relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004

by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H

of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served

respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never

called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner

from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not

approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there

existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved

before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was

submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by

petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where

direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred

and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even

after September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission

on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

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correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken

by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,

on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the

job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had

been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that

petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable

evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of

abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 84 days in the year 1996, 135 days in 1997, 116 days in 1998, 115 days in 1999, 115

days in 2000, 114 days in 2001, 164 days in 2002, 108 days in 2003 and 109 days in 2004 and

thus a total of his service in 1996 to 2004 in 09 years he had worked for 1060 days in his entire

service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1996 to 2001 and 2003 to 2004 petitioner had

worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only

with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the

year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 109 days and thus immediately in preceding 12

calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of

160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it

was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of

the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of

the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after 2001 even at the time when junior persons were

reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of

the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No. 10 of the affidavit were retained whereas

petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and

even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for re-employment for work

which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has

placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419

in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of

the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in

case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement

junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.

On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 22.09.2015

of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against

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respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the

petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him for

regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004,

he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for

full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the

State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he

had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained

not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he

had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as

daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North

East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in

which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had

held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom

income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self

employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use

being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated

here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court

was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had

income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not

gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner

and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G

and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus,

applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to

hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the

period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case.

The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the

catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically

held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to

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make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for

adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of

material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

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appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon‟ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing- cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of

service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the

petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations

when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has

certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four

situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of

reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be

appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that

petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave

notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 supra)

even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only

compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,

Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex

Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to

rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh vs. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this

case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR

2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would

be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R.

502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for

petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that

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Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court

Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner

cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the

law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied

relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in

hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably

indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR

2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees

Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company

principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial

Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling

petitioner for retrenchment

compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case

in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand

before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD

which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and

availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the

petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by

the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances

is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors

which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09 years and

actually worked for 1060 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner

were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute

by issuance of demand notice after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on 15.5.2012.

Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex

Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back

wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013

(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of

delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely

declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in

2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through

these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the

petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid

down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the

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judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint

Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals

reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble

High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been

challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the

Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not

be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts

made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who

was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled

worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of

petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,10,000/-

(Rupees one lakh ten thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is

entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear

that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award

failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till

its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,10,000/- (Rupees one lakh ten thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation

so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum

on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 578/2015

Date of Institution

: 04-12-2015

Date of Decision

: 18-09-2017

Shri Yuvraj s/o Shri Tika Ram, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Yuvraj s/o Shri Tika Ram, r/o

Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 25-03-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services

during August, 2003, suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of

services of worker Shri Yuvraj s/o Shri Tika Ram, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar

(Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during August, 2003, without complying the provisions of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back

wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is

entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/

artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required

to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability

of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had

terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's

notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation

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was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that

respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the

services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income

besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time

and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of

petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman

from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go' envisaged

under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously

retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who appointed in 1996,

Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash Chand in

2001, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Dev Raj in 2007. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence

or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served

upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The

petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the

year 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully

employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have

committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays

for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2005. He

further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2005 alongwith back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his

illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given

time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1996 to October, 2005 be counted

160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2004

having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled

by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till

2003 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in

para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating

its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle

of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2003 he

would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner

is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of

issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended

that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back

wages.

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5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/

proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D, copy of notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the

evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive

Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex.

RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

25.03.2012 qua his termination of service during August, 2003 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,

2003 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief :

9.

For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Discussed

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is

dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident

from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked

from 1996 till 2003 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1996 to

October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding

documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that

petitioner had been factually engaged till 2003 and not upto October, 2005. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim

of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for

relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he

had

served

respondent

with

due

diligence

and

had

spotless

service

record

as

respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him

but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has

also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before

this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and

petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a

failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for

industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by

filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner

whenever he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or

omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken

by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,

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on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the

job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had

been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that

petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable

evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of

abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 166 days in the year 1996, 172 days in 1997, 148 days in 1998, 137 days in 1999, 109

days in 2000, 83 days in 2001, 85 days in 2002 and 97 days in 2003 and thus a total of his

service in 1996 to 2003 in 08 years he had worked for 997 days in his entire service period. Be it

noticed that except the years 1998 to 2003 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and

as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks,

this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident

from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2003 the petitioner had merely worked for 119

days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of

petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having

continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued

a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not

violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document

have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner.

Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called

upon to join for service at any time after 2001 even at the time when junior persons were

reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of

the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas

petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and

even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work

which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has

placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419

in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of

the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in

case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify

engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by

Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order

dated 05.10.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as

against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour

of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner

is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him

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for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2003,

he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for

full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the

State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he

had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained

not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he

had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as

daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North

East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in

which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had

held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom

income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self

employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use

being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated

here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court

was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had

income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not

gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner

and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-

G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment.

Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be

erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back

wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/

Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the

employer.

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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or

unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay

in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for

adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming

rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

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during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/

petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash Kumar Paul

vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may

pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on

justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation

where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and

no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge

duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to

discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may

justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that has to be

supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be

followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the

aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker may be

awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly

appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met

requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation

which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak

Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs.

General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments

652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner

on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has

relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh vs. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through

regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of

petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal

of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of

Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner

interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of

Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652

(SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied

relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it

was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the

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court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not

be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by

ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373

titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned,

the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come

First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and

retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the

facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former

closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no

closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when

there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of

Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/

circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and

21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as

Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh

provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep

in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by

the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances

is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs. 1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which

have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 08 years and actually

worked for 997 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were

disengaged in 2003 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by

issuance of demand notice after about nine years i.e. demand notice was given on 25.3.2012.

Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex

Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back

wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013

(139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of

delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely

declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014

titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through

these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the

petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid

down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint

Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals

reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble

High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged

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on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in

this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in

the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in

judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was

working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled

worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of

petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/-

(Rupees one lakh only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which

the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the

peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 574/2015

Date of Institution

: 04-12-2015

Date of Decision

: 18-9-2017

Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Duni Chand, r/o VPO Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Duni

Chand, r/o V.P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide demand

notice dated nil received in the Labour Office Chamba on dated 08-05-2012 regarding

his alleged illegal termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay

and laches? If not, Whether termination of services of Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Duni

Chand, r/o V.P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer,

Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004,

without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and

justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1998 who continuously worked till October, 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way

of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing

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one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment

compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is

contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while

disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source

of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the

respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when

the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of

new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come,

First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department

had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Jai Dass who

appointed in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram

in 2003, Devi Singh in 2004, Sher singh in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2003. The claimant/

petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any

act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no

charge-sheet had been served upon him and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been

afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination from month of October, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim

petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages.

Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-

F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of

Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment

by the respondent in the month of October, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service

w.e.f. month of October, 2004 alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as

petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has

also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service

of petitioner between 1998 to October, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and

regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2006 having completed 10 years of

service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of

H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1998 who remained engaged till

2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in

para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the

job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.

Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own

sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per

direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not

violated the principle of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been

terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after

seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and

laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the

respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the

same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his

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termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus

not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/

proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D, copy of notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the

evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive

Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex.

RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D. A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil

qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from

the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. . OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

9.

For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Discussed

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.70,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 To 3 :

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10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1998 continuously worked till September, 2004 with the

respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim

of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for

relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1998 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004

by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H

of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served

respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never

called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner

from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not

approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there

existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved

before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was

submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by

petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where

direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred

and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even

after September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission

on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken

by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,

on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the

job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had

been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that

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petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable

evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of

abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 28 days in the year 1998, 82 days in 1999, 45 days in 2000, 90.5 days in 2001, 113

days in 2002, 110 days in 2003 and 88 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1998 to 2004

in 07 years he had worked for 556.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner

had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only

with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in

the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 88 days and thus immediately in preceding 12

calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160

days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was

not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of

the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of

the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior

persons were re-engaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of

Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

re-employment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,

1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-

G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked

for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement

junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.

On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 16.04.2015

of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against

respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the

petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 07 years which entitled him for

regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

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17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy.

D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has

admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of

having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-

examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as

he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of

Hon'ble

Apex

Court

North

East

Karnataka

Road

Transport

Corporation

vs.

M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.

Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also

include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from

employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources

from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment

of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual

pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was

gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case

has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent

was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment.

Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated

that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view

of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed

between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance

of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it

may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not

entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen

and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

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appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of

material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

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the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the

Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred

to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost

important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at

large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D. Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after

6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

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Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of

service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. counsel for the

petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations

when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has

certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four

situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of

reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be

appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that

petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave

notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra)

even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only

compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,

Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex

Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to

rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh vs. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this

case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR

2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would

be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R.

502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for

petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that

Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court

Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner

cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the

law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied

relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in

hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably

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indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR

2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees

Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company

principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial

Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation.

Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in

former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court,

there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged

petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work.

As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged,

judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/

circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and

21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as

Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh

provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep

in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by

the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances

is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors

which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 07 years and

actually worked for 556.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner

were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial

dispute by issuance of demand notice after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on

08.5.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble

Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back

wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139)

FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay

and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined

on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as

Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also

the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous

judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which

are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the

ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in

judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director

Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals reference

under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High

Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged

on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government

in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be

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attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made

in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was

working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled

worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of

petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 70,000/-

(Rupees seventy thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is

entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that

amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award

failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award

till its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainble could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.70,000/- (Rupees seventy thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the

peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 521/2015

Date of Institution

: 21-11-2015

Date of Decision

: 18-9-2017

Ms. Sarita d/o Shri Kewal Ram, r/o V.P.O. Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, HPPWD Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Ms. Sarita d/o Shri Kewal Ram, r/o

V.P.O. Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer,

Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice

dated 03-04-2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of services during August, 1998

suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of services of Ms. Sarita

d/o Shri Kewal Ram, r/o V.P.O. Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

during August, 1998, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service

benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above

employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1994 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/

artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required

to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability

of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had

terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's

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notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation

was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that

respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the

services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income

besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the respondent time

and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of

petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman

from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go' envisaged

under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously

retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Chuni Lal who appointed in 1997,

Tek Chand in 1999, Bhag Dei in 2000, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004, Bameshwar Dutt in

2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record

who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and

even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and at the

same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that

she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 2005

till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed

and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed

violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for

setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October,

2005. She further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2005 along-with

back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed

since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of

intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994

to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of

petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2003 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP

Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is

entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till

1998 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in

para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating

its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour

Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last

come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1998 she would have

definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to

be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since

the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of

notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for

charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner

was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

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5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of''Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/

proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy

of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 16.2.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

3.4.2012 qua her termination of service during August, 1998 by respondent suffers

from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,

1998 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief:

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Discussed

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.30,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own

and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is

dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident

from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked

from 1996 till 1998 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1994 to

October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding

documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that

petitioner had been factually engaged w.e.f. 1996 to 1998 and not from 1994 to October, 2005.

Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but

only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts

on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is

entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits

and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1994 to October, 2005. She has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and

thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she

had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/

department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while

retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason

for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there

existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before

the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted

and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by

petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where

direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had

occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever

she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or

omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand

taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The

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petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used

to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit

breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so

that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable

evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea

of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 125 days in the year 1996, 106 days in 1997 and 61 days in 1998 and thus a total of her

service in 1996 to 1998 in 03 years she had worked for 292 days in her entire service period.

Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no

reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is

to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays

chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1998 the petitioner had merely worked for 61 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had

not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous

service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice

envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the

provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. Some of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after August, 1998 even at the time when junior

persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of

Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

re-employment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,

1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked

for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify

engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by

Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order

dated 22.9.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as

against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour

of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner

is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled her

for regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

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accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in August,

1998, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled

for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the

State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she

had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained

not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross- examination in which

she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as well as she has been

working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex

Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10

SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas

Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom

income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from

self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end

use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from her agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain her and her family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here

that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was

not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income,

she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from

agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully

employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it

is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and

respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G

and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus,

applying the ratio of judgment of Hon‟ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to

hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the

period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen

and the employer.

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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability

of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal.

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The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages

instead of full back wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,

since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had

rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there

was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the

Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1998 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon‟ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of

service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the

petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations

when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has

certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four

situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of

reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be

appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that

petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave

notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 supra)

even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only

compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,

Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex

Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to

rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this

case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR

2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation

would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1)

Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by

ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which

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provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3)

Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that

claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches.

That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner

cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding

relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the

claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by

reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize &

Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held

on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated

Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling

petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s

case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved

whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the

department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although

subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by

respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made

applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon‟ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by

the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances

is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors

which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 03 years and

actually worked for 292 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner

were disengaged in August, 1998 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial

dispute by issuance of demand notice after about fourteen years i.e. demand notice was given

on 03.04.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of

Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or

for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment

2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the

matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be

solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in

this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through

these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to

the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex

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Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon

the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint

Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals

reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble

High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been

challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the

Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment

would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation

qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person

who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate

unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim

of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.30,000/-

(Rupees thirty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in

the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the

peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 522/2015

Date of Institution : 21-11-2015

Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Ms. Suman Kumari d/o Shri Mahatam Chand, r/o Village Kuffa, P.O. Killar, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, HPPWD, Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Ms. Suman Kumari d/o Shri

Mahatam Chand, r/o Village Kuffa, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before

the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

vide demand notice dated 13-06-2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of

services during September, 1998 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether

termination of the services of Ms. Suman Kumari d/o Shri Mahatam Chand, r/o Village

Kuffa, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar

Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 1998,

without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and

justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1992 who continuously worked till October, 1998 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/

artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required

to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability

of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had

terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's

notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation

was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that

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respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the

services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income

besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the respondent time

and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of

petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman

from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go'

envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had

continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Chuni Lal who

appointed in 1997, Tek Chand in 1999, Bhag Dei in 2000, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004,

Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or

negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been

served upon her and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him.

The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination

from month of October, 1998 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had

been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging

respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and

Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India,

the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/ retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of October, 1998. She further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

October, 1998 alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed

that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between 1992 to October, 1998 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the

service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy

of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief

petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till

1998 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in

para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating

its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour

Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last

come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1998 she would

have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is

stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of

issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended

that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back

wages.

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5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1

tendered/proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list

Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy

of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

13.6.2012 qua her termination of service during September, 1998 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

1998 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. . OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief:

9.

For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Discussed

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.60,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own

and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is

dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident

from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked

from 1994 till 1998 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1992 to

October, 1998. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding

documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that

petitioner had been factually engaged in the year 1994 and not in 1992.

Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks

but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted

facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if

petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past

service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1992 to October, 1998. She has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and

thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 1998 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she

had

served

respondent

with

due

diligence

and

had

spotless

service

record

as

respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but

even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also

explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this

Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner

had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure

report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial

dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing

CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever

she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or

omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand

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taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The

petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used

to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit

breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so

that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable

evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea

of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 49 ½ days in the year 1994, 135 ½ days in 1995, 196 days in 1996, 153 days in 1997

and 123 days in 1998 and thus a total of her service in 1994 to 1998 in 05 years she had worked

for 657 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1994, 1995, 1997

and 1998 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the

Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its

findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B that in the year 1998 the petitioner had merely worked for 123 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had

not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous

service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice

envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated

the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. Some of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when junior persons

were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section

25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994

was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,

1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-

G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked

for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify

engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by

Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/C the order

dated 22.9.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as

against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour

of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner

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is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 04 years which entitled her

for regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

September, 1998, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy.

D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has

admitted that she had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of

having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-

examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as

well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M.

Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.

Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also

include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from

employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely

because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged

in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her

livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be

entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of

workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was

illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although

remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully

employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being

terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

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Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen

and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability

of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

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appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal.

The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages

instead of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,

since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had

rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there

was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the

Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the

State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal

principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the

Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench

of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without

examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government

under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing

industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial

peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the

same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1998 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing- cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon‟ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of

service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the

petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations

when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has

certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four

situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of

reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be

appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that

petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave

notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 supra)

even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only

compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,

Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex

Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to

rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh vs. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this

case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR

2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation

would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1)

Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by

ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which

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provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3)

Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that

claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches.

That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner

cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding

relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the

claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by

reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize &

Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has

held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed

which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling

petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s

case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved

whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the

department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure

although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit

by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be

made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/

circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and

21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as

Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh

provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep

in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by

the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances

is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors

which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 05 years and

actually worked for 657 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner

were disengaged in September, 1998 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised

industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about fourteen years i.e. demand notice

was given on 13.06.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to

judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for

reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in

view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for

petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the

petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment

of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the

rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate

as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant

Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan

Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case

as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the

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basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A.

representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in

AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.

I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial

Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction

under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate

unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in

challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and

circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment (2016)

supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas

in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid

reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees

sixty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts

and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No. 4:

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs. 60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the

peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 581/2015

Date of Institution

: 04.12.2015

Date of Decision

: 18.9.2017

Smt. Dhuri Devi w/o Shri Devi Singh, r/o V.P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. . Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar

Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Dhuri Devi w/o Shri Devi

Singh, r/o V.P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated nil received in the Labour Office Chamba on dated 08-05-2012

regarding her alleged illegal termination of services during August, 2005 suffers from

delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Smt. Dhuri Devi w/o Shri

Devi Singh, r/o V.P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during

August, 2005 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is

legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 2000 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way

of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/ disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally

without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no

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retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated.

It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act

while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no

source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the

respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the

services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new

workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First

go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had

continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Prakash Chand who

appointed in 2001, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004, Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj

Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who

never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even

at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and at the same

time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that she

has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 2005

till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed

and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed

violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting

aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005.

She further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2005 along-with back

wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the

date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional

breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1996 to October, 2005

be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.

01.01.2008 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to

law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 2003 who remained engaged till

2005 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in

para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating

its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle

of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 she

would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner

is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of

issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended

that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back

wages.

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5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1

tendered/proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list

Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy

of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated nil

qua her termination of service during August, 2005 by respondent suffers from the vice

of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August,

2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief :

9.

For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No. 1

: Discussed

Issue No. 2

: Yes

Issue No. 3

: Discussed

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.40,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

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11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own

and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is

dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident

from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked

from 2003 till 2005 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 2000 to

October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding

documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that

petitioner had been factually engaged in the year 2003 and not in 2000.

Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks

but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted

facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if

petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past

service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 2000 to October, 2005. She has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and

thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she

had

served

respondent

with

due

diligence

and

had

spotless

service

record

as

respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but

even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also

explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this

Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner

had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure

report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial

dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing

CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever

she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or

omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand

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taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The

petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used

to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that

intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of

petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area

and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and

reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had

established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 122 days in the year 2003, 91 days in 2004 and 75 days in 2005 and thus a total of her

service in 2003 to 2005 in 03 years she had worked for 288 days in her entire service period.

Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no

reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is

to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays

chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 75 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had

not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous

service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice

envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated

the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter. Some of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document

have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner.

Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called

upon to join for service at any time after August, 2005 even at the time when junior persons were

re-engaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G

of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained

whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 2003 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam,

1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-

G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked

for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify

engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by

Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order

dated 01.10.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as

against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour

of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner

is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled her

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for regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in August,

2005, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled

for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the

State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she

had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained

not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she

had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as well as she has been working

as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC

765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir

had held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom

income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from

self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end

use being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from her agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain her and her family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here

that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was

not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income,

she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from

agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully

employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it

is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and

respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G

and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus,

applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold

that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period

she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen

and the employer.

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13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability

of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal.

The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages

instead of full back wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

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16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,

since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had

rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there

was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the

Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section

5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

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during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of

service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/

petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash Kumar Paul

vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may

pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on

justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation

where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and

no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge

duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the management to

discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may

justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that has to be

supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be

followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the

aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker may be

awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly

appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met

requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation

which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak

Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs.

General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments

652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner

on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has

relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh vs. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through

regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of

petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal

of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of

Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner

interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of

Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652

(SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied

relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it

was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the

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court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not

be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by

ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373

titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned,

the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come

First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and

retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts

of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of

unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure

of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when

there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of

Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial

dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded

by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the

Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is

not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-

with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within

six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have

weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 03 years and actually worked

for 288 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in

August, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of

demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on 08.05.2012. Taking into

consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to

above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum

compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The

judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more

or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of

delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir

Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble

Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in

the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-

Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which are not

attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground

of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of

2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex

Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture

Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under

Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can

intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the

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ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this

case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in

the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made

in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was

working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled

worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of

petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.40,000/-

(Rupees forty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in

the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing

which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No. 4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the

peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 526/2015

Date of Institution

: 21-11-2015

Date of Decision

: 18-9-2017

Smt. Amar Dei w/o Shri Thakur Chand, r/o Village Sagli, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. . Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Amar Dei w/o Shri Thakur

Chand, r/o Village Sagli, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 06.10.2011 regarding her alleged illegal

termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not,

Whether termination of the services of Smt. Amar Dei w/o Shri Thakur Chand, r/o

Village Sagli, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive

Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

during September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the

above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1991 who continuously worked till October, 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way

of

intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks

are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

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department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing

one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment

compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is

contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while

disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source

of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the

respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the

services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new

workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First

go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had

continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Chuni Lal who

appointed in 1997, Tek Chand in 1999, Bhag Dei in 2000, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004,

Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had

spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or

negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been

served upon her and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him.

The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination

from month of October, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had

been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging

respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and

Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India,

the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/ retrenchment by the respondent

in the month of October, 2004. She further prayed for reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of

October, 2004 alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has

remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed

that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner

between 1991 to October, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the

service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2001 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy

of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief

petitioner is entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1998 who remained engaged till

2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in

para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job

at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating

its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and

the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle

of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 she

would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner

is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended

that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of

issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

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necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended

that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back

wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/

proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy

of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

06.10.2011 qua her termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief :

9.

For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Discussed

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.70,000/- per

operative part of award.

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REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own

and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is

dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident

from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked

from 1998 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1991 to

October, 2004. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding

documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that

petitioner had been factually engaged in the year 1998 and not in 1991. Admittedly, the reference

of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's

termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of

petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief

of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as

claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1991 to October, 2004. She has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and

thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2004 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she

had

served

respondent

with

due

diligence

and

had

spotless

service

record

as

respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but

even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also

explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this

Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner

had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure

report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial

dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing

CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart

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Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever

she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or

omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand

taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The

petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used

to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit

breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so

that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for

applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable

evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea

of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 28 days in the year 1998, 55 ½ days in 1999, 104 days in 2000, 57 days in 2001, 119

days in 2002, 126 days in 2003 and 108 days in 2004 and thus a total of her service in 1998 to

2004 in 07 years she had worked for 597.5 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that

petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only

with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in

the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 108 days and thus immediately in preceding

12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160

days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was

not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the

Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the

Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. Some of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this

document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to

petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was

called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior

persons were re-engaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of

Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were

retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for re-

employment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel

for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5)

SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and

25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240

days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

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16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement

junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.

On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 22.9.2015

of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against

respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the

petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 07 years which entitled her for

regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in

September, 2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such

was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy.

D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has

admitted that she had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of

having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-

examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as

well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs.

M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R.

Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment would also

include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from

employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and

manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely

because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged

in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her

livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be

entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of

workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was

illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although

remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully

employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being

terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

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factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen

and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability

of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

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“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal.

The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages

instead of full back wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute,

since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had

rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there

was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the

Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing- cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

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20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section

5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labaur Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act- Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of

service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/

petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash Kumar Paul

vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may

pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on

justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation

where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and

no period is left to her credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge

duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the management to

discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may

justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that has to be

supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be

followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the

aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker may be

awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly

appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not

mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining

of duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met

requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation

which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak

Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs.

General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments

652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner

on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has

relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,

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Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473.

It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through

regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of

petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal

of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of

Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner

interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of

Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652

(SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied

relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it

was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the

court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not

be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by

ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373

titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned,

the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come

First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and

retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts

of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case in hand as in former closure of

unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure

of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without

following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when

there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of

Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/

circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and

21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as

Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh

provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep

in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by

the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances

is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors

which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 07 years and

actually worked for 597.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner

were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial

dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on

06.10.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble

Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back

wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139)

FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay

and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined

on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as

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Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also

the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous

judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which

are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the

ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in

judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director

Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals reference

under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High

Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged

on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government

in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be

attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made

in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was

working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled

worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of

petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 70,000/- (Rupees

seventy thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the

facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which

the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief:

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs. 70,000/- (Rupees seventy thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the

reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per

annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the

peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

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Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 558/2015

Date of Institution : 04-12-2015

Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Shri Basant Singh s/o Shri Puran Chand, r/o VPO Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./ I.&P.H., Killar (Pangi), District

Chamba, H.P.

. . Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Basant Singh s/o Shri Puran

Chand, r/o V.P.O. Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive

Engineer, Killar Division, I.P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. vide

demand notice dated 08-12-2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services

during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of

services of worker Shri Basant Singh s/o Shri Puran Chand, r/o V.P.P. Kumar, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.P.H./

H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004, without

complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not,

what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above

aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3.

Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above

named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the

year 1994 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in

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the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the

criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for

continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the

petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/

artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required

to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability

of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had

terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's

notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation

was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that

respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the

services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income

besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time

and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of

petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman

from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go'

envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had

continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Gurdev who appointed

in 1994, Sher Singh in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku

Ram in 2000, Prakash Chand in 2001 and Budhi Ram in 2003. The claimant/petitioner

claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of

indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-

sheet had been served upon him and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been

afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his

illegal termination in the year 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had

been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging

respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and

Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India,

the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent

in the year 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2005 alongwith

back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed

since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of

intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994

to 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner

w.e.f. 01.01.2002 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in

pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is

entitled.

4.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits

denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by

stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till

2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own

sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by

the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required

for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the

petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in

para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other

juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of

termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the

job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.

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Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own

sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per

direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not

violated the principle of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been

terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that

after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and

laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the

respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the

same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his

termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus

not entitled for back wages.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/

proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex.

PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the

petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy

of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7.

I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,

gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 18.5.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

08.12.2011 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. . OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief :

9.

For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Discussed

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

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Issue No.4

: No

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,25,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute

with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from

mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from

1994 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1994 to October,

2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary

evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had

been factually engaged till 2004 and not upto 2005. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate

govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination

from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to

be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back

wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1994 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he

had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/

department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even

while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also

explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this

Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and

petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a

failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for

industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by

filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which

delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

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13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever

he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on

the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence

calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the

respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the

other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in

between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been

deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did

not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of

Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by

respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 61 days in the year 1994, 146.5 days in 1995, 27.5 days in 1996, 118 days in 1997,

111 days in 1998, 53 days in 1999, 77 days in 2000, 118 days in 2001, 125 days in 2002 and

105 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2004 in 10 years he had worked

for 942 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more

than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of

artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal

termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner

had merely worked for 105 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from

the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet

requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required

from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such,

the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of

workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained

in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go'

was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was

terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged

workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of

these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division

HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in

those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll

for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document

have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner.

Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called

upon to join for service at any time after 2004 even at the time when junior persons were

reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of

the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No. 10 of the affidavit were retained whereas

petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was terminated and

even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work

which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has

placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419

in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of

the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in

case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

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16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement

junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court.

On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 05.10.2015

of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. vide which the orders qua termination passed as against

respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the

petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him

for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial

Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004,

he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for

full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the

State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he

had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained

not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he

had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as

daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North

East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in

which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had

held that 'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom

income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self

employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use

being the same’. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the

petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to

maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated

here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court

was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture

income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had

income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not

gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing

discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between

petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of

Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his

retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it

may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not

entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

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2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen

and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of

material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

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cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

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20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section

5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D. Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after

6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of

service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Court held that

a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the

petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations

when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has

certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four

situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of

reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be

appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that

petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave

notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra)

even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only

compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior

Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121,

Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex

Court Judgments 652. I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to

rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State

on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor,

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Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported

in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case

was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015

SC supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be

sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R.

502 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for

petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that

Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court

Judgment 652 (SC) similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner

cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the

law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied

relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in

hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably

indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR

2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees

Union is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company

principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial

Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment

compensation. Since the facts of case of Mackinon Machenize’s case are different from case

in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand

before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD

which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and

availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the

petitioner was engaged, judgment of Mackinon Machenize cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos.

20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to

keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be

enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum

of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 10

years and actually worked for 942 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial

dispute by issuance of demand notice after about seven years i.e. demand notice was given on

08.12.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of

Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement

or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of

judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on

the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be

solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

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in 2014 titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in

this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble

Apex Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through

these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the

petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid

down in judgment of 2013. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint

Director Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals

reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble

High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged

on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this

case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the

facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment

(2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as

Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the

abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,25,000/-

(Rupees one lakh twenty five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the

petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made

clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of

Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of

Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,25,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty five thousand only) to the petitioner

in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of

compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from

the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9%

per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the

peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA ( H.P.)

Ref. No. 109/ 2017

Shri Dinesh Singh s/o Sh. Chatter Singh, r/o Village Agoger, P.O. Andreta, Tehsil

Palampur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Vice Chancellor, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishav

Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur District Kangra, H.P.

2.

The Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishav Vidyalya

(CSKHPKV), Palampur District Kangra, H.P.

. .Respondents.

23-09-2017 Present:

None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondents.

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due

service. It is 11.30 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

23-09-2017 Present:

None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondents.

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It

is 2.30 P.M. None appearance of petitioner today is indicative of the fact that he is not interested

to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and

further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:

23-09-2017

(K.K.Sharma)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 103/2015

Date of Institution : 04-3-2015

Date of Decision : 04-9-2017

Shri Kaman Singh s/o Shri Daulat Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Shahli, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar District Chamba, H.P. . .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Kaman Singh s/o Shri Daulat

Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Shahli, Tehsi Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand

notice dated 18.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service w.e.f.

October, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the

services of Shri Kaman Singh s/o Shri Daulat Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Shahli,

Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division,

Killar, District Chamba, H.P. w.e.f. 18.08.2010 without complying the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back

wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is

entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On 21st January, 2017 the corrigendum had been received from the appropriate

Government whereby the reference has been partly modified in the aforesaid terms:

“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 24-02-

2015, the date of termination of workman Shri Kaman Singh s/o Shri Daulat Ram may

be read as 'October, 2005' instead of '18-08-2010', which was inadvertently recorded in

the said notification”.

3.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

4.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner

above named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll

basis in the month of June, 1997 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the

respondent/department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had

worked for 160 days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District

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Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of

Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for

brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted

by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as

such breaks are required to be counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of

160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner

remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage

service in the end of October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other

co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of

respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of

daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/

retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of

'Last come First go' had not been followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named

27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st May, 1998 to 1st September,

2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by

way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time,

one month's wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason

termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/

petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act

of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no

charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since

his illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim

petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages.

Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section

25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16

of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/

retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. He further prayed for

reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of October, 2005 alongwith back wages, seniority including

continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal

termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given

time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1997 to October, 2005 be counted

160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f. 01.01.2005

having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is

entitled.

5.

The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On

merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather

clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained

engaged till 2005 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work

at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically

pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year

as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to

the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned

at serial Nos. 1 to 25 in para No. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour

Court and at serial Nos. 26 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of

petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore

serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has

maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned

in para No. 4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial

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Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated

in 2005, he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years

petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is

also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the

respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the

same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his

termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus

not entitled for back wages.

6.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

7.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1

tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L

mandays charts of junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the

evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman the then Executive

Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex.

RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of

orders/awards and closed the evidence.

8.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

9.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 7.7.2015 and issue

No.1 recasted and was framed on 01.09.2017 for determination which are as under:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. October, 2005

is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief :

10. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: Discussed

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,40,000/-

per operative part of award.

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REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1, 2 and 4 :

11. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

12. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1997 who continuously worked till 2005 with the respondent/

department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or

settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no

written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim

of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for

relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

13. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1997 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by

oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and

25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he

had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/

department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even

while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also

explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this

Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent

upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make

reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble

High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court

due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

14. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even

after October, 2005. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission

on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken

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by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,

on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the

job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks

had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so

that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also

for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable

evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of

abandonment.

15. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 132 days in the year 1997, 160 days in 1998, 157 days in 1999, 119 days in 2000, 174.5

days in 2001, 151.5 days in 2002, 96 days in 2003, 65.5 days in 2004 and 65 days in 2005 and

thus a total of his service in 1997 to 2005 in 08 years he had worked for 1120 days in his

entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1997, 1999, 2000 and 2002 to 2005

petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour

Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only

with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the

year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 56 days and thus immediately in preceding 12

calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160

days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was

not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the

Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the

Act.

16. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that

large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to

07.9.1999 and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of

petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were

retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason.

Ex. PW1/B, Ex. PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who

were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex.

PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers

shown in Ex. PW1/E the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar

were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more

than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole

month. Ex. PW1/E also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked

for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently,

there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for

service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That

being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the

juniors workers mentioned in para No.3 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was

senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1997 was terminated and even

thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for re-employment for work

which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for

petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5)

SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H

of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in

case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

17. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

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reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/

petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons

were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22

were primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status

of these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him

for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that

respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

18. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's

termination in October, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld.

Authorized Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through

cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also

worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been

earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance

has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural

and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because

the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in

gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his

livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not

be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of

workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was

illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although

remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully

employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being

terminated by the respondent.

19. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways,

Hissar reported in 2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced

below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

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factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case.

The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the

catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically

held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to

make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for

adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of

material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

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cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to

make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the

order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the

appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the

dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government

had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that

there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to

the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

20. Ld. Counsel representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

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21. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon

the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture

Marketing Board, Sub- Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant

para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-

Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and his termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.

one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of

service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as

ld. Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon'ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep

in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the

delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by

the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days

and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and

he raised industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to

be enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts

and circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum

of Rs.1 lakh alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this

court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09

years and actually worked for 1120 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services

of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and had

raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about five years i.e. demand notice

was given on 18.8.2010. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on the date of filing

claim petition was ageing 35 years who has sufficient spell of life to work and earn his livelihood.

Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex

Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but

compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR

25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter

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of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely

declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014

titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was

reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow

University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in

AIR 2015 SC 3473. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment

of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar vs. Joint Director

Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals

reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that

Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been

challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the

Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment

would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation

qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person

who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate

unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim

of petitioner.

22. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,40,000/-

(Rupees one lakh forty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is

entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear

that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award

failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award

and its realization. Issues No. 1, 2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.3 :

23. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

24. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,40,000/- (Rupees one lakh forty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum

on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

25. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

26. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

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28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

______________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 155/2015

Date of Institution : 04-4-2015

Date of Decision : 04-9-2017

Shri Bhag Chand s/o Shri Laxmi Chand, r/o Village and P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, Killar District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Bhag Chand s/o Shri Laxmi

Chand, r/o Village and P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P. vide demand notice dated 18.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of

services w.e.f. August, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination

of the services of Shri Bhag Chand s/o Shri Laxmi Chand, r/o Village and P.O. Rei,

Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division,

H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. w.e.f. August, 2004 without

complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If

not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the

above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On 9th February, 2017, the corrigendum had been received from the appropriate

Government whereby the reference has been partly modified in the aforesaid terms:

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“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated

24-02-2015, the date of termination of workman Shri Bhag Chand s/o Shri Laxmi

Chand may be read as 'September, 2004' instead of 'August, 2004', which was

inadvertently recorded in the said notification”.

3.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

4.

Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner

above named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll

basis in the month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the

respondent/department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had

worked for 160 days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil

District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions

of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for

brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted

by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as

such breaks are required to be counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of

160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner

remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage

service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other

co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of

respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of

daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/

retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of

'Last come First go' had not been followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named

27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st May, 1998 to 1st September,

2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by

way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time,

one month's wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason

termination of the services of petitioner was prima facie illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/

petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act

of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no

charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had

been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since

his illegal termination from month of September, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim

petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages.

Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section

25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16

of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/

retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004. He further prayed for

reinstatement in service w.e.f. month of September, 2004 alongwith back wages, seniority

including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his

illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks

given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994 to September, 2004 be

counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner w.e.f.

01.01.2002 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief

petitioner is entitled.

5. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On

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merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather

clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained

engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work

at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically

pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year

as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to

the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned

at serial Nos. 1 to 24 and 26 in para No. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of

Labour Court and at serial Nos. 25 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service

of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will

therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent

has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons

mentioned in para No.4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-cum-

Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been

terminated in 2004, he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after

ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and

laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by

the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at

the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his

termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus

not entitled for back wages.

6.

The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality

besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

7.

In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1

tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L

mandays charts of junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the

evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then

Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner

Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy

of orders/awards and closed the evidence.

8.

I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.

representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this

case.

9.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.8.2015 and issue

No.1 recasted and was framed on 01.09.2017 for determination which are as under:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. September,

2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. . OPP.

2.

If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the

petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief :

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10. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as

follows:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Discussed

Issue No.3

: No

Issue No.4

: Discussed

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,50,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1, 2 and 4 :

11. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

12. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent

on muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2004 with the

respondent/department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written

order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that

no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent

remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own

and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to

petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim

of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for

relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and

compensation as claimed by him.

13. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and

reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to

have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division

Chamba District and remained engaged from 1994 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath

that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his

service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and

thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service

with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further

alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004

by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in

service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been

regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H

of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served

respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never

called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner

from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not

approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner

had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure

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report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial

dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing

CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay

had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

14. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits

rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be

established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has

specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued.

RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even

after September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission

on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken

by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,

on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the

job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks

had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so

that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also

for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable

evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of

abandonment.

15. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had

worked for 163 days in the year 1994, 111 days in 1995, 180 days in 1996, 96 days in 1997, 109

days in 1998, 140 days in 1999, 137 days in 2000, 73.5 days in 2001, 62 days in 2002, 84 days in

2003 and 78 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2004 in 11 years he had

worked for 1233.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1995 and

1997 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the

Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its

findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex.

RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 56 days and thus

immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not

rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one

year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that

large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to

07.9.1999 and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of

petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were

retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason.

Ex. PW1/B, Ex. PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who

were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex.

PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the mandays chart of other co-workers. All of these co-workers

shown in Ex. PW1/E the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar

were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more

than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole

month. Ex. PW1/E also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked

for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently,

there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join

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for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior persons were

reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G

of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.3 of the affidavit were retained

whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was

terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for

reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld.

Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of Central Bank of

India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the

applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner

to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

17. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile

attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of

orders of Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through

which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/

petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons

were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22

were primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status

of these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is

proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him

for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that

respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

18. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's

termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything

thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld.

Authorized Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through

cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and

also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied

admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been

earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance

has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural

and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because

the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in

gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his

livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not

be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of

workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was

illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although

remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully

employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being

terminated by the respondent.

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19. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways,

Hissar reported in 2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced

below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd

issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case.

The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the

catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically

held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to

make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for

adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

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raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of

material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....”

(Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case,

the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a

reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

20. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent/department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Dy. D.A., ld.

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AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

21. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon

the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture

Marketing Board, Sub- Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant

para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and his termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable.

[Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of

service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as

ld. Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon'ble Apex Court in various judgments

referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important

circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of

judgment 2013 supra has referred to Gitam Singh’s case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)

titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam

Singh observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep

in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the

delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by

the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days

and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and

he raised industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though

compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to

be enhanced by the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts

and circumstances is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum

of Rs.1 lakh alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

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compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court

factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 11 years and

actually worked for 1233.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of

petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had

raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e. demand notice

was given on 18.8.2010. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on the date of filing

claim petition was ageing 39 years who has sufficient spell of life to work and earn his livelihood.

Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex

Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but

compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR

25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter

of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely

declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014

titled as Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this

judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State

Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. Similar view was

reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment titled as Vice Chancellor, Lucknow

University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in

AIR 2015 SC 3473. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment

of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar v. Joint Director

Sericulture Department and another. I have gone through the judgment which deals

reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that

Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been

challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the

Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment

would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation

qua facts made in judgment (2016) supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person

who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate

unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim

of petitioner.

22. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,50,000/-

(Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is

entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear

that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award

failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award

and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.3 :

23. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

24. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

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of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum

on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

25. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

26. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

27. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

______________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref. No.

: 377/2015

Date of Institution

: 18-8-2015

Date of decision

: 20-9-2017

Shri Abdul Sitar s/o Shri Ramjan, r/o Village and Post Office Rajpura, Tehsil

Chamba, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Deputy Director of Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Ld. Dy.D.A.

AWARD

The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Abdul Sitar s/o Shri Ramjan,

r/o Village and Post Office Rajpura, Tehsil Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Deputy Director of Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, vide demand notice dated

12.12.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during year, 2003 suffers

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from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Abdul Sitar s/o

Shri Ramjan, r/o Village and Post Office Rajpura, Tehsil Chamba, District Chamba, H.P.

by the Deputy Director of Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. during year, 2003

without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and

justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim before this court.

3.

Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner was engaged as

daily waged labourer on muster roll basis with the respondent department in PCDO Rajpura

w.e.f. 03.01.1992 who worked continuously with intermittent/artificial breaks. In the year 2003,

the respondent had orally terminated services of petitioner without any reason whereas the

workers junior to petitioner had been retained and their services have been regularized

however service of petitioner was terminated in the year 2003. It is further alleged that

when the services of petitioner were illegally terminated orally on 2003 it was assured that

petitioner would be engaged on contract basis but when petitioner requested with the

officers/officials of respondent/department not to change his service condition from daily wage to

contract but it was of no avail. It is alleged that petitioner had given short term/spell of 10-15

days on contract basis in a year just to deprive the petitioner from continuity and seniority which

is unfair labour practice within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act whereas the respondent

had retained junior workers continuously on muster roll basis who were consequently regularized.

It is further alleged that respondent had not followed the relevant provisions of Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called as 'the Act' for brevity) and had also not taken any prior

approval from the appropriate government as well as written consent from petitioner. As

respondent in gross violation of statutory provisions of law had changed service conditions of

petitioner due to which he could not complete criteria of 240 days in each calendar year by

which petitioner was deprived from benefit of regularization. It is further averred that the

respondent had appointed/engaged many daily waged junior to the petitioner namely Amar

Nath, Khairati Ram, Om Prakash, Roshan Lal, Dharam Chand, Narain Singh, Suresh Kumar,

Ghinder Dutt, Hans Raj, Joginder Singh, Dharam Chand, Jodh Singh, Devi Parshad, Jagat Ram,

Man Singh, Mukesh Kumari, Punam, Shakuntla, Sushil Kumar, Kartar Chand, Devinder,

Kaushalya, Sudarshna Devi and Bachan Singh who were appointed in the years 1997, 1998,

1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004 respectively and their service have been regularized. It is also

averred that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-G of 'the Act' while

engaging the services of abovestated juniors on muster roll but changed the service condition of

petitioner. It is further alleged that respondent had given spotless services to the respondent/

department who had never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline, negligence of work or

misconduct however petitioner had worked with full devotion. It is alleged that respondent had

committed gross violation of statutory provision of Sections 25-B, 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the

Act in malafide, arbitrary, unconstitutional, illegal and unjustified manner besides violating

principle of natural justice which was to 'unfair labour practice' within the meaning of Industrial

Disputes Act. The petitioner thus prayed that oral orders of illegal termination/retrenchment from

daily waged services during year 2003 be set aside being illegal, malafide, arbitrary and unjustified

and petitioner be engaged on daily waged basis because juniors workmen engaged after him had

been working continuously on daily waged basis with the respondent. It is further prayed that the

petitioner be reinstated along with full back wages, seniority, continuity in service as the

petitioner remained unemployed from the date of his illegal retrenchment/termination. It is

prayed that the period of intermittent/fictional breaks which has been given to the petitioner

during period from 3.1.1992 onward for calculation of continuous service of 240 days in each

year under Section 25-B of the Act and regularize the service of petitioner w.e.f. 1.1.2002 as per

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Govt. regularization policy framed in view of Hon'ble Apex Court decision in Mool Raj

Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and others and from the date of regularization of juniors of

petitioner along-with all consequential service benefits.

4.

The respondent contested the claim petition filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections qua maintainability, claim of the petitioner being bad on account of delay and

laches. On merits, admitted that the petitioner was initially engaged as daily waged labourer to

carryout seasonal and occasional work in the year 1992 subject to work and funds besides stated

that he had not completed 240 days in any calendar year since his initial engagement was as

intermittent worker for seasonal work and the petitioner had worked with the respondent as per

his own convenience and sweet will. It is further stated that petitioner had worked with the

respondent/department upto the year 2003 and thereafter 'abandoned' the job at his own sweet will

and convenience and never reported for work after 2003. It is alleged that petitioner had never

worked with the respondent/department during the years 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and

1999. It is, however, denied that the services of the petitioner had been terminated by the

respondent and that junior workmen had been retained by respondent continuously and not

violated provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. It is denied that respondent had intentionally

provided work to petitioner for short term/spell of 10-15 days however no assurance was given

to petitioner to engage him on contract basis. It is also denied that respondent had changed the

service condition of petitioner who is opted to have never completed 240 days of work in each

calendar year since petitioner did not come for work with the respondent after the year 2003. It is

averred that only those workers had been regularized by the respondent/department who had

completed the requisite criteria for regularization as per the government policy and as such the

respondent had not violated any principle of 'Last come First go'. It is stated that the services of

petitioner were engaged by the respondent intermittently for seasonal work which was already

known to petitioner and no fictional breaks were ever given to petitioner by the respondent. It is

contended that no new/fresh workmen/labourers had been engaged by respondent and as such

there was no violation of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The respondent thus

alleges claim petition to be devoid of merit which was accordingly sought to be dismissed.

5.

The petitioner filed rejoinder to reply filed by respondent, reiterated his stand as

maintained in the claim petition.

6.

To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/A, seniority list Ex. PW1/B to Ex. PW1/D, copy

of order dated 19.5.2011 Ex. PW1/E, copy of order dated 11.8.2015 Ex. PW1/F and closed

evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondent had

examined Shri K. L. Sharma, Deputy Director, Horticulture, Chamba as RW1 who tendered/proved

his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. RW1/B copy of mandays chart of petitioner, Ex.

RW1/C letter No.15-80/79-Horticulture, copy of certificate dated 3.9.2011 Ex. RW1/D and

closed evidence.

7.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

12.12.2011 qua his termination of service during year, 2003 by respondent suffers

from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during year

2003 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

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4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief :

8.

I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel as well as Ld. Dy. D.A. for

respondent gone through evidence on record carefully relevant for disposal of the present

reference.

9.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my

findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:

Issue No.1

: Discussed

Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.75,000/- per

operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No. 1 to 3:

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. It is admitted case of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged by

respondent on 3.1.1992 who worked as daily wage labourer intermittently till 2003. Be it

noticed that the respondent had not placed/exhibited on record any document evidencing that the

services of the petitioner used to be engaged for specific period or for short spell of 10-15

days to knowledge of peittioner. The case of the petitioner remains that he was engaged as beldar

by the respondent in the year 1992 and worked till 2003 on which date his services were illegally

terminated and that he had completed 240 days continuously preceding 12 months from date of

termination On the other hand, it remains the plea of the respondent that the petitioner was

engaged as casual labourer in the year 1992 who had not completed 240 days in any calendar

year since his initial engagement as petitioner is alleged to have abandoned the job of his own

sweet will and convenience during year 2003. However, there is nothing on record to establish

that the petitioner had completed 240 days in the 12 calendar months preceding his termination

except bald statement of the petitioner. On the other hand, the mandays chart of the petitioner

which has been placed on record as Ex. RW1/B by the respondent establish that the petitioner

has factually not completed 240 days in 12 calendar months preceding his termination. The perusal

of mandays chart of the petitioner Ex. RW1/B shows that petitioner had worked only for 45

days during the year 1992, 08 days in 1995, 21 days in 2000, 222 days in 2001, 177 days in

2002 and 83 days in 2003. In view of mandays chart referred to above plea of petitioner having

completed 240 days in 12 calendar months preceding his termination cannot be accepted and thus

retrenchment of petitioner cannot be said to be in violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the

Act.

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12. It is also remains the plea of the petitioner that the services of Shakuntla Devi

and Kaushalya Devi and others as mentioned in his affidavit have been regularized despite the

fact that they were appointed much after petitioner however such plea of the petitioner has

been denied by the respondent. On the other hand, plea of the respondent remains that persons

figuring at serial Nos. 17 to 24 in the seniority list Ex. PW1/D were re-engaged as per orders of

the Hon'ble High Court and they were not junior to the petitioner. It further the plea of respondent

that services of workmen at serial No. 17 to 24 have been regularized as they had completed 240

days in each calendar year which was only the criteria for regularization of daily wagers.

13. The plea of the petitioner remains that service of petitioner was illegally

terminated by the respondent by verbal order in the year 2003 which had been denied by

respondent. On the contrary, it is the plea of the respondent that the petitioner had left the job of

his own accord and free volition. To support the plea of the abandonment, the respondent had

examined Shri K.L.Sharma, Deputy Director, Horticulture, Chamba as RW1 who has deposed

that the services of petitioner were engaged in the year 1992 who worked upto 2003. It is

admitted case of respondent/department to have engaged petitioner on muster roll basis

however denied services of petitioner were retrenched. It is admitted case of respondent that neither

notice nor compensation in lieu of notice was ever given to petitioner. It is admitted that no

approval was taken from the government at the time of retrenchment of the service of

petitioner. It is denied that department had not followed principle of 'Last come First go'. It is

admitted that when respondent/department had given work to petitioner he always remained

present for the work. It was denied that petitioner was not kept on seasonal work. There is nothing

on record to remotely suggest that any notice was served upon the petitioner for his willful

and unauthorized absence from the duty. There is also no documentary evidence on record to

show that some correspondence worth the name in this behalf had been addressed to the

petitioner. Nothing except the bald statement of RW-1, the respondent in this case there is

nothing to show that the petitioner had in fact abandoned the job. It is well settled preposition of

law that the 'abandonment' has to be established by leading evidence and it is a 'question of fact'

which has to be determined in the light of surrounding circumstances of each case, as has been

held by our own Hon'ble High Court in a case titled State of H.P. vs. Bhatag Ram and Anr.

(2007 Latest HLJ 903). Absence from duty is a serious misconduct and admittedly no disciplinary

proceedings was ever initiated against the petitioner by the respondent for his alleged willful

absence from duty. In view of same, bald and uncorroborated statement of RW-1 cannot be

relied upon qua allegation of abandonment of job by petitioner moreso when there is no iota of

evidence on record of respondent establishing that any notice was issued which was served

upon petitioner and there being no record of initiation of disciplinary proceedings and thus for

want of such specific evidence inference of abandonment could not be drawn and thus it is held

that petitioner had not abandoned the job.

14. It also remains plea of the petitioner that the persons junior to him namely Devi

Parkash, Jagat Ram, Man Singh and others have been retained in service which was in

violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. It is not disputed by the respondent that

the abovestated workmen were engaged as daily waged labourers who were still continuously

working with the respondent/department. This fact also finds support from seniority list Ex.

PW1/D, which establishes that workmen mentioned in serial Nos. 17 to 24 were initially

engaged during the years 1998, 1999, 2000 & 2001 respectively who were junior to the

petitioner and admittedly engaged during January, 1992 and have still been retained in service by

the respondent/department. In his cross-examination, RW1 has specifically admitted when

petitioner and other workers were retrenched in the year 2003 and that some of the workers had

been re-engaged by the respondent/department except the petitioner and their services had been

regularized. In view of foregoing, the respondent can be safely held to have violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act which is mandatory in nature and non-compliance of the said

provision vitiates retrenchment entitling petitioner for relief claimed.

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15. It is by now well settled that for seeking the protection of Sections 25-G of the Act,

the requirement of having completed 240 days is not a condition precedent as has been held by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419 and

Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, AIR 2010 SC 1116. In HP

State Electricity Board vs. Shri Charan Dass 2012(1) Him. L.R. (DB) 320. It has come in the

evidence that respondent failed to establish that the petitioner has abandoned the job of his own

free will as discussed in foregoing paras and the respondent retained the daily waged labourer who

were junior to the petitioner in service whereas case of the respondent remains that no person

junior to the petitioner save and except those who were ordered to be reinstated by the Court,

were retained in service. In such circumstances, it was held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P.

that the plea of the respondent itself reveals that the persons junior to the petitioner have been

retained in service and as such the respondent is held to have violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and that completion of 240 days by the workman in a calendar

year is not required for seeking the protection under Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act in view of

law laid down in judgments (supra). Thus, in view of such settled preposition of law even if

the petitioner has not completed the requisite number of days in the 12 calendar months

preceding his termination, the respondent was still bound to follow the principle of 'last come

first go', which has not been done in the present case while engaging junior persons. Thus,

the termination of the services of the petitioner is illegal being against the mandatory

provisions of Sections 25-G of the Act.

16. On perusal of the statement of claim as filed by the petitioner and his statement on

oath while appearing as PW1, it is clear that the petitioner has not uttered a single word that he

was not gainfully employed during the period of his retrenchment till filing of the claim rather

admitted that petitioner had cultivable land from which he could have his livelihood. In view of

this, the petitioner has failed to discharge the initial onus that during the period of his

retrenchment till filing of the claim, he was not gainfully employed. The petitioner while

appearing as PW1 has stated his age as 42 years and it can be safely assumed that a young man

like the petitioner would not have sat ideally at home during the period despite the fact

that he was out of the job. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that

after petitioner's termination in the year 2003, he had remained unemployed and was not earning

anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld.

Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of

the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private

labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied from admission of

petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from

agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural

and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because

the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in

gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his

livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not

be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of

workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was

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illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although

remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully

employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being

terminated by the respondent.

17. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/

Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the

employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

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industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of

material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

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18. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute was

raised after eight years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld. AR for

the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble High

Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may

be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even

longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu Ram,

Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High

Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar

view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that

the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes

Act.

19. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination

of service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

20. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/

petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash Kumar Paul

vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has held that a

Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a

situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going to retire

shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in capacitated to

discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the

management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts

which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that has to

be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should

be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the

aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a worker may

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be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment certainly not correctly

appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are

illustrative in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that

does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of

duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met requirement,

cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be

appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex

Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)

and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager,

Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652. I have gone

through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of

reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon

the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been

contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode

of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for

reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance

of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal

Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of

Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did

not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view

was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for

merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground

of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to

consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous

to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering

compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as

Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the

Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First

go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment

was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation.

21. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/

circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and

21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as

Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh

provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep

in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial

dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial

dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded

by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the

Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is

not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-

with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within

six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have

weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 06 years and actually worked

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for 556 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in

2003 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of

demand notice after about eight years i.e. demand notice was given on 12.12.2011. Taking

into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court

referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but

a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139) FLR 25

(SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is

more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground

of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as Raghubir

Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the

Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous

judgment in the year 2013 i.e. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these judgments which

are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground

of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of 2013.

22. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees

seventy five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in

the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of

compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which

the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

23. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

24. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of

the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so

awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum

on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

25. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

26. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

27. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-

INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref. No.

: 378/2015

Date of Institution

: 18-8-2015

Date of decision

: 20-9-2017

Shri Kirpa Ram s/o Shri Rasalu, r/o Village Salla, P.O. Mani, Tehsil and District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Deputy Director of Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Ld. Dy.D.A.

AWARD

The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Kirpa Ram s/o Shri Rasalu, r/o

Village Salla, P.O. Mani, Tehsil and District Chamba, H.P. before the Deputy Director of

Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 12.12.2011

regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during year, 2003 suffers from delay and

laches? If not, Whether termination of the service of Shri Kirpa Ram s/o Shri Rasalu Ram,

r/o Village Salla, P.O. Mani, Tehsil and District Chamba, H.P. by the Deputy Director

of Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. during year, 2003 without complying the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount

of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved

workman is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 20th February,

2016 was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:

“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 05-08-

2015, the date of termination of services of Shri Kirpa Ram s/o Shri Rasalu, r/o Village

Salla, P.O. Mani, Tehsil and District Chamba, H.P. may be read as "21-06-2005"

instead of "year, 2003", which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification”.

3.

On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the

parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim before this court.

4.

Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner was engaged as

daily waged labourer on muster roll basis with the respondent department in PCDO Rajpura

w.e.f. 01.01.1992 who worked continuously with intermittent/artificial breaks. On 21.6.2005,

the respondent had orally terminated services of petitioner without any reason whereas the

workers junior to petitioner had been retained and their services have been regularized

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however service of petitioner was terminated on 21.6.2005. It is further alleged that when the

services of petitioner were illegally terminated orally on 21.5.2006 it was assured that

petitioner would be engaged on contract basis but when petitioner requested with the officers/

officials of respondent/department not to change his service condition from daily wage to contract

but it was of no avail. It is alleged that petitioner had given short term/spell of 10-15 days on

contract basis in a year just to deprive the petitioner from continuity and seniority which is unfair

labour practice within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act whereas the respondent had

retained junior workers continuously on muster roll basis who were consequently regularized. It is

further alleged that respondent had not followed the relevant provisions of Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter called as 'the Act' for brevity) and had also not taken any prior approval

from the appropriate government as well as written consent from petitioner. As respondent in

gross violation of statutory provisions of law had changed service conditions of petitioner due

to which he could not complete criteria of 240 days in each calendar year by which petitioner

was deprived from benefit of regularization. It is further averred that the respondent had

appointed/engaged many daily waged junior to the petitioner namely Amar Nath, Khairati Ram,

Om Prakash, Roshan Lal, Dharam Chand, Narain Singh, Suresh Kumar, Ghinder Dutt, Hans

Raj, Joginder Singh, Dharam Chand, Jodh Singh, Devi Parshad, Jagat Ram, Man Singh, Mukesh

Kumari, Punam, Shakuntla, Sushil Kumar, Kartar Chand, Devinder, Kaushalya, Sudarshna Devi

and Bachan Singh who were appointed in the years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004

respectively and their service have been regularized. It is also averred that respondent had not

followed the provisions of Section 25-G of 'the Act' while engaging the services of abovestated

juniors on muster roll but changed the service condition of petitioner. It is further alleged that

respondent had given spotless services to the respondent/department who had never been charge-

sheeted for any act of indiscipline, negligence of work or misconduct however petitioner had

worked with full devotion. It is alleged that respondent had committed gross violation of

statutory provision of Sections 25-B, 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act in malafide, arbitrary,

unconstitutional, illegal and unjustified manner besides violating principle of natural justice which

was to 'unfair labour practice' within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner thus

prayed that oral orders of illegal termination/retrenchment from daily waged services from

21.6.2005 be set aside being illegal, malafide, arbitrary and unjustified and petitioner be engaged

on daily waged basis because juniors workmen engaged after him had been working

continuously on daily waged basis with the respondent. It is further prayed that the petitioner be

reinstated along with full back wages, seniority, continuity in service as the petitioner remained

unemployed from the date of his illegal retrenchment/termination. It is prayed that the period of

intermittent/fictional breaks which has been given to the petitioner during period from 1.1.1992

onward for calculation of continuous service of 240 days in each year under Section 25-B of the

Act and regularize the service of petitioner w.e.f. 1.1.2002 as per Govt. regularization policy

framed in view of Hon'ble Apex Court decision in Mool Raj Upadhayay vs. State of H.P. and

others and from the date of regularization of juniors of petitioner alongwith all consequential

service benefits.

5.

The respondent contested the claim petition filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary

objections qua maintainability, claim of the petitioner being bad on account of delay and

laches. On merits, admitted that the petitioner was initially engaged as daily waged labourer to

carryout seasonal and occasional work in the year 1992 subject to work and funds besides stated

that he had not completed 240 days in any calendar year since his initial engagement was as

intermittent worker for seasonal work and the petitioner had worked with the respondent as

per his own convenience and sweet will. It is further stated that petitioner had worked with the

respondent/department upto the year 2005 and thereafter 'abandoned' the job at his own sweet will

and convenience and never reported for work after 2005. It is alleged that petitioner had never

worked with the respondent/department during the years 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998. It is,

however, denied that the services of the petitioner had been terminated by the respondent and that

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junior workmen had been retained by respondent continuously and not violated provisions of

Section 25-G of the Act. It is denied that respondent had intentionally provided work to

petitioner for short term/spell of 10-15 days however no assurance was given to petitioner to

engage him on contract basis. It is also denied that respondent had changed the service

condition of petitioner who is opted to have never completed 240 days of work in each calendar

year since petitioner did not come for work with the respondent after the year 2005. It is averred

that only those workers had been regularized by the respondent/department who had completed

the requisite criteria for regularization as per the government policy and as such the respondent

had not violated any principle of 'Last come First go'. It is stated that the services of petitioner

were engaged by the respondent intermittently for seasonal work which was already known to

petitioner and no fictional breaks were ever given to petitioner by the respondent. It is contended

that no new/fresh workmen/labourers had been engaged by respondent and as such there was no

violation of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The respondent thus alleges claim

petition to be devoid of merit which was accordingly sought to be dismissed.

6.

The petitioner filed rejoinder to reply filed by respondent, reiterated his stand as

maintained in the claim petition.

7.

To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/A, seniority list Ex. PW1/B to Ex. PW1/D, copy

of order dated 19.5.2011 Ex. PW1/E, copy of order dated 11.8.2015 Ex. PW1/F and closed

evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondent had

examined Shri K. L. Sharma, Deputy Director, Horticulture, Chamba as RW1 who tendered/proved

his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. RW1/B copy of mandays chart of petitioner, Ex.

RW1/C letter No.15-80/79-Horticulture, copy of certificate dated 3.9.2011 Ex. RW1/D and

closed evidence.

8.

From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 24.10.2016 for

determination:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

12.12.2011 qua his termination of service w.e.f. 21.6.2005 by respondent suffers

from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during

21.6.2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . .OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief:

9.

I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel as well as Ld. Dy. D.A. for

respondent gone through evidence on record carefully relevant for disposal of the present

reference.

10. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my

findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:

Issue No.1

: Discussed

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Issue No.2

: Yes

Issue No.3

: Discussed

Issue No.4

: No

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,60,000/-

per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No. 1 to 3 :

11. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected

which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

12. It is admitted case of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged by

respondent on 1992 who worked as daily wage labourer intermittently till 21.6.2005. Be it noticed

that the respondent had not placed/exhibited on record any document evidencing that the services

of the petitioner used to be engaged for specific period or for short spell of 10-15 days to

knowledge of peittioner. The case of the petitioner remains that he was engaged as beldar by the

respondent in the year 1992 and worked till 21.6.2005 on which date his services were

illegally terminated and that he had completed 240 days continuously preceding 12 months from

date of termination On the other hand, it remains the plea of the respondent that the petitioner

was engaged as casual labourer in the year 1992 who had not completed 240 days in any

calendar year since his initial engagement as petitioner is alleged to have abandoned the job of his

own sweet will and convenience in the month of June, 2005. However, there is nothing on record

to establish that that the petitioner had completed 240 days in the 12 calendar months preceding

his termination except bald statement of the petitioner. On the other hand, the mandays chart of

the petitioner which has been placed on record as Ex. RW1/B by the respondent establish

that the petitioner has factually not completed 240 days in 12 calendar months preceding his

termination. The perusal of mandays chart of the petitioner Ex. RW1/B shows that petitioner had

worked only for 29 days during the year 1992, 08 days in 1994, 194 days in 1999, 229 days in

2000, 230 days in 2001, 158 days in 2002, 216 days in 2003, 211 days in 2004 and 81 days in 2005.

In view of mandays chart referred to above plea of petitioner having completed 240 days in 12

calendar months preceding his termination cannot be accepted and thus retrenchment of

petitioner cannot be said to be in violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

13. It is also remains the plea of the petitioner that the services of Shakuntla Devi

and Kaushalya Devi and others as mentioned in his affidavit have been regularized despite the

fact that they were appointed much after petitioner however such plea of the petitioner has

been denied by the respondent. On the other hand, plea of the respondent remains that persons

figuring at serial Nos. 17 to 24 in the seniority list Ex. PW1/D were re-engaged as per orders of

the Hon'ble High Court and they were not junior to the petitioner. It further the plea of respondent

that services of workmen at serial No. 17 to 24 have been regularized as they had completed 240

days in each calendar year which was only the criteria for regularization of daily wagers.

14. The plea of the petitioner remains that service of petitioner was illegally

terminated by the respondent by verbal order in June, 2005 which had been denied by

respondent. On the contrary, it is the plea of the respondent that the petitioner had left the job of

his own accord and free volition. To support the plea of the abandonment, the respondent had

examined Shri K. L. Sharma, Deputy Director, Horticulture, Chamba as RW1 who has

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deposed that the services of petitioner were engaged in the year 1992 who worked upto 2005.

It is admitted case of respondent/department to have engaged petitioner on muster roll basis

however denied services of petitioner were retrenched. It is admitted case of respondent that neither

notice nor compensation in lieu of notice was ever given to petitioner. It is admitted that no

approval was taken from the government at the time of retrenchment of the service of

petitioner. It is denied that department had not followed principle of 'Last come First go'. It is

admitted that when respondent/department had given work to petitioner he always remained

present for the work. It was denied that petitioner was not kept on seasonal work. There is nothing

on record to remotely suggest that any notice was served upon the petitioner for his willful

and unauthorized absence from the duty. There is also no documentary evidence on record to

show that some correspondence worth the name in this behalf had been addressed to the

petitioner. Nothing except the bald statement of RW-1, the respondent in this case there is

nothing to show that the petitioner had in fact abandoned the job. It is well settled preposition of

law that the 'abandonment' has to be established by leading evidence and it is a 'question of fact'

which has to be determined in the light of surrounding circumstances of each case, as has been

held by our own Hon'ble High Court in a case titled State of H.P. vs. Bhatag Ram and Anr.

(2007 Latest HLJ 903). Absence from duty is a serious misconduct and admittedly no disciplinary

proceedings was ever initiated against the petitioner by the respondent for his alleged willful

absence from duty. In view of same, bald and uncorroborated statement of RW-1 cannot be

relied upon qua allegation of abandonment of job by petitioner moreso when there is no iota of

evidence on record of respondent establishing that any notice was issued which was served

upon petitioner and there being no record of initiation of disciplinary proceedings and thus for

want of such specific evidence inference of abandonment could not be drawn and thus it is held

that petitioner had not abandoned the job.

15. It also remains plea of the petitioner that the persons junior to him namely Devi

Parkash, Jagat Ram, Man Singh and others have been retained in service which was in

violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. It is not disputed by the respondent that

the abovestated workmen were engaged as daily waged labourers who were still continuously

working with the respondent/department. This fact also finds support from seniority list Ex.

PW1/D, which establishes that workmen mentioned in serial Nos. 17 to 24 were initially

engaged during the years 1998, 1999, 2000 & 2001 respectively who were junior to the

petitioner and admittedly engaged during January, 1992 and have still been retained in service by

the respondent/department. In his cross-examination, RW1 has specifically admitted when

petitioner and other workers were retrenched in the year 2005 and that some of the workers had

been reengaged by the respondent/department except the petitioner and their services had been

regularized. In view of foregoing, the respondent can be safely held to have violated the provisions

of Section 25-G of the Act which is mandatory in nature and non-compliance of the said

provision vitiates retrenchment entitling petitioner for relief claimed.

16. It is by now well settled that for seeking the protection of Sections 25- G of the Act,

the requirement of having completed 240 days is not a condition precedent as has been held

by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419

and Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, AIR 2010 SC 1116. In HP

State Electricity Board vs. Shri Charan Dass 2012(1) Him. L.R. (DB) 320. It has come in the

evidence that respondent failed to establish that the petitioner has abandoned the job of his own

free will as discussed in foregoing paras and the respondent retained the daily waged labourer who

were junior to the petitioner in service whereas case of the respondent remains that no person

junior to the petitioner save and except those who were ordered to be reinstated by the Court,

were retained in service. In such circumstances, it was held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P.

that the plea of the respondent itself reveals that the persons junior to the petitioner have been

retained in service and as such the respondent is held to have violated the provisions of

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Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and that completion of 240 days by the workman in a calendar

year is not required for seeking the protection under Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act in view of

law laid down in judgments (supra). Thus, in view of such settled preposition of law even if

the petitioner has not completed the requisite number of days in the 12 calendar months

preceding his termination, the respondent was still bound to follow the principle of 'last come

first go', which has not been done in the present case while engaging junior persons. Thus,

the termination of the services of the petitioner is illegal being against the mandatory

provisions of Sections 25-G of the Act.

17. On perusal of the statement of claim as filed by the petitioner and his statement on

oath while appearing as PW1, it is clear that the petitioner has not uttered a single word that he

was not gainfully employed during the period of his retrenchment till filing of the claim rather

admitted that petitioner had cultivable land from which he could have his livelihood. In view of

this, the petitioner has failed to discharge the initial onus that during the period of his

retrenchment till filing of the claim, he was not gainfully employed. The petitioner while

appearing as PW1 has stated his age as 36 years and it can be safely assumed that a young man

like the petitioner would not have sat ideally at home during the period despite the fact

that he was out of the job. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that

after petitioner's termination in June, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning

anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld.

Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of

the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private

labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied from admission of

petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from

agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been

placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court North East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation vs. M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of

Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that 'term gainfully employment

would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either

from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the

sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same’. Applying the ratio of

judgment of 2007 (supra) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural

and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that

petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in Deepali Gundu

Surwase’s case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because

the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in

gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his

livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not

be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of

workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was

illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although

remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully

employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being

terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is

inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the

other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

titled Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014 Lab

IC 4266 (SC) and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

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“12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the

Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned

Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be

applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court

has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the

case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason

the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has

categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no

application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen

and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the

appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief

accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court

is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the

jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the

Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in

Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of

delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. Telecom

District Manager, Karnataka[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

“17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the

dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants.

We cannot agree...... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results

in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has

resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not

available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable

as to disentitle the appellants for any relief.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court

to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a

reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed,

firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had

assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case.

Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of

material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the

industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely

erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his

employer.

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15. In the case of Ajaib Singh vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-cum-

Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be

denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

“10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised

by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice

and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the

date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The

Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead

of full back wages.....” (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case

that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance

given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal

case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of

dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant

and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since

the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly

referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour

Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the

additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by

the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the

legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters

Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the

power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of

the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties

referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the

foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public

interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with

vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been

pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute

was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon’ble

High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram’s case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute

may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments

even longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs. Garibu

Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon‟ble

High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

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Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has

been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the

Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of

petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments

advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of

Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing

Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125], the relevant para of the

judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-

Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had

completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section

25-F of the I.D. Act-Wokrman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of

Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six

weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of

service-Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to

reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an

important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting

relief”.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for

claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Tapash

Kumar Paul vs. BSNL & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 357 wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has

held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same

has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be

granted in a situation where the industry is closed or that employees has superannuated or going

to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit or where workman has been rendered in

capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of

the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on

facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that

has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement

should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner

with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only four situations when a

worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment certainly not

correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which

are illustrative in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that

does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding

compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the

job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of

duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 supra) even if not met requirement,

cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be

appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex

Court titled as Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)

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and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121, Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager,

Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in 2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652. I have gone

through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of

reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon

the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar

Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another reported in AIR 2015 SC 3473. It has been

contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode

of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment AIR 2015 SC supra, claim of petitioner for

reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance

of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in 2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502 titled as State of Himachal

Pradesh and another vs. Chaman Singh relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of

Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did

not apply to industrial disputes. In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC) similar view

was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for

merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground

of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to

consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous

to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering

compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as

Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd. vs. Mackinon Employees Union is concerned, the

Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First

go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment

was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it

can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/

circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and

21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC) titled as

Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another vs. Geetam Singh

provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep

in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of

employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in

raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised

industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised

industrial dispute after six years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation

awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by

the Division Bench but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances

is not the appropriate relief and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh

along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation

within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors

which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09 years and

actually worked for 1356 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner

were disengaged in June, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute

by issuance of demand notice after about six years i.e. demand notice was given on 12.12.2011.

Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex

Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back

wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment 2013 (139)

FLR 25 (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and

laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the

ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2014 titled as

Raghubir Singh’s case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also

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the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

previous judgment in the year 2013 i.e.Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture

Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal’s case. I have gone through these

judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the

petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid

down in judgment of 2013.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,60,000/-

(Rupees one lakh sixty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is

entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear

that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award

failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till

its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No. 4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the

Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in

reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.

Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not

maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of

petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay

the compensation of Rs.1,60,000/- (Rupees one lakh sixty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation

so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of

receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum

on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar

circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in

the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 29th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-

(K. K. SHARMA),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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INDUSTRIES DEPARTMENT

A-Section

NOTIFICATION

Shimla-2,the 12th July, 2018

No. Ind-A(B)8-4/2017.—On the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion

Committee, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order the promotion of Shri Pranav

Kumar, Industrial Promotion Officer to the post of Manager, DIC (Class-II, Gazetted) in the pay

scale of `10300-34800+`4400 Grade pay in the Department of Industries, H.P. with immediate

effect.

The Governor, Himachal Pradesh is further pleased to order the posting of Shri Pranav

Kumar, Manager at DIC Kangra against vacant post, with immediate effect, in public interest.

The officer shall remain on probation for a period of two years. He will also exercise option

for fixation of pay under the provisions of FR-22, within a period of one month from the date of

issue of this Notification.

The above Officer is directed to join his duties within 10 days and submit his joining report

to this Department through the Director of Industries, H.P., failing which the promotion orders will

automatically be treated as withdrawn.

By order,

R. D. DHIMAN, IAS,

Principal Secretary (Inds.).

__________

In the Court of Shri Chander Mohan Thakur, Executive Magistrate (Naib-Tehsildar)

Solan, District Solan, H. P.

In the matter of :

Ms. Poonam Thapa d/o Sh. Sher Singh, r/o Village & P.O. Basal, Tehsil & District Solan,

Himachal Pradesh

. . Applicant.

Versus

General Public

. . Respondent.

Application under section 13(3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.

Ms. Poonam Thapa d/o Sh. Sher Singh, r/o Village & P.O. Basal, Tehsil & District Solan,

Himachal Pradesh has moved an application before the undersigned under section 13(3) of Birth &

Death Registration Act, 1969 alongwith affidavit and other documents for enter her birth in the

record of Gram Panchayat Basal, she was born on 08-08-1981 at Village Basal, Tehsil & District

Solan, but her birth could not be entered in the record of Gram Panchayat Basal, Tehsil & District

Solan.

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Therefore, by this proclamation, the general public is hereby informed that any person

having any objection for the delayed registration of birth of Poonam Thapa d/o Sh. Sher Singh may

submit their objection in writing or appear in person in this court on or before 18-07-2018 at 10.00

A.M. failing which no objection will be entertained after expiry of date.

Given under my hand and seal of the court on this 9th day of June, 2018.

Seal.

CHANDER MOHAN THAKUR,

Executive Magistrate (Tehsildar),

Solan, District Solan, H. P.

___________

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In the Court of Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bangana, District Una,

Himachal Pradesh

In the matter of :

1.

Shri Dinesh Kumar age 27 years s/o Shri Chain Singh, Village Paproli, P.O. Nahri

Devi Singh, Tehsil Bangana, District Una, Himachal Pradesh.

3367

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 16 tqykbZ] 2018@25 vk"kk<+] 1940

2. Baby age 34 years d/o Sh. Rattan Chand, Village Salasi, Tehsil Sujanpur & District

Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh

.. Applicants.

Versus

General Public

Subject .—Application for registration of marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954.

Whereas a application under section 15 of the Special Marriage Act has been received on

20-06-2018 by the undersigned from (1) Shri Dinesh Kumar age 27 years s/o Shri Chain Singh,

Village Paproli, P.O. Nahri Devi Singh, Tehsil Bangana, District Una, Himachal Pradesh (2) Baby

age 34 years d/o Sh. Rattan Chand, Village Salasi, Tehsil Sujanpur & District Hamirpur, Himachal

Pradesh for the registration of their marriage. Hence, this proclamation is hereby issued for the

information of general public that if any person has any objection for the registration of the above

marriage, he/she can appear in this Court on or before 27-07-2018 to object registration of marriage

either personally or through an authorized agent failing which marriage will be registered under this

Act, accordingly.

Issued today on 29-06-2018 under my hand and seal of the court.

Seal.

Sd/-

Marriage Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate,

Bangana,District Una (H.P.).

_____________

CHANGE OF NAME

I, Aruna Kumari (d/o Shri Jagir Singh) w/o Shri Kulbhushan Singh Thakur, Village

Surajpur, P.O. Dhaliara, Tehsil Dehra, Distt. Kangra, H.P., employed in Govt. Primary School

Badhal Noun, Elementary Education Block Dadasiba in H.P. Department of Elementary Education,

has changed my name from Aruna Kumari to Aruna Thakur. All concerned to note please.

ARUNA THAKUR,

(d/o Jagir Singh ) w/o Shri Kulbhushan Singh Thakur,

Village Surajpur, P.O. Dhaliara,

Tehsil Dehra, Distt. Kangra, H.P.

3368

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 16 tqykbZ] 2018@25 vk"kk<+] 1940

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