jkti=] fgekpy izns'k
fgekpy izns'k jkT; 'kklu }kjk izdkf'kr
lkseokj] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
fgekpy izns'k ljdkj
LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT
NOTIFICATION
Dharamshala, the 29th October, 2018
No. Shram (A) 6-2/2014 (Awards).—In exercise of the powers vested under section 17 (1)
of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order the
publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court
23&jkti=@2019&29&04&2019
¼1095½
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Dharamshala on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment Government of Himachal
Pradesh.—
Sl. No.
Ref.
No.
Petitioner
Respondent
Date of Award/
Order
1.
482/16
Madan Lal
D.F.O. Nurpur
02-04-2018
2.
206/16
Gulab Deen
E.E. HPPWD, Nurpur
04-04-2018
3.
228/16
Prem Singh
E.E. HPPWD, Nurpur
04-04-2018
4.
269/16
Krishan Singh
E.E. HPPWD, Nurpur
04-04-2018
5.
209/16
Prakash Chand
E.E. HPPWD, Nurpur
04-04-2018
6.
224/16
Desh Raj
E.E. HPPWD, Nurpur
04-04-2018
7.
207/16
Jaram Singh
E.E. HPPWD, Nurpur
04-04-2018
8.
225/16
Om Prakash
E.E. HPPWD, Nurpur
04-04-2018
9.
256/16
Mohinder Pal
E.E. HPPWD, Nurpur
04-04-2018
10.
413/16
Subhash Singh
E.E. HPPWD, Nurpur
04-04-2018
11.
418/16
Sham Lal
E.E. HPPWD, Nurpur
04-04-2018
12.
407/16
Des Raj
E.E. HPPWD, Nurpur
04-04-2018
13.
267/16
Budhi Ram
E.E. HPPWD, Nurpur
04-04-2018
14.
410/16
Vijay Kumar
E.E. HPPWD, Nurpur
04-04-2018
15.
208/16
Mohinder Singh
E.E. HPPWD, Nurpur
04-04-2018
16.
329/15
Sanjeev Kumar
M/s Pal Roller Flour Mill
04-04-2018
17.
119/16
Pipan Dei
E.E. HPPWD, Killar
21-04-2018
18.
594/16
Shounki Devi
E.E. HPPWD, Killar
21-04-2018
19.
310/15
Kamal Kishore
D.F.O. Joginder Nagar
24-04-2018
20.
11/15
Raj Kumar
Dir. Institute of Biotechnology
24-04-2018
21.
10/15
Rajeev Kumar
Dir. Institute of Biotechnology
24-04-2018
22.
12/15
Anil Kumar
Dir. Institute of Biotechnology
24-04-2018
23.
13/15
Manjeet Kumar
Dir. Institute of Biotechnology
24-04-2018
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24.
07/15
Suresh Kumar
Dir. Institute of Biotechnology
24-04-2018
25.
16/15
Sanjay Mohammad
Dir. Institute of Biotechnology
24-04-2018
26.
09/15
Joginder Singh
Dir. Institute of Biotechnology
24-04-2018
27.
62/15
Dev Raj
Dir. Institute of Biotechnology
24-04-2018
28.
08/15
Madan Lal
Dir. Institute of Biotechnology
24-04-2018
29.
06/15
Vipan Kumar
Dir. Institute of Biotechnology
24-04-2018
30.
17/15
Joginder Singh
Dir. Institute of Biotechnology
24-04-2018
31.
14/15
Rajesh Kumar
Dir. Institute of Biotechnology
24-04-2018
32.
44/15
Subhash Chand
Dir. Institute of Biotechnology
24-04-2018
33.
15/15
Rajeev Kumar
Dir. Institute of Biotechnology
24-04-2018
34.
509/16
Kamal Singh
M/s Universal Electric Energy
28-04-2018
35.
495/16
Harjinder Singh
M/s Universal Electric Energy
28-04-2018
36.
496/16
Sant Ram
M/s Universal Electric Energy
28-04-2018
37.
494/16
Banarasi Dass
M/s Universal Electric Energy
28-04-2018
38.
507/16
Pyar Singh
M/s Universal Electric Energy
28-04-2018
39.
508/16
Narender Kumar
M/s Universal Electric Energy
28-04-2018
40.
492/16
Bhupender Singh
M/s Universal Electric Energy
28-04-2018
41.
490/16
Kuldeep Singh
M/s Universal Electric Energy
28-04-2018
42.
491/16
Gurbhajan Singh
M/s Universal Electric Energy
28-04-2018
43.
493/16
Surender Kumar
M/s Universal Electric Energy
28-04-2018
By order,
NISHA SINGH, IAS
Addl. Chief Secretary (Lab. & Emp.).
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
482/2016
Date of Institution : 22-8-2016
Date of Decision :
02-04-2018
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Shri Madan Lal s/o Shri Ramel Singh, r/o Village Bhaloon, P.O. Kharota, Tehsil Jawali,
District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Divisional Forest Officer, Nurpur Forest Division, Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner
: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Madan Lal s/o Shri Ramel Singh, r/o
Village Bhaloon, P.O. Kharota, Tehsil Jawali, District Kangra, H.P. during April, 2002 by
the Divisional Forest Officer, Nurpur Forest Division, Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. who
was worked as beldar on daily wages basis and has raised his industrial dispute vide demand
notice dated 04-11-2013 after more than 9 years, allegedly without complying with the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view
of working period of 191, 264, 118 and 45 days during years 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002
respectively and delay of more than 9 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is
entitled to from the above employer/management?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition revealed that petitioner had been engaged
by respondent on daily waged basis on muster roll as beldar in the year, 1999 where he continued
to work under the Range Officer Jawali, upto April, 2001 along-with co-workers namely Jugal
Kishore and during the aforestated period the service of petitioner had been engaged and
disengaged by the Range Officer, Jawali without any instructions and respondent had given
fictional breaks to petitioner who had not completed 240 days for the purpose of continuous service
as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act'
for brevity). It is alleged that the service of petitioner had been terminated unlawfully by Range
Officer, Jawali w.e.f. April, 2001 without serving any notice, charge sheet nor any inquiry was
conducted against the misconduct of petitioner however no retrenchment compensation was paid to
the petitioner in lieu of notice period thereof and the respondent had violated the provisions of
Section 25-F (a) & (b) of the Act whereas petitioner had not completed 240 days prior to his
termination and the same was null and void. Aggrieved with termination order of respondent,
petitioner had approached the Hon'ble Administrative Tribunal by filing O.A. (D) No. 264/2001
and on 7-3-2002 the Hon'ble Administrative Tribunal had directed the petitioner to approach the
appropriate forum and the same was covered under the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the
Hon'ble Administrative Tribunal was no jurisdiction and the same was disposed of on ground of
jurisdiction thereafter petitioner had approached the respondent and raised demand notice dated
20-8-2002. It is further alleged that the respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come
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First go' when the service of petitioner had been engaged and disengaged from 1999 onwards and
finally terminated on April, 2001 whereas persons junior to petitioner namely Sanjeev Kumar who
had appointed in (1999), Sawroop Singh (12/1999), Shiv Kumar (2000), Budhia (1-1-2000), Onkar
Singh (1-1-2001) had been retained in service and after termination of service of petitioner
respondent had been appointed Fouza Singh who was appointed on 1-6-2008 and no opportunity of
re-employment had been given to petitioner however respondent had violated the provisions of
Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It is stated that petitioner again filed O.A. No. 370/2002 before
the Hon'ble Administrative Tribunal had been decided on 23-8-2004 however Conservator of
Forest, Dharamshala had called the petitioner vide letter dated 27-1-2005 whereas petitioner had
appeared but his case was not considered for reinstatement. Feeling aggrieved the action of
respondent in terminating the services of petitioner an industrial dispute was raised vide demand
notice dated 20-8-2002 but his dispute was not forwarded to the appropriate government. It is
alleged that Dy. Labour Commissioner had not examined the petitioner's demand notice properly. It
is alleged that one Smt. Renu Vaidya who had been terminated by Assistant Town Planner, Sub
Divisional Town Planning Office Chamba in the month of July, 1999 and she had raised her
demand notice in the year 2013 and the appropriate govt. had considered delay of 13 years as well
as this Tribunal has also considered delay of 13 years and the relief was granted to said Smt. Renu
Vaidya. It is alleged that respondent had orally terminated the services of petitioner in the month of
April, 2002 which was unjustified, arbitrary and unconstitutional, contrary, unlawful and against
the mandatory provisions of the Act and act of respondent was also unfair labour practice under
Section 2 (ra) read with Schedule 5th Clause 10 of the Act. It is alleged that the petitioner is still
unemployed and not gainfully employed anywhere from the date of his illegal termination.
Accordingly, prayer has been made to set aside the illegal termination order of petitioner directing
the respondent to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages, seniority and continuity in service
with all consequential benefits.
4.
The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, delay and laches. On merits admitted that petitioner was engaged as
daily wager on April, 1999 who intermittently worked upto April, 2001 under the Range Officer,
Jawali. It is denied that petitioner had not allowed to complete 240 days in a calendar year. It is
further stated that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and not completed 240 days in
any calendar year and as such there was no violation of Section 25-B of the Act. It is contended that
petitioner had not completed 240 days as he left the work of his own sweet will and the respondent
had not violated the provisions of Section 25-F (a) & (b) of the Act. It is denied that respondent had
not followed the principle of last come first go as juniors had been engaged by respondent. It is
stated that persons namely Subhash Singh, Budhiya never worked with Jawali Forest Range as well
as Sawarna Devi had been engaged on compassionate grounds. It is contended that persons namely
Sanjeev Kumar, Maru Ram, Sawroop etc. had been engaged by way of direction of Hon'ble
Administrative Tribunal as well as Fouza Singh was engaged in the year 1998 who was senior to
the petitioner. Alleges that question of termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent
does not arise. Delay in filing the claim petition is stated to be fatal to the case of petitioner and the
petitioner raised his claim when other workers raised demand notice and that petitioner was
gainfully employed as an agriculturist. Accordingly, petition was sought to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
6.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit under Order 18 Rule, 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A, copy of letter dated 25-11-2002 Ex. PW1/B,
copy of OA No.269/2002 Ex. PW1/C, copy of letter dated 27-1-2005 Ex. PW1/D, copy of seniority
list Ex. PW1/E, copy of mandays chart of Jugal Kishore Ex. PW1/F, copy of Award dated
15-6-2013 Ex. PW1/G and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the
petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Dinesh Sharma, the then Divisional Forest Officer,
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Nurpur Forest Division Nurpur as RW1 tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, mandays chart
of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of Fauja Singh Ex. RW1/C, copy of orders Ex.
RW1/D to Ex. RW1/G and closed the evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative/counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A.
representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this
case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20-1-2017 for
determination:
1.
Whether termination of services of the claimant/petitioner by the respondent during
April, 2002 and raised his industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 04-11-2013
is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form? . .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim petition suffers from vice of delay and laches as alleged. If so, its
effect?
. .OPR.
Relief.
9.
For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No. 1 : Yes
Issue No. 2 : Discussed
Issue No. 3 : No
Issue No. 4 : Discussed
Relief :
Petition is partly allowed awarding lump sum compensation of Rs.60,000/-
per operative part of award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1, 2 and 4 :
10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. It is pertinent to mention here that claim petition before this Court was filed by
petitioner in which he has prayed for setting aside the retrenchment order in the month of April,
2001 qua his illegal termination and sought direction to the effect that services of petitioner be
treated as continuous service till date with full back wages. It has further been prayed that services
of petitioner be regularized after completion of eight years of service on the basis of policy framed
by the State Govt. with all consequential benefits. Not only this, petitioner also prayed that his case
may also be considered for engagement in service as per policy framed by the State Govt. and to
another relief petitioner is entitled.
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12. A bare glance at claim petition would reveal that petitioner was appointed as daily
wage basis with the respondent in the year 1999 on muster roll basis as beldar who continued to
work till April, 2001 when his services were terminated without paying any retrenchment
compensation under Section 25-F of the Act. It is claimed that petitioner had completed more than
240 days in each calendar prior to his termination and that while retrenching the services of
petitioner principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as Sanjeev Kumar who had appointed
in (1999), Sawroop Singh (12/1999), Shiv Kumar (2000), Budhia (1-1-2000), Onkar Singh
(1-1-2001) were retained in service and thus the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not
followed by the respondent. Mandays chart Ex. RW1/B on record reveals that petitioner had
worked for 191 days in the year 1999, 264 days in 2000 and 45 days in 2001. Even if we look at the
mandays chart, this would show that immediately preceding his termination in 2001, petitioner has
factually worked for 45 days in 2001 days prior to termination. A bare glance at the mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B would reveal petitioner had not worked for more than 240 days immediately prior to
his retrenchment as stated above. Be it noticed that Fouza Singh and Swarna had been appointed in
2003 and 2008 respectively. It is pertinent to mention to state here that when persons mentioned in
para No. 4 of the affidavit Ex. PW1/A were engaged petitioner was factually not given offer for re-
employment which manifestly violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. From evidence, it
is evidently clear that after termination of petitioner he was available for job who was not appointed
however some persons fresh were allowed to join in service. As such, action of respondent in doing
so clearly violates Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty, respondent had not issued any notice
or letter. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner
abandoned the job. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against
petitioner even after April, 2001. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or
omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making
correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken
by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. As such, in absence
of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent
had established plea of abandonment.
14. In so far as violation of provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, suffice
would be to state here that persons mentioned in Senioirty list Ex. PW1/E were engaged after
termination of petitioner but no opportunity was given to petitioner for re-employment which
violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Close scrutiny of the petitioner in cross-
examination would reveal that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed for all the
workmen appointed in between 1999 to 2010 whereas petitioner had been retrenched in April, 2001
and thereafter several persons were engaged in service but petitioner has not given any opportunity
for re-employment. Since the persons mentioned in para 5 of claim petition as well as affidavit of
petitioner Ex. PW1/A had been appointed by 1999 to 2008 provisions of Section 25-G of the Act
could not be stated to have been violated. It is pertinent to mention to state here that when persons
mentioned in Para No. 5 of the claim petition were engaged and petitioner was not given offer for
re-employment which manifestly violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. From
evidence, it is evidently clear that after termination of petitioner he was available for job who was
not appointed however some persons fresh were allowed to join in service. As such, which is
clearly violation of Section 25-H of the Act.
15. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that petitioner be treated
in continuous service for eight years and for said reason the left period after April, 2001 be treated
as regular period. It is not understood as to how petitioner claim this benefit as petitioner never
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worked with the respondent/department after his termination as well as there is no adequate
evidence on record suggesting that petitioner had represented the respondent/department after his
termination, although petitioner had issued demand notice i.e. 4-11-2013 after about 9 years and
thus judgment of Hon'ble High Court reported in 2012 (132) FLR 528 (SC) titled as H.S.
Rajashekara and State Bank of Mysore and another does not come to the rescue of the
petitioner. Therefore, the entire period cannot be treated in service. As stated above that petitioner
remained out of job after his termination but there is nothing authenticated in evidence suggesting
that he remained without earning and petitioner as PW1 has nowhere stated that he had opted out
for job when terminated from service. As such, it is held that after his termination he was not in
government job and cross-examination of PW1 reveals that he had not been paid retrenchment
compensation and notice at the time of retrenchment. Since the respondent had failed to prove on
record any seniority list by which it would be stated that persons who were junior to petitioner were
retained in service whereas petitioner who was senior to persons mentioned and thus respondent
had clearly violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act. In view of ratio of judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2015 SC 1373 titled as Mackinon Machenize & Company
Ltd. Vs. Mackinon Employees Union which mandatorily requires the employer to circulate
seniority list as prepared. There is no iota of evidence on record remotely suggesting that
respondent had provided seniority list of daily waged workers. As such, plea of petitioner that he
was ignored and new hands were allowed to join is to be accepted. In view of foregoing
discussions, respondent is held to have violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act.
16. Ld. Authorized Representative/Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance of judgment
of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 titled as Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor
Sangh and Employers in Relation to Management of Kenduahih Colliery of M/s BCCL and
Ors., in which Hon'ble Apex Court has awarded compensation of Rs.4 lakh to each workman.
Similarly, reliance has placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana reported in
2014 LLR 967 titled as Deshsewak Foundry Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur
& Ors., in which compensation of Rs.5 lakh was awarded. In another judgment of Hon'ble High
Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench reported in 2017 (152) FLR 206, titled as Youth Co-ordinator,
Nehru Yuva Kendra and Labour Court No. 2, Jaipur and Anr. in which compensation of Rs. 2
lakh was granted to the workman who had merely worked for two years. Thus, above said
judgments disclosing awarding larger amount of compensation which the claimant/petitioner has
prayed for. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has relied upon judgment of Assistant Engineer Rajasthan
Development Corporation and another Vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893
(SC), in which various criteria to be looked by the Hon'ble Apex Court in awarding compensation.
It has been held that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view
all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length
of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial
dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute and in this judgment Hon'ble Apex Court had
awarded compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- only in lieu of reinstatement and consequential benefits to
a retrenched employee who had issued demand notice after about six years.
17. Since no straight-jacket formula can be applied for determining compensation as it is
to be awarded on the basis of facts of case. In 2014 LLR 967 Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &
Haryana had awarded compensation of Rs. 5 lac to claimant petitioner who was litigating for past
30 years. Similarly, in 2016 (151) FLR 1039 Hon'ble Apex Court awarded compensation to each
worker of Rs. 4 lacs. It was observed that many of the workmen were at age of retirement and that
nearly 27 years had elapsed since the time of retrenchment. Moreover, the workers who were
awarded compensation of Rs. 4 lac belonged to skilled category of Tyndals. As such, judgment
relied upon by ld. Counsel/Authorized Representative for petitioner does not apply to present case
rather applying the criteria laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Geetam Singh's case 2013 (136)
FLR 893 (SC) has been followed and applied.
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18. Ld. Counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence
that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that
termination of petitioner in this case took place in the month of April, 2001 and the industrial
dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld.
AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in 2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High
Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case) in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be
considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even
longer delay has been condoned. In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs. Garibu Ram,
Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High
Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar
view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82 in which it has been held that
the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes
Act.
19. Ld. Dy. D.A. has representing State/respondent has vehemently contended that
claimant/petitioner is not entitled for any relief either by way of reinstatement or compensation in
view of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2016 SC 2984 titled as Prabhakar vs.
Joint Director Sericulture Department and another. Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, it has
been contended that while making reference to the Labour Court by the Government, the competent
authority has to see that there is existence of an industrial dispute or apprehension of an industrial
dispute and if there is no live dispute or if dispute was no longer existing reference could not be
made at belated stage. On the other hand, ld. Authorized Representative for the petitioner has
contended that the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above does not come to the rescue
to the respondents moreso when government itself made reference and has not challenged the
correctness of reference before the Hon'ble High Court. I have carefully gone through the judgment
referred to above and of the view that the contention of the ld. Dy. D.A. is fallacious. It would be
relevant to refer to para 7 of the judgment in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held
that the issue which fell for determination is whether reference of such a belated claim was
appropriate. It was further observed that order of reference cannot be made mechanically without
forming an opinion as referred to in the other paragraphs of the judgment and order of making
reference is open to judicial review if it is shown that the appropriate government had no material
before it or it has not applied its mind to the material before it or has not taken into consideration
certain vital facts which it ought to have taken into consideration. In paragraph 23 Sub para (8) of
the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in which it has been specially observed that the High Court
can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very
jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It was submitted before the Hon'ble Apex Court that once a
reference has been made under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Labour Court has to
decide the same and the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the
Labour Court which was found be not correct proposition but certainly correctness of reference
under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act is not in challenge before this Court. Reliance has been
made on another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2000) 1 SCC 371, National Engg.
Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan in judgment of 2016 (supra). In Sapan Kumar Pandit's
(2000), case it was held that the period of making of reference is co extensive with the existence of
dispute, meaning thereby that the dispute should be alive on the day when the decision was taken to
make a reference or to refuse to make reference. Although, Hon'ble Apex Court has made
elaborated discussions qua consideration before making reference which is not issue before this
Court. The judgment referred in 2016 primarily reveals guidelines how reference under Section 10
of Industrial Disputes Act is to be made by competent authority under the Industrial Disputes Act.
In the judgment, there is no stipulation of violation of any other provisions of Industrial Disputes
Act in which had been denied either for relief of reinstatement or compensation. As such, this
judgment of (2016) does not apply to the present case which deals primarily with reference under
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Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act and not for wrongful termination under Section 25 of
Industrial Disputes Act. Moreover, the facts of case before the Hon'ble Apex Court are altogether
different from case in hand as in case before Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was educated person
working as clerk whereas the claimant before this Court is uneducated unskilled labourer besides
being an illiterate villager who had been engaged as labourer to manual work by respondents. On
this score also facts of case are different. Not only this, law of limitation is held to be not applicable
in view of observation made in para (18) of judgment (2016) supra. Accordingly, it is held that
judgment of 2016 does not apply to the present case having different facts as well as law.
20. Applying the ratio of aforesaid judgments more specifically judgment reported in 2013
(136) FLR 893 SC (supra) and that petitioner had rendered total service for four years who was
non-skilled worker ageing 47 years when his services were illegally terminated who is not likely to
get government job at this age and had factually worked for 618 days in all the four years
aforestated and that demand notice was issued after a period of 9 years by the petitioner and in view
peculiar facts and circumstances as stated above, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 60,000/-
(Rupees sixty thousand only) would be appropriate relief to the petitioner in lieu of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid
within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled
for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1, 2 and 4 are
answered accordingly.
Issue No. 3 :
21. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in
reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright.
Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of
petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
22. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay
the compensation of Rs. 60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the back
wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by
the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which
the respondents shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the
date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are
left to bear their own costs.
23. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
24. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
25. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 2nd day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
1105
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No.
: 206/2016
Date of Institution
: 11-04-2016
Date of Decision
: 04-04-2018
Shri Gulab Deen s/o Shri Meer Deen, r/o Village Manoharan, P.O. Sadwan, Tehsil Nurpur,
District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.
2.
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Jawali Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
For the Petitioner :
Sh. S.D. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of services Sh. Gulab Deen s/o Sh. Meer Deen r/o Village
Manoharan, P.O. Sadwan, Tehsil Nurpur, Distt. Kangra, H.P. from 1-9-1988 by the
Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Nurpur Division, Nurpur, Distt. Kangra, H.P., and (ii) the
Executive Engineer, HPPWD Jawali Division, Jawali, Distt. Kangra, (H.P.) who had
worked as beldar on daily wages basis only for 75.5 days during the year 3/1988 to 8/1988
and raised his Industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 24-11-2013 after more than 24
years, allegedly without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of working period as mentioned above and
delay of more than 24 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the
above employer/management?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
beldar on daily wages in the month of September, 1986 in Suliali Sub Division HPPWD falling
under HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. where he continuously worked till October,
1990 when he was disengaged by respondent illegally despite availability of work and funds. It is
alleged that HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. was involved in construction of road
Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and various sites adjoining to it but
service of petitioner was disengaged orally in October, 1990 in violation of law. It is further alleged
1106
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that petitioner had been engaged in construction of roads leading to villages, national highway and
had worked to the satisfaction of respondent and other superiors and there was no complaint against
him. It further transpires from claim petition that after termination of petitioner by the respondent,
he had made several verbal request to respondent by visiting its office as well as office at Sub
Division Suliali who was assured of re-engagement in 3-4 months but did not receive any response
from the respondent when petitioner had written various letters to department for re-engagement on
daily wage basis but was not engaged. It is alleged that a resolution on behalf of retrenched
workmen were also sent to Assistant Registrar to the Hon'ble H.P. State Administrative Tribunal,
Shimla which was pending and not decided till date. The grievance of the petitioner further remains
that petitioner and similarly situated workmen who had been engaged on daily wage basis by
HPPWD constituted one unit and procedure for retrenchment which involved applicability of
principle of 'Last come First go'. It is alleged that in utter disregard to the provisions of Section 25
G of Industrial Disputes Act junior persons had been retained whereas petitioner had been
disengaged more specifically one Smt. Kusam Sharma w/o Sh. Roshan Lal, Village & P.O. Suliali,
Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. who was retained in pursuance to letter of Engineer-in-Chief
vide letter No. 3058/61 dated 18-1-2000. It is claimed that said Kusam Sharma had joined HPPWD
Division Nurpur in the year 2000 after disengagement of petitioner in 1987 which clearly violates
Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside the order of verbal termination as petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding one year from date of termination and thus respondent had
violated Section 25-F of the Act. It is alleged that respondent had also not followed the procedure
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act after disengaging petitioner junior persons were engaged
and at the same time no notice for re-employment/re-engagement was issued calling upon
petitioner to join before engaging junior which violates Section 25-G of the Act. Accordingly,
petitioner seeks his reinstatement in service by respondent with seniority, back wages and all the
other consequential benefits.
4.
The respondent contested the claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied
that petitioner had been engaged as beldar in September, 1986 in HPPWD Division Nurpur rather
he was disengaged in October, 1990. It has been categorically stated that petitioner was engaged as
daily wager in Sub Division HPPWD Suliali falling under Jassur Division where he worked
intermittently between March, 1988 to August, 1988 and thereafter left the work and did not
approach the respondent/department. It is alleged that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted to
Jawali Division vide HP Government Notification No. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July,
1994 and strength and staff of Jassur Division was shifted to Jawali but area of Suliali Sub Division
was shifted to Nurpur Division. It has been emphatically denied that petitioner had completed 240
days rather claimed that petitioner merely worked from March, 1988 till August, 1988 who did not
complete 240 days in any calendar year as reflected in mandays chart. It is alleged that since Suliali
Sub Division was shifted to HPPWD Division Nurpur in 1994. As such, question of termination of
service of petitioner in October, 1990 did not arise. Moreover, petitioner is alleged to be gainfully
employed as an agriculturist. Reiterating his stand, it has been contended that petitioner left the
work of beldar in August, 1988. However, denied that any resolution was pending before Assistant
Registrar, H.P. State Administrative Tribunal for want of knowledge. In so far as Kusam Sharma is
concerned, it has been categorically stated that Kusam Sharma was engaged as helper on daily
wage basis by HPPWD Division Dalhousie in 1983 who worked intermittently till November, 1998
when said Kusam Sharma made representation to Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD Shimla in December,
1999 stipulating therein that she belonged to Suliali village as such permission be granted to work
in HPPWD Division Nurpur and request was considered and allowed and adjusted against the post
of daily waged Store Clerk. As such, said Kusam Sharma even after joining HPPWD Division
Nurpur from Dalhousie Division continued to work with the respondent who was senior to the
petitioner having joined service with the respondent/department in 1983. As such, there can be no
1107
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violation of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and for similar reasons, it was not required
for respondent to have issued notice calling upon the petitioner for re-employment. It has
categorically stated that no other junior persons has been retained or re-employed by the respondent
besides maintained that only those workmen were regularized who continuously worked and fulfill
the requisite criteria for regularization as per government policy however, denied that petitioner
was terminated by the respondent. Accordingly, claim petition was sought to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1, tendered/proved
his affidavit under Order 18, Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A and closed evidence. On the other hand,
repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Inder Singh Uttam,
the then Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. as RW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, copy of mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of
Notification dated 21-7-1994 Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated 23-7-1994 Ex. RW1/D, copy
of letter dated 18-1-2000 Ex. RW1/E, copy of mandays chart of Smt. Kusum Ex. RW1/F and
Ex. RW1/G, copy of letter dated 18-12-1999 Ex. RW1/H and closed evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 31-08-2017 for
determination which are as under:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents w.e.f. 1-9-1988
is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on the ground of delay and laches on the part of
petitioner as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief.
9. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No. 1 : No
Issue No. 2 : No
Issue No. 3 : No
Issue No. 4 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is dismissed per operative part of Award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 and 2 :
1108
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10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Stepping into witness box as PW1 petitioner has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. The Petitioner has specifically stated on
oath that he had completed 240 days having worked from September, 1986 to October, 1990
besides maintained to have remained engaged in construction site of road Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund
Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and that his service had been terminated/disengaged verbally
in the year 1990 in violation of law by respondent. The respondent in its reply as well as statement
on oath as RW1 has maintained that petitioner had not worked from September, 1986 but was
engaged in March, 1988 and continued to work till August, 1988 during this period also, he had
worked intermittently. The testimony of RW1 corresponds with mandays chart Ex. RW1/B which
reveals that petitioner had merely worked for 75½ days in the year 1988. As such, from oral as well
as documentary evidence on record, it cannot be stated that petitioner had worked for 240 days. Be
it stated that for applicability of Section 25-F of the Act, petitioner was required to prove that he
had worked for 240 days continuously in preceding one year before termination and testimony of
petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding evidence to this effect. As such, when
petitioner had not completed 240 days, respondent was not required to issue any notice while
disengaging him from service which is not the plea of respondent as it has pleaded that petitioner
had abandoned the job.
12. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after 1988. No reason
whatsoever has been assigned for such inaction or omission on the part of respondent in not
initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to
join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. Ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has contended that even if the
respondent has not been able to prove abandonment of job by respondent as required under law yet
petitioner was not absolved from his accountability to prove to have worked for a minimum period
of 240 days in preceding 12 months from termination. In view of the foregoing, it is held that
respondent has not violated Section 25-F of the Act who was not required issue any notice or pay
compensation as contended by petitioner.
13. In so far as violation of provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, it deals
with procedure for retrenchment to be adopted by employer. In the case in hand, petitioner has
emphasized enough that juniors were retained by respondent whereas petitioner had been
disengaged despite availability of funds and work. In his affidavit petitioner has stated that one
Kusum Sharma had been engaged who was junior to him and was retained in service. To appreciate
the pleas so raised by petitioner, it would be relevant to go through evidence qua period when said
Kusum Sharma had been engaged. Before proceeding further it may not be erroneous to mention
here that petitioner has failed to prove seniority list of workmen of Suliali Sub Division which was
to proved so as to establish violation of Section 25-G of the Act. Ld. Dy. D.A. for respondent has
placed reliance upon mandays chart of Kusum Sharma d/o Daulat Ram who was working in
Banikhet Sub Division No.1 HPPWD Banikhet as reflected in Ex. RW1/G. This document shows
that Kusum Sharma had been engaged in November, 1983. Said Kusum Sharma continued to work
till November, 1988 at Dalhousie Division when she had made representation to Engineer-in-Chief,
HPPWD Shimla vide application Ex. RW1/H requesting her transfer from HPPWD Dalhousie to
Suliali HPPWD Sub Division which was allowed as letter Ex. RW1/E dated 18-1-2000 revealed
1109
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that one post of Store Clerk (work charged brought in regular cadre) had been allotted to HPPWD
Nurpur Circle. Said Kusum Sharma was engaged in February, 2000 under HPPWD as is evident
from Ex. RW1/F who continued to work uninterruptedly till January, 2009. It is admittedly not the
case of the petitioner that said Kusum Sharma had been disengaged rather she is stated to be still
working under HPPWD Division Nurpur. If said Kusum Sharma had joined in Suliali HPPWD
Division in February, 2000 she cannot be stated to be junior to petitioner as her service had been
placed at the disposal of Executive Engineer HPPWD Nurpur in pursuance to her request allowed
by competent authority who had been initially engaged in November, 1983 whereas petitioner had
been engaged in 1988.
14. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to go through the evidence concerning
creation of Sub Division of Jwali and Nurpur in the year 1994. In the case in hand, evidence qua
petitioner revealed that he had been initially engaged in Suliali Sub Division in September, 1986.
This Suliali Sub Division was under Jassur Division out of which Jawali Sub Division was made in
the year 1990 as is evident from Notification dated 21st July 1994 Ex. RW1/C and Ex. RW1/D on
record. These documents further show that Jassur Sub Division cease to exist upon creation of
Nurpur and Jawali Sub Division meaning thereby that on creation of Jawali Sub Division and
Nurpur, Suliali Sub Division falling under the Nurpur Division got merged in Nurpur Sub Division.
Said Kusum Sharma is shown to have joined at Suliali Sub Division which consequently fell under
Nurpur Sub Division as discussed in foregoing paragraphs. It is evident from evidence on record
that petitioner had been working under Suliali Sub Division since 1988 as stated above but with the
bifurcation of Divisions as stated above, it cannot be concluded that petitioner was disengaged in
the month of August, 1988 by respondent rather prior to creation of these two new Sub-Divisions
i.e. Nurpur and Jawali, petitioner himself was not in job as he had left the job who did not report for
duty. This plea of respondent has although not been accepted by this court for want of issuance of
notice or charge-sheet but it cannot be stated that petitioner had been disengaged by respondent by
a verbal order. In view of foregoing plea of petitioner that Section 25-G was violated cannot be
accepted and for similar reasons plea of petitioner that respondent had violated Section 25-H of the
Act can also not accepted. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to establish that respondent had
violated provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. In view of forgoing discussions,
issue No. 1 is decided in negative holding that termination of service of petitioner by the
respondent in August 1988 is neither illegal and nor unjustified and since the petitioner has been
lawfully terminated, he would not be entitled for any service benefits. Both these issues are
answered in negative in favour of respondent and against the petitioner.
Issue No.3:
15. On the plea non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has contended that present claim
petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had abandoned the job of his own and did not join his
duty despite issuance of muster roll for the relevant period. From the pleadings of the parties and
evidence on record as discussed in foregoing paras, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised instead the same is held to be maintainable. As such, the issue in hand
is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue No. 4:
16. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
1110
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come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors., AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-
operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
17. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot
be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is
decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.
Relief :
18. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues No. 1 and 2, the instant claim petition
fails and the same is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
19. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
20. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
21. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
1111
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)
Ref. No.
: 228/2016
Date of Institution
: 16-06-2016
Date of Decision
: 04-04-2018
Shri Prem Singh s/o Shri Munshi Lal, r/o Village Nera, P.O. Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur, District
Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Nurpur, Division, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, Tehsil Nurpur, District
Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. S.D. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of services between Sh. Prem Singh s/o Sh. Munshi Lal r/o &
Village Nera, P.O. Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur, Distt. Kangra, H.P. w.e.f. 1-10-1988 by the
Executive Engineer, HPPWD Nurpur Division, Nurpur, Distt. Kangra, H.P. who had
worked as beldar on daily wages basis only for 77.5 days during the year 3/1988 to 9/1988
and has raised his Industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 24/11/13 after more than 24
years, allegedly without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of working period as mentioned above and
delay of more than 24 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the
above employer/management?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
beldar on daily wages in the month of September, 1987 in Suliali Sub Division HPPWD falling
under HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. where he continuously worked till October,
1989 when he was disengaged by respondent illegally despite availability of work and funds. It is
alleged that HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. was involved in construction of road
Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and various sites adjoining to it but
service of petitioner was disengaged orally in October, 1989 in violation of law. It is further alleged
that petitioner had been engaged in construction of roads leading to villages, national highway and
had worked to the satisfaction of respondent and other superiors and there was no complaint against
him. It further transpires from claim petition that after termination of petitioner by the respondent,
1112
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he had made several verbal request to respondent by visiting its office as well as office at Sub
Division Suliali who was assured of re-engagement in 3—4 months but did not receive any
response from the respondent when petitioner had written various letters to department for
reengagement on daily wage basis but was not engaged. It is alleged that a resolution on behalf of
retrenched workmen were also sent to Assistant Registrar to the Hon'ble H.P. State Administrative
Tribunal, Shimla which was pending and not decided till date. The grievance of the petitioner
further remains that petitioner and similarly situated workmen who had been engaged on daily
wage basis by HPPWD constituted one unit and procedure for retrenchment which involved
applicability of principle of 'Last come First go'. It is alleged that in utter disregard to the provisions
of Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act junior persons had been retained whereas petitioner had
been disengaged more specifically one Smt. Kusam Sharma w/o Sh. Roshan Lal, Village & P.O.
Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. who was retained in pursuance to letter of Engineer-
in-Chief vide letter No. 3058/61 dated 18-1-2000. It is claimed that said Kusam Sharma had joined
HPPWD Division Nurpur in the year 2000 after disengagement of petitioner in 1987 which clearly
violates Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside the order of verbal termination as petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding one year from date of termination and thus respondent had
violated Section 25-F of the Act. It is alleged that respondent had also not followed the procedure
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act after disengaging petitioner junior persons were engaged
and at the same time no notice for re-employment/re-engagement was issued calling upon
petitioner to join before engaging junior which violates Section 25-G of the Act. Accordingly,
petitioner seeks his reinstatement in service by respondent with seniority, back wages and all the
other consequential benefits.
4.
The respondent contested the claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied
that petitioner had been engaged as beldar in September, 1987 in HPPWD Division Nurpur rather
he was disengaged in October, 1989. It has been categorically stated that petitioner was engaged as
daily wager in Sub Division HPPWD Suliali falling under Jassur Division where he worked
intermittently between March, 1988 till September, 1988 and thereafter left the work and did not
approach the respondent/department. It is alleged that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted to
Jawali Division vide HP Government Notification No.PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July,
1994 and strength and staff of Jassur Division was shifted to Jawali but area of Suliali Sub Division
was shifted to Nurpur Division. It has been emphatically denied that petitioner had completed 240
days rather claimed that petitioner merely worked for 20½ days in March 1988, 09 days in April,
1988, 24 days in August, 1988 and 24 days in September, 1988 aggregating to 77 ½ days who did
not complete 240 days in any calendar year as reflected in mandays chart. It is alleged that since
Suliali Sub Division was shifted to HPPWD Division Nurpur in 1994. As such, question of
termination of service of petitioner in October, 1987 did not arise. Moreover, petitioner is alleged to
be gainfully employed as an agriculturist. Reiterating his stand, it has been contended that
petitioner left the work of beldar in March, 1988. However, denied that any resolution was pending
before Assistant Registrar, H.P. State Administrative Tribunal for want of knowledge. In so far as
Kusam Sharma is concerned, it has been categorically stated that Kusam Sharma was engaged as
helper on daily wage basis by HPPWD Division Dalhousie in 1983 who worked intermittently till
November, 1998 when said Kusam Sharma made representation to Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD
Shimla in December, 1999 stipulating therein that she belonged to Suliali village as such
permission be granted to work in HPPWD Division Nurpur and request was considered and
allowed and adjusted against the post of daily waged Store Clerk. As such, said Kusam Sharma
even after joining HPPWD Division Nurpur from Dalhousie Division continued to work with the
respondent who was senior to the petitioner having joined service with the respondent/department
in 1983. As such, there can be no violation of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and for
similar reasons, it was not required for respondent to have issued notice calling upon the petitioner
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for re-employment. It has categorically stated that no other junior persons has been retained or
reemployed by the respondent besides maintained that only those workmen were regularized who
continuously worked and fulfill the requisite criteria for regularization as per government policy
however, denied that petitioner was terminated by the respondent. Accordingly, claim petition was
sought to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1, tendered/proved
his affidavit under Order 18 Rule, 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A and closed evidence. On the other hand,
repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Inder Singh Uttam,
the then Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. as RW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, copy of mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of
Notification dated 21-7-1994 Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated 23-7-1994 Ex. RW1/D, copy
of letter dated 18-1-2000 Ex. RW1/E, copy of mandays chart of Smt. Kusum Ex. RW1/F and
Ex. RW1/G, copy of letter dated 18-12-1999 Ex. RW1/H and closed evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 22-09-2017 for
determination which are as under:
1. Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents w.e.f. 1-10-1988
is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on the ground of delay and laches as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follow:—
Issue No. 1 : No
Issue No. 2 : No
Issue No. 3 : No
Issue No. 4 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is dismissed per operative part of Award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 and 2 :
10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Stepping into witness box as PW1 petitioner has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. The Petitioner has specifically stated on
oath that he had completed 240 days having worked from September, 1987 to October, 1989
besides maintained to have remained engaged in construction site of road Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund
Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and that his service had been terminated/disengaged verbally
in the year 1989 in violation of law by respondent. The respondent in its reply as well as statement
on oath as RW1 has maintained that petitioner had not worked from September, 1987 but was
engaged in March, 1988 and continued to work till September, 1988 and during this period also, he
had worked intermittently. The testimony of RW1 corresponds with mandays chart Ex. RW1/B
which reveals that petitioner had merely worked for 20 ½ days in March, 1987, 09 days in April, 24
days in August and 24 days in September, 1988 aggregating to total 77½ days. As such, from oral
as well as documentary evidence on record, it cannot be stated that petitioner had worked for 240
days. Be it stated that for applicability of Section 25-F of the Act, petitioner was required to prove
that he had worked for 240 days continuously in preceding one year before termination and
testimony of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding evidence to this effect. As such,
when petitioner had not completed 240 days, respondent was not required to issue any notice while
disengaging him from service which is not the plea of respondent as it has pleaded that petitioner
had abandoned the job.
12. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after 1988. No reason
whatsoever has been assigned for such inaction or omission on the part of respondent in not
initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to
join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. Ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has contended that even if the
respondent has not been able to prove abandonment of job by respondent as required under law yet
petitioner was not absolved from his accountability to prove to have worked for a minimum period
of 240 days in preceding 12 months from termination. In view of the foregoing, it is held that
respondent has not violated Section 25-F of the Act who was not required issue any notice or pay
compensation as contended by petitioner.
13. In so far as violation of provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, it deals
with procedure for retrenchment to be adopted by employer. In the case in hand, petitioner has
emphasized enough that juniors were retained by respondent whereas petitioner had been
disengaged despite availability of funds and work. In his affidavit petitioner has stated that one
Kusum Sharma had been engaged who was junior to him and was retained in service. To appreciate
the pleas so raised by petitioner, it would be relevant to go through evidence qua period when said
Kusum Sharma had been engaged. Before proceeding further it may not be erroneous to mention
here that petitioner has failed to prove seniority list of workmen of Suliali Sub Division which was
to be proved so as to establish violation of Section 25-G of the Act. Ld. Dy. D.A. for respondent
has placed reliance upon mandays chart of Kusum Sharma d/o Daulat Ram who was working in
Banikhet Sub Division No.1 HPPWD Banikhet as reflected in Ex. RW1/G. This document shows
that Kusum Sharma had been engaged in November, 1983. Said Kusum Sharma continued to work
till November, 1988 at Dalhousie Division when she had made representation to Engineer-in-Chief,
HPPWD Shimla vide application Ex. RW1/H requesting her transfer from HPPWD Dalhousie to
Suliali HPPWD Sub Division which was allowed as letter Ex. RW1/E dated 18-1-2000 revealed
that one post of Store Clerk (work charged brought in regular cadre) had been allotted to HPPWD
Nurpur Circle. Said Kusum Sharma was engaged in February, 2000 under HPPWD as is evident
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from Ex. RW1/F who continued to work uninterruptedly till January, 2009. It is admittedly not the
case of the petitioner that said Kusum Sharma had been disengaged rather she is stated to be still
working under HPPWD Division Nurpur. If said Kusum Sharma had joined in Suliali HPPWD
Division in February, 2000 she cannot be stated to be junior to petitioner as her service had been
placed at the disposal of Executive Engineer HPPWD Nurpur in pursuance to her request allowed
by competent authority who had been initially engaged in November, 1983 whereas petitioner had
been engaged in 1988.
14. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to go through the evidence concerning
creation of Sub Division of Jwali and Nurpur in the year 1994. In the case in hand, evidence qua
petitioner revealed that he had been initially engaged in Suliali Sub Division in February, 1987.
This suliali Sub Division was under Jassur Division out of which Jawali Sub Division was made in
the year 1990 as is evident from Notification dated 21st July 1994 Ex. RW1/C and Ex. RW1/D on
record. These documents further show that Jassur Sub Division cease to exist upon creation of
Nurpur and Jawali Sub Division meaning thereby that on creation of Jawali Sub Division and
Nurpur, Suliali Sub Division falling under the Nurpur Division got merged in Nurpur Sub Division.
Said Kusum Sharma is shown to have joined at Suliali Sub Division which consequently fell under
Nurpur Sub Division as discussed in foregoing paragraphs. It is evident from evidence on record
that petitioner had been working under Suliali Sub Division since 1987 as stated above but with the
bifurcation of Divisions as stated above, it cannot be concluded that petitioner was disengaged in
the month of September, 1988 by respondent rather prior to creation of these two new Sub
Divisions i.e. Nurpur and Jawali, petitioner himself was not in job as he had left the job who did not
report for duty. This plea of respondent has although not been accepted by this court for want of
issuance of notice or chargesheet but it cannot be stated that petitioner had been disengaged by
respondent by a verbal order. In view of foregoing plea of petitioner that Section 25-G was violated
cannot be accepted and for similar reasons plea of petitioner that respondent had violated Section
25-H of the Act can also not accepted. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to establish that
respondent had violated provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. In view of forgoing
discussions, issue No.1 is decided in negative holding that termination of service of petitioner by
the respondent in September, 1988 is neither illegal and nor unjustified and since the petitioner has
been lawfully terminated, he would not be entitled for any service benefits. Both these issues are
answered in negative in favour of respondent and against the petitioner.
Issue No. 3 :
15. On the plea non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has contended that present claim
petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had abandoned the job of his own and did not join his
duty despite issuance of muster roll for the relevant period. From the pleadings of the parties and
evidence on record as discussed in foregoing paras, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised instead the same is held to be maintainable. As such, the issue in hand
is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue No.4 :
16. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
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the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-
operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
17. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot
be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is
decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.
Relief :
18. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues No.1 and 2, the instant claim petition
fails and the same is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
19. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
20. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
21. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No.
: 269/2016
Date of Institution
: 04-05-2016
Date of Decision
: 04-04-2018
Shri Krishan Singh s/o Shri Thakur Dass, r/o Village Nera, P.O. Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur,
District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.
2.
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Jawali Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. S.D. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of services of Sh. Krishan Singh s/o Sh. Thakur Dass r/o
Village Nera, P.O. Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur, Distt. Kangra, H. P. during the year 12/1987 by
(i) the Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Nurpur Division, Nurpur, Distt. Kangra, H.P., and (ii)
the Executive Engineer, HPPWD Jawali Division, Jawali Division, Distt. Kangra, (H.P.),
who had worked as beldar on daily wages basis during the year 12/1989 and has worked
only for 22 days has raised his Industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 24-11-2013 after
more than 25 years, allegedly without complying with the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of working period
mentioned as above and delay of more 25 years in raising the industrial dispute, what
amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker
is entitled to from the above employer/management?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
beldar on daily wages in the month of August, 1986 in Suliali Sub Division HPPWD falling under
HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. where he continuously worked till September,
1988 when he was disengaged by respondent illegally despite availability of work and funds. It is
alleged that HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. was involved in construction of road
Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and various sites adjoining to it but
service of petitioner was disengaged orally in September, 1988 in violation of law. It is further
alleged that petitioner had been engaged in construction of roads leading to villages, national
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highway and had worked to the satisfaction of respondent and other superiors and there was no
complaint against him. It further transpires from claim petition that after termination of petitioner
by the respondent, he had made several verbal request to respondent by visiting its office as well as
office at Sub Division Suliali who was assured of re-engagement in 3-4 months but did not receive
any response from the respondent when petitioner had written various letters to department for
reengagement on daily wage basis but was not engaged. It is alleged that a resolution on behalf of
retrenched workmen were also sent to Assistant Registrar to the Hon'ble H.P. State Administrative
Tribunal, Shimla which was pending and not decided till date. The grievance of the petitioner
further remains that petitioner and similarly situated workmen who had been engaged on daily
wage basis by HPPWD constituted one unit and procedure for retrenchment which involved
applicability of principle of 'Last come First go'. It is alleged that in utter disregard to the provisions
of Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act junior persons had been retained whereas petitioner had
been disengaged more specifically one Smt. Kusam Sharma w/o Sh. Roshan Lal, Village & P.O.
Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. who was retained in pursuance to letter of Engineer in
Chief vide letter No. 3058/61 dated 18-1-2000. It is claimed that said Kusam Sharma had joined
HPPWD Division Nurpur in the year 2000 after disengagement of petitioner in 1987 which clearly
violates Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside the order of verbal termination as petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding one year from date of termination and thus respondent had
violated Section 25-F of the Act. It is alleged that respondent had also not followed the procedure
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act after disengaging petitioner junior persons were engaged
and at the same time no notice for re-employment/re-engagement was issued calling upon
petitioner to join before engaging junior which violates Section 25-G of the Act. Accordingly,
petitioner seeks his reinstatement in service by respondent with seniority, back wages and all the
other consequential benefits.
4.
The respondent contested the claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied
that petitioner had been engaged as beldar in August, 1986 in HPPWD Division Nurpur rather he
was disengaged in September, 1988. It has been categorically stated that petitioner was engaged as
daily wager in Sub-Division HPPWD Suliali falling under Jassur Division where he worked
intermittently in December, 1987 and thereafter left the work and did not approach the
respondent/department. It is alleged that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted to Jawali Division
vide H.P. Government Notification No. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July, 1994 and strength
and staff of Jassur Division was shifted to Jawali but area of Suliali Sub Division was shifted to
Nurpur Division. It has been emphatically denied that petitioner had completed 240 days rather
claimed that petitioner merely worked in December, 1987 who did not complete 240 days in any
calendar year as reflected in mandays chart. It is alleged that since Suliali Sub Division was shifted
to HPPWD Division Nurpur in 1994. As such, question of termination of service of petitioner in
September, 1988 did not arise. Moreover, petitioner is alleged to be gainfully employed as an
agriculturist. Reiterating his stand, it has been contended that petitioner left the work of beldar in
December, 1988. However, denied that any resolution was pending before Assistant Registrar, HP
State Administrative Tribunal for want of knowledge. In so far as Kusam Sharma is concerned, it
has been categorically stated that Kusam Sharma was engaged as helper on daily wage basis by
HPPWD Division Dalhousie in 1983 who worked intermittently till November, 1998 when said
Kusam Sharma made representation to Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD Shimla in December, 1999
stipulating therein that she belonged to Suliali village as such permission be granted to work in
HPPWD Division Nurpur and request was considered and allowed and adjusted against the post of
daily waged Store Clerk. As such, said Kusam Sharma even after joining HPPWD Division Nurpur
from Dalhousie Division continued to work with the respondent who was senior to the petitioner
having joined service with the respondent/department in 1983. As such, there can be no violation of
Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and for similar reasons, it was not required for
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respondent to have issued notice calling upon the petitioner for re-employment. It has categorically
stated that no other junior persons has been retained or re-employed by the respondent besides
maintained that only those workmen were regularized who continuously worked and fulfill the
requisite criteria for regularization as per government policy however, denied that petitioner was
terminated by the respondent. Accordingly, claim petition was sought to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1, tendered/proved
his affidavit under order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A and closed evidence. On the other hand,
repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Inder Singh Uttam,
the then Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. as RW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, copy of mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of
Notification dated 21-7-1994 Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated 23-7-1994 Ex. RW1/D, copy
of letter dated 18-1-2000 Ex. RW1/E, copy of mandays chart of Smt. Kusum Ex. RW1/F and
Ex. RW1/G, copy of letter dated 18.12.1999 Ex. RW1/H and closed evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 31-08-2017 for
determination which are as under:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents during December,
1987 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on the ground of delay and laches on the part of
petitioner as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No. 1 : No
Issue No. 2 : No
Issue No. 3 : No
Issue No. 4 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is dismissed per operative part of Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 and 2
10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Stepping into witness box as PW1 petitioner has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. The Petitioner has specifically stated on
oath that he had completed 240 days having worked from August, 1986 to September, 1988 besides
maintained to have remained engaged in construction site of road Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal
and Suliali to Dev Barari road and that his service had been terminated/disengaged verbally in the
year 1988 in violation of law by respondent. The respondent in its reply as well as statement on
oath as RW1 has maintained that petitioner had not worked from August, 1986 but was engaged in
December, 1987 and he had worked intermittently. The testimony of RW1 corresponds with
mandays chart Ex. RW1/B which reveals that petitioner had merely worked for 22½ days in the
year 1987. As such, from oral as well as documentary evidence on record, it cannot be stated that
petitioner had worked for 240 days. Be it stated that for applicability of Section 25-F of the Act,
petitioner was required to prove that he had worked for 240 days continuously in preceding one
year before termination and testimony of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding
evidence to this effect. As such, when petitioner had not completed 240 days, respondent was not
required to issue any notice while disengaging him from service which is not the plea of respondent
as it has pleaded that petitioner had abandoned the job.
12. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after 1987. No reason
whatsoever has been assigned for such inaction or omission on the part of respondent in not
initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to
join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. Ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has contended that even if the
respondent has not been able to prove abandonment of job by respondent as required under law yet
petitioner was not absolved from his accountability to prove to have worked for a minimum period
of 240 days in preceding 12 months from termination. In view of the foregoing, it is held that
respondent has not violated Section 25-F of the Act who was not required issue any notice or pay
compensation as contended by petitioner.
13. In so far as violation of provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, it deals
with procedure for retrenchment to be adopted by employer. In the case in hand, petitioner has
emphasized enough that juniors were retained by respondent whereas petitioner had been
disengaged despite availability of funds and work. In his affidavit petitioner has stated that one
Kusum Sharma had been engaged who was junior to him and was retained in service. To appreciate
the pleas so raised by petitioner, it would be relevant to go through evidence qua period when said
Kusum Sharma had been engaged. Before proceeding further it may not be erroneous to mention
here that petitioner has failed to prove seniority list of workmen of Suliali Sub Division which was
to be proved so as to establish violation of Section 25-G of the Act. Ld. Dy. D.A. for respondent
has placed reliance upon mandays chart of Kusum Sharma d/o Daulat Ram who was working in
Banikhet Sub Division No.1 HPPWD Banikhet as reflected in Ex. RW1/G. This document shows
that Kusum Sharma had been engaged in November, 1983. Said Kusum Sharma continued to work
till November, 1988 at Dalhousie Division when she had made representation to Engineer-in-Chief,
HPPWD Shimla vide application Ex. RW1/H requesting her transfer from HPPWD Dalhousie to
Suliali HPPWD Sub Division which was allowed as letter Ex. RW1/E dated 18-1-2000 revealed
that one post of Store Clerk (work charged brought in regular cadre) had been allotted to HPPWD
Nurpur Circle. Said Kusum Sharma was engaged in February, 2000 under HPPWD as is evident
from Ex. RW1/F who continued to work uninterruptedly till January, 2009. It is admittedly not the
case of the petitioner that said Kusum Sharma had been disengaged rather she is stated to be still
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working under HPPWD Division Nurpur. If said Kusum Sharma had joined in Suliali HPPWD
Division in February, 2000 she cannot be stated to be junior to petitioner as her service had been
placed at the disposal of Executive Engineer HPPWD Nurpur in pursuance to her request allowed
by competent authority who had been initially engaged in November, 1983 whereas petitioner had
been engaged in 1987.
14. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to go through the evidence concerning
creation of Sub Division of Jwali and Nurpur in the year 1994. In the case in hand, evidence qua
petitioner revealed that he had been initially engaged in Suliali Sub Division in December, 1987.
This Suliali Sub Division was under Jassur Division out of which Jawali Sub Division was made in
the year 1990 as is evident from Notification dated 21st July, 1994 Ex. RW1/C and Ex. RW1/D on
record. These documents further show that Jassur Sub Division cease to exist upon creation of
Nurpur and Jawali Sub Division meaning thereby that on creation of Jawali Sub Division and
Nurpur, Suliali Sub Division falling under the Nurpur Division got merged in Nurpur Sub Division.
Said Kusum Sharma is shown to have joined at Suliali Sub Division which consequently fell under
Nurpur Sub Division as discussed in foregoing paragraphs. It is evident from evidence on record
that petitioner had been working under Suliali Sub Division since 1987 as stated above but with the
bifurcation of Divisions as stated above, it cannot be concluded that petitioner was disengaged in
the year 1988 by respondent rather prior to creation of these two new Sub Divisions i.e. Nurpur and
Jawali, petitioner himself was not in job as he had left the job who did not report for duty. This plea
of respondent has although not been accepted by this court for want of issuance of notice or charge
sheet but it cannot be stated that petitioner had been disengaged by respondent by a verbal order. In
view of foregoing plea of petitioner that Section 25-G was violated cannot be accepted and for
similar reasons plea of petitioner that respondent had violated Section 25-H of the Act can also not
accepted. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to establish that respondent had violated provisions of
Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. In view of forgoing discussions, issue No. 1 is decided in
negative holding that termination of service of petitioner by the respondent in December, 1987 is
neither illegal and nor unjustified and since the petitioner has been lawfully terminated, he would
not be entitled for any service benefits. Both these issues are answered in negative in favour of
respondent and against the petitioner.
Issue No. 3 :
15. On the plea non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has contended that present claim
petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had abandoned the job of his own and did not join his
duty despite issuance of muster roll for the relevant period. From the pleadings of the parties and
evidence on record as discussed in foregoing paras, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised instead the same is held to be maintainable. As such, the issue in hand
is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue No. 4:
16. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
1122
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was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-
operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
17. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot
be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is
decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.
Relief :
18. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues No.1 and 2, the instant claim petition
fails and the same is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
19. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
20. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
21. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No.
: 209/2016
Date of Institution
: 11-04-2016
Date of Decision
: 04-04-2018
Shri Parkash Chand s/o Shri Mangat Ram, r/o Village Raug, P.O. Panghoori, Tehsil Dhar
Kalan, District Pathankot, Punjab.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Nurpur, Division, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, Tehsil Nurpur, District
Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. S.D. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of services between Sh. Parkash Chand s/o Sh. Mangat Ram
R.O. Village Raug, P.O. Panghoori, Tehsil Dhar Kalan, Distt. Pathankot (Punjab) from
26-3-1989 by the Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Nurpur Division, Nurpur, Distt. Kangra,
H.P. who had worked as beldar on daily wages basis only for 2 days during the year 1989
and has raised his industrial dispute vide demand notice dated nil (received in the office of
the Labour Officer Kangra on 26-11-2013) after more than 24 years, allegedly without
complying wit the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If
not, keeping in view of working period as mentioned above and delay of more than 24 years
in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits
and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employer/
management?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
beldar on daily wages in the month of September, 1988 in Suliali Sub Division HPPWD falling
under HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. where he continuously worked till March,
1990 when he was disengaged by respondent illegally despite availability of work and funds. It is
alleged that HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. was involved in construction of road
Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and various sites adjoining to it but
service of petitioner was disengaged orally in March, 1990 in violation of law. It is further alleged
that petitioner had been engaged in construction of roads leading to villages, national highway and
had worked to the satisfaction of respondent and other superiors and there was no complaint against
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him. It further transpires from claim petition that after termination of petitioner by the respondent,
he had made several verbal request to respondent by visiting its office as well as office at Sub
Division Suliali who was assured of re-engagement in 3-4 months but did not receive any response
from the respondent when petitioner had written various letters to department for reengagement on
daily wage basis but was not engaged. It is alleged that a resolution on behalf of retrenched
workmen were also sent to Assistant Registrar to the Hon'ble H.P. State Administrative Tribunal,
Shimla which was pending and not decided till date. The grievance of the petitioner further remains
that petitioner and similarly situated workmen who had been engaged on daily wage basis by
HPPWD constituted one unit and procedure for retrenchment which involved applicability of
principle of 'Last come First go'. It is alleged that in utter disregard to the provisions of Section 25-
G of Industrial Disputes Act junior persons had been retained whereas petitioner had been
disengaged more specifically one Smt. Kusam Sharma w/o Sh. Roshan Lal, Village & P.O. Suliali,
Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. who was retained in pursuance to letter of Engineer-in-Chief
vide letter No. 3058/61 dated 18.1.2000. It is claimed that said Kusam Sharma had joined HPPWD
Division Nurpur in the year 2000 after disengagement of petitioner in 1987 which clearly violates
Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside the order of verbal termination as petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding one year from date of termination and thus respondent had
violated Section 25-F of the Act. It is alleged that respondent had also not followed the procedure
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act after disengaging petitioner junior persons were engaged
and at the same time no notice for re-employment/re-engagement was issued calling upon
petitioner to join before engaging junior which violates Section 25-G of the Act. Accordingly,
petitioner seeks his reinstatement in service by respondent with seniority, back wages and all the
other consequential benefits.
4. The respondent contested the claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied
that petitioner had been engaged as beldar in September, 1988 in HPPWD Division Nurpur rather
he was disengaged in March, 1990. It has been categorically stated that petitioner was engaged as
daily wager in Sub Division HPPWD Suliali falling under Jassur Division where he worked
intermittently in March, 1989 and thereafter left the work and did not approach the respondent/
department. It is alleged that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted to Jawali Division vide H.P.
Government Notification No. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July, 1994 and strength and staff
of Jassur Division was shifted to Jawali but area of Suliali Sub Division was shifted to Nurpur
Division. It has been emphatically denied that petitioner had completed 240 days rather claimed
that petitioner merely worked till March, 1989 who did not complete 240 days in any calendar year
as reflected in mandays chart. It is alleged that since Suliali Sub Division was shifted to HPPWD
Division Nurpur in 1994. As such, question of termination of service of petitioner in March, 1989
did not arise. Moreover, petitioner is alleged to be gainfully employed as an agriculturist.
Reiterating his stand, it has been contended that petitioner left the work of beldar in March, 1989.
However, denied that any resolution was pending before Assistant Registrar, HP State
Administrative Tribunal for want of knowledge. In so far as Kusam Sharma is concerned, it has
been categorically stated that Kusam Sharma was engaged as helper on daily wage basis by
HPPWD Division Dalhousie in 1983 who worked intermittently till November, 1998 when said
Kusam Sharma made representation to Engineerin-Chief HPPWD Shimla in December, 1999
stipulating therein that she belonged to Suliali village as such permission be granted to work in
HPPWD Division Nurpur and request was considered and allowed and adjusted against the post of
daily waged Store Clerk. As such, said Kusam Sharma even after joining HPPWD Division Nurpur
from Dalhousie Division continued to work with the respondent who was senior to the petitioner
having joined service with the respondent/department in 1983. As such, there can be no violation of
Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and for similar reasons, it was not required for
respondent to have issued notice calling upon the petitioner for re-employment. It has categorically
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stated that no other junior persons has been retained or re-employed by the respondent besides
maintained that only those workmen were regularized who continuously worked and fulfill the
requisite criteria for regularization as per government policy however, denied that petitioner was
terminated by the respondent. Accordingly, claim petition was sought to be dismissed.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1, tendered/proved
his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A and closed evidence. On the other hand,
repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Inder Singh Uttam,
the then Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. as RW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, copy of mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of
Notification dated 21-7-1994 Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated 23-7-1994 Ex. RW1/D, copy
of letter dated 18-1-2000 Ex. RW1/E, copy of mandays chart of Smt. Kusum Ex. RW1/F and
Ex. RW1/G, copy of letter dated 18-12-1999 Ex. RW1/H and closed evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 31-08-2017 for
determination which are as under:
1. Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. 26-3-1989
is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on the ground of delay and laches on the part of
petitioner as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No. 1 : No
Issue No. 2 : No
Issue No. 3 : No
Issue No. 4 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is dismissed per operative part of Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 and 2 :
10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Stepping into witness box as PW1 petitioner has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. The Petitioner has specifically stated on
oath that he had completed 240 days having worked from September, 1988 to March, 1990 besides
maintained to have remained engaged in construction site of road Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal
and Suliali to Dev Barari road and that his service had been terminated/disengaged verbally in the
year 1990 in violation of law by respondent. The respondent in its reply as well as statement on
oath as RW1 has maintained that petitioner had not worked from September, 1988 but was engaged
in March, 1989 and he had worked intermittently. The testimony of RW1 corresponds with
mandays chart Ex. RW1/B which reveals that petitioner had merely worked for 02 days in March,
1989. As such, from oral as well as documentary evidence on record, it cannot be stated that
petitioner had worked for 240 days. Be it stated that for applicability of Section 25-F of the Act,
petitioner was required to prove that he had worked for 240 days continuously in preceding one
year before termination and testimony of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding
evidence to this effect. As such, when petitioner had not completed 240 days, respondent was not
required to issue any notice while disengaging him from service which is not the plea of respondent
as it has pleaded that petitioner had abandoned the job.
12. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after 1989. No reason
whatsoever has been assigned for such inaction or omission on the part of respondent in not
initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to
join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. Ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has contended that even if the
respondent has not been able to prove abandonment of job by respondent as required under law yet
petitioner was not absolved from his accountability to prove to have worked for a minimum period
of 240 days in preceding 12 months from termination. In view of the foregoing, it is held that
respondent has not violated Section 25-F of the Act who was not required issue any notice or pay
compensation as contended by petitioner.
13. In so far as violation of provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, it deals
with procedure for retrenchment to be adopted by employer. In the case in hand, petitioner has
emphasized enough that juniors were retained by respondent whereas petitioner had been
disengaged despite availability of funds and work. In his affidavit petitioner has stated that one
Kusum Sharma had been engaged who was junior to him and was retained in service. To appreciate
the pleas so raised by petitioner, it would be relevant to go through evidence qua period when said
Kusum Sharma had been engaged. Before proceeding further it may not be erroneous to mention
here that petitioner has failed to prove seniority list of workmen of Suliali Sub Division which was
to be proved so as to establish violation of Section 25-G of the Act. Ld. Dy. D.A. for respondent
has placed reliance upon mandays chart of Kusum Sharma d/o Daulat Ram who was working in
Banikhet Sub Division No.1 HPPWD Banikhet as reflected in Ex. RW1/G. This document shows
that Kusum Sharma had been engaged in November, 1983. Said Kusum Sharma continued to work
till November, 1988 at Dalhousie Division when she had made representation to Engineer-in-Chief,
HPPWD Shimla vide application Ex. RW1/H requesting her transfer from HPPWD Dalhousie to
Suliali HPPWD Sub Division which was allowed as letter Ex. RW1/E dated 18.1.2000 revealed
that one post of Store Clerk (work charged brought in regular cadre) had been allotted to HPPWD
Nurpur Circle. Said Kusum Sharma was engaged in February, 2000 under HPPWD as is evident
from Ex. RW1/F who continued to work uninterruptedly till January, 2009. It is admittedly not the
case of the petitioner that said Kusum Sharma had been disengaged rather she is stated to be still
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working under HPPWD Division Nurpur. If said Kusum Sharma had joined in Suliali HPPWD
Division in February, 2000 she cannot be stated to be junior to petitioner as her service had been
placed at the disposal of Executive Engineer HPPWD Nurpur in pursuance to her request allowed
by competent authority who had been initially engaged in November, 1983 whereas petitioner had
been engaged in 1989.
14. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to go through the evidence concerning
creation of Sub Division of Jwali and Nurpur in the year 1994. In the case in hand, evidence qua
petitioner revealed that he had been initially engaged in Suliali Sub Division in December, 1987.
This Suliali Sub Division was under Jassur Division out of which Jawali Sub Division was made in
the year 1990 as is evident from Notification dated 21st July 1994 Ex. RW1/C and Ex. RW1/D on
record. These documents further show that Jassur Sub Division cease to exist upon creation of
Nurpur and Jawali Sub Division meaning thereby that on creation of Jawali Sub Division and
Nurpur, Suliali Sub Division falling under the Nurpur Division got merged in Nurpur Sub Division.
Said Kusum Sharma is shown to have joined at Suliali Sub Division which consequently fell under
Nurpur Sub Division as discussed in foregoing paragraphs. It is evident from evidence on record
that petitioner had been working under Suliali Sub Division since 1989 as stated above but with the
bifurcation of Divisions as stated above, it cannot be concluded that petitioner was disengaged in
the month of March, 1989 by respondent rather prior to creation of these two new Sub Divisions
i.e. Nurpur and Jawali, petitioner himself was not in job as he had left the job who did not report for
duty. This plea of respondent has although not been accepted by this court for want of issuance of
notice or charge-sheet but it cannot be stated that petitioner had been disengaged by respondent by
a verbal order. In view of foregoing plea of petitioner that Section 25-G was violated cannot be
accepted and for similar reasons plea of petitioner that respondent had violated Section 25-H of the
Act can also not accepted. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to establish that respondent had
violated provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. In view of forgoing discussions,
issue No.1 is decided in negative holding that termination of service of petitioner by the respondent
in January, 1988 is neither illegal and nor unjustified and since the petitioner has been lawfully
terminated, he would not be entitled for any service benefits. Both these issues are answered in
negative in favour of respondent and against the petitioner.
Issue No.3
15. On the plea non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has contended that present claim
petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had abandoned the job of his own and did not join his
duty despite issuance of muster roll for the relevant period. From the pleadings of the parties and
evidence on record as discussed in foregoing paras, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised instead the same is held to be maintainable. As such, the issue in hand
is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue No.4
16. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
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was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-
operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
17. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot
be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is
decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.
Relief :
18. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues No.1 and 2, the instant claim petition
fails and the same is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
19. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
20. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
21. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No.
: 224/2016
Date of Institution
: 16-06-2016
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Date of Decision
: 04-04-2018
Shri Desh Raj s/o Shri Gian Chand, r/o Village & Post Office Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur,
District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. S.D. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of services between Sh. Desh Raj s/o Sh. Gian Chand R.O. &
V.P.O. Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur Distt. Kangra, H.P. from 1/8/1988 by the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD, Nurpur Division, Nurpur, Distt. Kangra, H.P. who had worked as beldar on daily
wages basis only for 99.5 days during the year 3/1988 to 7/1988 and has raised his
industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 24/11/2013 after more than 24 years, allegedly
without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and
justified? If not, keeping in view of working period as mentioned above and delay of more
24 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service
benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employer/
management?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
beldar on daily wages in the month of September, 1988 in Suliali Sub Division HPPWD falling
under HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. where he continuously worked till October,
1990 when he was disengaged by respondent illegally despite availability of work and funds. It is
alleged that HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. was involved in construction of road
Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and various sites adjoining to it but
service of petitioner was disengaged orally in October, 1990 in violation of law. It is further alleged
that petitioner had been engaged in construction of roads leading to villages, national highway and
had worked to the satisfaction of respondent and other superiors and there was no complaint against
him. It further transpires from claim petition that after termination of petitioner by the respondent,
he had made several verbal request to respondent by visiting its office as well as office at Sub
Division Suliali who was assured of re-engagement in 3-4 months but did not receive any response
from the respondent when petitioner had written various letters to department for re-engagement on
daily wage basis but was not engaged. It is alleged that a resolution on behalf of retrenched
workmen were also sent to Assistant Registrar to the Hon'ble H.P. State Administrative Tribunal,
Shimla which was pending and not decided till date. The grievance of the petitioner further remains
that petitioner and similarly situated workmen who had been engaged on daily wage basis by
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HPPWD constituted one unit and procedure for retrenchment which involved applicability of
principle of 'Last come First go'. It is alleged that in utter disregard to the provisions of Section 25-
G of Industrial Disputes Act junior persons had been retained whereas petitioner had been
disengaged more specifically one Smt. Kusam Sharma w/o Sh. Roshan Lal, Village & P.O. Suliali,
Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. who was retained in pursuance to letter of Engineer-in-Chief
vide letter No. 3058/61 dated 18-1-2000. It is claimed that said Kusam Sharma had joined HPPWD
Division Nurpur in the year 2000 after disengagement of petitioner in 1990 which clearly violates
Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside the order of verbal termination as petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding one year from date of termination and thus respondent had
violated Section 25-F of the Act. It is alleged that respondent had also not followed the procedure
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act after disengaging petitioner junior persons were engaged
and at the same time no notice for re-employment/re-engagement was issued calling upon
petitioner to join before engaging junior which violates Section 25-G of the Act. Accordingly,
petitioner seeks his reinstatement in service by respondent with seniority, back wages and all the
other consequential benefits.
4.
The respondent contested the claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied
that petitioner had been engaged as beldar in September, 1988 in HPPWD Division Nurpur rather
he was disengaged in October, 1990. It has been categorically stated that petitioner was engaged as
daily wager in Sub Division HPPWD Suliali falling under Jassur Division where he worked
intermittently between March, 1988 till July, 1988 and thereafter left the work and did not approach
the respondent/department. It is alleged that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted to Jawali Division
vide H.P. Government Notification No. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July, 1994 and strength
and staff of Jassur Division was shifted to Jawali but area of Suliali Sub Division was shifted to
Nurpur Division. It has been emphatically denied that petitioner had completed 240 days rather
claimed that petitioner merely worked from March, 1988 till July, 1988 who did not complete 240
days in any calendar year as reflected in mandays chart. It is alleged that since Suliali Sub Division
was shifted to HPPWD Division Nurpur in 1994. As such, question of termination of service of
petitioner in July, 1988 did not arise. Moreover, petitioner is alleged to be gainfully employed as an
agriculturist. Reiterating his stand, it has been contended that petitioner left the work of beldar in
July, 1988. However, denied that any resolution was pending before Assistant Registrar, H.P. State
Administrative Tribunal for want of knowledge. In so far as Kusam Sharma is concerned, it has
been categorically stated that Kusam Sharma was engaged as helper on daily wage basis by
HPPWD Division Dalhousie in 1983 who worked intermittently till November, 1998 when said
Kusam Sharma made representation to Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD Shimla in December, 1999
stipulating therein that she belonged to Suliali village as such permission be granted to work in
HPPWD Division Nurpur and request was considered and allowed and adjusted against the post of
daily waged Store Clerk. As such, said Kusam Sharma even after joining HPPWD Division Nurpur
from Dalhousie Division continued to work with the respondent who was senior to the petitioner
having joined service with the respondent/department in 1983. As such, there can be no violation of
Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and for similar reasons, it was not required for
respondent to have issued notice calling upon the petitioner for re-employment. It has categorically
stated that no other junior persons has been retained or reemployed by the respondent besides
maintained that only those workmen were regularized who continuously worked and fulfill the
requisite criteria for regularization as per government policy however, denied that petitioner was
terminated by the respondent. Accordingly, claim petition was sought to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1, tendered/proved
his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A and closed evidence. On the other hand,
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repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Inder Singh Uttam,
the then Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. as RW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, copy of mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of
Notification dated 21-7-1994 Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated 23-7-1994 Ex. RW1/D, copy
of letter dated 18-1-2000 Ex. RW1/E, copy of mandays chart of Smt. Kusum Ex. RW1/F and
Ex. RW1/G, copy of letter dated 18-12-1999 Ex. RW1/H and closed evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 31-08-2017 for
determination which are as under:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. 1-8-1988
is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on the ground of delay and laches on the part of
petitioner as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No. 1 : No
Issue No. 2 : No
Issue No. 3 : No
Issue No. 4 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is dismissed per operative part of Award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 and 2 :
10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Stepping into witness box as PW1 petitioner has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. The Petitioner has specifically stated on
oath that he had completed 240 days having worked from September, 1988 to October, 1990
besides maintained to have remained engaged in construction site of road Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund
Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and that his service had been terminated/disengaged verbally
in the year 1990 in violation of law by respondent. The respondent in its reply as well as statement
on oath as RW1 has maintained that petitioner had not worked from September, 1988 but was
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engaged in March, 1988 and during this period also, he had worked intermittently. The testimony
of RW1 corresponds with mandays chart Ex. RW1/B which reveals that petitioner had merely
worked for 26 days in March, 1988, 30 days in April, 24 ½ days in May and 19 days in July, 1988
aggregating to total 99½ days. As such, from oral as well as documentary evidence on record, it
cannot be stated that petitioner had worked for 240 days. Be it stated that for applicability of
Section 25-F of the Act, petitioner was required to prove that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in preceding one year before termination and testimony of petitioner is not
substantiated from any corresponding evidence to this effect. As such, when petitioner had not
completed 240 days, respondent was not required to issue any notice while disengaging him from
service which is not the plea of respondent as it has pleaded that petitioner had abandoned the job.
12. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after 1988. No reason
whatsoever has been assigned for such inaction or omission on the part of respondent in not
initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to
join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. Ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has contended that even if the
respondent has not been able to prove abandonment of job by respondent as required under law yet
petitioner was not absolved from his accountability to prove to have worked for a minimum period
of 240 days in preceding 12 months from termination. In view of the foregoing, it is held that
respondent has not violated Section 25-F of the Act who was not required issue any notice or pay
compensation as contended by petitioner.
13. In so far as violation of provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, it deals
with procedure for retrenchment to be adopted by employer. In the case in hand, petitioner has
emphasized enough that juniors were retained by respondent whereas petitioner had been
disengaged despite availability of funds and work. In his affidavit petitioner has stated that one
Kusum Sharma had been engaged who was junior to him and was retained in service. To appreciate
the pleas so raised by petitioner, it would be relevant to go through evidence qua period when said
Kusum Sharma had been engaged. Before proceeding further it may not be erroneous to mention
here that petitioner has failed to prove seniority list of workmen of Suliali Sub Division which was
to be proved so as to establish violation of Section 25-G of the Act. Ld. Dy. D.A. for respondent
has placed reliance upon mandays chart of Kusum Sharma d/o Daulat Ram who was working in
Banikhet Sub Division No.1 HPPWD Banikhet as reflected in Ex. RW1/G. This document shows
that Kusum Sharma had been engaged in November, 1983. Said Kusum Sharma continued to work
till November, 1988 at Dalhousie Division when she had made representation to Engineer-in-Chief,
HPPWD Shimla vide application Ex. RW1/H requesting her transfer from HPPWD Dalhousie to
Suliali HPPWD Sub Division which was allowed as letter Ex. RW1/E dated 18-1-2000 revealed
that one post of Store Clerk (work charged brought in regular cadre) had been allotted to HPPWD
Nurpur Circle. Said Kusum Sharma was engaged in February, 2000 under HPPWD as is evident
from Ex. RW1/F who continued to work uninterruptedly till January, 2009. It is admittedly not the
case of the petitioner that said Kusum Sharma had been disengaged rather she is stated to be still
working under HPPWD Division Nurpur. If said Kusum Sharma had joined in Suliali HPPWD
Division in February, 2000 she cannot be stated to be junior to petitioner as her service had been
placed at the disposal of Executive Engineer HPPWD Nurpur in pursuance to her request allowed
by competent authority who had been initially engaged in November, 1983 whereas petitioner had
been engaged in 1988.
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14. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to go through the evidence concerning
creation of Sub Division of Jwali and Nurpur in the year 1994. In the case in hand, evidence qua
petitioner revealed that he had been initially engaged in Suliali Sub Division in December, 1987.
This Suliali Sub Division was under Jassur Division out of which Jawali Sub Division was made in
the year 1990 as is evident from Notification dated 21st July 1994 Ex. RW1/C and Ex. RW1/D on
record. These documents further show that Jassur Sub Division cease to exist upon creation of
Nurpur and Jawali Sub Division meaning thereby that on creation of Jawali Sub Division and
Nurpur, Suliali Sub Division falling under the Nurpur Division got merged in Nurpur Sub Division.
Said Kusum Sharma is shown to have joined at Suliali Sub Division which consequently fell under
Nurpur Sub Division as discussed in foregoing paragraphs. It is evident from evidence on record
that petitioner had been working under Suliali Sub Division since 1987 as stated above but with the
bifurcation of Divisions as stated above, it cannot be concluded that petitioner was disengaged in
the month of July, 1988 by respondent rather prior to creation of these two new Sub Divisions i.e.
Nurpur and Jawali, petitioner himself was not in job as he had left the job who did not report for
duty. This plea of respondent has although not been accepted by this court for want of issuance of
notice or charge-sheet but it cannot be stated that petitioner had been disengaged by respondent by
a verbal order. In view of foregoing plea of petitioner that Section 25-G was violated cannot be
accepted and for similar reasons plea of petitioner that respondent had violated Section 25-H of the
Act can also not accepted. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to establish that respondent had
violated provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. In view of forgoing discussions,
issue No.1 is decided in negative holding that termination of service of petitioner by the respondent
in January, 1988 is neither illegal and nor unjustified and since the petitioner has been lawfully
terminated, he would not be entitled for any service benefits. Both these issues are answered in
negative in favour of respondent and against the petitioner.
Issue No. 3 :
15. On the plea non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has contended that present claim
petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had abandoned the job of his own and did not join his
duty despite issuance of muster roll for the relevant period. From the pleadings of the parties and
evidence on record as discussed in foregoing paras, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised instead the same is held to be maintainable. As such, the issue in hand
is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue No. 4:
16. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
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and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-
operative Marketing cum Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
17. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot
be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is
decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.
Relief :
18. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues No.1 and 2, the instant claim petition
fails and the same is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
19. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
20. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
21. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No.
: 207/2016
Date of Institution
: 11-04-2016
Date of Decision
: 04-04-2018
Shri Jaram Singh s/o Shri Chuha Ram, r/o Village Raug, P.O. Panghoori, Tehsil Dhar
Kalan, District Pathankot, Punjab.
.Petitioner.
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Versus
1.
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner
: Sh. S. D. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of services of Sh. Jaram Singh s/o Sh. Chuha Ram R.O. &
Village Raug, P.O. Panghoori, Tehsil Dhar Kalan, Distt. Pathankot (Pb) during 7/1989 by
(i) the Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Nurpur Division, Distt. Kangra, H.P. (ii) the Executive
Engineer HPPWD Jawali, Distt. Kangra (H.P.) who had worked as beldar on daily wages
basis during the year 12/1987 to 7/1989 and has raised his industrial dispute vide demand
notice dated nil (received in the office of the Labour Officer Kangra on 26/11/2013 after
more than 23 years, allegedly without complying with the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of working period as
mentioned above and delay of more than 23 years in raising the industrial dispute, what
amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-
worker is entitled to from the above employer/management?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
beldar on daily wages in the month of March, 1987 in Suliali Sub Division HPPWD falling under
HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. where he continuously worked till October, 1990
when he was disengaged by respondent illegally despite availability of work and funds. It is alleged
that HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. was involved in construction of road Bodh
Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and various sites adjoining to it but
service of petitioner was disengaged orally in March, 1990 in violation of law. It is further alleged
that petitioner had been engaged in construction of roads leading to villages, national highway and
had worked to the satisfaction of respondent and other superiors and there was no complaint against
him. It further transpires from claim petition that after termination of petitioner by the respondent,
he had made several verbal request to respondent by visiting its office as well as office at Sub
Division Suliali who was assured of re-engagement in 3-4 months but did not receive any response
from the respondent when petitioner had written various letters to department for re-engagement on
daily wage basis but was not engaged. It is alleged that a resolution on behalf of retrenched
workmen were also sent to Assistant Registrar to the Hon'ble H.P. State Administrative Tribunal,
Shimla which was pending and not decided till date. The grievance of the petitioner further remains
that petitioner and similarly situated workmen who had been engaged on daily wage basis by
HPPWD constituted one unit and procedure for retrenchment which involved applicability of
principle of 'Last come First go'. It is alleged that in utter disregard to the provisions of Section 25-
G of Industrial Disputes Act junior persons had been retained whereas petitioner had been
disengaged more specifically one Smt. Kusam Sharma w/o Sh. Roshan Lal, Village & P.O. Suliali,
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Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. who was retained in pursuance to letter of Engineer-in-Chief
vide letter No. 3058/61 dated 18-1-2000. It is claimed that said Kusam Sharma had joined HPPWD
Division Nurpur in the year 2000 after disengagement of petitioner in 1990 which clearly violates
Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside the order of verbal termination as petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding one year from date of termination and thus respondent had
violated Section 25-F of the Act. It is alleged that respondent had also not followed the procedure
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act after disengaging petitioner junior persons were engaged
and at the same time no notice for re-employment/re-engagement was issued calling upon
petitioner to join before engaging junior which violates Section 25-G of the Act. Accordingly,
petitioner seeks his reinstatement in service by respondent with seniority, back wages and all the
other consequential benefits.
4.
The respondent contested the claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied
that petitioner had been engaged as beldar in March, 1987 in HPPWD Division Nurpur rather he
was disengaged in October, 1990. It has been categorically stated that petitioner was engaged as
daily wager in Sub Division HPPWD Suliali falling under Jassur Division where he worked
intermittently between December, 1987 till July, 1989 and thereafter left the work and did not
approach the respondent/department. It is alleged that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted to
Jawali Division vide HP Government Notification No. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July,
1994 and strength and staff of Jassur Division was shifted to Jawali but area of Suliali Sub Division
was shifted to Nurpur Division. It has been emphatically denied that petitioner had completed 240
days rather claimed that petitioner merely worked from 1987 to 1989 who did not complete 240
days in any calendar year as reflected in mandays chart. It is alleged that since Suliali Sub Division
was shifted to HPPWD Division Nurpur in 1994. As such, question of termination of service of
petitioner in October, 1990 did not arise. Moreover, petitioner is alleged to be gainfully employed
as an agriculturist. Reiterating his stand, it has been contended that petitioner left the work of beldar
in July, 1989. However, denied that any resolution was pending before Assistant Registrar, HP
State Administrative Tribunal for want of knowledge. In so far as Kusam Sharma is concerned, it
has been categorically stated that Kusam Sharma was engaged as helper on daily wage basis by
HPPWD Division Dalhousie in 1983 who worked intermittently till November, 1998 when said
Kusam Sharma made representation to Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD Shimla in December, 1999
stipulating therein that she belonged to Suliali village as such permission be granted to work in
HPPWD Division Nurpur and request was considered and allowed and adjusted against the post of
daily waged Store Clerk. As such, said Kusam Sharma even after joining HPPWD Division Nurpur
from Dalhousie Division continued to work with the respondent who was senior to the petitioner
having joined service with the respondent/department in 1983. As such, there can be no violation of
Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and for similar reasons, it was not required for
respondent to have issued notice calling upon the petitioner for reemployment. It has categorically
stated that no other junior persons has been retained or reemployed by the respondent besides
maintained that only those workmen were regularized who continuously worked and fulfill the
requisite criteria for regularization as per government policy however, denied that petitioner was
terminated by the respondent. Accordingly, claim petition was sought to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1, tendered/proved
his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A and closed evidence. On the other hand,
repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Inder Singh Uttam,
the then Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. as RW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, copy of mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of
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Notification dated 21-7-1994 Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated 23-7-1994 Ex. RW1/D, copy
of letter dated 18-1-2000 Ex. RW1/E, copy of mandays chart of Smt. Kusum Ex. RW1/F and
Ex. RW1/G, copy of letter dated 18-12-1999 Ex. RW1/H and closed evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 31-08-2017 for
determination which are as under:
1. Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents during July, 1989
is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2. If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on the ground of delay and laches on the part of
petitioner as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No. 1 :
No
Issue No. 2 :
No
Issue No. 3 :
No
Issue No. 4 :
No
Relief :
Claim petition is dismissed per operative part of Award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 and 2:
10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Stepping into witness box as PW1 petitioner has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. The Petitioner has specifically stated on
oath that he had completed 240 days having worked from March, 1987 to October, 1990 besides
maintained to have remained engaged in construction site of road Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal
and Suliali to Dev Barari road and that his service had been terminated/disengaged verbally in the
year 1990 in violation of law by respondent. The respondent in its reply as well as statement on
oath as RW1 has maintained that petitioner had not worked from March, 1987 but was engaged in
December, 1987 and he had worked intermittently till July, 1989. The testimony of RW1
corresponds with mandays chart Ex. RW1/B which reveals that petitioner had merely worked for
28 days in the year 1987, 42 days in 1988 and 60 ½ days in 1989 aggregating to total 130½ days.
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As such, from oral as well as documentary evidence on record, it cannot be stated that petitioner
had worked for 240 days. Be it stated that for applicability of Section 25-F of the Act, petitioner
was required to prove that he had worked for 240 days continuously in preceding one year before
termination and testimony of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding evidence to this
effect. As such, when petitioner had not completed 240 days, respondent was not required to issue
any notice while disengaging him from service which is not the plea of respondent as it has pleaded
that petitioner had abandoned the job.
12. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after 1989. No reason
whatsoever has been assigned for such inaction or omission on the part of respondent in not
initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to
join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. Ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has contended that even if the
respondent has not been able to prove abandonment of job by respondent as required under law yet
petitioner was not absolved from his accountability to prove to have worked for a minimum period
of 240 days in preceding 12 months from termination. In view of the foregoing, it is held that
respondent has not violated Section 25-F of the Act who was not required issue any notice or pay
compensation as contended by petitioner.
13. In so far as violation of provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, it deals
with procedure for retrenchment to be adopted by employer. In the case in hand, petitioner has
emphasized enough that juniors were retained by respondent whereas petitioner had been
disengaged despite availability of funds and work. In his affidavit petitioner has stated that one
Kusum Sharma had been engaged who was junior to him and was retained in service. To appreciate
the pleas so raised by petitioner, it would be relevant to go through evidence qua period when said
Kusum Sharma had been engaged. Before proceeding further it may not be erroneous to mention
here that petitioner has failed to prove seniority list of workmen of Suliali Sub Division which was
to to proved so as to establish violation of Section 25-G of the Act. Ld. Dy. D.A. for respondent has
placed reliance upon mandays chart of Kusum Sharma d/o Daulat Ram who was working in
Banikhet Sub Division No.1 HPPWD Banikhet as reflected in Ex. RW1/G. This document shows
that Kusum Sharma had been engaged in November, 1983. Said Kusum Sharma continued to work
till November, 1988 at Dalhousie Division when she had made representation to Engineer-in-Chief,
HPPWD Shimla vide application Ex. RW1/H requesting her transfer from HPPWD Dalhousie to
Suliali HPPWD Sub Division which was allowed as letter Ex. RW1/E dated 18-1-2000 revealed
that one post of Store Clerk (work charged brought in regular cadre) had been allotted to HPPWD
Nurpur Circle. Said Kusum Sharma was engaged in February, 2000 under HPPWD as is evident
from Ex. RW1/F who continued to work uninterruptedly till January, 2009. It is admittedly not the
case of the petitioner that said Kusum Sharma had been disengaged rather she is stated to be still
working under HPPWD Division Nurpur. If said Kusum Sharma had joined in Suliali HPPWD
Division in February, 2000 she cannot be stated to be junior to petitioner as her service had been
placed at the disposal of Executive Engineer HPPWD Nurpur in pursuance to her request allowed
by competent authority who had been initially engaged in November, 1983 whereas petitioner had
been engaged in 1987.
14. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to go through the evidence concerning
creation of Sub Division of Jwali and Nurpur in the year 1994. In the case in hand, evidence qua
petitioner revealed that he had been initially engaged in Suliali Sub Division in December, 1987.
1139
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This Suliali Sub Division was under Jassur Division out of which Jawali Sub Division was made in
the year 1990 as is evident from Notification dated 21st July 1994 Ex. RW1/C and Ex. RW1/D on
record. These documents further show that Jassur Sub Division cease to exist upon creation of
Nurpur and Jawali Sub Division meaning thereby that on creation of Jawali Sub Division and
Nurpur, Suliali Sub Division falling under the Nurpur Division got merged in Nurpur Sub Division.
Said Kusum Sharma is shown to have joined at Suliali Sub Division which consequently fell under
Nurpur Sub Division as discussed in foregoing paragraphs. It is evident from evidence on record
that petitioner had been working under Suliali Sub Division since 1987 as stated above but with the
bifurcation of Divisions as stated above, it cannot be concluded that petitioner was disengaged in
the year 1988 by respondent rather prior to creation of these two new Sub Divisions i.e. Nurpur and
Jawali, petitioner himself was not in job as he had left the job who did not report for duty. This plea
of respondent has although not been accepted by this court for want of issuance of notice or charge-
sheet but it cannot be stated that petitioner had been disengaged by respondent by a verbal order. In
view of foregoing plea of petitioner that Section 25-G was violated cannot be accepted and for
similar reasons plea of petitioner that respondent had violated Section 25-H of the Act can also not
accepted. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to establish that respondent had violated provisions of
Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. In view of forgoing discussions, issue No. 1 is decided in
negative holding that termination of service of petitioner by the respondent in July, 1989 is neither
illegal and nor unjustified and since the petitioner has been lawfully terminated, he would not be
entitled for any service benefits. Both these issues are answered in negative in favour of respondent
and against the petitioner.
Issue No. 3 :
15. On the plea non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has contended that present claim
petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had abandoned the job of his own and did not join his
duty despite issuance of muster roll for the relevant period. From the pleadings of the parties and
evidence on record as discussed in foregoing paras, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised instead the same is held to be maintainable. As such, the issue in hand
is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue No. 4 :
16. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425,
it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim
on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government and the
Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government and same
is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The
Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 752, has
categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of Section
1140
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to put the restriction of
limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the provision and in absence of
any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to introduce the limitation on the
ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
17. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot
be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is
decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.
Relief :
18. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues No.1 and 2, the instant claim petition
fails and the same is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
19. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
20. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
21. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No.
: 225/2016
Date of Institution
: 16-04-2016
Date of Decision
: 04-04-2018
Shri Om Parkash s/o Shri Fathe Singh, r/o Village Nera, P.O. Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur, District
Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
1141
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Versus
1.
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.
2.
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Jawali Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. S.D. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of services of Sh. Om Parkash s/o Sh. Fathe Singh R.O.
Village Nera, P.O. Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur, Distt. Kangra, H.P. from 1-1-1988 by (i) the
Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Nurpur Division, Nurpur, Distt. Kangra H.P., (ii) the
Executive Engineer, HPPWD Jawali Division, Jawali, Distt. Kangra (H.P.) who had worked
as beldar on daily wages basis only for 30 days during year 1987 and has raised his
industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 24-11-2013 after more than 25 years, allegedly
without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and
justified? If not, keeping in view of working period as mentioned above and delay of more
than25 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past
service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above
employer/ management?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
beldar on daily wages in the month of August, 1985 in Suliali Sub Division HPPWD falling under
HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. where he continuously worked till September,
1990 when he was disengaged by respondent illegally despite availability of work and funds. It is
alleged that HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. was involved in construction of road
Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and various sites adjoining to it but
service of petitioner was disengaged orally in September, 1990 in violation of law. It is further
alleged that petitioner had been engaged in construction of roads leading to villages, national
highway and had worked to the satisfaction of respondent and other superiors and there was no
complaint against him. It further transpires from claim petition that after termination of petitioner
by the respondent, he had made several verbal request to respondent by visiting its office as well as
office at Sub Division Suliali who was assured of re-engagement in 3-4 months but did not receive
any response from the respondent when petitioner had written various letters to department for re-
engagement on daily wage basis but was not engaged. It is alleged that a resolution on behalf of
retrenched workmen were also sent to Assistant Registrar to the Hon'ble H.P. State Administrative
Tribunal, Shimla which was pending and not decided till date. The grievance of the petitioner
further remains that petitioner and similarly situated workmen who had been engaged on daily
wage basis by HPPWD constituted one unit and procedure for retrenchment which involved
applicability of principle of 'Last come First go'. It is alleged that in utter disregard to the provisions
1142
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of Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act junior persons had been retained whereas petitioner had
been disengaged more specifically one Smt. Kusam Sharma w/o Sh. Roshan Lal, Village & P.O.
Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. who was retained in pursuance to letter of Engineer-
in-Chief vide letter No. 3058/61 dated 18-1-2000. It is claimed that said Kusam Sharma had joined
HPPWD Division Nurpur in the year 2000 after disengagement of petitioner in 1987 which clearly
violates Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside the order of verbal termination as petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding one year from date of termination and thus respondent had
violated Section 25-F of the Act. It is alleged that respondent had also not followed the procedure
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act after disengaging petitioner junior persons were engaged
and at the same time no notice for re-employment/re-engagement was issued calling upon
petitioner to join before engaging junior which violates Section 25-G of the Act. Accordingly,
petitioner seeks his reinstatement in service by respondent with seniority, back wages and all the
other consequential benefits.
4.
The respondent contested the claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied
that petitioner had been engaged as beldar in August, 1985 in HPPWD Division Nurpur rather he
was disengaged in September, 1990. It has been categorically stated that petitioner was engaged as
daily wager in Sub Division HPPWD Suliali falling under Jassur Division where he worked
intermittently between December, 1987 and thereafter left the work and did not approach the
respondent/department. It is alleged that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted to Jawali Division
vide HP Government Notification No. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July, 1994 and strength
and staff of Jassur Division was shifted to Jawali but area of Suliali Sub Division was shifted to
Nurpur Division. It has been emphatically denied that petitioner had completed 240 days rather
claimed that petitioner merely worked till December, 1987 who did not complete 240 days in any
calendar year as reflected in mandays chart. It is alleged that since Suliali Sub Division was shifted
to HPPWD Division Nurpur in 1994. As such, question of termination of service of petitioner in
December, 1987 did not arise. Moreover, petitioner is alleged to be gainfully employed as an
agriculturist. Reiterating his stand, it has been contended that petitioner left the work of beldar in
December, 1987. However, denied that any resolution was pending before Assistant Registrar, H.P.
State Administrative Tribunal for want of knowledge. In so far as Kusam Sharma is concerned, it
has been categorically stated that Kusam Sharma was engaged as helper on daily wage basis by
HPPWD Division Dalhousie in 1983 who worked intermittently till November, 1998 when said
Kusam Sharma made representation to Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD Shimla in December, 1999
stipulating therein that she belonged to Suliali village as such permission be granted to work in
HPPWD Division Nurpur and request was considered and allowed and adjusted against the post of
daily waged Store Clerk. As such, said Kusam Sharma even after joining HPPWD Division Nurpur
from Dalhousie Division continued to work with the respondent who was senior to the petitioner
having joined service with the respondent/department in 1983. As such, there can be no violation of
Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and for similar reasons, it was not required for
respondent to have issued notice calling upon the petitioner for re-employment. It has categorically
stated that no other junior persons has been retained or re-employed by the respondent besides
maintained that only those workmen were regularized who continuously worked and fulfill the
requisite criteria for regularization as per government policy however, denied that petitioner was
terminated by the respondent. Accordingly, claim petition was sought to be dismissed.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1, tendered/proved
his affidavit under order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A and closed evidence. On the other hand,
repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Inder Singh Uttam,
1143
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the then Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. as RW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, copy of mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of
Notification dated 21-7-1994 Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated 23-7-1994 Ex. RW1/D, copy
of letter dated 18-1-2000 Ex. RW1/E, copy of mandays chart of Smt. Kusum Ex. RW1/F and
Ex. RW1/G, copy of letter dated 18-12-1999 Ex. RW1/H and closed evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 31-08-2017 for
determination which are as under:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents 1-1-1988 is/was
illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on the ground of delay and laches on the part of
petitioner as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No. 1 : No
Issue No. 2 : No
Issue No. 3 : No
Issue No. 4 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is dismissed per operative part of Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 and 2 :
10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Stepping into witness box as PW1 petitioner has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. The Petitioner has specifically stated on
oath that he had completed 240 days having worked from August, 1985 to September, 1990 besides
maintained to have remained engaged in construction site of road Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal
and Suliali to Dev Barari road and that his service had been terminated/disengaged verbally in the
year 1990 in violation of law by respondent. The respondent in its reply as well as statement on
oath as RW1 has maintained that petitioner had not worked from August, 1985 but was engaged in
December, 1987 and during this period also, he had worked intermittently. The testimony of RW1
1144
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corresponds with mandays chart Ex. RW1/B which reveals that petitioner had merely worked for
30 days in December 1987. As such, from oral as well as documentary evidence on record, it
cannot be stated that petitioner had worked for 240 days. Be it stated that for applicability of
Section 25-F of the Act, petitioner was required to prove that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in preceding one year before termination and testimony of petitioner is not
substantiated from any corresponding evidence to this effect. As such, when petitioner had not
completed 240 days, respondent was not required to issue any notice while disengaging him from
service which is not the plea of respondent as it has pleaded that petitioner had abandoned the job.
12. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after 1987. No reason
whatsoever has been assigned for such inaction or omission on the part of respondent in not
initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to
join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. Ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has contended that even if the
respondent has not been able to prove abandonment of job by respondent as required under law yet
petitioner was not absolved from his accountability to prove to have worked for a minimum period
of 240 days in preceding 12 months from termination. In view of the foregoing, it is held that
respondent has not violated Section 25-F of the Act who was not required issue any notice or pay
compensation as contended by petitioner.
13. In so far as violation of provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, it deals
with procedure for retrenchment to be adopted by employer. In the case in hand, petitioner has
emphasized enough that juniors were retained by respondent whereas petitioner had been
disengaged despite availability of funds and work. In his affidavit petitioner has stated that one
Kusum Sharma had been engaged who was junior to him and was retained in service. To appreciate
the pleas so raised by petitioner, it would be relevant to go through evidence qua period when said
Kusum Sharma had been engaged. Before proceeding further it may not be erroneous to mention
here that petitioner has failed to prove seniority list of workmen of Suliali Sub Division which was
to proved so as to establish violation of Section 25-G of the Act. Ld. Dy. D.A. for respondent has
placed reliance upon mandays chart of Kusum Sharma d/o Daulat Ram who was working in
Banikhet Sub Division No.1 HPPWD Banikhet as reflected in Ex. RW1/G. This document shows
that Kusum Sharma had been engaged in November, 1983. Said Kusum Sharma continued to work
till November, 1988 at Dalhousie Division when she had made representation to Engineer-in-Chief,
HPPWD Shimla vide application Ex. RW1/H requesting her transfer from HPPWD Dalhousie to
Suliali HPPWD Sub Division which was allowed as letter Ex. RW1/E dated 18-1-2000 revealed
that one post of Store Clerk (work charged brought in regular cadre) had been allotted to HPPWD
Nurpur Circle. Said Kusum Sharma was engaged in February, 2000 under HPPWD as is evident
from Ex. RW1/F who continued to work uninterruptedly till January, 2009. It is admittedly not the
case of the petitioner that said Kusum Sharma had been disengaged rather she is stated to be still
working under HPPWD Division Nurpur. If said Kusum Sharma had joined in Suliali HPPWD
Division in February, 2000 she cannot be stated to be junior to petitioner as her service had been
placed at the disposal of Executive Engineer HPPWD Nurpur in pursuance to her request allowed
by competent authority who had been initially engaged in November, 1983 whereas petitioner had
been engaged in 1987.
14. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to go through the evidence concerning
creation of Sub Division of Jwali and Nurpur in the year 1994. In the case in hand, evidence qua
1145
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petitioner revealed that he had been initially engaged in Suliali Sub Division in December, 1987.
This Suliali Sub Division was under Jassur Division out of which Jawali Sub Division was made in
the year 1990 as is evident from Notification dated 21st July, 1994 Ex. RW1/C and Ex. RW1/D on
record. These documents further show that Jassur Sub Division cease to exist upon creation of
Nurpur and Jawali Sub Division meaning thereby that on creation of Jawali Sub Division and
Nurpur, Suliali Sub Division falling under the Nurpur Division got merged in Nurpur Sub Division.
Said Kusum Sharma is shown to have joined at Suliali Sub Division which consequently fell under
Nurpur Sub Division as discussed in foregoing paragraphs. It is evident from evidence on record
that petitioner had been working under Suliali Sub Division since 1987 as stated above but with the
bifurcation of Divisions as stated above, it cannot be concluded that petitioner was disengaged in
the month of January, 1988 by respondent rather prior to creation of these two new Sub Divisions
i.e. Nurpur and Jawali, petitioner himself was not in job as he had left the job who did not report for
duty. This plea of respondent has although not been accepted by this court for want of issuance of
notice or charge-sheet but it cannot be stated that petitioner had been disengaged by respondent by
a verbal order. In view of foregoing plea of petitioner that Section 25-G was violated cannot be
accepted and for similar reasons plea of petitioner that respondent had violated Section 25-H of the
Act can also not accepted. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to establish that respondent had
violated provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. In view of forgoing discussions,
issue No. 1 is decided in negative holding that termination of service of petitioner by the
respondent in January, 1988 is neither illegal and nor unjustified and since the petitioner has been
lawfully terminated, he would not be entitled for any service benefits. Both these issues are
answered in negative in favour of respondent and against the petitioner.
Issue No.3 :
15. On the plea non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has contended that present claim
petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had abandoned the job of his own and did not join his
duty despite issuance of muster roll for the relevant period. From the pleadings of the parties and
evidence on record as discussed in foregoing paras, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised instead the same is held to be maintainable. As such, the issue in hand
is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue No.4 :
16. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425,
it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim
on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government and the
Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government and same
is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The
Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 752, has
1146
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of Section
33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to put the restriction of
limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the provision and in absence of
any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to introduce the limitation on the
ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
17. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot
be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is
decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.
Relief :
18. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues No.1 and 2, the instant claim petition
fails and the same is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
19. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
20. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
21. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No.
: 256/2016
Date of Institution
: 03-05-2016
Date of Decision
: 04-04-2018
1147
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Shri Mohinder Pal s/o Shri Chuha Ram, r/o Village Raug, P.O. Panghoori, Tehsil Dhar
Kalan, District Pathankot, Punjab.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.
2.
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Jawali Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. S.D. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Mohinder Pal s/o Sh. Chuha Ram r/o
Village Raug, P.O. Panghoori, Tehsil Dhar Kalan, District Pathankot Punjab during
October, 1989 by (i) the Executive Engineer HPPWD Division Nurpur, Distt. Kangra H.P.,
(ii) the Executive Engineer HPPWD Jawali Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P., who has
worked as beldar on daily wages basis and has raised his industrial dispute after vide
demand notice dated nil received Labour Office Dharamshala on 26-11-2013 more than 24
years, allegedly without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of working period of 167 days in year during
November, 1988, to October, 1989 respectively and delay of more than 24 years in raising
the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above exworker is entitled to from the above employer/management?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
beldar on daily wages in the month of March, 1987 in Suliali Sub Division HPPWD falling under
HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. where he continuously worked till October, 1990
when he was disengaged by respondent illegally despite availability of work and funds. It is alleged
that HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. was involved in construction of road Bodh
Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and various sites adjoining to it but
service of petitioner was disengaged orally in March, 1990 in violation of law. It is further alleged
that petitioner had been engaged in construction of roads leading to villages, national highway and
had worked to the satisfaction of respondent and other superiors and there was no complaint against
him. It further transpires from claim petition that after termination of petitioner by the respondent,
he had made several verbal request to respondent by visiting its office as well as office at Sub
Division Suliali who was assured of re-engagement in 3-4 months but did not receive any response
from the respondent when petitioner had written various letters to department for re-engagement on
daily wage basis but was not engaged. It is alleged that a resolution on behalf of retrenched
workmen were also sent to Assistant Registrar to the Hon'ble H.P. State Administrative Tribunal,
Shimla which was pending and not decided till date. The grievance of the petitioner further remains
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that petitioner and similarly situated workmen who had been engaged on daily wage basis by
HPPWD constituted one unit and procedure for retrenchment which involved applicability of
principle of 'Last come First go'. It is alleged that in utter disregard to the provisions of Section
25-G of Industrial Disputes Act junior persons had been retained whereas petitioner had been
disengaged more specifically one Smt. Kusam Sharma w/o Sh. Roshan Lal, Village & P.O. Suliali,
Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. who was retained in pursuance to letter of Engineer-in-Chief
vide letter No. 3058/61 dated 18-1-2000. It is claimed that said Kusam Sharma had joined HPPWD
Division Nurpur in the year 2000 after disengagement of petitioner in 1987 which clearly violates
Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside the order of verbal termination as petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding one year from date of termination and thus respondent had
violated Section 25-F of the Act. It is alleged that respondent had also not followed the procedure
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act after disengaging petitioner junior persons were engaged
and at the same time no notice for re-employment/re-engagement was issued calling upon
petitioner to join before engaging junior which violates Section 25-G of the Act. Accordingly,
petitioner seeks his reinstatement in service by respondent with seniority, back wages and all the
other consequential benefits.
4.
The respondent contested the claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied
that petitioner had been engaged as beldar in March, 1987 in HPPWD Division Nurpur rather he
was disengaged in March, 1990. It has been categorically stated that petitioner was engaged as
daily wager in Sub Division HPPWD Suliali falling under Jassur Division where he worked
intermittently between November, 1988 till October, 1989 and thereafter left the work and did not
approach the respondent/department. It is alleged that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted to
Jawali Division vide HP Government Notification No. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July,
1994 and strength and staff of Jassur Division was shifted to Jawali but area of Suliali Sub Division
was shifted to Nurpur Division. It has been emphatically denied that petitioner had completed 240
days rather claimed that petitioner merely worked from November, 1988 till October, 1989 who did
not complete 240 days in any calendar year as reflected in mandays chart. It is alleged that since
Suliali Sub Division was shifted to HPPWD Division Nurpur in 1994. As such, question of
termination of service of petitioner in October, 1987 did not arise. Moreover, petitioner is alleged to
be gainfully employed as an agriculturist. Reiterating his stand, it has been contended that
petitioner left the work of beldar in October, 1989. However, denied that any resolution was
pending before Assistant Registrar, H.P. State Administrative Tribunal for want of knowledge. In
so far as Kusam Sharma is concerned, it has been categorically stated that Kusam Sharma was
engaged as helper on daily wage basis by HPPWD Division Dalhousie in 1983 who worked
intermittently till November, 1998 when said Kusam Sharma made representation to Engineer-in-
Chief HPPWD Shimla in December, 1999 stipulating therein that she belonged to Suliali village as
such permission be granted to work in HPPWD Division Nurpur and request was considered and
allowed and adjusted against the post of daily waged Store Clerk. As such, said Kusam Sharma
even after joining HPPWD Division Nurpur from Dalhousie Division continued to work with the
respondent who was senior to the petitioner having joined service with the respondent/department
in 1983. As such, there can be no violation of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and for
similar reasons, it was not required for respondent to have issued notice calling upon the petitioner
for reemployment. It has categorically stated that no other junior persons has been retained or re-
employed by the respondent besides maintained that only those workmen were regularized who
continuously worked and fulfill the requisite criteria for regularization as per government policy
however, denied that petitioner was terminated by the respondent. Accordingly, claim petition was
sought to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
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6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1, tendered/proved
his affidavit under order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A and closed evidence. On the other hand,
repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Inder Singh Uttam,
the then Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. as RW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, copy of mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of
Notification dated 21-7-1994 Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated 23-7-1994 Ex. RW1/D, copy
of letter dated 18-1-2000 Ex. RW1/E, copy of mandays chart of Smt. Kusum Ex. RW1/F and
Ex. RW1/G, copy of letter dated 18-12-1999 Ex. RW1/H and closed evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 31-08-2017 for
determination which are as under:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents during October,
1989 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
4. Whether the claim petition is bad on the ground of delay and laches on the part of
petitioner as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No. 1 : No
Issue No. 2 : No
Issue No. 3 : No
Issue No. 4 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is dismissed per operative part of Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 and 2 :
10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Stepping into witness box as PW1 petitioner has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. The Petitioner has specifically stated on
oath that he had completed 240 days having worked from March, 1987 to October, 1990 besides
maintained to have remained engaged in construction site of road Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal
and Suliali to Dev Barari road and that his service had been terminated/disengaged verbally in the
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year 1990 in violation of law by respondent. The respondent in its reply as well as statement on
oath as RW1 has maintained that petitioner had not worked from March, 1987 but was engaged in
November, 1988 and continued to work till October, 1989 and during this period also, he had
worked intermittently. The testimony of RW1 corresponds with mandays chart Ex. RW1/B which
reveals that petitioner had merely worked for 16 days in November, 1988 and 127 days in 1989
aggregating to total 143 days. As such, from oral as well as documentary evidence on record, it
cannot be stated that petitioner had worked for 240 days. Be it stated that for applicability of
Section 25-F of the Act, petitioner was required to prove that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in preceding one year before termination and testimony of petitioner is not
substantiated from any corresponding evidence to this effect. As such, when petitioner had not
completed 240 days, respondent was not required to issue any notice while disengaging him from
service which is not the plea of respondent as it has pleaded that petitioner had abandoned the job.
12. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after 1989. No reason
whatsoever has been assigned for such inaction or omission on the part of respondent in not
initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to
join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. Ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has contended that even if the
respondent has not been able to prove abandonment of job by respondent as required under law yet
petitioner was not absolved from his accountability to prove to have worked for a minimum period
of 240 days in preceding 12 months from termination. In view of the foregoing, it is held that
respondent has not violated Section 25-F of the Act who was not required issue any notice or pay
compensation as contended by petitioner.
13. In so far as violation of provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, it deals
with procedure for retrenchment to be adopted by employer. In the case in hand, petitioner has
emphasized enough that juniors were retained by respondent whereas petitioner had been
disengaged despite availability of funds and work. In his affidavit petitioner has stated that one
Kusum Sharma had been engaged who was junior to him and was retained in service. To appreciate
the pleas so raised by petitioner, it would be relevant to go through evidence qua period when said
Kusum Sharma had been engaged. Before proceeding further it may not be erroneous to mention
here that petitioner has failed to prove seniority list of workmen of Suliali Sub Division which was
to be proved so as to establish violation of Section 25-G of the Act. Ld. Dy. D.A. for respondent
has placed reliance upon mandays chart of Kusum Sharma d/o Daulat Ram who was working in
Banikhet Sub Division No.1 HPPWD Banikhet as reflected in Ex. RW1/G. This document shows
that Kusum Sharma had been engaged in November, 1983. Said Kusum Sharma continued to work
till November, 1988 at Dalhousie Division when she had made representation to Engineer-in-Chief,
HPPWD Shimla vide application Ex. RW1/H requesting her transfer from HPPWD Dalhousie to
Suliali HPPWD Sub Division which was allowed as letter Ex. RW1/E dated 18-1-2000 revealed
that one post of Store Clerk (work charged brought in regular cadre) had been allotted to HPPWD
Nurpur Circle. Said Kusum Sharma was engaged in February, 2000 under HPPWD as is evident
from Ex. RW1/F who continued to work uninterruptedly till January, 2009. It is admittedly not the
case of the petitioner that said Kusum Sharma had been disengaged rather she is stated to be still
working under HPPWD Division Nurpur. If said Kusum Sharma had joined in Suliali HPPWD
Division in February, 2000 she cannot be stated to be junior to petitioner as her service had been
placed at the disposal of Executive Engineer HPPWD Nurpur in pursuance to her request allowed
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by competent authority who had been initially engaged in November, 1983 whereas petitioner
hadbeen engaged in 1988.
14. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to go through the evidence concerning
creation of Sub Division of Jwali and Nurpur in the year 1994. In the case in hand, evidence qua
petitioner revealed that he had been initially engaged in Suliali Sub Division in February, 1987.
This suliali Sub Division was under Jassur Division out of which Jawali Sub Division was made in
the year 1990 as is evident from Notification dated 21st July 1994 Ex. RW1/C and Ex. RW1/D on
record. These documents further show that Jassur Sub Division cease to exist upon creation of
Nurpur and Jawali Sub Division meaning thereby that on creation of Jawali Sub Division and
Nurpur, Suliali Sub Division falling under the Nurpur Division got merged in Nurpur Sub Division.
Said Kusum Sharma is shown to have joined at Suliali Sub Division which consequently fell under
Nurpur Sub Division as discussed in foregoing paragraphs. It is evident from evidence on record
that petitioner had been working under Suliali Sub Division since 1988 as stated above but with the
bifurcation of Divisions as stated above, it cannot be concluded that petitioner was disengaged in
the month of October, 1989 by respondent rather prior to creation of these two new Sub Divisions
i.e. Nurpur and Jawali, petitioner himself was not in job as he had left the job who did not report for
duty. This plea of respondent has although not been accepted by this court for want of issuance of
notice or charge-sheet but it cannot be stated that petitioner had been disengaged by respondent by
a verbal order. In view of foregoing plea of petitioner that Section 25-G was violated cannot be
accepted and for similar reasons plea of petitioner that respondent had violated Section 25-H of the
Act can also not accepted. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to establish that respondent had
violated provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. In view of forgoing discussions,
issue No.1 is decided in negative holding that termination of service of petitioner by the respondent
in October, 1989 is neither illegal and nor unjustified and since the petitioner has been lawfully
terminated, he would not be entitled for any service benefits. Both these issues are answered in
negative in favour of respondent and against the petitioner.
Issue No.3 :
15. On the plea non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has contended that present claim
petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had abandoned the job of his own and did not join his
duty despite issuance of muster roll for the relevant period. From the pleadings of the parties and
evidence on record as discussed in foregoing paras, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised instead the same is held to be maintainable. As such, the issue in hand
is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue No.4 :
16. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425,
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it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim
on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government and the
Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government and same
is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The
Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors AIR 1964 SC 752, has
categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of Section
33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to put the restriction of
limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the provision and in absence of
any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to introduce the limitation on the
ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
17. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot
be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is
decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.
Relief :
18. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues No. 1 and 2, the instant claim petition
fails and the same is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
19. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
20. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
21. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
______________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
413/2016
Date of Institution : 27-06-2016
Date of Decision :
04-04-2018
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Shri Subhash Singh s/o Shri Fateh Singh, r/o Village Nera, P.O. Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur,
District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.
2. The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Jawali Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. S.D. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of the services of Shri Subhash Singh s/o Shri Fateh Singh,
s/o Village Nera, P.O. Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. during September, 1987
by (i) the Executive Engineer, Nupur Division, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.,
(ii) the Executive Engineer, Jawali Division, H.P.P.W.D. Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.,
without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as alleged by
workman, is legal and justified; whereas he has raised the industrial dispute vide demand
notice dated 24-11-2013 after lapse of more than 26 years. If not, keeping in view delay of
more than 26 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority,
past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above
employers?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
beldar on daily wages in the month of August, 1985 in Suliali Sub Division HPPWD falling under
HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. where he continuously worked till September,
1987 when he was disengaged by respondent illegally despite availability of work and funds. It is
alleged that HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. was involved in construction of road
Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and various sites adjoining to it but
service of petitioner was disengaged orally in September, 1988 in violation of law. It is further
alleged that petitioner had been engaged in construction of roads leading to villages, national
highway and had worked to the satisfaction of respondent and other superiors and there was no
complaint against him. It further transpires from claim petition that after termination of petitioner
by the respondent, he had made several verbal request to respondent by visiting its office as well as
office at Sub Division Suliali who was assured of re-engagement in 3-4 months but did not receive
any response from the respondent when petitioner had written various letters to department for re-
engagement on daily wage basis but was not engaged. It is alleged that a resolution on behalf of
retrenched workmen were also sent to Assistant Registrar to the Hon'ble H.P. State Administrative
Tribunal, Shimla which was pending and not decided till date. The grievance of the petitioner
further remains that petitioner and similarly situated workmen who had been engaged on daily
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wage basis by HPPWD constituted one unit and procedure for retrenchment which involved
applicability of principle of 'Last come First go'. It is alleged that in utter disregard to the provisions
of Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act junior persons had been retained whereas petitioner had
been disengaged more specifically one Smt. Kusam Sharma w/o Sh. Roshan Lal, Village & P.O.
Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. who was retained in pursuance to letter of Engineer-
in-Chief vide letter No. 3058/61 dated 18-1-2000. It is claimed that said Kusam Sharma had joined
HPPWD Division Nurpur in the year 2000 after disengagement of petitioner in 1988 which clearly
violates Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside the order of verbal termination as petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding one year from date of termination and thus respondent had
violated Section 25-F of the Act. It is alleged that respondent had also not followed the procedure
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act after disengaging petitioner junior persons were engaged
and at the same time no notice for re-employment/re-engagement was issued calling upon
petitioner to join before engaging junior which violates Section 25-G of the Act. Accordingly,
petitioner seeks his reinstatement in service by respondent with seniority, back wages and all the
other consequential benefits.
4.
The respondent contested the claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability and petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had been engaged as beldar in August, 1985 in HPPWD Division Nurpur and
was disengaged in September, 1987. It is alleged that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted to
Jawali Division vide HP Government Notification No. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July,
1994 and strength and staff of Jassur Division was shifted to Jawali but area of Suliali Sub Division
was shifted to Nurpur Division. It has been emphatically denied that petitioner was ever engaged by
the respondent and the question of completion of 240 days did not arise. It is alleged that since
Suliali Sub Division was shifted to HPPWD Division Nurpur in 1994. As such, question of
termination of service of petitioner in September, 1987 did not arise. Moreover, petitioner has
alleged to gainfully employed as an agriculturist. However, denied that any resolution was pending
before Assistant Registrar, H.P. State Administrative Tribunal for want of knowledge. It is further
stated that petitioner was never engaged by the respondent and violation of any provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act does not arise. Accordingly, claim petition was sought to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1, tendered/proved
his affidavit under order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A and closed evidence. On the other hand,
repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Inder Singh Uttam,
the then Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. as RW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A and closed evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 31-08-2017 for
determination which are as under:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents during Sept., 1987
is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2. If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
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4. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of
petitioner as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No. 1 : No
Issue No. 2 : No
Issue No. 3 : Yes
Issue No. 4 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is dismissed per operative part of Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 and 2 :
10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. At the outset, it is apt to mention here that petitioner had neither proved mandays chart
nor produced seniority list in absence of which it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
violated Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. Be it stated here that there is
only oral evidence on record adduced by the parties in support of their respective contentions and
that there is no documentary evidence led by either parties to claim petition. Stepping into witness
box as PW1 petitioner has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterated his stand as maintained in the
claim petition. Be it stated that petitioner has specifically alleged that he had completed 240 days
having worked from August, 1985 to September, 1987. He has also stated to have remained
engaged in construction site of road Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari
besides maintained that his service had been terminated/disengaged verbally in the year 1987 by
respondent despite availability of work and funds. The respondent in its reply as well as statement
on oath as RW1 has maintained that petitioner had not at all worked with the respondent. As such,
from evidence on record, it cannot be stated that petitioner had worked for 240 days. For the
applicability of Section 25-F of the Act, petitioner was required to prove that he had worked for
240 days and his testimony was required to be substantiated from evidence on record. As such,
when petitioner has not proved to have factually worked with respondent question of completing
240 days did not arise and thus respondent was not required to issue any notice while disengaging
him from service.
12. In so far as violation of provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, it deals
with procedure for retrenchment to be adopted by employer. In the case in hand petitioner has
emphasized enough that juniors were retained whereas petitioner had been disengaged. In his
affidavit Ex. PW1/A petitioner has stated that one Kusum Sharma had been engaged who was
junior to him and was retained in service. To appreciate the pleas so raised by petitioner, it would
be relevant to go through evidence qua period when said Kusum Sharma had been engaged. Ld.
Dy. D.A. for respondent has contended that Kusum Sharma d/o Daulat Ram who was working in
Banikhet Sub Division No.1 HPPWD Banikhet as reflected in affidavit of RW1. Be it stated that
Kusum Sharma had been engaged in November, 1983 by HPPWD Banikhet Divsion. Said Kusum
1156
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Sharma continued to work till November, 1988 at Dalhousie Division when she had made
representation to Engineer-in-Chief, HPPWD Shimla vide petitioner's application requesting her
transfer from HPPWD Dalhousie to Suliali HPPWD Sub Division which was allowed in her favour
on 18-1-2000 RW1 further stated that one post of Store Clerk (work charged brought in regular
cadre) had been allotted to Circle at HPPWD Nurpur. Said Kusum Sharma was engaged in
February, 2000 as is evident from Ex. RW1/A affidavit of Inder Singh Uttam, Executive Engineer,
HPPWD, B&R Division Nurpur and she continued to work uninterruptedly till January, 2009. It is
admittedly not the case of the petitioner that said Kusum Sharma had been disengaged at any point
of time rather she is stated to be still working under HPPWD Division Nurpur. If said Kusum
Sharma had joined in Suliali HPPWD Division in February, 2000 she cannot be stated to be junior
the petitioner as her service had been placed at the disposal of Executive Engineer HPPWD Nurpur
in pursuance to her request allowed by competent authority and that she had been initially engaged
in November, 1983 and transferred to Suliali Sub Division as has been admitted by RW1 in cross-
examination.
13. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to go through the evidence concerning
creation of Sub Division at Jwali and Nurpur in the year 1994. In the case in hand evidence qua
petitioner revealed that he had been engaged in Suliali Sub Division in March, 1987 wherefrom he
was allegedly terminated in the same year. This suliali Sub Division was under Jassur Division out
of which Jawali Sub Division was made in the year 1999 as per Notification dated 21st July 1994
as shown in affidavit Ex. RW1/A on record. RW1 further stated that Jassur Division cease to exist
consequent upon creation of Nurpur and Jawali Sub Division meaning thereby that on creation of
Jawali Sub Division and Nurpur, Suliali Sub Division had fallen under the Nurpur Division. Said
Kusum Sharma is shown to have joined at Suliali Sub Division on transfer as deposed by RW1
which consequently fell under Nurpur. It is evident from evidence on record that petitioner had
been working under Suliali Sub Division but with the bifurcation of Divisions, it cannot be
concluded that petitioner was disengaged in the month of September, 1987 by respondent rather
prior to creation of these two new Divisions i.e. Nurpur and Jawali, petitioner himself was not in
job as he had left the job who did not report for duty. This plea of respondent although not been
accepted but it cannot be also stated that petitioner had been disengaged by respondent by a verbal
order as claimed by petitioner. Similarly, no written representation was made to respondent as
alleged in claim petition has been brought in evidence. In view of foregoing plea of petitioner that
Section 25-G was violated cannot be accepted moreso when there is no iota of evidence qua
engagement of petitioner by respondent even for a single day and for similar reasons, plea of
petitioner that respondent had violated Section 25-H of the Act can also not be accepted.
Accordingly, petitioner has failed to establish that respondent had violated provisions of Sections
25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. In view of forgoing discussions, issue No. 1 is decided in negative
holding that termination of service of petitioner by the respondent in September, 1987 is neither
illegal and nor unjustified and since the petitioner has been lawfully terminated, he would not be
entitled for any service benefits. Both these issues are answered in negative in favour of respondent
and against the petitioner.
Issue No. 3 :
14. Since the petitioner has failed to prove that he ever worked with the respondent as
beldar and thus there existed no relationship of employer and workman and therefore respondent
cannot be stated to have violated provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act and on this score petition is held to be not maintainable. Issue in question is answered
in negative in favour of respondent and against petitioner.
Issue No. 4 :
15. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
1157
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by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind
Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
16. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot
be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is
decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.
Relief :
17. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues No. 1 and 2, the instant claim petition
fails and the same is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
18. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
19. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
20. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM- INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref No.
: 418/2016
Date of Institution
: 27-06-2016
Date of Decision
: 04-04-2018
Shri Sham Lal s/o Shri Girdhari Lal, r/o V.P.O. Kopra, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1. The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.
2. The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Jawali Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. S.D. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of the services of Shri Sham Lal s/o Shri Girdhari Lal, r/o
V.P.O. Kopra, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H. P. during September, 1988 by (i) the
Executive Engineer, Nurpur Division, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P., (ii) the
Executive Engineer, Jawali Division H.P.P.W.D. Jawali, District Kangra, H.P., without
complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as alleged by workman,
is legal and justified; whereas he has raised the industrial dispute vide demand notice dated
nil received in Labour Office Kangra during year, 2014 after lapse of about 26 years. If not,
keeping in view delay of about 26 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of
back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is
entitled to from the above employers?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
beldar on daily wages in the month of August, 1986 in Suliali Sub Division HPPWD falling under
HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H. P. where he continuously worked till September,
1988 when he was disengaged by respondent illegally despite availability of work and funds. It is
alleged that HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. was involved in construction of road
Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and various sites adjoining to it but
service of petitioner was disengaged orally in September, 1988 in violation of law. It is further
alleged that petitioner had been engaged in construction of roads leading to villages, national
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highway and had worked to the satisfaction of respondent and other superiors and there was no
complaint against him. It further transpires from claim petition that after termination of petitioner
by the respondent, he had made several verbal request to respondent by visiting its office as well as
office at Sub Division Suliali who was assured of re-engagement in 3-4 months but did not receive
any response from the respondent when petitioner had written various letters to department for re-
engagement on daily wage basis but was not engaged. It is alleged that a resolution on behalf of
retrenched workmen were also sent to Assistant Registrar to the Hon'ble H.P. State Administrative
Tribunal, Shimla which was pending and not decided till date. The grievance of the petitioner
further remains that petitioner and similarly situated workmen who had been engaged on daily
wage basis by HPPWD constituted one unit and procedure for retrenchment which involved
applicability of principle of 'Last come First go'. It is alleged that in utter disregard to the provisions
of Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act junior persons had been retained whereas petitioner had
been disengaged more specifically one Smt. Kusam Sharma w/o Sh. Roshan Lal, Village & P.O.
Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H. P. who was retained in pursuance to letter of Engineer-
in-Chief vide letter No. 3058/61 dated 18-1-2000. It is claimed that said Kusam Sharma had joined
HPPWD Division Nurpur in the year 2000 after disengagement of petitioner in 1988 which clearly
violates Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside the order of verbal termination as petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding one year from date of termination and thus respondent had
violated Section 25-F of the Act. It is alleged that respondent had also not followed the procedure
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act after disengaging petitioner junior persons were engaged
and at the same time no notice for re-employment/re-engagement was issued calling upon
petitioner to join before engaging junior which violates Section 25-G of the Act. Accordingly,
petitioner seeks his reinstatement in service by respondent with seniority, back wages and all the
other consequential benefits.
4.
The respondent contested the claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability and petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had been engaged as beldar in August, 1986 in HPPWD Division Nurpur and
was disengaged in September, 1988. It is alleged that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted to
Jawali Division vide H.P. Government Notification No. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July,
1994 and strength and staff of Jassur Division was shifted to Jawali but area of Suliali Sub Division
was shifted to Nurpur Division. It has been emphatically denied that petitioner was ever engaged by
the respondent and the question of completion of 240 days did not arise. It is alleged that since
Suliali Sub Division was shifted to HPPWD Division Nurpur in 1994. As such, question of
termination of service of petitioner in September, 1988 did not arise. Moreover, petitioner has
alleged to gainfully employed as an agriculturist. However, denied that any resolution was pending
before Assistant Registrar, HP State Administrative Tribunal for want of knowledge. It is further
stated that petitioner was never engaged by the respondent and violation of any provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act does not arise. Accordingly, claim petition was sought to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1, tendered/proved
his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A and closed evidence. On the other hand,
repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Inder Singh Uttam,
the then Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. as RW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A and closed evidence.
7. I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
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8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 31-08-2017 for
determination which are as under:
(1) Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents during Sept., 1988
is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
(2) If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
(3) Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
(4) Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of
petitioner as alleged?
. .OPR.
(5) Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No. 1 :
No
Issue No. 2 :
No
Issue No. 3 :
Yes
Issue No. 4 :
No
Relief :
Claim petition is dismissed per operative part of Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 and 2 :
10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. At the outset, it is apt to mention here that petitioner had neither proved mandays chart
nor produced seniority list in absence of which it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
violated Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. Be it stated here that there is
only oral evidence on record adduced by the parties in support of their respective contentions and
that there is no documentary evidence led by either parties to claim petition. Stepping into witness
box as PW1 petitioner has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterated his stand as maintained in the
claim petition. Be it stated that petitioner has specifically alleged that he had completed 240 days
having worked from August, 1986 to September, 1988. He has also stated to have remained
engaged in construction site of road Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari
besides maintained that his service had been terminated/disengaged verbally in the year 1988 by
respondent despite availability of work and funds. The respondent in its reply as well as statement
on oath as RW1 has maintained that petitioner had not at all worked with the respondent. As such,
from evidence on record, it cannot be stated that petitioner had worked for 240 days. For the
applicability of Section 25-F of the Act, petitioner was required to prove that he had worked for
240 days and his testimony was required to be substantiated from evidence on record. As such,
when petitioner has not proved to have factually worked with respondent question of completing
1161
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240 days did not arise and thus respondent was not required to issue any notice while disengaging
him from service.
12. In so far as violation of provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, it deals
with procedure for retrenchment to be adopted by employer. In the case in hand petitioner has
emphasized enough that juniors were retained whereas petitioner had been disengaged. In his
affidavit Ex. PW1/A petitioner has stated that one Kusum Sharma had been engaged who was
junior to him and was retained in service. To appreciate the plea so raised by petitioner, it would be
relevant to go through evidence qua period when said Kusum Sharma had been engaged. Ld. Dy.
D.A. for respondent has contended that Kusum Sharma d/o Daulat Ram who was working in
Banikhet Sub Division No.1 HPPWD Banikhet as reflected in affidavit of RW1. Be it stated that
Kusum Sharma had been engaged in November, 1983 by HPPWD Banikhet Divsion. Said Kusum
Sharma continued to work till November, 1988 at Dalhousie Division when she had made
representation to Engineer-in-Chief, HPPWD Shimla vide petitioner's application requesting her
transfer from HPPWD Dalhousie to Suliali HPPWD Sub Division which was allowed in her favour
on 18-1-2000 RW1 further stated that one post of Store Clerk (work charged brought in regular
cadre) had been allotted to Circle at HPPWD Nurpur. Said Kusum Sharma was engaged in
February, 2000 as is evident from Ex. RW1/A affidavit of Inder Singh Uttam, Executive Engineer,
HPPWD, B&R Division Nurpur and she continued to work uninterruptedly till January, 2009. It is
admittedly not the case of the petitioner that said Kusum Sharma had been disengaged at any point
of time rather she is stated to be still working under HPPWD Division Nurpur. If said Kusum
Sharma had joined in Suliali HPPWD Division in February, 2000 she cannot be stated to be junior
the petitioner as her service had been placed at the disposal of Executive Engineer HPPWD Nurpur
in pursuance to her request allowed by competent authority and that she had been initially engaged
in November, 1983 and transferred to Suliali Sub Division as has been admitted by RW1 in cross-
examination.
13. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to go through the evidence concerning
creation of Sub Division at Jwali and Nurpur in the year 1994. In the case in hand evidence qua
petitioner revealed that he had been engaged in Suliali Sub Division in August, 1986 wherefrom he
was allegedly terminated in the year 1988. This suliali Sub Division was under Jassur Division out
of which Jawali Sub Division was made in the year 1999 as per Notification dated 21st July 1994
as shown in affidavit Ex. RW1/A on record. RW1 further stated that Jassur Division cease to exist
consequent upon creation of Nurpur and Jawali Sub Division meaning thereby that on creation of
Jawali Sub Division and Nurpur, Suliali Sub Division had fallen under the Nurpur Division. Said
Kusum Sharma is shown to have joined at Suliali Sub Division on transfer as deposed by RW1
which consequently fell under Nurpur. It is evident from evidence on record that petitioner had
been working under Suliali Sub Division but with the bifurcation of Divisions, it cannot be
concluded that petitioner was disengaged in the month of September, 1987 by respondent rather
prior to creation of these two new Divisions i.e. Nurpur and Jawali, petitioner himself was not in
job as he had left the job who did not report for duty. This plea of respondent has although not been
accepted but it cannot be also stated that petitioner had been disengaged by respondent by a verbal
order as claimed by petitioner. Similarly, no written representation was made to respondent as
alleged in claim petition has been brought in evidence. In view of foregoing plea of petitioner that
Section 25-G was violated cannot be accepted moreso when there is no iota of evidence qua
engagement of petitioner by respondent even for a single day and for similar reasons, plea of
petitioner that respondent had violated Section 25-H of the Act can also not be accepted.
Accordingly, petitioner has failed to establish that respondent had violated provisions of Sections
25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. In view of forgoing discussions, issue No.1 is decided in negative
holding that termination of service of petitioner by the respondent in September, 1988 is neither
illegal and nor unjustified and since the petitioner has been lawfully terminated, he would not be
1162
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entitled for any service benefits. Both these issues are answered in negative in favour of respondent
and against the petitioner.
Issue No. 3 :
14. Since the petitioner has failed to prove that he ever worked with the respondent as
beldar and thus there existed no relationship of employer and workman and therefore respondent
cannot be stated to have violated provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act and on this score petition is held to be not maintainable. Issue in question is answered
in negative in favour of respondent and against petitioner.
Issue No. 4 :
15. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind
Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
16. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot
be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is
decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.
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Relief :
17. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues No. 1 and 2, the instant claim petition
fails and the same is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
18. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
19. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
20. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
407/2016
Date of Institution : 27-06-2016
Date of Decision :
04-04-2018
Shri Des Raj s/o Shri Phoolan Ram, r/o V.P.O. Kotpalhari, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra,
H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.
2.
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Jawali Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. S.D. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
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“Whether alleged termination of the services of Shri Des Raj s/o Shri Phoolan Ram, r/o
V.P.O. Kotpalhari, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. during November, 1982 by (i) the
Executive Engineer, Nurpur Division, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P., (ii) the
Executive Eingineer, Jawali Division, H.P.P.W.D. Jawali, District Kangra, H.P., without
complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as alleged by workman,
is legal and justified; whereas he has raised the industrial dispute vide demand notice dated
26-11-2013 after lapse of more than 14 years. If not, keeping in view delay of more than 14
years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service
benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employers?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
beldar on daily wages in the month of March, 1987 in Suliali Sub Division HPPWD falling under
HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. where he continuously worked till September,
1988 when he was disengaged by respondent illegally despite availability of work and funds. It is
alleged that HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. was involved in construction of road
Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and various sites adjoining to it but
service of petitioner was disengaged orally in September, 1988 in violation of law. It is further
alleged that petitioner had been engaged in construction of roads leading to villages, national
highway and had worked to the satisfaction of respondent and other superiors and there was no
complaint against him. It further transpires from claim petition that after termination of petitioner
by the respondent, he had made several verbal request to respondent by visiting its office as well as
office at Sub Division Suliali who was assured of re-engagement in 3-4 months but did not receive
any response from the respondent when petitioner had written various letters to department for re-
engagement on daily wage basis but was not engaged. It is alleged that a resolution on behalf of
retrenched workmen were also sent to Assistant Registrar to the Hon'ble H.P. State Administrative
Tribunal, Shimla which was pending and not decided till date. The grievance of the petitioner
further remains that petitioner and similarly situated workmen who had been engaged on daily
wage basis by HPPWD constituted one unit and procedure for retrenchment which involved
applicability of principle of 'Last come First go'. It is alleged that in utter disregard to the provisions
of Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act junior persons had been retained whereas petitioner had
been disengaged more specifically one Smt. Kusam Sharma w/o Sh. Roshan Lal, Village & P.O.
Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. who was retained in pursuance to letter of Engineer-
in-Chief vide letter No. 3058/61 dated 18-1-2000. It is claimed that said Kusam Sharma had joined
HPPWD Division Nurpur in the year 2000 after disengagement of petitioner in 1988 which clearly
violates Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside the order of verbal termination as petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding one year from date of termination and thus respondent had
violated Section 25-F of the Act. It is alleged that respondent had also not followed the procedure
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act after disengaging petitioner junior persons were engaged
and at the same time no notice for re-employment/re-engagement was issued calling upon
petitioner to join before engaging junior which violates Section 25-G of the Act. Accordingly,
petitioner seeks his reinstatement in service by respondent with seniority, back wages and all the
other consequential benefits.
4.
The respondent contested the claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability and petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had been engaged as beldar in March, 1987 in HPPWD Division Nurpur and
was disengaged in September, 1988. It is alleged that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted to
Jawali Division vide HP Government Notification No. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July,
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1994 and strength and staff of Jassur Division was shifted to Jawali but area of Suliali Sub Division
was shifted to Nurpur Division. It has been emphatically denied that petitioner was ever engaged by
the respondent and the question of completion of 240 days did not arise. It is alleged that since
Suliali Sub Division was shifted to HPPWD Division Nurpur in 1994. As such, question of
termination of service of petitioner in September, 1988 did not arise. Moreover, petitioner has
alleged to gainfully employed as an agriculturist. However, denied that any resolution was pending
before Assistant Registrar, H.P. State Administrative Tribunal for want of knowledge. It is further
stated that petitioner was never engaged by the respondent and violation of any provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act does not arise. Accordingly, claim petition was sought to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1, tendered/proved
his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A and closed evidence. On the other hand,
repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Inder Singh Uttam,
the then Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. as RW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A and closed evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 01-09-2017 for
determination which are as under:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents during November,
1982 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on the ground of delay and laches as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No. 1 : No
Issue No. 2 : No
Issue No. 3 : Yes
Issue No. 4 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is dismissed per operative part of Award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 and 2 :
10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. At the outset, it is apt to mention here that petitioner had neither proved mandays chart
nor produced seniority list in absence of which it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
violated Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. Be it stated here that there is
only oral evidence on record adduced by the parties in support of their respective contentions and
that there is no documentary evidence led by either parties to claim petition. Stepping into witness
box as PW1 petitioner has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterated his stand as maintained in the
claim petition. Be it stated that petitioner has specifically alleged that he had completed 240 days
having worked from March, 1987 to September, 1988. He has also stated to have remained engaged
in construction site of road Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari besides
maintained that his service had been terminated/disengaged verbally in the year 1987 by respondent
despite availability of work and funds. The respondent in its reply as well as statement on oath as
RW1 has maintained that petitioner had not at all worked with the respondent. As such, from
evidence on record, it cannot be stated that petitioner had worked for 240 days. For the applicability
of Section 25-F of the Act, petitioner was required to prove that he had worked for 240 days and his
testimony was required to be substantiated from evidence on record. As such, when petitioner has
not proved to have factually worked with respondent question of completing 240 days did not arise
and thus respondent was not required to issue any notice while disengaging him from service.
12. In so far as violation of provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, it deals
with procedure for retrenchment to be adopted by employer. In the case in hand petitioner has
emphasized enough that juniors were retained whereas petitioner had been disengaged. In his
affidavit Ex. PW1/A petitioner has stated that one Kusum Sharma had been engaged who was
junior to him and was retained in service. To appreciate the plea so raised by petitioner, it would be
relevant to go through evidence qua period when said Kusum Sharma had been engaged. Ld. Dy.
D.A. for respondent has contended that Kusum Sharma d/o Daulat Ram who was working in
Banikhet Sub Division No.1 HPPWD Banikhet as reflected in affidavit of RW1. Be it stated that
Kusum Sharma had been engaged in November, 1983 by HPPWD Banikhet Divsion. Said Kusum
Sharma continued to work till November, 1988 at Dalhousie Division when she had made
representation to Engineer-in-Chief, HPPWD Shimla vide petitioner's application requesting her
transfer from HPPWD Dalhousie to Suliali HPPWD Sub Division which was allowed in her favour
on 18-1-2000 RW1 further stated that one post of Store Clerk (work charged brought in regular
cadre) had been allotted to Circle at HPPWD Nurpur. Said Kusum Sharma was engaged in
February, 2000 as is evident from Ex. RW1/A affidavit of Inder Singh Uttam, Executive Engineer,
HPPWD, B&R Division Nurpur and she continued to work uninterruptedly till January, 2009. It is
admittedly not the case of the petitioner that said Kusum Sharma had been disengaged at any point
of time rather she is stated to be still working under HPPWD Division Nurpur. If said Kusum
Sharma had joined in Suliali HPPWD Division in February, 2000 she cannot be stated to be junior
the petitioner as her service had been placed at the disposal of Executive Engineer HPPWD Nurpur
in pursuance to her request allowed by competent authority and that she had been initially engaged
in November, 1983 and transferred to Suliali Sub Division as has been admitted by RW1 in cross-
examination.
13. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to go through the evidence concerning
creation of Sub Division at Jwali and Nurpur in the year 1994. In the case in hand evidence qua
petitioner revealed that he had been engaged in Suliali Sub Division in March, 1987 wherefrom he
was allegedly terminated in the same year. This suliali Sub Division was under Jassur Division out
of which Jawali Sub Division was made in the year 1999 as per Notification dated 21st July 1994
as shown in affidavit Ex. RW1/A on record. RW1 further stated that Jassur Division cease to exist
consequent upon creation of Nurpur and Jawali Sub Division meaning thereby that on creation of
Jawali Sub Division and Nurpur, Suliali Sub Division had fallen under the Nurpur Division. Said
Kusum Sharma is shown to have joined at Suliali Sub Division on transfer as deposed by RW1
which consequently fell under Nurpur. It is evident from evidence on record that petitioner had
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been working under Suliali Sub Division but with the bifurcation of Divisions, it cannot be
concluded that petitioner was disengaged in the month of September, 1987 by respondent rather
prior to creation of these two new Divisions i.e. Nurpur and Jawali, petitioner himself was not in
job as he had left the job who did not report for duty. This plea of respondent has although not been
accepted but it cannot be also stated that petitioner had been disengaged by respondent by a verbal
order as claimed by petitioner. Similarly, no written representation was made to respondent as
alleged in claim petition has been brought in evidence. In view of foregoing plea of petitioner that
Section 25-G was violated cannot be accepted moreso when there is no iota of evidence qua
engagement of petitioner by respondent even for a single day and for similar reasons, plea of
petitioner that respondent had violated Section 25-H of the Act can also not be accepted.
Accordingly, petitioner has failed to establish that respondent had violated provisions of Sections
25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. Inview of forgoing discussions, issue No. 1 is decided in negative
holding that termination of service of petitioner by the respondent in September, 1987 is neither
illegal and nor unjustified and since the petitioner has been lawfully terminated, he would not be
entitled for any service benefits. Both these issues are answered in negative in favour of respondent
and against the petitioner.
Issue No. 3 :
14. Since the petitioner has failed to prove that he ever worked with the respondent as
beldar and thus there existed no relationship of employer and workman and therefore respondent
cannot be stated to have violated provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act and on this score petition is held to be not maintainable. Issue in question is answered
in negative in favour of respondent and against petitioner.
Issue No. 4 :
15. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind
Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
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“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
16. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot
be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is
decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.
Relief :
17. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues No.1 and 2, the instant claim petition
fails and the same is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
18. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
19. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
20. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
267/2016
Date of Institution :
04-05-2016
Date of Decision :
04-04-2018
Shri Budhi Chand s/o Shri Chuhru Ram, r/o Village Nera, P.O. Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur,
District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.
2.
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Jawali Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondents.
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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. S.D. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Budhi Chand s/o Shri Chuhru Ram, r/o
Village Nera, P.O. Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. during March, 1987 by (i)
the Executive Engineer H.P.P.W.D. Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P., (ii) the
Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Jawali Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P., who has
worked as beldar on daily wages basis and has raised his industrial dispute after more than
26 years, vide his demand notice dated 24-11-2013 allegedly without complying with the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view
of working period of 40 ½ days in year during 1987 to March 1987 respectively and delay
of more than 26 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above exworker is entitled to from the
above employer/management?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
beldar on daily wages in the month of April, 1985 in Suliali Sub Division HPPWD falling under
HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. where he continuously worked till August, 1987
when he was disengaged by respondent illegally despite availability of work and funds. It is alleged
that HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. was involved in construction of road Bodh
Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and various sites adjoining to it but
service of petitioner was disengaged orally in August, 1987 in violation of law. It is further alleged
that petitioner had been engaged in construction of roads leading to villages, national highway and
had worked to the satisfaction of respondent and other superiors and there was no complaint against
him. It further transpires from claim petition that after termination of petitioner by the respondent,
he had made several verbal request to respondent by visiting its office as well as office at Sub
Division Suliali who was assured of re-engagement in 3-4 months but did not receive any response
from the respondent when petitioner had written various letters to department for re-engagement on
daily wage basis but was not engaged. It is alleged that a resolution on behalf of retrenched
workmen were also sent to Assistant Registrar to the Hon'ble H.P. State Administrative Tribunal,
Shimla which was pending and not decided till date. The grievance of the petitioner further remains
that petitioner and similarly situated workmen who had been engaged on daily wage basis by
HPPWD constituted one unit and procedure for retrenchment which involved applicability of
principle of 'Last come First go'. It is alleged that in utter disregard to the provisions of Section 25-
G of Industrial Disputes Act junior persons had been retained whereas petitioner had been
disengaged more specifically one Smt. Kusam Sharma w/o Sh. Roshan Lal, Village & P.O. Suliali,
Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. who was retained in pursuance to letter of Engineer-in-Chief
vide letter No. 3058/61 dated 18-1-2000. It is claimed that said Kusam Sharma had joined HPPWD
Division Nurpur in the year 2000 after disengagement of petitioner in 1987 which clearly violates
Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside the order of verbal termination as petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding one year from date of termination and thus respondent had
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violated Section 25-F of the Act. It is alleged that respondent had also not followed the procedure
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act after disengaging petitioner junior persons were engaged
and at the same time no notice for re-employment/re-engagement was issued calling upon
petitioner to join before engaging junior which violates Section 25-G of the Act. Accordingly,
petitioner seeks his reinstatement in service by respondent with seniority, back wages and all the
other consequential benefits.
4.
The respondent contested the claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied
that petitioner had been engaged as beldar in April, 1985 in HPPWD Division Nurpur rather he was
disengaged in 1987. It has been categorically stated that petitioner was engaged as daily wager in
Sub Division HPPWD Suliali falling under Jassur Division where he worked intermittently
between February, 1987 till March, 1987 and thereafter left the work and did not approach the
respondent/department. It is alleged that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted to Jawali Division
vide HP Government Notification No.PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July, 1994 and strength
and staff of Jassur Division was shifted to Jawali but area of Suliali Sub Division was shifted to
Nurpur Division. It has been emphatically denied that petitioner had completed 240 days rather
claimed that petitioner merely worked for 21½ days in March 1997 and 19 days aggregating to 40½
days who did not complete 240 days in any calendar year as reflected in mandays chart. It is
alleged that since Suliali Sub Division was shifted to HPPWD Division Nurpur in 1994. As such,
question of termination of service of petitioner in October, 1987 did not arise. Moreover, petitioner
is alleged to be gainfully employed as an agriculturist. Reiterating his stand, it has been contended
that petitioner left the work of beldar in March, 1987. However, denied that any resolution was
pending before Assistant Registrar, H.P. State Administrative Tribunal for want of knowledge. In
so far as Kusam Sharma is concerned, it has been categorically stated that Kusam Sharma was
engaged as helper on daily wage basis by HPPWD Division Dalhousie in 1983 who worked
intermittently till November, 1998 when said Kusam Sharma made representation to Engineer-in
Chief HPPWD Shimla in December, 1999 stipulating therein that she belonged to Suliali village as
such permission be granted to work in HPPWD Division Nurpur and request was considered and
allowed and adjusted against the post of daily waged Store Clerk. As such, said Kusam Sharma
even after joining HPPWD Division Nurpur from Dalhousie Division continued to work with the
respondent who was senior to the petitioner having joined service with the respondent/department
in 1983. As such, there can be no violation of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and for
similar reasons, it was not required for respondent to have issued notice calling upon the petitioner
for re-employment. It has categorically stated that no other junior persons has been retained or
reemployed by the respondent besides maintained that only those workmen were regularized who
continuously worked and fulfill the requisite criteria for regularization as per government policy
however, denied that petitioner was terminated by the respondent. Accordingly, claim petition was
sought to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1, tendered/proved
his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A and closed evidence. On the other hand,
repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Inder Singh Uttam,
the then Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. as RW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, copy of mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of
Notification dated 21-7-1994 Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated 23-7-1994 Ex. RW1/D, copy
of letter dated 18-1-2000 Ex. RW1/E, copy of mandays chart of Smt. Kusum Ex. RW1/F and
Ex. RW1/G, copy of letter dated 18-12-1999 Ex. RW1/H and closed evidence.
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7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 22-09-2017 for
determination which are as under:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents during March,
1987 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on the ground of delay and laches as alleged? . .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No. 1 : No
Issue No. 2 : No
Issue No. 3 : No
Issue No. 4 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is dismissed per operative part of Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1 and 2 :
10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. Stepping into witness box as PW1 petitioner has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. The Petitioner has specifically stated on
oath that he had completed 240 days having worked from April, 1985 to March, 1987 besides
maintained to have remained engaged in construction site of road Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal
and Suliali to Dev Barari road and that his service had been terminated/disengaged verbally in the
year 1987 in violation of law by respondent. The respondent in its reply as well as statement on
oath as RW1 has maintained that petitioner had not worked from April, 1985 but was engaged in
February, 1987 and continued to work till March, 1987 and during this period also, he had worked
intermittently. The testimony of RW1 corresponds with mandays chart Ex RW1/B which reveals
that petitioner had merely worked for 21½ days in February, 1987 and 19 days in March, 1987
aggregating to total 40½ days. As such, from oral as well as documentary evidence on record, it
cannot be stated that petitioner had worked for 240 days. Be it stated that for applicability of
Section 25-F of the Act, petitioner was required to prove that he had worked for 240 days
continuously in preceding one year before termination and testimony of petitioner is not
substantiated from any corresponding evidence to this effect. As such, when petitioner had not
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completed 240 days, respondent was not required to issue any notice while disengaging him from
service which is not the plea of respondent as it has pleaded that petitioner had abandoned the job.
12. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex.
RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after 1987. No reason
whatsoever has been assigned for such inaction or omission on the part of respondent in not
initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to
join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. Ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has contended that even if the
respondent has not been able to prove abandonment of job by respondent as required under law yet
petitioner was not absolved from his accountability to prove to have worked for a minimum period
of 240 days in preceding 12 months from termination. In view of the foregoing, it is held that
respondent has not violated Section 25-F of the Act who was not required issue any notice or pay
compensation as contended by petitioner.
13. In so far as violation of provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, it deals
with procedure for retrenchment to be adopted by employer. In the case in hand, petitioner has
emphasized enough that juniors were retained by respondent whereas petitioner had been
disengaged despite availability of funds and work. In his affidavit petitioner has stated that one
Kusum Sharma had been engaged who was junior to him and was retained in service. To appreciate
the pleas so raised by petitioner, it would be relevant to go through evidence qua period when said
Kusum Sharma had been engaged. Before proceeding further it may not be erroneous to mention
here that petitioner has failed to prove seniority list of workmen of Suliali Sub Division which was
to be proved so as to establish violation of Section 25-G of the Act. Ld. Dy. D.A. for respondent
has placed reliance upon mandays chart of Kusum Sharma d/o Daulat Ram who was working in
Banikhet Sub Division No.1 HPPWD Banikhet as reflected in Ex. RW1/G. This document shows
that Kusum Sharma had been engaged in November, 1983. Said Kusum Sharma continued to work
till November, 1988 at Dalhousie Division when she had made representation to Engineer-in-Chief,
HPPWD Shimla vide application Ex. RW1/H requesting her transfer from HPPWD Dalhousie to
Suliali HPPWD Sub Division which was allowed as letter Ex. RW1/E dated 18-1-2000 revealed
that one post of Store Clerk (work charged brought in regular cadre) had been allotted to HPPWD
Nurpur Circle. Said Kusum Sharma was engaged in February, 2000 under HPPWD as is evident
from Ex. RW1/F who continued to work uninterruptedly till January, 2009. It is admittedly not the
case of the petitioner that said Kusum Sharma had been disengaged rather she is stated to be still
working under HPPWD Division Nurpur. If said Kusum Sharma had joined in Suliali HPPWD
Division in February, 2000 she cannot be stated to be junior to petitioner as her service had been
placed at the disposal of Executive Engineer HPPWD Nurpur in pursuance to her request allowed
by competent authority who had been initially engaged in November, 1983 whereas petitioner had
been engaged in 1987.
14. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to go through the evidence concerning
creation of Sub Division of Jwali and Nurpur in the year 1994. In the case in hand, evidence qua
petitioner revealed that he had been initially engaged in Suliali Sub Division in February, 1987.
This suliali Sub Division was under Jassur Division out of which Jawali Sub Division was made in
the year 1990 as is evident from Notification dated 21st July, 1994 Ex. RW1/C and Ex. RW1/D on
record. These documents further show that Jassur Sub Division cease to exist upon creation of
Nurpur and Jawali Sub Division meaning thereby that on creation of Jawali Sub Division and
Nurpur, Suliali Sub Division falling under the Nurpur Division got merged in Nurpur Sub Division.
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Said Kusum Sharma is shown to have joined at Suliali Sub Division which consequently fell under
Nurpur Sub Division as discussed in foregoing paragraphs. It is evident from evidence on record
that petitioner had been working under Suliali Sub Division since 1987 as stated above but with the
bifurcation of Divisions as stated above, it cannot be concluded that petitioner was disengaged in
the month of March, 1987 by respondent rather prior to creation of these two new Sub Divisions
i.e. Nurpur and Jawali, petitioner himself was not in job as he had left the job who did not report for
duty. This plea of respondent has although not been accepted by this court for want of issuance of
notice or charge-sheet but it cannot be stated that petitioner had been disengaged by respondent by
a verbal order. In view of foregoing plea of petitioner that Section 25-G was violated cannot be
accepted and for similar reasons plea of petitioner that respondent had violated Section 25-H of the
Act can also not accepted. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to establish that respondent had
violated provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. In view of forgoing discussions,
issue No.1 is decided in negative holding that termination of service of petitioner by the respondent
in March, 1987 is neither illegal and nor unjustified and since the petitioner has been lawfully
terminated, he would not be entitled for any service benefits. Both these issues are answered in
negative in favour of respondent and against the petitioner.
Issue No.3 :
15. On the plea non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has contended that present claim
petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had abandoned the job of his own and did not join his
duty despite issuance of muster roll for the relevant period. From the pleadings of the parties and
evidence on record as discussed in foregoing paras, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised instead the same is held to be maintainable. As such, the issue in hand
is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue No. 4 :
16. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-
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operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
17. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot
be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is
decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.
Relief :
18. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues No.1 and 2, the instant claim petition
fails and the same is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
19. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
20. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
21. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
410/2016
Date of Institution :
27-06-2016
Date of Decision :
04-04-2018
Shri Vijay Kumar s/o Shri Dharam Singh, r/o Village Ghali, P.O. Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur,
District Kangra, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.
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2.
The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Jawali Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. S. D. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of the services of Shri Vijay Kumar s/o Shri Dharam Singh,
r/o Village Ghali, P.O. Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. during October, 1989
by (i) the Executive Engineer, Nurpur Division, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.
(ii) the Executive Engineer, Jawali Division, H.P.P.W.D. Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.,
without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as alleged by
workman, is legal and justified; whereas he has raised the industrial dispute vide demand
notice dated 24-11-2013 after lapse of more than 24 years. If not, keeping in view delay of
more than 24 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority,
past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above
employer?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
beldar on daily wages in the month of September, 1986, in Suliali Sub Division HPPWD falling
under HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. where he continuously worked till October,
1989 when he was disengaged by respondent illegally despite availability of work and funds. It is
alleged that HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. was involved in construction of road
Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and various sites adjoining to it but
service of petitioner was disengaged orally in October, 1989 in violation of law. It is further alleged
that petitioner had been engaged in construction of roads leading to villages, national highway and
had worked to the satisfaction of respondent and other superiors and there was no complaint against
him. It further transpires from claim petition that after termination of petitioner by the respondent,
he had made several verbal request to respondent by visiting its office as well as office at Sub
Division Suliali who was assured of re-engagement in 3-4 months but did not receive any response
from the respondent when petitioner had written various letters to department for re-engagement on
daily wage basis but was not engaged. It is alleged that a resolution on behalf of retrenched
workmen were also sent to Assistant Registrar to the Hon'ble H.P. State Administrative Tribunal,
Shimla which was pending and not decided till date. The grievance of the petitioner further remains
that petitioner and similarly situated workmen who had been engaged on daily wage basis by
HPPWD constituted one unit and procedure for retrenchment which involved applicability of
principle of 'Last come First go'. It is alleged that in utter disregard to the provisions of Section 25-
G of Industrial Disputes Act junior persons had been retained whereas petitioner had been
disengaged more specifically one Smt. Kusam Sharma w/o Sh. Roshan Lal, Village & P.O. Suliali,
Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. who was retained in pursuance to letter of Engineer-in-Chief
vide letter No.3058/61 dated 18-1-2000. It is claimed that said Kusam Sharma had joined HPPWD
Division Nurpur in the year 2000 after disengagement of petitioner in 1988 which clearly violates
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Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside the order of verbal termination as petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding one year from date of termination and thus respondent had
violated Section 25-F of the Act. It is alleged that respondent had also not followed the procedure
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act after disengaging petitioner junior persons were engaged
and at the same time no notice for re-employment/re-engagement was issued calling upon
petitioner to join before engaging junior which violates Section 25-G of the Act. Accordingly,
petitioner seeks his reinstatement in service by respondent with seniority, back wages and all the
other consequential benefits.
4.
The respondent contested the claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability and petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits
denied that petitioner had been engaged as beldar in September, 1986 in HPPWD Division Nurpur
and was disengaged in October, 1989. It is alleged that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted to
Jawali Division vide HP Government Notification No. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July,
1994 and strength and staff of Jassur Division was shifted to Jawali but area of Suliali Sub Division
was shifted to Nurpur Division. It has been emphatically denied that petitioner was ever engaged by
the respondent and the question of completion of 240 days did not arise. It is alleged that since
Suliali Sub Division was shifted to HPPWD Division Nurpur in 1994. As such, question of
termination of service of petitioner in October, 1989 did not arise. Moreover, petitioner has alleged
to gainfully employed as an agriculturist. However, denied that any resolution was pending before
Assistant Registrar, H.P. State Administrative Tribunal for want of knowledge. It is further stated
that petitioner was never engaged by the respondent and violation of any provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act does not arise. Accordingly, claim petition was sought to be dismissed.
5.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1, tendered/proved
his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A and closed evidence. On the other hand,
repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Inder Singh Uttam,
the then Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. as RW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A and closed evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 31-08-2017 for
determination which are as under:
1.
Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents during October,
1989 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of
petitioner as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
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9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No. 1 : No
Issue No. 2 : No
Issue No. 3 : Yes
Issue No. 4 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is dismissed per operative part of Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1 and 2 :
10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
11. At the outset, it is apt to mention here that petitioner had neither proved mandays chart
nor produced seniority list in absence of which it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had
violated Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. Be it stated here that there is
only oral evidence on record adduced by the parties in support of their respective contentions and
that there is no documentary evidence led by either parties to claim petition. Stepping into witness
box as PW1 petitioner has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterated his stand as maintained in the
claim petition. Be it stated that petitioner has specifically alleged that he had completed 240 days
having worked from September, 1986 to October, 1989. He has also stated to have remained
engaged in construction site of road Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari
besides maintained that his service had been terminated/disengaged verbally in the year 1989 by
respondent despite availability of work and funds. The respondent in its reply as well as statement
on oath as RW1 has maintained that petitioner had not at all worked with the respondent. As such,
from evidence on record, it cannot be stated that petitioner had worked for 240 days. For the
applicability of Section 25-F of the Act, petitioner was required to prove that he had worked for
240 days and his testimony was required to be substantiated from evidence on record. As such,
when petitioner has not proved to have factually worked with respondent question of completing
240 days did not arise and thus respondent was not required to issue any notice while disengaging
him from service.
12. In so far as violation of provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, it deals
with procedure for retrenchment to be adopted by employer. In the case in hand petitioner has
emphasized enough that juniors were retained whereas petitioner had been disengaged. In his
affidavit Ex. PW1/A petitioner has stated that one Kusum Sharma had been engaged who was
junior to him and was retained in service. To appreciate the plea so raised by petitioner, it would be
relevant to go through evidence qua period when said Kusum Sharma had been engaged. Ld. Dy.
D.A. for respondent has contended that Kusum Sharma d/o Daulat Ram who was working in
Banikhet Sub Division No.1 HPPWD Banikhet as reflected in affidavit of RW1. Be it stated that
Kusum Sharma had been engaged in November, 1983 by HPPWD Banikhet Divsion. Said Kusum
Sharma continued to work till November, 1988 at Dalhousie Division when she had made
representation to Engineer-in-Chief, HPPWD Shimla vide petitioner's application requesting her
transfer from HPPWD Dalhousie to Suliali HPPWD Sub Division which was allowed in her favour
on 18-1-2000 RW1 further stated that one post of Store Clerk (work charged brought in regular
cadre) had been allotted to Circle at HPPWD Nurpur. Said Kusum Sharma was engaged in
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February, 2000 as is evident from Ex. RW1/A affidavit of Inder Singh Uttam, Executive Engineer,
HPPWD, B&R Division Nurpur and she continued to work uninterruptedly till January, 2009. It is
admittedly not the case of the petitioner that said Kusum Sharma had been disengaged at any point
of time rather she is stated to be still working under HPPWD Division Nurpur. If said Kusum
Sharma had joined in Suliali HPPWD Division in February, 2000 she cannot be stated to be junior
the petitioner as her service had been placed at the disposal of Executive Engineer HPPWD Nurpur
in pursuance to her request allowed by competent authority and that she had been initially engaged
in November, 1983 and transferred to Suliali Sub Division as has been admitted by RW1 in cross-
examination.
13. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to go through the evidence concerning
creation of Sub Division at Jwali and Nurpur in the year 1994. In the case in hand evidence qua
petitioner revealed that he had been engaged in Suliali Sub Division in March, 1987 wherefrom he
was allegedly terminated in the same year. This suliali Sub Division was under Jassur Division out
of which Jawali Sub Division was made in the year 1999 as per Notification dated 21st July, 1994
as shown in affidavit Ex. RW1/A on record. RW1 further stated that Jassur Division cease to exist
consequent upon creation of Nurpur and Jawali Sub Division meaning thereby that on creation of
Jawali Sub Division and Nurpur, Suliali Sub Division had fallen under the Nurpur Division. Said
Kusum Sharma is shown to have joined at Suliali Sub Division on transfer as deposed by RW1
which consequently fell under Nurpur. It is evident from evidence on record that petitioner had
been working under Suliali Sub Division but with the bifurcation of Divisions, it cannot be
concluded that petitioner was disengaged in the month of October, 1989 by respondent rather prior
to creation of these two new Divisions i.e. Nurpur and Jawali, petitioner himself was not in job as
he had left the job who did not report for duty. This plea of respondent although not been accepted
but it cannot be also stated that petitioner had been disengaged by respondent by a verbal order as
claimed by petitioner. Similarly, no written representation was made to respondent as alleged in
claim petition has been brought in evidence. In view of foregoing plea of petitioner that Section
25 G was violated cannot be accepted moreso when there is no iota of evidence qua engagement of
petitioner by respondent even for a single day and for similar reasons, plea of petitioner that
respondent had violated Section 25-H of the Act can also not be accepted. Accordingly, petitioner
has failed to establish that respondent had violated provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of
the Act. In view of forgoing discussions, issue No. 1 is decided in negative holding that termination
of service of petitioner by the respondent in October, 1989 is neither illegal and nor unjustified and
since the petitioner has been lawfully terminated, he would not be entitled for any service benefits.
Both these issues are answered in negative in favour of respondent and against the petitioner.
Issue No. 3 :
14. Since the petitioner has failed to prove that he ever worked with the respondent as
beldar and thus there existed no relationship of employer and workman and therefore respondent
cannot be stated to have violated provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial
Disputes Act and on this score petition is held to be not maintainable. Issue in question is answered
in negative in favour of respondent and against petitioner.
Issue No. 4 :
15. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
1179
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provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind
Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
16. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot
be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is
decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.
Relief :
17. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues No.1 and 2, the instant claim petition
fails and the same is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
18. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
19. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
20. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
208/2016
Date of Institution : 11-04-2016
Date of Decision :
04-04-2018
Shri Mahinder Singh s/o Shri Kushia Ram, r/o VPO Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra,
H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, Nurpur Division, H.P.P.W.D. Nurpur, Tehsil Nurpur, District
Kangra, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. S. D. Sharma, Adv.
For the Respondent :
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether alleged termination of services of Sh. Mahinder Singh s/o Sh. Kushia Ram r/o
V.P.O. Suliali, Tehsil Nurpur, Distt. Kangra, H.P. w.e.f. 20-3-1986 by the Executive
Engineer, HPPWD Division Nurpur, Distt. Kangra, H.P. who had worked as beldar on daily
wages basis only for 62 days and 54 days during the year 1985, 1986 and has raised his
industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 24-11-2013 after more than 26 years, allegedly
without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and
justified? If not, keeping in view of working period as above mentioned and delay of more
than 26 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past
service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above
employer/management?”
2.
On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
beldar on daily wages in the month of September, 1984 in Suliali Sub Division HPPWD falling
under HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. where he continuously worked till October,
1986 when he was disengaged by respondent illegally despite availability of work and funds. It is
alleged that HPPWD Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. was involved in construction of road
Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and various sites adjoining to it but
service of petitioner was disengaged orally in October, 1986 in violation of law. It is further alleged
that petitioner had been engaged in construction of roads leading to villages, national highway and
had worked to the satisfaction of respondent and other superiors and there was no complaint against
him. It further transpires from claim petition that after termination of petitioner by the respondent,
1181
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he had made several verbal request to respondent by visiting its office as well as office at Sub
Division Suliali who was assured of re-engagement in 3-4 months but did not receive any response
from the respondent when petitioner had written various letters to department for re-engagement on
daily wage basis but was not engaged. It is alleged that a resolution on behalf of retrenched
workmen were also sent to Assistant Registrar to the Hon'ble H.P. State Administrative Tribunal,
Shimla which was pending and not decided till date. The grievance of the petitioner further remains
that petitioner and similarly situated workmen who had been engaged on daily wage basis by
HPPWD constituted one unit and procedure for retrenchment which involved applicability of
principle of 'Last come First go'. It is alleged that in utter disregard to the provisions of Section
25-G of Industrial Disputes Act junior persons had been retained whereas petitioner had been
disengaged more specifically one Smt. Kusam Sharma w/o Sh. Roshan Lal, Village & P.O. Suliali,
Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. who was retained in pursuance to letter of Engineer-in-Chief
vide letter No. 3058/61 dated 18-1-2000. It is claimed that said Kusam Sharma had joined HPPWD
Division Nurpur in the year 2000 after disengagement of petitioner in 1986 which clearly violates
Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside the order of verbal termination as petitioner had
completed 240 days in preceding one year from date of termination and thus respondent had
violated Section 25-F of the Act. It is alleged that respondent had also not followed the procedure
envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act after disengaging petitioner junior persons were engaged
and at the same time no notice for re-employment/re-engagement was issued calling upon
petitioner to join before engaging junior which violates Section 25-G of the Act. Accordingly,
petitioner seeks his reinstatement in service by respondent with seniority, back wages and all the
other consequential benefits.
4.
The respondent contested the claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied
that petitioner had been engaged as beldar in September, 1984 in HPPWD Division Nurpur rather
he was disengaged in October, 1986. It has been categorically stated that petitioner was engaged as
daily wager in Sub Division HPPWD Suliali falling under Jassur Division where he worked
intermittently between July, 1985 till March, 1986 and thereafter left the work and did not approach
the respondent/department. It is alleged that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted to Jawali Division
vide HP Government Notification No. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July, 1994 and strength
and staff of Jassur Division was shifted to Jawali but area of Suliali Sub Division was shifted to
Nurpur Division. It has been emphatically denied that petitioner had completed 240 days rather
claimed that petitioner merely worked from July, 1985 till March, 1986 who did not complete 240
days in any calendar year as reflected in mandays chart. It is alleged that since Suliali Sub Division
was shifted to HPPWD Division Nurpur in 1994. As such, question of termination of service of
petitioner in March, 1986 did not arise. Moreover, petitioner is alleged to be gainfully employed as
an agriculturist. Reiterating his stand, it has been contended that petitioner left the work of beldar in
July, 1988. However, denied that any resolution was pending before Assistant Registrar, H.P. State
Administrative Tribunal for want of knowledge. In so far as Kusam Sharma is concerned, it has
been categorically stated that Kusam Sharma was engaged as helper on daily wage basis by
HPPWD Division Dalhousie in 1983 who worked intermittently till November, 1998 when said
Kusam Sharma made representation to Engineer-in-Chief HPPWD Shimla in December, 1999
stipulating therein that she belonged to Suliali village as such permission be granted to work in
HPPWD Division Nurpur and request was considered and allowed and adjusted against the post of
daily waged Store Clerk. As such, said Kusam Sharma even after joining HPPWD Division Nurpur
from Dalhousie Division continued to work with the respondent who was senior to the petitioner
having joined service with the respondent/department in 1983. As such, there can be no violation of
Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and for similar reasons, it was not required for
respondent to have issued notice calling upon the petitioner for reemployment. It has categorically
stated that no other junior persons has been retained or reemployed by the respondent besides
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maintained that only those workmen were regularized who continuously worked and fulfill the
requisite criteria for regularization as per government policy however, denied that petitioner was
terminated by the respondent. Accordingly, claim petition was sought to be dismissed.
5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
6.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1, tendered/proved
his affidavit under order 18 Rule 4 CPC Ex. PW1/A and closed evidence. On the other hand,
repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Inder Singh Uttam,
the then Executive Engineer, B&R Division HPPWD Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. as RW1
tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, copy of mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of
Notification dated 21-7-1994 Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated 23-7-1994 Ex. RW1/D, copy
of letter dated 18-1-2000 Ex. RW1/E, copy of mandays chart of Smt. Kusum Ex. RW1/F and
Ex. RW1/G, copy of letter dated 18-12-1999 Ex. RW1/H and closed evidence.
7.
I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent,
gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.
8.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 31-08-2017 for
determination which are as under:
1. Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. 20-3-1986
is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim petition is bad on the ground of delay and laches on the part of
petitioner as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
9.
For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No. 1 : No
Issue No. 2 : No
Issue No. 3 : No
Issue No. 4 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is dismissed per operative part of Award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1 and 2 :
10. Both these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected
which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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11. Stepping into witness box as PW1 petitioner has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. The Petitioner has specifically stated on
oath that he had completed 240 days having worked from September, 1984 to October, 1986
besides maintained to have remained engaged in construction site of road Bodh Chakki Dhar Aund
Haddal and Suliali to Dev Barari road and that his service had been terminated/disengaged verbally
in the year 1986 in violation of law by respondent. The respondent in its reply as well as statement
on oath as RW1 has maintained that petitioner had not worked from September, 1984 but was
engaged in July, 1985 till March, 1986 and during this period also, he had worked intermittently.
The testimony of RW1 corresponds with mandays chart Ex. RW1/B which reveals that petitioner
had merely worked for 62 days in 1985 and 54 days in 1986 aggregating to total 116 days. As such,
from oral as well as documentary evidence on record, it cannot be stated that petitioner had worked
for 240 days. Be it stated that for applicability of Section 25-F of the Act, petitioner was required to
prove that he had worked for 240 days continuously in preceding one year before termination and
testimony of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding evidence to this effect. As such,
when petitioner had not completed 240 days, respondent was not required to issue any notice while
disengaging him from service which is not the plea of respondent as it has pleaded that petitioner
had abandoned the job.
12. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits
rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be
established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart
Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically
admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically
admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after 1986. No reason
whatsoever has been assigned for such inaction or omission on the part of respondent in not
initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to
join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be
proved like any other fact in issue. Ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has contended that even if the
respondent has not been able to prove abandonment of job by respondent as required under law yet
petitioner was not absolved from his accountability to prove to have worked for a minimum period
of 240 days in preceding 12 months from termination. In view of the foregoing, it is held that
respondent has not violated Section 25-F of the Act who was not required issue any notice or pay
compensation as contended by petitioner.
13. In so far as violation of provisions of Section 25-G of the Act is concerned, it deals
with procedure for retrenchment to be adopted by employer. In the case in hand, petitioner has
emphasized enough that juniors were retained by respondent whereas petitioner had been
disengaged despite availability of funds and work. In his affidavit petitioner has stated that one
Kusum Sharma had been engaged who was junior to him and was retained in service. To appreciate
the pleas so raised by petitioner, it would be relevant to go through evidence qua period when said
Kusum Sharma had been engaged. Before proceeding further it may not be erroneous to mention
here that petitioner has failed to prove seniority list of workmen of Suliali Sub Division which was
to be proved so as to establish violation of Section 25-G of the Act. Ld. Dy. D.A. for respondent
has placed reliance upon mandays chart of Kusum Sharma d/o Daulat Ram who was working in
Banikhet Sub Division No.1 HPPWD Banikhet as reflected in Ex. RW1/G. This document shows
that Kusum Sharma had been engaged in November, 1983. Said Kusum Sharma continued to work
till November, 1988 at Dalhousie Division when she had made representation to Engineer-in-Chief,
HPPWD Shimla vide application Ex. RW1/H requesting her transfer from HPPWD Dalhousie to
Suliali HPPWD Sub Division which was allowed as letter Ex. RW1/E dated 18-1-2000 revealed
that one post of Store Clerk (work charged brought in regular cadre) had been allotted to HPPWD
Nurpur Circle. Said Kusum Sharma was engaged in February, 2000 under HPPWD as is evident
from Ex. RW1/F who continued to work uninterruptedly till January, 2009. It is admittedly not the
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case of the petitioner that said Kusum Sharma had been disengaged rather she is stated to be still
working under HPPWD Division Nurpur. If said Kusum Sharma had joined in Suliali HPPWD
Division in February, 2000 she cannot be stated to be junior to petitioner as her service had been
placed at the disposal of Executive Engineer HPPWD Nurpur in pursuance to her request allowed
by competent authority who had been initially engaged in November, 1983 whereas petitioner had
been engaged in 1986.
14. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to go through the evidence concerning
creation of Sub Division of Jwali and Nurpur in the year 1994. In the case in hand, evidence qua
petitioner revealed that he had been initially engaged in Suliali Sub Division in December, 1987.
This Suliali Sub Division was under Jassur Division out of which Jawali Sub Division was made in
the year 1990 as is evident from Notification dated 21st July 1994 Ex. RW1/C and Ex. RW1/D on
record. These documents further show that Jassur Sub Division cease to exist upon creation of
Nurpur and Jawali Sub Division meaning thereby that on creation of Jawali Sub Division and
Nurpur, Suliali Sub Division falling under the Nurpur Division got merged in Nurpur Sub Division.
Said Kusum Sharma is shown to have joined at Suliali Sub Division which consequently fell under
Nurpur Sub Division as discussed in foregoing paragraphs. It is evident from evidence on record
that petitioner had been working under Suliali Sub Division since 1985 as stated above but with the
bifurcation of Divisions as stated above, it cannot be concluded that petitioner was disengaged in
the month of March, 1986 by respondent rather prior to creation of these two new Sub Divisions
i.e. Nurpur and Jawali, petitioner himself was not in job as he had left the job who did not report for
duty. This plea of respondent has although not been accepted by this court for want of issuance of
notice or charge-sheet but it cannot be stated that petitioner had been disengaged by respondent by
a verbal order. In view of foregoing plea of petitioner that Section 25-G was violated cannot be
accepted and for similar reasons plea of petitioner that respondent had violated Section 25-H of the
Act can also not accepted. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to establish that respondent had
violated provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. In view of forgoing discussions,
issue No. 1 is decided in negative holding that termination of service of petitioner by the
respondent in March 1986 is neither illegal and nor unjustified and since the petitioner has been
lawfully terminated, he would not be entitled for any service benefits. Both these issues are
answered in negative in favour of respondent and against the petitioner.
Issue No. 3 :
15. On the plea non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has contended that present claim
petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had abandoned the job of his own and did not join his
duty despite issuance of muster roll for the relevant period. From the pleadings of the parties and
evidence on record as discussed in foregoing paras, no inference of claim petition being not
maintainable could be raised instead the same is held to be maintainable. As such, the issue in hand
is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
Issue No. 4 :
16. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (H.P.) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
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applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-
operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
17. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondent. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner cannot
be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged by the respondent. Hence, this issue is
decided against the respondent and is answered accordingly.
Relief :
18. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues No. 1 and 2, the instant claim petition
fails and the same is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
19. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
20. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
21. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
329/2015
Date of Institution : 29-07-2015
Date of Decision :
04-04-2018
Shri Sanjeev Kumar s/o Shri Balraj Kumar, r/o V.P.O. Jakhera, District Una, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Employer, M/s Pal Roller Flour Mills Private Limited, Plot No.12-A, Industrial Area,
Mehatpur, District Una, H.P.
. .Respondent.
Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. Kumar Karan, Adv.
For the Respondent :
Sh. Anish J.P., Adv.
AWARD
The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether termination of the services of Shri Sanjeev Kumar s/o Shri Balraj Kumar, r/o
V.P.O. Jakhera, District Una, H.P. w.e.f. 12-05-2014 by Employer, M/s Pal Roller Flour
Mills Private Limited, Plot No.12-A, Industrial Area, Mehatpur, District Una, H.P., without
complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If
not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the
above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”
2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties
in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.
3.
Brief facts as stipulated in the claim petition reveal that the petitioner had been
engaged as helper/worker in the month of July, 2008 vide verbal order of respondent who continued
to work in the factory premises till 11-5-2014 when his service had been unlawfully terminated by
respondent/management. Averments made in the claim petition revealed that while terminating
service of petitioner, no show cause notice or charge-sheet was issued revealing his misconduct for
which he was terminated and at the same time, no notice under Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act or pay in lieu thereof as retrenchment compensation had been paid. It is alleged that
petitioner had completed more than 240 days in each and every calendar year as well as in last 12
months preceding his termination. It is stated that on his termination petitioner has raised industrial
dispute raising a demand notice copy of which was forwarded to Labour Inspector, Una when
conciliation proceedings commenced in which management had filed reply to demand notice and at
the same time petitioner had filed rejoinder to reply so filed by the management refuting all
allegations made by respondent. It is alleged that conciliation proceedings ended in failure as
respondent vide letter dated 18-7-2014 had totally refused to reinstate petitioner in service.
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4.
In addition to the above facts, the petitioner had highlighted in his claim petition that
one settlement had been arrived at between Shri Sanjay Garg, Director of company and
Shri Rakesh Sharma, Secretary BMS on 19-6-2010 preceded by demand notice raised by Mazdoor
Sangh on 20-5-2009 and vide settlement demand No.1 was resolved vide which respondent/
management had agreed to provide two uniforms to each worker every year in pursuance to which
respondent had provided uniform to workers of factory in the year 2010 after settlement and
thereafter from 1-4-2011 uniforms had not been given to workers. The petitioner in his claim
petition has highlighted that he was active member of union and in election held on 27-10-2011 he
was elected as Vice President of the union intimation of which was sent to respondent/
management. It is claimed that activity of petitioner involved demand of uniform, 8% annual
increment and due to petitioner being office bearer of Mazdoor Sangh, the respondent did not allow
petitioner to resume duty on 12-5-2014 who was illegally terminated. Even while terminating
service of petitioner, respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go' envisaged
under Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
While recruiting new workers opportunity of employment was not offered to petitioner which
violated Section 25-H of the Act. Claiming that service of petitioner had been terminated with
malafide intention of the respondent/management due to union activities of petitioner and his
termination fell within the ambit of unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Section
25-T and 25-U read with Vth Schedule clause 1(a) 5 (f) and 13 of the Act. It is alleged that after his
termination, petitioner has remained unemployed and was not gainfully employed anywhere and as
such was entitled for full back wages from the date of his illegal termination. Accordingly,
petitioner has prayed for setting aside illegal termination w.e.f. 12-5-2014 with direction to
respondent to reinstate petitioner in service with seniority, continuity in service at his original place
besides costs of litigation.
5.
The respondent contested the claim petition filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, estoppel, suppression of material facts, limitation. On merits admitted
that petitioner was employee of respondent as claimed by him in the claim petition but work and
conduct was not upto the mark and several time he was found removing property of the company
but lenient view was taken towards him from side of management. It is alleged that on 12-6-2010
petitioner was caught red handed removing 10 kg. of wheat flour for which he tendered written
apology dated 12-6-2010. It is claimed that service of petitioner had not been terminated rather he
had of his own voluntarily resigned from service on 10-5-2014. It is alleged that on 10-5-2014,
supervisor of the company had asked petitioner to perform some task which was in the course of
his employment and due to negligence of the petitioner fire took place in factory premises and
entire wooden material lying got burnt however huge financial loss as it was controlled and did not
spread. Realizing his mistake, petitioner had submitted resignation as on 10-5-2012 to the
management without any pressure or coercion. Admitted that petitioner had moved an application
before Labour Office Una which was replied by respondent. It is claimed that since petitioner had
resigned from service, question of allowing the petitioner to join duty did not arise at all moreso
when service of petitioner was not at all terminated by respondent. Accordingly, denying cause of
action, petition was sought to be dismissed.
6.
The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.
7.
In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved
his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of letter dated 27-11-2011 Ex. PW1/B,
copy of settlement Ex. PW1/C, copy of settlement Mark-A, copy of demand notice Ex. PW1/D,
copy of reply to demand notice Ex. PW1/E, copy of rejoinder to reply Ex. PW1/F, copy of zimni
orders Ex. PW1/G, Ex. PW1/G1 to Ex. PW1/G3, copy of report dated 30-8-2014 Ex. PW1/H.
Shri Devi Prasad examined PW1, tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW2/A, copy of letter dated
9-6-2015 Mark-A, copy of letter regarding bonus Mark-B, copy of letter dated 21-7-2006 Mark-C
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and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent
examined RW1 Shri Sanjay Garg, Director, M/s. Pal Roller Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd. as RW1,
tendered/proved affidavit Ex. RW1/A, copy of bank certificate Ex. RW1/B. Respondent has also
examined one Shri Shashi Shekar, Assistant, State Bank of India Mehatpur, Branch Una as RW2,
tendered/proved copy of statement of account Ex. RW2/A and Ex. RW2/B. Respondent examined
one Shri Sanjeev Kumar working as Supervisor in the Factory of respondent as RW3, tendered/
proved his affidavit Ex. RW3/A, resignation letter dated 10-5-2014 Ex. RW3/B and also proved
signature in red circle Ex. RW3/C and closed evidence.
8.
I have heard the ld. counsel for the parties, gone through records of the case carefully
relevant for disposed of this case.
9.
From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 25-10-2016 for
determination which are as under:
1.
Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.
12-5-2014 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled
to?
. .OPP.
3. Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
4.
Whether the claim petition is barred by his act and conduct as alleged. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
5.
Whether the petitioner has concealed the material facts from Court as alleged. If so, its
effect?
. .OPR.
Relief :
10. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—
Issue No. 1 : No
Issue No. 2 : No
Issue No. 3 : No
Issue No. 4 : Yes
Issue No. 5 : Yes
Relief :
Claim petition is dismissed per operative part of Award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No.1, 2, 4 and 5 :
11. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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12. At the outset, it would be pertinent to mention here that respondent was required to
raise charge-sheet or hold departmental inquiry if petitioner had not resigned vide his letter dated
10-5-2014 and compliance of Section 25-F of the Act would have come into picture only when it
was case of termination. In the backdrop of foregoing facts the evidence adduced by the parties
needs to be scanned to determine if petitioner had been illegally terminated by respondent as
claimed by petitioner or he had voluntarily tendered resignation due to which his service came to an
end. Admittedly, petitioner has remained employed with respondent as helper/worker from July,
2008 to 10-5-2014. The claim of the petitioner remains that his service has been terminated
illegally by respondent due to union activities. On the other hand, the plea of respondent remains
that service of petitioner has not been terminated rather petitioner of his own had tendered
resignation on 10-5-2014 Ex. RW3/B preceded by an incident in which fire broke out on the same
day in the factory premises due to negligence of the petitioner and that petitioner had shown
inability to indemnify respondent for the loss caused as a result of which he tendered resignation
Ex. RW1/B.
13. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has contended that petitioner was an office bearer of
union of respondent company and was involved in enforcement of demands which had been agreed
by management of the respondent company vide agreement dated 19-6-2010. In support of his
contention reliance upon Ex. PW1/B dated 27-11-2011 showing Sanjeev Kumar petitioner had
been elected as Vice President. Ex. PW1/C is a compromise dated 19-6-2010 which had been
signed by RW1 Shri Sanjay Garg and Shri Rakesh Sharma Secretary of BMS. While referring to
this document, it has been contended that although the management had agreed to provide two
uniforms to its workers but only one uniform was given and from 1st April, 2010 it was not given.
Mark-A is the compromise dated 12-12-2012 which revealed increase in annual salaries of workers
and was signed by petitioner as an office bearer of union besides other had also signed. With the
aid of this document, ld. counsel for the petitioner has tried to project that being union leader who
was negotiating and highlighting demands of the workers, the petitioner had been illegally
terminated and he had not resigned but this plea merits rejection in view of overwhelming record
suggesting petitioner had in-fact resigned from service who had specifically admitted on oath that
resignation letter Ex. RW1/B was written and signed by him besides did not complain to
government authority about his signature having been obtained either forcibly or on blank papers
and even before Labour Inspector-cum-Conciliation Officer, such plea was not at all raised which
manifestly belies statement of petitioner on oath before this court qua having not written and signed
resignation letter Ex. RW3/B voluntarily. As such, under the garb of union activities, petitioner had
made futile endevour to establish that as the office bearer of union he was victimized and that has
recoursed to unfair labour practice in terminating his service. Since petitioner had resigned from
service, there could be no occasion for respondent to have recoursed to any unfair labour practice
moreso when the resignation was not only signed by the petitioner but was also written by him as
admitted by him on oath which supports plea of management of respondent company.
14. Stepping into witness box as PW1 Sanjeev Kumar has sworn his affidavit Ex.PW1/A
reiterating his stand as maintained in the claim petition. In his affidavit, petitioner has stated that on
10-5-2014 he was assigned job by one Shri Anurag Sharma, Supervisor which involved removal of
wooden frames from iron lying in the factory and burn them and petitioner has after taking out 10
wood frames started putting fire which got spread over all wooden frames lying inside in the
factory premises were totally destroyed in fire. He has further stated that respondent had called
police and was taken to the office where said Shri Anurag Sharma, Supervisor slapped him and
obtained resignation forcibly. Be it stated that petitioner could have been charge-sheeted for the
misconduct of putting fire inside factory as stated above if he had not resigned from service on
10-5-2012. He has further stated in affidavit that on 12-5-2014 when he came to factory for his
duty, he was refused to enter factory premises when he raised demand notice on 16-5-2014 before
Labour Inspector and the said demand notice was replied by management. He has further stated that
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his signature existed in the zimni orders Ex. PW1/G1 to G3 before Conciliation Officer besides
maintained that on submission of failure report reference was made by Labour Commissioner. The
affidavit so filed by petitioner also revealed that he was initially appointed, respondent had got
three blank papers and some vouchers signed from him and manipulated resignation letter
Ex. RW1/B besides prayed that his illegal termination order be set aside and he be given back
wages from 12-5-2014. Cross-examination of petitioner clearly reveals that he had written
resignation Ex. RW3/B (Mark-X) and he had also identified his signature upon it. Thereafter, stated
of his own that his signature had been got signed forcibly on resignation letter Ex. RW3/B and
thereafter stated of his own that his signature were taken on blank papers. In both the situations,
atleast blank papers which were allegedly got taken at the time of joining duty were not used. Be it
noticed that in claim petition petitioner has not alleged even a single word that his signature had
been obtained on blank papers. RW3/B. As such, the petitioner himself was not clear about the
facts and the manner in which he signed resignation letter Ex. RW1/B. Significantly, resignation
letter was counter signed as witness by one Sanjeev Kumar RW3 working with respondent and one
Indu Shekhar who had although filed affidavit but was not examined being repetitive in nature.
Said Sanjeev Kumar RW3 was examined has admitted his signature Ex. RW3/C on the resignation
letter of petitioner. Similarly, PW2 admitted signature on the resignation letter, once the petitioner
has admitted on oath that he had written the letter and signed it which showed that he had
voluntarily resigned as he was not in a position to pay respondent for loss caused due to fire that
broke out in the factory premises on the same day before tendering resignation. Earlier also he was
found stealing 10 kg wheat flour and had tendered written apology letter Mark-Y. As such, his
version that signature had been obtained on blank papers or vouchers he was asked to forcibly sign
was the same resignation letter could not be accepted. PW2 Shri Devi Prasad who was admittedly
present with petitioner on the relevant date while waiting to meet M.D. of respondent company. In
cross-examination petitioner has admitted that on 10-5-2014 fire broke out in the factory premises
but claimed that it was on vacant land and that petitioner was involved in incident of fire in factory
premises. The proceedings before Labour Inspector as Ex. PW1/G1 to G3 read with Ex. PW1/H the
report under Section 12(4) of the Act in detail revealed the fact of incident of fire in factory
premises which took place on 10-5-2014 and same could have caused huge loss or say damage to
the factory due to negligence of petitioner. The failure report under Section 12(4) clearly shows that
petitioner had apologized from respondent/management and showed his inability to indemnify
respondent due to which had given resignation and that service of petitioner had not been
terminated by the respondent rather petitioner of his own had resigned vide letter Ex. RW1/B. The
above stated evidence is in consonance with plea of respondent which established that petitioner
had voluntarily resigned on 10-5-2014 and had thus ceased to be employee of respondent.
15. Cross-examination of PW2 support the plea of management to the extent that fire
broke out in the factory premises on 10-5-2014 when petitioner was asked to perform certain duty
by Shri Anurag Sharma, Supervisor besides petitioner had earlier been involved an incident in
when he was caught red handed stealing 10 kg flour from factory. PW2 who worked in the same
factory since 1986 has shown his ignorance about taking away of wheat flour by petitioner but
petitioner in his cross-examination has admitted his signature over apology letter dated 12-6-2010
Mark-Y but claimed that his signature had been obtained on blank papers. Significantly, when these
blank papers or voucher were got signed by respondent from petitioner, he did not approach any
government agency including Labour Officer complaining about act of respondent which
manifestly show that plea in afterthought. As such, when petitioner himself has admitted his
signature on apology letter dated 12-6-2010 Mark-Y which has although duly not proved but it
support the plea of respondent management to the extent that petitioner was found stealing 10 kg.
wheat flour from factory premises and caught red handed but even management did not take initiate
departmental action and he was allowed to go with direction not to repeat such like misconduct but
this evidence would certainly show that work and conduct of petitioner was not satisfactory.
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16. RW1 Sh. Sanjay Garg, Director respondent company has tendered his affidavit
Ex. RW1/A reiterated his stand as maintained in reply. Cross-examination of RW1 revealed that
petitioner had handed his resignation Ex. RW1/B dated 10-5-2012 in his office. He has admitted
that supervisor had asked petitioner to perform some duty when fire broke out and loss was caused.
He has clarified that huge loss was averted as sufficient water was available to handle the fire
which broke out due to negligence of petitioner. He has also admitted that petitioner had been
caught red handed while stealing property of the respondent company. Nothing in cross-
examination has been asked by the ld. Counsel for petitioner which would show that while getting
in to service petitioner was asked to sign blank papers or vouchers as contended by petitioner in his
statement of oath. Similarly, nothing has been asked about getting signature obtained on resignation
letter forcibly. That being so and that nothing material in the cross-examination could be elicited by
ld. counsel for the petitioner which would show that factually resignation was not voluntarily made
and/or that it was result coercion as contended by the petitioner, this court is left with no option but
to hold that resignation Ex. RW1/B of petitioner was voluntarily act as due to his negligence fire
broke out in the factory premises due to which huge loss could have occurred. Similarly, incident of
theft of 10 kg. wheat flour and apology letter dated 12-6-2010 as reflected Mark-Y clearly shows
that petitioner was in habit of removing properties of respondent/management including wheat
flour which was prepared in the factory. In so far as testimony of petitioner that his service was
terminated verbally on 12-5-2014 as he was not allowed to enter into the factory premises could not
be accepted as he himself admitted that he had tendered resignation Ex. RW1/B written and signed
by him to the respondent as stated in foregoing paras.
17. Ld. Counsel for respondent vehemently contended that petitioner after tendering
resignation has also received his dues as on date of resignation and this fact is evident from the
testimony of RW2 Shri Shashi Shekhar working as Assistant in State Bank of India Mehatpur Una
Branch who has tendered statement of account Ex RW2/B of respondent which showed that a sum
of Rs.1303/- had been transferred in account of petitioner on 9th July, 2014. Ex. RW2/A is the
statement account of petitioner in which the above said amount had been deposited being dues
payable by respondent as on 10-5-2012 of which petitioner had withdrawn a sum of Rs. 900/- on
30-3-2015. Meaning thereby after deposit of amount of Rs.1303/- on 9-7-2014, petitioner had also
withdrawn Rs.900/- out of it. This witness in cross-examination although admitted that in account
of petitioner there could be amount deposited except salary also but this fact could have been
correctly appreciated had the petitioner brought in evidence that in the said account, he had receipts
from other source as well but certificate Ex. RW2/B relied upon by the respondent, revealed
transfer of Rs. 1303/- and in view of version of RW2 a sum of Rs. 900/- was withdrawn by
petitioner thereafter. As such, payment of dues by respondent on date of resignation also stands
proved. Accordingly, issues No.1 & 2 are answered in negative however issue No. 5 is answered in
affirmative holding that petitioner had suppressed material facts in particular qua his previous
misconduct out of which one related to theft of 10 kg. wheat flour as shown in his apology letter
dated 12-6-2010. That being so, petitioner is held to have suppressed material facts qua his act and
conduct in working to the satisfaction of the respondent company and was involved in loss caused
to the company by causing wood lying burnt and at when assigned with the job on 10-5-2012 by
supervisor which could have also caused huge damage to factory of respondent. As such, petitioner
is held to have suppressed material facts. Issue No. 5 is decided in affirmative against petitioner and
in favour of respondent as petitioner has himself resigned from service he is debarred from filing
claim petition by his act and conduct. Issue No. 4 is decided in affirmative in favour of respondent
and against the petitioner.
Issue No. 3 :
18. Ld. Counsel for respondent has contended with vehemence that claim petition is not
maintainable but it has nowhere been alleged in the pleadings in what manner claim petition is not
1192
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maintainable. Otherwise also, petitioner being aggrieved with the action of the respondent/
management could have legitimately raised industrial dispute as well as filed claim petition which
would be maintainable in the given circumstances. Accordingly, this issue is decided in negative in
favour of petitioner and against the respondent.
Relief :
19. As a sequel to my findings on foregoing issues No.1, 2, 4 and 5, the instant claim
petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
20. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
21. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
22. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT -
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Campt at Chamba
Ref. No.
119/ 2016
Smt. Pipan Dei w/o Sh. Prakash, r/o V. & P.O. Dharwas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,
H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
21-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
service. It is 11.37 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
1193
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21-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.37 P.M. None appearance of petitioner today is indicative of the fact that she is not interested to
pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action/publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
21-04-2018
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref: No. 594/ 2016
Smt. Shounki Devi w/o Sh. Hukam Chand, Village Micham, P.O. Sahali, Tehsil Pangi,
Distt. Chamba, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Killar Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
. .Respondent.
21-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
service. It is 11.40 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
21-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent.
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.40 P.M. None appearance of petitioner today is indicative of the fact that she is not interested to
pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.
1194
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Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action/publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
21-04-2018
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUMINDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. : 310/15
Sh. Kamal Kishore s/o Late Shri Inder Singh, r/o V.P.O. Dharwar, Tehsil Sarkaghat,
District Mandi, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
The Divisional Forest Officer, Joginder Nagar Forest Division, District Mandi, H.P.
. .Respondent..
24-04-2018 Present: Sh. N. L. Kaundal, A.R. for the petitioner.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent.
Heard. At this stage, ld. Authorised Representative for petitioner has made statement for
withdrawal of reference pending before this Court. Statement recorded and placed on file. In view
of the statement so made by the ld. Authorised Representative petitioner as stated above, the
reference No. 310/15 is hereby dismissed as withdrawn.
2.
Ordered accordingly. The parties to bear their own costs.
3.
The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
4.
A copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action/publication at its end.
5.
The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
24-04-2018
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
1195
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
11/2015
Date of Institution : 13-01-2015
Date of decision :
24-4-2018
Shri Raj Kumar s/o Shri Ram Saran, r/o Village Sorar, P.O. Jol Sappar, Tehsil Nadaun,
District Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Dean, College of Horticulture and Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
2.
The Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, District
Solan, H.P.
3. The Contractor, M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P.
(Contractor Company)
. .Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.
For the Respondents 1&2 : Sh. Karan Pathania, Adv.
For the Respondent No. 3 : Sh. Vikramjeet Sharma, Adv.
AWARD
The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Raj Kumar s/o Shri Ram Saran,
r/o Village Sorar, P.O. Jol Sappar, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P. w.e.f. 28-02-
2007 to 22-04-2013 by (i) the Director, Institute of Biotechnology & Environmental
Sciences, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur,
H.P. (Principal Employer), (ii) the Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture &
Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P. (Principal Employer) without complying with the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thereafter his services were transferred
to the contractor company i.e. M/s Shimla Cleanways without his knowledge w.e.f. 15-07-
2013 where he worked till 31-03-2014 and was again terminated w.e.f. 01-04-2014 by the
Contractor, M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. (Contractor
Company), without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is
legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employers?”
2.
After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 3rd February, 2017
was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:
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“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 24-12-2014,
the name of employer no (i) may be read as 'the Dean, College of Horticulture and Foerstry
Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.' instead of 'the Director, Institute of Biotechnology &
Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamipur, H.P.', which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification.”
3.
On receipt of reference as well as addendum from appropriate government, notices
were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.
4.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
unskilled labourer by respondent No. 1 on 22-7-2007 for 89 days who thereafter worked
intermittently although with fictional breaks upto the year 2013. Averments made in the claim
petition revealed that during above said period, respondents No. 1 and 2 given time to time break to
petitioner despite work and funds. It is alleged that respondents No. 1 and 2 had entered into a
agreement with M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. to outsource unskilled
labourers from 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 for 11 months and thereafter the contract was renewed for
another one year. It is alleged that from 15-7-2013 service of petitioner had been adjusted by
respondent No. 1 in the rolls of contractor M/s. Shimla Cleanways without knowledge of petitioner
to continue work there uninterruptedly till 31-3-2014. Believing to be working under respondent
No. 1 for the period aforestated, it is alleged that Rampal Baniyal under whom petitioner worked as
well as respondent No. 3 never disclosed that petitioner had been working under respondent No. 3.
It is alleged that respondents No. 1 and 2 had been marking attendance of petitioner besides making
payment of monthly salary and thus without knowledge of petitioner, service conditions has been
changed by the respondents. It is alleged that while terminating service on 1-4-2014, no notice or
retrenchment compensation in lieu thereof was paid and thus termination of petitioner is stated to
be null and void ab-initio. It is claimed that respondents No. 1 and 2 had given fictional breaks
under two spells by engaging petitioner initially for 89 days thereafter with a gap of 89 days with
the object that petitioner did not complete 240 days for the purpose of continuous service envisaged
under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
Reliance has been placed upon judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana High Court
reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development Authority,
Manimajra, and Anr. Vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak and Anr.
in which Hon'ble High Court has held appointment workmen for 89 days to be illegal. It is further
alleged that while terminating service of petitioner (i.e. time to time termination and final
termination) provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not adhered to as doctrine of 'Last come
First go' was ignored retaining juniors namely Ishwar Dass and Rajeev Kumar whereas service of
petitioner had been terminated. The grievance of petitioner further remains that respondents No. 1
and 2 had engaged regular unskilled Class-IV workers on regular pay scale in Neri I & II including
petitioner on daily wage basis for 89 days onwards for two spells besides respondents No. 1 and 2
had engaged some workmen without break namely Mahinder Singh, Ishwar Singh, Harnam Singh,
Gorkh Singh, Tarsem Chand, and Ravi Dutt. It is claimed that while engaging above-named four
workmen, respondent No. 1 had shown favourtism to one set of workers whereas service of other
14 workmen including petitioner were consistently given fictional breaks for 89 days who were
allowed to work in two spells whereas service of the remaining workmen had been engaged
without any break which constituted unfair labour practice. It is alleged that petitioner alongwith 13
others had filed complaint against their illegal termination before Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur
referring to order dated 20-11-2014 passed in CWP No.4991/2012 in which Hon'ble High Court of
H.P. had directed respondents to not give fictional breaks and if their (i.e. service of petitioner and
13 others) already stand dispensed with, no fresh hands shall be engaged meaning thereby that after
20-11-2014, no fresh hands were to be engaged without first offering the retrenched workers
including petitioner. As such, it is also claimed by petitioner that respondents had violated order of
Hon'ble High Court of H.P. dated 20-11-2014. It is further alleged that reference No.154/2012
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titled as Mahinder Singh Vs. The Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and
Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P. had been implemented by respondents No. 1 and 2 and said
Mahinder Singh was still working with the respondents. It is claimed that Sanjay Mohmmad and
others had filed application dated 4-5-2013 through e-samadhan regarding fictional breaks and
regularization of service of 14 workmen which has been consequently forwarded to respondent
No. 2 for necessary action but till the date of filing of claim information sought for has not been
provided to petitioner alongwith 13 others who had since been not regularized. It is claimed that
respondents No. 1 and 2 had given time to time break in service of petitioner by giving fictional
breaks after 89 days in two spells in a year and finally terminated his service on 1-4-2014 which is
stated to be illegal and unjustified and same is liable to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly,
petitioner has prayed that illegal fictional breaks period w.e.f. 2007 to 2013-14 directing the
respondents to condone break breaks period in continuity of service for the petitioner with direction
to pay wages for the break period. The petitioner further prays that final termination dated 1-4-2014
be set aside and respondents No. 1 and 2 be directed to reinstate petitioner in service forthwith
alongwith back wages, seniority and continuity in service with consequential service benefits and to
any other relief petitioner is found entitled to.
5.
Respondents No. 1 and 2 contested claim petition, filed joint reply inter-alia taken
preliminary objections of maintainability, limitation and jurisdiction. On merits admitted that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour to do manual work in the experimental fields on
seasonal basis but denied that his service had been illegally terminated by the respondents. It is
alleged that due to non-availability of funds a policy for the engagement of contractual labour was
formulated by the respondent w.e.f. 1-1-2002 so as to recognize engagement and avoid additional
financial liability. It is claimed that respondent university did not have permanent and perennial
nature of experimental field work which requires attendance of labourers (during Rabi and Kharif
season). It is alleged that seasonal labourers were employed for a limited period on contract basis to
accomplish the field trial work with the object of research trial and their data etc. are not wasted for
want of adequate manpower. It is specifically alleged that petitioner had been engaged as
contractual labour on a fixed salary for a particular period in different spells as and when work and
funds were available under the project code No.HMS-218-62/HMM036-62 as is evident from letter
No.UHF/IBES/HMS-218-62-2261-67 dated 21-1-2012 which postulates that no seniority to
contractual labour shall be given and the service of individual will be terminated after the contract
was over as envisaged conditions No. 2 and 8. The respondent No. 3 has asserted that petitioner had
accepted the engagement to the contract alongwith terms and conditions of the appointment/
engagement letter without any hesitation and did not complete 240 days in any of the calendar
years. It is also claimed by the respondents in their reply specifically alleged that as and when work
and funds were available under time bound project, service of labour for field work was required
for which advertisement was given from time to time but the petitioner did not turn up for facing
interviews and seeking job. It is emphatically denied that junior persons namely Rajeev Kumar and
Ishwar Dass had been retained by university rather said Ishwar Dass had been working with the
university since 2000. However, the court had given seniority w.e.f. 14-11-2005 and thus allegation
of petitioner that juniors were retained was stated to be wrong. It is admitted that respondent had
entered into contract with M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla vide letter No.827-
76 dated 30-4-2013 but outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-1-2013 onwards and engaged
through them to carry out the seasonal and adhoc projects work as and when needed and if
petitioner wanted to get himself engaged for field work with the respondents then petitioner was
required to approach the said agency. It is asserted that termination of petitioner including co-
workers engaging contractor outsourced labourers by respondents had become compulsion of
university due to reason that the university was already facing liability of surplus staff including
class-IV employees. Moreover, three class-IV employees were stated to have been relieved and
sent to the State Govt. besides respondents No. 1 and 2 were not in a position to continue the
service of labourers and with object that to avoid additional financial liability. No policy of
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engaging regular labourer for 89 days for the seasonal work and adhoc project under which the
labourers were engaged for stipulated period existed. It is further stated that as and when the work
and funds were available with the respondents under the time bound project and the service of
labour for field work were required, advertisement were made from time to time besides most of
the labourers mentioned in the petition had been engaged on compassionate grounds as per
provisions of rules with the prior approval of State Govt. besides that petitioner was engaged on
contractual basis of specific terms and conditions which were binding on petitioner. It is alleged
that petitioner was engaged from time to time on fixed salary on contractual basis and not on
regular basis for a specific period besides termination of service of petitioner including other co-
workers and opting to outsource through outside agency which is stated to be facing liability of
surplus staff including class-IV employees. It is claimed that university was not in a position to
continue services of labour and to avoid additional liability however university has formed its own
policy for engaging labour for 89 days for carrying out the seasonal work and adhoc project work
under which the labourers were engaged for stipulated period. It is also asserted that as and when
works and funds available under the time bound projects, service of labourers for field work was
required for which advertisement was made from time to time but petitioner had never turned up to
appear an interview so as to seek job. It is alleged that at present unskilled labourers were being
engaged through independent agency i.e. M/s. Shimla Cleanways and not by university itself and if
petitioner wanted to get himself engaged for field work with respondents he needed approach the
said agency. Accordingly, denying all allegations of petitioner as contained in claim petition
respondents No. 1 and 2 have sought for dismissal of claim petition.
6.
Respondent No. 3 contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, mis-joinder and non-joinder of parties, estopple, cause of action. On
merits admitted that respondent No. 3 was engaged for providing unskilled labourer on outsource
basis to respondents No.1 and 2 for which the contract was entered into between the parties which
was effective from 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 and thereafter the contract in question was renewed fro
another one year. Admitted that petitioner had worked under the rolls of respondent No. 3
accepting terms and conditions and performed the duties under the contract according to which
engagement of particular workers remained in force subject to availability of work besides asserted
that the dispute raised against respondent No. 3 did not fall within the ambit of Act as there existed
no relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and respondent No. 3 was not
principal employer rather it is respondent No. 1 for whom respondent No. 3 worked as a contractor.
Accordingly claim petition is sought to be dismissed.
7.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to the joint reply filed by respondents No. 1 and 2,
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. It is also reiterated that workmen mentioned
in para No. 6 of the claim petition namely Chaman Lal, Krishan Chand, Jamaldeen, Sanjeev
Kumar, Om Prakash, Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram regular workmen who had been working with
the petitioner and other co-workmen have since been disengaged. It is denied that respondents had
engaged some workmen on compassionate grounds moreover petitioner to be unemployed and not
gainfully employee anywhere from the date of his alleged illegal termination.
8.
The petitioner has filed rejoinder separately to the reply filed by respondent No.3,
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. It is reiterated that service of petitioner had
been terminated on verbal order of respondent No.1 w.e.f. 1-4-2014 and thereafter new/fresh hands
had been engaged by respondent No.1 who were on the rolls of the respondent No. 3 after
termination of service of petitioner.
9.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit Ex. PW1/ A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, affidavit of petitioner Ex. PW1/A, copy of letter
dated 3-1-2012 Ex. PW1/B, copy of mandays chart Ex. PW1/C, copy of letter dated 10-12-2012
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Ex. PW1/D, copy of letter dated 22-4-2013 Ex. PW1/E, copy of complaint Ex. PW1/F, copy of
letter dated 13-2-2013 Ex. PW1/G, copy of letter dated 27-1-2014 Ex. PW1/H, copy of judgment
dated 20-11-2014 Ex. PW1/I, copy of Award dated 24-8-2012 passed by this Court Ex. PW1/J,
copy of letter dated 18-1-2010 Ex. PW1/K, copy of letter dated 2-8-2010 Ex. PW1/L, copy of letter
dated 20-1-2011 Ex. PW1/M, copy of letter dated 18-9-2012 Ex. PW1/N, copy of letter dated 13-3-
2013 and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner,
respondents No. 1 and 2 had examined Dr. P.C. Sharma as RW1, tendered/proved his affidavit Ex.
RW1/A, standing instructions regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis dated 5-12-2001
Ex. RW1/B, letter dated 18-9-2012 regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis Ex.
RW1/C, copy of office order dated 21-2-2005 Ex. RW1/D, copy of letter dated 13-5-2016
regarding substitution of name of Dir. Institute of Biotechnology Ex. RW1/E and closed evidence.
Respondent No. 3 however did not lead any evidence and closed the same as is evident from
statement of ld. Counsel for respondent No. 3 record and placed on the file on 31-10-2017.
10. It is pertinent to mention here that after closing evidence by the respondent, petitioner
had moved an application for additional evidence which was allowed and Shri Jai Ram,
Superintendent office of Dean College of Horticulture & Forestry Neri, Distt. Hamirpur, H.P.
examined as PW2, tendered/proved seniority list/tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated
30-4-2010, 11-4-2011, 23-2-2011, 1-10-2014, 17-10-2015, 16-3-2009, 10-6-2011, 7-10-2014, 16-9-
2016 respectively Ex. P1 to P9, copy of mandays chart of contractual labourers Ex. P10 and closed
evidence. Respondents however did not lead any further evidence so as to repudiate claim of
petitioner.
11. I have heard the counsel representing petitioner and ld. Counsel. for respondent, gone
through records of the case carefully.
12. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28-08-2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner w.e.f. 28-2-207 to 22-4-
2013 by the respondent Nos. 1&2 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged? . .OPP.
2.
Whether the services of petitioner were transferred to the contractor company i.e. M/s
Shimla Cleanways respondent No. 3 without knowledge of petitioner w.e.f. 15-7-2013
where he continued work till 31-3-2014 as alleged. If so, its effect? . .OPP.
3.
Whether final termination of services of petitioner w.e.f. 01-04-2014 is/was improper
and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
4.
If issue No. 1 or issue No. 3 or both are proved in affirmative, to what relief the
petitioner is entitled from respondents as alleged?
. .OPP.
5.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?
. .OPR 1 to 3
6.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution is not covered under
the jurisdiction of this court as alleged?
. .OPR 1& 2
7.
Whether the claim petition is time barred by limitation as alleged?
. .OPR 1&2
8.
Whether the claim petition is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of the necessary
parties as alleged?
. .OPR3
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9.
Whether the petitioner is estopped to file present claim petition on account of his act
and conduct as alleged?
. .OPR3
10. Whether the petitioner has no cause of action against the respondent No. 3 as alleged?
. .OPR 3
11. Whether respondent No. 3 being contractor worked under contract of award by the
respondent No. 1 & 2 for specific purpose as alleged?
. .OPR3
Relief :
13. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No. 1 :
Yes
Issue No. 2 :
Discussed
Issue No. 3 :
Yes
Issue No. 4 :
Discussed
Issue No. 5 :
No
Issue No. 6 :
No
Issue No. 7 :
No
Issue No. 8 :
No
Issue No. 9 :
No
Issue No. 10 :
Discussed
Issue No. 11 :
Discussed
Relief :
Claim petition is partly allowed per operative part of the Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1, 2, 3 4, 10 and 11 :
14. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
15. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged by respondents No.1 and 2 in year 2007
initially for a period of 89 days and thereafter with intermittent breaks several times till 2013 as is
also evident from mandays chart Ex. P-10. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged on the basis of
policy for engagement of labourers on contractual basis incorporated in Ex. RW1/B dated
5-12-2001. It is admitted case of respondents that contractual labourers including petitioner had
remained engaged till 2013 ever since initial engagement when respondents allegedly engaged
contractor respondent No. 3 for outsourcing unskilled contractual labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013.
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Equally admitted case of respondents No. 1 and 2 is that duration of contractual labourers as per
policy Ex. RW1/B was not to exceed 89 days in one spell and two spell in whole year and in case
re-engaged was to be made then break of atleast 15 days was necessary. It is admittedly not case of
respondents No. 1 and 2 that work and conduct of petitioner was not good and satisfactory.
Admittedly, respondents had sufficient work and funds for engaging petitioner in different projects
moreso when unskilled labourers were decided to be engaged from contractor on outsource basis. It
is further admitted case of respondents No. 1 and 2 that petitioner being contractual unskilled
labourer provisions of Section 25 of Act did not apply as petitioner was squarely covered under
Section 2(oo) (bb) of the 'Act'. In view of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner
qua termination in violation of Section 2 (oo) of Act needs to be determined and at the same it also
needs to be determined, if respondents No. 1 and 2 deliberately recoursed to time to time
termination of petitioner and thereafter final termination in the year 2013 falling within ambit of
unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Clause 9 of Vth Schedule of 'Act'.
16. At the outset, it would be pertinent to mention here that Ex. RW1/B Standing
Instructions of respondents for engaging contractual unskilled labourers clearly provided that no
casual worker shall be engaged on muster roll by any functionary of University w.e.f. 1-1-2002
which further stipulated that as far as possible continuing casual worker should be adjusted in
research and extension projects and thereafter demand for additional hands by deployment of
labour on contract may be made. Clause (e) of policy is reproduced below for reference:
“(e) The duration of the engagement of contractual labour should not exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spells in whole of the year and in case of re-engagement, a break of atleast 15
days is necessary in each case”.
17. Ld. counsel for petitioner referring to above-stated rule for engagement of unskilled
contractual labour has contended that respondents No. 1 and 2 being employers have given
intermittent break in service which was countable as petitioner like any other labourer engaged on
contract was not in position to bargain with respondents rather had no option but to work in illegal
service conditions imposed. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble
Apex Court titled as Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. Hindalco Industries, reported in 2014 LLR
673 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that artificial break in service every year by
reappointing the employee on the same post tantamounts to 'unfair labour practice' under Section
2(ra) of the Act which is not permissible under law. It was further observed that when repeated
artificial periodical breaks in service are proved, the termination of workman would not be having
protection under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Act which would attract relief of reinstatement with full
back wages being illegal retrenchment.
18. PW1 has stepped into witness box deposed on oath as maintained in claim petition
specifically stated that petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2007 who continued to
work with respondents till 31-3-2014 when service of petitioner had been terminated finally along
with 13 other workers without complying with provisions of the 'Act'. He has further stated neither
any show cause notice nor compensation was given although petitioner had completed 240 days in
preceding 12 months from date of termination. Significantly, Ex. P10 mandays does not factually
show petitioner to have worked for 240 days immediately prior to his termination but plea of
petitioner remains that Ex. RW1/B Standing Instructions for engagement of unskilled labourer on
contract basis which fell in the ambit of an unfair labour practice had been invariably recoursed by
respondents during period of employment of petitioner when there were sufficient funds and work
with respondents and in the judgment (supra) of Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was held liable to
be reinstated in service being illegally retrenched.
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19. Reliance has further been placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &
Haryana reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development
Authority, Manimajra, and Anr. versus Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Rohtak and Anr. Relevant para of judgment is reproduced below:
“Since provision of Section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature of an exception it has to be construed
strictly in favour of the workman as far as possible in letter and spirit. If the termination is
meant to exploit an employee or to increase the bargaining power of the employer,
then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause (bb) and the definition of
'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning…”
20. In the aforestated judgment, Hon'ble High Court (DB) had upheld award passed by
Labour Court relying upon judgment titled as Kapurthala Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. Vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 1984 (2) Indian Law Reporter 333 (DB) in which
service of workman had been terminated when case of those had completed 230 days. In this case,
services of workmen were terminated without any departmental inquiry or charge-sheet and at the
same time, no notice or compensation was paid. The bank before the Hon'ble Court took plea that
service of workman for specified period and that too with notional breaks and thereafter workmen
were neither entitled for any retrenchment compensation nor reinstatement. The court in (1984)
case after dilating upon various aspects of matter held that attempt of employer to dispense with
service of workman so as to deprive him in continuity of service for specified period i.e. 240
days envisaged under Section 25-B and 25-F of the Act amounts to unfair labour practice when it is
found that conduct and service of workman was satisfactory. In 1994 judgment (supra) reference
has been made to another case reported in 1989 (2) RSJ 55 titled as Balbir Singh Vs. The
Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Limited in which J. Amarjit Chaudhary interpreted
Sub Clause (bb) (oo) of Section 2 and relevant para is reproduced below:
Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act, which was added in 1984 by an
amendment cannot be so construed as to drastically restrict the orbit of the term of 'retrenchment'
clause (bb) is an exception which must be interpreted narrowly. It cannot be given meanings which
may nullify or curtail the ambit of their principal clause. No doubt, the intention of the Parliament
in enacting clause (bb) was to exclude certain categories of workers from the term of retrenchment
but there is nothing in this clause which allows an outlet to un-scrupulour employers to shunt out
workers in the graph of non-renewal of their contract even when the work subsists. This Clause as a
whole has to be construed strictly in favour of the workman as far as possible as to ensure that the
Act is implemented in letter and spirit. If the termination is meant to exploit an employee or to
increase the bargaining power of the employer, then it has to be excluded from the ambit of
clause (bb) and the definition of term 'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning. The
contractual clause enshrined in clause (bb) cannot be resorted to frustrate the claim of the
employee against his uncalled for retrenchment or for denying other benefits. It cannot be so
interpreted, as to enable for employer to resort to the policy of hire and fire….”
21. It is admittedly not the case of respondents No. 1 and 2 that petitioner could not be
deployed or employed or say that respondents No. 1 and 2 had terminated service of petitioner
since there was not sufficient work and funds. Be it stated that by engaging contractor for
outsourcing unskilled labourer to be provided to respondents w.e.f. 1-5-2013 is clearly suggestive
of the fact that respondents No. 1 and 2 had sufficient work and funds. Not only this, even several
unskilled labourer had been engaged for whole of the year as reflected in Ex. P5 the tentative
seniority list as on 31-12-2014. Thus, intermittent breaks given by respondents to petitioner
establishes unfair labour practice within the meaning of Section 2(ra) of the Act as the object
behind engaging petitioner as contractual labourer and thereafter giving intermittent breaks and
finally terminating without any notice, changing service conditions by asking petitioner to join
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contractor from a specific date as has also been admitted by RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma in cross-
examination who is the only witness examined by respondents No. 1 and 2. Equally important to
mention here is that while filing reply respondents No. 1 and 2 have withheld facts qua number of
labourers engaged in two spells while implementing its policy Ex. RW1/B and at the same time,
their names too have not been disclosed establishes that respondents No. 1 and 2 from very
beginning while engaging petitioner intended that petitioner did not attain permanency in job but
for reason stated hereinabove, petitioner is held to have continuous service from 2012 to 2014 as
envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. That being so, it was incumbent upon respondents No. 1
and 2 to have issued notice under Section 25-F of Act and alternatively to pay wages of one month
in lieu of notice which has not so been done by respondents No. 1 and 2 establishing violation of
provisions of Section 25-F of the Act for intermittent breaks as well as for final termination and for
similar reasons disengaging petitioner periodically and retaining juniors in two spells as has come
in evidence clearly establish violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
22. In order to prove his case, the petitioner has placed reliance upon Ex. R10 the mandays
on fixed wages w.e.f. 2007 relating to petitioner which showed that petitioner had worked under
project FCR 034-62 etc. from 28-2-2007 for 89 days and thereafter with several intermittent breaks
till 31-3-2014 as shown in this document. The plea of the petitioner remains that the breaks had
been given deliberately by respondents No.1 and 2 so that the petitioner did not complete 240 days.
It has also been stated by petitioner that despite availability of funds and work intermittent breaks
had been given from time to time during total period petitioner remained engaged with the
respondents No.1 and 2.
23. Before accepting plea of petitioner for having been given break deliberately from time
to time, it would be also relevant to consider if the petitioner succeeded in establishing that if
throughout the year intermittent breaks would not have been given, he would have continued to be
in service for whole of the year and deemed to have completed continuous service in a year
envisaged under Section 25-B of Act. To prove that provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not
adhered to by respondent while giving intermittent breaks reliance has been placed on seniority list
Ex. P1 to P5 showing junior workmen to petitioner i.e. those daily beldar who joined after
petitioner have been retained, engaging more than 300 days in a year whereas petitioner had been
given intermittent breaks in the same year. The seniority list Ex. P1 shows that Asha Devi and Tara
Chand figuring at serial No. 33 & 34 have joined on 13-7-2009. Ex. P4 is the tentative seniority list
(as on 31-12-2013) of these officials showed i.e. Tara Chand to have worked for 365 days in the
year 2010, 354 days in 2011, 366 days in 2012 and 365 days in 2013. Said Tara Chand figured at
serial No.15 in the seniority list. Similarly, Asha Devi figuring at serial No.16 in seniority list Ex.
R4 is shown to have worked for 304 days in 2010, 347 days in 2011, 341 days in 2012 and 363
days in 2013. With the aid of these entries concerning Tara Chand and Asha Devi figuring at serial
No.15 and 16, it has been contended that there was sufficient work and funds available with the
respondents in different projects and these two officials had joined after joining of petitioner who
as per Ex. P10 figured at serial No. 5 and had joined on 28-2-2007 and as both these workmen had
been given sufficient work throughout the year(s) despite being engaged at later stage, the
petitioner is held to have been given intermittent break from 28-2-2007 till 31-3-2014 deliberately
by respondents despite having sufficient work and funds, Ex. P10 further shows that petitioner
during these years had remained engaged with intermittent breaks for 12 times from 2007 to 2014
in project FCR -034-62 etc. If Tara Chand and Asha Devi could be given work for more than 300
days in a year in particular year from 2010 to 2013, there was no reasons or compulsion for the
respondents to have given break to the petitioner as stated above which manifestly shows that
petitioner has been deliberately given breaks in service.
24. The tentative seniority list of daily wage labourers as it stood on 31-12-2013. Ex. P4
revealed that at serial No.15 and 16 names of Tara Chand and Asha Devi existed but at serial nos.
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17 to 20 names of Amravati, Bhim Dutt, Kamla Devi and Saroj Bala have been mentioned who
were shown to have joined and worked with respondents on 28-10-2010, 1-5-2012, 8-5-2012 and
15-5-2012 respectively much later than petitioner who joined in 2007. As such, latest seniority list
available at the time when petitioner was removed from service except Tara Chand and Asha Devi,
others are shown to have joined in the year 2010 and 2012 respectively as mentioned above.
Nothing in the cross-examination of petitioner PW1 could be elicited by respondents which would
demolish his claim qua deliberate intermittent breaks given by the respondents despite work and
funds as other juniors had been given sufficient work for whole of the year and policy Ex. RW1/B
dealing with contractual labourers was primarily a policy meant to exploit unskilled contractual
labourers which could be termed as entirely based on unfair labour practice. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma,
Director, Institute of Biotechnology and Environment Sciences, College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
has deposed that he had been posted on the present assignment since 1-11-2016 besides stated that
petitioner worked with university but did not know that petitioner remained engaged from date of
appointment till 31-3-2014. He has admitted in cross-examination that from 2002 to 2013, 30-32
contractual labourers were engaged, initially for 89 days who were appointed in two batches after
engaging the first batch, second batch was engaged when first batch was disengaged and thereafter
second batch was disengaged which support the plea of petitioner that the process of engagement
and disengagements was deliberate on part of respondents. Apparently, giving such intermittent
breaks to two groups of unskilled labourers without notice violated Section 25-G of the Act. As
such, respondents are held to have given intermittent breaks to the petitioner in violation of
provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act.
25. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that although adopting
policy for engagement of unskilled labourer on contractual basis vide Ex. RW1/B, respondents
No.1 and 2 had changed conditions of service of petitioner without issuing any prior notice vide
which petitioner was required to join to contractor respondent No. 3 engaged to provide unskilled
labourers on outsource basis to respondents No. 1 and 2 which tentamounts to termination of
service of petitioner as petitioner had been engaged with respondents since 2011 and no prior
notice was served upon him in 2014 notifying petitioner to join contractor respondent No. 3 who
was to provide labourers to respondents No. 1 and 2 on the basis of some agreement entered into
between respondents No. 1 and 2 and contractor respondent No. 3. Ld. counsel/Authorized
Representative for petitioner had also contended if contractual employment is resorted to as
mechanism to frustrate the claim so that employee did not become regular or permanent against a
job which continues or the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is
given to take it out from clause of Section 2(oo) of the Act, the same would be an unfair labour
practice under the 'Act'. Before proceedings further, it would be most pertinent to refer to order
dated 20-11-2014 Ex. PW1/I of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in which present petitioner along with
13 other had filed CWP No. 4991/2012 when respondents had been directed “to not give fictional
breaks to petitioner and if their services on this count already stand dispense with, no fresh
hand shall be engaged without first affording the work to the petitioners”. In pursuance to the
above said order, petitioner alongwith 13 others had filed the complaint before Deputy
Commissioner Hamirpur for non enforcement of order dated 20-11-2014 passed by Hon'ble High
Court of H.P. in pursuance to which Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur had directed respondents to
enforce the order of the Hon'ble High Court dated 20-11-2014. The plea of respondents in their
joint reply remained that petitioner had not applied for reengagement with contractor engaged in
2013 which leads to an irresistible inference that petitioner had been disengaged i.e. terminated
from service of respondents in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. It is admittedly
not the case of the respondents No. 1 and 2 that any notice was served upon petitioner as could also
be gathered from cross examination of RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma, Director Dean College of
Horticulture respondent No. 1 who showed his ignorance if while disengaging petitioner in the year
2014, any notice was served upon petitioner by respondents. If any notice as required would have
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been issued by respondents No.1 and 2, RW1 would have certainly denied this question. He has
specifically admitted that while terminating service of petitioner, no compensation was paid by
respondents No. 1 and 2. Although these facts revealed in cross-examination of RW1 coupled with
the order of Hon'ble High Court as referred to above, it can be safely gathered that respondents
No.1 and 2 had not adhered to the mandate of Hon'ble High Court as the petitioner was not to be
disengaged and if disengaged, no fresh hands shall be engaged although several persons juniors to
petitioner have been engaged thereafter as per seniority list Ex. P5 which further showed
availability sufficient work and funds with respondents No. 1 and 2.
26. Ld. Counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 had contended that petitioner being
contractual employee was not covered under the definition of retrenchment under Section 2 (bb) of
the Act as under Clause (bb)(oo) termination of service of workman on contract specifically was
excluded from definition of retrenchment. It is pointed out that since the petitioner was appointed
on contract, he stands excluded from definition of 'retrenchment' and therefore respondents were
not required to adhere to provisions of Section 25-F of the 'Act' while disengaging petitioner. Ld.
Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, repudiated the arguments so advanced by the ld.
Counsel for respondents and has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
titled as Manoj Kumar Vs. H.R.T.C. and Anr. reported in 2007 LLR 1155. In the above said
judgment Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held that when repeated and fictional breaks have
been given to workman so that he should not attain permanency, it would not come within the
purview of section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act excluding termination of
retrenchment. In the case before the Hon'ble High Court respondents had set up similar plea of
petitioner being on contractual employment and thus Section 25-F could not be invoked by the
petitioner. In the above said judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held in para 12
reproduced below for reference:
“….12. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has held in Shailendra Nath Vs. Vice
Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1987 Lab IC 1607 that section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature
of an exception to section 2(oo) and has to be construed strictly and in favour of the
workman as the entire object of the Act is secure a just and fair deal to them. Their
Lordships of the Allahabad High Court have held as under:
“The expression, 'termination for whatsoever reason' used in Cl. (oo) came up for
interpretation before the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. N.S. Money, AIR 1976
SC 1111: (1976 Lab IC 769). It was held to mean a termination which takes place either by
active step of employer or by running out of stipulated period. The Hon'ble Court observed.
Termination embraced not merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact
of termination, however, produced". Since this wide interpretation resulted in extending
benefit of retrenchment to even purpose or particular job or were casual workers the
Legislature appears to have added sub cl. (bb) to cl.(oo) in 1984. Even though petitioners
claim to have acquired status of regular employees before the clause was amended as each
of them had completed 240 days prior to its addition in 1984 it may be examined if the
petitioners can be said to be contractual employees as contemplated in this sub-clause. For
that it is necessary to examine its scope and ambit. It may, however, be stated at the outset
that it obviously attempts to exclude that which otherwise would have been included in
principal clause or to be more precise is in the nature of an exception, therefore, it has to be
construed strictly and in favour of workmen as the entire objective of the Act is to secure
just and fair deal for them. Terminations which are included in it are those which are
brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time
stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide a
gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation the nature of
employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of
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duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be
for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes
to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated
period or completion of work whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But
if contractual employment is resorted to as a mechanism to frustrate the claim of
employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature
of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on the anvil of
fairness and bonafide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire
and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Cl. (bb). Because if it is left to be employer not
to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstances then the protection
afforded to a workman by treating every termination, of service as retrenchment shall be
rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post
ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bona fide.
It cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also
satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That
would be unfair labour practice [See H.D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India. (1985) 51 Fac
LR 494: (1985 Lab IC 1733) (SC)]. From various annexures filed with affidavits it is clear
that some of the petitioners were employed as Office Assistant, other book binders and
peons. They were awarded benefit of bonus. They have been working for nearly five years.
Their job was not casual, seasonal or of a daily worker. They have not been paid their salary
on volume of work. Although the wages in some cases are computed on per day basis but
the payment is monthly including holidays. Their duty, therefore, was like a regular
employee and not as casual, daily or seasonal worker….”
Para No.17 of the aforestated judgment is also reproduced below which has bearing on
merits of issue and is reproduced below:
“17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Haryana State Electronics Development
Corporation Limited Vs. Mamni (2206) 9 SCC 434: AIR 2006 SC 2427: 2006 LLR 667
(SC), that appointment for a short period (89 days) and termination of service at the end of
the said period and reappointment after a gap of one day, such action of termination and
reappointment repeated again and again for a period of about one and a half years, in such
circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the termination not bona fide but
adopted to defeat the object of the Act. Thus, it is not covered by section 2(oo)(bb) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947……..”
27. Reliance has further been placed by Hon'ble High Court in Manoj Kumar's case on
another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay titled as Dalip H. Shirke Vs. Zila Parishad
Yavatmal, reported in 1990 Lab IC 100 in which judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as State
Bank of India Vs. N. Sundaramoney reported in 1976 Lab IC 769 had been relied by Hon'ble
High Court of Bombay. It was observed that exception as contained in sub-clause (bb) will have to
be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been
enjoying earlier to the amendment. The benefit of law laid down by the Supreme Court was
extended to all the workmen even to those who were employed for specific work or for a
particular job and even to casual labourers who were engaged merely to complete casual nature
of work. In the judgment of N. Sundaramoney's case relied in 2007 case and had observed that
time and again it has been held that welfare statutes must receive the construction which
advances the object of the statutes and protects the weaker section of the society. It was
observed that the employer is always in a position to dictate the terms of service vis-à-vis the
workman or to be workman. The employer can unilaterally impose oppressive and
unreasonable conditions of service and the workman will be left with little choice but to
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accept all such conditions even unconscionable conditions of service in the contract of
employment. In the case in hand before this court, respondents No.1 and 2 had adopted policy of
engagement of contractual labourer to avoid financial liability Ex. RW1/B which prescribed the
manner in which workman was to employed for 89 days in two spells which follows that
contractual labourers engaged for 89 days in first spell were to be disengaged after 89 days
engaging new batch and following such engagements show that after first engagement of labourers
as stated above junior contractual labourer were to certainly disengage senior workmen i.e. first
batch for 89 days without notice despite availability of work and funds which manifestly violated
Section 25-G of the 'Act'.
28. In the concluding para in Manoj Kumar's case, Hon'ble High Court has held that
workman had been offered appointment with fictional breaks to prevent petitioner from taking
benefit of Section 25-F of Act. The appointment orders issued in successor to workman was
camouflage to take out petitioner-workman from the ambit of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The appointment of petitioner cannot be termed as contractual and his case will
fall under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it will be covered under
expression 'retrenchment'. The act of respondents of engaging petitioner giving fictional
breaks was not bonafide and reinstatement of petitioner-workman was allowed. Applying the
ratio of case law referred to above, it may not be erroneous to observe that in the case in hand
before this court, contractual employment of petitioner and time to time termination was made by
respondents No. 1 and 2 so that petitioner did not become permanent and at the same time act of
respondents No.1 and 2 in throwing out petitioner from work with contractor respondent No. 3
without notice is manifestly unfair labour practice and petitioner would be covered under definition
of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) and not under exception in Clause (bb) (oo) as has been held
in Manoj Kumar's case.
29. Thus, in the case before this court respondents No. 1 and 2 had made scheme which
was significantly promulgated for engagement of contractual labourer for 89 days in one spell and
in the case before the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana having similar period of
engagement of workmen respondents were held to have not complied with the Section 25-F of the
Industrial Disputes Act as the workman who was a clerk had been engaged for 89 days and given
fresh appointment twice for 89 days. As such, referring to aforestated case law and evidence on
record, it may not be erroneous to conclude that respondents No. 1 and 2 had recoursed to unfair
labour practice initially by adopting standing instruction for engagement of contractual labour Ex.
RW1/B which in its prescribed clause (e) duration of contractual labourer was to be not more that
89 in a year for two spells and thereafter by abrupting engagement of labourers on outsource basis
through contractor. But in this case, the petitioner had been engaged several times with intervals as
shown in mandays chart Ex. P10 from 2007 to 2014 and thus the action of respondents in giving
intermittent break as well as finally terminating service without notice and asking the petitioner to
work with contractor who was to provide unskilled labourers to respondents on outsource basis was
nothing else but termination of service of petitioner without any notice and that the intermittent
breaks are held to be deliberately made by the respondents No. 1 and 2 with the object to avoid
financial liability upon respondents No. 1 and 2 which could not be accepted as ground to negate or
say defeat claim of petitioner. The termination of petitioner would thus be not excluded under
Section 2 (oo) (bb) and squarely fell under the definition of retrenchment under the Act
necessitating issuance of notice of one month envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act and in
alternative wages for one month in lieu of notice period which has admittedly not been done as
RW1 has shown his inability to tell if while disengaging petitioner any notice was served. Being
the Director in university authorized to contest and depose in this case on behalf of respondents was
expected to know material facts qua engagement and disengagement of petitioner. Accordingly,
applying the case law as referred to above, it is held that petitioner had been wrongly retrenched
from service by the respondents in violation of provisions of Act.
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30. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has taken this court through Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex.
PW1/J passed in Reference No. 154/2012 titled as Mohinder Singh versus Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, Distt. Solan, H. P. & Anr. vide which this
court had directed reinstatement of petitioner setting aside retrenchment order qua petitioner w.e.f.
1-1-2005 by respondents and was held entitled for seniority and continuity in service from the date
of illegal termination except back wages. While relying upon the above said Award, ld. counsel for
the petitioner has contended that above said award has not been assailed by respondents which had
attained finality having similar facts with regard to award Ex. PW1/J. RW1 in cross-examination
has showed his inability to tell if above said award passed against the respondents had been
challenged however specifically admitted that said Mohinder Singh was still working with the
university. Statement of RW1 recorded on 1-10-2011 and award was passed on 28-4-2017 and was
allegedly terminated on 1-1-2005 which goes to show after implementation of award Ex. PW1/J
above-named, Mohinder Singh has been in continuous service with the respondent from 1-1-2005
to 31-10-2017 when RW1 was cross-examined. As such, Mohinder Singh's case having similar
facts and not challenged by respondents is equally binding upon respondents qua similarly situated
workmen. In the said judgment also, my ld. predecessor-in-office in para No. 26 on record has
specifically held that action of respondents was unfair labour practice under Clause 10 Vth
Schedule appended under the Act. In so far claim of petitioner qua back wages from date of illegal
termination in the year 2013 is concerned, suffice would be state here that onus to prove that
petitioner/claimant remained unemployed and not gainfully employed was upon respondents.
Although, petitioner has alleged that he remained unemployed and was not gainfully employed ever
since his termination in 2014 by filing affidavit to this effect could not be relied as being a young
person ageing about 38 years would not have sit idle for about five years without earning and thus
his plea to this effect merits rejection. Accordingly, petitioner is held to be not entitled for back
wages.
31. In so far as claim of petitioner as against M/s Shimla Cleanways Contractor respondent
No. 3 the contractor is concerned, it would be relevant, at the outset to refer to mandays chart as
Ex. P10 concerning petitioner in which his name figures at serial No. 18. A bare glance at the
above said document would show that petitioner had been engaged initially on 28-2-2007 who
continued to work with the respondents No.1 and 2 till 20-8-2012 and thereafter is shown to have
been engaged on 15-7-2013 to 31-3-2014 for different number of working days enumerated therein.
In the column of note, there is stipulation to the effect that service of labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013 were
engaged through outsourcing agencies of manpower through contractor as per outsource policy
introduced from 4/2013. It was further stipulated in this note that consolidated wages for the
particular month was paid to contractor as per policy. Be it stated that note appended to mandays
chart Ex. P10 concerning Manjeet Kumar neither stipulated name of the contractor nor evidence
has been led showing that consolidated wages concerning or including petitioner's wages for
specific months enumerated in Ex. P10 was paid to contractor whose name has not even been
mentioned and as such no inference can be drawn that respondent No. 3 paid wags to petitioner for
different months. It can also be noticed from above said details in Ex. P10 qua period for which
petitioner had worked or say had been shown to be engaged by the university initially for nine
spells whereas under contractor for next ten spells. With the aid of this document, respondents No.1
and 2 have made futile endevour to defeat the claim of petitioner by submitting that petitioner was
no more employee of university who was working under contractor respondent No. 3. In reply
respondent No. 3 has maintained that it had been engaged for providing labourers on outsource
basis to respondent No. 1 on the basis of which petitioner was engaged. There is no documentary
evidence on record establishing that petitioner was initially appointed by respondent No. 1 and
thereafter his service were placed at the disposal of respondent No. 3 or that he was transferred at
any point of time for which he remained engaged. Significantly, respondent No. 3 did not lead any
evidence as ld. Counsel for the respondent No. 3 has made statement before this court on 31-10-
2017 that no evidence was to be led on behalf of respondent No. 3 and thus, in absence of any
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evidence led by respondent No. 3, it cannot be stated that plea set up in the reply stood proved as
against the petitioner.
32. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma representing respondents No.1 & 2 has not stated even a single
word qua engagement of respondent No. 3 who employed petitioner as his affidavit Ex. RW1/A
merely stipulated that unskilled labourers were being engaged through independent agency i.e.
M/s Shimla Cleanways and not by the university itself besides stated that if petitioner wanted to get
himself engaged for field work he should approach the contractor which showed that the only
witness of respondents No. 1 and 2 did not know if petitioner was placed under respondent No. 3. It
is nowhere in evidence of respondents No. 1 and 2 that petitioner had been engaged by respondent
No. 3 irrespective of plea of respondent No. 3 that petitioner was engaged by him on demand of
respondents No. 1 and 2. It is to be seen by this court if petitioner worked under respondent No. 3
and was its employee or was under supervision of university and its field staff while being engaged
for carrying out different projects.
33. Reliance has been placed on judgment reported in 2015 LLR 580 titled as General
Manger, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Ranipet Vs. Canteen Workers of BHEL, rep. by
BHEL Canteen Workers Union, Chennai & Ors. in which the Hon'ble High Court of Madras
has held that when it is proved that employment contract with the contractor is sham and nominal,
the employees of the contractor will be having their right to be absorbed as regular employees of
the principal employer.
34. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of
Bombay reported in 2015 LLR 974 titled as Goa MRF Employees' Union Vs. ICARUS Food
and Farm and Others where the employees were engaged through contractor working for the
principal employer continuously for a long period, would, in reality, be the employees of the
principal employer. Ld. Authorized Representative for the petitioner has taken me through oral
evidence on record which establish that factually entire control and supervision of petitioner in this
case was by the university and its field staff and not of respondent No. 3. Be it stated that petitioner
PW1 in cross-examination has denied to have worked under M/s Shimla Cleanways and his
officials rather he asserted that officers of university were supervising his work. He has denied that
payments of salary etc. was being made by M/s. Shimla Cleanways rather stated that salary was
being paid by university. Not only this, even attendance was being marked by the officers of
university and field assistants and not by officers of M/s Shimla Cleanways and whatever worked
was assigned by field assistants of the university, the same was performed by him. In cross
examination petitioner has shown ignorance if contract was entered into between respondents No.1
and 2 and between in respondent No. 3. On the other hand, for providing unskilled labourers on
outsource basis, petitioner admitted that he was working with the university before 1-5-2013. He
has further stated that no appointment letter was given by M/s Shimla Cleanways. Thus, when
entire supervision or control was that of principal employer i.e. university and applying the ratio of
judgments referred to above, it may not be erroneous to conclude here respondents No.1 and 2
continue to be principal employer of petitioner.
35. In so far as disengagement of petitioner on 01-4-2014 by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 or
by respondent No. 3 M/s Shimla Cleanways is concerned, there is no reliable evidence linking
petitioner to have been engaged by M/s Shimla Cleanways in the manner projected in this case and
as documentary evidence Ex. P10 does not specifically substantiate plea of respondents No.1 and 2
qua engagement of respondent No. 3 as neither the name of contractor was mentioned Ex. P10 nor
wages in consolidated form being paid to petitioner has been proved as note appended to Ex. P10
mandays chart of petitioner does not stipulate any such fact specifically and no witness has been
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examined by respondents No. 1 and 2 to prove this fact. Be it stated that RW1 is totally silent on
this aspect. It is nowhere in the evidence of respondents No.1 and 2 that petitioner had knowledge
either of being transferred to respondent No. 3 on 15-7-2013 and RW1 the sole respondent
contesting on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 has specifically stated that petitioner had been
transferred to work under contractor but his statement on oath in cross-examination does not clarify
specifically in what manner petitioner was transferred or made to work under respondent No. 3
rather shows that petitioner worked as before with the university ever since 2011 and the
arrangement of outsourcing was never notified to him as there is no written document establishing
that he was made to work with M/s Shimla Cleanways and similarly when on 15-7-2013 petitioner
was working with the university, respondent No. 3 did not issue any letter to petitioner to work
with him or that he was on the roll of respondent No. 3. Admittedly, petitioner had worked 31st
March, 2014 as per mandays chart with university and while cross-examining petitioner as PW1,
ld. Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 2 did not put a specific question that petitioner was appointed
by M/s Shimla Cleanways who has denied that he worked under M/s Shimla Cleanways besides
shown ignorance if M/s Shimla Cleanways had been engaged by respondents No.1 and 2 besides
stated that field staff of university used to pay wages and even the attendance was being marked by
them. Significantly, petitioner admitted that whatever work was assigned by university petitioner
performed the same. Even cross examination of petitioner by respondent No. 3 reveal that
petitioner had been engaged by university besides supervision was also conducted by field staff of
university. He has admitted that M/s Shimla Cleanways did not give any appointment letter when
cross-examined by ld. counsel for respondent No. 3. Thus, from evidence on record led by
respondents it is not established that petitioner had been transferred in the manner projected by
respondent No.1 who has been held to be principal employer of petitioner and the petitioner would
be liable to be absorbed on rolls of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and not on rolls of respondent No. 3
who was merely contractor and even if respondent No. 3 i.e. contractor had been engaged by
respondents No. 1 and 2, the engagement manifestly appear to be sham transaction as practically
respondents No. 1 and 2 had complete control over working of petitioner as has been held in 2015
LLR 580. In another judgment titled as Mannu Khan Vs. Union of India reported in 1989 (2)
SCC 99, the Hon'ble Apex Court has regularized contract labourers of cleaning catering
establishment and pantry cars in Western Railways. It also needs to be pointed out that none of the
respondents had obtained licence under Contract Labour (Regulations & Abolition) Act, 1970 as
there is no evidence to this effect adduced by respondents and in such like situation, respondents
No.1 and 2 who had engaged respondent No. 3 to provide unskilled labourers are held to be
principal employers of petitioner. Accordingly, when respondent No. 3 was engaged to provide
labourers who was not registered under Contract Labour (Regulations & Abolition) Act, 1970, he
cannot be stated to be registered contractor or principal employer as he was primarily working as
contractor and engaged labourers for principal employers as stated above. Accordingly, no relief
can be granted to petitioner against respondent No. 3 as respondents 1 and 2 are held to be principal
employers of petitioner as stated above.
36. In view of foregoing discussions, it is held that the petitioner despite being contractual
labourer would be entitled to be regularized as he had been working intermittently when work was
not provided to him whereas other juniors shown namely Bhim Dutt, Kamla Devi and Saroj Bala
who joined after him had been given sufficient work as reflected in seniority list Ex. P4 and P5 and
thus intermittent breaks are also held to be deliberate and during intermittent break present
petitioner he shall be deemed to be in continuous service from date of his initial appointment till
was illegally terminated without issuance of one month's notice or compensation in lieu thereof.
Accordingly, issues No.1 and 2 are answered in affirmative holding that act of respondents No. 1 &
2 in giving time to time break and finally terminating on 1-4-2014 are improper and unjustified.
However, issue no.3 is decided as discussed holding that petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in
service with seniority and continuity in service without back wages. Issues are decided accordingly.
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Issue No. 5 :
37. Ld. counsel for the respondents has not pressed this issue during course of argument.
Otherwise also, from pleadings on record no inference of claim petition being not maintainable can
be raised industrial dispute. In the case in hand, the petitioner had challenged his illegal termination
by the respondents who had allegedly violated of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. As such, being
aggrieved with action of the respondents in terminating service, petitioner could legitimately agitate
his claim before this court. Issue No.5 is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against
the respondents.
Issue No.6 :
38. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has contended that College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Neri, Hamirpur, H.P. does not fall under the jurisdiction before this court. On the other
hand ld. counsel for petitioner had relied upon Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board etc.
and A. Rajappa and others, AIR 1978 SC 548 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the definition of 'industry' envisaged under Section 2(j) of the Act and held that university would
fall within the definition of industry and its employees are workman entitled to protection
envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Ld. Counsel for respondents has failed to
repudiate arguments and as such university cannot be stated to be not industry and its workers to be
not workmen. Issue is decided in negative against the respondents and in favour of petitioner.
Issue No. 7 :
39. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (H.P.) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-
operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
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delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
40. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondents. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner
coupled with evidence on record cannot be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged
by the respondents. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondent and is answered
accordingly.
Issues No. 8 & 9 :
41. Both these issues were not pressed by ld. Counsel for respondents at the time of
arguments which are decided unpressed in favour of petitioner and against respondents.
Relief :
42. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the claim petition is partly allowed
against respondents No.1 and 2 who are directed to re-engage the petitioner forthwith. It is further
held that petitioner shall be in continuous uninterrupted service with the respondents No.1 and 2
from the date of his initial engagement in the year 2007 and that the breaks given by the
respondents No.1 and 2 during this period being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the
seniority and continuity of service of the petitioner whose seniority shall be reckoned from his
initial date of engagement besides, petitioner shall be entitled to seniority and continuity in service
from the date of his initial engagement except back wages. However, claim petition as against M/s
Shimla Cleanways (Contractor) respondent No. 3 is hereby dismissed. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
43. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
44. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
45. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No.
: 10/2015
Date of Institution
: 13-01-2015
Date of decision
: 24-4-2018
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Shri Rajeev Kumar s/o Shri Sarwan Kumar, r/o Village Sohri, P.O. Jolsappar, Tehsil
Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Dean, College of Horticulture and Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
2.
The Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, District
Solan H.P.
3.
The Contractor, M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. (Contractor
Company)
. .Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.
For the Respondents 1 & 2 :
Sh. Karan Pathania, Adv.
For the Respondent No. 3 :
Sh. Vikramjeet Sharma, Adv.
AWARD
The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Rajeev Kumar s/o Shri Sarwan
Kumar, r/o Village Sohri, P.O. Jolsappar, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P. during
year 2006 to 22-04-2013 by (i) the Director, Institute of Biotechnology & Environmental
Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur,
H.P. (Principal Employer), (ii) the Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture &
Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P. (Principal Employer) without complying with the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thereafter his services were transferred
to the contractor company i.e. M/s Shimla Cleanways without his knowledge w.e.f. 15-07-
2013 where he worked till 8-09-2014 and was again terminated w.e.f. 09-09-2014 by the
Contractor, M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. (Contractor
Company), without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is
legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and
compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employers?”
2.
After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 3rd February, 2017
was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:
“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 24-12 2014,
the name of employer no (i) may be read as 'the Dean, College of Horticulture and Foerstry
Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.' instead of 'the Director, Institute of Biotechnology &
Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamipur, H.P.', which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification.”
3.
On receipt of reference as well as addendum from appropriate government, notices
were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.
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4.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
unskilled labourer by respondent No. 1 on 2006 for 89 days who thereafter worked intermittently
although with fictional breaks upto the year 2013. Averments made in the claim petition revealed
that during above said period, respondents No. 1 and 2 given time to time break to petitioner
despite work and funds. It is alleged that respondents No. 1 and 2 had entered into a agreement with
M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. to outsource unskilled labourers from
1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 for 11 months and thereafter the contract was renewed for another one year.
It is alleged that from 15-7-2013 service of petitioner had been adjusted by respondent No.1 in the
rolls of contractor M/s Shimla Cleanways without knowledge of petitioner to continue work there
uninterruptedly till 8-9-2014. Believing to be working under respondent No.1 for the period
aforestated, it is alleged that Rampal Baniyal under whom petitioner worked as well as respondent
No. 3 never disclosed that petitioner had been working under respondent No. 3. It is alleged that
respondents No. 1 and 2 had been marking attendance of petitioner besides making payment of
monthly salary and thus without knowledge of petitioner, service conditions has been changed by
the respondents. It is alleged that while terminating service on 9-9-2014, no notice or retrenchment
compensation in lieu thereof was paid and thus termination of petitioner is stated to be null and
void ab-initio. It is claimed that respondents No.1 and 2 had given fictional breaks under two spells
by engaging petitioner initially for 89 days thereafter with a gap of 89 days with the object that
petitioner did not complete 240 days for the purpose of continuous service envisaged under Section
25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereafter called 'the Act' for brevity). Reliance has been
placed upon judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in 1994
LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development Authority, Manimajra, and
Anr. Vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak and Anr. in which
Hon'ble High Court has held appointment workmen for 89 days to be illegal. It is further alleged
that while terminating service of petitioner (i.e. time to time termination and final termination)
provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not adhered to as doctrine of 'Last come First go' was
ignored retaining juniors namely Ishwar Dass and Rajeev Kumar whereas service of petitioner had
been terminated. The grievance of petitioner further remains that respondents No. 1 and 2 had
engaged regular unskilled Class-IV workers on regular pay scale in Neri I & II including petitioner
on daily wage basis for 89 days onwards for two spells besides respondents No.1 and 2 had
engaged some workmen without break namely Mahinder Singh, Ishwar Singh, Harnam Singh,
Gorkh Singh, Tarsem Chand, and Ravi Dutt. It is claimed that while engaging above-named four
workmen, respondent No.1 had shown favourtism to one set of workers whereas service of other 14
workmen including petitioner were consistently given fictional breaks for 89 days who were
allowed to work in two spells whereas service of the remaining workmen had been engaged
without any break which constituted unfair labour practice. It is alleged that petitioner alongwith 13
others had filed complaint against their illegal termination before Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur
referring to order dated 20-11-2014 passed in CWP No. 4991/2012 in which Hon'ble High Court of
H.P. had directed respondents to not give fictional breaks and if their (i.e. service of petitioner and
13 others) already stand dispensed with, no fresh hands shall be engaged meaning thereby that after
20-11-2014, no fresh hands were to be engaged without first offering the retrenched workers
including petitioner. As such, it is also claimed by petitioner that respondents had violated order of
Hon'ble High Court of H.P. dated 20-11-2014. It is further alleged that reference No.154/2012
titled as Mahinder Singh Vs. The Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and
Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P. had been implemented by respondents No. 1 and 2 and said
Mahinder Singh was still working with the respondents. It is claimed that Sanjay Mohmmad and
others had filed application dated 4-5-2013 through e-samadhan regarding fictional breaks and
regularization of service of 14 workmen which has been consequently forwarded to respondent
No. 2 for necessary action but till the date of filing of claim information sought for has not been
provided to petitioner alongwith 13 others who had since been not regularized. It is claimed that
respondents No.1 and 2 had given time to time break in service of petitioner by giving fictional
breaks after 89 days in two spells in a year and finally terminated his service on 9-9-2014 which is
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stated to be illegal and unjustified and same is liable to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly,
petitioner has prayed that illegal fictional breaks period w.e.f. 2006 to 2013-14 directing the
respondents to condone break breaks period in continuity of service for the petitioner with direction
to pay wages for the break period. The petitioner further prays that final termination dated 9-9-2014
be set aside and respondents No. 1 and 2 be directed to reinstate petitioner in service forthwith
alongwith back wages, seniority and continuity in service with consequential service benefits and to
any other relief petitioner is found entitled to.
5.
Respondents No. 1 and 2 contested claim petition, filed joint reply inter-alia taken
preliminary objections of maintainability, limitation and jurisdiction. On merits admitted that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour to do manual work in the experimental fields on
seasonal basis but denied that his service had been illegally terminated by the respondents. It is
alleged that due to non-availability of funds a policy for the engagement of contractual labour was
formulated by the respondent w.e.f. 1-1-2002 so as to recognize engagement and avoid additional
financial liability. It is claimed that respondent university did not have permanent and perennial
nature of experimental field work which requires attendance of labourers (during Rabi and Kharif
season). It is alleged that seasonal labourers were employed for a limited period on contract basis to
accomplish the field trial work with the object of research trial and their data etc. are not wasted for
want of adequate manpower. It is specifically alleged that petitioner had been engaged as
contractual labour on a fixed salary for a particular period in different spells as and when work and
funds were available under the project code No. HPL-038-62/HMS-218-62/HMM036-32 as is
evident from letter No.UHF/RHRFES/1-7/1551-58 dated 21-1-2012 which postulates that no
seniority to contractual labour shall be given and the service of individual will be terminated after
the contract was over as envisaged conditions No. 2 and 8. The respondent No. 3 has asserted that
petitioner had accepted the engagement to the contract alongwith terms and conditions of the
appointment/engagement letter without any hesitation and did not complete 240 days in any of the
calendar years. It is also claimed by the respondents in their reply specifically alleged that as and
when work and funds were available under time bound project, service of labour for field work was
required for which advertisement was given from time to time but the petitioner did not turn up for
facing interviews and seeking job. It is emphatically denied that junior persons namely Rajeev
Kumar and Ishwar Dass had been retained by university rather said Ishwar Dass had been working
with the university since 2000. However, the court had given seniority w.e.f. 14-11-2005 and thus
allegation of petitioner that juniors were retained was stated to be wrong. It is admitted that
respondent had entered into contract with M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla vide
letter No. 827-76 dated 30-4-2013 but outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-1-2013 onwards and
engaged through them to carry out the seasonal and adhoc projects work as and when needed and if
petitioner wanted to get himself engaged for field work with the respondents then petitioner was
required to approach the said agency. It is asserted that termination of petitioner including co
workers engaging contractor outsourced labourers by respondents had become compulsion of
university due to reason that the university was already facing liability of surplus staff including
class-IV employees. Moreover, three class-IV employees were stated to have been relieved and
sent to the State Govt. besides respondents No. 1 and 2 were not in a position to continue the
service of labourers and with object that to avoid additional financial liability. No policy of
engaging regular labourer for 89 days for the seasonal work and adhoc project under which the
labourers were engaged for stipulated period existed. It is further stated that as and when the work
and funds were available with the respondents under the time bound project and the service of
labour for field work were required, advertisement were made from time to time besides most of
the labourers mentioned in the petition had been engaged on compassionate grounds as per
provisions of rules with the prior approval of State Govt. besides that petitioner was engaged on
contractual basis of specific terms and conditions which were binding on petitioner. It is alleged
that petitioner was engaged from time to time on fixed salary on contractual basis and not on
regular basis for a specific period besides termination of service of petitioner including other co-
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workers and opting to outsource through outside agency which is stated to be facing liability of
surplus staff including class-IV employees. It is claimed that university was not in a position to
continue services of labour and to avoid additional liability however university has formed its own
policy for engaging labour for 89 days for carrying out the seasonal work and adhoc project work
under which the labourers were engaged for stipulated period. It is also asserted that as and when
works and funds available under the time bound projects, service of labourers for field work was
required for which advertisement was made from time to time but petitioner had never turned up to
appear an interview so as to seek job. It is alleged that at present unskilled labourers were being
engaged through independent agency i.e. M/s. Shimla Cleanways and not by university itself and if
petitioner wanted to get himself engaged for filed work with respondents he needed approach the
said agency. Accordingly, denying all allegations of petitioner as contained in claim petition
respondents No. 1 and 2 have sought for dismissal of claim petition.
6.
Respondent No. 3 contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, mis-joinder and non-joinder of parties, estopple, cause of action. On
merits admitted that respondent No. 3 was engaged for providing unskilled labourer on outsource
basis to respondents No. 1 and 2 for which the contract was entered into between the parties which
was effective from 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 and thereafter the contract in question was renewed for
another one year. Admitted that petitioner had worked under the rolls of respondent No. 3
accepting terms and conditions and performed the duties under the contract according to which
engagement of particular workers remained in force subject to availability of work besides asserted
that the dispute raised against respondent No. 3 did not fall within the ambit of Act as there existed
no relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and respondent No. 3 was not
principal employer rather it is respondent No. 1 for whom respondent No. 3 worked as a contractor.
Accordingly claim petition is sought to be dismissed.
7.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to the joint reply filed by respondents No. 1 and 2,
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. It is also reiterated that workmen mentioned
in para No. 6 of the claim petition namely Chaman Lal, Krishan Chand, Jamaldeen, Sanjeev
Kumar, Om Prakash, Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram regular workmen who had been working with
the petitioner and other co-workmen have since been disengaged. It is denied that respondents had
engaged some workmen on compassionate grounds moreover petitioner to be unemployed and not
gainfully employee anywhere from the date of his alleged illegal termination.
8.
The petitioner has filed rejoinder separately to the reply filed by respondent No. 3,
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. It is reiterated that service of petitioner had
been terminated on verbal order of respondent No. 1 w.e.f. 9-9-2014 and thereafter new/fresh hands
had been engaged by respondent No. 1 who were on the rolls of the respondent No. 3 after
termination of service of petitioner.
9.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit Ex. PW1/ A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, affidavit of petitioner Ex. PW1/A, copy of letter
dated 3-1-2012 Ex. PW1/B, copy of mandays chart Ex. PW1/C, copy of letter dated 10-12-2012
Ex. PW1/D, copy of letter dated 22-4-2013 Ex. PW1/E, copy of complaint Ex. PW1/F, copy of
letter dated 13-2-2013 Ex. PW1/G, copy of letter dated 27-1-2014 Ex. PW1/H, copy of judgment
dated 20-11-2014 Ex. PW1/I, copy of Award dated 24-8-2012 passed by this Court Ex. PW1/J and
closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondents No. 1
and 2 had examined Dr. P.C. Sharma as RW1, tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, standing
instructions regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis dated 5-12-2001 Ex. RW1/B,
letter dated 18-9-2012 regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis Ex. RW1/C, copy of
office order dated 21-2-2005 Ex. RW1/D, copy of letter dated 13-5-2016 regarding substitution of
name of Dir. Institute of Biotechnology Ex. RW1/E and closed evidence. Respondent No. 3
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however did not lead any evidence and closed the same as is evident from statement of ld. Counsel
for respondent No. 3 record and placed on the file on 31-10-2017.
10. It is pertinent to mention here that after closing evidence by the respondent, petitioner
had moved an application for additional evidence which was allowed and Shri Jai Ram,
Superintendent office of Dean College of Horticulture & Forestry Neri, Distt. Hamirpur, H.P.
examined as PW2, tendered/proved seniority list/tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated
30-4-2010, 11-4-2011, 23-2-2011, 1-10-2014, 17-10-2015, 16-3-2009, 10-6-2011, 7-10-2014, 16-9-
2016 respectively Ex. P1 to P9, copy of mandays chart of contractual labourers Ex. P10 and closed
evidence. Respondents however did not lead any further evidence so as to repudiate claim of
petitioner.
11. I have heard the counsel representing petitioner and ld. Counsel. for respondent, gone
through records of the case carefully.
12. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28-08-2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner during the year 2006 to
22-4-2013 by the respondent Nos. 1&2 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether the services of petitioner were transferred to the contractor company i.e. M/s
Shimla Cleanways respondent No. 3 without knowledge of petitioner w.e.f. 15-7-2013
where he continued work till 8-9-2014 as alleged. If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether final termination of services of petitioner w.e.f. 09-09-2014 is/was improper
and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
4.
If issue No. 1 or issue No. 3 or both are proved in affirmative, to what relief the
petitioner is entitled from respondents as alleged?
. .OPP.
5.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?
. .OPR 1 to 3.
6.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution is not covered under
the jurisdiction of this court as alleged?
. .OPR 1&2.
7.
Whether the claim petition is time barred by limitation as alleged?
. .OPR 1&2.
8.
Whether the claim petition is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of the necessary
parties as alleged?
. .OPR 3.
9.
Whether the petitioner is estopped to file present claim petition on account of his act
and conduct as alleged?
. .OPR 3.
10. Whether the petitioner has no cause of action against the respondent No. 3 as alleged?
. .OPR 3.
11. Whether respondent No. 3 being contractor worked under contract of award by the
respondent No. 1&2 for specific purpose as alleged?
. .OPR 3.
Relief :
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13. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No. 1 : Yes
Issue No. 2 : Discussed
Issue No. 3 : Yes
Issue No. 4 : Discussed
Issue No. 5 : No
Issue No. 6 : No
Issue No. 7 : No
Issue No. 8 : No
Issue No.9 :
No
Issue No. 10 : Discussed
Issue No. 11 : Discussed
Relief :
Claim petition is partly allowed per operative part of the Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1, 2,3 4, 10 and 11:
14. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
15. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged by respondents No. 1 and 2 in year 2006
initially for a period of 89 days and thereafter with intermittent breaks several times till 2014 as is
also evident from mandays chart Ex. P-10. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged on the basis of
policy for engagement of labourers on contractual basis incorporated in Ex. RW1/B dated 5-12-
2001. It is admitted case of respondents that contractual labourers including petitioner had
remained engaged till 2013 ever since initial engagement when respondents allegedly engaged
contractor respondent No. 3 for outsourcing unskilled contractual labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013.
Equally admitted case of respondents No.1 and 2 is that duration of contractual labourers as per
policy Ex. RW1/B was not to exceed 89 days in one spell and two spell in whole year and in case
re-engaged was to be made then break of atleast 15 days was necessary. It is admittedly not case of
respondents No. 1 and 2 that work and conduct of petitioner was not good and satisfactory.
Admittedly, respondents had sufficient work and funds for engaging petitioner in different projects
moreso when unskilled labourers were decided to be engaged from contractor on outsource basis. It
is further admitted case of respondents No. 1 and 2 that petitioner being contractual unskilled
labourer provisions of Section 25 of Act did not apply as petitioner was squarely covered under
Section 2(oo) (bb) of the 'Act'. In view of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner
qua termination in violation of Section 2 (oo) of Act needs to be determined and at the same it also
needs to be determined, if respondents No. 1 and 2 deliberately recoursed to time to time
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termination of petitioner and thereafter final termination in the year 2013 falling within ambit of
unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Clause 9 of Vth Schedule of 'Act'.
16. At the outset, it would be pertinent to mention here that Ex. RW1/B Standing
Instructions of respondents for engaging contractual unskilled labourers clearly provided that no
casual worker shall be engaged on muster roll by any functionary of University w.e.f. 1-1-2002
which further stipulated that as far as possible continuing casual worker should be adjusted in
research and extension projects and thereafter demand for additional hands by deployment of
labour on contract may be made. Clause (e) of policy is reproduced below for reference:
“(e) The duration of the engagement of contractual labour should not exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spells in whole of the year and in case of re-engagement, a break of atleast 15
days is necessary in each case”.
17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner referring to above-stated rule for engagement of unskilled
contractual labour has contended that respondents No. 1 and 2 being employers have given
intermittent break in service which was countable as petitioner like any other labourer engaged on
contract was not in position to bargain with respondents rather had no option but to work in illegal
service conditions imposed. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble
Apex Court titled as Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries, reported in 2014 LLR
673 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that artificial break in service every year by
reappointing the employee on the same post tantamounts to 'unfair labour practice' under Section
2(ra) of the Act which is not permissible under law. It was further observed that when repeated
artificial periodical breaks in service are proved, the termination of workman would not be having
protection under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Act which would attract relief of reinstatement with full
back wages being illegal retrenchment.
18. PW1 has stepped into witness box deposed on oath as maintained in claim petition
specifically stated that petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2006 who continued to
work with respondents till 8-9-2014 when service of petitioner had been terminated finally
alongwith 13 other workers without complying with provisions of the 'Act'. He has further stated
neither any show cause notice nor compensation was given although petitioner had completed 240
days in preceding 12 months from date of termination. Significantly, Ex. P10 mandays does not
factually show petitioner to have worked for 240 days immediately prior to his termination but plea
of petitioner remains that Ex. RW1/B Standing Instructions for engagement of unskilled labourer
on contract basis which fell in the ambit of an unfair labour practice had been invariably recoursed
by respondents during period of employment of petitioner when there were sufficient funds and
work with respondents and in the judgment (supra) of Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was held
liable to be reinstated in service being illegally retrenched.
19. Reliance has further been placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &
Haryana reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development
Authority, Manimajra, and Anr. versus Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Rohtak and Anr. Relevant para of judgment is reproduced below:
“Since provision of Section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature of an exception it has to be construed
strictly in favour of the workman as far as possible in letter and spirit. If the termination is
meant to exploit an employee or to increase the bargaining power of the employer,
then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause (bb) and the definition of
'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning…”
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20. In the aforestated judgment, Hon'ble High Court (DB) had upheld award passed by
Labour Court relying upon judgment titled as Kapurthala Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. Vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 1984 (2) Indian Law Reporter 333 (DB) in which
service of workman had been terminated when case of those had completed 230 days. In this case,
services of workmen were terminated without any departmental inquiry or charge-sheet and at the
same time, no notice or compensation was paid. The bank before the Hon'ble Court took plea that
service of workman for specified period and that too with notional breaks and thereafter workmen
were neither entitled for any retrenchment compensation nor reinstatement. The court in (1984)
case after dilating upon various aspects of matter held that attempt of employer to dispense with
service of workman so as to deprive him in continuity of service for specified period i.e. 240
days envisaged under Section 25-B and 25-F of the Act amounts to unfair labour practice when it is
found that conduct and service of workman was satisfactory. In 1994 judgment (supra) reference
has been made to another case reported in 1989 (2) RSJ 55 titled as Balbir Singh Vs. The
Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Limited in which J. Amarjit Chaudhary interpreted
Sub-Clause (bb) (oo) of Section 2 and relevant para is reproduced below:
Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act, which was added in 1984 by an
amendment cannot be so construed as to drastically restrict the orbit of the term of
'retrenchment' clause (bb) is an exception which must be interpreted narrowly. It cannot be
given meanings which may nullify or curtail the ambit of their principal clause. No doubt,
the intention of the Parliament in enacting clause (bb) was to exclude certain categories of
workers from the term of retrenchment but there is nothing in this clause which allows an
outlet to un-scrupulour employers to shunt out workers in the graph of non-renewal of their
contract even when the work subsists. This Clause as a whole has to be construed strictly in
favour of the workman as far as possible as to ensure that the Act is implemented in letter
and spirit. If the termination is meant to exploit an employee or to increase the
bargaining power of the employer, then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause
(bb) and the definition of term 'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning. The
contractual clause enshrined in clause (bb) cannot be resorted to frustrate the claim of
the employee against his uncalled for retrenchment or for denying other benefits. It
cannot be so interpreted, as to enable for employer to resort to the policy of hire and fire….”
21. It is admittedly not the case of respondents No. 1 and 2 that petitioner could not be
deployed or employed or say that respondents No. 1 and 2 had terminated service of petitioner
since there was not sufficient work and funds. Be it stated that by engaging contractor for
outsourcing unskilled labourer to be provided to respondents w.e.f. 1-5-2013 is clearly suggestive
of the fact that respondents No.1 and 2 had sufficient work and funds. Not only this, even several
unskilled labourer had been engaged for whole of the year as reflected in Ex. P5 the tentative
seniority list as on 31-12-2014. Thus, intermittent breaks given by respondents to petitioner
establishes unfair labour practice within the meaning of Section 2(ra) of the Act as the object
behind engaging petitioner as contractual labourer and thereafter giving intermittent breaks and
finally terminating without any notice, changing service conditions by asking petitioner to join
contractor from a specific date as has also been admitted by RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma in cross-
examination who is the only witness examined by respondents No. 1 and 2. Equally important to
mention here is that while filing reply respondents No. 1 and 2 have withheld facts qua number of
labourers engaged in two spells while implementing its policy Ex. RW1/B and at the same time,
their names too have not been disclosed establishes that respondents No. 1 and 2 from very
beginning while engaging petitioner intended that petitioner did not attain permanency in job but
for reason stated hereinabove, petitioner is held to have continuous service from 2006 to 2014 as
envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. That being so, it was incumbent upon respondents No. 1
and 2 to have issued notice under Section 25-F of Act and alternatively to pay wages of one month
in lieu of notice which has not so been done by respondents No.1 and 2 establishing violation of
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provisions of Section 25-F of the Act for intermittent breaks as well as for final termination and for
similar reasons disengaging petitioner periodically and retaining juniors in two spells as has come
in evidence clearly establish violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
22. In order to prove his case, the petitioner has placed reliance upon Ex. R10 the mandays
on fixed wages w.e.f. 2006 relating to petitioner which showed that petitioner had worked under
project HPL-56-62 etc. from 17-7-2006 for 89 days and thereafter with several intermittent breaks
till 30-9-2014 as shown in this document. The plea of the petitioner remains that the breaks had
been given deliberately by respondents No. 1 and 2 so that the petitioner did not complete 240
days. It has also been stated by petitioner that despite availability of funds and work intermittent
breaks had been given from time to time during total period petitioner remained engaged with the
respondents No.1 and 2.
23. Before accepting plea of petitioner for having been given break deliberately from time
to time, it would be also relevant to consider if the petitioner succeeded in establishing that if
throughout the year intermittent breaks would not have been given, he would have continued to be
in service for whole of the year and deemed to have completed continuous service in a year
envisaged under Section 25-B of Act. To prove that provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not
adhered to by respondent while giving intermittent breaks reliance has been placed on seniority list
Ex. P1 to P5 showing junior workmen to petitioner i.e. those daily beldar who joined after
petitioner have been retained, engaging more than 300 days in a year whereas petitioner had been
given intermittent breaks in the same year. The seniority list Ex. P1 shows that Asha Devi and Tara
Chand figuring at serial No. 33 & 34 have joined on 13-7-2009. Ex. P4 is the tentative seniority list
(as on 31-12-2013) of these officials showed i.e. Tara Chand to have worked for 365 days in the
year 2010, 354 days in 2011, 366 days in 2012 and 365 days in 2013. Said Tara Chand figured at
serial No. 15 in the seniority list. Similarly, Asha Devi figuring at serial No.16 in seniority list Ex.
R4 is shown to have worked for 304 days in 2010, 347 days in 2011, 341 days in 2012 and 363
days in 2013. With the aid of these entries concerning Tara Chand and Asha Devi figuring at serial
no.15 and 16, it has been contended that there was sufficient work and funds available with the
respondents in different projects and these two officials had joined after joining of petitioner who
as per Ex. P10 figured at serial No. 2 and had joined on 17-7-2006 and as both these workmen had
been given sufficient work throughout the year(s) despite being engaged at later stage, the
petitioner is held to have been given intermittent break from 17-7-2006 till 30-9-2014 deliberately
by respondents despite having sufficient work and funds, Ex. P10 further shows that petitioner
during these years had remained engaged with intermittent breaks for 27 times from 2006 to 2014
in project HPL-056-62 etc. If Tara Chand and Asha Devi could be given work for more than 300
days in a year in particular year from 2010 to 2013, there was no reasons or compulsion for the
respondents to have given break to the petitioner as stated above which manifestly shows that
petitioner has been deliberately given breaks in service.
24. The tentative seniority list of daily wage labourers as it stood on 31-12-2013. Ex. P4
revealed that at serial No.15 and 16 names of Tara Chand and Asha Devi existed but at serial Nos.
17 to 20 names of Amravati, Bhim Dutt, Kamla Devi and Saroj Bala have been mentioned who
were shown to have joined and worked with respondents on 28-10-2010, 1-5-2012, 8-5-2012 and
15-5-2012 respectively much later than petitioner who joined in 2007. As such, latest seniority list
available at the time when petitioner was removed from service except Tara Chand and Asha Devi,
others are shown to have joined in the year 2010 and 2012 respectively as mentioned above.
Nothing in the cross-examination of petitioner PW1 could be elicited by respondents which would
demolish his claim qua deliberate intermittent breaks given by the respondents despite work and
funds as other juniors had been given sufficient work for whole of the year and policy Ex. RW1/B
dealing with contractual labourers was primarily a policy meant to exploit unskilled contractual
labourers which could be termed as entirely based on unfair labour practice. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma,
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Director, Institute of Biotechnology and Environment Sciences, College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
has deposed that he had been posted on the present assignment since 1-11-2016 besides stated that
petitioner worked with university but did not know that petitioner remained engaged from date of
appointment till 31-3-2014. He has admitted in cross-examination that from 2002 to 2013, 30-32
contractual labourers were engaged, initially for 89 days who were appointed in two batches after
engaging the first batch, second batch was engaged when first batch was disengaged and thereafter
second batch was disengaged which support the plea of petitioner that the process of engagement
and disengagements was deliberate on part of respondents. Apparently, giving such intermittent
breaks to two groups of unskilled labourers without notice violated Section 25-G of the Act. As
such, respondents are held to have given intermittent breaks to the petitioner in violation of
provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act.
25. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that although adopting
policy for engagement of unskilled labourer on contractual basis vide Ex. RW1/B, respondents had
changed conditions of service of petitioner without issuing any prior notice vide which petitioner
was required to join to contractor engaged to provide unskilled labourers on outsource basis to
respondents which tentamounts to termination of service of petitioner as petitioner had been
engaged with respondents since 2006 and no prior notice was served upon him in 2013 notifying
petitioner to join contractor who was to provide labourers to respondents on the basis of some
agreement entered into between respondents and contractor Ld. Counsel/Authorized Representative
for petitioner had also contended if contractual employment is resorted to as mechanism to frustrate
the claim so that employee did not become regular or permanent against a job which continues or
the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
clause of Section 2(oo) of the Act, the same would be an unfair labour practice under the 'Act'.
Before proceedings further, it would be most pertinent to refer to order dated 20-11-2014 Ex.
PW1/I of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in which present petitioner along with 13 other had filed
CWP No. 4991/2012 when respondents had been directed “to not give fictional breaks to
petitioner and if their services on this count already stand dispense with, no fresh hand shall
be engaged without first affording the work to the petitioners”. In pursuance to the above said
order, petitioner alongwith 13 others had filed the complaint before Deputy Commissioner
Hamirpur for non enforcement of order dated 20-11-2014 passed by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in
pursuance to which Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur had directed respondents to enforce the order
of the Hon'ble High Court dated 20-11-2014. The plea of respondents in their joint reply remained
that petitioner had not applied for re-engagement with contractor engaged in 2013 which leads to
an irresistible inference that petitioner had been disengaged i.e. terminated from service of
respondents in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. It is admittedly not the case of the
respondents that any notice was served upon petitioner as could also be gathered from cross-
examination of RW1 Dr. P. C. Sharma, Director Dean College of Horticulture respondent No.1
who showed his ignorance if while disengaging petitioner in the year 2014, any notice was served
upon petitioner by respondents. If any notice as required would have been issued by respondents,
RW1 would have certainly denied this question. He has specifically admitted that while
terminating service of petitioner no compensation was paid by respondents. Although these facts
revealed in cross examination of RW1 coupled with the order of Hon'ble High Court as referred to
above, it can be safely gathered that respondents had not adhered to the mandate of Hon'ble High
Court as the petitioner was not to be disengaged and if disengaged, no fresh hands shall be engaged
although several persons juniors to petitioner have been engaged thereafter as per seniority list Ex.
P5 which further showed availability sufficient work and funds with respondents No. 1 and 2.
27. Ld. Counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 had contended that petitioner being
contractual employee was not covered under the definition of retrenchment under Section 2 (bb) of
the Act as under Clause (bb)(oo) termination of service of workman on contract specifically was
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excluded from definition of retrenchment. It is pointed out that since the petitioner was appointed
on contract, he stands excluded from definition of 'retrenchment' and therefore respondents were
not required to adhere to provisions of Section 25-F of the 'Act' while disengaging petitioner. Ld.
Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, repudiated the arguments so advanced by the ld.
counsel for respondents and has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
titled as Manoj Kumar Vs. H.R.T.C. and Anr. reported in 2007 LLR 1155. In the above said
judgment Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held that when repeated and fictional breaks have
been given to workman so that he should not attain permanency, it would not come within the
purview of section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act excluding termination of
retrenchment. In the case before the Hon'ble High Court respondents had set up similar plea of
petitioner being on contractual employment and thus Section 25-F could not be invoked by the
petitioner. In the above said judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held in para 12
reproduced below for reference:
“….12. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has held in Shailendra Nath Vs. Vice
Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1987 Lab IC 1607 that section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature
of an exception to section 2(oo) and has to be construed strictly and in favour of the
workman as the entire object of the Act is secure a just and fair deal to them. Their
Lordships of the Allahabad High Court have held as under:
“The expression, 'termination for whatsoever reason' used in Cl. (oo) came up for
interpretation before the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. N. S. Money, AIR 1976
SC 1111: (1976 Lab IC 769). It was held to mean a termination which takes place either by
active step of employer or by running out of stipulated period. The Hon'ble Court observed.
Termination embraced not merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact
of termination, however, produced". Since this wide interpretation resulted in extending
benefit of retrenchment to even purpose or particular job or were casual workers the
Legislature appears to have added sub-cl. (bb) to cl.(oo) in 1984. Even though petitioners
claim to have acquired status of regular employees before the clause was amended as each
of them had completed 240 days prior to its addition in 1984 it may be examined if the
petitioners can be said to be contractual employees as contemplated in this su-clause. For
that it is necessary to examine its scope and ambit. It may, however, be stated at the outset
that it obviously attempts to exclude that which otherwise would have been included in
principal clause or to be more precise is in the nature of an exception, therefore, it has to be
construed strictly and in favour of workmen as the entire objective of the Act is to secure
just and fair deal for them. Terminations which are included in it are those which are
brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time
stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide a
gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation the nature of
employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of
duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be
for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes
to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated
period or completion of work whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But
if contractual employment is resorted to as a mechanism to frustrate the claim of
employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature
of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on the anvil of
fairness and bonafide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire
and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Cl. (bb). Because if it is left to be employer not
to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstances then the protection
afforded to a workman by treating every termination, of service as retrenchment shall be
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rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post
ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bona fide.
It cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also
satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That
would be unfair labour practice [See H.D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India. (1985) 51 Fac
LR 494: (1985 Lab IC 1733) (SC)]. From various annexures filed with affidavits it is clear
that some of the petitioners were employed as Office Assistant, other book binders and
peons. They were awarded benefit of bonus. They have been working for nearly five years.
Their job was not casual, seasonal or of a daily worker. They have not been paid their salary
on volume of work. Although the wages in some cases are computed on per day basis but
the payment is monthly including holidays. Their duty, therefore, was like a regular
employee and not as casual, daily or seasonal worker….”
Para no.17 of the aforestated judgment is also reproduced below which has bearing on
merits of issue and is reproduced below:
“17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Haryana State Electronics Development
Corporation Limited Vs. Mamni (2206) 9 SCC 434: AIR 2006 SC 2427: 2006 LLR 667
(SC), that appointment for a short period (89 days) and termination of service at the end of
the said period and reappointment after a gap of one day, such action of termination and
reappointment repeated again and again for a period of about one and a half years, in such
circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the termination not bona fide but
adopted to defeat the object of the Act. Thus, it is not covered by section 2(oo)(bb) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947……..”
27. Reliance has further been placed by Hon'ble High Court in Manoj Kumar's case on
another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay titled as Dalip H. Shirke Vs. Zila Parishad
Yavatmal, reported in 1990 Lab IC 100 in which judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as State
Bank of India Vs. N. Sundaramoney reported in 1976 Lab IC 769 had been relied by Hon'ble
High Court of Bombay. It was observed that exception as contained in sub Clause (bb) will have to
be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been
enjoying earlier to the amendment. The benefit of law laid down by the Supreme Court was
extended to all the workmen even to those who were employed for specific work or for a
particular job and even to casual labourers who were engaged merely to complete casual nature
of work. In the judgment of N. Sundaramoney's case relied in 2007 case and had observed that
time and again it has been held that welfare statutes must receive the construction which
advances the object of the statutes and protects the weaker section of the society. It was
observed that the employer is always in a position to dictate the terms of service vis-à-vis the
workman or to be workman. The employer can unilaterally impose oppressive and
unreasonable conditions of service and the workman will be left with little choice but to
accept all such conditions even unconscionable conditions of service in the contract of
employment. In the case in hand before this court, respondents No.1 and 2 had adopted policy of
engagement of contractual labourer to avoid financial liability Ex. RW1/B which prescribed the
manner in which workman was to employed for 89 days in two spells which follows that
contractual labourers engaged for 89 days in first spell were to be disengaged after 89 days
engaging new batch and following such engagements show that after first engagement of labourers
as stated above junior contractual labourer were to certainly disengage senior workmen i.e. first
batch for 89 days without notice despite availability of work and funds which manifestly violated
Section 25-G of the 'Act'.
28. In the concluding para in Manoj Kumar's case, Hon'ble High Court has held that
workman had been offered appointment with fictional breaks to prevent petitioner from taking
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benefit of Section 25-F of Act. The appointment orders issued in successor to workman was
camouflage to take out petitioner-workman from the ambit of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The appointment of petitioner cannot be termed as contractual and his case will
fall under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it will be covered under
expression “retrenchment”. The act of respondents of engaging petitioner giving fictional
breaks was not bonafide and reinstatement of petitioner-workman was allowed. Applying the
ratio of case law referred to above, it may not be erroneous to observe that in the case in hand
before this court, contractual employment of petitioner and time to time termination was made by
respondents No.1 and 2 so that petitioner did not become permanent and at the same time act of
respondents No.1 and 2 in throwing out petitioner from work with contractor respondent No.3
without notice is manifestly unfair labour practice and petitioner would be covered under definition
of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) and not under exception in Clause (bb) (oo) as has been held
in Manoj Kumar's case.
29. Thus, in the case before this court respondents No. 1 and 2 had made scheme which
was significantly promulgated for engagement of contractual labourer for 89 days in one spell and
in the case before the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana having similar period of
engagement of workmen respondents were held to have not complied with the Section 25-F of the
Industrial Disputes Act as the workman who was a clerk had been engaged for 89 days and given
fresh appointment twice for 89 days. As such, referring to aforestated case law and evidence on
record, it may not be erroneous to conclude that respondents No.1 and 2 had recoursed to unfair
labour practice initially by adopting standing instruction for engagement of contractual labour Ex.
RW1/B which in its prescribed clause (e) duration of contractual labourer was to be not more than
89 in a year for two spells and thereafter by abrupting engagement of labourers on outsource basis
through contractor. But in this case, the petitioner had been engaged several times with intervals as
shown in mandays chart Ex. P10 from 2006 to 2014 and thus the action of respondents in giving
intermittent break as well as finally terminating service without notice and asking the petitioner to
work with contractor who was to provide unskilled labourers to respondents on outsource basis was
nothing else but termination of service of petitioner without any notice and that the intermittent
breaks are held to be deliberately made by the respondents No. 1 and 2 with the object to avoid
financial liability upon respondents No. 1 and 2 which could not be accepted as ground to negate or
say defeat claim of petitioner. The termination of petitioner would thus be not excluded under
Section 2 (oo) (bb) and squarely fell under the definition of retrenchment under the Act
necessitating issuance of notice of one month envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act and in
alternative wages for one month in lieu of notice period which has admittedly not been done as
RW1 has shown his inability to tell if while disengaging petitioner any notice was served. Being
the Director in university authorized to contest and depose in this case on behalf of respondents was
expected to know material facts qua engagement and disengagement of petitioner. Accordingly,
applying the case law as referred to above, it is held that petitioner had been wrongly retrenched
from service by the respondents in violation of provisions of Act.
30. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has taken this court through Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex.
PW1/J passed in Reference No.154/2012 titled as Mohinder Singh versus Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, Distt. Solan, H.P. & Anr. vide which this
court had directed reinstatement of petitioner setting aside retrenchment order qua petitioner w.e.f.
1-1-2005 by respondents and was held entitled for seniority and continuity in service from the date
of illegal termination except back wages. While relying upon the above said Award, ld. Counsel for
the petitioner has contended that above said award has not been assailed by respondents which had
attained finality having similar facts with regard to award Ex. PW1/J. RW1 in cross-examination
has showed his inability to tell if above said award passed against the respondents had been
challenged however specifically admitted that said Mohinder Singh was still working with the
university. Statement of RW1 recorded on 1-10-2011 and award was passed on 28-4-2017 and was
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allegedly terminated on 1-1-2005 which goes to show after implementation of award Ex. PW1/J
above-named, Mohinder Singh has been in continuous service with the respondent from 1-1-2005
to 31-10-2017 when RW1 was cross-examined. As such, Mohinder Singh's case having similar
facts and not challenged by respondents is equally binding upon respondents qua similarly situated
workmen. In the said judgment also, my ld. predecessor-in-office in para No.26 on record has
specifically held that action of respondents was unfair labour practice under Clause 10 Vth
Schedule appended under the Act. In so far claim of petitioner qua back wages from date of illegal
termination in the year 2013 is concerned, suffice would be state here that onus to prove that
petitioner/claimant remained unemployed and not gainfully employed was upon respondents.
Although, petitioner has alleged that he remained unemployed and was not gainfully employed ever
since his termination in 2014 by filing affidavit to this effect could not be relied as being a young
person ageing about 38 years would not have sit idle for about five years without earning and thus
his plea to this effect merits rejection. Accordingly, petitioner is held to be not entitled for back
wages.
31. In so far as claim of petitioner as against M/s Shimla Cleanways Contractor respondent
No. 3 the contractor is concerned, it would be relevant, at the outset to refer to mandays chart as
Ex. P10 concerning petitioner in which his name figures at serial No. 2. A bare glance at the above
said document would show that petitioner had been engaged initially on 17-7-2006 who continued
to work with the respondents No.1 and 2 till 20-8-2012 and thereafter is shown to have been
engaged on 15-7-2013 to 30-9-2014 for different number of working days enumerated therein. In
the column of note, there is stipulation to the effect that service of labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013 were
engaged through outsourcing agencies of manpower through contractor as per outsource policy
introduced from 4/2013. It was further stipulated in this note that consolidated wages for the
particular month was paid to contractor as per policy. Be it stated that note appended to mandays
chart Ex. P10 concerning Manjeet Kumar neither stipulated name of the contractor nor evidence
has been led showing that consolidated wages concerning or including petitioner's wages for
specific months enumerated in Ex. P10 was paid to contractor whose name has not even been
mentioned and as such no inference can be drawn that respondent No. 3 paid wags to petitioner for
different months. It can also be noticed from above said details in Ex. P10 qua period for which
petitioner had worked or say had been shown to be engaged by the university initially for nine
spells whereas under contractor for next ten spells. With the aid of this document, respondents No.1
and 2 have made futile endevour to defeat the claim of petitioner by submitting that petitioner was
no more employee of university who was working under contractor respondent No. 3. In reply
respondent No. 3 has maintained that it had been engaged for providing labourers on outsource
basis to respondent No. 1 on the basis of which petitioner was engaged. There is no documentary
evidence on record establishing that petitioner was initially appointed by respondent No. 1 and
thereafter his service were placed at the disposal of respondent No. 3 or that he was transferred at
any point of time for which he remained engaged. Significantly, respondent No. 3 did not lead any
evidence as ld. Counsel for the respondent No. 3 has made statement before this court on
31-10-2017 that no evidence was to be led on behalf of respondent No.3 and thus, in absence of any
evidence led by respondent No. 3, it cannot be stated that plea set up in the reply stood proved as
against the petitioner.
32. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma representing respondents No. 1 &2 has not stated even a single
word qua engagement of respondent No. 3 who employed petitioner as his affidavit Ex. RW1/A
merely stipulated that unskilled labourers were being engaged through independent agency i.e.
M/s Shimla Cleanways and not by the university itself besides stated that if petitioner wanted to get
himself engaged for field work he should approach the contractor which showed that the only
witness of respondents No. 1 and 2 did not know if petitioner was placed under respondent No. 3. It
is nowhere in evidence of respondents No. 1 and 2 that petitioner had been engaged by respondent
No.3 irrespective of plea of respondent No. 3 that petitioner was engaged by him on demand of
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respondents No. 1 and 2. It is to be seen by this court if petitioner worked under respondent No. 3
and was its employee or was under supervision of university and its field staff while being engaged
for carrying out different projects.
33. Reliance has been placed on judgment reported in 2015 LLR 580 titled as General
Manger, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Ranipet Vs. Canteen Workers of BHEL, rep. by
BHEL Canteen Workers Union, Chennai & Ors. in which the Hon'ble High Court of Madras
has held that when it is proved that employment contract with the contractor is sham and nominal,
the employees of the contractor will be having their right to be absorbed as regular employees of
the principal employer.
34. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of
Bombay reported in 2015 LLR 974 titled as Goa MRF Employees' Union Vs. ICARUS Food
and Farm and Others where the employees were engaged through contractor working for the
principal employer continuously for a long period, would, in reality, be the employees of the
principal employer. Ld. Authorized Representative for the petitioner has taken me through oral
evidence on record which establish that factually entire control and supervision of petitioner in this
case was by the university and its field staff and not of respondent No. 3. Be it stated that petitioner
PW1 in cross-examination has denied to have worked under M/s Shimla Cleanways and his
officials rather he asserted that officers of university were supervising his work. He has denied that
payments of salary etc. was being made by M/s. Shimla Cleanways rather stated that salary was
being paid by university. Not only this, even attendance was being marked by the officers of
university and field assistants and not by officers of M/s Shimla Cleanways and whatever worked
was assigned by field assistants of the university, the same was performed by him. In cross-
examination petitioner has shown ignorance if contract was entered into between respondents No. 1
and 2 and between in respondent No. 3. On the other hand, for providing unskilled labourers on
outsource basis, petitioner admitted that he was working with the university before 1-5-2013. He
has further stated that no appointment letter was given by M/s Shimla Cleanways. Thus, when
entire supervision or control was that of principal employer i.e. university and applying the ratio of
judgments referred to above, it may not be erroneous to conclude here respondents no.1 and 2
continue to be principal employer of petitioner.
35. In so far as disengagement of petitioner on 09-9-2014 by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 or
by respondent No. 3 M/s Shimla Cleanways is concerned, there is no reliable evidence linking
petitioner to have been engaged by M/s Shimla Cleanways in the manner projected in this case and
as documentary evidence Ex. P10 does not specifically substantiate plea of respondents No. 1 and 2
qua engagement of respondent No. 3 as neither the name of contractor was mentioned Ex. P10 nor
wages in consolidated form being paid to petitioner has been proved as note appended to Ex. P10
mandays chart of petitioner does not stipulate any such fact specifically and no witness has been
examined by respondents No. 1 and 2 to prove this fact. Be it stated that RW1 is totally silent on
this aspect. It is nowhere in the evidence of respondents No. 1 and 2 that petitioner had knowledge
either of being transferred to respondent No. 3 on 15-7-2013 and RW1 the sole respondent
contesting on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 has specifically stated that petitioner had been
transferred to work under contractor but his statement on oath in cross-examination does not clarify
specifically in what manner petitioner was transferred or made to work under respondent No. 3
rather shows that petitioner worked as before with the university ever since 2011 and the
arrangement of outsourcing was never notified to him as there is no written document establishing
that he was made to work with M/s Shimla Cleanways and similarly when on 15-7-2013 petitioner
was working with the university respondent No. 3 did not issue any letter to petitioner to work with
him or that he was on the roll of respondent No. 3. Admittedly, petitioner had worked 30th
September, 2014 as per mandays chart with university and while crossexamining petitioner as
PW1, ld. counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 2 did not put a specific question that petitioner was
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appointed by M/s Shimla Cleanways who has denied that he worked under M/s Shimla Cleanways
besides shown ignorance if M/s Shimla Cleanways had been engaged by respondents No.1 and 2
besides stated that field staff of university used to pay wages and even the attendance was being
marked by them. Significantly, petitioner admitted that whatever work was assigned by university
petitioner performed the same. Even crossexamination of petitioner by respondent No. 3 reveal that
petitioner had been engaged by university besides supervision was also conducted by field staff of
university. He has admitted that M/s Shimla Cleanways did not give any appointment letter when
cross-examined by ld. Counsel for respondent No. 3. Thus, from evidence on record led by
respondents it is not established that petitioner had been transferred in the manner projected by
respondent No. 1 who has been held to be principal employer of petitioner and the petitioner would
be liable to be absorbed on rolls of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and not on rolls of respondent No. 3
who was merely contractor and even if respondent No. 3 i.e. contractor had been engaged by
respondents No.1 and 2, the engagement manifestly appear to be sham transaction as practically
respondents No.1 and 2 had complete control over working of petitioner as has been held in 2015
LLR 580. In another judgment titled as Mannu Khan Vs. Union of India reported in 1989 (2)
SCC 99, the Hon'ble Apex Court has regularized contract labourers of cleaning catering
establishment and pantry cars in Western Railways. It also needs to be pointed out that none of the
respondents had obtained licence under Contract Labour (Regulations & Abolition) Act, 1970 as
there is no evidence to this effect adduced by respondents and in such like situation, respondents
No.1 and 2 who had engaged respondent No. 3 to provide unskilled labourers are held to be
principal employers of petitioner. Accordingly, when respondent No. 3 was engaged to provide
labourers who was not registered under Contract Labour (Regulations & Abolition) Act, 1970, he
cannot be stated to be registered contractor or principal employer as he was primarily working as
contractor and engaged labourers for principal employers as stated above. Accordingly, no relief
can be granted to petitioner against respondent no.3 as respondents 1 and 2 are held to be principal
employers of petitioner as stated above.
36. In view of foregoing discussions, it is held that the petitioner despite being contractual
labourer would be entitled to be regularized as he had been working intermittently when work was
not provided to him whereas other juniors shown namely Bhim Dutt, Kamla Devi and Saroj Bala
who joined after him had been given sufficient work as reflected in seniority list Ex. P4 and P5 and
thus intermittent breaks are also held to be deliberate and during intermittent break present
petitioner he shall be deemed to be in continuous service from date of his initial appointment till
was illegally terminated without issuance of one month's notice or compensation in lieu thereof.
Accordingly, issues No. 1 and 2 are answered in affirmative holding that act of respondents No. 1
& 2 in giving time to time break and finally terminating on 9-9-2014 are improper and unjustified.
However, issue No. 3 is decided as discussed holding that petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in
service with seniority and continuity in service without back wages. Issues are decided accordingly.
Issue No. 5 :
37. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has not pressed this issue during course of argument.
Otherwise also, from pleadings on record no inference of claim petition being not maintainable can
be raised industrial dispute. In the case in hand, the petitioner had challenged his illegal termination
by the respondents who had allegedly violated of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. As such, being
aggrieved with action of the respondents in terminating service, petitioner could legitimately agitate
his claim before this court. Issue No. 5 is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against
the respondents.
Issue No. 6 :
38. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has contended that College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Neri, Hamirpur, H.P. does not fall under the jurisdiction before this court. On the other
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hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner had relied upon Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board etc.
and A. Rajappa and others, AIR 1978 SC 548 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the definition of 'industry' envisaged under Section 2(j) of the Act and held that university would
fall within the definition of industry and its employees are workman entitled to protection
envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Ld. Counsel for respondents has failed to
repudiate arguments and as such university cannot be stated to be not industry and its workers to be
not workmen. Issue is decided in negative against the respondents and in favour of petitioner.
Issue No. 7 :
39. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-
operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
40. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondents. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner
coupled with evidence on record cannot be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged
by the respondents. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondent and is answered
accordingly.
Issues No. 8 & 9 :
41. Both these issues were not pressed by ld. counsel for respondents at the time of
arguments which are decided unpressed in favour of petitioner and against respondents.
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Relief :
42. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the claim petition is partly allowed
against respondents No. 1 and 2 who are directed to re-engage the petitioner forthwith. It is further
held that petitioner shall be in continuous uninterrupted service with the respondents No. 1 and 2
from the date of his initial engagement in the year 2006 and that the breaks given by the
respondents No.1 and 2 during this period being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the
seniority and continuity of service of the petitioner whose seniority shall be reckoned from his
initial date of engagement besides, petitioner shall be entitled to seniority and continuity in service
from the date of his initial engagement except back wages. However, claim petition as against
M/s Shimla Cleanways (Contractor) respondent No. 3 is hereby dismissed. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
43. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
44. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
45. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
12/2015
Date of Institution : 13-01-2015
Date of decision :
24-4-2018
Shri Anil Kumar s/o Shri Krishan Chand, r/o V.P.O. Jol Sappar, Tehsil Nadaun, District
Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Dean, College of Horticulture and Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
2.
The Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, District
Solan H.P.
3.
The Contractor, M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. (Contractor
Company)
. .Respondents.
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Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.
For the Respondents 1 & 2 :
Sh. Karan Pathania, Adv.
For the Respondent No. 3 :
Sh. Vikramjeet Sharma, Adv.
AWARD
The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Anil Kumar s/o Shri Krishan
Chand, V.P.O. Jol Sappar, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P. during year 2011 to year
2012 by (i) the Director, Institute of Biotechnology & Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P. (Principal
Employer), (ii) the Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni,
District Solan, H.P. (Principal Employer) without complying with the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thereafter his services were transferred to the contractor
company i.e. M/s Shimla Cleanways without his knowledge w.e.f. 17-07-2013 where he
worked till 08-09-2014 and was again terminated w.e.f. 09-09-2014 by the Contractor, M/s
Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. (Contractor Company), without
complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If
not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the
above worker is entitled to from the above employers?”
2.
After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 3rd February, 2017
was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:
“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 24-12 2014,
the name of employer no (i) may be read as “the Dean, College of Horticulture and Foerstry
Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.” instead of “the Director, Institute of Biotechnology &
Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamipur, H.P.”, which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification.”
3.
On receipt of reference as well as addendum from appropriate government, notices
were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.
4.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
unskilled labourer by respondent No. 1 on 22-2-2011 for 89 days who thereafter worked
intermittently although with fictional breaks upto the year 2013. Averments made in the claim
petition revealed that during above said period, respondents No. 1 and 2 given time to time break to
petitioner despite work and funds. It is alleged that respondents No. 1 and 2 had entered into a
agreement with M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. to outsource unskilled
labourers from 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 for 11 months and thereafter the contract was renewed for
another one year. It is alleged that from 18-7-2013 service of petitioner had been adjusted by
respondent No. 1 in the rolls of contractor M/s. Shimla Cleanways without knowledge of petitioner
to continue work there uninterruptedly till 31-3-2014. Believing to be working under respondent
No.1 for the period aforestated, it is alleged that Rampal Baniyal under whom petitioner worked as
well as respondent No. 3 never disclosed that petitioner had been working under respondent No. 3.
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It is alleged that respondents No. 1 and 2 had been marking attendance of petitioner besides making
payment of monthly salary and thus without knowledge of petitioner, service conditions has been
changed by the respondents. It is alleged that while terminating service on 9-9-2014, no notice or
retrenchment compensation in lieu thereof was paid and thus termination of petitioner is stated to
be null and void ab-initio. It is claimed that respondents No. 1 and 2 had given fictional breaks
under two spells by engaging petitioner initially for 89 days thereafter with a gap of 89 days with
the object that petitioner did not complete 240 days for the purpose of continuous service envisaged
under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereafter called 'the Act' for brevity).
Reliance has been placed upon judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana High Court
reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development Authority,
Manimajra, and Anr. Vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak and Anr.
in which Hon'ble High Court has held appointment workmen for 89 days to be illegal. It is further
alleged that while terminating service of petitioner (i.e. time to time termination and final
termination) provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not adhered to as doctrine of 'Last come
First go' was ignored retaining juniors namely Ishwar Dass and Rajeev Kumar whereas service of
petitioner had been terminated. The grievance of petitioner further remains that respondents No.1
and 2 had engaged regular unskilled Class-IV workers on regular pay scale in Neri I & II including
petitioner on daily wage basis for 89 days onwards for two spells besides respondents No. 1 and 2
had engaged some workmen without break namely Mahinder Singh, Ishwar Singh, Harnam Singh,
Gorkh Singh, Tarsem Chand, and Ravi Dutt. It is claimed that while engaging above-named four
workmen, respondent No. 1 had shown favourtism to one set of workers whereas service of other
14 workmen including petitioner were consistently given fictional breaks for 89 days who were
allowed to work in two spells whereas service of the remaining workmen had been engaged
without any break which constituted unfair labour practice. It is alleged that petitioner alongwith 13
others had filed complaint against their illegal termination before Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur
referring to order dated 20-11-2014 passed in CWP No.4991/2012 in which Hon'ble High Court of
H.P. had directed respondents to not give fictional breaks and if their (i.e. service of petitioner and
13 others) already stand dispensed with, no fresh hands shall be engaged meaning thereby that after
20-11-2014, no fresh hands were to be engaged without first offering the retrenched workers
including petitioner. As such, it is also claimed by petitioner that respondents had violated order of
Hon'ble High Court of H.P. dated 20-11-2014. It is further alleged that reference No. 154/2012
titled as Mahinder Singh Vs. The Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and
Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P. had been implemented by respondents No. 1 and 2 and said
Mahinder Singh was still working with the respondents. It is claimed that Sanjay Mohmmad and
others had filed application dated 4-5-2013 through e-samadhan regarding fictional breaks and
regularization of service of 14 workmen which has been consequently forwarded to respondent No.
2 for necessary action but till the date of filing of claim information sought for has not been
provided to petitioner alongwith 13 others who had since been not regularized. It is claimed that
respondents No. 1 and 2 had given time to time break in service of petitioner by giving fictional
breaks after 89 days in two spells in a year and finally terminated his service on 9-9-2014 which is
stated to be illegal and unjustified and same is liable to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly,
petitioner has prayed that illegal fictional breaks period w.e.f. 2011 to 2013-14 directing the
respondents to condone break breaks period in continuity of service for the petitioner with direction
to pay wages for the break period. The petitioner further prays that final termination dated 9-9-2014
be set aside and respondents No. 1 and 2 be directed to reinstate petitioner in service forthwith
alongwith back wages, seniority and continuity in service with consequential service benefits and to
any other relief petitioner is found entitled to.
5.
Respondents No. 1 and 2 contested claim petition, filed joint reply inter-alia taken
preliminary objections of maintainability, limitation and jurisdiction. On merits admitted that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour to do manual work in the experimental fields on
seasonal basis but denied that his service had been illegally terminated by the respondents. It is
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alleged that due to non-availability of funds a policy for the engagement of contractual labour was
formulated by the respondent w.e.f. 1-1-2002 so as to recognize engagement and avoid additional
financial liability. It is claimed that respondent university did not have permanent and perennial
nature of experimental field work which requires attendance of labourers (during Rabi and Kharif
season). It is alleged that seasonal labourers were employed for a limited period on contract basis to
accomplish the field trial work with the object of research trial and their data etc. are not wasted for
want of adequate manpower. It is specifically alleged that petitioner had been engaged as
contractual labour on a fixed salary for a particular period in different spells as and when work and
funds were available under the project code No. HMS-218-62 as is evident from letter
No.UHF/IBES/HGI-130-62/1055-71 dated 14-2-2011 which postulates that no seniority to
contractual labour shall be given and the service of individual will be terminated after the contract
was over as envisaged conditions No. 2 and 8. The respondent No. 3 has asserted that petitioner had
accepted the engagement to the contract alongwith terms and conditions of the appointment/
engagement letter without any hesitation and did not complete 240 days in any of the calendar
years. It is also claimed by the respondents in their reply specifically alleged that as and when work
and funds were available under time bound project, service of labour for field work was required
for which advertisement was given from time to time but the petitioner did not turn up for facing
interviews and seeking job. It is emphatically denied that junior persons namely Rajeev Kumar and
Ishwar Dass had been retained by university rather said Ishwar Dass had been working with the
university since 2000. However, the court had given seniority w.e.f. 14-11-2005 and thus allegation
of petitioner that juniors were retained was stated to be wrong. It is admitted that respondent had
entered into contract with M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla vide letter No.827-
76 dated 30-4-2013 but outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-1-2013 onwards and engaged
through them to carry out the seasonal and adhoc projects work as and when needed and if
petitioner wanted to get himself engaged for field work with the respondents then petitioner was
required to approach the said agency. It is asserted that termination of petitioner including co
workers engaging contractor outsourced labourers by respondents had become compulsion of
university due to reason that the university was already facing liability of surplus staff including
class-IV employees. Moreover, three Class-IV employees were stated to have been relieved and
sent to the State Govt. besides respondents No. 1 and 2 were not in a position to continue the
service of labourers and with object that to avoid additional financial liability. No policy of
engaging regular labourer for 89 days for t seasonal work and adhoc project under which the
labourers were engaged for stipulated period existed. It is further stated that as and when the work
and funds were available with the respondents under the time bound project and the service of
labour for field work were required, advertisement were made from time to time besides most of
the labourers mentioned in the petition had been engaged on compassionate grounds as per
provisions of rules with the prior approval of State Govt. besides that petitioner was engaged on
contractual basis of specific terms and conditions which were binding on petitioner. It is alleged
that petitioner was engaged from time to time on fixed salary on contractual basis and not on
regular basis for a specific period besides termination of service of petitioner including other co-
workers and opting to outsource through outside agency which is stated to be facing liability of
surplus staff including Class-IV employees. It is claimed that university was not in a position to
continue services of labour and to avoid additional liability however university has formed its own
policy for engaging labour for 89 days for carrying out the seasonal work and adhoc project work
under which the labourers were engaged for stipulated period. It is also asserted that as and when
works and funds available under the time bound projects, service of labourers for field work was
required for which advertisement was made from time to time but petitioner had never turned up to
appear an interview so as to seek job. It is alleged that at present unskilled labourers were being
engaged through independent agency i.e. M/s. Shimla Cleanways and not by university itself and if
petitioner wanted to get himself engaged for field work with respondents he needed approach the
said agency. Accordingly, denying all allegations of petitioner as contained in claim petition
respondents No. 1 and 2 have sought for dismissal of claim petition.
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6.
Respondent No. 3 contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, mis-joinder and non-joinder of parties, estopple, cause of action. On
merits admitted that respondent No. 3 was engaged for providing unskilled labourer on outsource
basis to respondents No. 1 and 2 for which the contract was entered into between the parties which
was effective from 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 and thereafter the contract in question was renewed for
another one year. Admitted that petitioner had worked under the rolls of respondent No. 3
accepting terms and conditions and performed the duties under the contract according to which
engagement of particular workers remained in force subject to availability of work besides asserted
that the dispute raised against respondent No. 3 did not fall within the ambit of Act as there existed
no relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and respondent No. 3 was not
principal employer rather it is respondent No. 1 for whom respondent No. 3 worked as a contractor.
Accordingly claim petition is sought to be dismissed.
7.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to the joint reply filed by respondents No.1 and 2,
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. It is also reiterated that workmen mentioned
in para No. 6 of the claim petition namely Chaman Lal, Krishan Chand, Jamaldeen, Sanjeev
Kumar, Om Prakash, Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram regular workmen who had been working with
the petitioner and other co-workmen have since been disengaged. It is denied that respondents had
engaged some workmen on compassionate grounds moreover petitioner to be unemployed and not
gainfully employee anywhere from the date of his alleged illegal termination.
8.
The petitioner has filed rejoinder separately to the reply filed by respondent No. 3,
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. It is reiterated that service of petitioner had
been terminated on verbal order of respondent No.1 w.e.f. 9-9-2014 and thereafter new/fresh hands
had been engaged by respondent No. 1 who were on the rolls of the respondent No. 3 after
termination of service of petitioner.
9.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit Ex. PW1/ A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, affidavit of petitioner Ex. PW1/A, copy of letter
dated 3-1-2012 Ex. PW1/B, copy of mandays chart Ex. PW1/C, copy of letter dated 10-12-2012
Ex. PW1/D, copy of letter dated 22-4-2013 Ex. PW1/E, copy of complaint Ex. PW1/F, copy of
letter dated 13-2-2013 Ex. PW1/G, copy of letter dated 27-1-2014 Ex. PW1/H, copy of judgment
dated 20-11-2014 Ex. PW1/I, copy of Award dated 24-8-2012 passed by this 100000866952 Court
Ex. PW1/J and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner,
respondents No. 1 and 2 had examined Dr. P.C. Sharma as RW1, tendered/proved his affidavit
Ex. RW1/A, standing instructions regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis dated
5-12-2001 Ex. RW1/B, letter dated 18-9-2012 regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis
Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated 21-2-2005 Ex. RW1/D, copy of letter dated 13-5-2016
regarding substitution of name of Dir. Institute of Biotechnology Ex. RW1/E and closed evidence.
Respondent No. 3 however did not lead any evidence and closed the same as is evident from
statement of ld. Counsel for respondent no.3 record and placed on the file on 31-10-2017.
10. It is pertinent to mention here that after closing evidence by the respondent, petitioner
had moved an application for additional evidence which was allowed and Shri Jai Ram,
Superintendent Office of Dean College of Horticulture & Forestry Neri, Distt. Hamirpur, H.P.
examined as PW2, tendered/proved seniority list/tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated
30-4-2010, 11-4-2011, 23-2-2011, 1-10-2014, 17-10-2015, 16-3-2009, 10-6-2011, 7-10-2014,
16-9-2016 respectively Ex. P1 to P9, copy of mandays chart of contractual labourers Ex. P10 and
closed evidence. Respondents however did not lead any further evidence so as to repudiate claim of
petitioner.
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11. I have heard the counsel representing petitioner and ld. Counsel for respondent, gone
through records of the case carefully.
12. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28-08-2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner in the year 2011 to 2012
by the respondent Nos. 1&2 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether the services of petitioner were transferred to the contractor company i.e.
M/s Shimla Cleanways respondent No. 3 without knowledge of petitioner w.e.f. 17-7-
2013 where he continued work till 8-9-2014 as alleged. If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether final termination of services of petitioner w.e.f. 09-09-2014 is/was improper
and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
4. If issue No.1 or issue No. 3 or both are proved in affirmative, to what relief the
petitioner is entitled from respondents as alleged?
. .OPP.
5.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?
. .OPR 1 to 3.
6.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution is not covered under
the jurisdiction of this court as alleged?
. .OPR 1&2.
7.
Whether the claim petition is time barred by limitation as alleged?
. .OPR 1&2.
8.
Whether the claim petition is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of the necessary
parties as alleged?
. .OPR3.
9.
Whether the petitioner is estopped to file present claim petition on account of his act
and conduct as alleged?
. .OPR3.
10. Whether the petitioner has no cause of action against the respondent No.3 as alleged?
. .OPR3.
11. Whether respondent No. 3 being contractor worked under contract of award by the
respondent No. 1&2 for specific purpose as alleged?
. .OPR3.
Relief :
13. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No. 1 :
Yes
Issue No. 2 :
Discussed
Issue No. 3 :
Yes
Issue No. 4 :
Discussed
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Issue No. 5 :
No
Issue No. 6 :
No
Issue No. 7 :
No
Issue No. 8 :
No
Issue No. 9 :
No
Issue No. 10 :
Discussed
Issue No. 11 :
Discussed
Relief :
Claim petition is partly allowed per operative part of the Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1, 2,3 4, 10 and 11:
14. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
15. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged by respondents No. 1 and 2 in year 2011
initially for a period of 89 days and thereafter with intermittent breaks several times till 2013 as is
also evident from mandays chart Ex. P-10. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged on the basis of
policy for engagement of labourers on contractual basis incorporated in Ex. RW1/B dated 5-12-
2001. It is admitted case of respondents that contractual labourers including petitioner had
remained engaged till 2013 ever since initial engagement when respondents allegedly engaged
contractor respondent No. 3 for outsourcing unskilled contractual labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013.
Equally admitted case of respondents No.1 and 2 is that duration of contractual labourers as per
policy Ex. RW1/B was not to exceed 89 days in one spell and two spell in whole year and in case
re-engaged was to be made then break of atleast 15 days was necessary. It is admittedly not case of
respondents No. 1 and 2 that work and conduct of petitioner was not good and satisfactory.
Admittedly, respondents had sufficient work and funds for engaging petitioner in different projects
moreso when unskilled labourers were decided to be engaged from contractor on outsource basis. It
is further admitted case of respondents No. 1 and 2 that petitioner being contractual unskilled
labourer provisions of Section 25 of Act did not apply as petitioner was squarely covered under
Section 2(oo) (bb) of the 'Act'. In view of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner
qua termination in violation of Section 2 (oo) of Act needs to be determined and at the same it also
needs to be determined, if respondents No. 1 and 2 deliberately recoursed to time to time
termination of petitioner and thereafter final termination in the year 2013 falling within ambit of
unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Clause 9 of Vth Schedule of 'Act'.
16. At the outset, it would be pertinent to mention here that Ex. RW1/B Standing
Instructions of respondents for engaging contractual unskilled labourers clearly provided that no
casual worker shall be engaged on muster roll by any functionary of University w.e.f. 1-1-2002
which further stipulated that as far as possible continuing casual worker should be adjusted in
research and extension projects and thereafter demand for additional hands by deployment of
labour on contract may be made. Clause (e) of policy is reproduced below for reference:
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“(e) The duration of the engagement of contractual labour should not exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spells in whole of the year and in case of re-engagement, a break of atleast 15
days is necessary in each case”.
17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner referring to above-stated rule for engagement of unskilled
contractual labour has contended that respondents No. 1 and 2 being employers have given
intermittent break in service which was countable as petitioner like any other labourer engaged on
contract was not in position to bargain with respondents rather had no option but to work in illegal
service conditions imposed. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble
Apex Court titled as Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries, reported in 2014 LLR
673 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that artificial break in service every year by
reappointing the employee on the same post tantamounts to 'unfair labour practice' under Section
2(ra) of the Act which is not permissible under law. It was further observed that when repeated
artificial periodical breaks in service are proved, the termination of workman would not be having
protection under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Act which would attract relief of reinstatement with full
back wages being illegal retrenchment.
18. PW1 has stepped into witness box deposed on oath as maintained in claim petition
specifically stated that petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2012 who continued to
work with respondents till 8-9-2014 when service of petitioner had been terminated finally along
with 13 other workers without complying with provisions of the 'Act'. He has further stated neither
any show cause notice nor compensation was given although petitioner had completed 240 days in
preceding 12 months from date of termination. Significantly, Ex. P10 mandays does not factually
show petitioner to have worked for 240 days immediately prior to his termination but plea of
petitioner remains that Ex. RW1/B Standing Instructions for engagement of unskilled labourer on
contract basis which fell in the ambit of an unfair labour practice had been invariably recoursed by
respondents during period of employment of petitioner when there were sufficient funds and work
with respondents and in the judgment (supra) of Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was held liable to
be reinstated in service being illegally retrenched.
19. Reliance has further been placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &
Haryana reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development
Authority, Manimajra, and Anr. versus Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Rohtak and Anr. Relevant para of judgment is reproduced below:
“Since provision of Section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature of an exception it has to be construed
strictly in favour of the workman as far as possible in letter and spirit. If the termination is
meant to exploit an employee or to increase the bargaining power of the employer,
then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause (bb) and the definition of
'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning…”
20. In the aforestated judgment, Hon'ble High Court (DB) had upheld award passed by
Labour Court relying upon judgment titled as Kapurthala Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. Vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 1984 (2) Indian Law Reporter 333 (DB) in which
service of workman had been terminated when case of those had completed 230 days. In this case,
services of workmen were terminated without any departmental inquiry or charge-sheet and at the
same time, no notice or compensation was paid. The bank before the Hon'ble Court took plea that
service of workman for specified period and that too with notional breaks and thereafter workmen
were neither entitled for any retrenchment compensation nor reinstatement. The court in (1984)
case after dilating upon various aspects of matter held that attempt of employer to dispense with
service of workman so as to deprive him in continuity of service for specified period i.e. 240
days envisaged under Section 25-B and 25-F of the Act amounts to unfair labour practice when it is
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found that conduct and service of workman was satisfactory. In 1994 judgment (supra) reference
has been made to another case reported in 1989 (2) RSJ 55 titled as Balbir Singh Vs. The
Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Limited in which J. Amarjit Chaudhary interpreted
Sub Clause (bb) (oo) of Section 2 and relevant para is reproduced below:
Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act, which was added in 1984 by an
amendment cannot be so construed as to drastically restrict the orbit of the term of
'retrenchmen' clause (bb) is an exception which must be interpreted narrowly. It cannot be
given meanings which may nullify or curtail the ambit of their principal clause. No doubt,
the intention of the Parliament in enacting clause (bb) was to exclude certain categories of
workers from the term of retrenchment but there is nothing in this clause which allows an
outlet to un-scrupulour employers to shunt out workers in the graph of non renewal of their
contract even when the work subsists. This Clause as a whole has to be construed strictly in
favour of the workman as far as possible as to ensure that the Act is implemented in letter
and spirit. If the termination is meant to exploit an employee or to increase the
bargaining power of the employer, then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause
(bb) and the definition of term 'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning. The
contractual clause enshrined in clause (bb) cannot be resorted to frustrate the claim of
the employee against his uncalled for retrenchment or for denying other benefits. It
cannot be so interpreted, as to enable for employer to resort to the policy of hire and fire….”
21. It is admittedly not the case of respondents No. 1 and 2 that petitioner could not be
deployed or employed or say that respondents No. 1 and 2 had terminated service of petitioner
since there was not sufficient work and funds. Be it stated that by engaging contractor for
outsourcing unskilled labourer to be provided to respondents w.e.f. 1-5-2013 is clearly suggestive
of the fact that respondents No.1 and 2 had sufficient work and funds. Not only this, even several
unskilled labourer had been engaged for whole of the year as reflected in Ex. P5 the tentative
seniority list as on 31-12-2014. Thus, intermittent breaks given by respondents to petitioner
establishes unfair labour practice within the meaning of Section 2(ra) of the Act as the object
behind engaging petitioner as contractual labourer and thereafter giving intermittent breaks and
finally terminating without any notice, changing service conditions by asking petitioner to join
contractor from a specific date as has also been admitted by RW1 Dr. P. C. Sharma in cross-
examination who is the only witness examined by respondents No. 1 and 2. Equally important to
mention here is that while filing reply respondents No. 1 and 2 have withheld facts qua number of
labourers engaged in two spells while implementing its policy Ex. RW1/B and at the same time,
their names too have not been disclosed establishes that respondents No. 1 and 2 from very
beginning while engaging petitioner intended that petitioner did not attain permanency in job but
for reason stated hereinabove, petitioner is held to have continuous service from 2012 to 2014 as
envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. That being so, it was incumbent upon respondents No. 1
and 2 to have issued notice under Section 25-F of Act and alternatively to pay wages of one month
in lieu of notice which has not so been done by respondents No. 1 and 2 establishing violation of
provisions of Section 25-F of the Act for intermittent breaks as well as for final termination and for
similar reasons disengaging petitioner periodically and retaining juniors in two spells as has come
in evidence clearly establish violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
22. In order to prove his case, the petitioner has placed reliance upon Ex. P10 the mandays
on fixed wages w.e.f. 2012 relating to petitioner which showed that petitioner had worked under
project HMS 218-62 etc. from 21-2-2011 for 89 days and thereafter with several intermittent breaks
till 31-12-2012 as shown in this document. The plea of the petitioner remains that the breaks had
been given deliberately by respondents No. 1 and 2 so that the petitioner did not complete 240
days. It has also been stated by petitioner that despite availability of funds and work intermittent
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breaks had been given from time to time during total period petitioner remained engaged with the
respondents No. 1 and 2.
23. Before accepting plea of petitioner for having been given break deliberately from time
to time, it would be also relevant to consider if the petitioner succeeded in establishing that if
throughout the year intermittent breaks would not have been given, he would have continued to be
in service for whole of the year and deemed to have completed continuous service in a year
envisaged under Section 25-B of Act. To prove that provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not
adhered to by respondents while giving intermittent breaks reliance has been placed on seniority list
Ex. P1 to P5 showing junior workmen to petitioner i.e. those daily beldar who joined after
petitioner have been retained, engaging more than 300 days in a year whereas petitioner had been
given intermittent breaks in the same year. The seniority list Ex. P4 shows that Bhim Dutt and Ms.
Kamla Devi figuring at serial No. 18 & 19 have joined on 8-5-2012 & 15-5-2012 respectively. Ex.
P4 is the tentative seniority list (as on 31-12-2013) of these officials showed i.e. Tara Chand to
have worked for 244 days in the year 2012 and 358 days in 2013. Similarly, Kamla Devi figuring at
serial No. 19 in seniority list Ex. P4 is shown to have worked for 233 days in 2012 and 337 days in
2013. With the aid of these entries concerning Bhim Dutt and Kamla Devi figuring at serial No. 18
and 19, it has been contended that there was sufficient work and funds available with the
respondents No. 1 and 2 in different projects and these two officials had joined after joining of
petitioner who as per Ex. P10 figured at serial No. 12 and had joined on 21-2-2011 and as both
these workmen had been given sufficient work throughout the year(s) despite being engaged at later
stage, the petitioner is held to have been given intermittent break from 21-2-2011 till 2012
deliberately by respondents No. 1 and 2 despite having sufficient work and funds, Ex. P10 further
shows that petitioner during these years had remained engaged with intermittent breaks for 26 times
from 2011 to 2014 in project HMS 218-62. If Bhim Dutt and Kamla Devi could be given work for
more than 300 days in a year in particular year from 2012 to 2013, there was no reasons or
compulsion for the respondents No. 1 and 2 to have given break to the petitioner as stated above
which manifestly shows that petitioner has been deliberately given breaks in service.
24. The tentative seniority list of daily wage labourers as it stood on 31-12-2013. Ex. P4
revealed that at serial No.18 and 19 names of Bhim Dutt and Kamla Devi existed but at serial Nos.
20 name of Saroj Bala had been mentioned who was shown to have joined and worked with
respondents on 2012 to 2013 respectively much later than petitioner who joined in year 2011. As
such, latest seniority list available at the time when petitioner was removed from service except
Bhim Dutt and Kamla Devi, others are shown to have joined in the year 2012 respectively as
mentioned above. Nothing in the cross-examination of petitioner PW1 could be elicited by
respondents which would demolish his claim qua deliberate intermittent breaks given by the
respondents despite work and funds as other juniors had been given sufficient work for whole of
the year and policy Ex. RW1/B dealing with contractual labourers was primarily a policy meant to
exploit unskilled contractual labourers which could be termed as entirely based on unfair labour
practice. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma, Director, Institute of Biotechnology and Environment Sciences,
College of Horticulture and Forestry, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry,
Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P. representing respondents No. 1 and 2 has deposed that he had been
posted on the present assignment since 1-11-2016 besides stated that petitioner worked with
university but did not know that petitioner remained engaged from date of appointment till
30-9-2014. He has admitted in cross-examination that from 2002 to 2013, 30-32 contractual
labourers were engaged, initially for 89 days who were appointed in two batches after engaging the
first batch, second batch was engaged when first batch was disengaged and thereafter second batch
was disengaged which support the plea of petitioner that the process of engagement and
disengagements was deliberate on part of respondents. Apparently, giving such intermittent breaks
to two groups of unskilled labourers without notice violated Section 25-G of the Act. As such,
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respondents are held to have given intermittent breaks to the petitioner in violation of provisions of
Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act.
25. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that although adopting
policy for engagement of unskilled labourer on contractual basis vide Ex. RW1/B, respondents
No. 1 and 2 had changed conditions of service of petitioner without issuing any prior notice vide
which petitioner was required to join to contractor respondent No. 3 engaged to provide unskilled
labourers on outsource basis to respondents No. 1 and 2 which tentamounts to termination of
service of petitioner as petitioner had been engaged with respondents since 2011 and no prior
notice was served upon him in 2014 notifying petitioner to join contractor respondent No. 3 who
was to provide labourers to respondents No. 1 and 2 on the basis of some agreement entered into
between respondents No. 1 and 2 and contractor respondent No. 3. Ld. counsel/Authorized
Representative for petitioner had also contended if contractual employment is resorted to as
mechanism to frustrate the claim so that employee did not become regular or permanent against a
job which continues or the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is
given to take it out from clause of Section 2(oo) of the Act, the same would be an unfair labour
practice under the 'Act'. Before proceedings further, it would be most pertinent to refer to order
dated 20-11-2014 Ex. PW1/I of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in which present petitioner along with
13 other had filed CWP No. 4991/2012 when respondents had been directed “to not give fictional
breaks to petitioner and if their services on this count already stand dispense with, no fresh
hand shall be engaged without first affording the work to the petitioners”. In pursuance to the
above said order, petitioner alongwith 13 others had filed the complaint before Deputy
Commissioner Hamirpur for non enforcement of order dated 20-11-2014 passed by Hon'ble High
Court of H.P. in pursuance to which Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur had directed respondents to
enforce the order of the Hon'ble High Court dated 20-11-2014. The plea of respondents in their
joint reply remained that petitioner had not applied for re-engagement with contractor engaged in
2013 which leads to an irresistible inference that petitioner had been disengaged i.e. terminated
from service of respondents in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. It is admittedly
not the case of the respondents No. 1 and 2 that any notice was served upon petitioner as could also
be gathered from cross examination of RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma, Director Dean College of
Horticulture respondent No. 1 who showed his ignorance if while disengaging petitioner in the year
2014, any notice was served upon petitioner by respondents. If any notice as required would have
been issued by respondents No. 1 and 2, RW1 would have certainly denied this question. He has
specifically admitted that while terminating service of petitioner, no compensation was paid by
respondents No. 1 and 2. Although these facts revealed in cross-examination of RW1 coupled with
the order of Hon'ble High Court as referred to above, it can be safely gathered that respondents
No.1 and 2 had not adhered to the mandate of Hon'ble High Court as the petitioner was not to be
disengaged and if disengaged, no fresh hands shall be engaged although several persons juniors to
petitioner have been engaged thereafter as per seniority list Ex. P5 which further showed
availability sufficient work and funds with respondents No. 1 and 2.
26. Ld. Counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 had contended that petitioner being
contractual employee was not covered under the definition of retrenchment under Section 2 (bb) of
the Act as under Clause (bb)(oo) termination of service of workman on contract specifically was
excluded from definition of retrenchment. It is pointed out that since the petitioner was appointed
on contract, he stands excluded from definition of 'retrenchment' and therefore respondents were
not required to adhere to provisions of Section 25-F of the 'Act' while disengaging petitioner. Ld.
Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, repudiated the arguments so advanced by the ld.
counsel for respondents and has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
titled as Manoj Kumar Vs. H.R.T.C. and Anr. reported in 2007 LLR 1155. In the above said
judgment Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held that when repeated and fictional breaks have
been given to workman so that he should not attain permanency, it would not come within the
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purview of section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act excluding termination of
retrenchment. In the case before the Hon'ble High Court respondents had set up similar plea of
petitioner being on contractual employment and thus Section 25-F could not be invoked by the
petitioner. In the above said judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held in para 12
reproduced below for reference:
“….12. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has held in Shailendra Nath Vs. Vice
Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1987 Lab IC 1607 that section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature
of an exception to section 2(oo) and has to be construed strictly and in favour of the
workman as the entire object of the Act is secure a just and fair deal to them. Their
Lordships of the Allahabad High Court have held as under:
“The expression, 'termination for whatsoever reason' used in Cl. (oo) came up for
interpretation before the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. N.S. Money, AIR 1976
SC 1111: (1976 Lab IC 769). It was held to mean a termination which takes place either by
active step of employer or by running out of stipulated period. The Hon'ble Court observed.
Termination embraced not merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact
of termination, however, produced". Since this wide interpretation resulted in extending
benefit of retrenchment to even purpose or particular job or were casual workers the
Legislature appears to have added sub-cl. (bb) to cl. (oo) in 1984. Even though petitioners
claim to have acquired status of regular employees before the clause was amended as each
of them had completed 240 days prior to its addition in 1984 it may be examined if the
petitioners can be said to be contractual employees as contemplated in this sub-clause. For
that it is necessary to examine its scope and ambit. It may, however, be stated at the outset
that it obviously attempts to exclude that which otherwise would have been included in
principal clause or to be more precise is in the nature of an exception, therefore, it has to be
construed strictly and in favour of workmen as the entire objective of the Act is to secure
just and fair deal for them. Terminations which are included in it are those which are
brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time
stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide a
gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation the nature of
employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of
duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be
for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes
to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated
period or completion of work whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But
if contractual employment is resorted to as a mechanism to frustrate the claim of
employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature
of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on the anvil of
fairness and bonafide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire
and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Cl. (bb). Because if it is left to be employer not
to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstances then the protection
afforded to a workman by treating every termination, of service as retrenchment shall be
rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post
ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bona fide.
It cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also
satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That
would be unfair labour practice [See H.D. Singh. Reserve Bank of India. (1985) 51 Fac LR
494: (1985 Lab IC 1733) (SC)]. From various annexures filed with affidavits it is clear that
some of the petitioners were employed as Office Assistant, other book binders and peons.
They were awarded benefit of bonus. They have been working for nearly five years. Their
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job was not casual, seasonal or of a daily worker. They have not been paid their salary on
volume of work. Although the wages in some cases are computed on per day basis but the
payment is monthly including holidays. Their duty, therefore, was like a regular
employee and not as casual, daily or seasonal worker….”
Para No.17 of the aforestated judgment is also reproduced below which has bearing on
merits of issue and is reproduced below:
“17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Haryana State Electronics Development
Corporation Limited Vs. Mamni (2206) 9 SCC 434: AIR 2006 SC 2427: 2006 LLR 667
(SC), thatappointment for a short period (89 days) and termination of service at the end of
the said period and reappointment after a gap of one day, such action of termination and
reappointment repeated again and again for a period of about one and a half years, in such
circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the termination not bona fide but
adopted to defeat the object of the Act. Thus, it is not covered by section 2(oo)(bb) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947……..”
27. Reliance has further been placed by Hon'ble High Court in Manoj Kumar's case on
another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay titled as Dalip H. Shirke Vs. Zila Parishad
Yavatmal, reported in 1990 Lab IC 100 in which judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as State
Bank of India Vs. N. Sundaramoney reported in 1976 Lab IC 769 had been relied by Hon'ble
High Court of Bombay. It was observed that exception as contained in sub-clause (bb) will have to
be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been
enjoying earlier to the amendment. The benefit of law laid down by the Supreme Court was
extended to all the workmen even to those who were employed for specific work or for a
particular job and even to casual labourers who were engaged merely to complete casual nature
of work. In the judgment of N. Sundaramoney's case relied in 2007 case and had observed that
time and again it has been held that welfare statutes must receive the construction which
advances the object of the statutes and protects the weaker section of the society. It was
observed that the employer is always in a position to dictate the terms of service vis-à-vis the
workman or to be workman. The employer can unilaterally impose oppressive and
unreasonable conditions of service and the workman will be left with little choice but to
accept all such conditions even unconscionable conditions of service in the contract of
employment. In the case in hand before this court, respondents No. 1 and 2 had adopted policy of
engagement of contractual labourer to avoid financial liability Ex. RW1/B which prescribed the
manner in which workman was to employed for 89 days in two spells which follows that
contractual labourers engaged for 89 days in first spell were to be disengaged after 89 days
engaging new batch and following such engagements show that after first engagement of labourers
as stated above junior contractual labourer were to certainly disengage senior workmen i.e. first
batch for 89 days without notice despite availability of work and funds which manifestly violated
Section 25-G of the 'Act'.
28. In the concluding para in Manoj Kumar's case, Hon'ble High Court has held that
workman had been offered appointment with fictional breaks to prevent petitioner from taking
benefit of Section 25-F of Act. The appointment orders issued in successor to workman was
camouflage to take out petitioner-workman from the ambit of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The appointment of petitioner cannot be termed as contractual and his case will
fall under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it will be covered under
expression "retrenchment". The act of respondents of engaging petitioner giving fictional
breaks was not bonafide and reinstatement of petitioner-workman was allowed. Applying the
ratio of case law referred to above, it may not be erroneous to observe that in the case in hand
before this court, contractual employment of petitioner and time to time termination was made by
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respondents No. 1 and 2 so that petitioner did not become permanent and at the same time act of
respondents No. 1 and 2 in throwing out petitioner from work with contractor respondent No. 3
without notice is manifestly unfair labour practice and petitioner would be covered under definition
of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) and not under exception in Clause (bb) (oo) as has been held
in Manoj Kumar's case.
29. Thus, in the case before this court respondents No.1 and 2 had made scheme which
was significantly promulgated for engagement of contractual labourer for 89 days in one spell and
in the case before the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana having similar period of
engagement of workmen respondents were held to have not complied with the Section 25-F of the
Industrial Disputes Act as the workman who was a clerk had been engaged for 89 days and given
fresh appointment twice for 89 days. As such, referring to aforestated case law and evidence on
record, it may not be erroneous to conclude that respondents No. 1 and 2 had recoursed to unfair
labour practice initially by adopting standing instruction for engagement of contractual labour Ex.
RW1/B which in its prescribed clause (e) duration of contractual labourer was to be not more that
89 in a year for two spells and thereafter by abrupting engagement of labourers on outsource basis
through contractor. But in this case, the petitioner had been engaged several times with intervals as
shown in mandays chart Ex. P10 from 2011 to 2014 and thus the action of respondents in giving
intermittent break as well as finally terminating service without notice and asking the petitioner to
work with contractor who was to provide unskilled labourers to respondents on outsource basis was
nothing else but termination of service of petitioner without any notice and that the intermittent
breaks are held to be deliberately made by the respondents No. 1 and 2 with the object to avoid
financial liability upon respondents No. 1 and 2 which could not be accepted as ground to negate or
say defeat claim of petitioner. The termination of petitioner would thus be not excluded under
Section 2 (oo) (bb) and squarely fell under the definition of retrenchment under the Act
necessitating issuance of notice of one month envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act and in
alternative wages for one month in lieu of notice period which has admittedly not been done as
RW1 has shown his inability to tell if while disengaging petitioner any notice was served. Being
the Director in university authorized to contest and depose in this case on behalf of respondents was
expected to know material facts qua engagement and disengagement of petitioner. Accordingly,
applying the case law as referred to above, it is held that petitioner had been wrongly retrenched
from service by the respondents in violation of provisions of Act.
30. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has taken this court through Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex.
PW1/J passed in Reference No.154/2012 titled as Mohinder Singh versus Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, Distt. Solan, H.P. & Anr. vide which this
court had directed reinstatement of petitioner setting aside retrenchment order qua petitioner w.e.f.
1-1-2005 by respondents and was held entitled for seniority and continuity in service from the date
of illegal termination except back wages. While relying upon the above said Award, ld. Counsel for
the petitioner has contended that above said award has not been assailed by respondents which had
attained finality having similar facts with regard to award Ex. PW1/J. RW1 in cross-examination
has showed his inability to tell if above said award passed against the respondents had been
challenged however specifically admitted that said Mohinder Singh was still working with the
university. Statement of RW1 recorded on 1-10-2011 and award was passed on 28-4-2017 and was
allegedly terminated on 1-1-2005 which goes to show after implementation of award Ex. PW1/J
above-named, Mohinder Singh has been in continuous service with the respondent from 1-1-2005
to 31-10-2017 when RW1 was cross-examined. As such, Mohinder Singh's case having similar
facts and not challenged by respondents is equally binding upon respondents qua similarly situated
workmen. In the said judgment also, my ld. predecessor-in-office in para No. 26 on record has
specifically held that action of respondents was unfair labour practice under Clause 10 Vth
Schedule appended under the Act. In so far claim of petitioner qua back wages from date of illegal
termination in the year 2013 is concerned, suffice would be state here that onus to prove that
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petitioner/claimant remained unemployed and not gainfully employed was upon respondents.
Although, petitioner has alleged that he remained unemployed and was not gainfully employed ever
since his termination in 2013 by filing affidavit to this effect could not be relied as being a young
person ageing about 25 years would not have sit idle for about five years without earning and thus
his plea to this effect merits rejection. Accordingly, petitioner is held to be not entitled for back
wages.
31. In so far as claim of petitioner as against M/s Shimla Cleanways Contractor respondent
No. 3 the contractor is concerned, it would be relevant, at the outset to refer to mandays chart as
Ex. P10 concerning petitioner in which his name figures at serial No.18. A bare glance at the above
said document would show that petitioner had been engaged initially on 21-2-2011 who continued
to work with the respondents No. 1 and 2 till 31-12-2012 and thereafter is shown to have been
engaged on 15-7-2013 to 30-9-2014 for different number of working days enumerated therein. In
the column of note, there is stipulation to the effect that service of labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013 were
engaged through outsourcing agencies of manpower through contractor as per outsource policy
introduced from 4/2013. It was further stipulated in this note that consolidated wages for the
particular month was paid to contractor as per policy. Be it stated that note appended to mandays
chart Ex. P10 concerning Manjeet Kumar neither stipulated name of the contractor nor evidence
has been led showing that consolidated wages concerning or including petitioner's wages for
specific months enumerated in Ex. P10 was paid to contractor whose name has not even been
mentioned and as such no inference can be drawn that respondent No. 3 paid wags to petitioner for
different months. It can also be noticed from above said details in Ex. P10 qua period for which
petitioner had worked or say had been shown to be engaged by the university initially for nine
spells whereas under contractor for next ten spells. With the aid of this document, respondents No.1
and 2 have made futile endevour to defeat the claim of petitioner by submitting that petitioner was
no more employee of university who was working under contractor respondent No. 3. In reply
respondent No. 3 has maintained that it had been engaged for providing labourers on outsource
basis to respondent No. 1 on the basis of which petitioner was engaged. There is no documentary
evidence on record establishing that petitioner was initially appointed by respondent No.1 and
thereafter his service were placed at the disposal of respondent No. 3 or that he was transferred at
any point of time for which he remained engaged. Significantly, respondent No. 3 did not lead any
evidence as ld. counsel for the respondent No. 3 has made statement before this court on 31-10-
2017 that no evidence was to be led on behalf of respondent No. 3 and thus, in absence of any
evidence led by respondent No. 3, it cannot be stated that plea set up in the reply stood proved as
against the petitioner.
32. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma representing respondents No. 1 &2 has not stated even a single
word qua engagement of respondent No. 3 who employed petitioner as his affidavit Ex. RW1/A
merely stipulated that unskilled labourers were being engaged through independent agency i.e.
M/s Shimla Cleanways and not by the university itself besides stated that if petitioner wanted to get
himself engaged for field work he should approach the contractor which showed that the only
witness of respondents No. 1 and 2 did not know if petitioner was placed under respondent No. 3. It
is nowhere in evidence of respondents No. 1 and 2 that petitioner had been engaged by respondent
No. 3 irrespective of plea of respondent No. 3 that petitioner was engaged by him on demand of
respondents No. 1 and 2. It is to be seen by this court if petitioner worked under respondent No. 3
and was its employee or was under supervision of university and its field staff while being engaged
for carrying out different projects.
33. Reliance has been placed on judgment reported in 2015 LLR 580 titled as General
Manger, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Ranipet Vs. Canteen Workers of BHEL, rep. by
BHEL Canteen Workers Union, Chennai & Ors. in which the Hon'ble High Court of Madras
has held that when it is proved that employment contract with the contractor is sham and nominal,
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the employees of the contractor will be having their right to be absorbed as regular employees of
the principal employer.
34. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of
Bombay reported in 2015 LLR 974 titled as Goa MRF Employees' Union Vs. ICARUS Food
and Farm and Others where the employees were engaged through contractor working for the
principal employer continuously for a long period, would, in reality, be the employees of the
principal employer. Ld. Authorized Representative for the petitioner has taken me through oral
evidence on record which establish that factually entire control and supervision of petitioner in this
case was by the university and its field staff and not of respondent No. 3. Be it stated that petitioner
PW1 in cross-examination has denied to have worked under M/s Shimla Cleanways and his
officials rather he asserted that officers of university were supervising his work. He has denied that
payments of salary etc. was being made by M/s. Shimla Cleanways rather stated that salary was
being paid by university. Not only this, even attendance was being marked by the officers of
university and field assistants and not by officers of M/s Shimla Cleanways and whatever worked
was assigned by field assistants of the university, the same was performed by him. In cross
examination petitioner has shown ignorance if contract was entered into between respondents No. 1
and 2 and between in respondent No. 3. On the other hand, for providing unskilled labourers on
outsource basis, petitioner admitted that he was working with the university before 1-5-2013. He
has further stated that no appointment letter was given by M/s Shimla Cleanways. Thus, when
entire supervision or control was that of principal employer i.e. university and applying the ratio of
judgments referred to above, it may not be erroneous to conclude here respondents No. 1 and 2
continue to be principal employer of petitioner.
35. In so far as disengagement of petitioner on 09-9-2014 by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 or
by respondent No. 3 M/s Shimla Cleanways is concerned, there is no reliable evidence linking
petitioner to have been engaged by M/s Shimla Cleanways in the manner projected in this case and
as documentary evidence Ex. P10 does not specifically substantiate plea of respondents No. 1 and 2
qua engagement of respondent No. 3 as neither the name of contractor was mentioned Ex. P10 nor
wages in consolidated form being paid to petitioner has been proved as note appended to Ex. P10
mandays chart of petitioner does not stipulate any such fact specifically and no witness has been
examined by respondents No. 1 and 2 to prove this fact. Be it stated that RW1 is totally silent on
this aspect. It is nowhere in the evidence of respondents No.1 and 2 that petitioner had knowledge
either of being transferred to respondent No. 3 on 15-7-2013 and RW1 the sole respondent
contesting on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 has specifically stated that petitioner had been
transferred to work under contractor but his statement on oath in cross-examination does not clarify
specifically in what manner petitioner was transferred or made to work under respondent No. 3
rather shows that petitioner worked as before with the university ever since 2011 and the
arrangement of outsourcing was never notified to him as there is no written document establishing
that he was made to work with M/s Shimla Cleanways and similarly when on 15-7-2013 petitioner
was working with the university respondent No. 3 did not issue any letter to petitioner to work with
him or that he was on the roll of respondent No. 3. Admittedly, petitioner had worked 30th
September, 2014 as per mandays chart with university and while crossexamining petitioner as
PW1, ld. Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 2 did not put a specific question that petitioner was
appointed by M/s Shimla Cleanways who has denied that he worked under M/s Shimla Cleanways
besides shown ignorance if M/s Shimla Cleanways had been engaged by respondents No. 1 and 2
besides stated that field staff of university used to pay wages and even the attendance was being
marked by them. Significantly, petitioner admitted that whatever work was assigned by university
petitioner performed the same. Even cross-examination of petitioner by respondent No. 3 reveal
that petitioner had been engaged by university besides supervision was also conducted by field staff
of university. He has admitted that M/s Shimla Cleanways did not give any appointment letter
when cross-examined by ld. Counsel for respondent No. 3. Thus, from evidence on record led by
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respondents it is not established that petitioner had been transferred in the manner projected by
respondent No. 1 who has been held to be principal employer of petitioner and the petitioner would
be liable to be absorbed on rolls of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and not on rolls of respondent No. 3
who was merely contractor and even if respondent No. 3 i.e. contractor had been engaged by
respondents No. 1 and 2, the engagement manifestly appear to be sham transaction as practically
respondents No. 1 and 2 had complete control over working of petitioner as has been held in 2015
LLR 580. In another judgment titled as Mannu Khan Vs. Union of India reported in 1989 (2)
SCC 99, the Hon'ble Apex Court has regularized contract labourers of cleaning catering
establishment and pantry cars in Western Railways. It also needs to be pointed out that none of the
respondents had obtained licence under Contract Labour (Regulations & Abolition) Act, 1970 as
there is no evidence to this effect adduced by respondents and in such like situation, respondents
No.1 and 2 who had engaged respondent No. 3 to provide unskilled labourers are held to be
principal employers of petitioner. Accordingly, when respondent No. 3 was engaged to provide
labourers who was not registered under Contract Labour (Regulations & Abolition) Act, 1970, he
cannot be stated to be registered contractor or principal employer as he was primarily working as
contractor and engaged labourers for principal employers as stated above. Accordingly, no relief
can be granted to petitioner against respondent No.3 as respondents 1 and 2 are held to be principal
employers of petitioner as stated above.
36. In view of foregoing discussions, it is held that the petitioner despite being contractual
labourer would be entitled to be regularized as he had been working intermittently when work was
not provided to him whereas other juniors shown namely Bhim Dutt, Kamla Devi and Saroj Bala
who joined after him had been given sufficient work as reflected in seniority list Ex. P4 and P5 and
thus intermittent breaks are also held to be deliberate and during intermittent break present
petitioner he shall be deemed to be in continuous service from date of his initial appointment till
was illegally terminated without issuance of one month's notice or compensation in lieu thereof.
Accordingly, issues No.1 and 2 are answered in affirmative holding that act of respondents No. 1 &
2 in giving time to time break and finally terminating on 2012 and 9-9-2014 are improper and
unjustified. However, issue No. 3 is decided as discussed holding that petitioner is entitled to be
reinstated in service with seniority and continuity in service without back wages. Issues are decided
accordingly.
Issue No.5 :
37. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has not pressed this issue during course of argument.
Otherwise also, from pleadings on record no inference of claim petition being not maintainable can
be raised industrial dispute. In the case in hand, the petitioner had challenged his illegal termination
by the respondents who had allegedly violated of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. As such, being
aggrieved with action of the respondents in terminating service, petitioner could legitimately agitate
his claim before this court. Issue No. 5 is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against
the respondents.
Issue No. 6 :
38. Ld. counsel for the respondents has contended that College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Neri, Hamirpur, H.P. does not fall under the jurisdiction before this court. On the other
hand, ld. counsel for petitioner had relied upon Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board etc.
and A. Rajappa and others, AIR 1978 SC 548 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the definition of 'industry' envisaged under Section 2(j) of the Act and held that university would
fall within the definition of industry and its employees are workman entitled to protection
envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Ld. Counsel for respondents has failed to
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repudiate arguments and as such university cannot be stated to be not industry and its workers to be
not workmen. Issue is decided in negative against the respondents and in favour of petitioner.
Issue No. 7:
39. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-
operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
40. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondents. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner
coupled with evidence on record cannot be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged
by the respondents. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondent and is answered
accordingly.
Issues No. 8 & 9 :
41. Both these issues were not pressed by ld. Counsel for respondents at the time of
arguments which are decided unpressed in favour of petitioner and against respondents.
Relief :
42. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the claim petition is partly allowed
against respondents No. 1 and 2 who are directed to re-engage the petitioner forthwith. It is further
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held that petitioner shall be in continuous uninterrupted service with the respondents No. 1 and 2
from the date of his initial engagement in the year 2011 and that the breaks given by the
respondents No. 1 and 2 during this period being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the
seniority and continuity of service of the petitioner whose seniority shall be reckoned from his
initial date of engagement besides, petitioner shall be entitled to seniority and continuity in service
from the date of his initial engagement except back wages. However, claim petition as against
M/s Shimla Cleanways (Contractor) respondent No. 3 is hereby dismissed. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
43. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
44. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
45. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
13/2015
Date of Institution : 13-01-2015
Date of decision :
24-4-2018
Shri Manjeet Kumar s/o Shri Pyar Chand, r/o Village Sohri, P.O. Jol Sappar, Tehsil
Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Dean, College of Horticulture and Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
2. The Registrar, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, District
Solan H.P.
3. The Contractor, M/S Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. (Contractor
Company)
. .Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.
For the Respondents 1& 2 : Sh. Karan Pathania, Adv.
For the Respondent No. 3 : Sh. Vikramjeet Sharma, Adv.
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AWARD
The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Manjeet Kumar s/o Shri Pyar
Chand, r/o Village Sohri, P.O. Jol Sappar, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P. during
year 2012 by (i) the Director, Institute of Biotechnology & Enviornment Sciences, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P. (Principal
Employer), (ii) the Registrar, Dr. Y. S. Parmar Uniersity of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni,
District Solan, H.P. (Principal Employer) without complying with the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thereafter his services were transferred to the contractor
company i.e. M/s Shimla Cleanways without his knowledge w.e.f. 18-08-2013 where he
worked till 31-03-2014 and was again terminated w.e.f. 01-04-2014 by the Contractor,
M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. (Contractor Company), without
complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If
not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the
above worker is entitled to from the above employers?”
2.
After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 3rd February, 2017
was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:
“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 24-12-2014,
the name of employer no (i) may be read as 'the Dean, College of Horticulture and Foerstry
Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.' instead of 'the Director, Institute of Biotechnology &
Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamipur, H.P.', which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification.”
3.
On receipt of reference as well as addendum from appropriate government, notices
were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.
4.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
unskilled labourer by respondent No. 1 on 20-1-2011 for 89 days who thereafter worked
intermittently although with fictional breaks upto the year 2013. Averments made in the claim
petition revealed that during above said period, respondents No. 1 and 2 given time to time break to
petitioner despite work and funds. It is alleged that respondents No. 1 and 2 had entered into a
agreement with M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. to outsource unskilled
labourers from 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 for 11 months and thereafter the contract was renewed for
another one year. It is alleged that from 18-7-2013 service of petitioner had been adjusted by
respondent No. 1 in the rolls of contractor M/s Shimla Cleanways without knowledge of petitioner
to continue work there uninterruptedly till 31-3-2014. Believing to be working under respondent
No.1 for the period aforestated, it is alleged that Rampal Baniyal under whom petitioner worked as
well as respondent No. 3 never disclosed that petitioner had been working under respondent No. 3.
It is alleged that respondents No. 1 and 2 had been marking attendance of petitioner besides
making payment of monthly salary and thus without knowledge of petitioner, service conditions
has been changed by the respondents. It is alleged that while terminating service on 1-4-2014, no
notice or retrenchment compensation in lieu thereof was paid and thus termination of petitioner is
stated to be null and void ab-initio. It is claimed that respondents No. 1 and 2 had given fictional
breaks under two spells by engaging petitioner initially for 89 days thereafter with a gap of 89 days
with the object that petitioner did not complete 240 days for the purpose of continuous service
envisaged under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereafter called 'the Act' for
brevity). Reliance has been placed upon judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana
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High Court reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development
Authority, Manimajra, and Anr. Vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Rohtak and Anr. in which Hon'ble High Court has held appointment workmen for 89 days to be
illegal. It is further alleged that while terminating service of petitioner (i.e. time to time termination
and final termination) provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not adhered to as doctrine of 'Last
come First go' was ignored retaining juniors namely Ishwar Dass and Rajeev Kumar whereas
service of petitioner had been terminated. The grievance of petitioner further remains that
respondents No. 1 and 2 had engaged regular unskilled Class-IV workers on regular pay scale in
Neri I & II including petitioner on daily wage basis for 89 days onwards for two spells besides
respondents No.1 and 2 had engaged some workmen without break namely Mahinder Singh,
Ishwar Singh, Harnam Singh, Gorkh Singh, Tarsem Chand, and Ravi Dutt. It is claimed that while
engaging above-named four workmen, respondent No. 1 had shown favourtism to one set of
workers whereas service of other 14 workmen including petitioner were consistently given fictional
breaks for 89 days who were allowed to work in two spells whereas service of the remaining
workmen had been engaged without any break which constituted unfair labour practice. It is
alleged that petitioner alongwith 13 others had filed complaint against their illegal termination
before Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur referring to order dated 20-11-2014 passed in CWP No.
4991/2012 in which Hon'ble High Court of H.P. had directed respondents to not give fictional
breaks and if their (i.e. service of petitioner and 13 others) already stand dispensed with, no fresh
hands shall be engaged meaning thereby that after 20-11-2014, no fresh hands were to be engaged
without first offering the retrenched workers including petitioner. As such, it is also claimed by
petitioner that respondents had violated order of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. dated 20-11-2014. It is
further alleged that reference No. 154/2012 titled as Mahinder Singh Vs. The Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P. had been implemented
by respondents No. 1 and 2 and said Mahinder Singh was still working with the respondents. It is
claimed that Sanjay Mohmmad and others had filed application dated 4-5-2013 through esamadhan
regarding fictional breaks and regularization of service of 14 workmen which has been
consequently forwarded to respondent No. 2 for necessary action but till the date of filing of claim
information sought for has not been provided to petitioner alongwith 13 others who had since been
not regularized. It is claimed that respondents No.1 and 2 had given time to time break in service of
petitioner by giving fictional breaks after 89 days in two spells in a year and finally terminated his
service on 1-4-2014 which is stated to be illegal and unjustified and same is liable to be quashed
and set aside. Accordingly, petitioner has prayed that illegal fictional breaks period w.e.f. 2011 to
2012-13 directing the respondents to condone break breaks period in continuity of service for the
petitioner with direction to pay wages for the break period. The petitioner further prays that final
termination dated 1-4-2014 be set aside and respondents No. 1 and 2 be directed to reinstate
petitioner in service forthwith along-with back wages, seniority and continuity in service with
consequential service benefits and to any other relief petitioner is found entitled to.
5.
Respondents No. 1 and 2 contested claim petition, filed joint reply inter-alia taken
preliminary objections of maintainability, limitation and jurisdiction. On merits admitted that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour to do manual work in the experimental fields on
seasonal basis but denied that his service had been illegally terminated by the respondents. It is
alleged that due to non-availability of funds a policy for the engagement of contractual labour was
formulated by the respondent w.e.f. 1-1-2002 so as to recognize engagement and avoid additional
financial liability. It is claimed that respondent university did not have permanent and perennial
nature of experimental field work which requires attendance of labourers (during Rabi and Kharif
season). It is alleged that seasonal labourers were employed for a limited period on contract basis to
accomplish the field trial work with the object of research trial and their data etc. are not wasted for
want of adequate manpower. It is specifically alleged that petitioner had been engaged as
contractual labour on a fixed salary for a particular period in different spells as and when work and
funds were available under the project code No. HGI130-62 as is evident from letter No.
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UHF/IBES/HGI-130-62/1055-71 dated 3-10-2012 which postulates that no seniority to contractual
labour shall be given and the service of individual will be terminated after the contract was over as
envisaged conditions No. 2 and 8. The respondent No. 3 has asserted that petitioner had accepted
the engagement to the contract alongwith terms and conditions of the appointment/engagement
letter without any hesitation and did not complete 240 days in any of the calendar years. It is also
claimed by the respondents in their reply specifically alleged that as and when work and funds were
available under time bound project, service of labour for field work was required for which
advertisement was given from time to time but the petitioner did not turn up for facing interviews
and seeking job. It is emphatically denied that junior persons namely Rajeev Kumar and Ishwar
Dass had been retained by university rather said Ishwar Dass had been working with the university
since 2000. However, the court had given seniority w.e.f. 14-11-2005 and thus allegation of
petitioner that juniors were retained was stated to be wrong. It is admitted that respondent had
entered into contract with M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla vide letter No. 827-
76 dated 30-4-2013 but outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-1-2013 onwards and engaged
through them to carry out the seasonal and adhoc projects work as and when needed and if
petitioner wanted to get himself engaged for field work with the respondents then petitioner was
required to approach the said agency. It is asserted that termination of petitioner including co
workers engaging contractor outsourced labourers by respondents had become compulsion of
university due to reason that the university was already facing liability of surplus staff including
Class-IV employees. Moreover, three Class-IV employees were stated to have been relieved and
sent to the State Govt. besides respondents No. 1 and 2 were not in a position to continue the
service of labourers and with object that to avoid additional financial liability. No policy of
engaging regular labourer for 89 days for the seasonal work and adhoc project under which the
labourers were engaged for stipulated period existed. It is further stated that as and when the work
and funds were available with the respondents under the time bound project and the service of
labour for field work were required, advertisement were made from time to time besides most of
the labourers mentioned in the petition had been engaged on compassionate grounds as per
provisions of rules with the prior approval of State Govt. besides that petitioner was engaged on
contractual basis of specific terms and conditions which were binding on petitioner. It is alleged
that petitioner was engaged from time to time on fixed salary on contractual basis and not on
regular basis for a specific period besides termination of service of petitioner including other co-
workers and opting to outsource through outside agency which is stated to be facing liability of
surplus staff including Class-IV employees. It is claimed that university was not in a position to
continue services of labour and to avoid additional liability however university has formed its own
policy for engaging labour for 89 days for carrying out the seasonal work and adhoc project work
under which the labourers were engaged for stipulated period. It is also asserted that as and when
works and funds available under the time bound projects, service of labourers for field work was
required for which advertisement was made from time to time but petitioner had never turned up to
appear an interview so as to seek job. It is alleged that at present unskilled labourers were being
engaged through independent agency i.e. M/s. Shimla Cleanways and not by university itself and if
petitioner wanted to get himself engaged for field work with respondents he needed approach the
said agency. Accordingly, denying all allegations of petitioner as contained in claim petition
respondents No. 1 and 2 have sought for dismissal of claim petition.
6.
Respondent No. 3 contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary
objections of maintainability, mis-joinder and non-joinder of parties, estopple, cause of action. On
merits admitted that respondent No. 3 was engaged for providing unskilled labourer on outsource
basis to respondents No. 1 and 2 for which the contract was entered into between the parties which
was effective from 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 and thereafter the contract in question was renewed for
another one year. Admitted that petitioner had worked under the rolls of respondent No. 3
accepting terms and conditions and performed the duties under the contrac according to which
engagement of particular workers remained in force subject to availability of work besides asserted
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that the dispute raised against respondent No. 3 did not fall within the ambit of Act as there existed
no relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and respondent No. 3 was not
principal employer rather it is respondent No. 1 for whom respondent No. 3 worked as a contractor.
Accordingly claim petition is sought to be dismissed.
7.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to the joint reply filed by respondents No. 1 and 2,
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. It is also reiterated that workmen mentioned
in para No. 6 of the claim petition namely Chaman Lal, Krishan Chand, Jamaldeen, Sanjeev
Kumar, Om Prakash, Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram regular workmen who had been working with
the petitioner and other co-workmen have since been disengaged. It is denied that respondents had
engaged some workmen on compassionate grounds moreover petitioner to be unemployed and not
gainfully employee anywhere from the date of his alleged illegal termination.
8.
The petitioner has filed rejoinder separately to the reply filed by respondent No. 3,
reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. It is reiterated that service of petitioner had
been terminated on verbal order of respondent No. 1 w.e.f. 1-4-2014 and thereafter new/fresh hands
had been engaged by respondent No. 1 who were on the rolls of the respondent No. 3 after
termination of service of petitioner.
9.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit Ex. PW1/ A under order 18 Rule 4 CPC, affidavit of petitioner Ex. PW1/A, copy of letter
dated 3-1-2012 Ex. PW1/B, copy of mandays chart Ex. PW1/C, copy of letter dated 10-12-2012
Ex. PW1/D, copy of letter dated 22-4-2013 Ex. PW1/E, copy of complaint Ex. PW1/F, copy of
letter dated 13-2-2013 Ex. PW1/G, copy of letter dated 27-1-2014 Ex. PW1/H, copy of judgment
dated 20-11-2014 Ex. PW1/I, copy of Award dated 24-8-2012 passed by this Court Ex. PW1/J. On
the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondents No. 1 and 2 had examined
Dr. P.C. Sharma as RW1, tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, standing instructions regarding
engagement of labour on contractual basis dated 5-12-2001 Ex. RW1/B, letter dated 18-9-2012
regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated
21-2-2005 Ex. RW1/D, copy of letter dated 13-5-2016 regarding substitution of name of Dir.
Institute of Biotechnology Ex. RW1/E and closed evidence. Respondent No. 3 however did not
lead any evidence and closed the same as is evident from statement of ld. Counsel for respondent
No. 3 record and placed on the file on 31-10-2017.
10. It is pertinent to mention here that after closing evidence by the respondent, petitioner
had moved an application for additional evidence which was allowed and Shri Jai Ram,
Superintendent office of Dean College of Horticulture & Forestry Neri, Distt. Hamirpur, H.P.
examined as PW2, tendered/proved seniority list/tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated
30-4-2010, 11-4-2011, 23-2-2011, 1-10-2014, 17-10-2015, 16-3-2009, 10-6-2011, 7-10-2014, 16-9-
2016 respectively Ex. P1 to P9, copy of mandays chart of contractual labourers Ex. P10 and closed
evidence. Respondents however did not lead any further evidence so as to repudiate claim of
petitioner.
11. I have heard the counsel representing petitioner and ld. Counsel. for respondent, gone
through records of the case carefully.
12. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28-08-2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner in the year 2012 by the
respondent Nos. 1 & 2 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
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2. Whether the services of petitioner were transferred to the contractor company i.e.
M/s Shimla Cleanways respondent No. 3 without knowledge of petitioner w.e.f. 18-7-
2013 where he continued work till 31-3-2014 as alleged. If so, its effect?
. .OPP.
3.
Whether termination of services of petitioner w.e.f. 01-04-2014 is/was improper and
unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
4.
If issue No. 1 or issue No. 3 or both are proved in affirmative, to what relief the
petitioner is entitled from respondents as alleged?
. .OPP.
5.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?
. .OPR 1 to 3.
6.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution is not covered under
the jurisdiction of this court as alleged?
. .OPR 1&2.
7.
Whether the claim petition is time barred by limitation as alleged?
. . OPR 1&2
8.
Whether the claim petition is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of the necessary
parties as alleged?
. .OPR3
9.
Whether the petitioner is estopped to file present claim petition on account of his act
and conduct as alleged?
. .OPR3
10. Whether the petitioner has no cause of action against the respondent No. 3 as alleged?
. .OPR3
11. Whether respondent No. 3 being contractor worked under contract of award by the
respondent No. 1&2 for specific purpose as alleged?
. .OPR3
Relief :
13. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No. 1 :
Yes
Issue No. 2 :
Discussed
Issue No. 3 :
Yes
Issue No. 4 :
Discussed
Issue No. 5 :
No
Issue No. 6 :
No
Issue No. 7 :
No
Issue No. 8 :
No
Issue No. 9 :
No
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Issue No. 10 :
Discussed
Issue No. 11 :
Discussed
Relief :
Claim petition is partly allowed per operative part of the Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1, 2,3 4, 10 and 11 :
14. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
15. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged by respondents No.1 and 2 in year 2012
initially for a period of 89 days and thereafter with intermittent breaks several times till 2012 as is
also evident from mandays chart Ex. P-10. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged on the basis of
policy for engagement of labourers on contractual basis incorporated in Ex. RW1/B dated
5-12-2001. It is admitted case of respondents that contractual labourers including petitioner had
remained engaged till 2013 ever since initial engagement when respondents allegedly engaged
contractor respondent No. 3 for outsourcing unskilled contractual labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013.
Equally admitted case of respondents No. 1 and 2 is that duration of contractual labourers as per
policy Ex. RW1/B was not to exceed 89 days in one spell and two spell in whole year and in case
re-engaged was to be made then break of atleast 15 days was necessary. It is admittedly not case of
respondents No. 1 and 2 that work and conduct of petitioner was not good and satisfactory.
Admittedly, respondents had sufficient work and funds for engaging petitioner in different projects
moreso when unskilled labourers were decided to be engaged from contractor on outsource basis. It
is further admitted case of respondents No. 1 and 2 that petitioner being contractual unskilled
labourer provisions of Section 25 of Act did not apply as petitioner was squarely covered under
Section 2(oo) (bb) of the 'Act'. In view of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner
qua termination in violation of Section 2 (oo) of Act needs to be determined and at the same it also
needs to be determined, if respondents No. 1 and 2 deliberately recoursed to time to time
termination of petitioner and thereafter final termination in the year 2013 falling within ambit of
unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Clause 9 of Vth Schedule of 'Act'.
16. At the outset, it would be pertinent to mention here that Ex. RW1/B Standing
Instructions of respondents for engaging contractual unskilled labourers clearly provided that no
casual worker shall be engaged on muster roll by any functionary of University w.e.f. 1-1-2002
which further stipulated that as far as possible continuing casual worker should be adjusted in
research and extension projects and thereafter demand for additional hands by deployment of
labour on contract may be made. Clause (e) of policy is reproduced below for reference:
“(e) The duration of the engagement of contractual labour should not exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spells in whole of the year and in case of re-engagement, a break of atleast 15
days is necessary in each case”.
17. Ld. counsel for petitioner referring to above-stated rule for engagement of unskilled
contractual labour has contended that respondents No. 1 and 2 being employers have given
intermittent break in service which was countable as petitioner like any other labourer engaged on
contract was not in position to bargain with respondents rather had no option but to work in illegal
service conditions imposed. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble
Apex Court titled as Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries, reported in 2014 LLR
673 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that artificial break in service every year by
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reappointing the employee on the same post tantamounts to 'unfair labour practice' under Section
2(ra) of the Act which is not permissible under law. It was further observed that when repeated
artificial periodical breaks in service are proved, the termination of workman would not be having
protection under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Act which would attract relief of reinstatement with full
back wages being illegal retrenchment.
18. PW1 has stepped into witness box deposed on oath as maintained in claim petition
specifically stated that petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2009 who continued to
work with respondents till 22-4-3013 when service of petitioner had been terminated finally along
with 13 other workers without complying with provisions of the 'Act'. He has further stated neither
any show cause notice nor compensation was given although petitioner had completed 240 days in
preceding 12 months from date of termination. Significantly, Ex. P10 mandays does not factually
show petitioner to have worked for 240 days immediately prior to his termination but plea of
petitioner remains that Ex. RW1/B Standing Instructions for engagement of unskilled labourer on
contract basis which fell in the ambit of an unfair labour practice had been invariably recoursed by
respondents during period of employment of petitioner when there were sufficient funds and work
with respondents and in the judgment (supra) of Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was held liable to
be reinstated in service being illegally retrenched.
19. Reliance has further been placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &
Haryana reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development
Authority, Manimajra, and Anr. versus Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Rohtak and Anr. Relevant para of judgment is reproduced below:
“Since provision of Section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature of an exception it has to be construed
strictly in favour of the workman as far as possible in letter and spirit. If the termination is
meant to exploit an employee or to increase the bargaining power of the employer,
then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause (bb) and the definition of
'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning…”
20. In the aforestated judgment, Hon'ble High Court (DB) had upheld award passed by
Labour Court relying upon judgment titled as Kapurthala Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. Vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 1984 (2) Indian Law Reporter 333 (DB) in which
service of workman had been terminated when case of those had completed 230 days. In this case,
services of workmen were terminated without any departmental inquiry or charge-sheet and at the
same time, no notice or compensation was paid. The bank before the Hon'ble Court took plea that
service of workman for specified period and that too with notional breaks and thereafter workmen
were neither entitled for any retrenchment compensation nor reinstatement. The court in (1984)
case after dilating upon various aspects of matter held that attempt of employer to dispense with
service of workman so as to deprive him in continuity of service for specified period i.e. 240
days envisaged under Section 25-B and 25-F of the Act amounts to unfair labour practice when it is
found that conduct and service of workman was satisfactory. In 1994 judgment (supra) reference
has been made to another case reported in 1989 (2) RSJ 55 titled as Balbir Singh Vs. The
Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Limited in which J. Amarjit Chaudhary interpreted
Sub Clause (bb) (oo) of Section 2 and relevant para is reproduced below:
Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act, which was added in 1984 by an
amendment cannot be so construed as to drastically restrict the orbit of the term of
'retrenchment' clause (bb) is an exception which must be interpreted narrowly. It cannot be
given meanings which may nullify or curtail the ambit of their principal clause. No doubt,
the intention of the Parliament in enacting clause (bb) was to exclude certain categories of
workers from the term of retrenchment but there is nothing in this clause which allows an
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outlet to un-scrupulour employers to shunt out workers in the graph of non-renewal of their
contract even when the work subsists. This Clause as a whole has to be construed strictly in
favour of the workman as far as possible as to ensure that the Act is implemented in letter
and spirit. If the termination is meant to exploit an employee or to increase the
bargaining power of the employer, then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause
(bb) and the definition of term 'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning. The
contractual clause enshrined in clause (bb) cannot be resorted to frustrate the claim of
the employee against his uncalled for retrenchment or for denying other benefits. It
cannot be so interpreted, as to enable for employer to resort to the policy of hire and fire….”
21. It is admittedly not the case of respondents No. 1 and 2 that petitioner could not be
deployed or employed or say that respondents No. 1 and 2 had terminated service of petitioner
since there was not sufficient work and funds. Be it stated that by engaging contractor for
outsourcing unskilled labourer to be provided to respondents w.e.f. 1-5-2013 is clearly suggestive
of the fact that respondents No. 1 and 2 had sufficient work and funds. Not only this, even several
unskilled labourer had been engaged for whole of the year as reflected in Ex. P5 the tentative
seniority list as on 31-12-2014. Thus, intermittent breaks given by respondents to petitioner
establishes unfair labour practice within the meaning of Section 2(ra) of the Act as the object
behind engaging petitioner as contractual labourer and thereafter giving intermittent breaks and
finally terminating without any notice, changing service conditions by asking petitioner to join
contractor from a specific date as has also been admitted by RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma in cross-
examination who is the only witness examined by respondents No. 1 and 2. Equally important to
mention here is that while filing reply respondents No. 1 and 2 have withheld facts qua number of
labourers engaged in two spells while implementing its policy Ex. RW1/B and at the same time,
their names too have not been disclosed establishes that respondents No. 1 and 2 from very
beginning while engaging petitioner intended that petitioner did not attain permanency in job but
for reason stated hereinabove, petitioner is held to have continuous service from 2012 to 2014 as
envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. That being so, it was incumbent upon respondents No.1
and 2 to have issued notice under Section 25-F of Act and alternatively to pay wages of one month
in lieu of notice which has not so been done by respondents No. 1 and 2 establishing violation of
provisions of Section 25-F of the Act for intermittent breaks as well as for final termination and for
similar reasons disengaging petitioner periodically and retaining juniors in two spells as has come
in evidence clearly establish violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
22. In order to prove his case, the petitioner has placed reliance upon Ex. R10 the mandays
on fixed wages w.e.f. 2012 relating to petitioner which showed that petitioner had worked under
project HMS 218-62 etc. from 21-1-2012 for 89 days and thereafter with several intermittent breaks
till 31-3-2014 as shown in this document. The plea of the petitioner remains that the breaks had
been given deliberately by respondents No. 1 and 2 so that the petitioner did not complete 240
days. It has also been stated by petitioner that despite availability of funds and work intermittent
breaks had been given from time to time during total period petitioner remained engaged with the
respondents No. 1 and 2.
23. Before accepting plea of petitioner for having been given break deliberately from time
to time, it would be also relevant to consider if the petitioner succeeded in establishing that if
throughout the year intermittent breaks would not have been given, he would have continued to be
in service for whole of the year and deemed to have completed continuous service in a year
envisaged under Section 25-B of Act. To prove that provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not
adhered to by respondents while giving intermittent breaks reliance has been placed on seniority list
Ex. P1 to P5 showing junior workmen to petitioner i.e. those daily beldar who joined after
petitioner have been retained, engaging more than 300 days in a year whereas petitioner had been
given intermittent breaks in the same year. The seniority list Ex. P4 shows that Bhim Dutt and Ms.
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Kamla Devi figuring at serial No. 18 & 19 have joined on 8-5-2012 & 15-5-2012 respectively.
Ex. P4 is the tentative seniority list (as on 31-12-2013) of these officials showed i.e. Tara Chand to
have worked for 244 days in the year 2012 and 358 days in 2013. Similarly, Kamla Devi figuring at
serial no.19 in seniority list Ex. P4 is shown to have worked for 233 days in 2012 and 337 days in
2013. With the aid of these entries concerning Bhim Dutt and Kamla Devi figuring at serial No. 18
and 19, it has been contended that there was sufficient work and funds available with the
respondents No.1 and 2 in different projects and these two officials had joined after joining of
petitioner who as per Ex. P10 figured at serial No. 14 and had joined on 21-1-2012 and as both
these workmen had been given sufficient work throughout the year(s) despite being engaged at later
stage, the petitioner is held to have been given intermittent break from 21-1-2012 till 2014
deliberately by respondents No. 1 and 2 despite having sufficient work and funds, Ex. P10 further
shows that petitioner during these years had remained engaged with intermittent breaks for 18 times
from 2012 to 2014 in project HMS 218-62. If Bhim Dutt and Kamla Devi could be given work for
more than 300 days in a year in particular year from 2012 to 2013, there was no reasons or
compulsion for the respondents No.1 and 2 to have given break to the petitioner as stated above
which manifestly shows that petitioner has been deliberately given breaks in service.
24. The tentative seniority list of daily wage labourers as it stood on 31-12-2013. Ex. P4
revealed that at serial No. 18 and 19 names of Bhim Dutt and Kamla Devi existed but at serial Nos.
20 name of Saroj Bala had been mentioned who was shown to have joined and worked with
respondents on 2012 to 2013 respectively much later than petitioner who joined in January, 2012.
As such, latest seniority list available at the time when petitioner was removed from service except
Bhim Dutt and Kamla Devi, others are shown to have joined in the year 2012 respectively as
mentioned above. Nothing in the cross-examination of petitioner PW1 could be elicited by
respondents which would demolish his claim qua deliberate intermittent breaks given by the
respondents despite work and funds as other juniors had been given sufficient work for whole of
the year and policy Ex. RW1/B dealing with contractual labourers was primarily a policy meant to
exploit unskilled contractual labourers which could be termed as entirely based on unfair labour
practice. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma, Director, Institute of Biotechnology and Environment Sciences,
College of Horticulture and Forestry, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry,
Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P. representing respondents No. 1 and 2 has deposed that he had been
posted on the present assignment since 1-11-2016 besides stated that petitioner worked with
university but did not know that petitioner remained engaged from date of appointment till
22-4-2013. He has admitted in cross-examination that from 2002 to 2013, 30-32 contractual
labourers were engaged, initially for 89 days who were appointed in two batches after engaging the
first batch, second batch was engaged when first batch was disengaged and thereafter second batch
was disengaged which support the plea of petitioner that the process of engagement and
disengagements was deliberate on part of respondents. Apparently, giving such intermittent breaks
to two groups of unskilled labourers without notice violated Section 25-G of the Act. As such,
respondents are held to have given intermittent breaks to the petitioner in violation of provisions of
Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act.
25. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that although adopting
policy for engagement of unskilled labourer on contractual basis vide Ex. RW1/B, respondents
No.1 and 2 had changed conditions of service of petitioner without issuing any prior notice vide
which petitioner was required to join to contractor respondent No. 3 engaged to provide unskilled
labourers on outsource basis to respondents No. 1 and 2 which tentamounts to termination of
service of petitioner as petitioner had been engaged with respondents since 2012 and no prior
notice was served upon him in 2013 notifying petitioner to join contractor respondent No. 3 who
was to provide labourers to respondents No. 1 and 2 on the basis of some agreement entered into
between respondents No. 1 and 2 and contractor respondent No. 3. Ld. counsel/Authorized
Representative for petitioner had also contended if contractual employment is resorted to as
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mechanism to frustrate the claim so that employee did not become regular or permanent against a
job which continues or the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is
given to take it out from clause of Section 2(oo) of the Act, the same would be an unfair labour
practice under the 'Act'. Before proceedings further, it would be most pertinent to refer to order
dated 20-11-2014 Ex. PW1/I of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in which present petitioner along with
13 other had filed CWP No. 4991/2012 when respondents had been directed “to not give fictional
breaks to petitioner and if their services on this count already stand dispense with, no fresh
hand shall be engaged without first affording the work to the petitioners”. In pursuance to the
above said order, petitioner alongwith 13 others had filed the complaint before Deputy
Commissioner Hamirpur for non enforcement of order dated 20-11-2014 passed by Hon'ble High
Court of H.P. in pursuance to which Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur had directed respondents to
enforce the order of the Hon'ble High Court dated 20-11-2014. The plea of respondents in their
joint reply remained that petitioner had not applied for reengagement with contractor engaged in
2013 which leads to an irresistible inference that petitioner had been disengaged i.e. terminated
from service of respondents in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. It is admittedly
not the case of the respondents No.1 and 2 that any notice was served upon petitioner as could also
be gathered from cross examination of RW1 Dr. P. C. Sharma, Director Dean College of
Horticulture respondent No. 1 who showed his ignorance if while disengaging petitioner in the year
2014, any notice was served upon petitioner by respondents. If any notice as required would have
been issued by respondents No. 1 and 2, RW1 would have certainly denied this question. He has
specifically admitted that while terminating service of petitioner, no compensation was paid by
respondents No. 1 and 2. Although these facts revealed in cross-examination of RW1 coupled with
the order of Hon'ble High Court as referred to above, it can be safely gathered that respondents No.
1 and 2 had not adhered to the mandate of Hon'ble High Court as the petitioner was not to be
disengaged and if disengaged, no fresh hands shall be engaged although several persons juniors to
petitioner have been engaged thereafter as per seniority list Ex. P5 which further showed
availability sufficient work and funds with respondents No. 1 and 2.
26. Ld. counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 had contended that petitioner being
contractual employee was not covered under the definition of retrenchment under Section 2 (bb) of
the Act as under Clause (bb)(oo) termination of service of workman on contract specifically was
excluded from definition of retrenchment. It is pointed out that since the petitioner was appointed
on contract, he stands excluded from definition of “retrenchment” and therefore respondents were
not required to adhere to provisions of Section 25-F of the 'Act' while disengaging petitioner. Ld.
Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, repudiated the arguments so advanced by the ld.
Counsel for respondents and has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
titled as Manoj Kumar Vs. H.R.T.C. and Anr. reported in 2007 LLR 1155. In the above said
judgment Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held that when repeated and fictional breaks have
been given to workman so that he should not attain permanency, it would not come within the
purview of section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act excluding termination of
retrenchment. In the case before the Hon'ble High Court respondents had set up similar plea of
petitioner being on contractual employment and thus Section 25-F could not be invoked by the
petitioner. In the above said judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held in para 12
reproduced below for reference:
“….12. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has held in Shailendra Nath Vs. Vice
Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1987 Lab IC 1607 that section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature
of an exception to section 2(oo) and has to be construed strictly and in favour of the
workman as the entire object of the Act is secure a just and fair deal to them. Their
Lordships of the Allahabad High Court have held as under:
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“The expression, 'termination for whatsoever reason' used in Cl. (oo) came up for
interpretation before the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. N.S. Money, AIR 1976
SC 1111: (1976 Lab IC 769). It was held to mean a termination which takes place either by
active step of employer or by running out of stipulated period. The Hon'ble Court observed.
Termination embraced not merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact
of termination, however, produced". Since this wide interpretation resulted in extending
benefit of retrenchment to even purpose or particular job or were casual workers the
Legislature appears to have added sub cl. (bb) to cl.(oo) in 1984. Even though petitioners
claim to have acquired status of regular employees before the clause was amended as each
of them had completed 240 days prior to its addition in 1984 it may be examined if the
petitioners can be said to be contractual employees as contemplated in this sub-clause. For
that it is necessary to examine its scope and ambit. It may, however, be stated at the outset
that it obviously attempts to exclude that which otherwise would have been included in
principal clause or to be more precise is in the nature of an exception, therefore, it has to be
construed strictly and in favour of workmen as the entire objective of the Act is to secure
just and fair deal for them. Terminations which are included in it are those which are
brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time
stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide a
gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation the nature of
employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of
duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be
for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes
to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated
period or completion of work whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But
if contractual employment is resorted to as a mechanism to frustrate the claim of
employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature
of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on the anvil of
fairness and bonafide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire
and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Cl. (bb). Because if it is left to be employer not
to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstances then the protection
afforded to a workman by treating every termination, of service as retrenchment shall be
rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post
ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bona fide.
It cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also
satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That
would be unfair labour practice [See H.D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India. (1985) 51 Fac
LR 494: (1985 Lab IC 1733) (SC)]. From various annexures filed with affidavits it is clear
that some of the petitioners were employed as Office Assistant, other book binders and
peons. They were awarded benefit of bonus. They have been working for nearly five years.
Their job was not casual, seasonal or of a daily worker. They have not been paid their salary
on volume of work. Although the wages in some cases are computed on per day basis but
the payment is monthly including holidays. Their duty, therefore, was like a regular
employee and not as casual, daily or seasonal worker….”
Para No.17 of the aforestated judgment is also reproduced below which has bearing on
merits of issue and is reproduced below:
“17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Haryana State Electronics Development
Corporation Limited Vs. Mamni (2206) 9 SCC 434: AIR 2006 SC 2427: 2006 LLR 667
(SC), that appointment for a short period (89 days) and termination of service at the end of
the said period and reappointment after a gap of one day, such action of termination and
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reappointment repeated againand again for a period of about one and a half years, in such
circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the termination not bona fide but
adopted to defeat the object of the Act. Thus, it is not covered by section 2(oo)(bb) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947……..”
27. Reliance has further been placed by Hon'ble High Court in Manoj Kumar's case on
another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay titled as Dalip H. Shirke Vs. Zila Parishad
Yavatmal, reported in 1990 Lab IC 100 in which judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as State
Bank of India Vs. N. Sundaramoney reported in 1976 Lab IC 769 had been relied by Hon'ble
High Court of Bombay. It was observed that exception as contained in sub Clause (bb) will have to
be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been
enjoying earlier to the amendment. The benefit of law laid down by the Supreme Court was
extended to all the workmen even to those who were employed for specific work or for a
particular job and even to casual labourers who were engaged merely to complete casual nature
of work. In the judgment of N. Sundaramoney's case relied in 2007 case and had observed that
time and again it has been held that welfare statutes must receive the construction which
advances the object of the statutes and protects the weaker section of the society. It was
observed that the employer is always in a position to dictate the terms of service vis-à-vis the
workman or to be workman. The employer can unilaterally impose oppressive and
unreasonable conditions of service and the workman will be left with little choice but to
accept all such conditions even unconscionable conditions of service in the contract of
employment. In the case in hand before this court, respondents No. 1 and 2 had adopted policy of
engagement of contractual labourer to avoid financial liability Ex. RW1/B which prescribed the
manner in which workman was to employed for 89 days in two spells which follows that
contractual labourers engaged for 89 days in first spell were to be disengaged after 89 days
engaging new batch and following such engagements show that after first engagement of labourers
as stated above junior contractual labourer were to certainly disengage senior workmen i.e. first
batch for 89 days without notice despite availability of work and funds which manifestly violated
Section 25-G of the 'Act'.
28. In the concluding para in Manoj Kumar's case, Hon'ble High Court has held that
workman had been offered appointment with fictional breaks to prevent petitioner from taking
benefit of Section 25-F of Act. The appointment orders issued in successor to workman was
camouflage to take out petitioner-workman from the ambit of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The appointment of petitioner cannot be termed as contractual and his case will
fall under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it will be covered under
expression “retrenchment”. The act of respondents of engaging petitioner giving fictional
breaks was not bonafide and reinstatement of petitioner-workman was allowed. Applying the
ratio of case law referred to above, it may not be erroneous to observe that in the case in hand
before this court, contractual employment of petitioner and time to time termination was made by
respondents No. 1 and 2 so that petitioner did not become permanent and at the same time act of
respondents No. 1 and 2 in throwing out petitioner from work with contractor respondent No. 3
without notice is manifestly unfair labour practice and petitioner would be covered under definition
of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) and not under exception in Clause (bb) (oo) as has been held
in Manoj Kumar's case.
29. Thus, in the case before this court respondents No. 1 and 2 had made scheme which
was significantly promulgated for engagement of contractual labourer for 89 days in one spell and
in the case before the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana having similar period of
engagement of workmen respondents were held to have not complied with the Section 25-F of the
Industrial Disputes Act as the workman who was a clerk had been engaged for 89 days and given
fresh appointment twice for 89 days. As such, referring to aforestated case law and evidence on
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record, it may not be erroneous to conclude that respondents No. 1 and 2 had recoursed to unfair
labour practice initially by adopting standing instruction for engagement of contractual labour Ex.
RW1/B which in its prescribed clause (e) duration of contractual labourer was to be not more that
89 in a year for two spells and thereafter by abrupting engagement of labourers on outsource basis
through contractor. But in this case, the petitioner had been engaged several times with intervals as
shown in mandays chart Ex. P10 from 2012 to 2014 and thus the action of respondents in giving
intermittent break as well as finally terminating service without notice and asking the petitioner to
work with contractor who was to provide unskilled labourers to respondents on outsource basis was
nothing else but termination of service of petitioner without any notice and that the intermittent
breaks are held to be deliberately made by the respondents No. 1 and 2 with the object to avoid
financial liability upon respondents No. 1 and 2 which could not be accepted as ground to negate or
say defeat claim of petitioner. The termination of petitioner would thus be not excluded under
Section 2 (oo) (bb) and squarely fell under the definition of retrenchment under the Act
necessitating issuance of notice of one month envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act and in
alternative wages for one month in lieu of notice period which has admittedly not been done as
RW1 has shown his inability to tell if while disengaging petitioner any notice was served. Being
the Director in university authorized to contest and depose in this case on behalf of respondents was
expected to know material facts qua engagement and disengagement of petitioner. Accordingly,
applying the case law as referred to above, it is held that petitioner had been wrongly retrenched
from service by the respondents in violation of provisions of Act.
30. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has taken this court through Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex.
PW1/J passed in Reference No. 154/2012 titled as Mohinder Singh versus Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, Distt. Solan, H.P. & Anr. vide which this
court had directed reinstatement of petitioner setting aside retrenchment order qua petitioner w.e.f.
1-1-2005 by respondents and was held entitled for seniority and continuity in service from the date
of illegal termination except back wages. While relying upon the above said Award, ld. Counsel for
the petitioner has contended that above said award has not been assailed by respondents which had
attained finality having similar facts with regard to award Ex. PW1/J. RW1 in cross-examination
has showed his inability to tell if above said award passed against the respondents had been
challenged however specifically admitted that said Mohinder Singh was still working with the
university. Statement of RW1 recorded on 1-10-2011 and award was passed on 28-4-2017 and was
allegedly terminated on 1-1-2005 which goes to show after implementation of award Ex. PW1/J
above-named, Mohinder Singh has been in continuous service with the respondent from 1-1-2005
to 31-10-2017 when RW1 was cross-examined. As such, Mohinder Singh's case having similar
facts and not challenged by respondents is equally binding upon respondents qua similarly situated
workmen. In the said judgment also, my ld. predecessor-in-office in para No. 26 on record has
specifically held that action of respondents was unfair labour practice under Clause 10 Vth
Schedule appended under the Act. In so far claim of petitioner qua back wages from date of illegal
termination in the year 2013 is concerned, suffice would be state here that onus to prove that
petitioner/claimant remained unemployed and not gainfully employed was upon respondents.
Although, petitioner has alleged that he remained unemployed and was not gainfully employed ever
since his termination in 2013 by filing affidavit to this effect could not be relied as being a young
person ageing about 40 years would not have sit idle for about five years without earning and thus
his plea to this effect merits rejection. Accordingly, petitioner is held to be not entitled for back
wages.
31. In so far as claim of petitioner as against M/s Shimla Cleanways Contractor respondent
No. 3 the contractor is concerned, it would be relevant, at the outset to refer to mandays chart as
Ex. P10 concerning petitioner in which his name figures at serial No. 14. A bare glance at the
above said document would show that petitioner had been engaged initially on 21-1-2012 who
continued to work with the respondents No. 1 and 2 till 31-12-2012 and thereafter is shown to have
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been engaged on 15-7-2013 to 31-3-2014 for different number of working days enumerated therein.
In the column of note, there is stipulation to the effect that service of labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013 were
engaged through outsourcing agencies of manpower through contractor as per outsource policy
introduced from 4/2013. It was further stipulated in this note that consolidated wages for the
particular month was paid to contractor as per policy. Be it stated that note appended to mandays
chart Ex. P10 concerning Manjeet Kumar neither stipulated name of the contractor nor evidence
has been led showing that consolidated wages concerning or including petitioner's wages for
specific months enumerated in Ex. P10 was paid to contractor whose name has not even been
mentioned and as such no inference can be drawn that respondent No. 3 paid wags to petitioner for
different months. It can also be noticed from above said details in Ex. P10 qua period for which
petitioner had worked or say had been shown to be engaged by the university initially for nine
spells whereas under contractor for next ten spells. With the aid of this document, respondents No.1
and 2 have made futile endevour to defeat the claim of petitioner by submitting that petitioner was
no more employee of university who was working under contractor respondent No. 3. In reply
respondent No. 3 has maintained that it had been engaged for providing labourers on outsource
basis to respondent No. 1 on the basis of which petitioner was engaged. There is no documentary
evidence on record establishing that petitioner was initially appointed by respondent No. 1 and
thereafter his service were placed at the disposal of respondent No. 3 or that he was transferred at
any point of time for which he remained engaged. Significantly, respondent No. 3 did not lead any
evidence as ld. Counsel for the respondent No. 3 has made statement before this court on 31-10-
2017 that no evidence was to be led on behalf of respondent No. 3 and thus, in absence of any
evidence led by respondent No. 3, it cannot be stated that plea set up in the reply stood proved as
against the petitioner.
32. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma representing respondents No. 1 & 2 has not stated even a single
word qua engagement of respondent No. 3 who employed petitioner as his affidavit Ex. RW1/A
merely stipulated that unskilled labourers were being engaged through independent agency i.e.
M/s Shimla Cleanways and not by the university itself besides stated that if petitioner wanted to get
himself engaged for field work he should approach the contractor which showed that the only
witness of respondents No. 1 and 2 did not know if petitioner was placed under respondent No. 3. It
is nowhere in evidence of respondents No. 1 and 2 that petitioner had been engaged by respondent
No. 3 irrespective of plea of respondent No. 3 that petitioner was engaged by him on demand of
respondents No. 1 and 2. It is to be seen by this court if petitioner worked under respondent No. 3
and was its employee or was under supervision of university and its field staff while being engaged
for carrying out different projects.
33. Reliance has been placed on judgment reported in 2015 LLR 580 titled as General
Manger, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Ranipet Vs. Canteen Workers of BHEL, rep. by
BHEL Canteen Workers Union, Chennai & Ors. in which the Hon'ble High Court of Madras
has held that when it is proved that employment contract with the contractor is sham and nominal,
the employees of the contractor will be having their right to be absorbed as regular employees of
the principal employer.
34. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of
Bombay reported in 2015 LLR 974 titled as Goa MRF Employees' Union Vs. ICARUS Food
and Farm and Others where the employees were engaged through contractor working for the
principal employer continuously for a long period, would, in reality, be the employees of the
principal employer. Ld. Authorized Representative for the petitioner has taken me through oral
evidence on record which establish that factually entire control and supervision of petitioner in this
case was by the university and its field staff and not of respondent No. 3. Be it stated that petitioner
PW1 in cross-examination has denied to have worked under M/s Shimla Cleanways and his
officials rather he asserted that officers of university were supervising his work. He has denied that
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payments of salary etc. was being made by M/s. Shimla Cleanways rather stated that salary was
being paid by university. Not only this, even attendance was being marked by the officers of
university and field assistants and not by officers of M/s Shimla Cleanways and whatever worked
was assigned by field assistants of the university, the same was performed by him. In cross
examination petitioner has shown ignorance if contract was entered into between respondents No. 1
and 2 and between in respondent No. 3. On the other hand, for providing unskilled labourers on
outsource basis, petitioner admitted that he was working with the university before 1-5-2013. He
has further stated that no appointment letter was given by M/s Shimla Cleanways. Thus, when
entire supervision or control was that of principal employer i.e. university and applying the ratio of
judgments referred to above, it may not be erroneous to conclude here respondents No.1 and 2
continue to be principal employer of petitioner.
35. In so far as disengagement of petitioner on 01-4-2014 by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 or
by respondent No. 3 M/s Shimla Cleanways is concerned, there is no reliable evidence linking
petitioner to have been engaged by M/s Shimla Cleanways in the manner projected in this case and
as documentary evidence Ex. P10 does not specifically substantiate plea of respondents No. 1 and 2
qua engagement of respondent No. 3 as neither the name of contractor was mentioned Ex. P10 nor
wages in consolidated form being paid to petitioner has been proved as note appended to Ex. P10
mandays chart of petitioner does not stipulate any such fact specifically and no witness has been
examined by respondents No 1. and 2 to prove this fact. Be it noticed that RW1 is totally silent on
this aspect. It is nowhere in the evidence of respondents No. 1 and 2 that petitioner had knowledge
either of being transferred to respondent No. 3 on 18-7-2013 and RW1 the sole respondent
contesting on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 has specifically stated that petitioner had been
transferred to work under contractor but his statement on oath in cross examination does not clarify
specifically in what manner petitioner was transferred or made to work under respondent No. 3
rather shows that petitioner worked as before with the university ever since 2012 and the
arrangement of outsourcing was never notified to him as there is no written document establishing
that he was made to work with M/s Shimla Cleanways and similarly when on 18-7-2013 petitioner
was working with the university respondent No. 3 did not issue any letter to petitioner to work with
him or that he was on the roll of respondent No. 3. Admittedly, petitioner had worked 31st March,
2104 as per mandays chart with university and while cross-examining petitioner as PW1, ld.
Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 2 did not put a specific question that petitioner was appointed by
M/s Shimla Cleanways who has denied that he worked under M/s Shimla Cleanways besides
shown ignorance if M/s Shimla Cleanways had been engaged by respondents No. 1 and 2 besides
stated that field staff of university used to pay wages and even the attendance was being marked by
them. Significantly, petitioner admitted that whatever work was assigned by university petitioner
performed the same. Even cross-examination of petitioner by respondent No. 3 reveal that
petitioner had been engaged by university besides supervision was also conducted by field staff of
university. He has admitted that M/s Shimla Cleanways did not give any appointment letter when
cross-examined by ld. counsel for respondent No. 3. Thus, from evidence on record led by
respondents it is not established that petitioner had been transferred in the manner projected by
respondent No. 1 who has been held to be principal employer of petitioner and the petitioner would
be liable to be absorbed on rolls of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and not on rolls of respondent No. 3
who was merely contractor and even if respondent No. 3 i.e. contractor had been engaged by
respondents No.1 and 2, the engagement manifestly appear to be sham transaction as practically
respondents No. 1 and 2 had complete control over working of petitioner as has been held in 2015
LLR 580. In another judgment titled as Mannu Khan Vs. Union of India reported in 1989 (2)
SCC 99, the Hon'ble Apex Court has regularized contract labourers of cleaning catering
establishment and pantry cars in Western Railways. It also needs to be pointed out that none of the
respondents had obtained licence under Contract Labour (Regulations & Abolition) Act, 1970 as
there is no evidence to this effect adduced by respondents and in such like situation, respondents
No. 1 and 2 who had engaged respondent No. 3 to provide unskilled labourers are held to be
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principal employers of petitioner. Accordingly, when respondent No. 3 was engaged to provide
labourers who was not registered under Contract Labour (Regulations & Abolition) Act, 1970, he
cannot be stated to be registered contractor or principal employer as he was primarily working as
contractor and engaged labourers for principal employers as stated above. Accordingly, no relief
can be granted to petitioner against respondent No. 3 as respondents 1 and 2 are held to be principal
employers of petitioner as stated above.
36. In view of foregoing discussions, it is held that the petitioner despite being contractual
labourer would be entitled to be regularized as he had been working intermittently when work was
not provided to him whereas other juniors shown namely Bhim Dutt, Kamla Devi and Saroj Bala
who joined after him had been given sufficient work as reflected in seniority list Ex. P4 and P5 and
thus intermittent breaks are also held to be deliberate and during intermittent break present
petitioner he shall be deemed to be in continuous service from date of his initial appointment till
was illegally terminated without issuance of one month's notice or compensation in lieu thereof.
Accordingly, issues No.1 and 2 are answered in affirmative holding that act of respondents No. 1 &
2 in giving time to time break and finally terminating on 2012 and 1-4-2014 are improper and
unjustified. However, issue No. 3 is decided as discussed holding that petitioner is entitled to be
reinstated in service with seniority and continuity in service without back wages. Issues are decided
accordingly.
Issue No. 5 :
37. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has not pressed this issue during course of argument.
Otherwise also, from pleadings on record no inference of claim petition being not maintainable can
be raised industrial dispute. In the case in hand, the petitioner had challenged his illegal termination
by the respondents who had allegedly violated of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. As such, being
aggrieved with action of the respondents in terminating service, petitioner could legitimately agitate
his claim before this court. Issue No. 5 is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against
the respondents.
Issue No. 6 :
38. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has contended that College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Neri, Hamirpur, H.P. does not fall under the jurisdiction before this court. On the other
hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner had relied upon Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board etc.
and A. Rajappa and others, AIR 1978 SC 548 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the definition of 'industry' envisaged under Section 2(j) of the Act and held that university would
fall within the definition of industry and its employees are workman entitled to protection
envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Ld. Counsel for respondents has failed to
repudiate arguments and as such university cannot be stated to be not industry and its workers to be
not workmen. Issue is decided in negative against the respondents and in favour of petitioner.
Issue No.7:
39. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
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applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-
operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
40. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondents. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner
coupled with evidence on record cannot be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged
by the respondents. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondent and is answered
accordingly.
Issues No. 8 & 9 :
41. Both these issues were not pressed by ld. Counsel for respondents at the time of
arguments which are decided unpressed in favour of petitioner and against respondents.
Relief :
42. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the claim petition is partly allowed
against respondents No. 1 and 2 who are directed to re-engage the petitioner forthwith. It is further
held that petitioner shall be in continuous uninterrupted service with the respondents No. 1 and 2
from the date of his initial engagement in the year 2012 and that the breaks given by the
respondents No. 1 and 2 during this period being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the
seniority and continuity of service of the petitioner whose seniority shall be reckoned from his
initial date of engagement besides, petitioner shall be entitled to seniority and continuity in service
from the date of his initial engagement except back wages. However, claim petition as against
M/s Shimla Cleanways (Contractor) respondent No. 3 is hereby dismissed. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
43. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
44. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
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45. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
07/2015
Date of Institution :
13-01-2015
Date of decision :
24-4-2018
Shri Suresh Kumar s/o Late Shri Kuldeep Chand, r/o Village Neri, P.O. Khaggal, Tehsil &
District Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Dean, College of Horticulture and Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
2.
The Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, District
Solan, H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Karan Pathania, Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Suresh Kumar s/o Late Shri
Kuldeep Chand, r/o Village Neri, P.O. Khaggal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P. w.e.f.
12-01-2010 to 31-12-2012 and finally w.e.f. 01-01-2013 by (i) the Director, Institute of
Biotechnology & Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture &
Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P. (ii) the Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of
Horticulture & Forestry Nauni, District Solan, H.P., without complying with the provisions
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back
wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to
from the above employers?”
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2.
After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 3rd February, 2017
was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:
“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 16-12-2014,
the name of employer no. (i) may be read as “the Dean, College of Horticulture and
Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.” instead of “the Director, Institute of Biotechnology
& Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamipur, H.P.”, which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification.”
3.
On receipt of reference as well as addendum from appropriate government, notices
were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.
4.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
unskilled labourer by respondent No. 1 in the year 2010 with prior approval of respondent No. 2
who continued to work uninterruptedly with the respondents upto 31-12-2012. Averments made in
the claim petition further revealed that from 2012 to 31-12-2012, petitioner had been engaged for
89 days in first spell and after completion of 89 days, he had been given fictional break in his
service as some other group of workmen had been engaged for second spell of 89 days and when
the second spell of workers had completed after 89 days, petitioner had been engaged again for 89
days and such practice of engaging and disengaging by giving fictional breaks to the petitioner
continued upto 31st December, 2012. It is further alleged that respondents had given fictional
breaks of 89 days in two spells to the petitioner and other co-workmen so that they did not
complete 240 days in each calendar year for the purpose of counting continuous service envisaged
under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'Act' for brevity). The
grievance of petitioner remains that his service had been finally terminated by respondent No. 1 on
1-1-2013 along-with other co-workmen without complying with mandatory provisions of Act as
neither any show cause notice had been issued nor charge-sheet had been raised for any alleged
misconduct and at the same time, no inquiry had been conducted against the petitioner besides no
retrenchment notice or compensation of one month's pay in lieu of notice period had been given
and thus termination order is stated to be illegal, null and void as petitioner had completed 240 days
in preceding 12 calendar months from date of termination. It is alleged that while terminating of
service of petitioner even principle of 'Last come First go' had not been followed as several junior
workmen namely Ishwar Dass and Rajeev Kumar had been retained in service ignoring the rights
of petitioner in violation of Section 25-G of Act as above named two workmen had worked
alongwith petitioner on muster-roll and performed same duties. It is alleged that after terminating
service of petitioner and other co workmen, respondents had entered into contract with M/s Shimla
Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. vide letter No. 827-76 dated 30th April, 2013 to
outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 for 11 months and after expiry of the
above said period, respondent No. 1 had renewed contract with contractor above-named for further
period of one year and as such the above said contractor had engaged 15 workmen as unskilled
labourers on daily rate basis namely Raj Kumar, Arvind Kumar, Premi Devi, Asha Devi, Kanta
Devi, Beena Devi, Santosh Kumari, Sunita Devi, Nirmla Devi, Soma Devi, Raj Kumari, Sudesh
Kumari, Meena Devi, Santosh Kumari and Sobha Ram who had worked under Shri Rampal
Baniyal, Incharge and thus respondents had violated provisions of Section 25-H of Act. It is
categorically stated that respondents had sufficient work due to which they had outsourced
unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to be engaged through M/s Shimla Cleanwayas, Sahibu Niwas,
New Shimla, H.P and thus it cannot be stated that respondents did not have sufficient work and
funds in different projects run by it. It is alleged that the service of petitioner and other co-workmen
who had been engaged by the respondents had been terminated with the object to deprive petitioner
and other unskilled labourers so that they did not complete 240 days. It is alleged that respondent
No.1 without any instructions from respondent No. 2 had given fictional breaks to petitioner and
said act of respondent No. 1 fell under the definition of “unfair labour practice” as defined in Vth
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Schedule Clause 10 read with Section 25-T and 25-U of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It further
transpires from petition that the respondents had engaged regular unskilled Class-IV workers on
regular pay scale in Neri I and II who are S/Sh. Chaman Lal, Kishan Chand, Deen, Sanjeev Kumar,
Parkash Chand, Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram however 14 workmen including petitioner had been
initially engaged on daily rate basis for 89 days in two spells as stated above. It is also alleged that
in addition to petitioner and other workers as stated in this para some other workmen had been
engaged who were not given any break and thus respondents has also shown favourtism to one set
of workers which violated provisions of Clause 9 of Schedule 5th of Industrial Disputes Act. It is
alleged that respondents had admitted in the reply filed before the Labour Inspector, Hamirpur that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labourer for 89 days in two spells during calendar year
as per the rules framed by university in year 2002 and that initially after working for 89 days,
petitioner had been given break. It is alleged that these 14 workmen including petitioner had filed a
complaint of illegal termination before Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur in pursuance to which
Additional Deputy Commissioner, District Hamirpur had written a letter No. 129 dated 16-5-2013
for reengagement of services of retrenched workmen on the basis of order dated 20-11-2004 of
Hon'ble High Court of H.P. It is alleged that petitioner alongwith other workmen had filed CWP
No. 4991/2012 in which Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 20-11-2014 in which directions had
been given to respondents to not give fictional breaks to the petitioners and if their services on this
count already stood dispensed with, then no fresh hand shall be engaged without first offering the
work to the petitioners. It is alleged that despite directions vide order dated 20-11-2014 respondents
had not given offer to petitioner and other co-workmen for appointment in service and contrarily
engaged 15 workmen with contractor and thus respondent No.1 has violated even order of Hon'ble
High Court. Moreover, respondent did not file any application before Hon'ble High Court seeking
permission in CWP No. 4991/2012 to allow respondents to outsource petitioner unskilled contract
labour in place of terminated workmen. It further remains the case of the petitioner that in reference
154/2012 decided by this Court on 24-8-2012 titled as Mahinder Singh Vs. Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P. retrenchment of
Mahinder Singh dated 1-1-2005 was set aside and respondents were directed to reengage the
petitioner forthwith who was further held entitled to seniority and continuity of service from the
date of his illegal termination except back wages. It is alleged that in pursuance to Award dated
24-8-2012 said Mahinder Singh has been continuously working with the respondents till date of
filing of present claim petition. Accordingly, alleging respondents to have given fictional breaks
from time to time terminating service of petitioner and other co-workmen for 89 days in two spells
and finally terminating service of petitioner on 1-1-2013 is illegal, arbitrary and unjustified in
violation of mandatory provisions of Act. It is claimed that after termination, petitioner has
remained unemployed who was not gainfully employed anywhere from 2013 and thus petitioner
claimed to be entitled for full back wages for period of fictional breaks from 2010 to 31-12-2012
till final termination on 1-1-2013. Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside illegal fictional
breaks w.e.f. 2010 to 31-12-2012 with direction to the respondents to condone the break period in
continuity in service for the purposes of regularization besides has prayed wages for time to time
break period. The claimant/petitioner has further prayed for setting aside illegal termination w.e.f.
1-1-2013 with direction to the respondents to reinstate petitioner forthwith alongwith back wages,
seniority, continuity in service with consequential benefits and litigation costs.
5.
Respondents No. 1 and 2 contested claim petition, filed joint reply inter-alia taken
preliminary objections of maintainability, limitation and jurisdiction. On merits admitted that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour to do manual work in the experimental fields on
seasonal basis but denied that his service had been illegally terminated by the respondents. It is
alleged that due to non-availability of funds a policy for the engagement of contractual labour was
formulated by the respondent w.e.f. 1-1-2002 so as to recognize engagement and avoid additional
liability. It is claimed that respondents did not have permanent and perennial nature of experimental
field work which required attendance of labourers (during Rabi and Kharif season) as seasonal
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labourers were employed for a limited period on contract basis to accomplish the field trial work
with the object of research trial and their data etc. were not wasted for want of adequate manpower.
It is specifically alleged that petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour on a fixed salary for
a particular period in different spells as and when work and funds were available under the project
code No. HGI-130-62 as is evident from letter No. UHF/IBES/HGI-130-62/1055-71 dated
3-10-2012 which postulated that no seniority shall be given to contractual labour and the service of
individual will be terminated after the contract was over as envisaged under conditions No. 2 and 8
of appointment letter. The respondents have asserted that petitioner had after understanding terms
and conditions accepted the engagement and did not complete 240 days in any of the calendar
years. It is alleged by respondents in their reply that as and when work and funds were available
under time bound project, service of labour for field work was required for which advertisement
was given from time to time but the petitioner did not turn up for facing interviews and seeking job.
It is emphatically denied that junior persons namely Rajeev Kumar and Ishwar Dass had been
retained by university rather said Ishwar Dass has been working with the college since 2000.
However, the court had given seniority w.e.f. 14-11-2005 and thus allegation of petitioner that
juniors were retained was stated to be wrong. It is admitted that respondent had entered into
contract with M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla vide letter No. 827-76 dated
30-4-2013 but outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-1-2013 onwards and engaged skilled and
unskilled labourer through them to carry out the seasonal and adhoc projects work as and when
needed and that if petitioner wanted to get engaged for field work with the respondents then
petitioner was required to approach the said agency. It is asserted that termination of petitioner
including other co-workers outsourcing by respondents had become compulsion of university due
to reason that the university was already facing liability of surplus staff including Class-IV. It is
alleged that respondents are not in a position to continue the service of labourer including petitioner
so as avoid additional financial liability. It is alleged that most of the labourers mentioned in the
petition had been engaged on compassionate grounds as per provisions of rules with the prior
approval of State Govt. besides maintained that petitioner was engaged on contractual basis for
specific terms and conditions and thus he cannot retract from conditions imposed by the
respondents. It is alleged that petitioner was engaged from time to time on fixed salary on
contractual basis and not on regular basis for a specific period. Accordingly, denying all allegations
of petitioner, as contained in claim petition respondents have prayed for dismissal of claim petition.
6.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to the join reply filed by respondents, reiterated his stand
as maintained in the claim petition. It is also reiterated that workmen mentioned in para No. 6 of the
claim petition namely Chaman Lal, Krishan Chand, Jamaldeen, Sanjeev Kumar, Om Prakash,
Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram regular workmen who had been working with the petitioner and
other co-workmen have since been disengaged. It is denied that respondents had engaged some
workmen on compassionate grounds moreover asserted petitioner to be unemployed and not
gainfully employed anywhere during time to time termination and from the date of his final
termination.
7.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit Ex. PW1/ A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of letter dated 3-10-2012 Ex. PW1/B, copy
of mandays chart Ex. PW1/C, copies of letters dated 17-5-2013, 16-5-2013, 4-5-2013, 10-12-2012,
22-4-2013 Ex. PW1/D to Ex. PW1/H respectively, copy of complaint Ex. PW1/I, copy of letter
dated 13-2-2013 Ex. PW1/J, copy of letter dated 27-1-2014 Ex. PW1/K, copy of notification dated
30-4-2012 Ex. PW1/L, copy of CWP No. 4991/2012 Ex. PW1/M, copy of Award dated 24-8-2012
Ex. PW1/N and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner,
respondents had examined Dr. P. C. Sharma as RW1, tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A,
standing instructions regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis dated 5-12-2001 Ex.
RW1/B, letter dated 18-9-2012 regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis Ex. RW1/C,
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copy of office order dated 21-2-2005 Ex. RW1/D, copy of letter dated 13-5-2016 regarding
substitution of name of Dir. Institute of Biotechnology Ex. RW1/E and closed evidence.
8.
It is pertinent to mention here that after closing evidence by the respondent, petitioner
had moved an application for additional evidence which was allowed and Shri Jai Ram,
Superintendent office of Dean College of Horticulture & Forestry Neri, Distt. Hamirpur, H.P.
examined as PW2, tendered/proved seniority list of daily paid workers dated 30-4-2017 (07 leaves)
Ex. P1, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 11-4-2011 (06 leaves) Ex. P-2, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 23-2-2011 (07 leaves) Ex. P-3, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 1-10-2014 Ex. P-4, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 17-
10-2015 Ex. P-5, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 16-3-2009 (29 leaves) Ex. P-6,
tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 10-6-2011 (30 leaves) Ex. P-7, tentative seniority
list of daily paid workers dated 7-10-2014 (31 leaves) Ex. P-8, tentative seniority list of daily paid
workers dated 16-9-2016 (30 leaves) Ex. P-9, copy of mandays chart of contractual labourers (09
leaves) Ex. P-10 and closed additional evidence. However, ld. counsel for the respondent Nos. 1
and 2 did not lead any further additional evidence which was closed vide separate statement of ld.
Counsel for respondents.
9. I have heard ld. Authorized Representative representing petitioner and ld. counsel for
respondents, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposal of this case.
10. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28-05-2015 for
determination:
1. Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents
during the year 12-1-2010 to 31-12-2012 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether final termination of services of petitioner w.e.f. 01-01-2013 is/was improper
and unjustified?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 1 or issue No. 2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
5.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
6.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
7.
Whether the claim petition is time barred by limitation as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
11. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No. 1 :
Yes
Issue No. 2 :
Yes
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Issue No. 3 :
Discussed
Issue No. 4 :
No
Issue No. 5 :
No
Issue No. 6 :
Redundant
Issue No. 7 :
No
Relief :
Claim petition is partly allowed per operative part of the Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1, 2 and 3 :
12. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
13. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2010 initially for a
period of 89 days and thereafter with intermittent breaks several times till 2012 as is also evident
from mandays chart Ex. P-10. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged on the basis of policy for
engagement of labourers on contractual basis incorporated in Ex. RW1/B dated 5-12-2001. It is
admitted case of respondents that contractual labourers including petitioner had remained engaged
till 2013 ever since initial engagement when respondents allegedly engaged contractor for
outsourcing unskilled contractual labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013. Equally admitted case of respondents is
that duration of contractual labourers as per policy Ex. RW1/B was not to exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spell in whole year and in case re-engaged was to be made then break of atleast 15
days was necessary. It is admittedly not case of respondents that work and conduct of petitioner
was not good and satisfactory. Admittedly, respondents had sufficient work and funds for engaging
petitioner in different projects moreso when unskilled labourers were decided to be engaged from
contractor on outsource basis. It is further admitted case of respondents that petitioner being
contractual unskilled labourer provisions of Section 25 of Act did not apply as petitioner was
squarely covered under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the 'Act'. In view of foregoing admitted facts on
record, claim of petitioner qua termination in violation of Section 2 (oo) of Act needs to be
determined and at the same it also needs to be determined, if respondents deliberately recoursed to
time to time termination of petitioner and thereafter final termination in the year 2013 falling within
ambit of unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Clause 9 of Vth Schedule of 'Act'.
14. At the outset, it would be pertinent to mention here that Ex. RW1/B Standing
Instructions of respondents for engaging contractual unskilled labourers clearly provided that no
casual worker shall be engaged on muster-roll by any functionary of University w.e.f. 1-1-2002
which further stipulated that as far as possible continuing casual worker should be adjusted in
research and extension projects and thereafter demand for additional hands by deployment of
labour on contract may be made. Clause (e) of policy is reproduced below for reference:
“(e) The duration of the engagement of contractual labour should not exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spells in whole of the year and in case of re-engagement, a break of atleast 15
days is necessary in each case”.
15. Ld. counsel for petitioner referring to above-stated rule for engagement of unskilled
contractual labour has contended that respondents being employer have given intermittent break in
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service which was countable as petitioner like any other labourer engaged on contract was not in
position to bargain with respondents rather had no option but to work in illegal service conditions
imposed. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as
Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries, reported in 2014 LLR 673 in which
Hon'ble Apex Court has held that artificial break in service every year by reappointing the
employee on the same post tantamounts to 'unfair labour practice' under Section 2(ra) of the Act
which is not permissible under law. It was further observed that when repeated artificial periodical
breaks in service are proved, the termination of workman would not be having protection under
Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Act which would attract relief of reinstatement with full back wages being
illegal retrenchment.
16. PW1 has stepped into witness box deposed on oath as maintained in claim petition
specifically stated that petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2010 who continued to
work with respondents till 31-12-2012 when service of petitioner had been terminated finally along
with 13 other workers without complying with provisions of the 'Act'. He has further stated neither
any show cause notice nor compensation was given although petitioner had completed 240 days in
preceding 12 months from date of termination. Significantly, Ex. P10 mandays does not factually
show petitioner to have worked for 240 days immediately prior to his termination but plea of
petitioner remains that Ex. RW1/B Standing Instructions for engagement of unskilled labourer on
contract basis which fell in the ambit of an unfair labour practice had been invariably recoursed by
respondents during period of employment of petitioner when there were sufficient funds and work
with respondents and in the judgment (supra) of Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was held liable to
be reinstated in service being illegally retrenched.
17. Reliance has further been placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &
Haryana reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development
Authority, Manimajra, and Anr. versus Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Rohtak and Anr. Relevant para of judgment is reproduced below:
“Since provision of Section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature of an exception it has to be construed
strictly in favour of the workman as far as possible in letter and spirit. If the termination is
meant to exploit an employee or to increase the bargaining power of the employer,
then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause (bb) and the definition of
'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning…”
18. In the aforestated judgment, Hon'ble High Court (DB) had upheld award passed by
Labour Court relying upon judgment titled as Kapurthala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 1984 (2) Indian Law Reporter 333 (DB) in which
service of workman had been terminated when case of those had completed 230 days. In this case,
services of workmen were terminated without any departmental inquiry or charge-sheet and at the
same time, no notice or compensation was paid. The bank before the Hon'ble Court took plea that
service of workman for specified period and that too with notional breaks and thereafter workmen
were neither entitled for any retrenchment compensation nor reinstatement. The court in (1984)
case after dilating upon various aspects of matter held that attempt of employer to dispense with
service of workman so as to deprive him in continuity of service for specified period i.e. 240
days envisaged under Section 25-B and 25-F of the Act amounts to unfair labour practice when it is
found that conduct and service of workman was satisfactory. In 1994 judgment (supra) reference
has been made to another case reported in 1989 (2) RSJ 55 titled as Balbir Singh Vs. The
Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Limited in which J. Amarjit Chaudhary interpreted
Sub-Clause (bb) (oo) of Section 2 and relevant para is reproduced below:
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"Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act, which was added in 1984 by an
amendment cannot be so construed as to drastically restrict the orbit of the term of
'retrenchment' clause (bb) is an exception which must be interpreted narrowly. It cannot be
given meanings which may nullify or curtail the ambit of their principal clause. No doubt,
the intention of the Parliament in enacting clause (bb) was to exclude certain categories of
workers from the term of retrenchment but there is nothing in this clause which allows an
outlet to un-scrupulour employers to shunt out workers in the graph of non-renewal of their
contract even when the work subsists. This Clause as a whole has to be construed strictly in
favour of the workman as far as possible as to ensure that the Act is implemented in letter
and spirit. If the termination is meant to exploit an employee or to increase the
bargaining power of the employer, then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause
(bb) and the definition of term 'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning. The
contractual clause enshrined in clause (bb) cannot be resorted to frustrate the claim of
the employee against his uncalled for retrenchment or for denying other benefits. It
cannot be so interpreted, as to enable for employer to resort to the policy of hire and fire….”
19. It is admittedly not the case of respondents that petitioner could not be deployed or
employed or say that respondents had terminated service of petitioner since there was not sufficient
work and funds. Be it stated that by engaging contractor for outsourcing unskilled labourer to be
provided to respondents w.e.f. 1-5-2013 is clearly suggestive of the fact that respondents had
sufficient work and funds. Not only this, even several unskilled labourer had been engaged for
whole of the year as reflected in Ex. P5 the tentative seniority list as on 31-12-2014. Thus,
intermittent breaks given by respondents to petitioner establishes unfair labour practice within the
meaning of Section 2(ra) of the Act as the object behind engaging petitioner as contractual labourer
and thereafter giving intermittent breaks and finally terminating without any notice, changing
service conditions by asking petitioner to join contractor from a specific date as has also been
admitted by RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma in cross-examination who is the only witness examined by
respondents. Equally important to mention here is that while filing reply respondents have withheld
facts qua number of labourers engaged in two spells while implementing its policy Ex. RW1/B and
at the same time their names too have not been disclosed establishes that respondents from very
beginning while engaging petitioner intended that petitioner did not attain permanency in job but
for reason stated hereinabove, petitioner is held to have continuous service from 2010 to
31-12-2012 as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. That being so, it was incumbent upon
respondents to have issued notice under Section 25-F of Act and alternatively to pay wages of one
month in lieu of notice which has not so been done by respondents establishing violation of
provisions of Section 25-F of the Act for intermittent breaks as well as for final termination and for
similar reasons disengaging petitioner periodically and retaining juniors in two spells as has come
in evidence clearly establish violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. In order to prove his case, the petitioner has placed reliance upon Ex. P10 the mandays
on fixed wages w.e.f. 2010 relating to petitioner which showed that petitioner had worked under
project HGI-130-62 & HMM022-62 & HMM-36-62 from 12-1-2010 for 89 days and thereafter
with several intermittent breaks till 31-12-2012 as shown in this document. The plea of the
petitioner remains that the breaks had been given deliberately by respondents so that the petitioner
did not complete 240 days. It has also been stated by petitioner that despite availability of funds and
work intermittent breaks had been given from time to time during total period petitioner remained
engaged with the respondents.
21. Before accepting plea of petitioner for having been given break deliberately from time
to time, it would be also relevant to consider if the petitioner succeeded in establishing that if
throughout the year intermittent breaks would not have been given, he would have continued to be
in service for whole of the year and deemed to have completed continuous service in a year
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envisaged under Section 25-B of Act. To prove that provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not
adhered to by respondent while giving intermittent breaks reliance has been placed on seniority list
Ex. P1 to P5 showing junior workmen to petitioner i.e. those daily beldar who joined after
petitioner have been retained, engaging more than 300 days in a year whereas petitioner had been
given intermittent breaks in the same year. The seniority list Ex. P1 shows that Asha Devi and Tara
Chand figuring at serial No. 33 & 34 have joined on 13-7-2009. Ex. P4 is the tentative seniority list
(as on 31-12-2013) of these officials showed i.e. Tara Chand to have worked for 365 days in the
year 2010, 354 days in 2011, 366 days in 2012 and 365 days in 2013. Said Tara Chand figured at
serial No. 15 in the seniority list. Similarly, Asha Devi figuring at serial No. 16 in seniority list Ex.
R4 is shown to have worked for 304 days in 2010, 347 days in 2011, 341 days in 2012 and 363
days in 2013. With the aid of these entries concerning Tara Chand and Asha Devi figuring at serial
No. 15 and 16, it has been contended that there was sufficient work and funds available with the
respondents in different projects and these two officials had joined after joining of petitioner who
as per Ex. P10 figured at serial No. 11 and had joined on 12-1-2010 and as both these workmen had
been given sufficient work throughout the year(s) despite being engaged at later stage, the
petitioner is held to have been given intermittent break from 12-1-2010 till 31-12-2012 deliberately
by respondents despite having sufficient work and funds, Ex. P10 further shows that petitioner
during these years had remained engaged with intermittent breaks for 12 times from 2010 to 2012
in project HGI-130-62, HMM-022-62 & HMM-36-62. If Tara Chand and Asha Devi could be
given work for more than 300 days in a year in particular year from 2010 to 2013, there was no
reasons or compulsion for the respondents to have given break to the petitioner as stated above
which manifestly shows that petitioner has been deliberately given breaks in service.
22. The tentative seniority list of daily wage labourers as it stood on 31-12-2013. Ex. P4
revealed that at serial No. 15 and 16 names of Tara Chand and Asha Devi existed but at serial Nos.
17 to 20 names of Amravati, Bhim Dutt, Kamla Devi and Saroj Bala have been mentioned who
were shown to have joined and worked with respondents on 28-10-2010, 1-5-2012, 8-5-2012 and
15-5-2012 respectively much later than petitioner who joined in 2010. As such, latest seniority list
available at the time when petitioner was removed from service except Tara Chand and Asha Devi,
others are shown to have joined in the year 2010 and 2012 respectively as mentioned above.
Nothing in the cross-examination of petitioner PW1 could be elicited by respondents which would
demolish his claim qua deliberate intermittent breaks given by the respondents despite work and
funds as other juniors had been given sufficient work for whole of the year and policy Ex. RW1/B
dealing with contractual labourers was primarily a policy meant to exploit unskilled contractual
labourers which could be termed as entirely based on unfair labour practice. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma,
Director, Institute of Biotechnology and Environment Sciences, College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
has deposed that he had been posted on the present assignment since 1-11-2016 besides stated that
petitioner worked with university but did not know that petitioner remained engaged from date of
appointment till 31-12-2012. He has admitted in cross-examination that from 2002 to 2013, 30-32
contractual labourers were engaged, initially for 89 days who were appointed in two batches after
engaging the first batch, second batch was engaged when first batch was disengaged and thereafter
second batch was disengaged which support the plea of petitioner that the process of engagement
and disengagements was deliberate on part of respondents. Apparently, giving such intermittent
breaks to two groups of unskilled labourers without notice violated Section 25-G of the Act. As
such, respondents are held to have given intermittent breaks to the petitioner in violation of
provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act.
23. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that although adopting
policy for engagement of unskilled labourer on contractual basis vide Ex. RW1/B, respondents had
changed conditions of service of petitioner without issuing any prior notice vide which petitioner
was required to join to contractor engaged to provide unskilled labourers on outsource basis to
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respondents which tentamounts to termination of service of petitioner as petitioner had been
engaged with respondents since 2010 and no prior notice was served upon him in 2013 notifying
petitioner to join contractor who was to provide labourers to respondents on the basis of some
agreement entered into between respondents and contractor Ld. counsel/Authorized Representative
for petitioner had also contended if contractual employment is resorted to as mechanism to frustrate
the claim so that employee did not become regular or permanent against a job which continues or
the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
clause of Section 2(oo) of the Act, the same would be an unfair labour practice under the 'Act'.
Before proceedings further, it would be most pertinent to refer to order dated 20-11-2014 Ex.
PW1/M of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in which present petitioner along with 13 other had filed
CWP No. 4991/2012 when respondents had been directed “to not give fictional breaks to
petitioner and if their services on this count already stand dispense with, no fresh hand shall
be engaged without first affording the work to the petitioners”. In pursuance to the above said
order, petitioner alongwith 13 others had filed the complaint before Deputy Commissioner
Hamirpur for non-enforcement of order dated 20-11-2014 passed by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in
pursuance to which Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur had directed respondents to enforce the order
of the Hon'ble High Court dated 20-11-2014. The plea of respondents in their joint reply remained
that petitioner had not applied for re-engagement with contractor engaged in 2013 which leads to
an irresistible inference that petitioner had been disengaged i.e. terminated from service of
respondents in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. It is admittedly not the case of the
respondents that any notice was served upon petitioner as could also be gathered from cross-
examination of RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma, Director Dean College of Horticulture respondent No. 1
who showed his ignorance if while disengaging petitioner in the year 2013, any notice was served
upon petitioner by respondents. If any notice as required would have been issued by respondents,
RW1 would have certainly denied this question. He has specifically admitted that while
terminating service of petitioner no compensation was paid by respondents. Although these facts
revealed in cross-examination of RW1 coupled with the order of Hon'ble High Court as referred to
above, it can be safely gathered that respondents had not adhered to the mandate of Hon'ble High
Court as the petitioner was not to be disengaged and if disengaged, no fresh hands shall be engaged
although several persons juniors to petitioner have been engaged thereafter as per seniority list Ex.
P5 which further showed availability sufficient work and funds with respondents.
24. Ld. Counsel for the respondents had contended that petitioner being contractual
employee was not covered under the definition of retrenchment under Section 2 (bb) of the Act as
under Clause (bb)(oo) termination of service of workman on contract specifically was excluded
from definition of retrenchment. It is pointed out that since the petitioner was appointed on
contract, he stands excluded from definition of “retrenchment” and therefore respondents were not
required to adhere to provisions of Section 25-F of the 'Act' while disengaging petitioner. Ld.
Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, repudiated the arguments so advanced by the ld.
Counsel for respondents and has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
titled as Manoj Kumar Vs. H.R.T.C. and Anr. reported in 2007 LLR 1155. In the above said
judgment Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held that when repeated and fictional breaks have
been given to workman so that he should not attain permanency, it would not come within the
purview of section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act excluding termination of
retrenchment. In the case before the Hon'ble High Court respondents had set up similar plea of
petitioner being on contractual employment and thus Section 25-F could not be invoked by the
petitioner. In the above said judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held in para 12
reproduced below for reference:
“….12. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has held in Shailendra Nath Vs. Vice
Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1987 Lab IC 1607 that section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature
of an exception to section 2(oo) and has to be construed strictly and in favour of the
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workman as the entire object of the Act is secure a just and fair deal to them. Their
Lordships of the Allahabad High Court have held as under:
“The expression, 'termination for whatsoever reason' used in Cl. (oo) came up for
interpretation before the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. N.S. Money, AIR 1976
SC 1111: (1976 Lab IC 769). It was held to mean a termination which takes place either by
active step of employer or by running out of stipulated period. The Hon'ble Court observed.
Termination embraced not merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact
of termination, however, produced". Since this wide interpretation resulted in extending
benefit of retrenchment to even purpose or particular job or were casual workers the
Legislature appears to have added sub cl. (bb) to cl.(oo) in 1984. Even though petitioners
claim to have acquired status of regular employees before the clause was amended as each
of them had completed 240 days prior to its addition in 1984 it may be examined if the
petitioners can be said to be contractual employees as contemplated in this subclause. For
that it is necessary to examine its scope and ambit. It may, however, be stated at the outset
that it obviously attempts to exclude that which otherwise would have been included in
principal clause or to be more precise is in the nature of an exception, therefore, it has to be
construed strictly and in favour of workmen as the entire objective of the Act is to secure
just and fair deal for them. Terminations which are included in it are those which are
brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time
stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide a
gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation the nature of
employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of
duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be
for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes
to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated
period or completion of work whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But
if contractual employment is resorted to as a mechanism to frustrate the claim of
employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature
of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on the anvil of
fairness and bonafide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire
and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Cl. (bb). Because if it is left to be employer not
to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstances then the protection
afforded to a workman by treating every termination, of service as retrenchment shall be
rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post
ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bona fide.
It cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also
satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That
would be unfair labour practice [See H.D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India. (1985) 51 Fac
LR 494: (1985 Lab IC 1733) (SC)]. From various annexures filed with affidavits it is clear
that some of the petitioners were employed as Office Assistant, other book binders and
peons. They were awarded benefit of bonus. They have been working for nearly five years.
Their job was not casual, seasonal or of a daily worker. They have not been paid their salary
on volume of work. Although the wages in some cases are computed on per day basis but
the payment is monthly including holidays. Their duty, therefore, was like a regular
employee and not as casual, daily or seasonal worker….”
Para No.17 of the aforestated judgment is also reproduced below which has bearing on
merits of issue and is reproduced below:
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“17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Haryana State Electronics Development
Corporation Limited Vs. Mamni (2206) 9 SCC 434: AIR 2006 SC 2427: 2006 LLR 667
(SC), that appointment for a short period (89 days) and termination of service at the end of
the said period and reappointment after a gap of one day, such action of termination and
reappointment repeated again and again for a period of about one and a half years, in such
circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the termination not bona fide but
adopted to defeat the object of the Act. Thus, it is not covered by section 2(oo)(bb) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947……..”
25. Reliance has further been placed by Hon'ble High Court in Manoj Kumar's case on
another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay titled as Dalip H. Shirke Vs. Zila Parishad
Yavatmal, reported in 1990 Lab IC 100 in which judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as State
Bank of India Vs. N. Sundaramoney reported in 1976 Lab IC 769 had been relied by Hon'ble
High Court of Bombay. It was observed that exception as contained in sub-clause (bb) will have to
be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been
enjoying earlier to the amendment. The benefit of law laid down by the Supreme Court was
extended to all the workmen even to those who were employed for specific work or for a
particular job and even to casual labourers who were engaged merely to complete casual nature
of work. In the judgment of N. Sundaramoney's case relied in 2007 case and had observed that
time and again it has been held that welfare statutes must receive the construction which
advances the object of the statutes and protects the weaker section of the society. It was
observed that the employer is always in a position to dictate the terms of service vis-a-vis the
workman or to be workman. The employer can unilaterally impose oppressive and
unreasonable conditions of service and the workman will be left with little choice but to
accept all such conditions even unconscionable conditions of service in the contract of
employment. In the case in hand before this court, respondents had adopted policy of engagement
of contractual labourer to avoid financial liability Ex. RW1/B which prescribed the manner in
which workman was to employed for 89 days in two spells which follows that contractual labourers
engaged for 89 days in first spell were to be disengaged after 89 days engaging new batch and
following such engagements show that after first engagement of labourers as stated above junior
contractual labourer were to certainly disengage senior workmen i.e. first batch for 89 days without
notice despite availability of work and funds which manifestly violated Section 25-G of the 'Act'.
26. In the concluding para in Manoj Kumar's case, Hon'ble High Court has held that
workman had been offered appointment with fictional breaks to prevent petitioner from taking
benefit of Section 25-F of Act. The appointment orders issued in successor to workman was
camouflage to take out petitioner-workman from the ambit of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The appointment of petitioner cannot be termed as contractual and his case will
fall under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it will be covered under
expression “retrenchment”. The act of respondents of engaging petitioner giving fictional
breaks was not bonafide and reinstatement of petitioner-workman was allowed. Applying the
ratio of case law referred to above, it may not be erroneous to observe that in the case in hand
before this court, contractual employment of petitioner and time to time termination was made by
respondents so that petitioner did not become permanent and at the same time act of respondents in
throwing out petitioner from work with contractor without notice is manifestly unfair labour
practice and petitioner would be covered under definition of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) and
not under exception in Clause (bb) (oo) as has been held in Manoj Kumar's case.
27. Thus, in the case before this court respondents had made scheme which was
significantly promulgated for engagement of contractual labourer for 89 days in one spell and in the
case before the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana having similar period of engagement of
workmen respondents were held to have not complied with the Section 25-F of the Industrial
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Disputes Act as the workman who was a clerk had been engaged for 89 days and given fresh
appointment twice for 89 days. As such, referring to aforestated case law and evidence on record, it
may not be erroneous to conclude that respondents had recoursed to unfair labour practice initially
by adopting standing instruction for engagement of contractual labour Ex. RW1/B which in its
prescribed clause (e) duration of contractual labourer was to be not more than 89 in a year for two
spells and thereafter by abrupting engagement of labourers on outsource basis through contractor.
But in this case, the petitioner had been engaged several times with intervals as shown in mandays
chart Ex. P10 from 2010 to 31-12-2012 and thus the action of respondents in giving intermittent
break as well as finally terminating service without notice and asking the petitioner to work with
contractor who was to provide unskilled labourers to respondents on outsource basis was nothing
else but termination of service of petitioner without any notice and that the intermittent breaks are
held to be deliberately made by the respondents with the object to avoid financial liability upon
respondents which could not be accepted as ground to negate or say defeat claim of petitioner. The
termination of petitioner would thus be not excluded under Section 2 (oo) (bb) and squarely fell
under the definition of retrenchment under the Act necessitating issuance of notice of one month
envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act and in alternative wages for one month in lieu of notice
period which has admittedly not been done as RW1 has shown his inability to tell if while
disengaging petitioner any notice was served. Being the Director in university authorized to contest
and depose in this case on behalf of respondents was expected to know material facts qua
engagement and disengagement of petitioner. Accordingly, applying the case law as referred to
above, it is held that petitioner had been wrongly retrenched from service by the respondents in
violation of provisions of Act.
28. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has taken this court through Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex.
PW1/N passed in Reference No. 154/2012 titled as Mohinder Singh versus Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, Distt. Solan, H.P. & Anr. vide which this
court had directed reinstatement of petitioner setting aside retrenchment order qua petitioner w.e.f.
1-1-2005 by respondents and was held entitled for seniority and continuity in service from the date
of illegal termination except back wages. While relying upon the above said Award, ld. Counsel for
the petitioner has contended that above said award has not been assailed by respondents which had
attained finality having similar facts with regard to award Ex. PW1/N. RW1 in cross-examination
has showed his inability to tell if above said award passed against the respondent had been
challenged however specifically admitted that said Mohinder Singh was still working with the
university. Statement of RW1 recorded on 1-10-2011 and award was passed on 28-4-2017 and was
allegedly terminated on 1-1-2005 which goes to show after implementation of award Ex. PW1/N
above-named Mohinder Singh has been in continuous service with the respondent from 1-1-2005 to
31-10-2017 when RW1 was cross-examined. As such, Mohinder Singh's case having similar facts
and not challenged by respondents is equally binding upon respondents qua similarly situated
workmen. In the said judgment also, my ld. predecessor-in-office in para No. 26 on record has
specifically held that action of respondents was unfair labour practice under Clause 10 Vth
Schedule appended under the Act. In so far claim of petitioner qua back wages from date of illegal
termination in the year 2013 is concerned, suffice would be state here that onus to prove that
petitioner/claimant remained unemployed and not gainfully employed was upon respondents.
Although, petitioner has alleged that he remained unemployed and was not gainfully employed ever
since his termination in 2013 by filing affidavit to this effect could not be relied as being a young
person ageing about 36 years would not have sit idle for about five years without earning and thus
his plea to this effect merits rejection. Accordingly, petitioner is held to be not entitled for back
wages. Accordingly, issues No.1 and 2 are answered in affirmative holding that act of respondents
in giving time to time break and finally terminating on 1-1-2013 is improper and unjustified.
However, issue No. 3 is decided as discussed holding that petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in
service with seniority and continuity in service without back wages. Issues are decided accordingly.
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Issue No. 4:
29. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has contended that College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Neri, Hamirpur, H.P. does not fall under the jurisdiction before this court. On the other
hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner had relied upon Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board etc.
and A. Rajappa and others, AIR 1978 SC 548 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the definition of 'industry' envisaged under Section 2(j) of the Act and held that university would
fall within the definition of industry and its employees are workman entitled to protection
envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Ld. Counsel for respondents has failed to
repudiate arguments and as such university cannot be stated to be not industry and its workers to be
not workmen. Issue is decided in negative against the respondents and in favour of petitioner. Since
issues no.4 and 6 are the same, as such in view of findings of issue no.4 as stated above, issue no.6
has become redundant.
Issue No. 5:
30. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has not pressed this issue during course of argument.
Otherwise also, from pleadings on record no inference of claim petition being not maintainable can
be raised industrial dispute. In the case in hand, the petitioner had challenged his illegal termination
by the respondents who had allegedly violated of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. As such, being
aggrieved with action of the respondents in terminating service, petitioner could legitimately agitate
his claim before this court. Issue No. 5 is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against
the respondents.
Issue No.7 :
31. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425,
it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim
on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government and the
Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government and same
is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The
Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 752, has
categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of Section
33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to put the restriction of
limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the provision and in absence of
any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to introduce the limitation on the
ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing cum
Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that:
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“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
32. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondents. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner
coupled with evidence on record cannot be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged
by the respondents. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondent and is answered
accordingly.
Relief :
33. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues Nos. 1 to 6, the reference/claim petition
is partly allowed and the respondents are hereby directed to re-engage the petitioner forthwith who
is further held to be in continuous uninterrupted service with the respondents from the date of his
initial engagement in the year 2010 and that the breaks given by the respondent being fictional in
nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of service of the petitioner and his
seniority shall be reckoned from his initial date of engagement however, petitioner shall be entitled
to seniority and continuity in service from the date of his initial engagement except back wages. In
the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
34. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
35. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
36. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
16/2015
Date of Institution :
13-01-2015
Date of decision :
24-4-2018
Shri Sanjay Mohammad s/o Shri Liyakat Ali, r/o Village Neri, P.O. Khaggal, Tehsil &
District Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
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Versus
1.
The Dean, College of Horticulture and Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
2.
The Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, District
Solan H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Karan Pathania, Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Sanjay Mohammad s/o Shri
Liyakat Ali, r/o Village Neri, P.O. Khaggal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P. during year
2008 to year 2012 thereafter reengagement w.e.f. 13-03-2013 to 22-04-2013 and final
termination w.e.f. 23-4-2013 by (i) the Director, Institute of Biotechnology &
Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamirpur, H.P. (ii) the Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture &
Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the
above employers?”
2.
After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 3rd February, 2017
was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:
“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 01-01-2015,
the name of employer no. (i) may be read as “the Dean, College of Horticulture and
Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.” instead of “the Director, Institute of Biotechnology
& Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamipur, H.P.”, which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification.”
3.
On receipt of reference as well as addendum from appropriate government, notices
were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.
4.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
unskilled labourer by respondent No.1 in the year 2008 with prior approval of respondent No. 2
who continued to work uninterruptedly with the respondents upto 22nd April, 2013. Averments
made in the claim petition further revealed that from 2008 to 2013, petitioner had been engaged for
89 days in first spell and after completion of 89 days, he had been given fictional break in his
service as some other group of workmen had been engaged for second spell of 89 days and when
the second spell of workers had completed after 89 days, petitioner had been engaged again for 89
days and such practice of engaging and disengaging by giving fictional breaks to the petitioner
continued upto 22nd April, 2013. It is further alleged that respondents had given fictional breaks of
89 days in two spells to the petitioner and other co-workmen so that they did not complete 240 days
in each calendar year for the purpose of counting continuous service envisaged under Section 25-B
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of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'Act' for brevity). The grievance of
petitioner remains that his service had been finally terminated by respondent No.1 on 23-4-2013
along-with other co-workmen without complying with mandatory provisions of Act as neither any
show cause notice had been issued nor charge-sheet had been raised for any alleged misconduct
and at the same time, no inquiry had been conducted against the petitioner besides no retrenchment
notice or compensation of one month's pay in lieu of notice period had been given and thus
termination order is stated to be illegal, null and void as petitioner had completed 240 days in
preceding 12 calendar months from date of termination. It is alleged that while terminating of
service of petitioner even principle of 'Last come First go' had not been followed as several junior
workmen namely Ishwar Dass and Rajeev Kumar had been retained in service ignoring the rights
of petitioner in violation of Section 25-G of Act as above named two workmen had worked along
with petitioner on muster-roll and performed same duties. It is alleged that after terminating service
of petitioner and other co-workmen, respondents had entered into contract with M/s Shimla
Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. vide letter No. 827-76 dated 30th April, 2013 to
outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 for 11 months and after expiry of the
above said period, respondent No.1 had renewed contract with contractor above-named for further
period of one year and as such the above said contractor had engaged 15 workmen as unskilled
labourers on daily rate basis namely Raj Kumar, Arvind Kumar, Premi Devi, Asha Devi, Kanta
Devi, Beena Devi, Santosh Kumari, Sunita Devi, Nirmla Devi, Soma Devi, Raj Kumari, Sudesh
Kumari, Meena Devi, Santosh Kumari and Sobha Ram who had worked under Shri Rampal
Baniyal, Incharge and thus respondents had violated provisions of Section 25-H of Act. It is
categorically stated that respondents had sufficient work due to which they had outsourced
unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to be engaged through M/s Shimla Cleanwayas, Sahibu Niwas,
New Shimla, H.P and thus it cannot be stated that respondents did not have sufficient work and
funds in different projects run by it. It is alleged that the service of petitioner and other co-workmen
who had been engaged by the respondents had been terminated with the object to deprive petitioner
and other unskilled labourers so that they did not complete 240 days. It is alleged that respondent
No.1 without any instructions from respondent No. 2 had given fictional breaks to petitioner and
said act of respondent no.1 fell under the definition of “unfair labour practice” as defined in Vth
Schedule Clause 10 read with Section 25-T and 25-U of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It further
transpires from petition that the respondents had engaged regular unskilled Class-IV workers on
regular pay scale in Neri I and II who are S/Sh. Chaman Lal, Kishan Chand, Deen, Sanjeev Kumar,
Parkash Chand, Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram however 14 workmen including petitioner had been
initially engaged on daily rate basis for 89 days in two spells as stated above. It is also alleged that
in addition to petitioner and other workers as stated in this para some other workmen had been
engaged who were not given any break and thus respondents has also shown favourtism to one set
of workers which violated provisions of Clause 9 of Schedule 5th of Industrial Disputes Act. It is
alleged that respondents had admitted in the reply filed before the Labour Inspector, Hamirpur that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labourer for 89 days in two spells during calendar year
as per the rules framed by university in year 2002 and that initially after working for 89 days,
petitioner had been given break. It is alleged that these 14 workmen including petitioner had filed a
complaint of illegal termination before Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur in pursuance to which
Additional Deputy Commissioner, District Hamirpur had written a letter No.129 dated 16-5-2013
for reengagement of services of retrenched workmen on the basis of order dated 20-11-2004 of
Hon'ble High Court of H.P. It is alleged that petitioner alongwith other workmen had filed CWP
No. 4991/2012 in which Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 20-11-2014 in which directions had
been given to respondents to not give fictional breaks to the petitioners and if their services on this
count already stood dispensed with, then no fresh hand shall be engaged without first offering the
work to the petitioners. It is alleged that despite directions vide order dated 20-11-2014 respondents
had not given offer to petitioner and other co-workmen for appointment in service and contrarily
engaged 15 workmen with contractor and thus respondent No. 1 has violated even order of Hon'ble
High Court. Moreover, respondent did not file any application before Hon'ble High Court seeking
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permission in CWP No. 4991/2012 to allow respondents to outsource petitioner unskilled contract
labour in place of terminated workmen. It further remains the case of the petitioner that in reference
154/2012 decided by this Court on 24-8-2012 titled as Mahinder Singh Vs. Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P. retrenchment of
Mahinder Singh dated 1-1-2005 was set aside and respondents were directed to reengage the
petitioner forthwith who was further held entitled to seniority and continuity of service from the
date of his illegal termination except back wages. It is alleged that in pursuance to Award dated
24-8-2012 said Mahinder Singh has been continuously working with the respondents till date of
filing of present claim petition. Accordingly, alleging respondents to have given fictional breaks
from time to time terminating service of petitioner and other co-workmen for 89 days in two spells
and finally terminating service of petitioner on 23-4-2013 is illegal, arbitrary and unjustified in
violation of mandatory provisions of Act. It is claimed that after termination, petitioner has
remained unemployed who was not gainfully employed anywhere from 2013 and thus petitioner
claimed to be entitled for full back wages for period of fictional breaks from 2009 to 2013 till final
termination on 23-4-2013. Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside illegal fictional breaks
w.e.f. 2008 to 22-4-2013 with direction to the respondents to condone the break period in continuity
in service for the purposes of regularization besides has prayed wages for time to time break period.
The claimant/petitioner has further prayed for setting aside illegal termination w.e.f. 23-4-2013 with
direction to the respondents to reinstate petitioner forthwith along-with back wages, seniority,
continuity in service with consequential benefits and litigation costs.
5.
Respondents No. 1 and 2 contested claim petition, filed joint reply inter-alia taken
preliminary objections of maintainability, limitation and jurisdiction. On merits admitted that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour to do manual work in the experimental fields on
seasonal basis but denied that his service had been illegally terminated by the respondents. It is
alleged that due to non-availability of funds a policy for the engagement of contractual labour was
formulated by the respondent w.e.f. 1-1-2002 so as to recognize engagement and avoid additional
liability. It is claimed that respondents did not have permanent and perennial nature of experimental
field work which required attendance of labourers (during Rabi and Kharif season) as seasonal
labourers were employed for a limited period on contract basis to accomplish the field trial work
with the object of research trial and their data etc. were not wasted for want of adequate manpower.
It is specifically alleged that petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour on a fixed salary for
a particular period in different spells as and when work and funds were available under the project
code No. HMM-022-62 as is evident from letter No. UHF/RHFRS/HMM-022-62/1401-4 dated 15-
10-2008 which postulated that no seniority shall be given to contractual labour and the service of
individual will be terminated after the contract was over as envisaged under conditions No. 2 and 8
of appointment letter. The respondents have asserted that petitioner had after understanding terms
and conditions accepted the engagement and did not complete 240 days in any of the calendar
years. It is alleged by respondents in their reply that as and when work and funds were available
under time bound project, service of labour for field work was required for which advertisement
was given from time to time but the petitioner did not turn up for facing interviews and seeking job.
It is emphatically denied that junior persons namely Rajeev Kumar and Ishwar Dass had been
retained by university rather said Ishwar Dass has been working with the college since 2000.
However, the court had given seniority w.e.f. 14-11-2005 and thus allegation of petitioner that
juniors were retained was stated to be wrong. It is admitted that respondent had entered into
contract with M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla vide letter No. 827-76 dated
30-4-2013 but outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-1-2013 onwards and engaged skilled and
unskilled labourer through them to carry out the seasonal and adhoc projects work as and when
needed and that if petitioner wanted to get engaged for field work with the respondents then
petitioner was required to approach the said agency. It is asserted that termination of petitioner
including other co-workers outsourcing by respondents had become compulsion of university due
to reason that the university was already facing liability of surplus staff including Class-IV. It is
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alleged that respondents are not in a position to continue the service of labourer including petitioner
so as avoid additional financial liability. It is alleged that most of the labourers mentioned in the
petition had been engaged on compassionate grounds as per provisions of rules with the prior
approval of State Govt. besides maintained that petitioner was engaged on contractual basis for
specific terms and conditions and thus he cannot retract from conditions imposed by the
respondents. It is alleged that petitioner was engaged from time to time on fixed salary on
contractual basis and not on regular basis for a specific period. Accordingly, denying all allegations
of petitioner, as contained in claim petition respondents have prayed for dismissal of claim petition.
6.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to the join reply filed by respondents, reiterated his stand
as maintained in the claim petition. It is also reiterated that workmen mentioned in para No. 6 of the
claim petition namely Chaman Lal, Krishan Chand, Jamaldeen, Sanjeev Kumar, Om Prakash,
Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram regular workmen who had been working with the petitioner and
other co-workmen have since been disengaged. It is denied that respondents had engaged some
workmen on compassionate grounds moreover asserted petitioner to be unemployed and not
gainfully employed anywhere during time to time termination and from the date of his final
termination.
7. To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit Ex. PW1/ A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, affidavit of petitioner Ex. PW1/A1, copy of
judgment dated 20-11-2014 Ex. PW1/B, application dated 4-5-2013 regarding representation for
regularization, seniority and against the fictional breaks Ex. PW1/C, copy of notification dated
30-4-2013 Ex. PW1/D, copy of complaint letter dated 16-5-2013 Ex. PW1/E, copy of reply of
demand notice dated 3-7-2013 Ex. PW1/F copy of seniority list of the contractual labour Ex.
PW1/G, copy of letter dated 28-7-2008 Ex. PW1/H, copy of letter dated 13-3-2013 Ex. PW1/I,
copy of letter dated 3-1-2012 Ex. PW1/J, copy of representation dated 10-12-2012 Ex. PW1/K,
copy of letter dated 22-4-2013 Ex. PW1/L, copy of complaint Ex. PW1/M, copy of letter dated 13-
2-2013 Ex. PW1/N, copy of letter dated 27-1-2014 Ex. PW1/O, copy of Award dated 24-8-2012
Ex. PW1/P, copy of daily paid workers dated 30-4-2010 Ex. P1 and closed evidence. On the other
hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondents had examined Dr. P.C. Sharma as
RW1, tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, standing instructions regarding engagement of
labour on contractual basis dated 5-12-2001 Ex. RW1/B, letter dated 18-9-2012 regarding
engagement of labour on contractual basis Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated 21-2-2005 Ex.
RW1/D, copy of letter dated 13-5-2016 regarding substitution of name of Dir. Institute of
Biotechnology Ex. RW1/E and closed evidence.
8.
It is pertinent to mention here that after closing evidence by the respondent, petitioner
had moved an application for additional evidence which was allowed and Shri Jai Ram,
Superintendent office of Dean College of Horticulture & Forestry Neri, Distt. Hamirpur, H.P.
examined as PW2, tendered/proved seniority list of daily paid workers dated 30-4-2017 (07 leaves)
Ex. P1, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 11-4-2011 (06 leaves) Ex. P-2, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 23-2-2011 (07 leaves) Ex. P-3, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 1-10-2014 Ex. P-4, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated
17-10-2015 Ex. P-5, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 16-3-2009 (29 leaves) Ex. P
6, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 10-6-2011 (30 leaves) Ex. P-7, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 7-10-2014 (31 leaves) Ex. P-8, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 16-9-2016 (30 leaves) Ex. P-9, copy of mandays chart of contractual
labourers (09 leaves) Ex. P-10 and closed additional evidence. However, ld. Counsel for the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not lead any further additional evidence which was closed vide
separate statement of ld. Counsel for respondents
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9.
I have heard ld. Authorized Representative representing petitioner and ld. Counsel for
respondents, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposal of this case.
10. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28-08-2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents
during the year 2008 to year 2012 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged? . .OPP.
2.
Whether the petitioner was reengaged from 13-3-2013 to 22-4-2013 and final
termination of services of petitioner w.e.f. 23-4-2013 is/was improper and unjustified?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 1 or issue No. 2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
5.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
6.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
7.
Whether the claim petition is time barred by limitation as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
11. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No. 1 :
Yes
Issue No. 2 :
Yes
Issue No. 3 :
Discussed
Issue No. 4 :
No
Issue No. 5 :
No
Issue No. 6 :
Redundant
Issue No. 7 :
No
Relief :
Claim petition is partly allowed per operative part of the Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1, 2 and 3:
12. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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13. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2008 initially for a
period of 89 days and thereafter with intermittent breaks several times till 2013 as is also evident
from mandays chart Ex. P-10. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged on the basis of policy for
engagement of labourers on contractual basis incorporated in Ex. RW1/B dated 5-12-2001. It is
admitted case of respondents that contractual labourers including petitioner had remained engaged
till 2013 ever since initial engagement when respondents allegedly engaged contractor for
outsourcing unskilled contractual labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013. Equally admitted case of respondents is
that duration of contractual labourers as per policy Ex. RW1/B was not to exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spell in whole year and in case re-engaged was to be made then break of atleast 15
days was necessary. It is admittedly not case of respondents that work and conduct of petitioner
was not good and satisfactory. Admittedly, respondents had sufficient work and funds for engaging
petitioner in different projects moreso when unskilled labourers were decided to be engaged from
contractor on outsource basis. It is further admitted case of respondents that petitioner being
contractual unskilled labourer provisions of Section 25 of Act did not apply as petitioner was
squarely covered under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the 'Act'. In view of foregoing admitted facts on
record, claim of petitioner qua termination in violation of Section 2 (oo) of Act needs to be
determined and at the same it also needs to be determined, if respondents deliberately recoursed to
time to time termination of petitioner and thereafter final termination in the year 2013 falling within
ambit of unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Clause 9 of Vth Schedule of 'Act'.
14. At the outset, it would be pertinent to mention here that Ex. RW1/B Standing
Instructions of respondents for engaging contractual unskilled labourers clearly provided that no
casual worker shall be engaged on muster-roll by any functionary of University w.e.f. 1-1-2002
which further stipulated that as far as possible continuing casual worker should be adjusted in
research and extension projects and thereafter demand for additional hands by deployment of
labour on contract may be made. Clause (e) of policy is reproduced below for reference:
“(e) The duration of the engagement of contractual labour should not exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spells in whole of the year and in case of re-engagement, a break of atleast 15
days is necessary in each case”.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner referring to above-stated rule for engagement of unskilled
contractual labour has contended that respondents being employer have given intermittent break in
service which was countable as petitioner like any other labourer engaged on contract was not in
position to bargain with respondents rather had no option but to work in illegal service conditions
imposed. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as
Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries, reported in 2014 LLR 673 in which Hon'ble
Apex Court has held that artificial break in service every year by reappointing the employee on the
same post tantamounts to 'unfair labour practice' under Section 2(ra) of the Act which is not
permissible under law. It was further observed that when repeated artificial periodical breaks in
service are proved, the termination of workman would not be having protection under Section 2(oo)
(bb) of the Act which would attract relief of reinstatement with full back wages being illegal
retrenchment.
16. PW1 has stepped into witness box deposed on oath as maintained in claim petition
specifically stated that petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2008 who continued to
work with respondents till 22-4-2013 when service of petitioner had been terminated finally along-
with 13 other workers without complying with provisions of the 'Act'. He has further stated neither
any show cause notice nor compensation was given although petitioner had completed 240 days in
preceding 12 months from date of termination. Significantly, Ex. P10 mandays does not factually
show petitioner to have worked for 240 days immediately prior to his termination but plea of
petitioner remains that Ex. RW1/B Standing Instructions for engagement of unskilled labourer on
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contract basis which fell in the ambit of an unfair labour practice had been invariably recoursed by
respondents during period of employment of petitioner when there were sufficient funds and work
with respondents and in the judgment (supra) of Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was held liable to
be reinstated in service being illegally retrenched.
17. Reliance has further been placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &
Haryana reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development
Authority, Manimajra and Anr. versus Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Rohtak and Anr. Relevant para of judgment is reproduced below:
“Since provision of Section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature of an exception it has to be construed
strictly in favour of the workman as far as possible in letter and spirit. If the termination is
meant to exploit an employee or to increase the bargaining power of the employer,
then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause (bb) and the definition of
'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning…”
18. In the aforestated judgment, Hon'ble High Court (DB) had upheld award passed by
Labour Court relying upon judgment titled as Kapurthala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 1984 (2) Indian Law Reporter 333 (DB) in which
service of workman had been terminated when case of those had completed 230 days. In this case,
services of workmen were terminated without any departmental inquiry or charge-sheet and at the
same time, no notice or compensation was paid. The bank before the Hon'ble Court took plea that
service of workman for specified period and that too with notional breaks and thereafter workmen
were neither entitled for any retrenchment compensation nor reinstatement. The court in (1984)
case after dilating upon various aspects of matter held that attempt of employer to dispense with
service of workman so as to deprive him in continuity of service for specified period i.e. 240
days envisaged under Section 25-B and 25-F of the Act amounts to unfair labour practice when it is
found that conduct and service of workman was satisfactory. In 1994 judgment (supra) reference
has been made to another case reported in 1989 (2) RSJ 55 titled as Balbir Singh Vs. The
Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Limited in which J. Amarjit Chaudhary interpreted
Sub-Clause (bb) (oo) of Section 2 and relevant para is reproduced below:
"Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act, which was added in 1984 by an
amendment cannot be so construed as to drastically restrict the orbit of the term of
'retrenchment' clause (bb) is an exception which must be interpreted narrowly. It cannot be
given meanings which may nullify or curtail the ambit of their principal clause. No doubt,
the intention of the Parliament in enacting clause (bb) was to exclude certain categories of
workers from the term of retrenchment but there is nothing in this clause which allows an
outlet to un-scrupulour employers to shunt out workers in the graph of non-renewal of their
contract even when the work subsists. This clause as a whole has to be construed strictly in
favour of the workman as far as possible as to ensure that the Act is implemented in letter
and spirit. If the termination is meant to exploit an employee or to increase the
bargaining power of the employer, then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause
(bb) and the definition of term 'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning. The
contractual clause enshrined in clause (bb) cannot be resorted to frustrate the claim of
the employee against his uncalled for retrenchment or for denying other benefits. It
cannot be so interpreted, as to enable for employer to resort to the policy of hire and fire….”
19. It is admittedly not the case of respondents that petitioner could not be deployed or
employed or say that respondents had terminated service of petitioner since there was not sufficient
work and funds. Be it stated that by engaging contractor for outsourcing unskilled labourer to be
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provided to respondents w.e.f. 1-5-2013 is clearly suggestive of the fact that respondents had
sufficient work and funds. Not only this, even several unskilled labourer had been engaged for
whole of the year as reflected in Ex. P5 the tentative seniority list as on 31-12-2014. Thus,
intermittent breaks given by respondents to petitioner establishes unfair labour practice within the
meaning of Section 2(ra) of the Act as the object behind engaging petitioner as contractual labourer
and thereafter giving intermittent breaks and finally terminating without any notice, changing
service conditions by asking petitioner to join contractor from a specific date as has also been
admitted by RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma in cross-examination who is the only witness examined by
respondents. Equally important to mention here is that while filing reply respondents have withheld
facts qua number of labourers engaged in two spells while implementing its policy Ex. RW1/B and
at the same time their names too have not been disclosed establishes that respondents from very
beginning while engaging petitioner intended that petitioner did not attain permanency in job but
for reason stated hereinabove, petitioner is held to have continuous service from 2008 to 2013 as
envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. That being so, it was incumbent upon respondents to have
issued notice under Section 25-F of Act and alternatively to pay wages of one month in lieu of
notice which has not so been done by respondents establishing violation of provisions of Section
25-F of the Act for intermittent breaks as well as for final termination and for similar reasons
disengaging petitioner periodically and retaining juniors in two spells as has come in evidence
clearly establish violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. In order to prove his case, the petitioner has placed reliance upon Ex. P10 the mandays
on fixed wages w.e.f. 2009 relating to petitioner which showed that petitioner had worked under
project HMM-023-62 from 28-7-2008 to 8-12-2009 for 89 days and thereafter with several
intermittent breaks till 20-12-2012 as shown in this document. The plea of the petitioner remains
that the breaks had been given deliberately by respondents so that the petitioner did not complete
240 days. It has also been stated by petitioner that despite availability of funds and work
intermittent breaks had been given from time to time during total period petitioner remained
engaged with the respondents.
21. Before accepting plea of petitioner for having been given break deliberately from time
to time, it would be also relevant to consider if the petitioner succeeded in establishing that if
throughout the year intermittent breaks would not have been given, he would have continued to be
in service for whole of the year and deemed to have completed continuous service in a year
envisaged under Section 25-B of Act. To prove that provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not
adhered to by respondent while giving intermittent breaks reliance has been placed on seniority list
Ex. P1 to P5 showing junior workmen to petitioner i.e. those daily beldar who joined after
petitioner have been retained, engaging more than 300 days in a year whereas petitioner had been
given intermittent breaks in the same year. The seniority list Ex. P1 shows that Asha Devi and Tara
Chand figuring at serial No. 33 & 34 have joined on 13-7-2009. Ex. P4 is the tentative seniority list
(as on 31-12-2013) of these officials showed i.e. Tara Chand to have worked for 365 days in the
year 2010, 354 days in 2011, 366 days in 2012 and 365 days in 2013. Said Tara Chand figured at
serial No. 15 in the seniority list. Similarly, Asha Devi figuring at serial No. 16 in seniority list Ex.
R4 is shown to have worked for 304 days in 2010, 347 days in 2011, 341 days in 2012 and 363
days in 2013. With the aid of these entries concerning Tara Chand and Asha Devi figuring at serial
No. 15 and 16, it has been contended that there was sufficient work and funds available with the
respondents in different projects and these two officials had joined after joining of petitioner who
as per Ex. P10 figured at serial No. 6 and had joined on 28-7-2008 and as both these workmen had
been given sufficient work throughout the year(s) despite being engaged at later stage, the
petitioner is held to have been given intermittent break from 28-7-2008 till 20-12-2012 deliberately
by respondents despite having sufficient work and funds, Ex. P10 further shows that petitioner
during these years had remained engaged with intermittent breaks for 18 times from 2008 to 2013
in project HMM 023-62 & HGI-218-62. If Tara Chand and Asha Devi could be given work for
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more than 300 days in a year in particular year from 2010 to 2013, there was no reasons or
compulsion for the respondents to have given break to the petitioner as stated above which
manifestly shows that petitioner has been deliberately given breaks in service.
22. The tentative seniority list of daily wage labourers as it stood on 31-12-2013. Ex. P4
revealed that at serial No.15 and 16 names of Tara Chand and Asha Devi existed but at serial Nos.
17 to 20 names of Amravati, Bhim Dutt, Kamla Devi and Saroj Bala have been mentioned who
were shown to have joined and worked with respondents on 28-10-2010, 1-5-2012, 8-5-2012 and
15-5-2012 respectively much later than petitioner who joined in 2008. As such, latest seniority list
available at the time when petitioner was removed from service except Tara Chand and Asha Devi,
others are shown to have joined in the year 2010 and 2012 respectively as mentioned above.
Nothing in the cross-examination of petitioner PW1 could be elicited by respondents which would
demolish his claim qua deliberate intermittent breaks given by the respondents despite work and
funds as other juniors had been given sufficient work for whole of the year and policy Ex. RW1/B
dealing with contractual labourers was primarily a policy meant to exploit unskilled contractual
labourers which could be termed as entirely based on unfair labour practice. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma,
Director, Institute of Biotechnology and Environment Sciences, College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
has deposed that he had been posted on the present assignment since 1-11-2016 besides stated that
petitioner worked with university but did not know that petitioner remained engaged from date of
appointment till 22-4-2013. He has admitted in cross-examination that from 2002 to 2013, 30-32
contractual labourers were engaged, initially for 89 days who were appointed in two batches after
engaging the first batch, second batch was engaged when first batch was disengaged and thereafter
second batch was disengaged which support the plea of petitioner that the process of engagement
and disengagements was deliberate on part of respondents. Apparently, giving such intermittent
breaks to two groups of unskilled labourers without notice violated Section 25-G of the Act. As
such, respondents are held to have given intermittent breaks to the petitioner in violation of
provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act.
23. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that although adopting
policy for engagement of unskilled labourer on contractual basis vide Ex. RW1/B, respondents had
changed conditions of service of petitioner without issuing any prior notice vide which petitioner
was required to join to contractor engaged to provide unskilled labourers on outsource basis to
respondents which tentamounts to termination of service of petitioner as petitioner had been
engaged with respondents since 2008 and no prior notice was served upon him in 2013 notifying
petitioner to join contractor who was to provide labourers to respondents on the basis of some
agreement entered into between respondents and contractor Ld. Counsel/Authorized Representative
for petitioner had also contended if contractual employment is resorted to as mechanism to frustrate
the claim so that employee did not become regular or permanent against a job which continues or
the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
clause of Section 2(oo) of the Act, the same would be an unfair labour practice under the 'Act'.
Before proceedings further, it would be most pertinent to refer to order dated 20-11-2014 Ex.
PW1/B of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in which present petitioner along with 13 other had filed
CWP No.4991/2012 when respondents had been directed “to not give fictional breaks to
petitioner and if their services on this count already stand dispense with, no fresh hand shall
be engaged without first affording the work to the petitioners”. In pursuance to the above said
order, petitioner alongwith 13 others had filed the complaint before Deputy Commissioner
Hamirpur for non-enforcement of order dated 20-11-2014 passed by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in
pursuance to which Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur had directed respondents to enforce the order
of the Hon'ble High Court dated 20-11-2014. The plea of respondents in their joint reply remained
that petitioner had not applied for reengagement with contractor engaged in 2013 which leads to an
irresistible inference that petitioner had been disengaged i.e. terminated from service of respondents
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in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. It is admittedly not the case of the respondents
that any notice was served upon petitioner as could also be gathered from cross-examination of
RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma, Director Dean College of Horticulture respondent No. 1 who showed his
ignorance if while disengaging petitioner in the year 2013, any notice was served upon petitioner
by respondents. If any notice as required would have been issued by respondents, RW1 would have
certainly denied this question. He has specifically admitted that while terminating service of
petitioner no compensation was paid by respondents. Although these facts revealed in cross-
examination of RW1 coupled with the order of Hon'ble High Court as referred to above, it can be
safely gathered that respondents had not adhered to the mandate of Hon'ble High Court as the
petitioner was not to be disengaged and if disengaged, no fresh hands shall be engaged although
several persons juniors to petitioner have been engaged thereafter as per seniority list Ex. P5 which
further showed availability sufficient work and funds with respondents.
24. Ld. Counsel for the respondents had contended that petitioner being contractual
employee was not covered under the definition of retrenchment under Section 2 (bb) of the Act as
under Clause (bb)(oo) termination of service of workman on contract specifically was excluded
from definition of retrenchment. It is pointed out that since the petitioner was appointed on
contract, he stands excluded from definition of “retrenchment” and therefore respondents were not
required to adhere to provisions of Section 25-F of the 'Act' while disengaging petitioner. Ld.
Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, repudiated the arguments so advanced by the ld.
counsel for respondents and has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
titled as Manoj Kumar Vs. H.R.T.C. and Anr. reported in 2007 LLR 1155. In the above said
judgment Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held that when repeated and fictional breaks have
been given to workman so that he should not attain permanency, it would not come within the
purview of section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act excluding termination of
retrenchment. In the case before the Hon'ble High Court respondents had set up similar plea of
petitioner being on contractual employment and thus Section 25-F could not be invoked by the
petitioner. In the above said judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held in para 12
reproduced below for reference:
“….12. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has held in Shailendra Nath Vs. Vice
Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1987 Lab IC 1607 that section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature
of an exception to section 2(oo) and has to be construed strictly and in favour of the
workman as the entire object of the Act is secure a just and fair deal to them. Their
Lordships of the Allahabad High Court have held as under:
“The expression, 'termination for whatsoever reason' used in Cl. (oo) came up for
interpretation before the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. N. S. Money, AIR 1976
SC 1111: (1976 Lab IC 769). It was held to mean a termination which takes place either by
active step of employer or by running out of stipulated period. The Hon'ble Court observed
Termination embraced not merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact
of termination, however, produced'. Since this wide interpretation resulted in extending
benefit of retrenchment to even purpose or particular job or were casual workers the
Legislature appears to have added sub-cl. (bb) to cl.(oo) in 1984. Even though petitioners
claim to have acquired status of regular employees before the clause was amended as each
of them had completed 240 days prior to its addition in 1984 it may be examined if the
petitioners can be said to be contractual employees as contemplated in this sub-clause. For
that it is necessary to examine its scope and ambit. It may, however, be stated at the outset
that it obviously attempts to exclude that which otherwise would have been included in
principal clause or to be more precise is in the nature of an exception, therefore, it has to be
construed strictly and in favour of workmen as the entire objective of the Act is to secure
just and fair deal for them. Terminations which are included in it are those which are
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brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time
stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide a
gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation the nature of
employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of
duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be
for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes
to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated
period or completion of work whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But
if contractual employment is resorted to as a mechanism to frustrate the claim of
employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature
of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on the anvil of
fairness and bonafide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire
and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Cl. (bb). Because if it is left to be employer not
to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstances then the protection
afforded to a workman by treating every termination, of service as retrenchment shall be
rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post
ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bonafide. It
cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also
satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That
would be unfair labour practice [See H.D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India. (1985) 51 Fac
LR 494: (1985 Lab IC 1733) (SC)]. From various annexures filed with affidavits it is clear
that some of the petitioners were employed as Office Assistant, other book binders and
peons. They were awarded benefit of bonus. They have been working for nearly five years.
Their job was not casual, seasonal or of a daily worker. They have not been paid their salary
on volume of work. Although the wages in some cases are computed on per day basis but
the payment is monthly including holidays. Their duty, therefore, was like a regular
employee and not as casual, daily or seasonal worker….”
Para No. 17 of the aforestated judgment is also reproduced below which has bearing on
merits of issue and is reproduced below:
“17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Haryana State Electronics Development
Corporation Limited Vs. Mamni (2206) 9 SCC 434: AIR 2006 SC 2427: 2006 LLR 667
(SC), that appointment for a short period (89 days) and termination of service at the end of
the said period and reappointment after a gap of one day, such action of termination and
reappointment repeated again and again for a period of about one and a half years, in such
circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the termination not bona fide but
adopted to defeat the object of the Act. Thus, it is not covered by section 2(oo)(bb) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947……..”
25. Reliance has further been placed by Hon'ble High Court in Manoj Kumar's case on
another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay titled as Dalip H. Shirke Vs. Zila Parishad
Yavatmal, reported in 1990 Lab IC 100 in which judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as State
Bank of India Vs. N. Sundaramoney reported in 1976 Lab IC 769 had been relied by Hon'ble
High Court of Bombay. It was observed that exception as contained in sub-clause (bb) will have to
be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been
enjoying earlier to the amendment. The benefit of law laid down by the Supreme Court was
extended to all the workmen even to those who were employed for specific work or for a
particular job and even to casual labourers who were engaged merely to complete casual nature
of work. In the judgment of N. Sundaramoney's case relied in 2007 case and had observed that
time and again it has been held that welfare statutes must receive the construction which
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advances the object of the statutes and protects the weaker section of the society. It was
observed that the employer is always in a position to dictate the terms of service vis-a-vis the
workman or to be workman. The employer can unilaterally impose oppressive and
unreasonable conditions of service and the workman will be left with little choice but to
accept all such conditions even unconscionable conditions of service in the contract of
employment. In the case in hand before this court, respondents had adopted policy of engagement
of contractual labourer to avoid financial liability Ex. RW1/B which prescribed the manner in
which workman was to employed for 89 days in two spells which follows that contractual labourers
engaged for 89 days in first spell were to be disengaged after 89 days engaging new batch and
following such engagements show that after first engagement of labourers as stated above junior
contractual labourer were to certainly disengage senior workmen i.e. first batch for 89 days without
notice despite availability of work and funds which manifestly violated Section 25-G of the 'Act'.
26. In the concluding para in Manoj Kumar's case, Hon'ble High Court has held that
workman had been offered appointment with fictional breaks to prevent petitioner from taking
benefit of Section 25-F of Act. The appointment orders issued in successor to workman was
camouflage to take out petitioner-workman from the ambit of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The appointment of petitioner cannot be termed as contractual and his case will
fall under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it will be covered under
expression “retrenchment”. The act of respondents of engaging petitioner giving fictional
breaks was not bonafide and reinstatement of petitioner-workman was allowed. Applying the
ratio of case law referred to above, it may not be erroneous to observe that in the case in hand
before this court, contractual employment of petitioner and time to time termination was made by
respondents so that petitioner did not become permanent and at the same time act of respondents in
throwing out petitioner from work with contractor without notice is manifestly unfair labour
practice and petitioner would be covered under definition of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) and
not under exception in Clause (bb) (oo) as has been held in Manoj Kumar's case.
27. Thus, in the case before this court respondents had made scheme which was
significantly promulgated for engagement of contractual labourer for 89 days in one spell and in the
case before the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana having similar period of engagement of
workmen respondents were held to have not complied with the Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act as the workman who was a clerk had been engaged for 89 days and given fresh
appointment twice for 89 days. As such, referring to aforestated case law and evidence on record, it
may not be erroneous to conclude that respondents had recoursed to unfair labour practice initially
by adopting standing instruction for engagement of contractual labour Ex. RW1/B which in its
prescribed clause (e) duration of contractual labourer was to be not more than 89 in a year for two
spells and thereafter by abrupting engagement of labourers on outsource basis through contractor.
But in this case, the petitioner had been engaged several times with intervals as shown in mandays
chart Ex. P10 from 2009 to 2013 and thus the action of respondents in giving intermittent break as
well as finally terminating service without notice and asking the petitioner to work with contractor
who was to provide unskilled labourers to respondents on outsource basis was nothing else but
termination of service of petitioner without any notice and that the intermittent breaks are held to be
deliberately made by the respondents with the object to avoid financial liability upon respondents
which could not be accepted as ground to negate or say defeat claim of petitioner. The termination
of petitioner would thus be not excluded under Section 2 (oo) (bb) and squarely fell under the
definition of retrenchment under the Act necessitating issuance of notice of one month envisaged
under Section 25-F of the Act and in alternative wages for one month in lieu of notice period which
has admittedly not been done as RW1 has shown his inability to tell if while disengaging petitioner
any notice was served. Being the Director in university authorized to contest and depose in this
case on behalf of respondents was expected to know material facts qua engagement and
disengagement of petitioner. Accordingly, applying the case law as referred to above, it is held that
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petitioner had been wrongly retrenched from service by the respondents in violation of provisions
of Act.
28. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has taken this court through Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex.
PW1/P passed in Reference No.154/2012 titled as Mohinder Singh versus Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, Distt. Solan, H.P. & Anr. vide which this
court had directed reinstatement of petitioner setting aside retrenchment order qua petitioner w.e.f.
1-1-2005 by respondents and was held entitled for seniority and continuity in service from the date
of illegal termination except back wages. While relying upon the above said Award, ld. Counsel for
the petitioner has contended that above said award has not been assailed by respondents which had
attained finality having similar facts with regard to award Ex. PW1/P. RW1 in cross-examination
has showed his inability to tell if above said award passed against the respondent had been
challenged however specifically admitted that said Mohinder Singh was still working with the
university. Statement of RW1 recorded on 1-10-2011 and award was passed on 28-4-2017 and was
allegedly terminated on 1-1-2005 which goes to show after implementation of award Ex. PW1/P
above-named Mohinder Singh has been in continuous service with the respondent from 1-1-2005 to
31-10-2017 when RW1 was cross-examined. As such, Mohinder Singh's case having similar facts
and not challenged by respondents is equally binding upon respondents qua similarly situated
workmen. In the said judgment also, my ld. predecessor-in-office in para No. 26 on record has
specifically held that action of respondents was unfair labour practice under Clause 10 Vth
Schedule appended under the Act. In so far claim of petitioner qua back wages from date of illegal
termination in the year 2013 is concerned, suffice would be state here that onus to prove that
petitioner/claimant remained unemployed and not gainfully employed was upon respondents.
Although, petitioner has alleged that he remained unemployed and was not gainfully employed ever
since his termination in 2013 by filing affidavit to this effect could not be relied as being a young
person ageing about 35 years would not have sit idle for about five years without earning and thus
his plea to this effect merits rejection. Accordingly, petitioner is held to be not entitled for back
wages. Accordingly, issues No.1 and 2 are answered in affirmative holding that act of respondents
in giving time to time break and finally terminating on 23-4-2013 is improper and unjustified.
However, issue No. 3 is decided as discussed holding that petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in
service with seniority and continuity in service without back wages. Issues are decided accordingly.
Issue No. 4:
29. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has contended that College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Neri, Hamirpur, H.P. does not fall under the jurisdiction before this court. On the other
hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner had relied upon Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board etc.
and A. Rajappa and others, AIR 1978 SC 548 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the definition of “industry” envisaged under Section 2(j) of the Act and held that university would
fall within the definition of industry and its employees are workman entitled to protection
envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Ld. Counsel for respondents has failed to
repudiate arguments and as such university cannot be stated to be not industry and its workers to be
not workmen. Issue is decided in negative against the respondents and in favour of petitioner. Since
issues No. 4 and 6 are the same, as such in view of findings of issue No. 4 as stated above, issue
No. 6 has become redundant.
Issue No. 5 :
30. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has not pressed this issue during course of argument.
Otherwise also, from pleadings on record no inference of claim petition being not maintainable can
be raised industrial dispute. In the case in hand, the petitioner had challenged his illegal termination
by the respondents who had allegedly violated of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. As such, being
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aggrieved with action of the respondents in terminating service, petitioner could legitimately agitate
his claim before this court. Issue No. 5 is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against
the respondents.
Issue No. 7 :
31. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425,
it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim
on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government and the
Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government and same
is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The
Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 752,
has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of
Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to put the
restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the provision and in
absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to introduce the limitation
on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
32. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondents. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner
coupled with evidence on record cannot be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged
by the respondents. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondent and is answered
accordingly.
Relief :
33. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues Nos. 1 to 6, the reference/claim petition
is partly allowed and the respondents are hereby directed to re-engage the petitioner forthwith who
is further held to be in continuous uninterrupted service with the respondents from the date of his
initial engagement in the year 2007 and that the breaks given by the respondent being fictional in
nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of service of the petitioner and his
seniority shall be reckoned from his initial date of engagement however, petitioner shall be entitled
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to seniority and continuity in service from the date of his initial engagement except back wages. In
the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
34. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
35. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
36. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
09/2015
Date of Institution :
13-01-2015
Date of decision :
24-4-2018
Shri Joginder Singh s/o Shri Prem Singh, r/o Village Chunhal, P.O. Jhaniari Devi, Tehsil &
District Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Dean, College of Horticulture and Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
2.
The Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, District
Solan H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Karan Pathania, Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Joginder Singh s/o Shri Prem
Singh, r/o Village Chunhal, P.O. Jhaniari Devi, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P. w.e.f.
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08-7-2009 to 31-12-2012 and finally w.e.f. 01-01-2013 by (i) the Director, Institute of
Biotechnology & Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture &
Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P. (ii) the Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of
Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P., without complying with the provisions
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back
wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to
from the above employers?”
2.
After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 3rd February, 2017
was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:
“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 19-12-2014,
the name of employer no. (i) may be read as “the Dean, College of Horticulture and
Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.” instead of “the Director, Institute of Biotechnology
& Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamipur, H.P.”, which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification.”
3.
On receipt of reference as well as addendum from appropriate government, notices
were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.
4.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
unskilled labourer by respondent No. 1 in the year 2009 with prior approval of respondent No. 2
who continued to work uninterruptedly with the respondents upto 31st December, 2012. Averments
made in the claim petition further revealed that from 2009 to 2012, petitioner had been engaged for
89 days in first spell and after completion of 89 days, he had been given fictional break in his
service as some other group of workmen had been engaged for second spell of 89 days and when
the second spell of workers had completed after 89 days, petitioner had been engaged again for 89
days and such practice of engaging and disengaging by giving fictional breaks to the petitioner
continued upto 31st December, 2012. It is further alleged that respondents had given fictional
breaks of 89 days in two spells to the petitioner and other coworkmen so that they did not complete
240 days in each calendar year for the purpose of counting continuous service envisaged under
Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'Act' for brevity). The
grievance of petitioner remains that his service had been finally terminated by respondent No. 1 on
1-1-2013 alongwith other co-workmen without complying with mandatory provisions of Act as
neither any show cause notice had been issued nor charge-sheet had been raised for any alleged
misconduct and at the same time, no inquiry had been conducted against the petitioner besides no
retrenchment notice or compensation of one month's pay in lieu of notice period had been given
and thus termination order is stated to be illegal, null and void as petitioner had completed 240 days
in preceding 12 calendar months from date of termination. It is alleged that while terminating of
service of petitioner even principle of 'Last come First go' had not been followed as several junior
workmen namely Ishwar Dass and Rajeev Kumar had been retained in service ignoring the rights
of petitioner in violation of Section 25-G of Act as above named two workmen had worked along-
with petitioner on muster-roll and performed same duties. It is alleged that after terminating service
of petitioner and other co workmen, respondents had entered into contract with M/s Shimla
Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. vide letter No. 827-76 dated 30th April, 2013 to
outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 for 11 months and after expiry of the
above said period, respondent no.1 had renewed contract with contractor above-named for further
period of one year and as such the above said contractor had engaged 15 workmen as unskilled
labourers on daily rate basis namely Raj Kumar, Arvind Kumar, Premi Devi, Asha Devi, Kanta
Devi, Beena Devi, Santosh Kumari, Sunita Devi, Nirmla Devi, Soma Devi, Raj Kumari, Sudesh
Kumari, Meena Devi, Santosh Kumari and Sobha Ram who had worked under Shri Rampal
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Baniyal, Incharge and thus respondents had violated provisions of Section 25-H of Act. It is
categorically stated that respondents had sufficient work due to which they had outsourced
unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to be engaged through M/s Shimla Cleanwayas, Sahibu Niwas,
New Shimla, H.P and thus it cannot be stated that respondents did not have sufficient work and
funds in different projects run by it. It is alleged that the service of petitioner and other co-workmen
who had been engaged by the respondents had been terminated with the object to deprive petitioner
and other unskilled labourers so that they did not complete 240 days. It is alleged that respondent
No. 1 without any instructions from respondent No. 2 had given fictional breaks to petitioner and
said act of respondent No. 1 fell under the definition of “unfair labour practice” as defined in Vth
Schedule Clause 10 read with Section 25-T and 25-U of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It further
transpires from petition that the respondents had engaged regular unskilled Class-IV workers on
regular pay scale in Neri I and II who are S/Sh. Chaman Lal, Kishan Chand, Deen, Sanjeev Kumar,
Parkash Chand, Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram however 14 workmen including petitioner had been
initially engaged on daily rate basis for 89 days in two spells as stated above. It is also alleged that
in addition to petitioner and other workers as stated in this para some other workmen had been
engaged who were not given any break and thus respondents has also shown favourtism to one set
of workers which violated provisions of Clause 9 of Schedule 5th of Industrial Disputes Act. It is
alleged that respondents had admitted in the reply filed before the Labour Inspector, Hamirpur that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labourer for 89 days in two spells during calendar year
as per the rules framed by university in year 2002 and that initially after working for 89 days,
petitioner had been given break. It is alleged that these 14 workmen including petitioner had filed a
complaint of illegal termination before Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur in pursuance to which
Additional Deputy Commissioner, District Hamirpur had written a letter No. 129 dated 16-5-2013
for re-engagement of services of retrenched workmen on the basis of order dated 20-11-2004 of
Hon'ble High Court of H.P. It is alleged that petitioner alongwith other workmen had filed CWP
No. 4991/2012 in which Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 20-11-2014 in which directions had
been given to respondents to not give fictional breaks to the petitioners and if their services on this
count already stood dispensed with, then no fresh hand shall be engaged without first offering the
work to the petitioners. It is alleged that despite directions vide order dated 20-11-2014 respondents
had not given offer to petitioner and other co-workmen for appointment in service and contrarily
engaged 15 workmen with contractor and thus respondent No. 1 has violated even order of Hon'ble
High Court. Moreover, respondent did not file any application before Hon'ble High Court seeking
permission in CWP No. 4991/2012 to allow respondents to outsource petitioner unskilled contract
labour in place of terminated workmen. It further remains the case of the petitioner that in reference
154/2012 decided by this Court on 24-8-2012 titled as Mahinder Singh Vs. Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H. P. retrenchment of
Mahinder Singh dated 1-1-2005 was set aside and respondents were directed to re-engage the
petitioner forthwith who was further held entitled to seniority and continuity of service from the
date of his illegal termination except back wages. It is alleged that in pursuance to Award dated
24-8-2012 said Mahinder Singh has been continuously working with the respondents till date of
filing of present claim petition. Accordingly, alleging respondents to have given fictional breaks
from time to time terminating service of petitioner and other co-workmen for 89 days in two spells
and finally terminating service of petitioner on 1-1-2013 is illegal, arbitrary and unjustified in
violation of mandatory provisions of Act. It is claimed that after termination, petitioner has
remained unemployed who was not gainfully employed anywhere from 2013 and thus petitioner
claimed to be entitled for full back wages for period of fictional breaks from 2009 to 2013 till final
termination on 1-1-2013. Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside illegal fictional breaks
w.e.f. 2009 to 31-12-2012 with direction to the respondents to condone the break period in
continuity in service for the purposes of regularization besides has prayed wages for time to time
break period. The claimant/petitioner has further prayed for setting aside illegal termination w.e.f.
1-1-2013 with direction to the respondents to reinstate petitioner forthwith alongwith back wages,
seniority, continuity in service with consequential benefits and litigation costs.
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5.
Respondents No. 1 and 2 contested claim petition, filed joint reply inter-alia taken
preliminary objections of maintainability, limitation and jurisdiction. On merits admitted that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour to do manual work in the experimental fields on
seasonal basis but denied that his service had been illegally terminated by the respondents. It is
alleged that due to non-availability of funds a policy for the engagement of contractual labour was
formulated by the respondent w.e.f. 1-1-2002 so as to recognize engagement and avoid additional
liability. It is claimed that respondents did not have permanent and perennial nature of experimental
field work which required attendance of labourers (during Rabi and Kharif season) as seasonal
labourers were employed for a limited period on contract basis to accomplish the field trial work
with the object of research trial and their data etc. were not wasted for want of adequate manpower.
It is specifically alleged that petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour on a fixed salary for
a particular period in different spells as and when work and funds were available under the project
code No. HGI130-62 as is evident from letter No. UHF/IBES/HGI-130-62/1055-71 dated 3-10-
2012 which postulated that no seniority shall be given to contractual labour and the service of
individual will be terminated after the contract was over as envisaged under conditions No. 2 and 8
of appointment letter. The respondents have asserted that petitioner had after understanding terms
and conditions accepted the engagement and did not complete 240 days in any of the calendar
years. It is alleged by respondents in their reply that as and when work and funds were available
under time bound project, service of labour for field work was required for which advertisement
was given from time to time but the petitioner did not turn up for facing interviews and seeking job.
It is emphatically denied that junior persons namely Rajeev Kumar and Ishwar Dass had been
retained by university rather said Ishwar Dass has been working with the college since 2000.
However, the court had given seniority w.e.f. 14-11-2005 and thus allegation of petitioner that
juniors were retained was stated to be wrong. It is admitted that respondent had entered into
contract with M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla vide letter No. 827-76 dated 30-
4-2013 but outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-1-2013 onwards and engaged skilled and
unskilled labourer through them to carry out the seasonal and adhoc projects work as and when
needed and that if petitioner wanted to get engaged for field work with the respondents then
petitioner was required to approach the said agency. It is asserted that termination of petitioner
including other co-workers outsourcing by respondents had become compulsion of university due
to reason that the university was already facing liability of surplus staff including Class-IV. It is
alleged that respondents are not in a position to continue the service of labourer including petitioner
so as avoid additional financial liability. It is alleged that most of the labourers mentioned in the
petition had been engaged on compassionate grounds as per provisions of rules with the prior
approval of State Govt. besides maintained that petitioner was engaged on contractual basis for
specific terms and conditions and thus he cannot retract from conditions imposed by the
respondents. It is alleged that petitioner was engaged from time to time on fixed salary on
contractual basis and not on regular basis for a specific period. Accordingly, denying all allegations
of petitioner, as contained in claim petition respondents have prayed for dismissal of claim petition.
6.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to the join reply filed by respondents, reiterated his stand
as maintained in the claim petition. It is also reiterated that workmen mentioned in para No. 6 of the
claim petition namely Chaman Lal, Krishan Chand, Jamaldeen, Sanjeev Kumar, Om Prakash,
Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram regular workmen who had been working with the petitioner and
other co-workmen have since been disengaged. It is denied that respondents had engaged some
workmen on compassionate grounds moreover asserted petitioner to be unemployed and not
gainfully employed anywhere during time to time termination and from the date of his final
termination.
7.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, affidavit of petitioner Ex. PW1/A1, copies of
letters dated 3-1-2012, 8-7-2009, 8-1-2010, 2-8-2010, 20-5-2011, 12-1-2012, 3-10-2012 Ex.
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PW1/B to Ex. PW1/H respectively, copy of mandays chart Ex. PW1/I, copy of letter dated
4-5-2013 Ex. PW1/J, copy of CWP No. 4991/2012 Ex. PW1/K, copy of notification dated 30-4-
2012 Ex. PW1/L, copy of letter dated 16-5-2013 Ex. PW1/M, copy of representation dated 10-12-
2012 Ex. PW1/N, copy of letter dated 22-4-2013 Ex. PW1/O, copy of complaint Ex. PW1/P, copy
of letter dated 13-2-2013 Ex. PW1/Q, copy of letter dated 27-1-2014 Ex. PW1/R, copy of Award
dated 24-8-2012 Ex. PW1/S and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led
by petitioner, respondents had examined Dr. P. C. Sharma as RW1, tendered/proved his affidavit
Ex. RW1/A, standing instructions regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis dated
5-12-2001 Ex. RW1/B, letter dated 18-9-2012 regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis
Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated 21-2-2005 Ex. RW1/D, copy of letter dated 13-5-2016
regarding substitution of name of Dir. Institute of Biotechnology Ex. RW1/E and closed evidence.
8.
It is pertinent to mention here that after closing evidence by the respondent, petitioner
had moved an application for additional evidence which was allowed and Shri Jai Ram,
Superintendent office of Dean College of Horticulture & Forestry Neri, Distt. Hamirpur, H.P.
examined as PW2, tendered/proved seniority list of daily paid workers dated 30-4-2017 (07 leaves)
Ex. P1, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 11-4-2011 (06 leaves) Ex. P-2, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 23-2-2011 (07 leaves) Ex. P-3, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 1-10-2014 Ex. P-4, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated
17-10-2015 Ex. P-5, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 16-3-2009 (29 leaves) Ex. P
6, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 10-6-2011 (30 leaves) Ex. P-7, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 7-10-2014 (31 leaves) Ex. P-8, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 16-9-2016 (30 leaves) Ex. P-9, copy of mandays chart of contractual
labourers (09 leaves) Ex. P-10 and closed additional evidence. However, ld. counsel for the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not lead any further additional evidence which was closed vide
separate statement of ld. Counsel for respondents
9.
I have heard ld. Authorized Representative representing petitioner and ld. Counsel for
respondents, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposal of this case.
10. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28-08-2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents
during the years 8-7-2009 to 31-12-2012 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether final termination of services of petitioner w.e.f. 1-1-2013 is/was improper and
unjustified?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 1 or issue No. 2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
5.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
6.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
7.
Whether the claim petition is time barred by limitation as alleged?
. .OPR.
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Relief :
11. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No. 1 : Yes
Issue No. 2 : Yes
Issue No. 3 : Discussed
Issue No. 4 : No
Issue No. 5 : No
Issue No. 6 : Redundant
Issue No. 7 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is partly allowed per operative part of the Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1, 2 and 3 :
12. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
13. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2009 initially for a
period of 89 days and thereafter with intermittent breaks several times till 2012 as is also evident
from mandays chart Ex. P-10. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged on the basis of policy for
engagement of labourers on contractual basis incorporated in Ex. RW1/B dated 5-12-2001. It is
admitted case of respondents that contractual labourers including petitioner had remained engaged
till 2013 ever since initial engagement when respondents allegedly engaged contractor for
outsourcing unskilled contractual labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013. Equally admitted case of respondents is
that duration of contractual labourers as per policy Ex. RW1/B was not to exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spell in whole year and in case re-engaged was to be made then break of atleast 15
days was necessary. It is admittedly not case of respondents that work and conduct of petitioner
was not good and satisfactory. Admittedly, respondents had sufficient work and funds for engaging
petitioner in different projects moreso when unskilled labourers were decided to be engaged from
contractor on outsource basis. It is further admitted case of respondents that petitioner being
contractual unskilled labourer provisions of Section 25 of Act did not apply as petitioner was
squarely covered under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the 'Act'. In view of foregoing admitted facts on
record, claim of petitioner qua termination in violation of Section 2 (oo) of Act needs to be
determined and at the same it also needs to be determined, if respondents deliberately recoursed to
time to time termination of petitioner and thereafter final termination in the year 2013 falling within
ambit of unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Clause 9 of Vth Schedule of 'Act'.
14. At the outset, it would be pertinent to mention here that Ex. RW1/B Standing
Instructions of respondents for engaging contractual unskilled labourers clearly provided that no
casual worker shall be engaged on muster-roll by any functionary of University w.e.f. 1-1-2002
which further stipulated that as far as possible continuing casual worker should be adjusted in
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research and extension projects and thereafter demand for additional hands by deployment of
labour on contract may be made. Clause (e) of policy is reproduced below for reference:
“(e) The duration of the engagement of contractual labour should not exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spells in whole of the year and in case of re-engagement, a break of atleast 15
days is necessary in each case”.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner referring to above-stated rule for engagement of unskilled
contractual labour has contended that respondents being employer have given intermittent break in
service which was countable as petitioner like any other labourer engaged on contract was not in
position to bargain with respondents rather had no option but to work in illegal service conditions
imposed. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as
Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries, reported in 2014 LLR 673 in which Hon'ble
Apex Court has held that artificial break in service every year by reappointing the employee on the
same post tantamounts to 'unfair labour practice' under Section 2(ra) of the Act which is not
permissible under law. It was further observed that when repeated artificial periodical breaks in
service are proved, the termination of workman would not be having protection under Section 2(oo)
(bb) of the Act which would attract relief of reinstatement with full back wages being illegal
retrenchment.
16. PW1 has stepped into witness box deposed on oath as maintained in claim petition
specifically stated that petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2009 who continued to
work with respondents till 31-12-2012 when service of petitioner had been terminated finally along
with 13 other workers without complying with provisions of the 'Act'. He has further stated neither
any show cause notice nor compensation was given although petitioner had completed 240 days in
preceding 12 months from date of termination. Significantly, Ex. P10 mandays does not factually
show petitioner to have worked for 240 days immediately prior to his termination but plea of
petitioner remains that Ex. RW1/B Standing Instructions for engagement of unskilled labourer on
contract basis which fell in the ambit of an unfair labour practice had been invariably recoursed by
respondents during period of employment of petitioner when there were sufficient funds and work
with respondents and in the judgment (supra) of Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was held liable to
be reinstated in service being illegally retrenched.
17. Reliance has further been placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &
Haryana reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development
Authority, Manimajra and Anr. versus Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Rohtak and Anr. Relevant para of judgment is reproduced below:
“Since provision of Section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature of an exception it has to be construed
strictly in favour of the workman as far as possible in letter and spirit. If the termination is
meant to exploit an employee or to increase the bargaining power of the employer,
then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause (bb) and the definition of
'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning…”
18. In the aforestated judgment, Hon'ble High Court (DB) had upheld award passed by
Labour Court relying upon judgment titled as Kapurthala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 1984 (2) Indian Law Reporter 333 (DB) in which
service of workman had been terminated when case of those had completed 230 days. In this case,
services of workmen were terminated without any departmental inquiry or charge-sheet and at the
same time, no notice or compensation was paid. The bank before the Hon'ble Court took plea that
service of workman for specified period and that too with notional breaks and thereafter workmen
were neither entitled for any retrenchment compensation nor reinstatement. The court in (1984)
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case after dilating upon various aspects of matter held that attempt of employer to dispense with
service of workman so as to deprive him in continuity of service for specified period i.e. 240
days envisaged under Section 25-B and 25-F of the Act amounts to unfair labour practice when it is
found that conduct and service of workman was satisfactory. In 1994 judgment (supra) reference
has been made to another case reported in 1989 (2) RSJ 55 titled as Balbir Singh Vs. The
Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Limited in which J. Amarjit Chaudhary interpreted
Sub-Clause (bb) (oo) of Section 2 and relevant para is reproduced below:
"Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act, which was added in 1984 by an
amendment cannot be so construed as to drastically restrict the orbit of the term of
'retrenchment' clause (bb) is an exception which must be interpreted narrowly. It cannot be
given meanings which may nullify or curtail the ambit of their principal clause. No doubt,
the intention of the Parliament in enacting clause (bb) was to exclude certain categories of
workers from the term of retrenchment but there is nothing in this clause which allows an
outlet to un-scrupulour employers to shunt out workers in the graph of non-renewal of their
contract even when the work subsists. This Clause as a whole has to be construed strictly in
favour of the workman as far as possible as to ensure that the Act is implemented in letter
and spirit. If the termination is meant to exploit an employee or to increase the
bargaining power of the employer, then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause
(bb) and the definition of term 'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning. The
contractual clause enshrined in clause (bb) cannot be resorted to frustrate the claim of
the employee against his uncalled for retrenchment or for denying other benefits. It
cannot be so interpreted, as to enable for employer to resort to the policy of hire and fire….”
19. It is admittedly not the case of respondents that petitioner could not be deployed or
employed or say that respondents had terminated service of petitioner since there was not sufficient
work and funds. Be it stated that by engaging contractor for outsourcing unskilled labourer to be
provided to respondents w.e.f. 1-5-2013 is clearly suggestive of the fact that respondents had
sufficient work and funds. Not only this, even several unskilled labourer had been engaged for
whole of the year as reflected in Ex. P5 the tentative seniority list as on 31-12-2014. Thus,
intermittent breaks given by respondents to petitioner establishes unfair labour practice within the
meaning of Section 2(ra) of the Act as the object behind engaging petitioner as contractual labourer
and thereafter giving intermittent breaks and finally terminating without any notice, changing
service conditions by asking petitioner to join contractor from a specific date as has also been
admitted by RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma in cross-examination who is the only witness examined by
respondents. Equally important to mention here is that while filing reply respondents have withheld
facts qua number of labourers engaged in two spells while implementing its policy Ex. RW1/B and
at the same time their names too have not been disclosed establishes that respondents from very
beginning while engaging petitioner intended that petitioner did not attain permanency in job but
for reason stated hereinabove, petitioner is held to have continuous service from 2009 to 2012 as
envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. That being so, it was incumbent upon respondents to have
issued notice under Section 25-F of Act and alternatively to pay wages of one month in lieu of
notice which has not so been done by respondents establishing violation of provisions of Section
25-F of the Act for intermittent breaks as well as for final termination and for similar reasons
disengaging petitioner periodically and retaining juniors in two spells as has come in evidence
clearly establish violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. In order to prove his case, the petitioner has placed reliance upon Ex. R10 the mandays
on fixed wages w.e.f. 2009 relating to petitioner which showed that petitioner had worked under
project HMM 036-62 from 8-7-2009 to 19-4-2011 for 89 days and thereafter with several
intermittent breaks till 31-12-2012 as shown in this document. The plea of the petitioner remains
that the breaks had been given deliberately by respondents so that the petitioner did not complete
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240 days. It has also been stated by petitioner that despite availability of funds and work
intermittent breaks had been given from time to time during total period petitioner remained
engaged with the respondents.
21. Before accepting plea of petitioner for having been given break deliberately from time
to time, it would be also relevant to consider if the petitioner succeeded in establishing that if
throughout the year intermittent breaks would not have been given, he would have continued to be
in service for whole of the year and deemed to have completed continuous service in a year
envisaged under Section 25-B of Act. To prove that provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not
adhered to by respondent while giving intermittent breaks reliance has been placed on seniority list
Ex. P1 to P5 showing junior workmen to petitioner i.e. those daily beldar who joined after
petitioner have been retained, engaging more than 300 days in a year whereas petitioner had been
given intermittent breaks in the same year. The seniority list Ex. P1 shows that Asha Devi and Tara
Chand figuring at serial No. 33 & 34 have joined on 13-7-2009. Ex. P4 is the tentative seniority list
(as on 31-12-2013) of these officials showed i.e. Tara Chand to have worked for 365 days in the
year 2010, 354 days in 2011, 366 days in 2012 and 365 days in 2013. Said Tara Chand figured at
Serial No.15 in the seniority list. Similarly, Asha Devi figuring at serial No. 16 in seniority list Ex.
R4 is shown to have worked for 304 days in 2010, 347 days in 2011, 341 days in 2012 and 363
days in 2013. With the aid of these entries concerning Tara Chand and Asha Devi figuring at serial
No.15 and 16, it has been contended that there was sufficient work and funds available with the
respondents in different projects and these two officials had joined after joining of petitioner who
as per Ex. P10 figured at serial No.8 and had joined on 8-7-2009 and as both these workmen had
been given sufficient work throughout the year(s) despite being engaged at later stage, the
petitioner is held to have been given intermittent break from 8-7-2009 till 31-12-2012 deliberately
by respondents despite having sufficient work and funds, Ex. P10 further shows that petitioner
during these years had remained engaged with intermittent breaks for 11 times from 2009 to 2012
in project HMM 36-62. If Tara Chand and Asha Devi could be given work for more than 300 days
in a year in particular year from 2010 to 2013, there was no reasons or compulsion for the
respondents to have given break to the petitioner as stated above which manifestly shows that
petitioner has been deliberately given breaks in service.
22. The tentative seniority list of daily wage labourers as it stood on 31-12-2013. Ex. P4
revealed that at serial No.15 and 16 names of Tara Chand and Asha Devi existed but at serial Nos.
17 to 20 names of Amravati, Bhim Dutt, Kamla Devi and Saroj Bala have been mentioned who
were shown to have joined and worked with respondents on 28-10-2010, 1-5-2012, 8-5-2012 and
15-5-2012 respectively much later than petitioner who joined in 2009. As such, latest seniority list
available at the time when petitioner was removed from service except Tara Chand and Asha Devi,
others are shown to have joined in the year 2010 and 2012 respectively as mentioned above.
Nothing in the cross-examination of petitioner PW1 could be elicited by respondents which would
demolish his claim qua deliberate intermittent breaks given by the respondents despite work and
funds as other juniors had been given sufficient work for whole of the year and policy Ex. RW1/B
dealing with contractual labourers was primarily a policy meant to exploit unskilled contractual
labourers which could be termed as entirely based on unfair labour practice. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma,
Director, Institute of Biotechnology and Environment Sciences, College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
has deposed that he had been posted on the present assignment since 1-11-2016 besides stated that
petitioner worked with university but did not know that petitioner remained engaged from date of
appointment till 22-4-2013. He has admitted in cross-examination that from 2002 to 2013, 30-32
contractual labourers were engaged, initially for 89 days who were appointed in two batches after
engaging the first batch, second batch was engaged when first batch was disengaged and thereafter
second batch was disengaged which support the plea of petitioner that the process of engagement
and disengagements was deliberate on part of respondents. Apparently, giving such intermittent
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breaks to two groups of unskilled labourers without notice violated Section 25-G of the Act. As
such, respondents are held to have given intermittent breaks to the petitioner in violation of
provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act.
23. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that although adopting
policy for engagement of unskilled labourer on contractual basis vide Ex. RW1/B, respondents had
changed conditions of service of petitioner without issuing any prior notice vide which petitioner
was required to join to contractor engaged to provide unskilled labourers on outsource basis to
respondents which tentamounts to termination of service of petitioner as petitioner had been
engaged with respondents since 2009 and no prior notice was served upon him in 2013 notifying
petitioner to join contractor who was to provide labourers to respondents on the basis of some
agreement entered into between respondents and contractor Ld. Counsel/Authorized Representative
for petitioner had also contended if contractual employment is resorted to as mechanism to frustrate
the claim so that employee did not become regular or permanent against a job which continues or
the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
clause of Section 2(oo) of the Act, the same would be an unfair labour practice under the 'Act'.
Before proceedings further, it would be most pertinent to refer to order dated 20-11-2014 Ex.
PW1/K of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in which present petitioner along with 13 other had filed
CWP No. 4991/2012 when respondents had been directed “to not give fictional breaks to
petitioner and if their services on this count already stand dispense with, no fresh hand shall
be engaged without first affording the work to the petitioners”. In pursuance to the above said
order, petitioner alongwith 13 others had filed the complaint before Deputy Commissioner
Hamirpur for non-enforcement of order dated 20-11-2014 passed by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in
pursuance to which Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur had directed respondents to enforce the order
of the Hon'ble High Court dated 20-11-2014. The plea of respondents in their joint reply remained
that petitioner had not applied for re-engagement with contractor engaged in 2013 which leads to
an irresistible inference that petitioner had been disengaged i.e. terminated from service of
respondents in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. It is admittedly not the case of the
respondents that any notice was served upon petitioner as could also be gathered from cross-
examination of RW1 Dr. P. C. Sharma, Director Dean College of Horticulture respondent No.1
who showed his ignorance if while disengaging petitioner in the year 2013, any notice was served
upon petitioner by respondents. If any notice as required would have been issued by respondents,
RW1 would have certainly denied this question. He has specifically admitted that while
terminating service of petitioner no compensation was paid by respondents. Although these facts
revealed in cross-examination of RW1 coupled with the order of Hon'ble High Court as referred to
above, it can be safely gathered that respondents had not adhered to the mandate of Hon'ble High
Court as the petitioner was not to be disengaged and if disengaged, no fresh hands shall be engaged
although several persons juniors to petitioner have been engaged thereafter as per seniority list Ex.
P5 which further showed availability sufficient work and funds with respondents.
24. Ld. Counsel for the respondents had contended that petitioner being contractual
employee was not covered under the definition of retrenchment under Section 2 (bb) of the Act as
under Clause (bb)(oo) termination of service of workman on contract specifically was excluded
from definition of retrenchment. It is pointed out that since the petitioner was appointed on
contract, he stands excluded from definition of "retrenchment" and therefore respondents were not
required to adhere to provisions of Section 25-F of the 'Act' while disengaging petitioner. Ld.
Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, repudiated the arguments so advanced by the ld.
Counsel for respondents and has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
titled as Manoj Kumar Vs. H.R.T.C. and Anr. reported in 2007 LLR 1155. In the above said
judgment Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held that when repeated and fictional breaks have
been given to workman so that he should not attain permanency, it would not come within the
purview of section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act excluding termination of
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retrenchment. In the case before the Hon'ble High Court respondents had set up similar plea of
petitioner being on contractual employment and thus Section 25-F could not be invoked by the
petitioner. In the above said judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held in para 12
reproduced below for reference:
“….12. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has held in Shailendra Nath Vs. Vice
Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1987 Lab IC 1607 that Section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature
of an exception to Section 2(oo) and has to be construed strictly and in favour of the
workman as the entire object of the Act is secure a just and fair deal to them. Their
Lordships of the Allahabad High Court have held as under:
“The expression, 'termination for whatsoever reason' used in Cl. (oo) came up for
interpretation before the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. N. S. Money, AIR 1976
SC 1111: (1976 Lab IC 769). It was held to mean a termination which takes place either by
active step of employer or by running out of stipulated period. The Hon'ble Court observed
Termination embraced not merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact
of termination, however, produced. Since this wide interpretation resulted in extending
benefit of retrenchment to even purpose or particular job or were casual workers the
Legislature appears to have added sub-cl. (bb) to cl.(oo) in 1984. Even though petitioners
claim to have acquired status of regular employees before the clause was amended as each
of them had completed 240 days prior to its addition in 1984 it may be examined if the
petitioners can be said to be contractual employees as contemplated in this sub-clause. For
that it is necessary to examine its scope and ambit. It may, however, be stated at the outset
that it obviously attempts to exclude that which otherwise would have been included in
principal clause or to be more precise is in the nature of an exception, therefore, it has to be
construed strictly and in favour of workmen as the entire objective of the Act is to secure
just and fair deal for them. Terminations which are included in it are those which are
brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time
stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide a
gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation the nature of
employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of
duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be
for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes
to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated
period or completion of work whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But
if contractual employment is resorted to as a mechanism to frustrate the claim of
employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature
of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on the anvil of
fairness and bonafide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire
and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Cl. (bb). Because if it is left to be employer not
to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstances then the protection
afforded to a workman by treating every termination, of service as retrenchment shall be
rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post
ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bona fide.
It cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also
satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That
would be unfair labour practice [See H.D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India. (1985) 51 Fac
LR 494: (1985 Lab IC 1733) (SC)]. From various annexures filed with affidavits it is clear
that some of the petitioners were employed as Office Assistant, other book binders and
peons. They were awarded benefit of bonus. They have been working for nearly five years.
Their job was not casual, seasonal or of a daily worker. They have not been paid their salary
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on volume of work. Although the wages in some cases are computed on per day basis but
the payment is monthly including holidays. Their duty, therefore, was like a regular
employee and not as casual, daily or seasonal worker….”
Para No.17 of the aforestated judgment is also reproduced below which has bearing on
merits of issue and is reproduced below:
“17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Haryana State Electronics Development
Corporation Limited Vs. Mamni (2206) 9 SCC 434: AIR 2006 SC 2427: 2006 LLR 667
(SC), that appointment for a short period (89 days) and termination of service at the end of
the said period and reappointment after a gap of one day, such action of termination and
reappointment repeated again and again for a period of about one and a half years, in such
circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the termination not bona fide but
adopted to defeat the object of the Act. Thus, it is not covered by section 2(oo)(bb) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947……..”
25. Reliance has further been placed by Hon'ble High Court in Manoj Kumar's case on
another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay titled as Dalip H. Shirke Vs. Zila Parishad
Yavatmal, reported in 1990 Lab IC 100 in which judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as State
Bank of India Vs. N. Sundaramoney reported in 1976 Lab IC 769 had been relied by Hon'ble
High Court of Bombay. It was observed that exception as contained in sub clause (bb) will have to
be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been
enjoying earlier to the amendment. The benefit of law laid down by the Supreme Court was
extended to all the workmen even to those who were employed for specific work or for a
particular job and even to casual labourers who were engaged merely to complete casual nature
of work. In the judgment of N. Sundaramoney's case relied in 2007 case and had observed that
time and again it has been held that welfare statutes must receive the construction which
advances the object of the statutes and protects the weaker section of the society. It was
observed that the employer is always in a position to dictate the terms of service vis-a-vis the
workman or to be workman. The employer can unilaterally impose oppressive and
unreasonable conditions of service and the workman will be left with little choice but to
accept all such conditions even unconscionable conditions of service in the contract of
employment. In the case in hand before this court, respondents had adopted policy of engagement
of contractual labourer to avoid financial liability Ex. RW1/B which prescribed the manner in
which workman was to employed for 89 days in two spells which follows that contractual labourers
engaged for 89 days in first spell were to be disengaged after 89 days engaging new batch and
following such engagements show that after first engagement of labourers as stated above junior
contractual labourer were to certainly disengage senior workmen i.e. first batch for 89 days without
notice despite availability of work and funds which manifestly violated Section 25-G of the 'Act'.
26. In the concluding para in Manoj Kumar's case, Hon'ble High Court has held that
workman had been offered appointment with fictional breaks to prevent petitioner from taking
benefit of Section 25-F of Act. The appointment orders issued in successor to workman was
camouflage to take out petitioner-workman from the ambit of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The appointment of petitioner cannot be termed as contractual and his case will
fall under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it will be covered under
expression “retrenchment”. The act of respondents of engaging petitioner giving fictional
breaks was not bonafide and reinstatement of petitioner-workman was allowed. Applying the
ratio of case law referred to above, it may not be erroneous to observe that in the case in hand
before this court, contractual employment of petitioner and time to time termination was made by
respondents so that petitioner did not become permanent and at the same time act of respondents in
throwing out petitioner from work with contractor without notice is manifestly unfair labour
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practice and petitioner would be covered under definition of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) and
not under exception in Clause (bb) (oo) as has been held in Manoj Kumar's case.
27. Thus, in the case before this court respondents had made scheme which was
significantly promulgated for engagement of contractual labourer for 89 days in one spell and in the
case before the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana having similar period of engagement of
workmen respondents were held to have not complied with the Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act as the workman who was a clerk had been engaged for 89 days and given fresh
appointment twice for 89 days. As such, referring to aforestated case law and evidence on record, it
may not be erroneous to conclude that respondents had recoursed to unfair labour practice initially
by adopting standing instruction for engagement of contractual labour Ex. RW1/B which in its
prescribed clause (e) duration of contractual labourer was to be not more than 89 in a year for two
spells and thereafter by abrupting engagement of labourers on outsource basis through contractor.
But in this case, the petitioner had been engaged several times with intervals as shown in mandays
chart Ex. P10 from 2009 to 2013 and thus the action of respondents in giving intermittent break as
well as finally terminating service without notice and asking the petitioner to work with contractor
who was to provide unskilled labourers to respondents on outsource basis was nothing else but
termination of service of petitioner without any notice and that the intermittent breaks are held to be
deliberately made by the respondents with the object to avoid financial liability upon respondents
which could not be accepted as ground to negate or say defeat claim of petitioner. The termination
of petitioner would thus be not excluded under Section 2 (oo) (bb) and squarely fell under the
definition of retrenchment under the Act necessitating issuance of notice of one month envisaged
under Section 25-F of the Act and in alternative wages for one month in lieu of notice period which
has admittedly not been done as RW1 has shown his inability to tell if while disengaging petitioner
any notice was served. Being the Director in university authorized to contest and depose in this
case on behalf of respondents was expected to know material facts qua engagement and
disengagement of petitioner. Accordingly, applying the case law as referred to above, it is held that
petitioner had been wrongly retrenched from service by the respondents in violation of provisions
of Act.
28. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has taken this court through Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex.
PW1/S passed in Reference No.154/2012 titled as Mohinder Singh versus Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, Distt. Solan, H.P. & Anr. vide which this
court had directed reinstatement of petitioner setting aside retrenchment order qua petitioner w.e.f.
1-1-2005 by respondents and was held entitled for seniority and continuity in service from the date
of illegal termination except back wages. While relying upon the above said Award, ld. Counsel for
the petitioner has contended that above said award has not been assailed by respondents which had
attained finality having similar facts with regard to award Ex. PW1/S. RW1 in cross-examination
has showed his inability to tell if above said award passed against the respondent had been
challenged however specifically admitted that said Mohinder Singh was still working with the
university. Statement of RW1 recorded on 1-10-2011 and award was passed on 28-4-2017 and was
allegedly terminated on 1-1-2005 which goes to show after implementation of award Ex. PW1/S
above-named Mahinder Singh has been in continuous service with the respondent from 1-1-2005 to
31-10-2017 when RW1 was cross-examined. As such, Mohinder Singh's case having similar facts
and not challenged by respondents is equally binding upon respondents qua similarly situated
workmen. In the said judgment also, my ld. predecessor-in-office in para No. 26 on record has
specifically held that action of respondents was unfair labour practice under Clause 10 Vth
Schedule appended under the Act. In so far claim of petitioner qua back wages from date of illegal
termination in the year 2013 is concerned, suffice would be state here that onus to prove that
petitioner/claimant remained unemployed and not gainfully employed was upon respondents.
Although, petitioner has alleged that he remained unemployed and was not gainfully employed ever
since his termination in 2013 by filing affidavit to this effect could not be relied as being a young
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person ageing about 35 years would not have sit idle for about five years without earning and thus
his plea to this effect merits rejection. Accordingly, petitioner is held to be not entitled for back
wages. Accordingly, issues No. 1 and 2 are answered in affirmative holding that act of respondents
in giving time to time break and finally terminating on 1-1-2013 is improper and unjustified.
However, issue No. 3 is decided as discussed holding that petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in
service with seniority and continuity in service without back wages. Issues are decided accordingly.
Issue No. 4:
29. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has contended that College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Neri, Hamirpur, H.P. does not fall under the jurisdiction before this court. On the other
hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner had relied upon Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board etc.
and A. Rajappa and others, AIR 1978 SC 548 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the definition of “industry” envisaged under Section 2(j) of the Act and held that university would
fall within the definition of industry and its employees are workman entitled to protection
envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Ld. Counsel for respondents has failed to
repudiate arguments and as such university cannot be stated to be not industry and its workers to be
not workmen. Issue is decided in negative against the respondents and in favour of petitioner. Since
issues No. 4 and 6 are the same, as such in view of findings of issue No. 4 as stated above, issue
No. 6 has become redundant.
Issue No. 5 :
30. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has not pressed this issue during course of argument.
Otherwise also, from pleadings on record no inference of claim petition being not maintainable can
be raised industrial dispute. In the case in hand, the petitioner had challenged his illegal termination
by the respondents who had allegedly violated of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. As such, being
aggrieved with action of the respondents in terminating service, petitioner could legitimately agitate
his claim before this court. Issue No. 5 is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against
the respondents.
Issue No. 7 :
31. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
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put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-
operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
32. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondents. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner
coupled with evidence on record cannot be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged
by the respondents. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondent and is answered
accordingly.
Relief :
33. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues Nos. 1 to 6, the reference/claim petition
is partly allowed and the respondents are hereby directed to re-engage the petitioner forthwith who
is further held to be in continuous uninterrupted service with the respondents from the date of his
initial engagement in the year 2009 and that the breaks given by the respondent being fictional in
nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of service of the petitioner and his
seniority shall be reckoned from his initial date of engagement however, petitioner shall be entitled
to seniority and continuity in service from the date of his initial engagement except back wages. In
the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
34. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
35. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
36. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala (H.P.).
___________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
62/2015
Date of Institution : 23-02-2015
Date of decision :
24-04-2018
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Shri Dev Raj s/o Shri Gian Chand, r/o Village Mandu, P.O. Lahar, Tehsil Nadaun, District
Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Dean, College of Horticulture and Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
2.
The Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, District
Solan, H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Karan Pathania, Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Dev Raj s/o Shri Gian Chand, r/o
Village Mandu, P.O. Lahar, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P. during year 2012 and
finally w.e.f. 01-01-2013 by (i) the Director, Institute of Biotechnology & Environmental
Sciences, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur,
H.P. (ii) the Registrar, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni,
District Solan, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service
benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employers?”
2.
After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 3rd February, 2017
was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:
“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 28-01-2015,
the name of employer No (i) may be read as “the Dean, College of Horticulture and
Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.” instead of “the Director, Institute of Biotechnology
& Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamipur, H.P.”, which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification.”
3.
On receipt of reference as well as addendum from appropriate government, notices
were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.
4.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
unskilled labourer by respondent No. 1 in the year 2012 with prior approval of respondent No. 2
who continued to work uninterruptedly with the respondents upto 31-12-2012. Averments made in
the claim petition further revealed that from 2012 to 31-12-2012, petitioner had been engaged for
89 days in first spell and after completion of 89 days, he had been given fictional break in his
service as some other group of workmen had been engaged for second spell of 89 days and when
the second spell of workers had completed after 89 days, petitioner had been engaged again for 89
days and such practice of engaging and disengaging by giving fictional breaks to the petitioner
continued upto 31st December, 2012. It is further alleged that respondents had given fictional
breaks of 89 days in two spells to the petitioner and other co-workmen so that they did not
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complete 240 days in each calendar year for the purpose of counting continuous service envisaged
under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'Act' for brevity). The
grievance of petitioner remains that his service had been finally terminated by respondent No. 1 on
1-1-2013 alongwith other co-workmen without complying with mandatory provisions of Act as
neither any show cause notice had been issued nor charge-sheet had been raised for any alleged
misconduct and at the same time, no inquiry had been conducted against the petitioner besides no
retrenchment notice or compensation of one month's pay in lieu of notice period had been given
and thus termination order is stated to be illegal, null and void as petitioner had completed 240 days
in preceding 12 calendar months from date of termination. It is alleged that while terminating of
service of petitioner even principle of 'Last come First go' had not been followed as several junior
workmen namely Ishwar Dass and Rajeev Kumar had been retained in service ignoring the rights
of petitioner in violation of Section 25-G of Act as above named two workmen had worked along-
with petitioner on muster-roll and performed same duties. It is alleged that after terminating service
of petitioner and other co-workmen, respondents had entered into contract with M/s. Shimla
Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. vide letter No. 827-76 dated 30th April, 2013 to
outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 for 11 months and after expiry of the
above said period, respondent No. 1 had renewed contract with contractor above named for further
period of one year and as such the above said contractor had engaged 15 workmen as unskilled
labourers on daily rate basis namely Raj Kumar, Arvind Kumar, Premi Devi, Asha Devi, Kanta
Devi, Beena Devi, Santosh Kumari, Sunita Devi, Nirmla Devi, Soma Devi, Raj Kumari, Sudesh
Kumari, Meena Devi, Santosh Kumari and Sobha Ram who had worked under Shri Rampal
Baniyal, Incharge and thus respondents had violated provisions of Section 25-H of Act. It is
categorically stated that respondents had sufficient work due to which they had outsourced
unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to be engaged through M/s Shimla Cleanwayas, Sahibu Niwas,
New Shimla, H.P and thus it cannot be stated that respondents did not have sufficient work and
funds in different projects run by it. It is alleged that the service of petitioner and other co-workmen
who had been engaged by the respondents had been terminated with the object to deprive petitioner
and other unskilled labourers so that they did not complete 240 days. It is alleged that respondent
No. 1 without any instructions from respondent No. 2 had given fictional breaks to petitioner and
said act of respondent No. 1 fell under the definition of “unfair labour practice” as defined in Vth
Schedule Clause 10 read with Section 25-T and 25-U of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It further
transpires from petition that the respondents had engaged regular unskilled Class-IV workers on
regular pay scale in Neri I and II who are S/Sh. Chaman Lal, Kishan Chand, Deen, Sanjeev Kumar,
Parkash Chand, Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram however 14 workmen including petitioner had been
initially engaged on daily rate basis for 89 days in two spells as stated above. It is also alleged that
in addition to petitioner and other workers as stated in this para some other workmen had been
engaged who were not given any break and thus respondents has also shown favourtism to one set
of workers which violated provisions of Clause 9 of Schedule 5th of Industrial Disputes Act. It is
alleged that respondents had admitted in the reply filed before the Labour Inspector, Hamirpur that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labourer for 89 days in two spells during calendar year
as per the rules framed by university in year 2002 and that initially after working for 89 days,
petitioner had been given break. It is alleged that these 14 workmen including petitioner had filed a
complaint of illegal termination before Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur in pursuance to which
Additional Deputy Commissioner, District Hamirpur had written a letter No. 129 dated 16-5-2013
for re-engagement of services of retrenched workmen on the basis of order dated 20-11-2004 of
Hon'ble High Court of H.P. It is alleged that petitioner alongwith other workmen had filed CWP
No. 4991/2012 in which Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 20-11-2014 in which directions had
been given to respondents to not give fictional breaks to the petitioners and if their services on this
count already stood dispensed with, then no fresh hand shall be engaged without first offering the
work to the petitioners. It is alleged that despite directions vide order dated 20-11-2014 respondents
had not given offer to petitioner and other co-workmen for appointment in service and contrarily
engaged 15 workmen with contractor and thus respondent No. 1 has violated even order of Hon'ble
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High Court. Moreover, respondent did not file any application before Hon'ble High Court seeking
permission in CWP No. 4991/2012 to allow respondents to outsource petitioner unskilled contract
labour in place of terminated workmen. It further remains the case of the petitioner that in reference
154/2012 decided by this Court on 24-8-2012 titled as Mahinder Singh Vs. Registrar, Dr. Y. S.
Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P. retrenchment of
Mahinder Singh dated 1-1-2005 was set aside and respondents were directed to reengage the
petitioner forthwith who was further held entitled to seniority and continuity of service from the
date of his illegal termination except back wages. It is alleged that in pursuance to Award dated
24-8-2012 said Mahinder Singh has been continuously working with the respondents till date of
filing of present claim petition. Accordingly, alleging respondents to have given fictional breaks
from time to time terminating service of petitioner and other co-workmen for 89 days in two spells
and finally terminating service of petitioner on 1-1-2013 is illegal, arbitrary and unjustified in
violation of mandatory provisions of Act. It is claimed that after termination, petitioner has
remained unemployed who was not gainfully employed anywhere from 2013 and thus petitioner
claimed to be entitled for full back wages for period of fictional breaks from 2012 to 31-12-2012
till final termination on 1-1-2013. Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside illegal fictional
breaks w.e.f. 2012 to 31-12-2012 with direction to the respondents to condone the break period in
continuity in service for the purposes of regularization besides has prayed wages for time to time
break period. The claimant/petitioner has further prayed for setting aside illegal termination w.e.f.
1-1-2013 with direction to the respondents to reinstate petitioner forthwith alongwith back wages,
seniority, continuity in service with consequential benefits and litigation costs.
5.
Respondents No. 1 and 2 contested claim petition, filed joint reply inter-alia taken
preliminary objections of maintainability, limitation and jurisdiction. On merits admitted that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour to do manual work in the experimental fields on
seasonal basis but denied that his service had been illegally terminated by the respondents. It is
alleged that due to non-availability of funds a policy for the engagement of contractual labour was
formulated by the respondent w.e.f. 1-1-2002 so as to recognize engagement and avoid additional
liability. It is claimed that respondents did not have permanent and perennial nature of experimental
field work which required attendance of labourers (during Rabi and Kharif season) as seasonal
labourers were employed for a limited period on contract basis to accomplish the field trial work
with the object of research trial and their data etc. were not wasted for want of adequate manpower.
It is specifically alleged that petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour on a fixed salary for
a particular period in different spells as and when work and funds were available under the project
code No. HGI-130-62 as is evident from letter No.UHF/IBES/HGI-130-62/1055-1071 dated
3-10-2012 which postulated that no seniority shall be given to contractual labour and the service of
individual will be terminated after the contract was over as envisaged under conditions No. 2 and 8
of appointment letter. The respondents have asserted that petitioner had after understanding terms
and conditions accepted the engagement and did not complete 240 days in any of the calendar
years. It is alleged by respondents in their reply that as and when work and funds were available
under time bound project, service of labour for field work was required for which advertisement
was given from time to time but the petitioner did not turn up for facing interviews and seeking job.
It is emphatically denied that junior persons namely Rajeev Kumar and Ishwar Dass had been
retained by university rather said Ishwar Dass has been working with the college since 2000.
However, the court had given seniority w.e.f. 14-11-2005 and thus allegation of petitioner that
juniors were retained was stated to be wrong. It is admitted that respondent had entered into
contract with M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla vide letter No. 827-76 dated 30-
4-2013 but outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-1-2013 onwards and engaged skilled and
unskilled labourer through them to carry out the seasonal and adhoc projects work as and when
needed and that if petitioner wanted to get engaged for field work with the respondents then
petitioner was required to approach the said agency. It is asserted that termination of petitioner
including other co-workers outsourcing by respondents had become compulsion of university due
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to reason that the university was already facing liability of surplus staff including Class-IV. It is
alleged that respondents are not in a position to continue the service of labourer including petitioner
so as avoid additional financial liability. It is alleged that most of the labourers mentioned in the
petition had been engaged on compassionate grounds as per provisions of rules with the prior
approval of State Govt. besides maintained that petitioner was engaged on contractual basis for
specific terms and conditions and thus he cannot retract from conditions imposed by the
respondents. It is alleged that petitioner was engaged from time to time on fixed salary on
contractual basis and not on regular basis for a specific period. Accordingly, denying all allegations
of petitioner, as contained in claim petition respondents have prayed for dismissal of claim petition.
6.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to the join reply filed by respondents, reiterated his stand
as maintained in the claim petition. It is also reiterated that workmen mentioned in para No. 6 of the
claim petition namely Chaman Lal, Krishan Chand, Jamaldeen, Sanjeev Kumar, Om Prakash,
Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram regular workmen who had been working with the petitioner and
other co-workmen have since been disengaged. It is denied that respondents had engaged some
workmen on compassionate grounds moreover asserted petitioner to be unemployed and not
gainfully employed anywhere during time to time termination and from the date of his final
termination.
7.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit Ex. PW1/ A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of letter dated 3-1-2012 Ex. PW1/B, copy
of mandays chart Ex. PW1/C, copy of letter dated 4-5-2013 Ex. PW1/D, copy of letter dated
17-5-2013 Ex. PW1/E, Copy of letter dated 16-5-2012 Ex. PW1/F, copy of letter dated 30-4-2013
Ex. PW1/G, copy of letter dated 10-12-2012 Ex. PW1/H, copy of letter dated 13-2-2013 Ex.
PW1/I, copy of letter dated 20-4-2013 Ex. PW1/J, copy of complaint Ex. PW1/K, copy of letter
dated 27-1-2014 Ex. PW1/L, copy of CWP No. 4991/2012 Ex. PW1/M, copy of Award dated
24-8-2012 Ex. PW1/N and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by
petitioner, respondents had examined Dr. P.C. Sharma as RW1, tendered/proved his affidavit Ex.
RW1/A, standing instructions regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis dated 5-12-2001
Ex. RW1/B, letter dated 18-9-2012 regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis Ex.
RW1/C, copy of office order dated 21-2-2005 Ex. RW1/D, copy of letter dated 13-5-2016
regarding substitution of name of Dir. Institute of Biotechnology Ex. RW1/E and closed evidence.
8.
It is pertinent to mention here that after closing evidence by the respondent, petitioner
had moved an application for additional evidence which was allowed and Shri Jai Ram,
Superintendent office of Dean College of Horticulture & Forestry Neri, Distt. Hamirpur, H.P.
examined as PW2, tendered/proved seniority list of daily paid workers dated 30-4-2017 (07 leaves)
Ex. P1, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 11-4-2011 (06 leaves) Ex. P-2, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 23-2-2011 (07 leaves) Ex. P-3, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 1-10-2014 Ex. P-4, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated
17-10-2015 Ex. P-5, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 16-3-2009 (29 leaves) Ex. P
6, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 10-6-2011 (30 leaves) Ex. P-7, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 7-10-2014 (31 leaves) Ex. P-8, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 16-9-2016 (30 leaves) Ex. P-9, copy of mandays chart of contractual
labourers (09 leaves) Ex. P-10 and closed additional evidence. However, ld. Counsel for the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not lead any further additional evidence which was closed vide
separate statement of ld. Counsel for respondents.
9. I have heard ld. Authorized Representative representing petitioner and ld. Counsel for
respondents, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposal of this case.
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10. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28-05-2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents
during the year 2012 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether final termination of services of petitioner w.e.f. 01-01-2013 is/was improper
and unjustified?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 1 or issue No. 2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
5.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
6.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
7.
Whether the claim petition is time barred by limitation as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
11. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No. 1 : Yes
Issue No. 2 : Yes
Issue No. 3 : Discussed
Issue No. 4 : No
Issue No. 5 : No
Issue No. 6 : Redundant
Issue No. 7 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is partly allowed per operative part of the Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1, 2 and 3 :
12. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
13. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2012 initially for a
period of 89 days and thereafter with intermittent breaks several times till 2013 as is also evident
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from mandays chart Ex. P-10. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged on the basis of policy for
engagement of labourers on contractual basis incorporated in Ex. RW1/B dated 5-12-2001. It is
admitted case of respondents that contractual labourers including petitioner had remained engaged
till 2013 ever since initial engagement when respondents allegedly engaged contractor for
outsourcing unskilled contractual labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013. Equally admitted case of respondents is
that duration of contractual labourers as per policy Ex. RW1/B was not to exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spell in whole year and in case re-engaged was to be made then break of atleast 15
days was necessary. It is admittedly not case of respondents that work and conduct of petitioner
was not good and satisfactory. Admittedly, respondents had sufficient work and funds for engaging
petitioner in different projects moreso when unskilled labourers were decided to be engaged from
contractor on outsource basis. It is further admitted case of respondents that petitioner being
contractual unskilled labourer provisions of Section 25 of Act did not apply as petitioner was
squarely covered under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the 'Act'. In view of foregoing admitted facts on
record, claim of petitioner qua termination in violation of Section 2 (oo) of Act needs to be
determined and at the same it also needs to be determined, if respondents deliberately recoursed to
time to time termination of petitioner and thereafter final termination in the year 2013 falling within
ambit of unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Clause 9 of Vth Schedule of 'Act'.
14. At the outset, it would be pertinent to mention here that Ex. RW1/B Standing
Instructions of respondents for engaging contractual unskilled labourers clearly provided that no
casual worker shall be engaged on muster-roll by any functionary of University w.e.f. 1-1-2002
which further stipulated that as far as possible continuing casual worker should be adjusted in
research and extension projects and thereafter demand for additional hands by deployment of
labour on contract may be made. Clause (e) of policy is reproduced below for reference:
“(e) The duration of the engagement of contractual labour should not exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spells in whole of the year and in case of re-engagement, a break of atleast 15
days is necessary in each case”.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner referring to above-stated rule for engagement of unskilled
contractual labour has contended that respondents being employer have given intermittent break in
service which was countable as petitioner like any other labourer engaged on contract was not in
position to bargain with respondents rather had no option but to work in illegal service conditions
imposed. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as
Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries, reported in 2014 LLR 673 in which Hon'ble
Apex Court has held that artificial break in service every year by reappointing the employee on the
same post tantamounts to 'unfair labour practice' under Section 2(ra) of the Act which is not
permissible under law. It was further observed that when repeated artificial periodical breaks in
service are proved, the termination of workman would not be having protection under Section 2(oo)
(bb) of the Act which would attract relief of reinstatement with full back wages being illegal
retrenchment.
16. PW1 has stepped into witness box deposed on oath as maintained in claim petition
specifically stated that petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2012 who continued to
work with respondents till 31-12-2012 when service of petitioner had been terminated finally
along-with 13 other workers without complying with provisions of the 'Act'. He has further stated
neither any show cause notice nor compensation was given although petitioner had completed 240
days in preceding 12 months from date of termination. Significantly, Ex. P10 mandays does not
factually show petitioner to have worked for 240 days immediately prior to his termination but plea
of petitioner remains that Ex. RW1/B Standing Instructions for engagement of unskilled labourer
on contract basis which fell in the ambit of an unfair labour practice had been invariably recoursed
by respondents during period of employment of petitioner when there were sufficient funds and
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work with respondents and in the judgment (supra) of Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was held
liable to be reinstated in service being illegally retrenched.
17. Reliance has further been placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &
Haryana reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development
Authority, Manimajra and Anr. versus Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Rohtak and Anr. Relevant para of judgment is reproduced below:
“Since provision of Section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature of an exception it has to be construed
strictly in favour of the workman as far as possible in letter and spirit. If the termination is
meant to exploit an employee or to increase the bargaining power of the employer,
then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause (bb) and the definition of
'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning…”
18. In the aforestated judgment, Hon'ble High Court (DB) had upheld award passed by
Labour Court relying upon judgment titled as Kapurthala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 1984 (2) Indian Law Reporter 333 (DB) in which
service of workman had been terminated when case of those had completed 230 days. In this case,
services of workmen were terminated without any departmental inquiry or charge-sheet and at the
same time, no notice or compensation was paid. The bank before the Hon'ble Court took plea that
service of workman for specified period and that too with notional breaks and thereafter workmen
were neither entitled for any retrenchment compensation nor reinstatement. The court in (1984)
case after dilating upon various aspects of matter held that attempt of employer to dispense with
service of workman so as to deprive him in continuity of service for specified period i.e. 240
days envisaged under Section 25-B and 25-F of the Act amounts to unfair labour practice when it is
found that conduct and service of workman was satisfactory. In 1994 judgment (supra) reference
has been made to another case reported in 1989 (2) RSJ 55 titled as Balbir Singh Vs. The
Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Limited in which J. Amarjit Chaudhary interpreted
Sub-Clause (bb) (oo) of Section 2 and relevant para is reproduced below:
Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act, which was added in 1984 by an
amendment cannot be so construed as to drastically restrict the orbit of the term of
'retrenchment' clause (bb) is an exception which must be interpreted narrowly. It cannot be
given meanings which may nullify or curtail the ambit of their principal clause. No doubt,
the intention of the Parliament in enacting clause (bb) was to exclude certain categories of
workers from the term of retrenchment but there is nothing in this clause which allows an
outlet to un-scrupulour employers to shunt out workers in the graph of non renewal of their
contract even when the work subsists. This Clause as a whole has to be construed strictly in
favour of the workman as far as possible as to ensure that the Act is implemented in letter
and spirit. If the termination is meant to exploit an employee or to increase the
bargaining power of the employer, then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause
(bb) and the definition of term 'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning. The
contractual clause enshrined in clause (bb) cannot be resorted to frustrate the claim of
the employee against his uncalled for retrenchment or for denying other benefits. It
cannot be so interpreted, as to enable for employer to resort to the policy of hire and fire….”
19. It is admittedly not the case of respondents that petitioner could not be deployed or
employed or say that respondents had terminated service of petitioner since there was not sufficient
work and funds. Be it stated that by engaging contractor for outsourcing unskilled labourer to be
provided to respondents w.e.f. 1-5-2013 is clearly suggestive of the fact that respondents had
sufficient work and funds. Not only this, even several unskilled labourer had been engaged for
whole of the year as reflected in Ex. P5 the tentative seniority list as on 31-12-2014. Thus,
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intermittent breaks given by respondents to petitioner establishes unfair labour practice within the
meaning of Section 2(ra) of the Act as the object behind engaging petitioner as contractual labourer
and thereafter giving intermittent breaks and finally terminating without any notice, changing
service conditions by asking petitioner to join contractor from a specific date as has also been
admitted by RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma in cross-examination who is the only witness examined by
respondents. Equally important to mention here is that while filing reply respondents have withheld
facts qua number of labourers engaged in two spells while implementing its policy Ex. RW1/B and
at the same time their names too have not been disclosed establishes that respondents from very
beginning while engaging petitioner intended that petitioner did not attain permanency in job but
for reason stated hereinabove, petitioner is held to have continuous service from 2012 to 31-12-
2012 as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. That being so, it was incumbent upon
respondents to have issued notice under Section 25-F of Act and alternatively to pay wages of one
month in lieu of notice which has not so been done by respondents establishing violation of
provisions of Section 25-F of the Act for intermittent breaks as well as for final termination and for
similar reasons disengaging petitioner periodically and retaining juniors in two spells as has come
in evidence clearly establish violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. In order to prove his case, the petitioner has placed reliance upon Ex. P10 the mandays
on fixed wages w.e.f. 2009 relating to petitioner which showed that petitioner had worked under
project HMS-218-62 etc. from 8-7-2009 to 19-8-2011 for 89 days and thereafter with several
intermittent breaks till 31-12-2012 as shown in this document. The plea of the petitioner remains
that the breaks had been given deliberately by respondents so that the petitioner did not complete
240 days. It has also been stated by petitioner that despite availability of funds and work
intermittent breaks had been given from time to time during total period petitioner remained
engaged with the respondents.
21. Before accepting plea of petitioner for having been given break deliberately from time
to time, it would be also relevant to consider if the petitioner succeeded in establishing that if
throughout the year intermittent breaks would not have been given, he would have continued to be
in service for whole of the year and deemed to have completed continuous service in a year
envisaged under Section 25-B of Act. To prove that provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not
adhered to by respondent while giving intermittent breaks reliance has been placed on seniority list
Ex. P1 to P5 showing junior workmen to petitioner i.e. those daily beldar who joined after
petitioner have been retained, engaging more than 300 days in a year whereas petitioner had been
given intermittent breaks in the same year. The seniority list Ex. P1 shows that Asha Devi and Tara
Chand figuring at serial No. 33 & 34 have joined on 13-7-2009. Ex. P4 is the tentative seniority list
(as on 31-12-2013) of these officials showed i.e. Tara Chand to have worked for 365 days in the
year 2010, 354 days in 2011, 366 days in 2012 and 365 days in 2013. Said Tara Chand figured at
serial No.15 in the seniority list. Similarly, Asha Devi figuring at serial No. 16 in seniority list Ex.
R4 is shown to have worked for 304 days in 2010, 347 days in 2011, 341 days in 2012 and 363
days in 2013. With the aid of these entries concerning Tara Chand and Asha Devi figuring at serial
No. 15 and 16, it has been contended that there was sufficient work and funds available with the
respondents in different projects and these two officials had joined after joining of petitioner who
as per Ex. P10 figured at serial No.13 and had joined on 8-7-2009 and as both these workmen had
been given sufficient work throughout the year(s) despite being engaged at later stage, the
petitioner is held to have been given intermittent break from 8-7-2009 till 31-12-2012 deliberately
by respondents despite having sufficient work and funds, Ex. P10 further shows that petitioner
during these years had remained engaged with intermittent breaks for 12 times from 2009 to 2013
in project HMS-218-62 and HGI 130- 62. If Tara Chand and Asha Devi could be given work for
more than 300 days in a year in particular year from 2010 to 2013, there was no reasons or
compulsion for the respondents to have given break to the petitioner as stated above which
manifestly shows that petitioner has been deliberately given breaks in service.
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22. The tentative seniority list of daily wage labourers as it stood on 31-12-2013. Ex. P4
revealed that at serial No. 15 and 16 names of Tara Chand and Asha Devi existed but at serial Nos.
17 to 20 names of Amravati, Bhim Dutt, Kamla Devi and Saroj Bala have been mentioned who
were shown to have joined and worked with respondents on 28-10-2010, 1-5-2012, 8-5-2012 and
15-5-2012 respectively much later than petitioner who joined in 2009. As such, latest seniority list
available at the time when petitioner was removed from service except Tara Chand and Asha Devi,
others are shown to have joined in the year 2010 and 2012 respectively as mentioned above.
Nothing in the cross-examination of petitioner PW1 could be elicited by respondents which would
demolish his claim qua deliberate intermittent breaks given by the respondents despite work and
funds as other juniors had been given sufficient work for whole of the year and policy Ex. RW1/B
dealing with contractual labourers was primarily a policy meant to exploit unskilled contractual
labourers which could be termed as entirely based on unfair labour practice. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma,
Director, Institute of Biotechnology and Environment Sciences, College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
has deposed that he had been posted on the present assignment since 1-11-2016 besides stated that
petitioner worked with university but did not know that petitioner remained engaged from date of
appointment till 31-12-2012. He has admitted in cross-examination that from 2002 to 2013, 30-32
contractual labourers were engaged, initially for 89 days who were appointed in two batches after
engaging the first batch, second batch was engaged when first batch was disengaged and thereafter
second batch was disengaged which support the plea of petitioner that the process of engagement
and disengagements was deliberate on part of respondents. Apparently, giving such intermittent
breaks to two groups of unskilled labourers without notice violated Section 25-G of the Act. As
such, respondents are held to have given intermittent breaks to the petitioner in violation of
provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act.
23. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that although adopting
policy for engagement of unskilled labourer on contractual basis vide Ex. RW1/B, respondents had
changed conditions of service of petitioner without issuing any prior notice vide which petitioner
was required to join to contractor engaged to provide unskilled labourers on outsource basis to
respondents which tentamounts to termination of service of petitioner as petitioner had been
engaged with respondents since 2009 and no prior notice was served upon him in 2013 notifying
petitioner to join contractor who was to provide labourers to respondents on the basis of some
agreement entered into between respondents and contractor Ld. Counsel/Authorized Representative
for petitioner had also contended if contractual employment is resorted to as mechanism to frustrate
the claim so that employee did not become regular or permanent against a job which continues or
the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
clause of Section 2(oo) of the Act, the same would be an unfair labour practice under the 'Act'.
Before proceedings further, it would be most pertinent to refer to order dated 20-11-2014 Ex.
PW1/M of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in which present petitioner along with 13 other had filed
CWP No. 4991/2012 when respondents had been directed “to not give fictional breaks to
petitioner and if their services on this count already stand dispense with, no fresh hand shall
be engaged without first affording the work to the petitioners”. In pursuance to the above said
order, petitioner alongwith 13 others had filed the complaint before Deputy Commissioner
Hamirpur for non-enforcement of order dated 20-11-2014 passed by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in
pursuance to which Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur had directed respondents to enforce the order
of the Hon'ble High Court dated 20-11-2014. The plea of respondents in their joint reply remained
that petitioner had not applied for re-engagement with contractor engaged in 2013 which leads to
an irresistible inference that petitioner had been disengaged i.e. terminated from service of
respondents in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. It is admittedly not the case of the
respondents that any notice was served upon petitioner as could also be gathered from cross-
examination of RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma, Director Dean College of Horticulture respondent no.1 who
showed his ignorance if while disengaging petitioner in the year 2013, any notice was served upon
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petitioner by respondents. If any notice as required would have been issued by respondents, RW1
would have certainly denied this question. He has specifically admitted that while terminating
service of petitioner no compensation was paid by respondents. Although these facts revealed in
crossexamination of RW1 coupled with the order of Hon'ble High Court as referred to above, it can
be safely gathered that respondents had not adhered to the mandate of Hon'ble High Court as the
petitioner was not to be disengaged and if disengaged, no fresh hands shall be engaged although
several persons juniors to petitioner have been engaged thereafter as per seniority list Ex. P5 which
further showed availability sufficient work and funds with respondents.
24. Ld. Counsel for the respondents had contended that petitioner being contractual
employee was not covered under the definition of retrenchment under Section 2 (bb) of the Act as
under Clause (bb)(oo) termination of service of workman on contract specifically was excluded
from definition of retrenchment. It is pointed out that since the petitioner was appointed on
contract, he stands excluded from definition of “retrenchment” and therefore respondents were not
required to adhere to provisions of Section 25-F of the 'Act' while disengaging petitioner. Ld.
Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, repudiated the arguments so advanced by the ld.
Counsel for respondents and has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
titled as Manoj Kumar Vs. H.R.T.C. and Anr. reported in 2007 LLR 1155. In the above said
judgment Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held that when repeated and fictional breaks have
been given to workman so that he should not attain permanency, it would not come within the
purview of section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act excluding termination of
retrenchment. In the case before the Honble High Court respondents had set up similar plea of
petitioner being on contractual employment and thus Section 25-F could not be invoked by the
petitioner. In the above said judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held in para 12
reproduced below for reference:
“….12. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has held in Shailendra Nath Vs. Vice
Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1987 Lab IC 1607 that section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature
of an exception to section 2(oo) and has to be construed strictly and in favour of the
workman as the entire object of the Act is secure a just and fair deal to them. Their
Lordships of the Allahabad High Court have held as under:
“The expression, 'termination for whatsoever reason' used in Cl. (oo) came up for
interpretation before the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. N. S. Money, AIR 1976
SC 1111: (1976 Lab IC 769). It was held to mean a termination which takes place either by
active step of employer or by running out of stipulated period. The Hon'ble Court observed.
Termination embraced not merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact
of termination, however, produced‟. Since this wide interpretation resulted in extending
benefit of retrenchment to even purpose or particular job or were casual workers the
Legislature appears to have added sub cl. (bb) to cl.(oo) in 1984. Even though petitioners
claim to have acquired status of regular employees before the clause was amended as each
of them had completed 240 days prior to its addition in 1984 it may be examined if the
petitioners can be said to be contractual employees as contemplated in this subclause. For
that it is necessary to examine its scope and ambit. It may, however, be stated at the outset
that it obviously attempts to exclude that which otherwise would have been included in
principal clause or to be more precise is in the nature of an exception, therefore, it has to be
construed strictly and in favour of workmen as the entire objective of the Act is to secure
just and fair deal for them. Terminations which are included in it are those which are
brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time
stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide a
gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation the nature of
employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of
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duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be
for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes
to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated
period or completion of work whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But
if contractual employment is resorted to as a mechanism to frustrate the claim of
employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature
of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on the anvil of
fairness and bonafide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire
and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Cl. (bb). Because if it is left to be employer not
to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstances then the protection
afforded to a workman by treating every termination, of service as retrenchment shall be
rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post
ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bona fide.
It cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also
satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That
would be unfair labour practice [See H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India. (1985) 51 Fac
LR 494: (1985 Lab IC 1733) (SC)]. From various annexures filed with affidavits it is clear
that some of the petitioners were employed as Office Assistant, other book binders and
peons. They were awarded benefit of bonus. They have been working for nearly five years.
Their job was not casual, seasonal or of a daily worker. They have not been paid their salary
on volume of work. Although the wages in some cases are computed on per day basis but
the payment is monthly including holidays. Their duty, therefore, was like a regular
employee and not as casual, daily or seasonal worker….”
Para No.17 of the aforestated judgment is also reproduced below which has bearing on
merits of issue and is reproduced below:
“17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Haryana State Electronics Development
Corporation Limited Vs. Mamni, (2206) 9 SCC 434: AIR 2006 SC 2427: 2006 LLR 667
(SC), that appointment for a short period (89 days) and termination of service at the end of
the said period and reappointment after a gap of one day, such action of termination and
reappointment repeated again and again for a period of about one and a half years, in such
circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the termination not bona fide but
adopted to defeat the object of the Act. Thus, it is not covered by section 2(oo)(bb) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947……..”
25. Reliance has further been placed by Hon'ble High Court in Manoj Kumar's case on
another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay titled as Dalip H. Shirke Vs. Zila Parishad
Yavatmal, reported in 1990 Lab IC 100 in which judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as State
Bank of India Vs. N. Sundaramoney reported in 1976 Lab IC 769 had been relied by Hon'ble
High Court of Bombay. It was observed that exception as contained in sub clause (bb) will have to
be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been
enjoying earlier to the amendment. The benefit of law laid down by the Supreme Court was
extended to all the workmen even to those who were employed for specific work or for a
particular job and even to casual labourers who were engaged merely to complete casual nature
of work. In the judgment of N. Sundaramoney's case relied in 2007 case and had observed that
time and again it has been held that welfare statutes must receive the construction which
advances the object of the statutes and protects the weaker section of the society. It was
observed that the employer is always in a position to dictate the terms of service vis-a-vis the
workman or to be workman. The employer can unilaterally impose oppressive and
unreasonable conditions of service and the workman will be left with little choice but to
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accept all such conditions even unconscionable conditions of service in the contract of
employment. In the case in hand before this court, respondents had adopted policy of engagement
of contractual labourer to avoid financial liability Ex. RW1/B which prescribed the manner in
which workman was to employed for 89 days in two spells which follows that contractual
labouerers engaged for 89 days in first spell were to be disengaged after 89 days engaging new
batch and following such engagements show that after first engagement of labourers as stated
above junior contractual labourer were to certainly disengage senior workmen i.e. first batch for 89
days without notice despite availability of work and funds which manifestly violated Section 25-G
of the 'Act'.
26. In the concluding para in Manoj Kumar's case, Hon'ble High Court has held that
workman had been offered appointment with fictional breaks to prevent petitioner from taking
benefit of Section 25-F of Act. The appointment orders issued in successor to workman was
camouflage to take out petitioner-workman from the ambit of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The appointment of petitioner cannot be termed as contractual and his case will
fall under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it will be covered under
expression “retrenchment”. The act of respondents of engaging petitioner giving fictional
breaks was not bonafide and reinstatement of petitioner-workman was allowed. Applying the
ratio of case law referred to above, it may not be erroneous to observe that in the case in hand
before this court, contractual employment of petitioner and time to time termination was made by
respondents so that petitioner did not become permanent and at the same time act of respondents in
throwing out petitioner from work with contractor without notice is manifestly unfair labour
practice and petitioner would be covered under definition of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) and
not under exception in Clause (bb) (oo) as has been held in Manoj Kumar's case.
27. Thus, in the case before this court respondents had made scheme which was
significantly promulgated for engagement of contractual labourer for 89 days in one spell and in the
case before the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana having similar period of engagement of
workmen respondents were held to have not complied with the Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act as the workman who was a clerk had been engaged for 89 days and given fresh
appointment twice for 89 days. As such, referring to aforestated case law and evidence on record, it
may not be erroneous to conclude that respondents had recoursed to unfair labour practice initially
by adopting standing instruction for engagement of contractual labour Ex. RW1/B which in its
prescribed clause (e) duration of contractual labourer was to be not more than 89 in a year for two
spells and thereafter by abrupting engagement of labourers on outsource basis through contractor.
But in this case, the petitioner had been engaged several times with intervals as shown in mandays
chart Ex. P10 from 2009 to 31-12-2012 and thus the action of respondents in giving intermittent
break as well as finally terminating service without notice and asking the petitioner to work with
contractor who was to provide unskilled labourers to respondents on outsource basis was nothing
else but termination of service of petitioner without any notice and that the intermittent breaks are
held to be deliberately made by the respondents with the object to avoid financial liability upon
respondents which could not be accepted as ground to negate or say defeat claim of petitioner. The
termination of petitioner would thus be not excluded under Section 2 (oo) (bb) and squarely fell
under the definition of retrenchment under the Act necessitating issuance of notice of one month
envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act and in alternative wages for one month in lieu of notice
period which has admittedly not been done as RW1 has shown his inability to tell if while
disengaging petitioner any notice was served. Being the Director in university authorized to contest
and depose in this case on behalf of respondents was expected to know material facts qua
engagement and disengagement of petitioner. Accordingly, applying the case law as referred to
above, it is held that petitioner had been wrongly retrenched from service by the respondents in
violation of provisions of Act.
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28. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has taken this court through Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex.
PW1/N passed in Reference No.154/2012 titled as Mohinder Singh versus Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, Distt. Solan, H.P. & Anr. vide which this
court had directed reinstatement of petitioner setting aside retrenchment order qua petitioner w.e.f.
1-1-2005 by respondents and was held entitled for seniority and continuity in service from the date
of illegal termination except back wages. While relying upon the above said Award, ld. Counsel for
the petitioner has contended that above said award has not been assailed by respondents which had
attained finality having similar facts with regard to award Ex. PW1/N. RW1 in cross-examination
has showed his inability to tell if above said award passed against the respondent had been
challenged however specifically admitted that said Mohinder Singh was still working with the
university. Statement of RW1 recorded on 1-10-2011 and award was passed on 28-4-2017 and was
allegedly terminated on 1-1-2005 which goes to show after implementation of award Ex. PW1/N
above-named Mohinder Singh has been in continuous service with the respondent from 1-1-2005 to
31-10-2017 when RW1 was cross-examined. As such, Mohinder Singh's case having similar facts
and not challenged by respondents is equally binding upon respondents qua similarly situated
workmen. In the said judgment also, my ld. predecessor-in-office in para No. 26 on record has
specifically held that action of respondents was unfair labour practice under Clause 10 Vth
Schedule appended under the Act. In so far claim of petitioner qua back wages from date of illegal
termination in the year 2013 is concerned, suffice would be state here that onus to prove that
petitioner/claimant remained unemployed and not gainfully employed was upon respondents.
Although, petitioner has alleged that he remained unemployed and was not gainfully employed ever
since his termination in 2013 by filing affidavit to this effect could not be relied as being a young
person ageing about 36 years would not have sit idle for about five years without earning and thus
his plea to this effect merits rejection. Accordingly, petitioner is held to be not entitled for back
wages. Accordingly, issues No.1 and 2 are answered in affirmative holding that act of respondents
in giving time to time break and finally terminating on 1-1-2013 is improper and unjustified.
However, issue No. 3 is decided as discussed holding that petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in
service with seniority and continuity in service without back wages. Issues are decided accordingly.
Issue No. 4:
29. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has contended that College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Neri, Hamirpur, H.P. does not fall under the jurisdiction before this court. On the other
hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner had relied upon Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board etc.
and A. Rajappa and others, AIR 1978 SC 548 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the definition of “industry” envisaged under Section 2(j) of the Act and held that university would
fall within the definition of industry and its employees are workman entitled to protection
envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Ld. Counsel for respondents has failed to
repudiate arguments and as such university cannot be stated to be not industry and its workers to be
not workmen. Issue is decided in negative against the respondents and in favour of petitioner. Since
issues No. 4 and 6 are the same, as such in view of findings of issue No. 4 as stated above, issue
No. 6 has become redundant.
Issue No. 5:
30. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has not pressed this issue during course of argument.
Otherwise also, from pleadings on record no inference of claim petition being not maintainable can
be raised industrial dispute. In the case in hand, the petitioner had challenged his illegal termination
by the respondents who had allegedly violated of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. As such, being
aggrieved with action of the respondents in terminating service, petitioner could legitimately agitate
his claim before this court. Issue No. 5 is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against
the respondents.
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Issue No. 7:
31. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425,
it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim
on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government and the
Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government and same
is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The
Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 752,
has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of
Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to put the
restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the provision and in
absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to introduce the limitation
on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
32. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondents. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner
coupled with evidence on record cannot be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged
by the respondents. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondent and is answered
accordingly.
Relief :
33. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues Nos. 1 to 6, the reference/claim petition
is partly allowed and the respondents are hereby directed to re-engage the petitioner forthwith who
is further held to be in continuous uninterrupted service with the respondents from the date of his
initial engagement in the year 2009 and that the breaks given by the respondent being fictional in
nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of service of the petitioner and his
seniority shall be reckoned from his initial date of engagement however, petitioner shall be entitled
to seniority and continuity in service from the date of his initial engagement except back wages. In
the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
34. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
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35. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
36. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
______________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
08/2015
Date of Institution : 13-01-2015
Date of decision :
24-4-2018
Shri Madan Lal s/o Shri Jondu Ram, r/o Village Badihina, P.O. Amroh, Tehsil Nadaun,
District Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Dean, College of Horticulture and Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
2. The Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, District
Solan, H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Karan Pathania, Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Madan Lal s/o Shri Jondu Ram,
r/o Village Badihina, P.O. Amroh, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P. w.e.f. 16-01-
2008 to 31-12-2012 thereafter re-engagement from 14-03-2013 to 22-4-2013 and final
termination w.e.f. 23-4-2013 by (i) the Director, Institute of Biotechnology & Environment
Sciences, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur,
H.P. (ii) the Registrar, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni,
District Solan, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,
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1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service
benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”
2.
After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 3rd February, 2017
was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:
“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 16-12-2014,
the name of employer No (i) may be read as “the Dean, College of Horticulture and
Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.” instead of “the Director, Institute of Biotechnology
& Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamipur, H.P.”, which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification.”
3.
On receipt of reference as well as addendum from appropriate government, notices
were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.
4.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
unskilled labourer by respondent No. 1 in the year 2008 with prior approval of respondent No. 2
who continued to work uninterruptedly with the respondents upto 22nd April, 2013. Averments
made in the claim petition further revealed that from 2004 to 2013, petitioner had been engaged for
89 days in first spell and after completion of 89 days, he had been given fictional break in his
service as some other group of workmen had been engaged for second spell of 89 days and when
the second spell of workers had completed after 89 days, petitioner had been engaged again for 89
days and such practice of engaging and disengaging by giving fictional breaks to the petitioner
continued upto 22nd April, 2013. It is further alleged that respondents had given fictional breaks of
89 days in two spells to the petitioner and other co-workmen so that they did not complete 240 days
in each calendar year for the purpose of counting continuous service envisaged under Section 25-B
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'Act' for brevity). The grievance of
petitioner remains that his service had been finally terminated by respondent No. 1 on 23-4-2013
alongwith other co-workmen without complying with mandatory provisions of Act as neither any
show cause notice had been issued nor charge-sheet had been raised for any alleged misconduct
and at the same time, no inquiry had been conducted against the petitioner besides no retrenchment
notice or compensation of one month's pay in lieu of notice period had been given and thus
termination order is stated to be illegal, null and void as petitioner had completed 240 days in
preceding 12 calendar months from date of termination. It is alleged that while terminating of
service of petitioner even principle of 'Last come First go' had not been followed as several junior
workmen namely Ishwar Dass and Rajeev Kumar had been retained in service ignoring the rights
of petitioner in violation of Section 25-G of Act as above named two workmen had worked along-
with petitioner on muster roll and performed same duties. It is alleged that after terminating service
of petitioner and other co-workmen, respondents had entered into contract with M/s. Shimla
Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. vide letter No. 827-76 dated 30th April, 2013 to
outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 for 11 months and after expiry of the
above said period, respondent No. 1 had renewed contract with contractor above-named for further
period of one year and as such the above said contractor had engaged 15 workmen as unskilled
labourers on daily rate basis namely Raj Kumar, Arvind Kumar, Premi Devi, Asha Devi, Kanta
Devi, Beena Devi, Santosh Kumari, Sunita Devi, Nirmla Devi, Soma Devi, Raj Kumari, Sudesh
Kumari, Meena Devi, Santosh Kumari and Sobha Ram who had worked under Shri Rampal
Baniyal, Incharge and thus respondents had violated provisions of Section 25-H of Act. It is
categorically stated that respondents had sufficient work due to which they had outsourced
unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to be engaged through M/s Shimla Cleanwayas, Sahibu Niwas,
New Shimla, H.P. and thus it cannot be stated that respondents did not have sufficient work and
funds in different projects run by it. It is alleged that the service of petitioner and other co-workmen
who had been engaged by the respondents had been terminated with the object to deprive petitioner
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and other unskilled labourers so that they did not complete 240 days. It is alleged that respondent
No. 1 without any instructions from respondent No. 2 had given fictional breaks to petitioner and
said act of respondent No. 1 fell under the definition of “unfair labour practice” as defined in Vth
Schedule Clause 10 read with Section 25-T and 25-U of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It further
transpires from petition that the respondents had engaged regular unskilled Class-IV workers on
regular pay scale in Neri I and II who are S/Sh. Chaman Lal, Kishan Chand, Deen, Sanjeev Kumar,
Parkash Chand, Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram however 14 workmen including petitioner had been
initially engaged on daily rate basis for 89 days in two spells as stated above. It is also alleged that
in addition to petitioner and other workers as stated in this para some other workmen had been
engaged who were not given any break and thus respondents has also shown favourtism to one set
of workers which violated provisions of Clause 9 of Schedule 5th of Industrial Disputes Act. It is
alleged that respondents had admitted in the reply filed before the Labour Inspector, Hamirpur that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labourer for 89 days in two spells during calendar year
as per the rules framed by university in year 2002 and that initially after working for 89 days,
petitioner had been given break. It is alleged that these 14 workmen including petitioner had filed a
complaint of illegal termination before Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur in pursuance to which
Additional Deputy Commissioner, District Hamirpur had written a letter No. 129 dated 16-5-2013
for reengagement of services of retrenched workmen on the basis of order dated 20-11-2004 of
Hon'ble High Court of H.P. It is alleged that petitioner alongwith other workmen had filed CWP
No. 4991/2012 in which Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 20-11-2014 in which directions had
been given to respondents to not give fictional breaks to the petitioners and if their services on this
count already stood dispensed with, then no fresh hand shall be engaged without first offering the
work to the petitioners. It is alleged that despite directions vide order dated 20-11-2014 respondents
had not given offer to petitioner and other co-workmen for appointment in service and contrarily
engaged 15 workmen with contractor and thus respondent No. 1 has violated even order of Hon'ble
High Court. Moreover, respondent did not file any application before Hon'ble High Court seeking
permission in CWP No. 4991/2012 to allow respondents to outsource petitioner unskilled contract
labour in place of terminated workmen. It further remains the case of the petitioner that in reference
154/2012 decided by this Court on 24-8-2012 titled as Mahinder Singh Vs. Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P. retrenchment of
Mahinder Singh dated 1-1-2005 was set aside and respondents were directed to reengage the
petitioner forthwith who was further held entitled to seniority and continuity of service from the
date of his illegal termination except back wages. It is alleged that in pursuance to Award dated
24-8-2012 said Mahinder Singh has been continuously working with the respondents till date of
filing of present claim petition. Accordingly, alleging respondents to have given fictional breaks
from time to time terminating service of petitioner and other co-workmen for 89 days in two spells
and finally terminating service of petitioner on 23-4-2013 is illegal, arbitrary and unjustified in
violation of mandatory provisions of Act. It is claimed that after termination, petitioner has
remained unemployed who was not gainfully employed anywhere from 2013 and thus petitioner
claimed to be entitled for full back wages for period of fictional breaks from 2008 to 2013 till final
termination on 23-4-2013. Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside illegal fictional breaks
w.e.f. 2008 to 22-4-2013 with direction to the respondents to condone the break period in continuity
in service for the purposes of regularization besides has prayed wages for time to time break period.
The claimant/petitioner has further prayed for setting aside illegal termination w.e.f. 22-4-2013 with
direction to the respondents to reinstate petitioner forthwith alongwith back wages, seniority,
continuity in service with consequential benefits and litigation costs.
5.
Respondents No. 1 and 2 contested claim petition, filed joint reply inter-alia taken
preliminary objections of maintainability, limitation and jurisdiction. On merits admitted that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour to do manual work in the experimental fields on
seasonal basis but denied that his service had been illegally terminated by the respondents. It is
alleged that due to non-availability of funds a policy for the engagement of contractual labour was
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formulated by the respondent w.e.f. 1-1-2002 so as to recognize engagement and avoid additional
liability. It is claimed that respondents did not have permanent and perennial nature of experimental
field work which required attendance of labourers (during Rabi and Kharif season) as seasonal
labourers were employed for a limited period on contract basis to accomplish the field trial work
with the object of research trial and their data etc. were not wasted for want of adequate manpower.
It is specifically alleged that petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour on a fixed salary for
a particular period in different spells as and when work and funds were available under the
project/scheme code No. HPL-038-62 as is evident from letter No. UHF/RHFRS/1-7/-1557 dated
15-1-2008 which postulated that no seniority shall be given to contractual labour and the service of
individual will be terminated after the contract was over as envisaged under conditions No. 2 and 8
of appointment letter. The respondents have asserted that petitioner had after understanding terms
and conditions accepted the engagement and did not complete 240 days in any of the calendar
years. It is alleged by respondents in their reply that as and when work and funds were available
under time bound project, service of labour for field work was required for which advertisement
was given from time to time but the petitioner did not turn up for facing interviews and seeking job.
It is emphatically denied that junior persons namely Rajeev Kumar and Ishwar Dass had been
retained by university rather said Ishwar Dass has been working with the college since 2000.
However, the court had given seniority w.e.f. 14-11-2005 and thus allegation of petitioner that
juniors were retained was stated to be wrong. It is admitted that respondent had entered into
contract with M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla vide letter No. 827-76 dated
30-4-2013 but outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-1-2013 onwards and engaged skilled and
unskilled labourer through them to carry out the seasonal and adhoc projects work as and when
needed and that if petitioner wanted to get engaged for field work with the respondents then
petitioner was required to approach the said agency. It is asserted that termination of petitioner
including other co-workers outsourcing by respondents had become compulsion of university due
to reason that the university was already facing liability of surplus staff including Class-IV. It is
alleged that respondents are not in a position to continue the service of labourer including petitioner
so as avoid additional financial liability. It is alleged that most of the labourers mentioned in the
petition had been engaged on compassionate grounds as per provisions of rules with the prior
approval of State Govt. besides maintained that petitioner was engaged on contractual basis for
specific terms and conditions and thus he cannot retract from conditions imposed by the
respondents. It is alleged that petitioner was engaged from time to time on fixed salary on
contractual basis and not on regular basis for a specific period. Accordingly, denying all allegations
of petitioner, as contained in claim petition respondents have prayed for dismissal of claim petition.
6.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to the join reply filed by respondents, reiterated his stand
as maintained in the claim petition. It is also reiterated that workmen mentioned in para No. 6 of the
claim petition namely Chaman Lal, Krishan Chand, Jamaldeen, Sanjeev Kumar, Om Prakash,
Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram regular workmen who had been working with the petitioner and
other co-workmen have since been disengaged. It is denied that respondents had engaged some
workmen on compassionate grounds moreover asserted petitioner to be unemployed and not
gainfully employed anywhere during time to time termination and from the date of his final
termination.
7.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, affidavit of petitioner Ex. PW1/A1, copy of
judgment dated 20-11-2014 Ex. PW1/B, copy of application dated 4-5-2013 Ex. PW1/C, copy of
notification dated 30-4-2013 Ex. PW1/D, copy of letter dated 16-5-2013 Ex. PW1/E, copy of reply
to the demand notice dated 3-7-2013 Ex. PW1/F, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/G, copies of letters
dated 3-10-2012, 14-2-2013, 13-3-2013, 30-4-2008, 30-4-2008 Ex. PW1/H to Ex. PW1/L
respectively, copy of representation dated 10-12-2012 Ex. PW1/M, copy of letter dated 22-4-2013
Ex. PW1/N, copy of complaint letter Ex. PW1/O, copy of letter dated 13-2-2013 Ex. PW1/P, copy
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of letter dated 27-1-2014 Ex. PW1/Q copy of Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex. PW1/R and closed
evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondents had examined
Dr. P.C. Sharma as RW1, tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, standing instructions regarding
engagement of labour on contractual basis dated 5-12-2001 Ex. RW1/B, letter dated 18-9-2012
regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated 21-2-
2005 Ex. RW1/D, copy of letter dated 13-5-2016 regarding substitution of name of Dir. Institute of
Biotechnology Ex. RW1/E and closed evidence.
8.
It is pertinent to mention here that after closing evidence by the respondent, petitioner
had moved an application for additional evidence which was allowed and Shri Jai Ram,
Superintendent office of Dean College of Horticulture & Forestry Neri, Distt. Hamirpur, H.P.
examined as PW2, tendered/proved seniority list of daily paid workers dated 30-4-2017 (07 leaves)
Ex. P1, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 11-4-2011 (06 leaves) Ex. P-2, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 23-2-2011 (07 leaves) Ex. P-3, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 1-10-2014 Ex. P 4, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated
17-10-2015 Ex. P-5, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 16-3-2009 (29 leaves) Ex.
P-6, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 10-6-2011 (30 leaves) Ex. P-7, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 7-10-2014 (31 leaves) Ex. P-8, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 16-9-2016 (30 leaves) Ex. P 9, copy of mandays chart of contractual
labourers (09 leaves) Ex. P-10 and closed additional evidence. However, ld. Counsel for the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not lead any further additional evidence which was closed vide
separate statement of ld. Counsel for respondents
9.
I have heard ld. Authorized Representative representing petitioner and ld. Counsel for
respondents, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposal of this case.
10. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28-08-2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents
during the year 16-1-2008 to 31-12-2012 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2. Whether the petitioner was reengaged from 14-03-2013 to 22-4-2013 and final
termination of services of petitioner w.e.f. 23-4-2013 is/was improper and unjustified?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 1 or issue No. 2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
5.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
6.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
7.
Whether the claim petition is time barred by limitation as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
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11. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No. 1 : Yes
Issue No. 2 : Yes
Issue No. 3 : Discussed
Issue No. 4 : No
Issue No. 5 : No
Issue No. 6 : Redundant
Issue No. 7 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is partly allowed per operative part of the Award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1, 2 and 3 :
12. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
13. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2008 initially for a
period of 89 days and thereafter with intermittent breaks several times till 2013 as is also evident
from mandays chart Ex. P-10. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged on the basis of policy for
engagement of labourers on contractual basis incorporated in Ex. RW1/B dated 5-12-2001. It is
admitted case of respondents that contractual labourers including petitioner had remained engaged
till 2013 ever since initial engagement when respondents allegedly engaged contractor for
outsourcing unskilled contractual labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013. Equally admitted case of respondents is
that duration of contractual labourers as per policy Ex. RW1/B was not to exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spell in whole year and in case re-engaged was to be made then break of atleast 15
days was necessary. It is admittedly not case of respondents that work and conduct of petitioner
was not good and satisfactory. Admittedly, respondents had sufficient work and funds for engaging
petitioner in different projects moreso when unskilled labourers were decided to be engaged from
contractor on outsource basis. It is further admitted case of respondents that petitioner being
contractual unskilled labourer provisions of Section 25 of Act did not apply as petitioner was
squarely covered under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the 'Act'. In view of foregoing admitted facts on
record, claim of petitioner qua termination in violation of Section 2 (oo) of Act needs to be
determined and at the same it also needs to be determined, if respondents deliberately recoursed to
time to time termination of petitioner and thereafter final termination in the year 2013 falling within
ambit of unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Clause 9 of Vth Schedule of 'Act'.
14. At the outset, it would be pertinent to mention here that Ex. RW1/B Standing
Instructions of respondents for engaging contractual unskilled labourers clearly provided that no
casual worker shall be engaged on muster-roll by any functionary of University w.e.f. 1-1-2002
which further stipulated that as far as possible continuing casual worker should be adjusted in
research and extension projects and thereafter demand for additional hands by deployment of
labour on contract may be made. Clause (e) of policy is reproduced below for reference:
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“(e) The duration of the engagement of contractual labour should not exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spells in whole of the year and in case of re-engagement, a break of atleast 15
days is necessary in each case”.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner referring to above-stated rule for engagement of unskilled
contractual labour has contended that respondents being employer have given intermittent break in
service which was countable as petitioner like any other labourer engaged on contract was not in
position to bargain with respondents rather had no option but to work in illegal service conditions
imposed. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as
Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries, reported in 2014 LLR 673 in which Hon'ble
Apex Court has held that artificial break in service every year by reappointing the employee on the
same post tantamounts to 'unfair labour practice' under Section 2(ra) of the Act which is not
permissible under law. It was further observed that when repeated artificial periodical breaks in
service are proved, the termination of workman would not be having protection under Section 2
(oo) (bb) of the Act which would attract relief of reinstatement with full back wages being illegal
retrenchment.
16. PW1 has stepped into witness box deposed on oath as maintained in claim petition
specifically stated that petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2008 who continued to
work with respondents till 22-4-2013 when service of petitioner had been terminated finally along
with 13 other workers without complying with provisions of the 'Act'. He has further stated neither
any show cause notice nor compensation was given although petitioner had completed 240 days in
preceding 12 months from date of termination. Significantly, Ex. P10 mandays does not factually
show petitioner to have worked for 240 days immediately prior to his termination but plea of
petitioner remains that Ex. RW1/B Standing Instructions for engagement of unskilled labourer on
contract basis which fell in the ambit of an unfair labour practice had been invariably recoursed by
respondents during period of employment of petitioner when there were sufficient funds and work
with respondents and in the judgment (supra) of Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was held liable to
be reinstated in service being illegally retrenched.
17. Reliance has further been placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &
Haryana reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development
Authority, Manimajra, and Anr. versus Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Rohtak and Anr. Relevant para of judgment is reproduced below:
“Since provision of Section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature of an exception it has to be construed
strictly in favour of the workman as far as possible in letter and spirit. If the termination is
meant to exploit an employee or to increase the bargaining power of the employer,
then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause (bb) and the definition of
'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning…”
18. In the aforestated judgment, Hon'ble High Court (DB) had upheld award passed by
Labour Court relying upon judgment titled as Kapurthala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 1984 (2) Indian Law Reporter 333 (DB) in which
service of workman had been terminated when case of those had completed 230 days. In this case,
services of workmen were terminated without any departmental inquiry or charge-sheet and at the
same time, no notice or compensation was paid. The bank before the Hon'ble Court took plea that
service of workman for specified period and that too with notional breaks and thereafter workmen
were neither entitled for any retrenchment compensation nor reinstatement. The court in (1984)
case after dilating upon various aspects of matter held that attempt of employer to dispense with
service of workman so as to deprive him in continuity of service for specified period i.e. 240
days envisaged under Section 25-B and 25-F of the Act amounts to unfair labour practice when it is
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found that conduct and service of workman was satisfactory. In 1994 judgment (supra) reference
has been made to another case reported in 1989 (2) RSJ 55 titled as Balbir Singh Vs. The
Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Limited in which J. Amarjit Chaudhary interpreted
Sub-clause (bb) (oo) of Section 2 and relevant para is reproduced below:
Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act, which was added in 1984 by an
amendment cannot be so construed as to drastically restrict the orbit of the term of
'retrenchment' clause (bb) is an exception which must be interpreted narrowly. It cannot be
given meanings which may nullify or curtail the ambit of their principal clause. No doubt,
the intention of the Parliament in enacting clause (bb) was to exclude certain categories of
workers from the term of retrenchment but there is nothing in this clause which allows an
outlet to un-scrupulour employers to shunt out workers in the graph of non-renewal of their
contract even when the work subsists. This Clause as a whole has to be construed strictly in
favour of the workman as far as possible as to ensure that the Act is implemented in letter
and spirit. If the termination is meant to exploit an employee or to increase the
bargaining power of the employer, then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause
(bb) and the definition of term 'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning. The
contractual clause enshrined in clause (bb) cannot be resorted to frustrate the claim of
the employee against his uncalled for retrenchment or for denying other benefits. It
cannot be so interpreted, as to enable for employer to resort to the policy of hire and fire….”
19. It is admittedly not the case of respondents that petitioner could not be deployed or
employed or say that respondents had terminated service of petitioner since there was not sufficient
work and funds. Be it stated that by engaging contractor for outsourcing unskilled labourer to be
provided to respondents w.e.f. 1-5-2013 is clearly suggestive of the fact that respondents had
sufficient work and funds. Not only this, even several unskilled labourer had been engaged for
whole of the year as reflected in Ex. P5 the tentative seniority list as on 31-12-2014. Thus,
intermittent breaks given by respondents to petitioner establishes unfair labour practice within the
meaning of Section 2(ra) of the Act as the object behind engaging petitioner as contractual labourer
and thereafter giving intermittent breaks and finally terminating without any notice, changing
service conditions by asking petitioner to join contractor from a specific date as has also been
admitted by RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma in cross-examination who is the only witness examined by
respondents. Equally important to mention here is that while filing reply respondents have withheld
facts qua number of labourers engaged in two spells while implementing its policy Ex. RW1/B and
at the same time their names too have not been disclosed establishes that respondents from very
beginning while engaging petitioner intended that petitioner did not attain permanency in job but
for reason stated hereinabove, petitioner is held to have continuous service from 2008 to 2013 as
envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. That being so, it was incumbent upon respondents to have
issued notice under Section 25-F of Act and alternatively to pay wages of one month in lieu of
notice which has not so been done by respondents establishing violation of provisions of Section
25-F of the Act for intermittent breaks as well as for final termination and for similar reasons
disengaging petitioner periodically and retaining juniors in two spells as has come in evidence
clearly establish violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. In order to prove his case, the petitioner has placed reliance upon Ex. P10 the mandays
on fixed wages w.e.f. 2008 relating to petitioner which showed that petitioner had worked under
project HMM 036-62 from 16-1-2008 to 30-9-2011 for 89 days and thereafter with several
intermittent breaks till 31-12-2012 as shown in this document. The plea of the petitioner remains
that the breaks had been given deliberately by respondents so that the petitioner did not complete
240 days. It has also been stated by petitioner that despite availability of funds and work
intermittent breaks had been given from time to time during total period petitioner remained
engaged with the respondents.
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21. Before accepting plea of petitioner for having been given break deliberately from time
to time, it would be also relevant to consider if the petitioner succeeded in establishing that if
throughout the year intermittent breaks would not have been given, he would have continued to be
in service for whole of the year and deemed to have completed continuous service in a year
envisaged under Section 25-B of Act. To prove that provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not
adhered to by respondent while giving intermittent breaks reliance has been placed on seniority list
Ex. P1 to P5 showing junior workmen to petitioner i.e. those daily beldar who joined after
petitioner have been retained, engaging more than 300 days in a year whereas petitioner had been
given intermittent breaks in the same year. The seniority list Ex. P1 shows that Asha Devi and Tara
Chand figuring at serial No. 33 & 34 have joined on 13-7-2009. Ex. P4 is the tentative seniority list
(as on 31-12-2013) of these officials showed i.e. Tara Chand to have worked for 365 days in the
year 2010, 354 days in 2011, 366 days in 2012 and 365 days in 2013. Said Tara Chand figured at
serial No. 15 in the seniority list. Similarly, Asha Devi figuring at serial No.16 in seniority list Ex.
R4 is shown to have worked for 304 days in 2010, 347 days in 2011, 341 days in 2012 and 363
days in 2013. With the aid of these entries concerning Tara Chand and Asha Devi figuring at serial
No.15 and 16, it has been contended that there was sufficient work and funds available with the
respondents in different projects and these two officials had joined after joining of petitioner who
as per Ex. P10 figured at serial No. 7 and had joined on 16-1-2008 and as both these workmen had
been given sufficient work throughout the year(s) despite being engaged at later stage, the
petitioner is held to have been given intermittent break from 16-1-2008 till 31-12-2012 deliberately
by respondents despite having sufficient work and funds, Ex. P10 further shows that petitioner
during these years had remained engaged with intermittent breaks for 14 times from 2008 to 2013
in project HMM-036-62 & HMS-218-62. If Tara Chand and Asha Devi could be given work for
more than 300 days in a year in particular year from 2010 to 2013, there was no reasons or
compulsion for the respondents to have given break to the petitioner as stated above which
manifestly shows that petitioner has been deliberately given breaks in service.
22. The tentative seniority list of daily wage labourers as it stood on 31-12-2013. Ex. P4
revealed that at serial No.15 and 16 names of Tara Chand and Asha Devi existed but at serial Nos.
17 to 20 names of Amravati, Bhim Dutt, Kamla Devi and Saroj Bala have been mentioned who
were shown to have joined and worked with respondents on 28-10-2010, 1-5-2012, 8-5-2012 and
15-5-2012 respectively much later than petitioner who joined in 2008. As such, latest seniority list
available at the time when petitioner was removed from service except Tara Chand and Asha Devi,
others are shown to have joined in the year 2010 and 2012 respectively as mentioned above.
Nothing in the cross-examination of petitioner PW1 could be elicited by respondents which would
demolish his claim qua deliberate intermittent breaks given by the respondents despite work and
funds as other juniors had been given sufficient work for whole of the year and policy Ex. RW1/B
dealing with contractual labourers was primarily a policy meant to exploit unskilled contractual
labourers which could be termed as entirely based on unfair labour practice. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma,
Director, Institute of Biotechnology and Environment Sciences, College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
has deposed that he had been posted on the present assignment since 1-11-2016 besides stated that
petitioner worked with university but did not know that petitioner remained engaged from date of
appointment till 22-4-2013. He has admitted in cross-examination that from 2002 to 2013, 30-32
contractual labourers were engaged, initially for 89 days who were appointed in two batches after
engaging the first batch, second batch was engaged when first batch was disengaged and thereafter
second batch was disengaged which support the plea of petitioner that the process of engagement
and disengagements was deliberate on part of respondents. Apparently, giving such intermittent
breaks to two groups of unskilled labourers without notice violated Section 25-G of the Act. As
such, respondents are held to have given intermittent breaks to the petitioner in violation of
provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act.
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23. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that although adopting
policy for engagement of unskilled labourer on contractual basis vide Ex. RW1/B, respondents had
changed conditions of service of petitioner without issuing any prior notice vide which petitioner
was required to join to contractor engaged to provide unskilled labourers on outsource basis to
respondents which tentamounts to termination of service of petitioner as petitioner had been
engaged with respondents since 2004 and no prior notice was served upon him in 2013 notifying
petitioner to join contractor who was to provide labourers to respondents on the basis of some
agreement entered into between respondents and contractor Ld. Counsel/Authorized Representative
for petitioner had also contended if contractual employment is resorted to as mechanism to frustrate
the claim so that employee did not become regular or permanent against a job which continues or
the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
clause of Section 2(oo) of the Act, the same would be an unfair labour practice under the 'Act'.
Before proceedings further, it would be most pertinent to refer to order dated 20-11-2014 Ex.
PW1/B of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in which present petitioner along with 13 other had filed
CWP No.4991/2012 when respondents had been directed “to not give fictional breaks to
petitioner and if their services on this count already stand dispense with, no fresh hand shall
be engaged without first affording the work to the petitioners”. In pursuance to the above said
order, petitioner along-with 13 others had filed the complaint before Deputy Commissioner
Hamirpur for non-enforcement of order dated 20-11-2014 passed by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in
pursuance to which Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur had directed respondents to enforce the order
of the Hon'ble High Court dated 20-11-2014. The plea of respondents in their joint reply remained
that petitioner had not applied for reengagement with contractor engaged in 2013 which leads to an
irresistible inference that petitioner had been disengaged i.e. terminated from service of respondents
in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. It is admittedly not the case of the respondents
that any notice was served upon petitioner as could also be gathered from cross-examination of
RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma, Director Dean College of Horticulture respondent No. 1 who showed his
ignorance if while disengaging petitioner in the year 2013, any notice was served upon petitioner
by respondents. If any notice as required would have been issued by respondents, RW1 would have
certainly denied this question. He has specifically admitted that while terminating service of
petitioner no compensation was paid by respondents. Although these facts revealed in cross-
examination of RW1 coupled with the order of Hon'ble High Court as referred to above, it can be
safely gathered that respondents had not adhered to the mandate of Hon'ble High Court as the
petitioner was not to be disengaged and if disengaged, no fresh hands shall be engaged although
several persons juniors to petitioner have been engaged thereafter as per seniority list Ex. P5 which
further showed availability sufficient work and funds with respondents.
24. Ld. Counsel for the respondents had contended that petitioner being contractual
employee was not covered under the definition of retrenchment under Section 2 (bb) of the Act as
under Clause (bb)(oo) termination of service of workman on contract specifically was excluded
from definition of retrenchment. It is pointed out that since the petitioner was appointed on
contract, he stands excluded from definition of “retrenchment” and therefore respondents were not
required to adhere to provisions of Section 25-F of the 'Act' while disengaging petitioner. Ld.
Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, repudiated the arguments so advanced by the ld.
Counsel for respondents and has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
titled as Manoj Kumar Vs. H.R.T.C. and Anr. reported in 2007 LLR 1155. In the above said
judgment Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held that when repeated and fictional breaks have
been given to workman so that he should not attain permanency, it would not come within the
purview of section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act excluding termination of
retrenchment. In the case before the Hon'ble High Court respondents had set up similar plea of
petitioner being on contractual employment and thus Section 25-F could not be invoked by the
petitioner. In the above said judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held in para 12
reproduced below for reference:
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“….12. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has held in Shailendra Nath Vs. Vice
Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1987 Lab IC 1607 that section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature
of an exception to section 2(oo) and has to be construed strictly and in favour of the
workman as the entire object of the Act is secure a just and fair deal to them. Their
Lordships of the Allahabad High Court have held as under:
“The expression, 'termination for whatsoever reason' used in Cl. (oo) came up for
interpretation before the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. N.S. Money, AIR 1976
SC 1111: (1976 Lab IC 769). It was held to mean a termination which takes place either by
active step of employer or by running out of stipulated period. The Hon'ble Court observed
Termination embraced not merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact
of termination, however, produced". Since this wide interpretation resulted in extending
benefit of retrenchment to even purpose or particular job or were casual workers the
Legislature appears to have added sub cl. (bb) to cl.(oo) in 1984. Even though petitioners
claim to have acquired status of regular employees before the clause was amended as each
of them had completed 240 days prior to its addition in 1984 it may be examined if the
petitioners can be said to be contractual employees as contemplated in this sub-clause. For
that it is necessary to examine its scope and ambit. It may, however, be stated at the outset
that it obviously attempts to exclude that which otherwise would have been included in
principal clause or to be more precise is in the nature of an exception, therefore, it has to be
construed strictly and in favour of workmen as the entire objective of the Act is to secure
just and fair deal for them. Terminations which are included in it are those which are
brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time
stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide a
gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation the nature of
employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of
duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be
for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes
to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated
period or completion of work whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But
if contractual employment is resorted to as a mechanism to frustrate the claim of
employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature
of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on the anvil of
fairness and bonafide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire
and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Cl. (bb). Because if it is left to be employer not
to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstances then the protection
afforded to a workman by treating every termination, of service as retrenchment shall be
rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post
ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bona fide.
It cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also
satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That
would be unfair labour practice [See H.D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India. (1985) 51 Fac
LR 494: (1985 Lab IC 1733) (SC)]. From various annexures filed with affidavits it is clear
that some of the petitioners were employed as Office Assistant, other book binders and
peons. They were awarded benefit of bonus. They have been working for nearly five years.
Their job was not casual, seasonal or of a daily worker. They have not been paid their salary
on volume of work. Although the wages in some cases are computed on per day basis but
the payment is monthly including holidays. Their duty, therefore, was like a regular
employee and not as casual, daily or seasonal worker….”
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Para No. 17 of the aforestated judgment is also reproduced below which has bearing on
merits of issue and is reproduced below:
“17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Haryana State Electronics Development
Corporation Limited Vs. Mamni (2206) 9 SCC 434: AIR 2006 SC 2427: 2006 LLR 667
(SC), that appointment for a short period (89 days) and termination of service at the end of
the said period and reappointment after a gap of one day, such action of termination and
reappointment repeated again and again for a period of about one and a half years, in such
circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the termination not bona fide but
adopted to defeat the object of the Act. Thus, it is not covered by section 2(oo)(bb) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947……..”
25. Reliance has further been placed by Hon'ble High Court in Manoj Kumar's case on
another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay titled as Dalip H. Shirke Vs. Zila Parishad
Yavatmal, reported in 1990 Lab IC 100 in which judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as State
Bank of India Vs. N. Sundaramoney reported in 1976 Lab IC 769 had been relied by Hon'ble
High Court of Bombay. It was observed that exception as contained in sub-clause (bb) will have to
be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been
enjoying earlier to the amendment. The benefit of law laid down by the Supreme Court was
extended to all the workmen even to those who were employed for specific work or for a
particular job and even to casual labourers who were engaged merely to complete casual nature
of work. In the judgment of N. Sundaramoney's case relied in 2007 case and had observed that
time and again it has been held that welfare statutes must receive the construction which
advances the object of the statutes and protects the weaker section of the society. It was
observed that the employer is always in a position to dictate the terms of service vis-a-vis the
workman or to be workman. The employer can unilaterally impose oppressive and
unreasonable conditions of service and the workman will be left with little choice but to
accept all such conditions even unconscionable conditions of service in the contract of
employment. In the case in hand before this court, respondents had adopted policy of engagement
of contractual labourer to avoid financial liability Ex. RW1/B which prescribed the manner in
which workman was to employed for 89 days in two spells which follows that contractual labourers
engaged for 89 days in first spell were to be disengaged after 89 days engaging new batch and
following such engagements show that after first engagement of labourers as stated above junior
contractual labourer were to certainly disengage senior workmen i.e. first batch for 89 days without
notice despite availability of work and funds which manifestly violated Section 25-G of the 'Act'.
26. In the concluding para in Manoj Kumar's case, Hon'ble High Court has held that
workman had been offered appointment with fictional breaks to prevent petitioner from taking
benefit of Section 25-F of Act. The appointment orders issued in successor to workman was
camouflage to take out petitioner-workman from the ambit of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The appointment of petitioner cannot be termed as contractual and his case will
fall under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it will be covered under
expression “retrenchment”. The act of respondents of engaging petitioner giving fictional
breaks was not bonafide and reinstatement of petitioner-workman was allowed. Applying the
ratio of case law referred to above, it may not be erroneous to observe that in the case in hand
before this court, contractual employment of petitioner and time to time termination was made by
respondents so that petitioner did not become permanent and at the same time act of respondents in
throwing out petitioner from work with contractor without notice is manifestly unfair labour
practice and petitioner would be covered under definition of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) and
not under exception in Clause (bb) (oo) as has been held in Manoj Kumar's case.
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27. Thus, in the case before this court respondents had made scheme which was
significantly promulgated for engagement of contractual labourer for 89 days in one spell and in the
case before the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana having similar period of engagement of
workmen respondents were held to have not complied with the Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act as the workman who was a clerk had been engaged for 89 days and given fresh
appointment twice for 89 days. As such, referring to aforestated case law and evidence on record, it
may not be erroneous to conclude that respondents had recoursed to unfair labour practice initially
by adopting standing instruction for engagement of contractual labour Ex. RW1/B which in its
prescribed clause (e) duration of contractual labourer was to be not more than 89 in a year for two
spells and thereafter by abrupting engagement of labourers on outsource basis through contractor.
But in this case, the petitioner had been engaged several times with intervals as shown in mandays
chart Ex. P10 from 2008 to 2013 and thus the action of respondents in giving intermittent break as
well as finally terminating service without notice and asking the petitioner to work with contractor
who was to provide unskilled labourers to respondents on outsource basis was nothing else but
termination of service of petitioner without any notice and that the intermittent breaks are held to be
deliberately made by the respondents with the object to avoid financial liability upon respondents
which could not be accepted as ground to negate or say defeat claim of petitioner. The termination
of petitioner would thus be not excluded under Section 2 (oo) (bb) and squarely fell under the
definition of retrenchment under the Act necessitating issuance of notice of one month envisaged
under Section 25-F of the Act and in alternative wages for one month in lieu of notice period which
has admittedly not been done as RW1 has shown his inability to tell if while disengaging petitioner
any notice was served. Being the Director in university authorized to contest and depose in this
case on behalf of respondents was expected to know material facts qua engagement and
disengagement of petitioner. Accordingly, applying the case law as referred to above, it is held that
petitioner had been wrongly retrenched from service by the respondents in violation of provisions
of Act.
28. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has taken this court through Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex.
PW1/R passed in Reference No.154/2012 titled as Mohinder Singh versus Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, Distt. Solan, H.P. & Anr. vide which this
court had directed reinstatement of petitioner setting aside retrenchment order qua petitioner w.e.f.
1-1-2005 by respondents and was held entitled for seniority and continuity in service from the date
of illegal termination except back wages. While relying upon the above said Award, ld. Counsel for
the petitioner has contended that above said award has not been assailed by respondents which had
attained finality having similar facts with regard to award Ex. PW1/R. RW1 in cross-examination
has showed his inability to tell if above said award passed against the respondent had been
challenged however specifically admitted that said Mohinder Singh was still working with the
university. Statement of RW1 recorded on 1-10-2011 and award was passed on 28-4-2017 and was
allegedly terminated on 1-1-2005 which goes to show after implementation of award Ex. PW1/R
above-named Mohinder Singh has been in continuous service with the respondent from 1-1-2005 to
31-10-2017 when RW1 was cross-examined. As such, Mohinder Singh's case having similar facts
and not challenged by respondents is equally binding upon respondents qua similarly situated
workmen. In the said judgment also, my ld. predecessor-in-office in para No. 26 on record has
specifically held that action of respondents was unfair labour practice under Clause 10 Vth
Schedule appended under the Act. In so far claim of petitioner qua back wages from date of illegal
termination in the year 2013 is concerned, suffice would be state here that onus to prove that
petitioner/claimant remained unemployed and not gainfully employed was upon respondents.
Although, petitioner has alleged that he remained unemployed and was not gainfully employed ever
since his termination in 2013 by filing affidavit to this effect could not be relied as being a young
person ageing about 36 years would not have sit idle for about five years without earning and thus
his plea to this effect merits rejection. Accordingly, petitioner is held to be not entitled for back
wages. Accordingly, issues No. 1 and 2 are answered in affirmative holding that act of respondents
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in giving time to time break and finally terminating on 23-4-2013 is improper and unjustified.
However, issue No. 3 is decided as discussed holding that petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in
service with seniority and continuity in service without back wages. Issues are decided accordingly.
Issue No.4:
29. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has contended that College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Neri, Hamirpur, H.P. does not fall under the jurisdiction before this court. On the other
hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner had relied upon Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board etc.
and A. Rajappa and others, AIR 1978 SC 548 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the definition of “industry” envisaged under Section 2(j) of the Act and held that university would
fall within the definition of industry and its employees are workman entitled to protection
envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Ld. Counsel for respondents has failed to
repudiate arguments and as such university cannot be stated to be not industry and its workers to be
not workmen. Issue is decided in negative against the respondents and in favour of petitioner. Since
issues No. 4 and 6 are the same, as such in view of findings of issue No. 4 as stated above, issue
No. 6 has become redundant.
Issue No. 5 :
30. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has not pressed this issue during course of argument.
Otherwise also, from pleadings on record no inference of claim petition being not maintainable can
be raised industrial dispute. In the case in hand, the petitioner had challenged his illegal termination
by the respondents who had allegedly violated of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. As such, being
aggrieved with action of the respondents in terminating service, petitioner could legitimately agitate
his claim before this court. Issue No. 5 is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against
the respondents.
Issue No. 7 :
31. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425,
it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim
on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government and the
Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government and same
is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The
Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 752,
has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of
Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to put the
restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the provision and in
absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to introduce the limitation
on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
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cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
32. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondents. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner
coupled with evidence on record cannot be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged
by the respondents. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondent and is answered
accordingly.
Relief :
33. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues Nos. 1 to 6, the reference/claim petition
is partly allowed and the respondents are hereby directed to re-engage the petitioner forthwith who
is further held to be in continuous uninterrupted service with the respondents from the date of his
initial engagement in the year 2008 and that the breaks given by the respondent being fictional in
nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of service of the petitioner and his
seniority shall be reckoned from his initial date of engagement however, petitioner shall be entitled
to seniority and continuity in service from the date of his initial engagement except back wages. In
the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
34. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
35. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
36. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
06/2015
Date of Institution : 13-01-2015
Date of decision :
24-4-2018
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Shri Vipan Kumar s/o Shri Chamel Singh, r/o V.P.O. Rangas, Tehsil Nadaun, District
Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Dean, College of Horticulture and Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
2.
The Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, District
Solan H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Karan Pathania, Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Vipan Kumar s/o Shri Chamel
Singh, r/o V.P.O. Rangas, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P. w.e.f. 21-05-2010 to
31-12-2012 and finally w.e.f. 01-01-2013 by (i) the Director, Institute of Biotechnology &
Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamirpur, H.P. (ii) the Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture &
Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the
above employers?”
2.
After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 3rd February, 2017
was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:
“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 16-12 2014,
the name of employer No (i) may be read as “the Dean, College of Horticulture and
Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.” instead of “the Director, Institute of Biotechnology
& Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamipur, H.P.”, which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification.”
3.
On receipt of reference as well as addendum from appropriate government, notices
were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.
4.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
unskilled labourer by respondent No.1 in the year 2010 with prior approval of respondent No. 2
who continued to work uninterruptedly with the respondents upto 31st December, 2012. Averments
made in the claim petition further revealed that from 2010 to 2012, petitioner had been engaged for
89 days in first spell and after completion of 89 days, he had been given fictional break in his
service as some other group of workmen had been engaged for second spell of 89 days and when
the second spell of workers had completed after 89 days, petitioner had been engaged again for 89
days and such practice of engaging and disengaging by giving fictional breaks to the petitioner
continued upto 31st December, 2012. It is further alleged that respondents had given fictional
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breaks of 89 days in two spells to the petitioner and other coworkmen so that they did not complete
240 days in each calendar year for the purpose of counting continuous service envisaged under
Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'Act' for brevity). The
grievance of petitioner remains that his service had been finally terminated by respondent No. 1 on
1-1-2013 along-with other co-workmen without complying with mandatory provisions of Act as
neither any show cause notice had been issued nor charge-sheet had been raised for any alleged
misconduct and at the same time, no inquiry had been conducted against the petitioner besides no
retrenchment notice or compensation of one month's pay in lieu of notice period had been given
and thus termination order is stated to be illegal, null and void as petitioner had completed 240 days
in preceding 12 calendar months from date of termination. It is alleged that while terminating of
service of petitioner even principle of 'Last come First go' had not been followed as several junior
workmen namely Ishwar Dass and Rajeev Kumar had been retained in service ignoring the rights
of petitioner in violation of Section 25-G of Act as above named two workmen had worked
alongwith petitioner on muster-roll and performed same duties. It is alleged that after terminating
service of petitioner and other co-workmen, respondents had entered into contract with M/s. Shimla
Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. vide letter No. 827-76 dated 30th April, 2013 to
outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 for 11 months and after expiry of the
above said period, respondent No.1 had renewed contract with contractor above named for further
period of one year and as such the above said contractor had engaged 15 workmen as unskilled
labourers on daily rate basis namely Raj Kumar, Arvind Kumar, Premi Devi, Asha Devi, Kanta
Devi, Beena Devi, Santosh Kumari, Sunita Devi, Nirmla Devi, Soma Devi, Raj Kumari, Sudesh
Kumari, Meena Devi, Santosh Kumari and Sobha Ram who had worked under Shri Rampal
Baniyal, Incharge and thus respondents had violated provisions of Section 25-H of Act. It is
categorically stated that respondents had sufficient work due to which they had outsourced
unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to be engaged through M/s Shimla Cleanwayas, Sahibu Niwas,
New Shimla, H.P and thus it cannot be stated that respondents did not have sufficient work and
funds in different projects run by it. It is alleged that the service of petitioner and other co-workmen
who had been engaged by the respondents had been terminated with the object to deprive petitioner
and other unskilled labourers so that they did not complete 240 days. It is alleged that respondent
No. 1 without any instructions from respondent No. 2 had given fictional breaks to petitioner and
said act of respondent No. 1 fell under the definition of “unfair labour practice” as defined in Vth
Schedule Clause 10 read with Section 25-T and 25-U of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It further
transpires from petition that the respondents had engaged regular unskilled Class-IV workers on
regular pay scale in Neri I and II who are S/Sh. Chaman Lal, Kishan Chand, Deen, Sanjeev Kumar,
Parkash Chand, Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram however 14 workmen including petitioner had been
initially engaged on daily rate basis for 89 days in two spells as stated above. It is also alleged that
in addition to petitioner and other workers as stated in this para some other workmen had been
engaged who were not given any break and thus respondents has also shown favourtism to one set
of workers which violated provisions of Clause 9 of Schedule 5th of Industrial Disputes Act. It is
alleged that respondents had admitted in the reply filed before the Labour Inspector, Hamirpur that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labourer for 89 days in two spells during calendar year
as per the rules framed by university in year 2002 and that initially after working for 89 days,
petitioner had been given break. It is alleged that these 14 workmen including petitioner had filed a
complaint of illegal termination before Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur in pursuance to which
Additional Deputy Commissioner, District Hamirpur had written a letter No. 129 dated 16-5-2013
for reengagement of services of retrenched workmen on the basis of order dated 20-11-2014 of
Hon'ble High Court of H.P. It is alleged that petitioner alongwith other workmen had filed CWP
No. 4991/2012 in which Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 20-11-2014 in which directions had
been given to respondents to not give fictional breaks to the petitioners and if their services on this
count already stood dispensed with, then no fresh hand shall be engaged without first offering the
work to the petitioners. It is alleged that despite directions vide order dated 20-11-2014 respondents
had not given offer to petitioner and other co-workmen for appointment in service and contrarily
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engaged 15 workmen with contractor and thus respondent No. 1 has violated even order of Hon'ble
High Court. Moreover, respondent did not file any application before Hon'ble High Court seeking
permission in CWP No. 4991/2012 to allow respondents to outsource petitioner unskilled contract
labour in place of terminated workmen. It further remains the case of the petitioner that in reference
154/2012 decided by this Court on 24-8-2012 titled as Mahinder Singh Vs. Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P. retrenchment of
Mahinder Singh dated 1-1-2005 was set aside and respondents were directed to reengage the
petitioner forthwith who was further held entitled to seniority and continuity of service from the
date of his illegal termination except back wages. It is alleged that in pursuance to Award dated
24-8-2012 said Mahinder Singh has been continuously working with the respondents till date of
filing of present claim petition. Accordingly, alleging respondents to have given fictional breaks
from time to time terminating service of petitioner and other co-workmen for 89 days in two spells
and finally terminating service of petitioner on 1-1-2013 is illegal, arbitrary and unjustified in
violation of mandatory provisions of Act. It is claimed that after termination, petitioner has
remained unemployed who was not gainfully employed anywhere from 2013 and thus petitioner
claimed to be entitled for full back wages for period of fictional breaks from 2009 to 2012 till final
termination on 1-1-2013. Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside illegal fictional breaks
w.e.f. 2010 to 31-12-2012 with direction to the respondents to condone the break period in
continuity in service for the purposes of regularization besides has prayed wages for time to time
break period. The claimant/petitioner has further prayed for setting aside illegal termination w.e.f.
1-1-2013 with direction to the respondents to reinstate petitioner forthwith alongwith back wages,
seniority, continuity in service with consequential benefits and litigation costs.
5.
Respondents No. 1 and 2 contested claim petition, filed joint reply inter-alia taken
preliminary objections of maintainability, limitation and jurisdiction. On merits admitted that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour to do manual work in the experimental fields on
seasonal basis but denied that his service had been illegally terminated by the respondents. It is
alleged that due to non availability of funds a policy for the engagement of contractual labour was
formulated by the respondent w.e.f. 1-1-2002 so as to recognize engagement and avoid additional
liability. It is claimed that respondents did not have permanent and perennial nature of experimental
field work which required attendance of labourers (during Rabi and Kharif season) as seasonal
labourers were employed for a limited period on contract basis to accomplish the field trial work
with the object of research trial and their data etc. were not wasted for want of adequate manpower.
It is specifically alleged that petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour on a fixed salary for
a particular period in different spells as and when work and funds were available under the project
code No. HGI130-62 as is evident from letter No. UHF/IBES/HGI-130-62/1055-71 dated 3-10-
2012 which postulated that no seniority shall be given to contractual labour and the service of
individual will be terminated after the contract was over as envisaged under conditions No. 2 and 8
of appointment letter. The respondents have asserted that petitioner had after understanding terms
and conditions accepted the engagement and did not complete 240 days in any of the calendar
years. It is alleged by respondents in their reply that as and when work and funds were available
under time bound project, service of labour for field work was required for which advertisement
was given from time to time but the petitioner did not turn up for facing interviews and seeking job.
It is emphatically denied that junior persons namely Rajeev Kumar and Ishwar Dass had been
retained by university rather said Ishwar Dass has been working with the college since 2000.
However, the court had given seniority w.e.f. 14-11-2005 and thus allegation of petitioner that
juniors were retained was stated to be wrong. It is admitted that respondent had entered into
contract with M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla vide letter No.827-76 dated 30-4-
2013 but outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-1-2013 onwards and engaged skilled and unskilled
labourer through them to carry out the seasonal and adhoc projects work as and when needed and
that if petitioner wanted to get engaged for field work with the respondents then petitioner was
required to approach the said agency. It is asserted that termination of petitioner including other co-
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workers outsourcing by respondents had become compulsion of university due to reason that the
university was already facing liability of surplus staff including Class-IV. It is alleged that
respondents are not in a position to continue the service of labourer including petitioner so as avoid
additional financial liability. It is alleged that most of the labourers mentioned in the petition had
been engaged on compassionate grounds as per provisions of rules with the prior approval of State
Govt. besides maintained that petitioner was engaged on contractual basis for specific terms and
conditions and thus he cannot retract from conditions imposed by the respondents. It is alleged that
petitioner was engaged from time to time on fixed salary on contractual basis and not on regular
basis for a specific period. Accordingly, denying all allegations of petitioner, as contained in claim
petition respondents have prayed for dismissal of claim petition.
6.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to the join reply filed by respondents, reiterated his stand
as maintained in the claim petition. It is also reiterated that workmen mentioned in para No. 6 of the
claim petition namely Chaman Lal, Krishan Chand, Jamaldeen, Sanjeev Kumar, Om Prakash,
Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram regular workmen who had been working with the petitioner and
other co-workmen have since been disengaged. It is denied that respondents had engaged some
workmen on compassionate grounds moreover asserted petitioner to be unemployed and not
gainfully employed anywhere during time to time termination and from the date of his final
termination.
7.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, affidavit of petitioner Ex. PW1/A1, copy of
judgment dated 20-11-2014 Ex. PW1/B, copy of application dated 4-5-2013 Ex. PW1/C, copy of
notification dated 30-4-2013 Ex. PW1/D, copy of letter dated 16-5-2013 Ex. PW1/E, copy of letter
dated 15-5-2010 Ex. PW1/F, copy of reply to the demand notice dated 17-5-2013 Ex. PW1/G, copy
of mandays chart Ex. PW1/H, copy of letter dated 3-1-2012 Ex. PW1/I, copy of representation
dated 10-12-2012 Ex. PW1/J, copy of letter dated 22-4-2013 Ex. PW1/K, copy of complaint Ex.
PW1/L, copy of letter dated 13-2-2013 Ex. PW1/M, copy of letter dated 27-1-2014 Ex. PW1/N,
copy of Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex. PW1/O, copy of mandays chart Ex. PW1/P and closed
evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondents had examined
Dr. P.C. Sharma as RW1, tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, standing instructions regarding
engagement of labour on contractual basis dated 5-12-2001 Ex. RW1/B, letter dated 18-9-2012
regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated
21-2-2005 Ex. RW1/D, copy of letter dated 13-5-2016 regarding substitution of name of Dir.
Institute of Biotechnology Ex. RW1/E and closed evidence.
8.
It is pertinent to mention here that after closing evidence by the respondent, petitioner
had moved an application for additional evidence which was allowed and Shri Jai Ram,
Superintendent office of Dean College of Horticulture & Forestry Neri, Distt. Hamirpur, H.P.
examined as PW2, tendered/proved seniority list of daily paid workers dated 30-4-2017 (07 leaves)
Ex. P1, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 11-4-2011 (06 leaves) Ex. P-2, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 23-2-2011 (07 leaves) Ex. P-3, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 1-10-2014 Ex. P 4, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated
17-10-2015 Ex. P-5, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 16-3-2009 (29 leaves) Ex.
P-6, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 10-6-2011 (30 leaves) Ex. P-7, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 7-10-2014 (31 leaves) Ex. P-8, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 16-9-2016 (30 leaves) Ex. P-9, copy of mandays chart of contractual
labourers (09 leaves) Ex. P-10 and closed additional evidence. However, ld. Counsel for the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not lead any further additional evidence which was closed vide
separate statement of ld. Counsel for respondents
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9.
I have heard ld. Authorized Representative representing petitioner and ld. Counsel. for
respondents, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposal of this case.
10. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28-08-2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents
during w.e.f. 21-5-2010 to 31-12-2012 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether final termination of services of petitioner w.e.f. 1-1-2013 is/was improper and
unjustified?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 1 or issue No. 2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
5.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
6.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
7.
Whether the claim petition is time barred by limitation as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
11. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No. 1 : Yes
Issue No. 2 : Yes
Issue No. 3 : Discussed
Issue No. 4 : No
Issue No. 5 : No
Issue No. 6 : Redundant
Issue No. 7 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is partly allowed per operative part of the Award.
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1, 2 and 3 :
12. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
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13. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2010 initially for a
period of 89 days and thereafter with intermittent breaks several times till 2012 as is also evident
from mandays chart Ex. P-10. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged on the basis of policy for
engagement of labourers on contractual basis incorporated in Ex. RW1/B dated 5-12-2001. It is
admitted case of respondents that contractual labourers including petitioner had remained engaged
till 2013 ever since initial engagement when respondents allegedly engaged contractor for
outsourcing unskilled contractual labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013. Equally admitted case of respondents is
that duration of contractual labourers as per policy Ex. RW1/B was not to exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spell in whole year and in case re-engaged was to be made then break of atleast 15
days was necessary. It is admittedly not case of respondents that work and conduct of petitioner
was not good and satisfactory. Admittedly, respondents had sufficient work and funds for engaging
petitioner in different projects moreso when unskilled labourers were decided to be engaged from
contractor on outsource basis. It is further admitted case of respondents that petitioner being
contractual unskilled labourer provisions of Section 25 of Act did not apply as petitioner was
squarely covered under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the 'Act'. In view of foregoing admitted facts on
record, claim of petitioner qua termination in violation of Section 2 (oo) of Act needs to be
determined and at the same it also needs to be determined, if respondents deliberately recoursed to
time to time termination of petitioner and thereafter final termination in the year 2013 falling within
ambit of unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Clause 9 of Vth Schedule of 'Act'.
14. At the outset, it would be pertinent to mention here that Ex. RW1/B Standing
Instructions of respondents for engaging contractual unskilled labourers clearly provided that no
casual worker shall be engaged on muster-roll by any functionary of University w.e.f. 1-1-2002
which further stipulated that as far as possible continuing casual worker should be adjusted in
research and extension projects and thereafter demand for additional hands by deployment of
labour on contract may be made. Clause (e) of policy is reproduced below for reference:
“(e) The duration of the engagement of contractual labour should not exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spells in whole of the year and in case of re-engagement, a break of atleast 15
days is necessary in each case”.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner referring to above-stated rule for engagement of unskilled
contractual labour has contended that respondents being employer have given intermittent break in
service which was countable as petitioner like any other labourer engaged on contract was not in
position to bargain with respondents rather had no option but to work in illegal service conditions
imposed. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as
Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries, reported in 2014 LLR 673 in which Hon'ble
Apex Court has held that artificial break in service every year by reappointing the employee on the
same post tantamounts to 'unfair labour practice' under Section 2(ra) of the Act which is not
permissible under law. It was further observed that when repeated artificial periodical breaks in
service are proved, the termination of workman would not be having protection under Section 2(oo)
(bb) of the Act which would attract relief of reinstatement with full back wages being illegal
retrenchment.
16. PW1 has stepped into witness box deposed on oath as maintained in claim petition
specifically stated that petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2010 who continued to
work with respondents till 31-12-2012 when service of petitioner had been terminated finally
alongwith 13 other workers without complying with provisions of the 'Act'. He has further stated
neither any show cause notice nor compensation was given although petitioner had completed 240
days in preceding 12 months from date of termination. Significantly, Ex. P10 mandays does not
factually show petitioner to have worked for 240 days immediately prior to his termination but plea
of petitioner remains that Ex. RW1/B Standing Instructions for engagement of unskilled labourer
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on contract basis which fell in the ambit of an unfair labour practice had been invariably recoursed
by respondents during period of employment of petitioner when there were sufficient funds and
work with respondents and in the judgment (supra) of Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was held
liable to be reinstated in service being illegally retrenched.
17. Reliance has further been placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &
Haryana reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development
Authority, Manimajra and Anr. versus Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Rohtak and Anr. Relevant para of judgment is reproduced below:
“Since provision of Section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature of an exception it has to be construed
strictly in favour of the workman as far as possible in letter and spirit. If the termination is
meant to exploit an employee or to increase the bargaining power of the employer,
then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause (bb) and the definition of
'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning…”
18. In the aforestated judgment, Hon'ble High Court (DB) had upheld award passed by
Labour Court relying upon judgment titled as Kapurthala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 1984 (2) Indian Law Reporter 333 (DB) in which
service of workman had been terminated when case of those had completed 230 days. In this case,
services of workmen were terminated without any departmental inquiry or charge-sheet and at the
same time, no notice or compensation was paid. The bank before the Hon'ble Court took plea that
service of workman for specified period and that too with notional breaks and thereafter workmen
were neither entitled for any retrenchment compensation nor reinstatement. The court in (1984)
case after dilating upon various aspects of matter held that attempt of employer to dispense with
service of workman so as to deprive him in continuity of service for specified period i.e. 240
days envisaged under Section 25-B and 25-F of the Act amounts to unfair labour practice when it is
found that conduct and service of workman was satisfactory. In 1994 judgment (supra) reference
has been made to another case reported in 1989 (2) RSJ 55 titled as Balbir Singh Vs. The
Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Limited in which J. Amarjit Chaudhary interpreted
Sub-Clause (bb) (oo) of Section 2 and relevant para is reproduced below:
"Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act, which was added in 1984 by an
amendment cannot be so construed as to drastically restrict the orbit of the term of
'retrenchment' clause (bb) is an exception which must be interpreted narrowly. It cannot be
given meanings which may nullify or curtail the ambit of their principal clause. No doubt,
the intention of the Parliament in enacting clause (bb) was to exclude certain categories of
workers from the term of retrenchment but there is nothing in this clause which allows an
outlet to un-scrupulour employers to shunt out workers in the graph of non-renewal of their
contract even when the work subsists. This Clause as a whole has to be construed strictly in
favour of the workman as far as possible as to ensure that the Act is implemented in letter
and spirit. If the termination is meant to exploit an employee or to increase the
bargaining power of the employer, then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause
(bb) and the definition of term 'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning. The
contractual clause enshrined in clause (bb) cannot be resorted to frustrate the claim of
the employee against his uncalled for retrenchment or for denying other benefits. It
cannot be so interpreted, as to enable for employer to resort to the policy of hire and fire….”
19. It is admittedly not the case of respondents that petitioner could not be deployed or
employed or say that respondents had terminated service of petitioner since there was not sufficient
work and funds. Be it stated that by engaging contractor for outsourcing unskilled labourer to be
provided to respondents w.e.f. 1-5-2013 is clearly suggestive of the fact that respondents had
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sufficient work and funds. Not only this, even several unskilled labourer had been engaged for
whole of the year as reflected in Ex. P5 the tentative seniority list as on 31-12-2014. Thus,
intermittent breaks given by respondents to petitioner establishes unfair labour practice within the
meaning of Section 2(ra) of the Act as the object behind engaging petitioner as contractual labourer
and thereafter giving intermittent breaks and finally terminating without any notice, changing
service conditions by asking petitioner to join contractor from a specific date as has also been
admitted by RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma in cross-examination who is the only witness examined by
respondents. Equally important to mention here is that while filing reply respondents have withheld
facts qua number of labourers engaged in two spells while implementing its policy Ex. RW1/B and
at the same time their names too have not been disclosed establishes that respondents from very
beginning while engaging petitioner intended that petitioner did not attain permanency in job but
for reason stated hereinabove, petitioner is held to have continuous service from 2010 to 2012 as
envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. That being so, it was incumbent upon respondents to have
issued notice under Section 25-F of Act and alternatively to pay wages of one month in lieu of
notice which has not so been done by respondents establishing violation of provisions of Section
25-F of the Act for intermittent breaks as well as for final termination and for similar reasons
disengaging petitioner periodically and retaining juniors in two spells as has come in evidence
clearly establish violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. In order to prove his case, the petitioner has placed reliance upon Ex. R10 the mandays
on fixed wages w.e.f. 2010 relating to petitioner which showed that petitioner had worked under
project HMS 218-62 from 21-5-2010 to 17-8-2010 for 89 days and thereafter with several
intermittent breaks till 31-12-2012 as shown in this document. The plea of the petitioner remains
that the breaks had been given deliberately by respondents so that the petitioner did not complete
240 days. It has also been stated by petitioner that despite availability of funds and work
intermittent breaks had been given from time to time during total period petitioner remained
engaged with the respondents.
21. Before accepting plea of petitioner for having been given break deliberately from time
to time, it would be also relevant to consider if the petitioner succeeded in establishing that if
throughout the year intermittent breaks would not have been given, he would have continued to be
in service for whole of the year and deemed to have completed continuous service in a year
envisaged under Section 25-B of Act. To prove that provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not
adhered to by respondent while giving intermittent breaks reliance has been placed on seniority list
Ex. P1 to P5 showing junior workmen to petitioner i.e. those daily beldar who joined after
petitioner have been retained, engaging more than 300 days in a year whereas petitioner had been
given intermittent breaks in the same year. The seniority list Ex. P1 shows that Asha Devi and Tara
Chand figuring at serial No. 33 & 34 have joined on 13-7-2009. Ex. P4 is the tentative seniority list
(as on 31-12-2013) of these officials showed i.e. Tara Chand to have worked for 365 days in the
year 2010, 354 days in 2011, 366 days in 2012 and 365 days in 2013. Said Tara Chand figured at
serial No.15 in the seniority list. Similarly, Asha Devi figuring at serial No.16 in seniority list Ex.
R4 is shown to have worked for 304 days in 2010, 347 days in 2011, 341 days in 2012 and 363
days in 2013. With the aid of these entries concerning Tara Chand and Asha Devi figuring at serial
No. 15 and 16, it has been contended that there was sufficient work and funds available with the
respondents in different projects and these two officials had joined after joining of petitioner who
as per Ex. P10 figured at serial No. 9 and had joined on 21-5-2010 and as both these workmen had
been given sufficient work throughout the year(s) despite being engaged at later stage, the
petitioner is held to have been given intermittent break from 21-5-2010 till 31-12-2012 deliberately
by respondents despite having sufficient work and funds, Ex. P10 further shows that petitioner
during these years had remained engaged with intermittent breaks for 11 times from 2010 to 2012
in project HMS-218-62 & HMS-292-62. If Tara Chand and Asha Devi could be given work for
more than 300 days in a year in particular year from 2010 to 2013, there was no reasons or
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compulsion for the respondents to have given break to the petitioner as stated above which
manifestly shows that petitioner has been deliberately given breaks in service.
22. The tentative seniority list of daily wage labourers as it stood on 31-12-2013. Ex. P4
revealed that at serial No.15 and 16 names of Tara Chand and Asha Devi existed but at serial Nos.
17 to 20 names of Amravati, Bhim Dutt, Kamla Devi and Saroj Bala have been mentioned who
were shown to have joined and worked with respondents on 28-10-2010, 1-5-2012, 8-5-2012 and
15-5-2012 respectively much later than petitioner who joined in 2010. As such, latest seniority list
available at the time when petitioner was removed from service except Tara Chand and Asha Devi,
others are shown to have joined in the year 2010 and 2012 respectively as mentioned above.
Nothing in the cross-examination of petitioner PW1 could be elicited by respondents which would
demolish his claim qua deliberate intermittent breaks given by the respondents despite work and
funds as other juniors had been given sufficient work for whole of the year and policy Ex. RW1/B
dealing with contractual labourers was primarily a policy meant to exploit unskilled contractual
labourers which could be termed as entirely based on unfair labour practice. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma,
Director, Institute of Biotechnology and Environment Sciences, College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
has deposed that he had been posted on the present assignment since 1-11-2016 besides stated that
petitioner worked with university but did not know that petitioner remained engaged from date of
appointment till 22-4-2013. He has admitted in cross-examination that from 2002 to 2013, 30-32
contractual labourers were engaged, initially for 89 days who were appointed in two batches after
engaging the first batch, second batch was engaged when first batch was disengaged and thereafter
second batch was disengaged which support the plea of petitioner that the process of engagement
and disengagements was deliberate on part of respondents. Apparently, giving such intermittent
breaks to two groups of unskilled labourers without notice violated Section 25-G of the Act. As
such, respondents are held to have given intermittent breaks to the petitioner in violation of
provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act.
23. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that although adopting
policy for engagement of unskilled labourer on contractual basis vide Ex. RW1/B, respondents had
changed conditions of service of petitioner without issuing any prior notice vide which petitioner
was required to join to contractor engaged to provide unskilled labourers on outsource basis to
respondents which tentamounts to termination of service of petitioner as petitioner had been
engaged with respondents since 2009 and no prior notice was served upon him in 2013 notifying
petitioner to join contractor who was to provide labourers to respondents on the basis of some
agreement entered into between respondents and contractor Ld. Counsel/Authorized Representative
for petitioner had also contended if contractual employment is resorted to as mechanism to frustrate
the claim so that employee did not become regular or permanent against a job which continues or
the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
clause of Section 2(oo) of the Act, the same would be an unfair labour practice under the 'Act'.
Before proceedings further, it would be most pertinent to refer to order dated 20-11-2014 Ex.
PW1/B of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in which present petitioner alongwith 13 other had filed
CWP No.4991/2012 when respondents had been directed “to not give fictional breaks to
petitioner and if their services on this count already stand dispense with, no fresh hand shall
be engaged without first affording the work to the petitioners”. In pursuance to the above said
order, petitioner alongwith 13 others had filed the complaint before Deputy Commissioner
Hamirpur for non-enforcement of order dated 20-11-2014 passed by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in
pursuance to which Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur had directed respondents to enforce the order
of the Hon'ble High Court dated 20-11-2014. The plea of respondents in their joint reply remained
that petitioner had not applied for reengagement with contractor engaged in 2013 which leads to an
irresistible inference that petitioner had been disengaged i.e. terminated from service of respondents
in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. It is admittedly not the case of the respondents
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that any notice was served upon petitioner as could also be gathered from cross-examination of
RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma, Director Dean College of Horticulture respondent No. 1 who showed his
ignorance if while disengaging petitioner in the year 2013, any notice was served upon petitioner
by respondents. If any notice as required would have been issued by respondents, RW1 would have
certainly denied this question. He has specifically admitted that while terminating service of
petitioner no compensation was paid by respondents. Although these facts revealed in cross-
examination of RW1 coupled with the order of Hon'ble High Court as referred to above, it can be
safely gathered that respondents had not adhered to the mandate of Hon'ble High Court as the
petitioner was not to be disengaged and if disengaged, no fresh hands shall be engaged although
several persons juniors to petitioner have been engaged thereafter as per seniority list Ex. P5 which
further showed availability sufficient work and funds with respondents.
24. Ld. Counsel for the respondents had contended that petitioner being contractual
employee was not covered under the definition of retrenchment under Section 2 (bb) of the Act as
under Clause (bb)(oo) termination of service of workman on contract specifically wa excluded
from definition of retrenchment. It is pointed out that since the petitioner was appointed on
contract, he stands excluded from definition of “retrenchment” and therefore respondents were not
required to adhere to provisions of Section 25-F of the 'Act' while disengaging petitioner. Ld.
Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, repudiated the arguments so advanced by the ld.
Counsel for respondents and has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
titled as Manoj Kumar Vs. H.R.T.C. and Anr. reported in 2007 LLR 1155. In the above said
judgment Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held that when repeated and fictional breaks have
been given to workman so that he should not attain permanency, it would not come within the
purview of section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act excluding termination of
retrenchment. In the case before the Hon'ble High Court respondents had set up similar plea of
petitioner being on contractual employment and thus Section 25-F could not be invoked by the
petitioner. In the above said judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held in para 12
reproduced below for reference:
“….12. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has held in Shailendra Nath Vs. Vice
Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1987 Lab IC 1607 that section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature
of an exception to section 2(oo) and has to be construed strictly and in favour of the
workman as the entire object of the Act is secure a just and fair deal to them. Their
Lordships of the Allahabad High Court have held as under:
“The expression, 'termination for whatsoever reason' used in Cl. (oo) came up for
interpretation before the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. N. S. Money, AIR 1976
SC 1111: (1976 Lab IC 769). It was held to mean a termination which takes place either by
active step of employer or by running out of stipulated period. The Hon'ble Court observed.
Termination embraced not merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact
of termination, however, produced". Since this wide interpretation resulted in extending
benefit of retrenchment to even purpose or particular job or were casual workers the
Legislature appears to have added sub cl. (bb) to cl.(oo) in 1984. Even though petitioners
claim to have acquired status of regular employees before the clause was amended as each
of them had completed 240 days prior to its addition in 1984 it may be examined if the
petitioners can be said to be contractual employees as contemplated in this sub-clause. For
that it is necessary to examine its scope and ambit. It may, however, be stated at the outset
that it obviously attempts to exclude that which otherwise would have been included in
principal clause or to be more precise is in the nature of an exception, therefore, it has to be
construed strictly and in favour of workmen as the entire objective of the Act is to secure
just and fair deal for them. Terminations which are included in it are those which are
brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time
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stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide a
gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation the nature of
employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of
duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be
for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes
to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated
period or completion of work whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But
if contractual employment is resorted to as a mechanism to frustrate the claim of
employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature
of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on the anvil of
fairness and bonafide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire
and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Cl. (bb). Because if it is left to be employer not
to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstances then the protection
afforded to a workman by treating every termination, of service as retrenchment shall be
rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post
ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bona fide.
It cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also
satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That
would be unfair labour practice [See H.D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India. (1985) 51 Fac
LR 494: (1985 Lab IC 1733) (SC)]. From various annexures filed with affidavits it is clear
that some of the petitioners were employed as Office Assistant, other book binders and
peons. They were awarded benefit of bonus. They have been working for nearly five years.
Their job was not casual, seasonal or of a daily worker. They have not been paid their salary
on volume of work. Although the wages in some cases are computed on per day basis but
the payment is monthly including holidays. Their duty, therefore, was like a regular
employee and not as casual, daily or seasonal worker….”
Para No.17 of the aforestated judgment is also reproduced below which has bearing on
merits of issue and is reproduced below:
“17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Haryana State Electronics Development
Corporation Limited Vs. Mamni (2206) 9 SCC 434: AIR 2006 SC 2427: 2006 LLR 667
(SC), that appointment for a short period (89 days) and termination of service at the end of
the said period and reappointment after a gap of one day, such action of termination and
reappointment repeated again and again for a period of about one and a half years, in such
circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the termination not bona fide but
adopted to defeat the object of the Act. Thus, it is not covered by section 2(oo)(bb) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947……..”
25. Reliance has further been placed by Hon'ble High Court in Manoj Kumar's case on
another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay titled as Dalip H. Shirke Vs. Zila Parishad
Yavatmal, reported in 1990 Lab IC 100 in which judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as State
Bank of India Vs. N. Sundaramoney reported in 1976 Lab IC 769 had been relied by Hon'ble
High Court of Bombay. It was observed that exception as contained in sub-clause (bb) will have to
be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been
enjoying earlier to the amendment. The benefit of law laid down by the Supreme Court was
extended to all the workmen even to those who were employed for specific work or for a
particular job and even to casual labourers who were engaged merely to complete casual nature
of work. In the judgment of N. Sundaramoney's case relied in 2007 case and had observed that
time and again it has been held that welfare statutes must receive the construction which
advances the object of the statutes and protects the weaker section of the society. It was
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observed that the employer is always in a position to dictate the terms of service vis-a-vis the
workman or to be workman. The employer can unilaterally impose oppressive and
unreasonable conditions of service and the workman will be left with little choice but to
accept all such conditions even unconscionable conditions of service in the contract of
employment. In the case in hand before this court, respondents had adopted policy of engagement
of contractual labourer to avoid financial liability Ex. RW1/B which prescribed the manner in
which workman was to employed for 89 days in two spells which follows that contractual labourers
engaged for 89 days in first spell were to be disengaged after 89 days engaging new batch and
following such engagements show that after first engagement of labourers as stated above junior
contractual labourer were to certainly disengage senior workmen i.e. first batch for 89 days without
notice despite availability of work and funds which manifestly violated Section 25-G of the 'Act'.
26. In the concluding para in Manoj Kumar's case, Hon'ble High Court has held that
workman had been offered appointment with fictional breaks to prevent petitioner from taking
benefit of Section 25-F of Act. The appointment orders issued in successor to workman was
camouflage to take out petitioner-workman from the ambit of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The appointment of petitioner cannot be termed as contractual and his case will
fall under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it will be covered under
expression “retrenchment”. The act of respondents of engaging petitioner giving fictional
breaks was not bonafide and reinstatement of petitioner-workman was allowed. Applying the
ratio of case law referred to above, it may not be erroneous to observe that in the case in hand
before this court, contractual employment of petitioner and time to time termination was made by
respondents so that petitioner did not become permanent and at the same time act of respondents in
throwing out petitioner from work with contractor without notice is manifestly unfair labour
practice and petitioner would be covered under definition of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) and
not under exception in Clause (bb) (oo) as has been held in Manoj Kumar's case.
27. Thus, in the case before this court respondents had made scheme which was
significantly promulgated for engagement of contractual labourer for 89 days in one spell and in the
case before the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana having similar period of engagement of
workmen respondents were held to have not complied with the Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act as the workman who was a clerk had been engaged for 89 days and given fresh
appointment twice for 89 days. As such, referring to aforestated case law and evidence on record, it
may not be erroneous to conclude that respondents had recoursed to unfair labour practice initially
by adopting standing instruction for engagement of contractual labour Ex. RW1/B which in its
prescribed clause (e) duration of contractual labourer was to be not more than 89 in a year for two
spells and thereafter by abrupting engagement of labourers on outsource basis through contractor.
But in this case, the petitioner had been engaged several times with intervals as shown in mandays
chart Ex. P10 from 2009 to 2013 and thus the action of respondents in giving intermittent break as
well as finally terminating service without notice and asking the petitioner to work with contractor
who was to provide unskilled labourers to respondents on outsource basis was nothing else but
termination of service of petitioner without any notice and that the intermittent breaks are held to be
deliberately made by the respondents with the object to avoid financial liability upon respondents
which could not be accepted as ground to negate or say defeat claim of petitioner. The termination
of petitioner would thus be not excluded under Section 2 (oo) (bb) and squarely fell under the
definition of retrenchment under the Act necessitating issuance of notice of one month envisaged
under Section 25-F of the Act and in alternative wages for one month in lieu of notice period which
has admittedly not been done as RW1 has shown his inability to tell if while disengaging petitioner
any notice was served. Being the Director in university authorized to contest and depose in this
case on behalf of respondents was expected to know material facts qua engagement and
disengagement of petitioner. Accordingly, applying the case law as referred to above, it is held that
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petitioner had been wrongly retrenched from service by the respondents in violation of provisions
of Act.
28. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has taken this court through Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex.
PW1/O passed in Reference No.154/2012 titled as Mohinder Singh versus Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, Distt. Solan, H.P. & Anr. vide which this
court had directed reinstatement of petitioner setting aside retrenchment order qua petitioner w.e.f.
1-1-2005 by respondents and was held entitled for seniority and continuity in service from the date
of illegal termination except back wages. While relying upon the above said Award, ld. Counsel for
the petitioner has contended that above said award has not been assailed by respondents which had
attained finality having similar facts with regard to award Ex. PW1/O. RW1 in cross-examination
has showed his inability to tell if above said award passed against the respondent had been
challenged however specifically admitted that said Mohinder Singh was still working with the
university. Statement of RW1 recorded on 1-10-2011 and award was passed on 28-4-2017 and was
allegedly terminated on 1-1-2005 which goes to show after implementation of award Ex. PW1/O
above-named Mohinder Singh has been in continuous service with the respondent from 1-1-2005 to
31-10-2017 when RW1 was cross-examined. As such, Mohinder Singh's case having similar facts
and not challenged by respondents is equally binding upon respondents qua similarly situated
workmen. In the said judgment also, my ld. predecessor-in office in para No. 26 on record has
specifically held that action of respondents was unfair labour practice under Clause 10 Vth
Schedule appended under the Act. In so far claim of petitioner qua back wages from date of illegal
termination in the year 2013 is concerned, suffice would be state here that onus to prove that
petitioner/claimant remained unemployed and not gainfully employed was upon respondents.
Although, petitioner has alleged that he remained unemployed and was not gainfully employed ever
since his termination in 2013 by filing affidavit to this effect could not be relied as being a young
person ageing about 28 years would not have sit idle for about five years without earning and thus
his plea to this effect merits rejection. Accordingly, petitioner is held to be not entitled for back
wages. Accordingly, issues No.1 and 2 are answered in affirmative holding that act of respondents
in giving time to time break and finally terminating on 1-1-2013 is improper and unjustified.
However, issue No. 3 is decided as discussed holding that petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in
service with seniority and continuity in service without back wages. Issues are decided accordingly.
Issue No. 4 :
29. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has contended that College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Neri, Hamirpur, H.P. does not fall under the jurisdiction before this court. On the other
hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner had relied upon Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board etc.
and A. Rajappa and others, AIR 1978 SC 548 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the definition of “industry” envisaged under Section 2(j) of the Act and held that university would
fall within the definition of industry and its employees are workman entitled to protection
envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Ld. Counsel for respondents has failed to
repudiate arguments and as such university cannot be stated to be not industry and its workers to be
not workmen. Issue is decided in negative against the respondents and in favour of petitioner. Since
issues No. 4 and 6 are the same, as such in view of findings of issue No. 4 as stated above, issue
No. 6 has become redundant.
Issue No. 5 :
30. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has not pressed this issue during course of argument.
Otherwise also, from pleadings on record no inference of claim petition being not maintainable can
be raised industrial dispute. In the case in hand, the petitioner had challenged his illegal termination
by the respondents who had allegedly violated of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. As such, being
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aggrieved with action of the respondents in terminating service, petitioner could legitimately agitate
his claim before this court. Issue No. 5 is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against
the respondents.
Issue No. 7 :
31. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another
Vs. Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have
not come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425,
it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim
on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government and the
Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government and same
is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The
Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 752,
has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of
Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to put the
restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the provision and in
absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to introduce the limitation
on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-
cum- Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
32. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondents. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner
coupled with evidence on record cannot be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged
by the respondents. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondent and is answered
accordingly.
Relief :
33. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues Nos. 1 to 6, the reference/claim petition
is partly allowed and the respondents are hereby directed to re-engage the petitioner forthwith who
is further held to be in continuous uninterrupted service with the respondents from the date of his
initial engagement in the year 2010 and that the breaks given by the respondent being fictional in
nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of service of the petitioner and his
seniority shall be reckoned from his initial date of engagement however, petitioner shall be entitled
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to seniority and continuity in service from the date of his initial engagement except back wages. In
the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
34. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
35. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
36. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
17/2015
Date of Institution :
13-01-2015
Date of decision :
24-4-2018
Shri Joginder Singh s/o Shri Puran Chand, r/o Village Neri, P.O. Khaggal, Tehsil & District
Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Dean, College of Horticulture and Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
2. The Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, District
Solan H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N. L. Kaundal, AR
Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Karan Pathania, Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Joginder Singh s/o Shri Puran
Chand, r/o Village Neri, P.O. Khaggal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P. w.e.f. 08-07-2009
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to 31-12-2012 and thereafter re-engagement w.e.f. 14-03-2013 to 22-04-2013 and final
termination w.e.f. 23-04-2013 by (i) the Director, Institute of Biotechnology &
Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamirpur, H.P. (ii) the Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture &
Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the
above employers?”
2.
After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 3rd February, 2017
was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:
“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 01-01-2015,
the name of employer No (i) may be read as “the Dean, College of Horticulture and
Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.” instead of “the Director, Institute of Biotechnology
& Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamipur, H.P.”, which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification.”
3.
On receipt of reference as well as addendum from appropriate government, notices
were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.
4.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
unskilled labourer by respondent No. 1 in the year 2009 with prior approval of respondent No. 2
who continued to work uninterruptedly with the respondents upto 22nd April, 2013. Averments
made in the claim petition further revealed that from 2009 to 2013, petitioner had been engaged for
89 days in first spell and after completion of 89 days, he had been given fictional break in his
service as some other group of workmen had been engaged for second spell of 89 days and when
the second spell of workers had completed after 89 days, petitioner had been engaged again for 89
days and such practice of engaging and disengaging by giving fictional breaks to the petitioner
continued upto 22nd April, 2013. It is further alleged that respondents had given fictional breaks of
89 days in two spells to the petitioner and other co-workmen so that they did not complete 240 days
in each calendar year for the purpose of counting continuous service envisaged under Section 25-B
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'Act' for brevity). The grievance of
petitioner remains that his service had been finally terminated by respondent No. 1 on 23-4-2013
alongwith other co-workmen without complying with mandatory provisions of Act as neither any
show cause notice had been issued nor charge-sheet had been raised for any alleged misconduct
and at the same time, no inquiry had been conducted against the petitioner besides no retrenchment
notice or compensation of one month's pay in lieu of notice period had been given and thus
termination order is stated to be illegal, null and void as petitioner had completed 240 days in
preceding 12 calendar months from date of termination. It is alleged that while terminating of
service of petitioner even principle of 'Last come First go' had not been followed as several junior
workmen namely Ishwar Dass and Rajeev Kumar had been retained in service ignoring the rights
of petitioner in violation of Section 25-G of Act as above named two workmen had worked
alongwith petitioner on muster-roll and performed same duties. It is alleged that after terminating
service of petitioner and other co-workmen, respondents had entered into contract with M/s. Shimla
Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. vide letter No. 827-76 dated 30th April, 2013 to
outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 for 11 months and after expiry of the
above said period, respondent No. 1 had renewed contract with contractor above-named for further
period of one year and as such the above said contractor had engaged 15 workmen as unskilled
labourers on daily rate basis namely Raj Kumar, Arvind Kumar, Premi Devi, Asha Devi, Kanta
Devi, Beena Devi, Santosh Kumari, Sunita Devi, Nirmla Devi, Soma Devi, Raj Kumari, Sudesh
Kumari, Meena Devi, Santosh Kumari and Sobha Ram who had worked under Shri Rampal
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Baniyal, Incharge and thus respondents had violated provisions of Section 25-H of Act. It is
categorically stated that respondents had sufficient work due to which they had outsourced
unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to be engaged through M/s Shimla Cleanwayas, Sahibu Niwas,
New Shimla, H.P. and thus it cannot be stated that respondents did not have sufficient work and
funds in different projects run by it. It is alleged that the service of petitioner and other co-workmen
who had been engaged by the respondents had been terminated with the object to deprive petitioner
and other unskilled labourers so that they did not complete 240 days. It is alleged that respondent
No. 1 without any instructions from respondent No. 2 had given fictional breaks to petitioner and
said act of respondent No. 1 fell under the definition of “unfair labour practice” as defined in Vth
Schedule Clause 10 read with Section 25-T and 25-U of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It further
transpires from petition that the respondents had engaged regular unskilled Class-IV workers on
regular pay scale in Neri I and II who are S/Sh. Chaman Lal, Kishan Chand, Deen, Sanjeev Kumar,
Parkash Chand, Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram however 14 workmen including petitioner had been
initially engaged on daily rate basis for 89 days in two spells as stated above. It is also alleged that
in addition to petitioner and other workers as stated in this para some other workmen had been
engaged who were not given any break and thus respondents has also shown favourtism to one set
of workers which violated provisions of Clause 9 of Schedule 5th of Industrial Disputes Act. It is
alleged that respondents had admitted in the reply filed before the Labour Inspector, Hamirpur that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labourer for 89 days in two spells during calendar year
as per the rules framed by university in year 2002 and that initially after working for 89 days,
petitioner had been given break. It is alleged that these 14 workmen including petitioner had filed a
complaint of illegal termination before Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur in pursuance to which
Additional Deputy Commissioner, District Hamirpur had written a letter No. 129 dated 16-5-2013
for re-engagement of services of retrenched workmen on the basis of order dated 20-11-2004 of
Hon'ble High Court of H.P. It is alleged that petitioner alongwith other workmen had filed CWP
No. 4991/2012 in which Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 20-11-2014 in which directions had
been given to respondents to not give fictional breaks to the petitioners and if their services on this
count already stood dispensed with, then no fresh hand shall be engaged without first offering the
work to the petitioners. It is alleged that despite directions vide order dated 20-11-2014 respondents
had not given offer to petitioner and other co-workmen for appointment in service and contrarily
engaged 15 workmen with contractor and thus respondent No. 1 has violated even order of Hon'ble
High Court. Moreover, respondent did not file any application before Hon'ble High Court seeking
permission in CWP No. 4991/2012 to allow respondents to outsource petitioner unskilled contract
labour in place of terminated workmen. It further remains the case of the petitioner that in reference
154/2012 decided by this Court on 24-8-2012 titled as Mahinder Singh Vs. Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P. retrenchment of
Mahinder Singh dated 1-1-2005 was set aside and respondents were directed to re-engage the
petitioner forthwith who was further held entitled to seniority and continuity of service from the
date of his illegal termination except back wages. It is alleged that in pursuance to Award dated 24-
8-2012 said Mahinder Singh has been continuously working with the respondents till date of filing
of present claim petition. Accordingly, alleging respondents to have given fictional breaks from
time to time terminating service of petitioner and other co-workmen for 89 days in two spells and
finally terminating service of petitioner on 23-4-2013 is illegal, arbitrary and unjustified in
violation of mandatory provisions of Act. It is claimed that after termination, petitioner has
remained unemployed who was not gainfully employed anywhere from 2013 and thus petitioner
claimed to be entitled for full back wages for period of fictional breaks from 2009 to 2013 till final
termination on 23-4-2013. Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside illegal fictional breaks
w.e.f. 2009 to 22-4-2013 with direction to the respondents to condone the break period in continuity
in service for the purposes of regularization besides has prayed wages for time to time break period.
The claimant/petitioner has further prayed for setting aside illegal termination w.e.f. 22-4-2013 with
direction to the respondents to reinstate petitioner forthwith alongwith back wages, seniority,
continuity in service with consequential benefits and litigation costs.
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5.
Respondents No. 1 and 2 contested claim petition, filed joint reply inter-alia taken
preliminary objections of maintainability, limitation and jurisdiction. On merits admitted that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour to do manual work in the experimental fields on
seasonal basis but denied that his service had been illegally terminated by the respondents. It is
alleged that due to non-availability of funds a policy for the engagement of contractual labour was
formulated by the respondent w.e.f. 1-1-2002 so as to recognize engagement and avoid additional
liability. It is claimed that respondents did not have permanent and perennial nature of experimental
field work which required attendance of labourers (during Rabi and Kharif season) as seasonal
labourers were employed for a limited period on contract basis to accomplish the field trial work
with the object of research trial and their data etc. were not wasted for want of adequate manpower.
It is specifically alleged that petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour on a fixed salary for
a particular period in different spells as and when work and funds were available under the project
code No. HGI130-62 as is evident from letter No.UHF/IBES/HGI-130-62/1055-71 dated 3-10-2012
which postulated that no seniority shall be given to contractual labour and the service of individual
will be terminated after the contract was over as envisaged under conditions No. 2 and 8 of
appointment letter. The respondents have asserted that petitioner had after understanding terms and
conditions accepted the engagement and did not complete 240 days in any of the calendar years. It
is alleged by respondents in their reply that as and when work and funds were available under time
bound project, service of labour for field work was required for which advertisement was given
from time to time but the petitioner did not turn up for facing interviews and seeking job. It is
emphatically denied that junior persons namely Rajeev Kumar and Ishwar Dass had been retained
by university rather said Ishwar Dass has been working with the college since 2000. However, the
court had given seniority w.e.f. 14-11-2005 and thus allegation of petitioner that juniors were
retained was stated to be wrong. It is admitted that respondent had entered into contract with M/s
Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla vide letter No. 827-76 dated 30-4-2013 but
outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-1-2013 onwards and engaged skilled and unskilled labourer
through them to carry out the seasonal and adhoc projects work as and when needed and that if
petitioner wanted to get engaged for field work with the respondents then petitioner was required to
approach the said agency. It is asserted that termination of petitioner including other co-workers
outsourcing by respondents had become compulsion of university due to reason that the university
was already facing liability of surplus staff including Class-IV. It is alleged that respondents are not
in a position to continue the service of labourer including petitioner so as avoid additional financial
liability. It is alleged that most of the labourers mentioned in the petition had been engaged on
compassionate grounds as per provisions of rules with the prior approval of State Govt. besides
maintained that petitioner was engaged on contractual basis for specific terms and conditions and
thus he cannot retract from conditions imposed by the respondents. It is alleged that petitioner was
engaged from time to time on fixed salary on contractual basis and not on regular basis for a
specific period. Accordingly, denying all allegations of petitioner, as contained in claim petition
respondents have prayed for dismissal of claim petition.
6.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to the join reply filed by respondents, reiterated his stand
as maintained in the claim petition. It is also reiterated that workmen mentioned in para No. 6 of the
claim petition namely Chaman Lal, Krishan Chand, Jamaldeen, Sanjeev Kumar, Om Prakash,
Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram regular workmen who had been working with the petitioner and
other co-workmen have since been disengaged. It is denied that respondents had engaged some
workmen on compassionate grounds moreover asserted petitioner to be unemployed and not
gainfully employed anywhere during time to time termination and from the date of his final
termination.
7.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit Ex. PW1/ A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, affidavit of petitioner Ex. PW1/A1, copy of
judgment dated 20-11-2014 Ex. PW1/B, application dated 4-5-2013 regarding representation for
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regularization, seniority and against the fictional breaks Ex. PW1/C copy of notification dated
30-4-2013 Ex. PW1/D, copy of complaint letter dated 16-5-2013 Ex. PW1/E, copy of reply of
demand notice dated 3-7-2013 Ex. PW1/F copy of seniority list of the contractual labour Ex.
PW1/G, copy of letter dated 3-10-2012 Ex. PW1/H, letter dated 7-7-2009 addressed to Shri Rajeev
Kumar Ex. PW1/I, letter dated 13-3-2013 Ex. PW1/J, letter dated 3-1-2012 Ex. PW1/K, copy of
representation dated 10-12-2012 Ex. PW1/L, complaint dated 22-4-2013 addressed to Deputy
Commissioner, Hamirpur Ex. PW1/M, complaint dated nil Ex. PW1/N, copy of representation
dated 13-2-2013 Ex. PW1/O, letter dated 27-1-2014 regarding reinstatement of Sh. Budh Ram as
daily paid labourer Ex. PW1/P, copy of Award dated 24-8-2012 passed by this Court Ex. PW1/Q
and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondents had
examined Dr. P.C. Sharma as RW1, tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, standing instructions
regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis dated 5-12-2001 Ex. RW1/B, letter dated
18-9-2012 regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order
dated 21-2-2005 Ex. RW1/D, copy of letter dated 13-5-2016 regarding substitution of name of Dir.
Institute of Biotechnology Ex. RW1/E and closed evidence.
8.
It is pertinent to mention here that after closing evidence by the respondent, petitioner
had moved an application for additional evidence which was allowed and Shri Jai Ram,
Superintendent office of Dean College of Horticulture & Forestry Neri, Distt. Hamirpur, H.P.
examined as PW2, tendered/proved seniority list of daily paid workers dated 30-4-2017 (07 leaves)
Ex. P1, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 11-4-2011 (06 leaves) Ex. P-2, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 23-2-2011 (07 leaves) Ex. P-3, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 1-10-2014 Ex. P-4, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated
17-10-2015 Ex. P-5, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 16-3-2009 (29 leaves) Ex. P
6, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 10-6-2011 (30 leaves) Ex. P-7, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 7-10-2014 (31 leaves) Ex. P-8, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 16-9-2016 (30 leaves) Ex. P-9, copy of mandays chart of contractual
labourers (09 leaves) Ex. P-10 and closed additional evidence. However, ld. Counsel for the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not lead any further additional evidence which was closed vide
separate statement of ld. Counsel for respondents.
9.
I have heard ld. Authorized Representative representing petitioner and ld. Counsel for
respondents, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposal of this case.
10. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28-05-2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents
during the year 8-7-2009 to 31-12-2012 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?
. .OPP.
2.
Whether the petitioner was re-engaged from 14-3-2013 to 22-4-2013 and final
termination of services of petitioner w.e.f. 23-4-2013 is/was improper and unjustified?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 1 or issue No. 2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
5.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
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6.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
7.
Whether the claim petition is time barred by limitation as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
11. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No. 1 : Yes
Issue No. 2 : Yes
Issue No. 3 : Discussed
Issue No. 4 : No
Issue No. 5 : No
Issue No. 6 : Redundant
Issue No. 7 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is partly allowed per operative part of the Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1, 2 and 3 :
12. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
13. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2009 initially for a
period of 89 days and thereafter with intermittent breaks several times till 2013 as is also evident
from mandays chart Ex. P-10. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged on the basis of policy for
engagement of labourers on contractual basis incorporated in Ex. RW1/B dated 5-12-2001. It is
admitted case of respondents that contractual labourers including petitioner had remained engaged
till 2013 ever since initial engagement when respondents allegedly engaged contractor for
outsourcing unskilled contractual labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013. Equally admitted case of respondents is
that duration of contractual labourers as per policy Ex. RW1/B was not to exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spell in whole year and in case re-engaged was to be made then break of atleast 15
days was necessary. It is admittedly not case of respondents that work and conduct of petitioner
was not good and satisfactory. Admittedly, respondents had sufficient work and funds for engaging
petitioner in different projects moreso when unskilled labourers were decided to be engaged from
contractor on outsource basis. It is further admitted case of respondents that petitioner being
contractual unskilled labourer provisions of Section 25 of Act did not apply as petitioner was
squarely covered under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the 'Act'. In view of foregoing admitted facts on
record, claim of petitioner qua termination in violation of Section 2 (oo) of Act needs to be
determined and at the same it also needs to be determined, if respondents deliberately recoursed to
time to time termination of petitioner and thereafter final termination in the year 2013 falling within
ambit of unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Clause 9 of Vth Schedule of 'Act'.
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14. At the outset, it would be pertinent to mention here that Ex. RW1/B Standing
Instructions of respondents for engaging contractual unskilled labourers clearly provided that no
casual worker shall be engaged on muster-roll by any functionary of University w.e.f. 1-1-2002
which further stipulated that as far as possible continuing casual worker should be adjusted in
research and extension projects and thereafter demand for additional hands by deployment of
labour on contract may be made. Clause (e) of policy is reproduced below for reference:
“(e) The duration of the engagement of contractual labour should not exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spells in whole of the year and in case of re-engagement, a break of atleast 15
days is necessary in each case”.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner referring to above-stated rule for engagement of unskilled
contractual labour has contended that respondents being employer have given intermittent break in
service which was countable as petitioner like any other labourer engaged on contract was not in
position to bargain with respondents rather had no option but to work in illegal service conditions
imposed. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as
Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries, reported in 2014 LLR 673 in which Hon'ble
Apex Court has held that artificial break in service every year by reappointing the employee on the
same post tantamounts to 'unfair labour practice' under Section 2(ra) of the Act which is not
permissible under law. It was further observed that when repeated artificial periodical breaks in
service are proved, the termination of workman would not be having protection under Section 2(oo)
(bb) of the Act which would attract relief of reinstatement with full back wages being illegal
retrenchment.
16. PW1 has stepped into witness box deposed on oath as maintained in claim petition
specifically stated that petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2009 who continued to
work with respondents till 22-4-2013 when service of petitioner had been terminated finally along-
with 13 other workers without complying with provisions of the 'Act'. He has further stated neither
any show cause notice nor compensation was given although petitioner had completed 240 days in
preceding 12 months from date of termination. Significantly, Ex. P10 mandays does not factually
show petitioner to have worked for 240 days immediately prior to his termination but plea of
petitioner remains that Ex. RW1/B Standing Instructions for engagement of unskilled labourer on
contract basis which fell in the ambit of an unfair labour practice had been invariably recoursed by
respondents during period of employment of petitioner when there were sufficient funds and work
with respondents and in the judgment (supra) of Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was held liable to
be reinstated in service being illegally retrenched.
17. Reliance has further been placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &
Haryana reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development
Authority, Manimajra and Anr. versus Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Rohtak and Anr. Relevant para of judgment is reproduced below:
“Since provision of Section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature of an exception it has to be construed
strictly in favour of the workman as far as possible in letter and spirit. If the termination is
meant to exploit an employee or to increase the bargaining power of the employer,
then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause (bb) and the definition of
'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning…”
18. In the aforestated judgment, Hon'ble High Court (DB) had upheld award passed by
Labour Court relying upon judgment titled as Kapurthala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 1984 (2) Indian Law Reporter 333 (DB) in which
service of workman had been terminated when case of those had completed 230 days. In this case,
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services of workmen were terminated without any departmental inquiry or charge-sheet and at the
same time, no notice or compensation was paid. The bank before the Hon'ble Court took plea that
service of workman for specified period and that too with notional breaks and thereafter workmen
were neither entitled for any retrenchment compensation nor reinstatement. The court in (1984)
case after dilating upon various aspects of matter held that attempt of employer to dispense with
service of workman so as to deprive him in continuity of service for specified period i.e. 240
days envisaged under Section 25-B and 25-F of the Act amounts to unfair labour practice when it is
found that conduct and service of workman was satisfactory. In 1994 judgment (supra) reference
has been made to another case reported in 1989 (2) RSJ 55 titled as Balbir Singh Vs. The
Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Limited in which J. Amarjit Chaudhary interpreted
Sub-clause (bb) (oo) of Section 2 and relevant para is reproduced below:
Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act, which was added in 1984 by an
amendment cannot be so construed as to drastically restrict the orbit of the term of
'retrenchment' clause (bb) is an exception which must be interpreted narrowly. It cannot be
given meanings which may nullify or curtail the ambit of their principal clause. No doubt,
the intention of the Parliament in enacting clause (bb) was to exclude certain categories of
workers from the term of retrenchment but there is nothing in this clause which allows an
outlet to un-scrupulour employers to shunt out workers in the graph of non-renewal of their
contract even when the work subsists. This Clause as a whole has to be construed strictly in
favour of the workman as far as possible as to ensure that the Act is implemented in letter
and spirit. If the termination is meant to exploit an employee or to increase the
bargaining power of the employer, then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause
(bb) and the definition of term 'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning. The
contractual clause enshrined in clause (bb) cannot be resorted to frustrate the claim of
the employee against his uncalled for retrenchment or for denying other benefits. It
cannot be so interpreted, as to enable for employer to resort to the policy of hire and fire….”
19. It is admittedly not the case of respondents that petitioner could not be deployed or
employed or say that respondents had terminated service of petitioner since there was not sufficient
work and funds. Be it stated that by engaging contractor for outsourcing unskilled labourer to be
provided to respondents w.e.f. 1-5-2013 is clearly suggestive of the fact that respondents had
sufficient work and funds. Not only this, even several unskilled labourer had been engaged for
whole of the year as reflected in Ex. P5 the tentative seniority list as on 31-12-2014. Thus,
intermittent breaks given by respondents to petitioner establishes unfair labour practice within the
meaning of Section 2(ra) of the Act as the object behind engaging petitioner as contractual labourer
and thereafter giving intermittent breaks and finally terminating without any notice, changing
service conditions by asking petitioner to join contractor from a specific date as has also been
admitted by RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma in cross-examination who is the only witness examined by
respondents. Equally important to mention here is that while filing reply respondents have withheld
facts qua number of labourers engaged in two spells while implementing its policy Ex. RW1/B and
at the same time their names too have not been disclosed establishes that respondents from very
beginning while engaging petitioner intended that petitioner did not attain permanency in job but
for reason stated hereinabove, petitioner is held to have continuous service from 2009 to 2013 as
envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. That being so, it was incumbent upon respondents to have
issued notice under Section 25-F of Act and alternatively to pay wages of one month in lieu of
notice which has not so been done by respondents establishing violation of provisions of Section
25-F of the Act for intermittent breaks as well as for final termination and for similar reasons
disengaging petitioner periodically and retaining juniors in two spells as has come in evidence
clearly establish violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
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20. In order to prove his case, the petitioner has placed reliance upon Ex. P10 the mandays
on fixed wages w.e.f. 2009 relating to petitioner which showed that petitioner had worked under
project FCR-034-62, HMM-022-62 from 1-3-2007 to 31-12-2010 for 89 days and thereafter with
several intermittent breaks till 31-12-2012 as shown in this document. The plea of the petitioner
remains that the breaks had been given deliberately by respondents so that the petitioner did not
complete 240 days. It has also been stated by petitioner that despite availability of funds and work
intermittent breaks had been given from time to time during total period petitioner remained
engaged with the respondents.
21. Before accepting plea of petitioner for having been given break deliberately from time
to time, it would be also relevant to consider if the petitioner succeeded in establishing that if
throughout the year intermittent breaks would not have been given, he would have continued to be
in service for whole of the year and deemed to have completed continuous service in a year
envisaged under Section 25-B of Act. To prove that provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not
adhered to by respondent while giving intermittent breaks reliance has been placed on seniority list
Ex. P1 to P5 showing junior workmen to petitioner i.e. those daily beldar who joined after
petitioner have been retained, engaging more than 300 days in a year whereas petitioner had been
given intermittent breaks in the same year. The seniority list Ex. P1 shows that Asha Devi and Tara
Chand figuring at serial No. 33 & 34 have joined on 13-7-2009. Ex. P4 is the tentative seniority list
(as on 31-12-2013) of these officials showed i.e. Tara Chand to have worked for 365 days in the
year 2010, 354 days in 2011, 366 days in 2012 and 365 days in 2013. Said Tara Chand figured at
serial No. 15 in the seniority list. Similarly, Asha Devi figuring at serial No.16 in seniority list Ex.
R4 is shown to have worked for 304 days in 2010, 347 days in 2011, 341 days in 2012 and 363
days in 2013. With the aid of these entries concerning Tara Chand and Asha Devi figuring at serial
No.15 and 16, it has been contended that there was sufficient work and funds available with the
respondents in different projects and these two officials had joined after joining of petitioner who
as per Ex. P10 figured at serial No. 3 and had joined on 1-3-2007 and as both these workmen had
been given sufficient work throughout the year(s) despite being engaged at later stage, the
petitioner is held to have been given intermittent break from 1-3-2007 till 31-12-2012 deliberately
by respondents despite having sufficient work and funds, Ex. P10 further shows that petitioner
during these years had remained engaged with intermittent breaks for 12 times from 2007 to 2013
in project FCR-034-62, HMM-022-62. If Tara Chand and Asha Devi could be given work for more
than 300 days in a year in particular year from 2010 to 2013, there was no reasons or compulsion
for the respondents to have given break to the petitioner as stated above which manifestly shows
that petitioner has been deliberately given breaks in service.
22. The tentative seniority list of daily wage labourers as it stood on 31-12-2013. Ex. P4
revealed that at serial No.15 and 16 names of Tara Chand and Asha Devi existed but at serial Nos.
17 to 20 names of Amravati, Bhim Dutt, Kamla Devi and Saroj Bala have been mentioned who
were shown to have joined and worked with respondents on 28-10-2010, 1-5-2012, 8-5-2012 and
15-5-2012 respectively much later than petitioner who joined in 2007. As such, latest seniority list
available at the time when petitioner was removed from service except Tara Chand and Asha Devi,
others are shown to have joined in the year 2010 and 2012 respectively as mentioned above.
Nothing in the cross-examination of petitioner PW1 could be elicited by respondents which would
demolish his claim qua deliberate intermittent breaks given by the respondents despite work and
funds as other juniors had been given sufficient work for whole of the year and policy Ex. RW1/B
dealing with contractual labourers was primarily a policy meant to exploit unskilled contractual
labourers which could be termed as entirely based on unfair labour practice. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma,
Director, Institute of Biotechnology and Environment Sciences, College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
has deposed that he had been posted on the present assignment since 1-11-2016 besides stated that
petitioner worked with university but did not know that petitioner remained engaged from date of
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appointment till 22-4-2013. He has admitted in cross-examination that from 2002 to 2013, 30-32
contractual labourers were engaged, initially for 89 days who were appointed in two batches after
engaging the first batch, second batch was engaged when first batch was disengaged and thereafter
second batch was disengaged which support the plea of petitioner that the process of engagement
and disengagements was deliberate on part of respondents. Apparently, giving such intermittent
breaks to two groups of unskilled labourers without notice violated Section 25-G of the Act. As
such, respondents are held to have given intermittent breaks to the petitioner in violation of
provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act.
23. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that although adopting
policy for engagement of unskilled labourer on contractual basis vide Ex. RW1/B, respondents had
changed conditions of service of petitioner without issuing any prior notice vide which petitioner
was required to join to contractor engaged to provide unskilled labourers on outsource basis to
respondents which tentamounts to termination of service of petitioner as petitioner had been
engaged with respondents since 2007 and no prior notice was served upon him in 2013 notifying
petitioner to join contractor who was to provide labourers to respondents on the basis of some
agreement entered into between respondents and contractor Ld. Counsel/Authorized Representative
for petitioner had also contended if contractual employment is resorted to as mechanism to frustrate
the claim so that employee did not become regular or permanent against a job which continues or
the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
clause of Section 2(oo) of the Act, the same would be an unfair labour practice under the 'Act'.
Before proceedings further, it would be most pertinent to refer to order dated 20-11-2014 Ex.
PW1/B of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in which present petitioner along with 13 other had filed
CWP No. 4991/2012 when respondents had been directed “to not give fictional breaks to
petitioner and if their services on this count already stand dispense with, no fresh hand shall
be engaged without first affording the work to the petitioners”. In pursuance to the above said
order, petitioner alongwith 13 others had filed the complaint before Deputy Commissioner
Hamirpur for non-enforcement of order dated 20-11-2014 passed by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in
pursuance to which Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur had directed respondents to enforce the order
of the Hon'ble High Court dated 20-11-2014. The plea of respondents in their joint reply remained
that petitioner had not applied for re-engagement with contractor engaged in 2013 which leads to
an irresistible inference that petitioner had been disengaged i.e. terminated from service of
respondents in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. It is admittedly not the case of the
respondents that any notice was served upon petitioner as could also be gathered from cross-
examination of RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma, Director Dean College of Horticulture respondent No.1 who
showed his ignorance if while disengaging petitioner in the year 2013, any notice was served upon
petitioner by respondents. If any notice as required would have been issued by respondents, RW1
would have certainly denied this question. He has specifically admitted that while terminating
service of petitioner no compensation was paid by respondents. Although these facts revealed in
cross-examination of RW1 coupled with the order of Hon'ble High Court as referred to above, it
can be safely gathered that respondents had not adhered to the mandate of Hon'ble High Court as
the petitioner was not to be disengaged and if disengaged, no fresh hands shall be engaged although
several persons juniors to petitioner have been engaged thereafter as per seniority list Ex. P5 which
further showed availability sufficient work and funds with respondents.
24. Ld. Counsel for the respondents had contended that petitioner being contractual
employee was not covered under the definition of retrenchment under Section 2 (bb) of the Act as
under Clause (bb)(oo) termination of service of workman on contract specifically was excluded
from definition of retrenchment. It is pointed out that since the petitioner was appointed on
contract, he stands excluded from definition of “retrenchment” and therefore respondents were not
required to adhere to provisions of Section 25-F of the 'Act' while disengaging petitioner. Ld.
Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, repudiated the arguments so advanced by the ld.
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Counsel for respondents and has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
titled as Manoj Kumar Vs. H.R.T.C. and Anr. reported in 2007 LLR 1155. In the above said
judgment Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held that when repeated and fictional breaks have
been given to workman so that he should not attain permanency, it would not come within the
purview of section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act excluding termination of
retrenchment. In the case before the Hon'ble High Court respondents had set up similar plea of
petitioner being on contractual employment and thus Section 25-F could not be invoked by the
petitioner. In the above said judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held in para 12
reproduced below for reference:
“….12. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has held in Shailendra Nath Vs. Vice
Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1987 Lab IC 1607 that section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature
of an exception to section 2(oo) and has to be construed strictly and in favour of the
workman as the entire object of the Act is secure a just and fair deal to them. Their
Lordships of the Allahabad High Court have held as under:
“The expression, 'termination for whatsoever reason' used in Cl. (oo) came up for
interpretation before the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. N. S. Money, AIR 1976
SC 1111: (1976 Lab IC 769). It was held to mean a termination which takes place either by
active step of employer or by running out of stipulated period. The Hon'ble Court observed.
Termination embraced not merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact
of termination, however, produced". Since this wide interpretation resulted in extending
benefit of retrenchment to even purpose or particular job or were casual workers the
Legislature appears to have added sub cl. (bb) to cl.(oo) in 1984. Even though petitioners
claim to have acquired status of regular employees before the clause was amended as each
of them had completed 240 days prior to its addition in 1984 it may be examined if the
petitioners can be said to be contractual employees as contemplated in this sub-clause. For
that it is necessary to examine its scope and ambit. It may, however, be stated at the outset
that it obviously attempts to exclude that which otherwise would have been included in
principal clause or to be more precise is in the nature of an exception, therefore, it has to be
construed strictly and in favour of workmen as the entire objective of the Act is to secure
just and fair deal for them. Terminations which are included in it are those which are
brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time
stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide a
gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation the nature of
employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of
duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be
for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes
to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated
period or completion of work whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But
if contractual employment is resorted to as a mechanism to frustrate the claim of
employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature
of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on the anvil of
fairness and bonafide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire
and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Cl. (bb). Because if it is left to be employer not
to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstances then the protection
afforded to a workman by treating every termination, of service as retrenchment shall be
rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post
ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bonafide. It
cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also
satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That
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would be unfair labour practice [See H.D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India (1985) 51 Fac
LR 494: (1985 Lab IC 1733) (SC)]. From various annexures filed with affidavits it is clear
that some of the petitioners were employed as Office Assistant, other book binders and
peons. They were awarded benefit of bonus. They have been working for nearly five years.
Their job was not casual, seasonal or of a daily worker. They have not been paid their salary
on volume of work. Although the wages in some cases are computed on per day basis but
the payment is monthly including holidays. Their duty, therefore, was like a regular
employee and not as casual, daily or seasonal worker….”
Para No.17 of the aforestated judgment is also reproduced below which has bearing on
merits of issue and is reproduced below:
“17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Haryana State Electronics Development
Corporation Limited Vs. Mamni (2206) 9 SCC 434: AIR 2006 SC 2427: 2006 LLR 667
(SC), that appointment for a short period (89 days) and termination of service at the end of
the said period and reappointment after a gap of one day, such action of termination and
reappointment repeated again and again for a period of about one and a half years, in such
circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the termination not bonafide but
adopted to defeat the object of the Act. Thus, it is not covered by section 2(oo)(bb) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947……..”
25. Reliance has further been placed by Hon'ble High Court in Manoj Kumar's case on
another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay titled as Dalip H. Shirke Vs. Zila Parishad
Yavatmal, reported in 1990 Lab IC 100 in which judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as State
Bank of India Vs. N. Sundaramoney reported in 1976 Lab IC 769 had been relied by Hon'ble
High Court of Bombay. It was observed that exception as contained in sub clause (bb) will have to
be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been
enjoying earlier to the amendment. The benefit of law laid down by the Supreme Court was
extended to all the workmen even to those who were employed for specific work or for a
particular job and even to casual labourers who were engaged merely to complete casual nature
of work. In the judgment of N. Sundaramoney's case relied in 2007 case and had observed that
time and again it has been held that welfare statutes must receive the construction which
advances the object of the statutes and protects the weaker section of the society. It was
observed that the employer is always in a position to dictate the terms of service vis-a-vis the
workman or to be workman. The employer can unilaterally impose oppressive and
unreasonable conditions of service and the workman will be left with little choice but to
accept all such conditions even unconscionable conditions of service in the contract of
employment. In the case in hand before this court, respondents had adopted policy of engagement
of contractual labourer to avoid financial liability Ex. RW1/B which prescribed the manner in
which workman was to employed for 89 days in two spells which follows that contractual labourers
engaged for 89 days in first spell were to be disengaged after 89 days engaging new batch and
following such engagements show that after first engagement of labourers as stated above junior
contractual labourer were to certainly disengage senior workmen i.e. first batch for 89 days without
notice despite availability of work and funds which manifestly violated Section 25-G of the 'Act'.
26. In the concluding para in Manoj Kumar's case, Hon'ble High Court has held that
workman had been offered appointment with fictional breaks to prevent petitioner from taking
benefit of Section 25-F of Act. The appointment orders issued in successor to workman was
camouflage to take out petitioner-workman from the ambit of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The appointment of petitioner cannot be termed as contractual and his case will
fall under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it will be covered under
expression “retrenchment”. The act of respondents of engaging petitioner giving fictional
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breaks was not bonafide and reinstatement of petitioner-workman was allowed. Applying the
ratio of case law referred to above, it may not be erroneous to observe that in the case in hand
before this court, contractual employment of petitioner and time to time termination was made by
respondents so that petitioner did not become permanent and at the same time act of respondents in
throwing out petitioner from work with contractor without notice is manifestly unfair labour
practice and petitioner would be covered under definition of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) and
not under exception in Clause (bb) (oo) as has been held in Manoj Kumar's case.
27. Thus, in the case before this court respondents had made scheme which was
significantly promulgated for engagement of contractual labourer for 89 days in one spell and in the
case before the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana having similar period of engagement of
workmen respondents were held to have not complied with the Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act as the workman who was a clerk had been engaged for 89 days and given fresh
appointment twice for 89 days. As such, referring to aforestated case law and evidence on record, it
may not be erroneous to conclude that respondents had recoursed to unfair labour practice initially
by adopting standing instruction for engagement of contractual labour Ex. RW1/B which in its
prescribed clause (e) duration of contractual labourer was to be not more than 89 in a year for two
spells and thereafter by abrupting engagement of labourers on outsource basis through contractor.
But in this case, the petitioner had been engaged several times with intervals as shown in mandays
chart Ex. P10 from 2009 to 2013 and thus the action of respondents in giving intermittent break as
well as finally terminating service without notice and asking the petitioner to work with contractor
who was to provide unskilled labourers to respondents on outsource basis was nothing else but
termination of service of petitioner without any notice and that the intermittent breaks are held to be
deliberately made by the respondents with the object to avoid financial liability upon respondents
which could not be accepted as ground to negate or say defeat claim of petitioner. The termination
of petitioner would thus be not excluded under Section 2 (oo) (bb) and squarely fell under the
definition of retrenchment under the Act necessitating issuance of notice of one month envisaged
under Section 25-F of the Act and in alternative wages for one month in lieu of notice period which
has admittedly not been done as RW1 has shown his inability to tell if while disengaging petitioner
any notice was served. Being the Director in university authorized to contest and depose in this
case on behalf of respondents was expected to know material facts qua engagement and
disengagement of petitioner. Accordingly, applying the case law as referred to above, it is held that
petitioner had been wrongly retrenched from service by the respondents in violation of provisions
of Act.
28. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has taken this court through Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex.
PW1/Q passed in Reference No. 154/2012 titled as Mohinder Singh versus Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, Distt. Solan, H.P. & Anr. vide which this
court had directed reinstatement of petitioner setting aside retrenchment order qua petitioner w.e.f.
1-1-2005 by respondents and was held entitled for seniority and continuity in service from the date
of illegal termination except back wages. While relying upon the above said Award, ld. Counsel for
the petitioner has contended that above said award has not been assailed by respondents which had
attained finality having similar facts with regard to award Ex. PW1/Q. RW1 in cross-examination
has showed his inability to tell if above said award passed against the respondent had been
challenged however specifically admitted that said Mohinder Singh was still working with the
university. Statement of RW1 recorded on 1-10-2011 and award was passed on 28-4-2017 and was
allegedly terminated on 1-1-2005 which goes to show after implementation of award Ex. PW1/Q
above-named Mohinder Singh has been in continuous service with the respondent from 1-1-2005 to
31-10-2017 when RW1 was cross-examined. As such, Mohinder Singh's case having similar facts
and not challenged by respondents is equally binding upon respondents qua similarly situated
workmen. In the said judgment also, my ld. predecessor-in office in para No. 26 on record has
specifically held that action of respondents was unfair labour practice under Clause 10 Vth
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Schedule appended under the Act. In so far claim of petitioner qua back wages from date of illegal
termination in the year 2013 is concerned, suffice would be state here that onus to prove that
petitioner/claimant remained unemployed and not gainfully employed was upon respondents.
Although, petitioner has alleged that he remained unemployed and was not gainfully employed ever
since his termination in 2013 by filing affidavit to this effect could not be relied as being a young
person ageing about 43 years would not have sit idle for about five years without earning and thus
his plea to this effect merits rejection. Accordingly, petitioner is held to be not entitled for back
wages. Accordingly, issues No. 1 and 2 are answered in affirmative holding that act of respondents
in giving time to time break and finally terminating on 23-4-2013 is improper and unjustified.
However, issue No. 3 is decided as discussed holding that petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in
service with seniority and continuity in service without back wages. Issues are decided accordingly.
Issue No. 4:
29. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has contended that College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Neri, Hamirpur, H.P. does not fall under the jurisdiction before this court. On the other
hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner had relied upon Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board etc.
and A. Rajappa and others, AIR 1978 SC 548 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the definition of “industry” envisaged under Section 2(j) of the Act and held that university would
fall within the definition of industry and its employees are workman entitled to protection
envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Ld. Counsel for respondents has failed to
repudiate arguments and as such university cannot be stated to be not industry and its workers to be
not workmen. Issue is decided in negative against the respondents and in favour of petitioner. Since
issues No. 4 and 6 are the same, as such in view of findings of issue No. 4 as stated above, issue
No. 6 has become redundant.
Issue No. 5:
30. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has not pressed this issue during course of argument.
Otherwise also, from pleadings on record no inference of claim petition being not maintainable can
be raised industrial dispute. In the case in hand, the petitioner had challenged his illegal termination
by the respondents who had allegedly violated of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. As such, being
aggrieved with action of the respondents in terminating service, petitioner could legitimately agitate
his claim before this court. Issue No. 5 is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against
the respondents.
Issue No. 7 :
31. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425,
it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim
on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government and the
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Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government and same
is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The
Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 752, has
categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of Section
33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to put the restriction of
limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the provision and in absence of
any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to introduce the limitation on the
ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
32. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondents. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner
coupled with evidence on record cannot be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged
by the respondents. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondent and is answered
accordingly.
Relief :
33. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues Nos. 1 to 6, the reference/claim petition
is partly allowed and the respondents are hereby directed to re-engage the petitioner forthwith who
is further held to be in continuous uninterrupted service with the respondents from the date of his
initial engagement in the year 2007 and that the breaks given by the respondent being fictional in
nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of service of the petitioner and his
seniority shall be reckoned from his initial date of engagement however, petitioner shall be entitled
to seniority and continuity in service from the date of his initial engagement except back wages. In
the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
34. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
35. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
36. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
14/2015
Date of Institution : 13-01-2015
Date of decision :
24-4-2018
Shri Rajesh Kumar s/o Shri Kashmir Singh, r/o Village Neri, P.O. Khagal, Tehsil & District
Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Dean, College of Horticulture and Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
2.
The Registrar, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, District
Solan, H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Karan Pathania, Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Rajesh Kumar, s/o Shri Kashmir
Singh, r/o Village Neri, P.O. Khagal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P. during year 2004 to
22-04 2013 and finally w.e.f. 23-4-2013 by (i) the Director, Institute of Biotechnology &
Environment Sciences, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamirpur, H.P. (ii) the Registrar, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture &
Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the
above employers?”
2.
After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 3rd February, 2017
was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:
“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 26-12-2014,
the name of employer No (i) may be read as “the Dean, College of Horticulture and
Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.” instead of “the Director, Institute of Biotechnology
& Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamipur, H.P.”, which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification.”
3.
On receipt of reference as well as addendum from appropriate government, notices
were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.
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4.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
unskilled labourer by respondent No.1 in the year 2004 with prior approval of respondent No. 2
who continued to work uninterruptedly with the respondents upto 22nd April, 2013. Averments
made in the claim petition further revealed that from 2004 to 2013, petitioner had been engaged for
89 days in first spell and after completion of 89 days, he had been given fictional break in his
service as some other group of workmen had been engaged for second spell of 89 days and when
the second spell of workers had completed after 89 days, petitioner had been engaged again for 89
days and such practice of engaging and disengaging by giving fictional breaks to the petitioner
continued upto 22nd April, 2013. It is further alleged that respondents had given fictional breaks of
89 days in two spells to the petitioner and other co-workmen so that they did not complete 240 days
in each calendar year for the purpose of counting continuous service envisaged under Section 25-B
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'Act' for brevity). The grievance of
petitioner remains that his service had been finally terminated by respondent No.1 on 23-4-2013
alongwith other co-workmen without complying with mandatory provisions of Act as neither any
show cause notice had been issued nor charge-sheet had been raised for any alleged misconduct
and at the same time, no inquiry had been conducted against the petitioner besides no retrenchment
notice or compensation of one month's pay in lieu of notice period had been given and thus
termination order is stated to be illegal, null and void as petitioner had completed 240 days in
preceding 12 calendar months from date of termination. It is alleged that while terminating of
service of petitioner even principle of 'Last come First go' had not been followed as several junior
workmen namely Ishwar Dass and Rajeev Kumar had been retained in service ignoring the rights
of petitioner in violation of Section 25-G of Act as above named two workmen had worked along
with petitioner on muster roll and performed same duties. It is alleged that after terminating service
of petitioner and other co-workmen, respondents had entered into contract with M/s. Shimla
Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. vide letter No. 827-76 dated 30th April, 2013 to
outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 for 11 months and after expiry of the
above said period, respondent No.1 had renewed contract with contractor above-named for further
period of one year and as such the above said contractor had engaged 15 workmen as unskilled
labourers on daily rate basis namely Raj Kumar, Arvind Kumar, Premi Devi, Asha Devi, Kanta
Devi, Beena Devi, Santosh Kumari, Sunita Devi, Nirmla Devi, Soma Devi, Raj Kumari, Sudesh
Kumari, Meena Devi, Santosh Kumari and Sobha Ram who had worked under Shri Rampal
Baniyal, Incharge and thus respondents had violated provisions of Section 25-H of Act. It is
categorically stated that respondents had sufficient work due to which they had outsourced
unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to be engaged through M/s Shimla Cleanwayas, Sahibu Niwas,
New Shimla, H.P and thus it cannot be stated that respondents did not have sufficient work and
funds in different projects run by it. It is alleged that the service of petitioner and other co-workmen
who had been engaged by the respondents had been terminated with the object to deprive petitioner
and other unskilled labourers so that they did not complete 240 days. It is alleged that respondent
No.1 without any instructions from respondent No. 2 had given fictional breaks to petitioner and
said act of respondent No. 1 fell under the definition of “unfair labour practice” as defined in Vth
Schedule Clause 10 read with Section 25-T and 25-U of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It further
transpires from petition that the respondents had engaged regular unskilled Class-IV workers on
regular pay scale in Neri I and II who are S/Sh. Chaman Lal, Kishan Chand, Deen, Sanjeev Kumar,
Parkash Chand, Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram however 14 workmen including petitioner had been
initially engaged on daily rate basis for 89 days in two spells as stated above. It is also alleged that
in addition to petitioner and other workers as stated in this para some other workmen had been
engaged who were not given any break and thus respondents has also shown favourtism to one set
of workers which violated provisions of Clause 9 of Schedule 5th of Industrial Disputes Act. It is
alleged that respondents had admitted in the reply filed before the Labour Inspector, Hamirpur that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labourer for 89 days in two spells during calendar year
as per the rules framed by university in year 2002 and that initially after working for 89 days,
petitioner had been given break. It is alleged that these 14 workmen including petitioner had filed a
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complaint of illegal termination before Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur in pursuance to which
Additional Deputy Commissioner, District Hamirpur had written a letter No. 129 dated 16-5-2013
for reengagement of services of retrenched workmen on the basis of order dated 20-11-2004 of
Hon'ble High Court of H.P. It is alleged that petitioner alongwith other workmen had filed CWP
No. 4991/2012 in which Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 20-11-2014 in which directions had
been given to respondents to not give fictional breaks to the petitioners and if their services on this
count already stood dispensed with, then no fresh hand shall be engaged without first offering the
work to the petitioners. It is alleged that despite directions vide order dated 20-11-2014 respondents
had not given offer to petitioner and other co-workmen for appointment in service and contrarily
engaged 15 workmen with contractor and thus respondent No. 1 has violated even order of Hon'ble
High Court. Moreover, respondent did not file any application before Hon'ble High Court seeking
permission in CWP No. 4991/ 2012 to allow respondents to outsource petitioner unskilled contract
labour in place of terminated workmen. It further remains the case of the petitioner that in reference
154/2012 decided by this Court on 24-8-2012 titled as Mahinder Singh Vs. Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P. retrenchment of
Mahinder Singh dated 1-1-2005 was set aside and respondents were directed to reengage the
petitioner forthwith who was further held entitled to seniority and continuity of service from the
date of his illegal termination except back wages. It is alleged that in pursuance to Award dated
24-8-2012 said Mahinder Singh has been continuously working with the respondents till date of
filing of present claim petition. Accordingly, alleging respondents to have given fictional breaks
from time to time terminating service of petitioner and other co-workmen for 89 days in two spells
and finally terminating service of petitioner on 23-4-2013 is illegal, arbitrary and unjustified in
violation of mandatory provisions of Act. It is claimed that after termination, petitioner has
remained unemployed who was not gainfully employed anywhere from 2013 and thus petitioner
claimed to be entitled for full back wages for period of fictional breaks from 2004 to 2013 till final
termination on 23-4-2013. Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside illegal fictional breaks
w.e.f. 2004 to 22-4-2013 with direction to the respondents to condone the break period in continuity
in service for the purposes of regularization besides has prayed wages for time to time break period.
The claimant/petitioner has further prayed for setting aside illegal termination w.e.f. 22-4-2013 with
direction to the respondents to reinstate petitioner forthwith alongwith back wages, seniority,
continuity in service with consequential benefits and litigation costs.
5.
Respondents No. 1 and 2 contested claim petition, filed joint reply inter-alia taken
preliminary objections of maintainability, limitation and jurisdiction. On merits admitted that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour to do manual work in the experimental fields on
seasonal basis but denied that his service had been illegally terminated by the respondents. It is
alleged that due to non-availability of funds a policy for the engagement of contractual labour was
formulated by the respondent w.e.f. 1-1-2002 so as to recognize engagement and avoid additional
liability. It is claimed that respondents did not have permanent and perennial nature of experimental
field work which required attendance of labourers (during Rabi and Kharif season) as seasonal
labourers were employed for a limited period on contract basis to accomplish the field trial work
with the object of research trial and their data etc. were not wasted for want of adequate manpower.
It is specifically alleged that petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour on a fixed salary for
a particular period in different spells as and when work and funds were available under the project
code No. HGI-130-62 as is evident from letter No.UHF/RHFRS/HGI-130-62/626-34 dated
1-7-2011 which postulated that no seniority shall be given to contractual labour and the service of
individual will be terminated after the contract was over as envisaged under conditions No. 2 and 8
of appointment letter. The respondents have asserted that petitioner had after understanding terms
and conditions accepted the engagement and did not complete 240 days in any of the calendar
years. It is alleged by respondents in their reply that as and when work and funds were available
under time bound project, service of labour for field work was required for which advertisement
was given from time to time but the petitioner did not turn up for facing interviews and seeking job.
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It is emphatically denied that junior persons namely Rajeev Kumar and Ishwar Dass had been
retained by university rather said Ishwar Dass has been working with the college since 2000.
However, the court had given seniority w.e.f. 14-11-2005 and thus allegation of petitioner that
juniors were retained was stated to be wrong. It is admitted that respondent had entered into
contract with M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla vide letter No. 827-76 dated
30-4-2013 but outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-1-2013 onwards and engaged skilled and
unskilled labourer through them to carry out the seasonal and adhoc projects work as and when
needed and that if petitioner wanted to get engaged for field work with the respondents then
petitioner was required to approach the said agency. It is asserted that termination of petitioner
including other co-workers outsourcing by respondents had become compulsion of university due
to reason that the university was already facing liability of surplus staff including Class-IV. It is
alleged that respondents are not in a position to continue the service of labourer including petitioner
so as avoid additional financial liability. It is alleged that most of the labourers mentioned in the
petition had been engaged on compassionate grounds as per provisions of rules with the prior
approval of State Govt. besides maintained that petitioner was engaged on contractual basis for
specific terms and conditions and thus he cannot retract from conditions imposed by the
respondents. It is alleged that petitioner was engaged from time to time on fixed salary on
contractual basis and not on regular basis for a specific period. Accordingly, denying all allegations
of petitioner, as contained in claim petition respondents have prayed for dismissal of claim petition.
6.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to the join reply filed by respondents, reiterated his stand
as maintained in the claim petition. It is also reiterated that workmen mentioned in para No. 6 of the
claim petition namely Chaman Lal, Krishan Chand, Jamaldeen, Sanjeev Kumar, Om Prakash,
Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram regular workmen who had been working with the petitioner and
other co-workmen have since been disengaged. It is denied that respondents had engaged some
workmen on compassionate grounds moreover asserted petitioner to be unemployed and not
gainfully employed anywhere during time to time termination and from the date of his final
termination.
7.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, affidavit of petitioner Ex. PW1/A1, copy of
judgment dated 20-11-2014 Ex. PW1/B, copy of application dated 4-5-2013 Ex. PW1/C, copy of
notification dated 30-4-2013 Ex. PW1/D, copy of letter dated 16-5-2013 Ex. PW1/E, copy of reply
to the demand notice dated 3-7-2013 Ex. PW1/F, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/G, copies of letters
dated 22-1-2009, 11-1-2010, 5-2-2011, 14-3-2013, 13-3-2013, 22-4-2013 Ex. PW1/H to Ex.
PW1/M respectively, copy of experience certificate Ex. PW1/N, copy of CWP No. 4991/2012
dated 20-11-2014 Ex. PW1/O, copy of Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex. PW1/P, copy of letter dated
27-1-2014 Ex. PW1/Q, copy of complaint letter Ex. PW1/R, copy of letter dated 22-4-2013 Ex.
PW1/S, copy of representation dated 10-12-2012 Ex. PW1/T, copy of letter dated 13-2-2013 Ex.
PW1/U and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner,
respondents had examined Dr. P.C. Sharma as RW1, tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A,
standing instructions regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis dated 5-12-2001 Ex.
RW1/B, letter dated 18-9-2012 regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis Ex. RW1/C,
copy of office order dated 21-2-2005 Ex. RW1/D, copy of letter dated 13-5-2016 regarding
substitution of name of Dir. Institute of Biotechnology Ex. RW1/E and closed evidence.
8.
It is pertinent to mention here that after closing evidence by the respondent, petitioner
had moved an application for additional evidence which was allowed and Shri Jai Ram,
Superintendent office of Dean College of Horticulture & Forestry Neri, Distt. Hamirpur, H.P.
examined as PW2, tendered/proved seniority list of daily paid workers dated 30-4-2017 (07 leaves)
Ex. P1, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 11-4-2011 (06 leaves) Ex. P-2, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 23-2-2011 (07 leaves) Ex. P-3, tentative seniority list of
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daily paid workers dated 1-10-2014 Ex. P-4, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated
17-10-2015 Ex. P-5, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 16-3-2009 (29 leaves) Ex. P
6, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 10-6-2011 (30 leaves) Ex. P-7, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 7-10-2014 (31 leaves) Ex. P-8, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 16-9-2016 (30 leaves) Ex. P-9, copy of mandays chart of contractual
labourers (09 leaves) Ex. P-10 and closed additional evidence. However, ld. Counsel for the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not lead any further additional evidence which was closed vide
separate statement of ld. Counsel for respondents.
9.
I have heard ld. Authorized Representative representing petitioner and ld. Counsel for
respondents, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposal of this case.
10. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28-08-2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents
during the year 2004 to 22-04-2013 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged? . .OPP.
2.
Whether final termination of services of petitioner w.e.f. 23-4-2013 is/was improper
and unjustified?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No.1 or issue No.2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
5.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
6.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
7.
Whether the claim petition is time barred by limitation as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
11. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No. 1 : Yes
Issue No. 2 : Yes
Issue No. 3 : Discussed
Issue No. 4 : No
Issue No. 5 : No
Issue No. 6 : Redundant
Issue No. 7 : No
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Relief :
Claim petition is partly allowed per operative part of the Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1, 2 and 3:
12. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
13. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2004 initially for a
period of 89 days and thereafter with intermittent breaks several times till 2013 as is also evident
from mandays chart Ex. P-10. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged on the basis of policy for
engagement of labourers on contractual basis incorporated in Ex. RW1/B dated 5-12-2001. It is
admitted case of respondents that contractual labourers including petitioner had remained engaged
till 2013 ever since initial engagement when respondents allegedly engaged contractor for
outsourcing unskilled contractual labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013. Equally admitted case of respondents is
that duration of contractual labourers as per policy Ex. RW1/B was not to exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spell in whole year and in case re-engaged was to be made then break of atleast 15
days was necessary. It is admittedly not case of respondents that work and conduct of petitioner
was not good and satisfactory. Admittedly, respondents had sufficient work and funds for engaging
petitioner in different projects moreso when unskilled labourers were decided to be engaged from
contractor on outsource basis. It is further admitted case of respondents that petitioner being
contractual unskilled labourer provisions of Section 25 of Act did not apply as petitioner was
squarely covered under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the 'Act'. In view of foregoing admitted facts on
record, claim of petitioner qua termination in violation of Section 2 (oo) of Act needs to be
determined and at the same it also needs to be determined, if respondents deliberately recoursed to
time to time termination of petitioner and thereafter final termination in the year 2013 falling within
ambit of unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Clause 9 of Vth Schedule of 'Act'.
14. At the outset, it would be pertinent to mention here that Ex. RW1/B Standing
Instructions of respondents for engaging contractual unskilled labourers clearly provided that no
casual worker shall be engaged on muster-roll by any functionary of University w.e.f. 1-1-2002
which further stipulated that as far as possible continuing casual worker should be adjusted in
research and extension projects and thereafter demand for additional hands by deployment of
labour on contract may be made. Clause (e) of policy is reproduced below for reference:
“(e) The duration of the engagement of contractual labour should not exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spells in whole of the year and in case of re-engagement, a break of atleast 15
days is necessary in each case”.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner referring to above-stated rule for engagement of unskilled
contractual labour has contended that respondents being employer have given intermittent break in
service which was countable as petitioner like any other labourer engaged on contract was not in
position to bargain with respondents rather had no option but to work in illegal service conditions
imposed. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as
Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries, reported in 2014 LLR 673 in which Hon'ble
Apex Court has held that artificial break in service every year by reappointing the employee on the
same post tantamounts to 'unfair labour practice' under Section 2(ra) of the Act which is not
permissible under law. It was further observed that when repeated artificial periodical breaks in
service are proved, the termination of workman would not be having protection under Section 2(oo)
(bb) of the Act which would attract relief of reinstatement with full back wages being illegal
retrenchment.
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16. PW1 has stepped into witness box deposed on oath as maintained in claim petition
specifically stated that petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2004 who continued to
work with respondents till 22-4-2013 when service of petitioner had been terminated finally along-
with 13 other workers without complying with provisions of the 'Act'. He has further stated neither
any show cause notice nor compensation was given although petitioner had completed 240 days in
preceding 12 months from date of termination. Significantly, Ex. P10 mandays does not factually
show petitioner to have worked for 240 days immediately prior to his termination but plea of
petitioner remains that Ex. RW1/B Standing Instructions for engagement of unskilled labourer on
contract basis which fell in the ambit of an unfair labour practice had been invariably recoursed by
respondents during period of employment of petitioner when there were sufficient funds and work
with respondents and in the judgment (supra) of Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was held liable to
be reinstated in service being illegally retrenched.
17. Reliance has further been placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &
Haryana reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development
Authority, Manimajra and Anr. versus Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Rohtak and Anr. Relevant para of judgment is reproduced below:
“Since provision of Section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature of an exception it has to be construed
strictly in favour of the workman as far as possible in letter and spirit. If the termination is
meant to exploit an employee or to increase the bargaining power of the employer,
then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause (bb) and the definition of
'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning…”
18. In the aforestated judgment, Hon'ble High Court (DB) had upheld award passed by
Labour Court relying upon judgment titled as Kapurthala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 1984 (2) Indian Law Reporter 333 (DB) in which
service of workman had been terminated when case of those had completed 230 days. In this case,
services of workmen were terminated without any departmental inquiry or charge-sheet and at the
same time, no notice or compensation was paid. The bank before the Hon'ble Court took plea that
service of workman for specified period and that too with notional breaks and thereafter workmen
were neither entitled for any retrenchment compensation nor reinstatement. The court in (1984)
case after dilating upon various aspects of matter held that attempt of employer to dispense with
service of workman so as to deprive him in continuity of service for specified period i.e. 240
days envisaged under Section 25-B and 25-F of the Act amounts to unfair labour practice when it is
found that conduct and service of workman was satisfactory. In 1994 judgment (supra) reference
has been made to another case reported in 1989 (2) RSJ 55 titled as Balbir Singh Vs. The
Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Limited in which J. Amarjit Chaudhary interpreted
Sub Clause (bb) (oo) of Section 2 and relevant para is reproduced below:
"Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act, which was added in 1984 by an
amendment cannot be so construed as to drastically restrict the orbit of the term of
'retrenchment' clause (bb) is an exception which must be interpreted narrowly. It cannot be
given meanings which may nullify or curtail the ambit of their principal clause. No doubt,
the intention of the Parliament in enacting clause (bb) was to exclude certain categories of
workers from the term of retrenchment but there is nothing in this clause which allows an
outlet to un-scrupulour employers to shunt out workers in the graph of non-renewal of their
contract even when the work subsists. This Clause as a whole has to be construed strictly in
favour of the workman as far as possible as to ensure that the Act is implemented in letter
and spirit. If the termination is meant to exploit an employee or to increase the
bargaining power of the employer, then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause
(bb) and the definition of term 'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning. The
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contractual clause enshrined in clause (bb) cannot be resorted to frustrate the claim of
the employee against his uncalled for retrenchment or for denying other benefits. It
cannot be so interpreted, as to enable for employer to resort to the policy of hire and fire….”
19. It is admittedly not the case of respondents that petitioner could not be deployed or
employed or say that respondents had terminated service of petitioner since there was not sufficient
work and funds. Be it stated that by engaging contractor for outsourcing unskilled labourer to be
provided to respondents w.e.f. 1-5-2013 is clearly suggestive of the fact that respondents had
sufficient work and funds. Not only this, even several unskilled labourer had been engaged for
whole of the year as reflected in Ex. P5 the tentative seniority list as on 31-12-2014. Thus,
intermittent breaks given by respondents to petitioner establishes unfair labour practice within the
meaning of Section 2(ra) of the Act as the object behind engaging petitioner as contractual labourer
and thereafter giving intermittent breaks and finally terminating without any notice, changing
service conditions by asking petitioner to join contractor from a specific date as has also been
admitted by RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma in cross-examination who is the only witness examined by
respondents. Equally important to mention here is that while filing reply respondents have withheld
facts qua number of labourers engaged in two spells while implementing its policy Ex. RW1/B and
at the same time their names too have not been disclosed establishes that respondents from very
beginning while engaging petitioner intended that petitioner did not attain permanency in job but
for reason stated hereinabove, petitioner is held to have continuous service from 2004 to 2013 as
envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. That being so, it was incumbent upon respondents to have
issued notice under Section 25-F of Act and alternatively to pay wages of one month in lieu of
notice which has not so been done by respondents establishing violation of provisions of Section
25-F of the Act for intermittent breaks as well as for final termination and for similar reasons
disengaging petitioner periodically and retaining juniors in two spells as has come in evidence
clearly establish violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. In order to prove his case, the petitioner has placed reliance upon Ex. P10 the mandays
on fixed wages w.e.f. 2004 relating to petitioner which showed that petitioner had worked under
project FCR-002-20 from 21-9-2004 to 11-4-2010 for 89 days and thereafter with several
intermittent breaks till 20-8-2012 as shown in this document. The plea of the petitioner remains that
the breaks had been given deliberately by respondents so that the petitioner did not complete 240
days. It has also been stated by petitioner that despite availability of funds and work intermittent
breaks had been given from time to time during total period petitioner remained engaged with the
respondents.
21. Before accepting plea of petitioner for having been given break deliberately from time
to time, it would be also relevant to consider if the petitioner succeeded in establishing that if
throughout the year intermittent breaks would not have been given, he would have continued to be
in service for whole of the year and deemed to have completed continuous service in a year
envisaged under Section 25-B of Act. To prove that provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not
adhered to by respondent while giving intermittent breaks reliance has been placed on seniority list
Ex. P1 to P5 showing junior workmen to petitioner i.e. those daily beldar who joined after
petitioner have been retained, engaging more than 300 days in a year whereas petitioner had been
given intermittent breaks in the same year. The seniority list Ex. P1 shows that Asha Devi and Tara
Chand figuring at serial No. 33 & 34 have joined on 13-7-2009. Ex. P4 is the tentative seniority list
(as on 31-12-2013) of these officials showed i.e. Tara Chand to have worked for 365 days in the
year 2010, 354 days in 2011, 366 days in 2012 and 365 days in 2013. Said Tara Chand figured at
serial No. 15 in the seniority list. Similarly, Asha Devi figuring at serial No. 16 in seniority list Ex.
R4 is shown to have worked for 304 days in 2010, 347 days in 2011, 341 days in 2012 and 363
days in 2013. With the aid of these entries concerning Tara Chand and Asha Devi figuring at serial
No.15 and 16, it has been contended that there was sufficient work and funds available with the
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respondents in different projects and these two officials had joined after joining of petitioner who
as per Ex. P10 figured at serial No. 4 and had joined on 21-9-2004 and as both these workmen had
been given sufficient work throughout the year(s) despite being engaged at later stage, the
petitioner is held to have been given intermittent break from 1-3-2004 till 20-8-2012 deliberately by
respondents despite having sufficient work and funds, Ex. P10 further shows that petitioner during
these years had remained engaged with intermittent breaks for 28 times from 2004 to 2013 in
project FCR-002-20, FPL-033-62 etc.. If Tara Chand and Asha Devi could be given work for more
than 300 days in a year in particular year from 2010 to 2013, there was no reasons or compulsion
for the respondents to have given break to the petitioner as stated above which manifestly shows
that petitioner has been deliberately given breaks in service.
22. The tentative seniority list of daily wage labourers as it stood on 31-12-2013. Ex. P4
revealed that at serial No.15 and 16 names of Tara Chand and Asha Devi existed but at serial nos.
17 to 20 names of Amravati, Bhim Dutt, Kamla Devi and Saroj Bala have been mentioned who
were shown to have joined and worked with respondents on 28-10-2010, 1-5-2012, 8-5-2012 and
15-5-2012 respectively much later than petitioner who joined in 2004. As such, latest seniority list
available at the time when petitioner was removed from service except Tara Chand and Asha Devi,
others are shown to have joined in the year 2010 and 2012 respectively as mentioned above.
Nothing in the cross-examination of petitioner PW1 could be elicited by respondents which would
demolish his claim qua deliberate intermittent breaks given by the respondents despite work and
funds as other juniors had been given sufficient work for whole of the year and policy Ex. RW1/B
dealing with contractual labourers was primarily a policy meant to exploit unskilled contractual
labourers which could be termed as entirely based on unfair labour practice. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma,
Director, Institute of Biotechnology and Environment Sciences, College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
has deposed that he had been posted on the present assignment since 1-11-2016 besides stated that
petitioner worked with university but did not know that petitioner remained engaged from date of
appointment till 22-4-2013. He has admitted in cross-examination that from 2002 to 2013, 30-32
contractual labourers were engaged, initially for 89 days who were appointed in two batches after
engaging the first batch, second batch was engaged when first batch was disengaged and thereafter
second batch was disengaged which support the plea of petitioner that the process of engagement
and disengagements was deliberate on part of respondents. Apparently, giving such intermittent
breaks to two groups of unskilled labourers without notice violated Section 25-G of the Act. As
such, respondents are held to have given intermittent breaks to the petitioner in violation of
provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act.
23. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that although adopting
policy for engagement of unskilled labourer on contractual basis vide Ex. RW1/B, respondents had
changed conditions of service of petitioner without issuing any prior notice vide which petitioner
was required to join to contractor engaged to provide unskilled labourers on outsource basis to
respondents which tentamounts to termination of service of petitioner as petitioner had been
engaged with respondents since 2004 and no prior notice was served upon him in 2013 notifying
petitioner to join contractor who was to provide labourers to respondents on the basis of some
agreement entered into between respondents and contractor Ld. Counsel/Authorized Representative
for petitioner had also contended if contractual employment is resorted to as mechanism to frustrate
the claim so that employee did not become regular or permanent against a job which continues or
the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
clause of Section 2(oo) of the Act, the same would be an unfair labour practice under the 'Act'.
Before proceedings further, it would be most pertinent to refer to order dated 20.11.2014 Ex.
PW1/B of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in which present petitioner along with 13 other had filed
CWP No.4991/2012 when respondents had been directed “to not give fictional breaks to
petitioner and if their services on this count already stand dispense with, no fresh hand shall
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be engaged without first affording the work to the petitioners”. In pursuance to the above said
order, petitioner alongwith 13 others had filed the complaint before Deputy Commissioner
Hamirpur for non-enforcement of order dated 20-11-2014 passed by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in
pursuance to which Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur had directed respondents to enforce the order
of the Hon'ble High Court dated 20-11-2014. The plea of respondents in their joint reply remained
that petitioner had not applied for reengagement with contractor engaged in 2013 which leads to an
irresistible inference that petitioner had been disengaged i.e. terminated from service of respondents
in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. It is admittedly not the case of the respondents
that any notice was served upon petitioner as could also be gathered from cross-examination of
RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma, Director Dean College of Horticulture respondent No.1 who showed his
ignorance if while disengaging petitioner in the year 2013, any notice was served upon petitioner
by respondents. If any notice as required would have been issued by respondents, RW1 would have
certainly denied this question. He has specifically admitted that while terminating service of
petitioner no compensation was paid by respondents. Although these facts revealed in cross-
examination of RW1 coupled with the order of Hon'ble High Court as referred to above, it can be
safely gathered that respondents had not adhered to the mandate of Hon'ble High Court as the
petitioner was not to be disengaged and if disengaged, no fresh hands shall be engaged although
several persons juniors to petitioner have been engaged thereafter as per seniority list Ex. P5 which
further showed availability sufficient work and funds with respondents.
24. Ld. Counsel for the respondents had contended that petitioner being contractual
employee was not covered under the definition of retrenchment under Section 2 (bb) of the Act as
under Clause (bb)(oo) termination of service of workman on contract specifically was excluded
from definition of retrenchment. It is pointed out that since the petitioner was appointed on
contract, he stands excluded from definition of “retrenchment” and therefore respondents were not
required to adhere to provisions of Section 25-F of the 'Act' while disengaging petitioner. Ld.
Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, repudiated the arguments so advanced by the ld.
Counsel for respondents and has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
titled as Manoj Kumar Vs. H.R.T.C. and Anr. reported in 2007 LLR 1155. In the above said
judgment Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held that when repeated and fictional breaks have
been given to workman so that he should not attain permanency, it would not come within the
purview of section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act excluding termination of
retrenchment. In the case before the Hon'ble High Court respondents had set up similar plea of
petitioner being on contractual employment and thus Section 25-F could not be invoked by the
petitioner. In the above said judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held in para 12
reproduced below for reference:
“….12. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has held in Shailendra Nath Vs. Vice
Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1987 Lab IC 1607 that section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature
of an exception to section 2(oo) and has to be construed strictly and in favour of the
workman as the entire object of the Act is secure a just and fair deal to them. Their
Lordships of the Allahabad High Court have held as under:
“The expression, 'termination for whatsoever reason' used in Cl. (oo) came up for
interpretation before the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. N.S. Money, AIR 1976
SC 1111: (1976 Lab IC 769). It was held to mean a termination which takes place either by
active step of employer or by running out of stipulated period. The Hon'ble Court observed.
Termination embraced not merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact
of termination, however, produced. Since this wide interpretation resulted in extending
benefit of retrenchment to even purpose or particular job or were casual workers the
Legislature appears to have added sub cl. (bb) to cl.(oo) in 1984. Even though petitioners
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claim to have acquired status of regular employees before the clause was amended as each
of them had completed 240 days prior to its addition in 1984 it may be examined if the
petitioners can be said to be contractual employees as contemplated in this sub-clause. For
that it is necessary to examine its scope and ambit. It may, however, be stated at the outset
that it obviously attempts to exclude that which otherwise would have been included in
principal clause or to be more precise is in the nature of an exception, therefore, it has to be
construed strictly and in favour of workmen as the entire objective of the Act is to secure
just and fair deal for them. Terminations which are included in it are those which are
brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time
stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide a
gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation the nature of
employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of
duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be
for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes
to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated
period or completion of work whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But
if contractual employment is resorted to as a mechanism to frustrate the claim of
employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature
of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on the anvil of
fairness and bonafide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire
and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Cl. (bb). Because if it is left to be employer not
to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstances then the protection
afforded to a workman by treating every termination, of service as retrenchment shall be
rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post
ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bona fide.
It cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also
satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That
would be unfair labour practice [See H.D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India (1985) 51 Fac
LR 494: (1985 Lab IC 1733) (SC)]. From various annexures filed with affidavits it is clear
that some of the petitioners were employed as Office Assistant, other book binders and
peons. They were awarded benefit of bonus. They have been working for nearly five years.
Their job was not casual, seasonal or of a daily worker. They have not been paid their salary
on volume of work. Although the wages in some cases are computed on per day basis but
the payment is monthly including holidays. Their duty, therefore, was like a regular
employee and not as casual, daily or seasonal worker….”
Para No.17 of the aforestated judgment is also reproduced below which has bearing on
merits of issue and is reproduced below:
“17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Haryana State Electronics Development
Corporation Limited Vs. Mamni, (2206) 9 SCC 434: AIR 2006 SC 2427: 2006 LLR 667
(SC), that appointment for a short period (89 days) and termination of service at the end of
the said period and reappointment after a gap of one day, such action of termination and
reappointment repeated again and again for a period of about one and a half years, in such
circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the termination not bonafide but
adopted to defeat the object of the Act. Thus, it is not covered by section 2(oo)(bb) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947……..”
25. Reliance has further been placed by Hon'ble High Court in Manoj Kumar's case on
another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay titled as Dalip H. Shirke Vs. Zila Parishad
Yavatmal, reported in 1990 Lab IC 100 in which judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as State
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Bank of India Vs. N. Sundaramoney reported in 1976 Lab IC 769 had been relied by Hon'ble
High Court of Bombay. It was observed that exception as contained in sub clause (bb) will have to
be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been
enjoying earlier to the amendment. The benefit of law laid down by the Supreme Court was
extended to all the workmen even to those who were employed for specific work or for a
particular job and even to casual labourers who were engaged merely to complete casual nature
of work. In the judgment of N. Sundaramoney's case relied in 2007 case and had observed that
time and again it has been held that welfare statutes must receive the construction which
advances the object of the statutes and protects the weaker section of the society. It was
observed that the employer is always in a position to dictate the term of service vis-a-vis the
workman or to be workman. The employer can unilaterally impose oppressive and
unreasonable conditions of service and the workman will be left with little choice but to
accept all such conditions even unconscionable conditions of service in the contract of
employment. In the case in hand before this court, respondents had adopted policy of engagement
of contractual labourer to avoid financial liability Ex. RW1/B which prescribed the manner in
which workman was to employed for 89 days in two spells which follows that contractual labourers
engaged for 89 days in first spell were to be disengaged after 89 days engaging new batch and
following such engagements show that after first engagement of labourers as stated above junior
contractual labourer were to certainly disengage senior workmen i.e. first batch for 89 days without
notice despite availability of work and funds which manifestly violated Section 25-G of the 'Act'.
26. In the concluding para in Manoj Kumar's case, Hon'ble High Court has held that
workman had been offered appointment with fictional breaks to prevent petitioner from taking
benefit of Section 25-F of Act. The appointment orders issued in successor to workman was
camouflage to take out petitioner-workman from the ambit of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The appointment of petitioner cannot be termed as contractual and his case will
fall under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it will be covered under
expression “retrenchment”. The act of respondents of engaging petitioner giving fictional
breaks was not bonafide and reinstatement of petitioner-workman was allowed. Applying the
ratio of case law referred to above, it may not be erroneous to observe that in the case in hand
before this court, contractual employment of petitioner and time to time termination was made by
respondents so that petitioner did not become permanent and at the same time act of respondents in
throwing out petitioner from work with contractor without notice is manifestly unfair labour
practice and petitioner would be covered under definition of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) and
not under exception in Clause (bb) (oo) as has been held in Manoj Kumar's case.
27. Thus, in the case before this court respondents had made scheme which was
significantly promulgated for engagement of contractual labourer for 89 days in one spell and in the
case before the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana having similar period of engagement of
workmen respondents were held to have not complied with the Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act as the workman who was a clerk had been engaged for 89 days and given fresh
appointment twice for 89 days. As such, referring to aforestated case law and evidence on record, it
may not be erroneous to conclude that respondents had recoursed to unfair labour practice initially
by adopting standing instruction for engagement of contractual labour Ex. RW1/B which in its
prescribed clause (e) duration of contractual labourer was to be not more than 89 in a year for two
spells and thereafter by abrupting engagement of labourers on outsource basis through contractor.
But in this case, the petitioner had been engaged several times with intervals as shown in mandays
chart Ex. P10 from 2004 to 2013 and thus the action of respondents in giving intermittent break as
well as finally terminating service without notice and asking the petitioner to work with contractor
who was to provide unskilled labourers to respondents on outsource basis was nothing else but
termination of service of petitioner without any notice and that the intermittent breaks are held to be
deliberately made by the respondents with the object to avoid financial liability upon respondents
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which could not be accepted as ground to negate or say defeat claim of petitioner. The termination
of petitioner would thus be not excluded under Section 2 (oo) (bb) and squarely fell under the
definition of retrenchment under the Act necessitating issuance of notice of one month envisaged
under Section 25-F of the Act and in alternative wages for one month in lieu of notice period which
has admittedly not been done as RW1 has shown his inability to tell if while disengaging petitioner
any notice was served. Being the Director in university authorized to contest and depose in this
case on behalf of respondents was expected to know material facts qua engagement and
disengagement of petitioner. Accordingly, applying the case law as referred to above, it is held that
petitioner had been wrongly retrenched from service by the respondents in violation of provisions
of Act.
28. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has taken this court through Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex.
PW1/P passed in Reference No. 154/2012 titled as Mohinder Singh versus Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, Distt. Solan, H.P. & Anr. vide which this
court had directed reinstatement of petitioner setting aside retrenchment order qua petitioner w.e.f.
1-1-2005 by respondents and was held entitled for seniority and continuity in service from the date
of illegal termination except back wages. While relying upon the above said Award, ld. Counsel for
the petitioner has contended that above said award has not been assailed by respondents which had
attained finality having similar facts with regard to award Ex. PW1/P. RW1 in cross-examination
has showed his inability to tell if above said award passed against the respondent had been
challenged however specifically admitted that said Mohinder Singh was still working with the
university. Statement of RW1 recorded on 1-10-2011 and award was passed on 28-4-2017 and was
allegedly terminated on 1-1-2005 which goes to show after implementation of award Ex. PW1/P
above-named Mahinder Singh has been in continuous service with the respondent from 1-1-2005 to
31-10-2017 when RW1 was cross-examined. As such, Mohinder Singh's case having similar facts
and not challenged by respondents is equally binding upon respondents qua similarly situated
workmen. In the said judgment also, my ld. predecessor-in-office in para No. 26 on record has
specifically held that action of respondents was unfair labour practice under Clause 10 Vth
Schedule appended under the Act. In so far claim of petitioner qua back wages from date of illegal
termination in the year 2013 is concerned, suffice would be state here that onus to prove that
petitioner/claimant remained unemployed and not gainfully employed was upon respondents.
Although, petitioner has alleged that he remained unemployed and was not gainfully employed ever
since his termination in 2013 by filing affidavit to this effect could not be relied as being a young
person ageing about 32 years would not have sit idle for about five years without earning and thus
his plea to this effect merits rejection. Accordingly, petitioner is held to be not entitled for back
wages. Accordingly, issues No.1 and 2 are answered in affirmative holding that act of respondents
in giving time to time break and finally terminating on 23-4-2013 is improper and unjustified.
However, issue No. 3 is decided as discussed holding that petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in
service with seniority and continuity in service without back wages. Issues are decided accordingly.
Issue No. 4 :
29. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has contended that College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Neri, Hamirpur, H.P. does not fall under the jurisdiction before this court. On the other
hand, ld. counsel for petitioner had relied upon Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board etc.
and A. Rajappa and others, AIR 1978 SC 548 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the definition of “industry” envisaged under Section 2(j) of the Act and held that university would
fall within the definition of industry and its employees are workman entitled to protection
envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Ld. Counsel for respondents has failed to
repudiate arguments and as such university cannot be stated to be not industry and its workers to be
not workmen. Issue is decided in negative against the respondents and in favour of petitioner. Since
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issues No. 4 and 6 are the same, as such in view of findings of issue No. 4 as stated above, issue
No. 6 has become redundant.
Issue No. 5 :
30. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has not pressed this issue during course of argument.
Otherwise also, from pleadings on record no inference of claim petition being not maintainable can
be raised industrial dispute. In the case in hand, the petitioner had challenged his illegal termination
by the respondents who had allegedly violated of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. As such, being
aggrieved with action of the respondents in terminating service, petitioner could legitimately agitate
his claim before this court. Issue No. 5 is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against
the respondents.
Issue No. 7 :
31. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425,
it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim
on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government and the
Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government and same
is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The
Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 752, has
categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of Section
33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to put the restriction of
limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the provision and in absence of
any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to introduce the limitation on the
ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
32. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondents. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner
coupled with evidence on record cannot be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged
by the respondents. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondent and is answered
accordingly.
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Relief :
33. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues Nos. 1 to 6, the reference/claim petition
is partly allowed and the respondents are hereby directed to re-engage the petitioner forthwith who
is further held to be in continuous uninterrupted service with the respondents from the date of his
initial engagement in the year 2004 and that the breaks given by the respondent being fictional in
nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of service of the petitioner and his
seniority shall be reckoned from his initial date of engagement however, petitioner shall be entitled
to seniority and continuity in service from the date of his initial engagement except back wages. In
the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
34. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
35. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
36. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
44/2015
Date of Institution :
21-02-2015
Date of decision :
24-4-2018
Shri Subhash Chand s/o Shri Penu Ram, r/o Village Neri, P.O. Khagal, Tehsil & District
Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Dean, College of Horticulture and Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
2.
The Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, District
Solan H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Karan Pathania, Adv.
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AWARD
1.
The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Subhash Chand, s/o Shri Penu
Ram, r/o Village Neri, P.O. Khagal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P. during year 2007 to
22-04 2013 and finally w.e.f. 23-04-2013 by (i) the Director, Institute of Biotechnology &
Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri
District Hamirpur, H.P., (ii) the Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture &
Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the
above employer?”
2.
After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 3rd February, 2017
was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:
“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 23-1-2015,
the name of employer no (i) may be read as “the Dean, College of Horticulture and Forestry
Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.” instead of “the Director, Institute of Biotechnology &
Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamipur, H.P.”, which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification.”
3. On receipt of reference as well as addendum from appropriate government, notices
were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.
4.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
unskilled labourer by respondent No. 1 in the year 2007 with prior approval of respondent No. 2
who continued to work uninterruptedly with the respondents upto 22nd April, 2013. Averments
made in the claim petition further revealed that from 2007 to 2013, petitioner had been engaged for
89 days in first spell and after completion of 89 days, he had been given fictional break in his
service as some other group of workmen had been engaged for second spell of 89 days and when
the second spell of workers had completed after 89 days, petitioner had been engaged again for 89
days and such practice of engaging and disengaging by giving fictional breaks to the petitioner
continued upto 22nd April, 2013. It is further alleged that respondents had given fictional breaks of
89 days in two spells to the petitioner and other co-workmen so that they did not complete 240 days
in each calendar year for the purpose of counting continuous service envisaged under Section 25-B
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'Act' for brevity). The grievance of
petitioner remains that his service had been finally terminated by respondent No. 1 on 23-4-2013
alongwith other co-workmen without complying with mandatory provisions of Act as neither any
show cause notice had been issued nor charge-sheet had been raised for any alleged misconduct
and at the same time, no inquiry had been conducted against the petitioner besides no retrenchment
notice or compensation of one month's pay in lieu of notice period had been given and thus
termination order is stated to be illegal, null and void as petitioner had completed 240 days in
preceding 12 calendar months from date of termination. It is alleged that while terminating of
service of petitioner even principle of 'Last come First go' had not been followed as several junior
workmen namely Ishwar Dass and Rajeev Kumar had been retained in service ignoring the rights
of petitioner in violation of Section 25-G of Act as above named two workmen had worked
alongwith petitioner on muster roll and performed same duties. It is alleged that after terminating
service of petitioner and other co-workmen, respondents had entered into contract with M/s Shimla
Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H. P. vide letter No. 827-76 dated 30th April, 2013 to
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outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 for 11 months and after expiry of the
above said period, respondent No. 1 had renewed contract with contractor above-named for further
period of one year and as such the above said contractor had engaged 15 workmen as unskilled
labourers on daily rate basis namely Raj Kumar, Arvind Kumar, Premi Devi, Asha Devi, Kanta
Devi, Beena Devi, Santosh Kumari, Sunita Devi, Nirmla Devi, Soma Devi, Raj Kumari, Sudesh
Kumari, Meena Devi, Santosh Kumari and Sobha Ram who had worked under Shri Rampal
Baniyal, Incharge and thus respondents had violated provisions of Section 25-H of Act. It is
categorically stated that respondents had sufficient work due to which they had outsourced
unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to be engaged through M/s Shimla Cleanwayas, Sahibu Niwas,
New Shimla, H.P and thus it cannot be stated that respondents did not have sufficient work and
funds in different projects run by it. It is alleged that the service of petitioner and other co-workmen
who had been engaged by the respondents had been terminated with the object to deprive petitioner
and other unskilled labourers so that they did not complete 240 days. It is alleged that respondent
No. 1 without any instructions from respondent No. 2 had given fictional breaks to petitioner and
said act of respondent No. 1 fell under the definition of “unfair labour practice” as defined in Vth
Schedule Clause 10 read with Section 25-T and 25-U of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It further
transpires from petition that the respondents had engaged regular unskilled class-IV workers on
regular pay scale in Neri I and II who are S/Sh. Chaman Lal, Kishan Chand, Deen, Sanjeev Kumar,
Parkash Chand, Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram however 14 workmen including petitioner had been
initially engaged on daily rate basis for 89 days in two spells as stated above. It is also alleged that
in addition to petitioner and other workers as stated in this para some other workmen had been
engaged who were not given any break and thus respondents has also shown favourtism to one set
of workers which violated provisions of Clause 9 of Schedule 5th of Industrial Disputes Act. It is
alleged that respondents had admitted in the reply filed before the Labour Inspector, Hamirpur that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labourer for 89 days in two spells during calendar year
as per the rules framed by university in year 2002 and that initially after working for 89 days,
petitioner had been given break. It is alleged that these 14 workmen including petitioner had filed a
complaint of illegal termination before Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur in pursuance to which
Additional Deputy Commissioner, District Hamirpur had written a letter No. 129 dated 16-5-2013
for reengagement of services of retrenched workmen on the basis of order dated 20-11-2004 of
Hon'ble High Court of H.P. It is alleged that petitioner alongwith other workmen had filed CWP
No. 4991/2012 in which Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 20-11-2014 in which directions had
been given to respondents to not give fictional breaks to the petitioners and if their services on this
count already stood dispensed with, then no fresh hand shall be engaged without first offering the
work to the petitioners. It is alleged that despite directions vide order dated 20-11-2014 respondents
had not given offer to petitioner and other co-workmen for appointment in service and contrarily
engaged 15 workmen with contractor and thus respondent No.1 has violated even order of Hon'ble
High Court. Moreover, respondent did not file any application before Hon'ble High Court seeking
permission in CWP No. 4991/ 2012 to allow respondents to outsource petitioner unskilled contract
labour in place of terminated workmen. It further remains the case of the petitioner that in reference
154/2012 decided by this Court on 24-8-2012 titled as Mahinder Singh Vs. Registrar, Dr. Y. S.
Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P. retrenchment of
Mahinder Singh dated 1-1-2005 was set aside and respondents were directed to reengage the
petitioner forthwith who was further held entitled to seniority and continuity of service from the
date of his illegal termination except back wages. It is alleged that in pursuance to Award dated 24-
8-2012 said Mahinder Singh has been continuously working with the respondents till date of filing
of present claim petition. Accordingly, alleging respondents to have given fictional breaks from
time to time terminating service of petitioner and other co-workmen for 89 days in two spells and
finally terminating service of petitioner on 23-4-2013 is illegal, arbitrary and unjustified in
violation of mandatory provisions of Act. It is claimed that after termination, petitioner has
remained unemployed who was not gainfully employed anywhere from 2013 and thus petitioner
claimed to be entitled for full back wages for period of fictional breaks from 2007 to 2013 till final
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termination on 23-4-2013. Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside illegal fictional breaks
w.e.f. 2007 to 22-4-2013 with direction to the respondents to condone the break period in continuity
in service for the purposes of regularization besides has prayed wages for time to time break period.
The claimant/petitioner has further prayed for setting aside illegal termination w.e.f. 22-4-2013 with
direction to the respondents to reinstate petitioner forthwith alongwith back wages, seniority,
continuity in service with consequential benefits and litigation costs.
5.
Respondents No. 1 and 2 contested claim petition, filed joint reply inter-alia taken
preliminary objections of maintainability, limitation and jurisdiction. On merits admitted that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour to do manual work in the experimental fields on
seasonal basis but denied that his service had been illegally terminated by the respondents. It is
alleged that due to non-availability of funds a policy for the engagement of contractual labour was
formulated by the respondent w.e.f. 1-1-2002 so as to recognize engagement and avoid additional
liability. It is claimed that respondents did not have permanent and perennial nature of experimental
field work which required attendance of labourers (during Rabi and Kharif season) as seasonal
labourers were employed for a limited period on contract basis to accomplish the field trial work
with the object of research trial and their data etc. were not wasted for want of adequate manpower.
It is specifically alleged that petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour on a fixed salary for
a particular period in different spells as and when work and funds were available under the project
code No.HMS-292-62/HGI-130-62 as is evident from letter No.UHF/IBES/HMS-292/62-2080-95
dated 3-1-2012 which postulated that no seniority shall be given to contractual labour and the
service of individual will be terminated after the contract was over as envisaged under conditions
No. 2 and 8 of appointment letter. The respondents have asserted that petitioner had after
understanding terms and conditions accepted the engagement and did not complete 240 days in any
of the calendar years. It is alleged by respondents in their reply that as and when work and funds
were available under time bound project, service of labour for field work was required for which
advertisement was given from time to time but the petitioner did not turn up for facing interviews
and seeking job. It is emphatically denied that junior persons namely Rajeev Kumar and Ishwar
Dass had been retained by university rather said Ishwar Dass has been working with the college
since 2000. However, the court had given seniority w.e.f. 14-11-2005 and thus allegation of
petitioner that juniors were retained was stated to be wrong. It is admitted that respondent had
entered into contract with M/s Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla vide letter No. 827-
76 dated 30-4-2013 but outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-1-2013 onwards and engaged skilled
and unskilled labourer through them to carry out the seasonal and adhoc projects work as and when
needed and that if petitioner wanted to get engaged for field work with the respondents then
petitioner was required to approach the said agency. It is asserted that termination of petitioner
including other co-workers outsourcing by respondents had become compulsion of university due
to reason that the university was already facing liability of surplus staff including Class-IV. It is
alleged that respondents are not in a position to continue the service of labourer including petitioner
so as avoid additional financial liability. It is alleged that most of the labourers mentioned in the
petition had been engaged on compassionate grounds as per provisions of rules with the prior
approval of State Govt. besides maintained that petitioner was engaged on contractual basis for
specific terms and conditions and thus he cannot retract from conditions imposed by the
respondents. It is alleged that petitioner was engaged from time to time on fixed salary on
contractual basis and not on regular basis for a specific period. Accordingly, denying all allegations
of petitioner, as contained in claim petition respondents have prayed for dismissal of claim petition.
6.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to the join reply filed by respondents, reiterated his stand
as maintained in the claim petition. It is also reiterated that workmen mentioned in para No. 6 of the
claim petition namely Chaman Lal, Krishan Chand, Jamaldeen, Sanjeev Kumar, Om Prakash,
Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram regular workmen who had been working with the petitioner and
other co-workmen have since been disengaged. It is denied that respondents had engaged some
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workmen on compassionate grounds moreover asserted petitioner to be unemployed and not
gainfully employed anywhere during time to time termination and from the date of his final
termination.
7.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit Ex. PW1/ A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, affidavit of petitioner Ex. PW1/A, copy of letter
dated 3-1-2012 Ex. PW1/B, copy of mandays chart Ex. PW1/C, copy of letter dated 16-5-2013 Ex.
PW1/D, copy of letter dated 4-5-2013 Ex. PW1/E, copy of letter dated 10-12-2012 Ex. PW1/F,
copy of letter dated 22-4-2013 Ex. PW1/G, copy of complaint Ex. PW1/H, copy of letter dated
13-2-2013 Ex. PW1/I, copy of letter dated 27-1-2014 Ex. PW1/J, copy of notification dated
30-4-2013 Ex. PW1/K, copy of CWP No. 4991/12 dated 20-11-2014 Ex. PW1/L, copy of Award
dated 24-8-2012 Ex. PW1/N and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led
by petitioner, respondents had examined Dr. P.C. Sharma as RW1, tendered/proved his affidavit
Ex. RW1/A, standing instructions regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis dated
5-12-2001 Ex. RW1/B, letter dated 18-9-2012 regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis
Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated 21-2-2005 Ex. RW1/D, copy of letter dated 13-5-2016
regarding substitution of name of Dir. Institute of Biotechnology Ex. RW1/E and closed evidence.
8.
It is pertinent to mention here that after closing evidence by the respondent, petitioner
had moved an application for additional evidence which was allowed and Shri Jai Ram,
Superintendent office of Dean College of Horticulture & Forestry Neri, Distt. Hamirpur, H.P.
examined as PW2, tendered/proved seniority list of daily paid workers dated 30-4-2017 (07 leaves)
Ex. P1, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 11-4-2011 (06 leaves) Ex. P-2, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 23-2-2011 (07 leaves) Ex. P-3, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 1-10-2014 Ex. P-4, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated
17-10-2015 Ex. P-5, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 16-3-2009 (29 leaves) Ex.
P-6, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 10-6-2011 (30 leaves) Ex. P-7, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 7-10-2014 (31 leaves) Ex. P-8, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 16-9-2016 (30 leaves) Ex. P-9, copy of mandays chart of contractual
labourers (09 leaves) Ex. P-10 and closed additional evidence. However, ld. Counsel for the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not lead any further additional evidence which was closed vide
separate statement of ld. Counsel for respondents.
9.
I have heard ld. Authorized Representative representing petitioner and ld. Counsel for
respondents, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposal of this case.
10. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28-08-2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents
during the year 2007 to 22-04-2013 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged? . .OPP.
2.
Whether final termination of services of petitioner w.e.f. 23-4-2013 is/was improper
and unjustified?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 1 or issue No. 2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
5. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
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6.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
7.
Whether the claim petition is time barred by limitation as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
11. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No. 1 : Yes
Issue No. 2 : Yes
Issue No. 3 : Discussed
Issue No. 4 : No
Issue No. 5 : No
Issue No. 6 : Redundant
Issue No. 7 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is partly allowed per operative part of the Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1, 2 and 3 :
12. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
13. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2007 initially for a
period of 89 days and thereafter with intermittent breaks several times till 2013 as is also evident
from mandays chart Ex. P-10. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged on the basis of policy for
engagement of labourers on contractual basis incorporated in Ex. RW1/B dated 5-12-2001. It is
admitted case of respondents that contractual labourers including petitioner had remained engaged
till 2013 ever since initial engagement when respondents allegedly engaged contractor for
outsourcing unskilled contractual labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013. Equally admitted case of respondents is
that duration of contractual labourers as per policy Ex. RW1/B was not to exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spell in whole year and in case re-engaged was to be made then break of atleast 15
days was necessary. It is admittedly not case of respondents that work and conduct of petitioner
was not good and satisfactory. Admittedly, respondents had sufficient work and funds for engaging
petitioner in different projects moreso when unskilled labourers were decided to be engaged from
contractor on outsource basis. It is further admitted case of respondents that petitioner being
contractual unskilled labourer provisions of Section 25 of Act did not apply as petitioner was
squarely covered under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the 'Act'. In view of foregoing admitted facts on
record, claim of petitioner qua termination in violation of Section 2 (oo) of Act needs to be
determined and at the same it also needs to be determined, if respondents deliberately recoursed to
time to time termination of petitioner and thereafter final termination in the year 2013 falling within
ambit of unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Clause 9 of Vth Schedule of 'Act'.
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14. At the outset, it would be pertinent to mention here that Ex. RW1/B Standing
Instructions of respondents for engaging contractual unskilled labourers clearly provided that no
casual worker shall be engaged on muster roll by any functionary of University w.e.f. 1-1-2002
which further stipulated that as far as possible continuing casual worker should be adjusted in
research and extension projects and thereafter demand for additional hands by deployment of
labour on contract may be made. Clause (e) of policy is reproduced below for reference:
“(e) The duration of the engagement of contractual labour should not exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spells in whole of the year and in case of re-engagement, a break of atleast 15
days is necessary in each case”.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner referring to above-stated rule for engagement of unskilled
contractual labour has contended that respondents being employer have given intermittent break in
service which was countable as petitioner like any other labourer engaged on contract was not in
position to bargain with respondents rather had no option but to work in illegal service conditions
imposed. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as
Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries, reported in 2014 LLR 673 in which Hon'ble
Apex Court has held that artificial break in service every year by reappointing the employee on the
same post tantamounts to 'unfair labour practice' under Section 2(ra) of the Act which is not
permissible under law. It was further observed that when repeated artificial periodical breaks in
service are proved, the termination of workman would not be having protection under Section 2(oo)
(bb) of the Act which would attract relief of reinstatement with full back wages being illegal
retrenchment.
16. PW1 has stepped into witness box deposed on oath as maintained in claim petition
specifically stated that petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2007 who continued to
work with respondents till 22-4-3013 when service of petitioner had been terminated finally
alongwith 13 other workers without complying with provisions of the 'Act'. He has further stated
neither any show cause notice nor compensation was given although petitioner had completed 240
days in preceding 12 months from date of termination. Significantly, Ex. P10 mandays does not
factually show petitioner to have worked for 240 days immediately prior to his termination but plea
of petitioner remains that Ex. RW1/B Standing Instructions for engagement of unskilled labourer
on contract basis which fell in the ambit of an unfair labour practice had been invariably recoursed
by respondents during period of employment of petitioner when there were sufficient funds and
work with respondents and in the judgment (supra) of Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was held
liable to be reinstated in service being illegally retrenched.
17. Reliance has further been placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &
Haryana reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development
Authority, Manimajra, and Anr. versus Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Rohtak and Anr. Relevant para of judgment is reproduced below:
“Since provision of Section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature of an exception it has to be construed
strictly in favour of the workman as far as possible in letter and spirit. If the termination is
meant to exploit an employee or to increase the bargaining power of the employer,
then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause (bb) and the definition of
'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning…”
18. In the aforestated judgment, Hon'ble High Court (DB) had upheld award passed by
Labour Court relying upon judgment titled as Kapurthala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 1984 (2) Indian Law Reporter 333 (DB) in which
service of workman had been terminated when case of those had completed 230 days. In this case,
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services of workmen were terminated without any departmental inquiry or charge-sheet and at the
same time, no notice or compensation was paid. The bank before the Hon'ble Court took plea that
service of workman for specified period and that too with notional breaks and thereafter workmen
were neither entitled for any retrenchment compensation nor reinstatement. The court in (1984)
case after dilating upon various aspects of matter held that attempt of employer to dispense with
service of workman so as to deprive him in continuity of service for specified period i.e. 240
days envisaged under Section 25-B and 25-F of the Act amounts to unfair labour practice when it is
found that conduct and service of workman was satisfactory. In 1994 judgment (supra) reference
has been made to another case reported in 1989 (2) RSJ 55 titled as Balbir Singh Vs. The
Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Limited in which J. Amarjit Chaudhary interpreted
Sub-clause (bb) (oo) of Section 2 and relevant para is reproduce below:
Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act, which was added in 1984 by an
amendment cannot be so construed as to drastically restrict the orbit of the term of
'retrenchment' clause (bb) is an exception which must be interpreted narrowly. It cannot be
given meanings which may nullify or curtail the ambit of their principal clause. No doubt,
the intention of the Parliament in enacting clause (bb) was to exclude certain categories of
workers from the term of retrenchment but there is nothing in this clause which allows an
outlet to un-scrupulour employers to shunt out workers in the graph of non-renewal of their
contract even when the work subsists. This clause as a whole has to be construed strictly in
favour of the workman as far as possible as to ensure that the Act is implemented in letter
and spirit. If the termination is meant to exploit an employee or to increase the
bargaining power of the employer, then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause
(bb) and the definition of term 'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning. The
contractual clause enshrined in clause (bb) cannot be resorted to frustrate the claim of
the employee against his uncalled for retrenchment or for denying other benefits. It
cannot be so interpreted, as to enable for employer to resort to the policy of hire and fire….”
19. It is admittedly not the case of respondents that petitioner could not be deployed or
employed or say that respondents had terminated service of petitioner since there was not sufficient
work and funds. Be it stated that by engaging contractor for outsourcing unskilled labourer to be
provided to respondents w.e.f. 1-5-2013 is clearly suggestive of the fact that respondents had
sufficient work and funds. Not only this, even several unskilled labourer had been engaged for
whole of the year as reflected in Ex. P5 the tentative seniority list as on 31-12-2014. Thus,
intermittent breaks given by respondents to petitioner establishes unfair labour practice within the
meaning of Section 2(ra) of the Act as the object behind engaging petitioner as contractual labourer
and thereafter giving intermittent breaks and finally terminating without any notice, changing
service conditions by asking petitioner to join contractor from a specific date as has also been
admitted by RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma in cross-examination who is the only witness examined by
respondents. Equally important to mention here is that while filing reply respondents have withheld
facts qua number of labourers engaged in two spells while implementing its policy Ex. RW1/B and
at the same time their names too have not been disclosed establishes that respondents from very
beginning while engaging petitioner intended that petitioner did not attain permanency in job but
for reason stated hereinabove, petitioner is held to have continuous service from 2007 to 2013 as
envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. That being so, it was incumbent upon respondents to have
issued notice under Section 25-F of Act and alternatively to pay wages of one month in lieu of
notice which has not so been done by respondents establishing violation of provisions of Section
25-F of the Act for intermittent breaks as well as for final termination and for similar reasons
disengaging petitioner periodically and retaining juniors in two spells as has come in evidence
clearly establish violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
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20. In order to prove his case, the petitioner has placed reliance upon Ex. P10 the mandays
on fixed wages w.e.f. 2007 relating to petitioner which showed that petitioner had worked under
project FCR-034-62, FPL-033-62, HNP-038-62, HMM-022-62 from 20-4-2010 for 89 days and
thereafter with several intermittent breaks till 20-8-2012 as shown in this document. The plea of the
petitioner remains that the breaks had been given deliberately by respondents so that the petitioner
did not complete 240 days. It has also been stated by petitioner that despite availability of funds and
work intermittent breaks had been given from time to time during total period petitioner remained
engaged with the respondents.
21. Before accepting plea of petitioner for having been given break deliberately from time
to time, it would be also relevant to consider if the petitioner succeeded in establishing that if
throughout the year intermittent breaks would not have been given, he would have continued to be
in service for whole of the year and deemed to have completed continuous service in a year
envisaged under Section 25-B of Act. To prove that provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not
adhered to by respondent while giving intermittent breaks reliance has been placed on seniority list
Ex. P1 to P5 showing junior workmen to petitioner i.e. those daily beldar who joined after
petitioner have been retained, engaging more than 300 days in a year whereas petitioner had been
given intermittent breaks in the same year. The seniority list Ex. P1 shows that Asha Devi and Tara
Chand figuring at serial No. 33 & 34 have joined on 13-7-2009. Ex. P4 is the tentative seniority list
(as on 31-12-2013) of these officials showed i.e. Tara Chand to have worked for 365 days in the
year 2010, 354 days in 2011, 366 days in 2012 and 365 days in 2013. Said Tara Chand figured at
serial No. 15 in the seniority list. Similarly, Asha Devi figuring at serial No.16 in seniority list Ex.
R4 is shown to have worked for 304 days in 2010, 347 days in 2011, 341 days in 2012 and 363
days in 2013. With the aid of these entries concerning Tara Chand and Asha Devi figuring at serial
No. 15 and 16, it has been contended that there was sufficient work and funds available with the
respondents in different projects and these two officials had joined after joining of petitioner who
as per Ex. P10 figured at serial No.4 and had joined on 1-3-2007 and as both these workmen had
been given sufficient work throughout the year(s) despite being engaged at later stage, the
petitioner is held to have been given intermittent break from 1-3-2007 till 20-8-2012 deliberately by
respondents despite having sufficient work and funds, Ex. P10 further shows that petitioner during
these years had remained engaged with intermittent breaks for 28 times from 2007 to 2013 in
project FCR-034-62, FPL-033-62, HNP-038-62, HMM-022-62. If Tara Chand and Asha Devi
could be given work for more than 300 days in a year in particular year from 2010 to 2013, there
was no reasons or compulsion for the respondents to have given break to the petitioner as stated
above which manifestly shows that petitioner has been deliberately given breaks in service.
22. The tentative seniority list of daily wage labourers as it stood on 31-12-2013. Ex. P4
revealed that at serial No. 15 and 16 names of Tara Chand and Asha Devi existed but at serial Nos.
17 to 20 names of Amravati, Bhim Dutt, Kamla Devi and Saroj Bala have been mentioned who
were shown to have joined and worked with respondents on 28-10-2010, 1-5-2012, 8-5-2012 and
15-5-2012 respectively much later than petitioner who joined in 2007. As such, latest seniority list
available at the time when petitioner was removed from service except Tara Chand and Asha Devi,
others are shown to have joined in the year 2010 and 2012 respectively as mentioned above.
Nothing in the cross-examination of petitioner PW1 could be elicited by respondents which would
demolish his claim qua deliberate intermittent breaks given by the respondents despite work and
funds as other juniors had been given sufficient work for whole of the year and policy Ex. RW1/B
dealing with contractual labourers was primarily a policy meant to exploit unskilled contractual
labourers which could be termed as entirely based on unfair labour practice. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma,
Director, Institute of Biotechnology and Environment Sciences, College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
has deposed that he had been posted on the present assignment since 1-11-2016 besides stated that
petitioner worked with university but did not know that petitioner remained engaged from date of
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appointment till 22-4-2013. He has admitted in cross-examination that from 2002 to 2013, 30-32
contractual labourers were engaged, initially for 89 days who were appointed in two batches after
engaging the first batch, second batch was engaged when first batch was disengaged and thereafter
second batch was disengaged which support the plea of petitioner that the process of engagement
and disengagements was deliberate on part of respondents. Apparently, giving such intermittent
breaks to two groups of unskilled labourers without notice violated Section 25-G of the Act. As
such, respondents are held to have given intermittent breaks to the petitioner in violation of
provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act.
23. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that although adopting
policy for engagement of unskilled labourer on contractual basis vide Ex. RW1/B, respondents had
changed conditions of service of petitioner without issuing any prior notice vide which petitioner
was required to join to contractor engaged to provide unskilled labourers on outsource basis to
respondents which tentamounts to termination of service of petitioner as petitioner had been
engaged with respondents since 2009 and no prior notice was served upon him in 2013 notifying
petitioner to join contractor who was to provide labourers to respondents on the basis of some
agreement entered into between respondents and contractor Ld. Counsel/Authorized Representative
for petitioner had also contended if contractual employment is resorted to as mechanism to frustrate
the claim so that employee did not become regular or permanent against a job which continues or
the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
clause of Section 2(oo) of the Act, the same would be an unfair labour practice under the 'Act'.
Before proceedings further, it would be most pertinent to refer to order dated 20-11-2014 Ex.
PW1/L of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in which present petitioner along with 13 other had filed
CWP No. 4991/2012 when respondents had been directed “to not give fictional breaks to
petitioner and if their services on this count already stand dispense with, no fresh hand shall
be engaged without first affording the work to the petitioners”. In pursuance to the above said
order, petitioner alongwith 13 others had filed the complaint before Deputy Commissioner
Hamirpur for non-enforcement of order dated 20-11-2014 passed by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in
pursuance to which Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur had directed respondents to enforce the order
of the Hon'ble High Court dated 20-11-2014. The plea of respondents in their joint reply remained
that petitioner had not applied for reengagement with contractor engaged in 2013 which leads to an
irresistible inference that petitioner had been disengaged i.e. terminated from service of respondents
in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. It is admittedly not the case of the respondents
that any notice was served upon petitioner as could also be gathered from cross-examination of
RW1 Dr. P. C. Sharma, Director Dean College of Horticulture respondent No. 1 who showed his
ignorance if while disengaging petitioner in the year 2013, any notice was served upon petitioner
by respondents. If any notice as required would have been issued by respondents, RW1 would have
certainly denied this question. He has specifically admitted that while terminating service of
petitioner no compensation was paid by respondents. Although these facts revealed in
crossexamination of RW1 coupled with the order of Hon'ble High Court as referred to above, it can
be safely gathered that respondents had not adhered to the mandate of Hon'ble High Court as the
petitioner was not to be disengaged and if disengaged, no fresh hands shall be engaged although
several persons juniors to petitioner have been engaged thereafter as per seniority list Ex. P5 which
further showed availability sufficient work and funds with respondents.
24. Ld. Counsel for the respondents had contended that petitioner being contractual
employee was not covered under the definition of retrenchment under Section 2 (bb) of the Act as
under Clause (bb)(oo) termination of service of workman on contract specifically was excluded
from definition of retrenchment. It is pointed out that since the petitioner was appointed on
contract, he stands excluded from definition of “retrenchment” and therefore respondents were not
required to adhere to provisions of Section 25-F of the 'Act' while disengaging petitioner. Ld.
Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, repudiated the arguments so advanced by the ld.
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Counsel for respondents and has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
titled as Manoj Kumar Vs. H.R.T.C. and Anr. reported in 2007 LLR 1155. In the above said
judgment Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held that when repeated and fictional breaks have
been given to workman so that he should not attain permanency, it would not come within the
purview of section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act excluding termination of
retrenchment. In the case before the Hon'ble High Court respondents had set up similar plea of
petitioner being on contractual employment and thus Section 25-F could not be invoked by the
petitioner. In the above said judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held in para 12
reproduced below for reference:
“….12. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has held in Shailendra Nath Vs. Vice
Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1987 Lab IC 1607 that section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature
of an exception to section 2(oo) and has to be construed strictly and in favour of the
workman as the entire object of the Act is secure a just and fair deal to them. Their
Lordships of the Allahabad High Court have held as under:
“The expression, 'termination for whatsoever reason' used in Cl. (oo) came up for
interpretation before the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. N. S. Money, AIR 1976
SC 1111: (1976 Lab IC 769). It was held to mean a termination which takes place either by
active step of employer or by running out of stipulated period. The Hon'ble Court observed
Termination embraced not merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact
of termination, however, produced‟. Since this wide interpretation resulted in extending
benefit of retrenchment to even purpose or particular job or were casual workers the
Legislature appears to have added sub-cl. (bb) to cl.(oo) in 1984. Even though petitioners
claim to have acquired status of regular employees before the clause was amended as each
of them had completed 240 days prior to its addition in 1984 it may be examined if the
petitioners can be said to be contractual employees as contemplated in this sub-clause. For
that it is necessary to examine its scope and ambit. It may, however, be stated at the outset
that it obviously attempts to exclude that which otherwise would have been included in
principal clause or to be more precise is in the nature of an exception, therefore, it has to be
construed strictly and in favour of workmen as the entire objective of the Act is to secure
just and fair deal for them. Terminations which are included in it are those which are
brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time
stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide a
gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation the nature of
employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of
duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be
for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes
to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated
period or completion of work whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But
if contractual employment is resorted to as a mechanism to frustrate the claim of
employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature
of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on the anvil of
fairness and bonafide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire
and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Cl. (bb). Because if it is left to be employer not
to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstances then the protection
afforded to a workman by treating every termination, of service as retrenchment shall be
rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post
ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bonafide. It
cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also
satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That
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would be unfair labour practice [See H.D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India (1985) 51 Fac
LR 494: (1985 Lab IC 1733) (SC)]. From various annexures filed with affidavits it is clear
that some of the petitioners were employed as Office Assistant, other book binders and
peons. They were awarded benefit of bonus. They have been working for nearly five years.
Their job was not casual, seasonal or of a daily worker. They have not been paid their salary
on volume of work. Although the wages in some cases are computed on per day basis but
the payment is monthly including holidays. Their duty, therefore, was like a regular
employee and not as casual, daily or seasonal worker….”
Para No.17 of the aforestated judgment is also reproduced below which has bearing on
merits of issue and is reproduced below:
“17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Haryana State Electronics Development
Corporation Limited Vs. Mamni (2206) 9 SCC 434: AIR 2006 SC 2427: 2006 LLR 667
(SC), that appointment for a short period (89 days) and termination of service at the end of
the said period and reappointment after a gap of one day, such action of termination and
reappointment repeated again and again for a period of about one and a half years, in such
circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the termination not bona fide but
adopted to defeat the object of the Act. Thus, it is not covered by section 2(oo)(bb) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947……..”
25. Reliance has further been placed by Hon'ble High Court in Manoj Kumar's case on
another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay titled as Dalip H. Shirke Vs. Zila Parishad
Yavatmal, reported in 1990 Lab IC 100 in which judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as State
Bank of India Vs. N. Sundaramoney reported in 1976 Lab IC 769 had been relied by Hon'ble
High Court of Bombay. It was observed that exception as contained in sub-clause (bb) will have to
be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been
enjoying earlier to the amendment. The benefit of law laid down by the Supreme Court was
extended to all the workmen even to those who were employed for specific work or for a
particular job and even to casual labourers who were engaged merely to complete casual nature
of work. In the judgment of N. Sundaramoney's case relied in 2007 case and had observed that
time and again it has been held that welfare statutes must receive the construction which
advances the object of the statutes and protects the weaker section of the society. It was
observed that the employer is always in a position to dictate the terms of service vis-a-vis the
workman or to be workman. The employer can unilaterally impose oppressive and
unreasonable conditions of service and the workman will be left with little choice but to
accept all such conditions even unconscionable conditions of service in the contract of
employment. In the case in hand before this court, respondents had adopted policy of engagement
of contractual labourer to avoid financial liability Ex. RW1/B which prescribed the manner in
which workman was to employed for 89 days in two spells which follows that contractual labourers
engaged for 89 days in first spell were to be disengaged after 89 days engaging new batch and
following such engagements show that after first engagement of labourers as stated above junior
contractual labourer were to certainly disengage senior workmen i.e. first batch for 89 days without
notice despite availability of work and funds which manifestly violated Section 25-G of the 'Act'.
26. In the concluding para in Manoj Kumar's case, Hon'ble High Court has held that
workman had been offered appointment with fictional breaks to prevent petitioner from taking
benefit of Section 25-F of Act. The appointment orders issued in successor to workman was
camouflage to take out petitioner-workman from the ambit of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The appointment of petitioner cannot be termed as contractual and his case will
fall under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it will be covered under
expression “retrenchment”. The act of respondents of engaging petitioner giving fictional
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breaks was not bonafide and reinstatement of petitioner-workman was allowed. Applying the
ratio of case law referred to above, it may not be erroneous to observe that in the case in hand
before this court, contractual employment of petitioner and time to time termination was made by
respondents so that petitioner did not become permanent and at the same time act of respondents in
throwing out petitioner from work with contractor without notice is manifestly unfair labour
practice and petitioner would be covered under definition of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) and
not under exception in Clause (bb) (oo) as has been held in Manoj Kumar's case.
27. Thus, in the case before this court respondents had made scheme which was
significantly promulgated for engagement of contractual labourer for 89 days in one spell and in the
case before the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana having similar period of engagement of
workmen respondents were held to have not complied with the Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act as the workman who was a clerk had been engaged for 89 days and given fresh
appointment twice for 89 days. As such, referring to aforestated case law and evidence on record, it
may not be erroneous to conclude that respondents had recoursed to unfair labour practice initially
by adopting standing instruction for engagement of contractual labour Ex. RW1/B which in its
prescribed clause (e) duration of contractual labourer was to be not more that 89 in a year for two
spells and thereafter by abrupting engagement of labourers on outsource basis through contractor.
But in this case, the petitioner had been engaged several times with intervals as shown in mandays
chart Ex. P10 from 2007 to 2013 and thus the action of respondents in giving intermittent break as
well as finally terminating service without notice and asking the petitioner to work with contractor
who was to provide unskilled labourers to respondents on outsource basis was nothing else but
termination of service of petitioner without any notice and that the intermittent breaks are held to be
deliberately made by the respondents with the object to avoid financial liability upon respondents
which could not be accepted as ground to negate or say defeat claim of petitioner. The termination
of petitioner would thus be not excluded under Section 2 (oo) (bb) and squarely fell under the
definition of retrenchment under the Act necessitating issuance of notice of one month envisaged
under Section 25-F of the Act and in alternative wages for one month in lieu of notice period which
has admittedly not been done as RW1 has shown his inability to tell if while disengaging petitioner
any notice was served. Being the Director in university authorized to contest and depose in this
case on behalf of respondents was expected to know material facts qua engagement and
disengagement of petitioner. Accordingly, applying the case law as referred to above, it is held that
petitioner had been wrongly retrenched from service by the respondents in violation of provisions
of Act.
28. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has taken this court through Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex.
PW1/M passed in Reference No. 154/2012 titled as Mohinder Singh versus Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, Distt. Solan, H.P. & Anr. vide which this
court had directed reinstatement of petitioner setting aside retrenchment order qua petitioner w.e.f.
1-1-2005 by respondents and was held entitled for seniority and continuity in service from the date
of illegal termination except back wages. While relying upon the above said Award, ld. Counsel for
the petitioner has contended that above said award has not been assailed by respondents which had
attained finality having similar facts with regard to award Ex. PW1/M. RW1 in cross-examination
has showed his inability to tell if above said award passed against the respondent had been
challenged however specifically admitted that said Mohinder Singh was still working with the
university. Statement of RW1 recorded on 1-10-2011 and award was passed on 28-4-2017 and was
allegedly terminated on 1-1-2005 which goes to show after implementation of award Ex. PW1/M
above-named Mohinder Singh has been in continuous service with the respondent from 1-1-2005 to
31-10-2017 when RW1 was cross-examined. As such, Mohinder Singh's case having similar facts
and not challenged by respondents is equally binding upon respondents qua similarly situated
workmen. In the said judgment also, my ld. predecessor-in-office in para No. 26 on record has
specifically held that action of respondents was unfair labour practice under Clause 10 Vth
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Schedule appended under the Act. In so far claim of petitioner qua back wages from date of illegal
termination in the year 2013 is concerned, suffice would be state here that onus to prove that
petitioner/claimant remained unemployed and not gainfully employed was upon respondents.
Although, petitioner has alleged that he remained unemployed and was not gainfully employed ever
since his termination in 2013 by filing affidavit to this effect could not be relied as being a young
person ageing about 40 years would not have sit idle for about five years without earning and thus
his plea to this effect merits rejection. Accordingly, petitioner is held to be not entitled for back
wages. Accordingly, issues No. 1 and 2 are answered in affirmative holding that act of respondents
in giving time to time break and finally terminating on 23-4-2013 is improper and unjustified.
However, issue No. 3 is decided as discussed holding that petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in
service with seniority and continuity in service without back wages. Issues are decided accordingly.
Issue No. 4 :
29. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has contended that College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Neri, Hamirpur, H.P. does not fall under the jurisdiction before this court. On the other
hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner had relied upon Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board etc.
and A. Rajappa and others, AIR 1978 SC 548 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the definition of “industry” envisaged under Section 2(j) of the Act and held that university would
fall within the definition of industry and its employees are workman entitled to protection
envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Ld. Counsel for respondents has failed to
repudiate arguments and as such university cannot be stated to be not industry and its workers to be
not workmen. Issue is decided in negative against the respondents and in favour of petitioner. Since
issues No. 4 and 6 are the same, as such in view of findings of issue No. 4 as stated above, issue
No. 6 has become redundant.
Issue No. 5 :
30. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has not pressed this issue during course of argument.
Otherwise also, from pleadings on record no inference of claim petition being not maintainable can
be raised industrial dispute. In the case in hand, the petitioner had challenged his illegal termination
by the respondents who had allegedly violated of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. As such, being
aggrieved with action of the respondents in terminating service, petitioner could legitimately agitate
his claim before this court. Issue No. 5 is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against
the respondents.
Issue No. 7 :
31. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 425,
it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the claim
on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government and the
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Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government and same
is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and laches. The
Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 752, has
categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the benefit of Section
33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to put the restriction of
limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the provision and in absence of
any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to introduce the limitation on the
ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-
Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
32. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondents. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner
coupled with evidence on record cannot be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged
by the respondents. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondent and is answered
accordingly.
Relief :
33. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues Nos. 1 to 6, the reference/claim petition
is partly allowed and the respondents are hereby directed to re-engage the petitioner forthwith who
is further held to be in continuous uninterrupted service with the respondents from the date of his
initial engagement in the year 2007 and that the breaks given by the respondent being fictional in
nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of service of the petitioner and his
seniority shall be reckoned from his initial date of engagement however, petitioner shall be entitled
to seniority and continuity in service from the date of his initial engagement except back wages. In
the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
34. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
35. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
36. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)
Ref. No. :
15/2015
Date of Institution : 13-01-2015
Date of decision :
24-4-2018
Shri Rajeev Kumar s/o Shri Mahant Ram, r/o Village Badhiana, P.O. Amroh, Tehsil &
District Hamirpur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Dean, College of Horticulture and Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
2.
The Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, District
Solan H.P.
. .Respondents.
Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
For the Petitioner :
Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR
Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) :
Sh. Karan Pathania, Adv.
AWARD
1.
The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for
adjudication:
“Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Rajeev Kumar, s/o Shri Mahant
Ram, r/o Village Badhiana, P.O. Amroh, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P. during year 2009
to 22-04-2013 and finally w.e.f. 23-04-2013 by (i) the Director, Institute of Biotechnology
& Environment Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri,
District Hamirpur, H.P., (ii) the Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture &
Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,
seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the
above employer?”
2.
After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 3rd February, 2017
was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:
“In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated
26-12- 2014, the name of employer no (i) may be read as “the Dean, College of Horticulture
and Forestry Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.” instead of “the Director, Institute of
Biotechnology & Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture &
Forestry, Neri, District Hamipur, H.P.”, which was inadvertently recorded in the said
notification.”
3.
On receipt of reference as well as addendum from appropriate government, notices
were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed his statement of claim.
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4.
Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner had been engaged as
unskilled labourer by respondent No. 1 in the year 2009 with prior approval of respondent No. 2
who continued to work uninterruptedly with the respondents upto 22nd April, 2013. Averments
made in the claim petition further revealed that from 2009 to 2013, petitioner had been engaged for
89 days in first spell and after completion of 89 days, he had been given fictional break in his
service as some other group of workmen had been engaged for second spell of 89 days and when
the second spell of workers had completed after 89 days, petitioner had been engaged again for 89
days and such practice of engaging and disengaging by giving fictional breaks to the petitioner
continued upto 22nd April, 2013. It is further alleged that respondents had given fictional breaks of
89 days in two spells to the petitioner and other co-workmen so that they did not complete 240 days
in each calendar year for the purpose of counting continuous service envisaged under Section 25-B
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'Act' for brevity). The grievance of
petitioner remains that his service had been finally terminated by respondent No. 1 on 23-4-2013
alongwith other co-workmen without complying with mandatory provisions of Act as neither any
show cause notice had been issued nor charge-sheet had been raised for any alleged misconduct
and at the same time, no inquiry had been conducted against the petitioner besides no retrenchment
notice or compensation of one month's pay in lieu of notice period had been given and thus
termination order is stated to be illegal, null and void as petitioner had completed 240 days in
preceding 12 calendar months from date of termination. It is alleged that while terminating of
service of petitioner even principle of 'Last come First go' had not been followed as several junior
workmen namely Ishwar Dass and Rajeev Kumar had been retained in service ignoring the rights
of petitioner in violation of Section 25-G of Act as above named two workmen had worked along
with petitioner on muster roll and performed same duties. It is alleged that after terminating service
of petitioner and other co-workmen, respondents had entered into contract with M/s Shimla
Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla, H.P. vide letter No. 827-76 dated 30th April, 2013 to
outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to 31-3-2014 for 11 months and after expiry of the
above said period, respondent no.1 had renewed contract with contractor above-named for further
period of one year and as such the above said contractor had engaged 15 workmen as unskilled
labourers on daily rate basis namely Raj Kumar, Arvind Kumar, Premi Devi, Asha Devi, Kanta
Devi, Beena Devi, Santosh Kumari, Sunita Devi, Nirmla Devi, Soma Devi, Raj Kumari, Sudesh
Kumari, Meena Devi, Santosh Kumari and Sobha Ram who had worked under Shri Rampal
Baniyal, Incharge and thus respondents had violated provisions of Section 25-H of Act. It is
categorically stated that respondents had sufficient work due to which they had outsourced
unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-5-2013 to be engaged through M/s Shimla Cleanwayas, Sahibu Niwas,
New Shimla, H.P and thus it cannot be stated that respondents did not have sufficient work and
funds in different projects run by it. It is alleged that the service of petitioner and other co-workmen
who had been engaged by the respondents had been terminated with the object to deprive petitioner
and other unskilled labourers so that they did not complete 240 days. It is alleged that respondent
No. 1 without any instructions from respondent No. 2 had given fictional breaks to petitioner and
said act of respondent No. 1 fell under the definition of “unfair labour practice” as defined in Vth
Schedule Clause 10 read with Section 25-T and 25-U of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It further
transpires from petition that the respondents had engaged regular unskilled Class-IV workers on
regular pay scale in Neri I and II who are S/Sh. Chaman Lal, Kishan Chand, Deen, Sanjeev Kumar,
Parkash Chand, Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram however 14 workmen including petitioner had been
initially engaged on daily rate basis for 89 days in two spells as stated above. It is also alleged that
in addition to petitioner and other workers as stated in this para some other workmen had been
engaged who were not given any break and thus respondents has also shown favourtism to one set
of workers which violated provisions of Clause 9 of Schedule 5th of Industrial Disputes Act. It is
alleged that respondents had admitted in the reply filed before the Labour Inspector, Hamirpur that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labourer for 89 days in two spells during calendar year
as per the rules framed by university in year 2002 and that initially after working for 89 days,
petitioner had been given break. It is alleged that these 14 workmen including petitioner had filed a
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complaint of illegal termination before Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur in pursuance to which
Additional Deputy Commissioner, District Hamirpur had written a letter No. 129 dated 16-5-2013
for reengagement of services of retrenched workmen on the basis of order dated 20-11-2004 of
Hon'ble High Court of H.P. It is alleged that petitioner along-with other workmen had filed CWP
No. 4991/2012 in which Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 20-11-2014 in which directions had
been given to respondents to not give fictional breaks to the petitioners and if their services on this
count already stood dispensed with, then no fresh hand shall be engaged without first offering the
work to the petitioners. It is alleged that despite directions vide order dated 20-11-2014 respondents
had not given offer to petitioner and other co-workmen for appointment in service and contrarily
engaged 15 workmen with contractor and thus respondent No. 1 has violated even order of Hon'ble
High Court. Moreover, respondent did not file any application before Hon'ble High Court seeking
permission in CWP No. 4991/ 2012 to allow respondents to outsource petitioner unskilled contract
labour in place of terminated workmen. It further remains the case of the petitioner that in reference
154/2012 decided by this Court on 24-8-2012 titled as Mahinder Singh Vs. Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P. retrenchment of
Mahinder Singh dated 1-1-2005 was set aside and respondents were directed to re-engage the
petitioner forthwith who was further held entitled to seniority and continuity of service from the
date of his illegal termination except back wages. It is alleged that in pursuance to Award dated
24-8-2012 said Mahinder Singh has been continuously working with the respondents till date of
filing of present claim petition. Accordingly, alleging respondents to have given fictional breaks
from time to time terminating service of petitioner and other co-workmen for 89 days in two spells
and finally terminating service of petitioner on 23-4-2013 is illegal, arbitrary and unjustified in
violation of mandatory provisions of Act. It is claimed that after termination, petitioner has
remained unemployed who was not gainfully employed anywhere from 2013 and thus petitioner
claimed to be entitled for full back wages for period of fictional breaks from 2009 to 2013 till final
termination on 23-4-2013. Accordingly, petitioner prays for setting aside illegal fictional breaks
w.e.f. 2009 to 22-4-2013 with direction to the respondents to condone the break period in continuity
in service for the purposes of regularization besides has prayed wages for time to time break period.
The claimant/petitioner has further prayed for setting aside illegal termination w.e.f. 22-4-2013 with
direction to the respondents to reinstate petitioner forthwith alongwith back wages, seniority,
continuity in service with consequential benefits and litigation costs.
5.
Respondents No. 1 and 2 contested claim petition, filed joint reply inter-alia taken
preliminary objections of maintainability, limitation and jurisdiction. On merits admitted that
petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour to do manual work in the experimental fields on
seasonal basis but denied that his service had been illegally terminated by the respondents. It is
alleged that due to non-availability of funds a policy for the engagement of contractual labour was
formulated by the respondent w.e.f. 1-1-2002 so as to recognize engagement and avoid additional
liability. It is claimed that respondents did not have permanent and perennial nature of experimental
field work which required attendance of labourers (during Rabi and Kharif season) as seasonal
labourers were employed for a limited period on contract basis to accomplish the field trial work
with the object of research trial and their data etc. were not wasted for want of adequate manpower.
It is specifically alleged that petitioner had been engaged as contractual labour on a fixed salary for
a particular period in different spells as and when work and funds were available under the project
code No. HGI130-62 as is evident from letter No.UHF/IBES/HGI-130-62/1055-71 dated 3-10-2012
which postulated that no seniority shall be given to contractual labour and the service of individual
will be terminated after the contract was over as envisaged under conditions No. 2 and 8 of
appointment letter. The respondents have asserted that petitioner had after understanding terms and
conditions accepted the engagement and did not complete 240 days in any of the calendar years. It
is alleged by respondents in their reply that as and when work and funds were available under time
bound project, service of labour for field work was required for which advertisement was given
from time to time but the petitioner did not turn up for facing interviews and seeking job. It is
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emphatically denied that junior persons namely Rajeev Kumar and Ishwar Dass had been retained
by university rather said Ishwar Dass has been working with the college since 2000. However, the
court had given seniority w.e.f. 14-11-2005 and thus allegation of petitioner that juniors were
retained was stated to be wrong. It is admitted that respondent had entered into contract with M/s
Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla vide letter No. 827-76 dated 30-4-2013 but
outsource the unskilled labour w.e.f. 1-1-2013 onwards and engaged skilled and unskilled labourer
through them to carry out the seasonal and adhoc projects work as and when needed and that if
petitioner wanted to get engaged for field work with the respondents then petitioner was required to
approach the said agency. It is asserted that termination of petitioner including other co-workers
outsourcing by respondents had become compulsion of university due to reason that the university
was already facing liability of surplus staff including Class-IV. It is alleged that respondents are not
in a position to continue the service of labourer including petitioner so as avoid additional financial
liability. It is alleged that most of the labourers mentioned in the petition had been engaged on
compassionate grounds as per provisions of rules with the prior approval of State Govt. besides
maintained that petitioner was engaged on contractual basis for specific terms and conditions and
thus he cannot retract from conditions imposed by the respondents. It is alleged that petitioner was
engaged from time to time on fixed salary on contractual basis and not on regular basis for a
specific period. Accordingly, denying all allegations of petitioner, as contained in claim petition
respondents have prayed for dismissal of claim petition.
6.
The petitioner filed rejoinder to the join reply filed by respondents, reiterated his stand
as maintained in the claim petition. It is also reiterated that workmen mentioned in para No. 6 of the
claim petition namely Chaman Lal, Krishan Chand, Jamaldeen, Sanjeev Kumar, Om Prakash,
Yashpal Singh and Mast Ram regular workmen who had been working with the petitioner and
other co-workmen have since been disengaged. It is denied that respondents had engaged some
workmen on compassionate grounds moreover asserted petitioner to be unemployed and not
gainfully employed anywhere during time to time termination and from the date of his final
termination.
7.
To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his
affidavit Ex. PW1/ A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, affidavit of petitioner Ex. PW1/A1, copy of
judgment dated 20-11-2014 Ex. PW1/B, application dated 4-5-2013 regarding representation for
regularization, seniority and against the fictional breaks Ex. PW1/C copy of notification dated
30-4-2013 Ex. PW1/D, copy of complaint letter dated 16-5-2013 Ex. PW1/E, copy of reply of
demand notice dated 3-7-2013 Ex. PW1/F copy of seniority list of the contractual labour Ex.
PW1/G, copy of letter dated 3-10-2012 Ex. PW1/H, letter dated 7-7-2009 addressed to Shri Rajeev
Kumar Ex. PW1/I, letter dated 13-3-2013 Ex. PW1/J, letter dated 3-1-2012 Ex. PW1/K, copy of
representation dated 10-12-2012 Ex. PW1/L, complaint dated 22-4-2013 addressed to Deputy
Commissioner, Hamirpur Ex. PW1/M, complaint dated nil Ex. PW1/N, copy of representation
dated 13-2-2013 Ex. PW1/O, letter dated 27-1-2014 regarding reinstatement of Sh. Budh Ram as
daily paid labourer Ex. PW1/P, copy of Award dated 24-8-2012 passed by this Court Ex. PW1/Q
and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondents had
examined Dr. P.C. Sharma as RW1, tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. RW1/A, standing instructions
regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis dated 5-12-2001 Ex. RW1/B, letter dated
18-9-2012 regarding engagement of labour on contractual basis Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order
dated 21-2-2005 Ex. RW1/D, copy of letter dated 13-5-2016 regarding substitution of name of Dir.
Institute of Biotechnology Ex. RW1/E and closed evidence.
8.
It is pertinent to mention here that after closing evidence by the respondent, petitioner
had moved an application for additional evidence which was allowed and Shri Jai Ram,
Superintendent office of Dean College of Horticulture & Forestry Neri, Distt. Hamirpur, H.P.
examined as PW2, tendered/proved seniority list of daily paid workers dated 30-4-2017 (07 leaves)
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Ex. P1, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 11-4-2011 (06 leaves) Ex. P-2, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 23-2-2011 (07 leaves) Ex. P-3, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 1-10-2014 Ex. P-4, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated
17-10-2015 Ex. P-5, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 16-3-2009 (29 leaves) Ex. P
6, tentative seniority list of daily paid workers dated 10-6-2011 (30 leaves) Ex. P-7, tentative
seniority list of daily paid workers dated 7-10-2014 (31 leaves) Ex. P-8, tentative seniority list of
daily paid workers dated 16-9-2016 (30 leaves) Ex. P-9, copy of mandays chart of contractual
labourers (09 leaves) Ex. P-10 and closed additional evidence. However, ld. Counsel for the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not lead any further additional evidence which was closed vide
separate statement of ld. Counsel for respondents.
9. I have heard ld. Authorized Representative representing petitioner and ld. Counsel. for
respondents, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposal of this case.
10. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 28-05-2015 for
determination:
1.
Whether time to time termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents
during the year 2009 to 22-04-2013 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged? . .OPP.
2.
Whether final termination of services of petitioner w.e.f. 23-4-2013 is/was improper
and unjustified?
. .OPP.
3.
If issue No. 1 or issue No. 2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service benefits
the petitioner is entitled to?
. .OPP.
4.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
5.
Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.
6.
Whether the respondent University being educational institution does not fall under the
jurisdiction of this Court. If so, its effect?
. .OPR.
7.
Whether the claim petition is time barred by limitation as alleged?
. .OPR.
Relief :
11. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my
findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:
Issue No. 1 : Yes
Issue No. 2 : Yes
Issue No. 3 : Discussed
Issue No. 4 : No
Issue No. 5 : No
Issue No. 6 : Redundant
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Issue No. 7 : No
Relief :
Claim petition is partly allowed per operative part of the Award
REASONS FOR FINDINGS
Issues No. 1, 2 and 3:
12. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which
can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.
13. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2009 initially for a
period of 89 days and thereafter with intermittent breaks several times till 2013 as is also evident
from mandays chart Ex. P-10. Admittedly, petitioner had been engaged on the basis of policy for
engagement of labourers on contractual basis incorporated in Ex. RW1/B dated 5-12-2001. It is
admitted case of respondents that contractual labourers including petitioner had remained engaged
till 2013 ever since initial engagement when respondents allegedly engaged contractor for
outsourcing unskilled contractual labourers w.e.f. 1-5-2013. Equally admitted case of respondents is
that duration of contractual labourers as per policy Ex. RW1/B was not to exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spell in whole year and in case re-engaged was to be made then break of atleast 15
days was necessary. It is admittedly not case of respondents that work and conduct of petitioner
was not good and satisfactory. Admittedly, respondents had sufficient work and funds for engaging
petitioner in different projects moreso when unskilled labourers were decided to be engaged from
contractor on outsource basis. It is further admitted case of respondents that petitioner being
contractual unskilled labourer provisions of Section 25 of Act did not apply as petitioner was
squarely covered under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the 'Act'. In view of foregoing admitted facts on
record, claim of petitioner qua termination in violation of Section 2 (oo) of Act needs to be
determined and at the same it also needs to be determined, if respondents deliberately recoursed to
time to time termination of petitioner and thereafter final termination in the year 2013 falling within
ambit of unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Clause 9 of Vth Schedule of 'Act'.
14. At the outset, it would be pertinent to mention here that Ex. RW1/B Standing
Instructions of respondents for engaging contractual unskilled labourers clearly provided that no
casual worker shall be engaged on muster roll by any functionary of University w.e.f. 1-1-2002
which further stipulated that as far as possible continuing casual worker should be adjusted in
research and extension projects and thereafter demand for additional hands by deployment of
labour on contract may be made. Clause (e) of policy is reproduced below for reference:
“(e) The duration of the engagement of contractual labour should not exceed 89 days in one
spell and two spells in whole of the year and in case of re-engagement, a break of atleast 15
days is necessary in each case”.
15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner referring to above-stated rule for engagement of unskilled
contractual labour has contended that respondents being employer have given intermittent break in
service which was countable as petitioner like any other labourer engaged on contract was not in
position to bargain with respondents rather had no option but to work in illegal service conditions
imposed. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as
Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries, reported in 2014 LLR 673 in which Hon'ble
Apex Court has held that artificial break in service every year by reappointing the employee on the
same post tantamounts to 'unfair labour practice' under Section 2(ra) of the Act which is not
permissible under law. It was further observed that when repeated artificial periodical breaks in
service are proved, the termination of workman would not be having protection under Section 2(oo)
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(bb) of the Act which would attract relief of reinstatement with full back wages being illegal
retrenchment.
16. PW1 has stepped into witness box deposed on oath as maintained in claim petition
specifically stated that petitioner had been engaged by respondents in year 2009 who continued to
work with respondents till 22-4-2013 when service of petitioner had been terminated finally along
with 13 other workers without complying with provisions of the 'Act'. He has further stated neither
any show cause notice nor compensation was given although petitioner had completed 240 days in
preceding 12 months from date of termination. Significantly, Ex. P10 mandays does not factually
show petitioner to have worked for 240 days immediately prior to his termination but plea of
petitioner remains that Ex. RW1/B Standing Instructions for engagement of unskilled labourer on
contract basis which fell in the ambit of an unfair labour practice had been invariably recoursed by
respondents during period of employment of petitioner when there were sufficient funds and work
with respondents and in the judgment (supra) of Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner was held liable to
be reinstated in service being illegally retrenched.
17. Reliance has further been placed on judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab &
Haryana reported in 1994 LLR 454 titled as Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development
Authority, Manimajra and Anr. versus Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Rohtak and Anr. Relevant para of judgment is reproduced below:
“Since provision of Section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature of an exception it has to be construed
strictly in favour of the workman as far as possible in letter and spirit. If the termination is
meant to exploit an employee or to increase the bargaining power of the employer,
then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause (bb) and the definition of
'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning…”
18. In the aforestated judgment, Hon'ble High Court (DB) had upheld award passed by
Labour Court relying upon judgment titled as Kapurthala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported in 1984 (2) Indian Law Reporter 333 (DB) in which
service of workman had been terminated when case of those had completed 230 days. In this case,
services of workmen were terminated without any departmental inquiry or charge-sheet and at the
same time, no notice or compensation was paid. The bank before the Hon'ble Court took plea that
service of workman for specified period and that too with notional breaks and thereafter workmen
were neither entitled for any retrenchment compensation nor reinstatement. The court in (1984)
case after dilating upon various aspects of matter held that attempt of employer to dispense with
service of workman so as to deprive him in continuity of service for specified period i.e. 240
days envisaged under Section 25-B and 25-F of the Act amounts to unfair labour practice when it is
found that conduct and service of workman was satisfactory. In 1994 judgment (supra) reference
has been made to another case reported in 1989 (2) RSJ 55 titled as Balbir Singh Vs. The
Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Limited in which J. Amarjit Chaudhary interpreted
Sub-clause (bb) (oo) of Section 2 and relevant para is reproduced below:
"Sub-clause (bb) of Clause (oo) of Section 2 of the Act, which was added in 1984 by an
amendment cannot be so construed as to drastically restrict the orbit of the term of
'retrenchment' clause (bb) is an exception which must be interpreted narrowly. It cannot be
given meanings which may nullify or curtail the ambit of their principal clause. No doubt,
the intention of the Parliament in enacting clause (bb) was to exclude certain categories of
workers from the term of retrenchment but there is nothing in this clause which allows an
outlet to un-scrupulour employers to shunt out workers in the graph of non-renewal of their
contract even when the work subsists. This Clause as a whole has to be construed strictly in
favour of the workman as far as possible as to ensure that the Act is implemented in letter
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and spirit. If the termination is meant to exploit an employee or to increase the
bargaining power of the employer, then it has to be excluded from the ambit of clause
(bb) and the definition of term 'retrenchment' has to be given full meaning. The
contractual clause enshrined in clause (bb) cannot be resorted to frustrate the claim of
the employee against his uncalled for retrenchment or for denying other benefits. It
cannot be so interpreted, as to enable for employer to resort to the policy of hire and fire….”
19. It is admittedly not the case of respondents that petitioner could not be deployed or
employed or say that respondents had terminated service of petitioner since there was not sufficient
work and funds. Be it stated that by engaging contractor for outsourcing unskilled labourer to be
provided to respondents w.e.f. 1-5-2013 is clearly suggestive of the fact that respondents had
sufficient work and funds. Not only this, even several unskilled labourer had been engaged for
whole of the year as reflected in Ex. P5 the tentative seniority list as on 31-12-2014. Thus,
intermittent breaks given by respondents to petitioner establishes unfair labour practice within the
meaning of Section 2(ra) of the Act as the object behind engaging petitioner as contractual labourer
and thereafter giving intermittent breaks and finally terminating without any notice, changing
service conditions by asking petitioner to join contractor from a specific date as has also been
admitted by RW1 Dr. P. C. Sharma in cross-examination who is the only witness examined by
respondents. Equally important to mention here is that while filing reply respondents have withheld
facts qua number of labourers engaged in two spells while implementing its policy Ex. RW1/B and
at the same time their names too have not been disclosed establishes that respondents from very
beginning while engaging petitioner intended that petitioner did not attain permanency in job but
for reason stated hereinabove, petitioner is held to have continuous service from 2009 to 2013 as
envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. That being so, it was incumbent upon respondents to have
issued notice under Section 25-F of Act and alternatively to pay wages of one month in lieu of
notice which has not so been done by respondents establishing violation of provisions of Section
25-F of the Act for intermittent breaks as well as for final termination and for similar reasons
disengaging petitioner periodically and retaining juniors in two spells as has come in evidence
clearly establish violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
20. In order to prove his case, the petitioner has placed reliance upon Ex. R10 the mandays
on fixed wages w.e.f. 2009 relating to petitioner which showed that petitioner had worked under
project HMS 218-62 from 8-7-2012 to 19-8-2011 for 89 days and thereafter with several
intermittent breaks till 20-12-2012 as shown in this document. The plea of the petitioner remains
that the breaks had been given deliberately by respondents so that the petitioner did not complete
240 days. It has also been stated by petitioner that despite availability of funds and work
intermittent breaks had been given from time to time during total period petitioner remained
engaged with the respondents.
21. Before accepting plea of petitioner for having been given break deliberately from time
to time, it would be also relevant to consider if the petitioner succeeded in establishing that if
throughout the year intermittent breaks would not have been given, he would have continued to be
in service for whole of the year and deemed to have completed continuous service in a year
envisaged under Section 25-B of Act. To prove that provisions of Section 25-G of the Act was not
adhered to by respondent while giving intermittent breaks reliance has been placed on seniority list
Ex. P1 to P5 showing junior workmen to petitioner i.e. those daily beldar who joined after
petitioner have been retained, engaging more than 300 days in a year whereas petitioner had been
given intermittent breaks in the same year. The seniority list Ex. P1 shows that Asha Devi and Tara
Chand figuring at serial No. 33 & 34 have joined on 13-7-2009. Ex. P4 is the tentative seniority list
(as on 31-12-2013) of these officials showed i.e. Tara Chand to have worked for 365 days in the
year 2010, 354 days in 2011, 366 days in 2012 and 365 days in 2013. Said Tara Chand figured at
serial No.15 in the seniority list. Similarly, Asha Devi figuring at serial No. 16 in seniority list Ex.
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R4 is shown to have worked for 304 days in 2010, 347 days in 2011, 341 days in 2012 and 363
days in 2013. With the aid of these entries concerning Tara Chand and Asha Devi figuring at serial
No.15 and 16, it has been contended that there was sufficient work and funds available with the
respondents in different projects and these two officials had joined after joining of petitioner who
as per Ex. P10 figured at serial no.10 and had joined on 8-7-2009 and as both these workmen had
been given sufficient work throughout the year(s) despite being engaged at later stage, the
petitioner is held to have been given intermittent break from 8-7-2009 till 20-12-2009 deliberately
by respondents despite having sufficient work and funds, Ex. P10 further shows that petitioner
during these years had remained engaged with intermittent breaks for 12 times from 2009 to 2013
in project HMS 218-62. If Tara Chand and Asha Devi could be given work for more than 300 days
in a year in particular year from 2010 to 2013, there was no reasons or compulsion for the
respondents to have given break to the petitioner as stated above which manifestly shows that
petitioner has been deliberately given breaks in service.
22. The tentative seniority list of daily wage labourers as it stood on 31-12-2013. Ex. P4
revealed that at serial No. 15 and 16 names of Tara Chand and Asha Devi existed but at serial Nos.
17 to 20 names of Amravati, Bhim Dutt, Kamla Devi and Saroj Bala have been mentioned who
were shown to have joined and worked with respondents on 28-10-2010, 1-5-2012, 8-5-2012 and
15-5-2012 respectively much later than petitioner who joined in 2009. As such, latest seniority list
available at the time when petitioner was removed from service except Tara Chand and Asha Devi,
others are shown to have joined in the year 2010 and 2012 respectively as mentioned above.
Nothing in the cross-examination of petitioner PW1 could be elicited by respondents which would
demolish his claim qua deliberate intermittent breaks given by the respondents despite work and
funds as other juniors had been given sufficient work for whole of the year and policy Ex. RW1/B
dealing with contractual labourers was primarily a policy meant to exploit unskilled contractual
labourers which could be termed as entirely based on unfair labour practice. RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma,
Director, Institute of Biotechnology and Environment Sciences, College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Dr. Y. S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P.
has deposed that he had been posted on the present assignment since 1-11-2016 besides stated that
petitioner worked with university but did not know that petitioner remained engaged from date of
appointment till 22-4-2013. He has admitted in cross-examination that from 2002 to 2013, 30-32
contractual labourers were engaged, initially for 89 days who were appointed in two batches after
engaging the first batch, second batch was engaged when first batch was disengaged and thereafter
second batch was disengaged which support the plea of petitioner that the process of engagement
and disengagements was deliberate on part of respondents. Apparently, giving such intermittent
breaks to two groups of unskilled labourers without notice violated Section 25-G of the Act. As
such, respondents are held to have given intermittent breaks to the petitioner in violation of
provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act.
23. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has contended with vehemence that although adopting
policy for engagement of unskilled labourer on contractual basis vide Ex. RW1/B, respondents had
changed conditions of service of petitioner without issuing any prior notice vide which petitioner
was required to join to contractor engaged to provide unskilled labourers on outsource basis to
respondents which tentamounts to termination of service of petitioner as petitioner had been
engaged with respondents since 2009 and no prior notice was served upon him in 2013 notifying
petitioner to join contractor who was to provide labourers to respondents on the basis of some
agreement entered into between respondents and contractor Ld. Counsel/Authorized Representative
for petitioner had also contended if contractual employment is resorted to as mechanism to frustrate
the claim so that employee did not become regular or permanent against a job which continues or
the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
clause of Section 2(oo) of the Act, the same would be an unfair labour practice under the 'Act'.
Before proceedings further, it would be most pertinent to refer to order dated 20-11-2014 Ex.
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PW1/B of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in which present petitioner along with 13 other had filed
CWP No. 4991/2012 when respondents had been directed “to not give fictional breaks to
petitioner and if their services on this count already stand dispense with, no fresh hand shall
be engaged without first affording the work to the petitioners”. In pursuance to the above said
order, petitioner alongwith 13 others had filed the complaint before Deputy Commissioner
Hamirpur for non-enforcement of order dated 20-11-2014 passed by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. in
pursuance to which Deputy Commissioner, Hamirpur had directed respondents to enforce the order
of the Hon'ble High Court dated 20-11-2014. The plea of respondents in their joint reply remained
that petitioner had not applied for re-engagement with contractor engaged in 2013 which leads to
an irresistible inference that petitioner had been disengaged i.e. terminated from service of
respondents in violation of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. It is admittedly not the case of the
respondents that any notice was served upon petitioner as could also be gathered from cross-
examination of RW1 Dr. P.C. Sharma, Director Dean College of Horticulture respondent No. 1
who showed his ignorance if while disengaging petitioner in the year 2013, any notice was served
upon petitioner by respondents. If any notice as required would have been issued by respondents,
RW1 would have certainly denied this question. He has specifically admitted that while
terminating service of petitioner no compensation was paid by respondents. Although these facts
revealed in crossexamination of RW1 coupled with the order of Hon'ble High Court as referred to
above, it can be safely gathered that respondents had not adhered to the mandate of Hon'ble High
Court as the petitioner was not to be disengaged and if disengaged, no fresh hands shall be engaged
although several persons juniors to petitioner have been engaged thereafter as per seniority list Ex.
P5 which further showed availability sufficient work and funds with respondents.
24. Ld. Counsel for the respondents had contended that petitioner being contractual
employee was not covered under the definition of retrenchment under Section 2 (bb) of the Act as
under Clause (bb)(oo) termination of service of workman on contract specifically was excluded
from definition of retrenchment. It is pointed out that since the petitioner was appointed on
contract, he stands excluded from definition of “retrenchment” and therefore respondents were not
required to adhere to provisions of Section 25-F of the 'Act' while disengaging petitioner. Ld.
Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, repudiated the arguments so advanced by the ld.
Counsel for respondents and has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P.
titled as Manoj Kumar Vs. H.R.T.C. and Anr. reported in 2007 LLR 1155. In the above said
judgment Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held that when repeated and fictional breaks have
been given to workman so that he should not attain permanency, it would not come within the
purview of section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act excluding termination of
retrenchment. In the case before the Hon'ble High Court respondents had set up similar plea of
petitioner being on contractual employment and thus Section 25-F could not be invoked by the
petitioner. In the above said judgment of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. has held in para 12
reproduced below for reference:
“….12. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court has held in Shailendra Nath Vs. Vice
Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1987 Lab IC 1607 that section 2(oo) (bb) is in the nature
of an exception to section 2(oo) and has to be construed strictly and in favour of the
workman as the entire object of the Act is secure a just and fair deal to them. Their
Lordships of the Allahabad High Court have held as under:
“The expression, 'termination for whatsoever reason' used in Cl. (oo) came up for
interpretation before the Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. N. S. Money, AIR 1976
SC 1111: (1976 Lab IC 769). It was held to mean a termination which takes place either by
active step of employer or by running out of stipulated period. The Hon'ble Court observed.
Termination embraced not merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact
of termination, however, produced". Since this wide interpretation resulted in extending
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benefit of retrenchment to even purpose or particular job or were casual workers the
Legislature appears to have added sub cl. (bb) to cl.(oo) in 1984. Even though petitioners
claim to have acquired status of regular employees before the clause was amended as each
of them had completed 240 days prior to its addition in 1984 it may be examined if the
petitioners can be said to be contractual employees as contemplated in this sub-clause. For
that it is necessary to examine its scope and ambit. It may, however, be stated at the outset
that it obviously attempts to exclude that which otherwise would have been included in
principal clause or to be more precise is in the nature of an exception, therefore, it has to be
construed strictly and in favour of workmen as the entire objective of the Act is to secure
just and fair deal for them. Terminations which are included in it are those which are
brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time
stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide a
gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation the nature of
employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of
duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be
for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes
to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated
period or completion of work whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But
if contractual employment is resorted to as a mechanism to frustrate the claim of
employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature
of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from
the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on the anvil of
fairness and bonafide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire
and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Cl. (bb). Because if it is left to be employer not
to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstances then the protection
afforded to a workman by treating every termination, of service as retrenchment shall be
rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post
ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bona fide.
It cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee's work is also
satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That
would be unfair labour practice [See H.D. Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India. (1985) 51 Fac
LR 494: (1985 Lab IC 1733) (SC)]. From various annexures filed with affidavits it is clear
that some of the petitioners were employed as Office Assistant, other book binders and
peons. They were awarded benefit of bonus. They have been working for nearly five years.
Their job was not casual, seasonal or of a daily worker. They have not been paid their salary
on volume of work. Although the wages in some cases are computed on per day basis but
the payment is monthly including holidays. Their duty, therefore, was like a regular
employee and not as casual, daily or seasonal worker….”
Para no.17 of the aforestated judgment is also reproduced below which has bearing on
merits of issue and is reproduced below:
“17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Haryana State Electronics Development
Corporation Limited Vs. Mamni (2206) 9 SCC 434: AIR 2006 SC 2427: 2006 LLR 667
(SC), that appointment for a short period (89 days) and termination of service at the end of
the said period and reappointment after a gap of one day, such action of termination and
reappointment repeated again and again for a period of about one and a half years, in such
circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the termination not bona fide but
adopted to defeat the object of the Act. Thus, it is not covered by section 2(oo)(bb) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947……..”
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25. Reliance has further been placed by Hon'ble High Court in Manoj Kumar's case on
another judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay titled as Dalip H. Shirke Vs. Zila Parishad
Yavatmal, reported in 1990 Lab IC 100 in which judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as State
Bank of India Vs. N. Sundaramoney reported in 1976 Lab IC 769 had been relied by Hon'ble
High Court of Bombay. It was observed that exception as contained in sub-clause (bb) will have to
be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been
enjoying earlier to the amendment. The benefit of law laid down by the Supreme Court was
extended to all the workmen even to those who were employed for specific work or for a
particular job and even to casual labourers who were engaged merely to complete casual nature
of work. In the judgment of N. Sundaramoney's case relied in 2007 case and had observed that
time and again it has been held that welfare statutes must receive the construction which
advances the object of the statutes and protects the weaker section of the society. It was
observed that the employer is always in a position to dictate the terms of service vis-a-vis the
workman or to be workman. The employer can unilaterally impose oppressive and
unreasonable conditions of service and the workman will be left with little choice but to
accept all such conditions even unconscionable conditions of service in the contract of
employment. In the case in hand before this court, respondents had adopted policy of engagement
of contractual labourer to avoid financial liability Ex. RW1/B which prescribed the manner in
which workman was to employed for 89 days in two spells which follows that contractual labourers
engaged for 89 days in first spell were to be disengaged after 89 days engaging new batch and
following such engagements show that after first engagement of labourers as stated above junior
contractual labourer were to certainly disengage senior workmen i.e. first batch for 89 days without
notice despite availability of work and funds which manifestly violated Section 25-G of the 'Act'.
26. In the concluding para in Manoj Kumar's case, Hon'ble High Court has held that
workman had been offered appointment with fictional breaks to prevent petitioner from taking
benefit of Section 25-F of Act. The appointment orders issued in successor to workman was
camouflage to take out petitioner-workman from the ambit of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The appointment of petitioner cannot be termed as contractual and his case will
fall under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it will be covered under
expression “retrenchment”. The act of respondents of engaging petitioner giving fictional
breaks was not bonafide and reinstatement of petitioner-workman was allowed. Applying the
ratio of case law referred to above, it may not be erroneous to observe that in the case in hand
before this court, contractual employment of petitioner and time to time termination was made by
respondents so that petitioner did not become permanent and at the same time act of respondents in
throwing out petitioner from work with contractor without notice is manifestly unfair labour
practice and petitioner would be covered under definition of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) and
not under exception in Clause (bb) (oo) as has been held in Manoj Kumar's case.
27. Thus, in the case before this court respondents had made scheme which was
significantly promulgated for engagement of contractual labourer for 89 days in one spell and in the
case before the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana having similar period of engagement of
workmen respondents were held to have not complied with the Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act as the workman who was a clerk had been engaged for 89 days and given fresh
appointment twice for 89 days. As such, referring to aforestated case law and evidence on record, it
may not be erroneous to conclude that respondents had recoursed to unfair labour practice initially
by adopting standing instruction for engagement of contractual labour Ex. RW1/B which in its
prescribed clause (e) duration of contractual labourer was to be not more that 89 in a year for two
spells and thereafter by abrupting engagement of labourers on outsource basis through contractor.
But in this case, the petitioner had been engaged several times with intervals as shown in mandays
chart Ex. P10 from 2009 to 2013 and thus the action of respondents in giving intermittent break as
well as finally terminating service without notice and asking the petitioner to work with contractor
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who was to provide unskilled labourers to respondents on outsource basis was nothing else but
termination of service of petitioner without any notice and that the intermittent breaks are held to be
deliberately made by the respondents with the object to avoid financial liability upon respondents
which could not be accepted as ground to negate or say defeat claim of petitioner. The termination
of petitioner would thus be not excluded under Section 2 (oo) (bb) and squarely fell under the
definition of retrenchment under the Act necessitating issuance of notice of one month envisaged
under Section 25-F of the Act and in alternative wages for one month in lieu of notice period which
has admittedly not been done as RW1 has shown his inability to tell if while disengaging petitioner
any notice was served. Being the Director in university authorized to contest and depose in this
case on behalf of respondents was expected to know material facts qua engagement and
disengagement of petitioner. Accordingly, applying the case law as referred to above, it is held that
petitioner had been wrongly retrenched from service by the respondents in violation of provisions
of Act.
28. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has taken this court through Award dated 24-8-2012 Ex.
PW1/Q passed in Reference No. 154/2012 titled as Mohinder Singh versus Registrar, Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, Distt. Solan, H.P. & Anr. vide which this
court had directed reinstatement of petitioner setting aside retrenchment order qua petitioner w.e.f.
1-1-2005 by respondents and was held entitled for seniority and continuity in service from the date
of illegal termination except back wages. While relying upon the above said Award, ld. counsel for
the petitioner has contended that above said award has not been assailed by respondents which had
attained finality having similar facts with regard to award Ex. PW1/Q. RW1 in cross-examination
has showed his inability to tell if above said award passed against the respondent had been
challenged however specifically admitted that said Mohinder Singh was still working with the
university. Statement of RW1 recorded on 1-10-2011 and award was passed on 28-4-2017 and was
allegedly terminated on 1-1-2005 which goes to show after implementation of award Ex. PW1/Q
above-named Mohinder Singh has been in continuous service with the respondent from 1-1-2005 to
31-10-2017 when RW1 was cross-examined. As such, Mohinder Singh's case having similar facts
and not challenged by respondents is equally binding upon respondents qua similarly situated
workmen. In the said judgment also, my ld. predecessor-in-office in para No. 26 on record has
specifically held that action of respondents was unfair labour practice under Clause 10 Vth
Schedule appended under the Act. In so far claim of petitioner qua back wages from date of illegal
termination in the year 2013 is concerned, suffice would be state here that onus to prove that
petitioner/claimant remained unemployed and not gainfully employed was upon respondents.
Although, petitioner has alleged that he remained unemployed and was not gainfully employed ever
since his termination in 2013 by filing affidavit to this effect could not be relied as being a young
person ageing about 40 years would not have sit idle for about five years without earning and thus
his plea to this effect merits rejection. Accordingly, petitioner is held to be not entitled for back
wages. Accordingly, issues No. 1 and 2 are answered in affirmative holding that act of respondents
in giving time to time break and finally terminating on 23-4-2013 is improper and unjustified.
However, issue No. 3 is decided as discussed holding that petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in
service with seniority and continuity in service without back wages. Issues are decided accordingly.
Issue No. 4 :
29. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has contended that College of Horticulture and
Forestry, Neri, Hamirpur, H.P. does not fall under the jurisdiction before this court. On the other
hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner had relied upon Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board etc.
and A. Rajappa and others, AIR 1978 SC 548 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the definition of “industry” envisaged under Section 2(j) of the Act and held that university would
fall within the definition of industry and its employees are workman entitled to protection
envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Ld. Counsel for respondents has failed to
1410
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repudiate arguments and as such university cannot be stated to be not industry and its workers to be
not workmen. Issue is decided in negative against the respondents and in favour of petitioner. Since
issues No. 4 and 6 are the same, as such in view of findings of issue No. 4 as stated above, issue
No. 6 has become redundant.
Issue No. 5 :
30. Ld. Counsel for the respondents has not pressed this issue during course of argument.
Otherwise also, from pleadings on record no inference of claim petition being not maintainable can
be raised industrial dispute. In the case in hand, the petitioner had challenged his illegal termination
by the respondents who had allegedly violated of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Act. As such, being
aggrieved with action of the respondents in terminating service, petitioner could legitimately agitate
his claim before this court. Issue No. 5 is answered in negative in favour of petitioner and against
the respondents.
Issue No. 7 :
31. It is settled preposition of law that in case a dispute is referred to for determination, the
Court will have to return a finding on merits and the delay in raising the dispute may be considered
by the Court at the time of granting the final relief, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High
Court in Bhatag Ram's case (2007 LHLJ 903). In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another Vs.
Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160, the delay of more than 10 years was held to have not
come in the way of the workman whose services were illegally terminated by holding that the
provisions of Limitation Act is not applicable to industrial dispute but however, depending upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, the principle of delay and laches have to be seen and
applied. In Deepa Ram Vs. State of H.P. and Ors., 2005 (1) Himachal Law Journal 248, there
was a delay of 12 years. In Ramesh Chand Vs. Union of India, CWP No. 812 of 2000, there was
a delay of 9 years. In CWP No. 95 of 2000 titled as Divisional Manager Vs. Mohinder Kumar,
there was a delay of 14 years. In Naginder Kumar Vs. HPSEB and anr. 2008 (1) SLJ (H.P.)
425, it has been held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the Labour Court cannot dismiss the
claim on the ground of delay and laches once the same has been referred by the State Government
and the Labour Court is bound to decide the reference which was made by the State Government
and same is required to be adjudicated upon the merits without touching the aspect of delay and
laches. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs. Gopal Bhiva & Ors, AIR 1964
SC 752, has categorically held that as such of all those employees, who are entitled to take the
benefit of Section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it may not be right to
put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the
provision and in absence of any provision for limitation, it may not be open to the Court to
introduce the limitation on the ground of fairness and justice. In Ajayab Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-
operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has
been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:
“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding
under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of
delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of
fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to
the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.
32. No material has been placed on record by the respondents to establish that there was
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in raising the dispute in the instant case or that any
prejudice had been caused to respondents. Accordingly, the petition as filed by the petitioner
coupled with evidence on record cannot be held to be hit by the vice of delays and laches as alleged
1411
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by the respondents. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondent and is answered
accordingly.
Relief :
33. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues Nos. 1 to 6, the reference/claim petition
is partly allowed and the respondents are hereby directed to re-engage the petitioner forthwith who
is further held to be in continuous uninterrupted service with the respondents from the date of his
initial engagement in the year 2009 and that the breaks given by the respondent being fictional in
nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity of service of the petitioner and his
seniority shall be reckoned from his initial date of engagement however, petitioner shall be entitled
to seniority and continuity in service from the date of his initial engagement except back wages. In
the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
34. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.
35. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the
official gazette.
36. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.
Announced in the open Court today this 24th day of April, 2018.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_______________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT –
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No.
509/ 2016
Sh. Kamal Singh s/o Shri Hari Singh, r/o Village Jadour, P.O. Tarsuh, Tehsil Shri Naina
Deviji, District Bilaspur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Partners, M/s Universal Electric Engineers, Dalhousie Road Pathankot, Punjab
(Contractor).
2.
The Executive Engineer, Changer Area Lift Irrigation Project Division Bassi, District
Bilaspur, H.P. (Principal Employer).
. .Respondents.
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No.1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
1412
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.37 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No.1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.47 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his Authorised Representative today is indicative of the
fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference/claim petition and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action/publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
28-04-2018
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. 495/ 2016
Sh. Harjinder Singh s/o Shri Bhola Nath, r/o V.P.O. Tarso, Tehsil Shri Naina Deviji,
District Bilaspur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Partners, M/s Universal Electric Engineers, Dalhousie Road Pathankot,
Punjab(Contractor).
2.
The Executive Engineer, Changer Area Lift Irrigation Project Division Bassi, District
Bilaspur, H.P. (Principal Employer)
. .Respondents.
1413
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
28-04-2018 Present:
None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for
the respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.38 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
28-04-2018 Present:
None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, adv. Csl. for
the respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.48 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his Authorised Representative today is indicative of the
fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference/claim petition and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action/publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
Sd/-
28-04-2018
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. 496/ 2016
Sh. Sant Ram s/o Shri Bhagwanu Ram, r/o Village Palsehar, P.O. Lehari, Tehsil Shri Naina
Deviji, District Bilaspur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Partners, M/s Universal Electric Engineers, Dalhousie Road Pathankot, Punjab
(Contractor).
1414
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
2.
The Executive Engineer, Changer Area Lift Irrigation Project Division Bassi, District
Bilaspur, H.P. (Principal Employer).
. .Respondents.
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.40 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.50 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his Authorised Representative today is indicative of the
fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference/claim petition and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action/publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
28-04-2018
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT
CUMINDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref.: No. 494/ 2016
Sh. Banarasi Dass s/o Shri Sant Ram, r/o Village Jheera, P.O. Tobba, Tehsil Shri Naina
Deviji, District Bilaspur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
1415
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
Versus
1.
The Partners, M/s Universal Electric Engineers, Dalhousie Road Pathankot, Punjab
(Contractor).
2.
The Executive Engineer, Changer Area Lift Irrigation Project Division Bassi, District
Bilaspur, H.P. (Principal Employer)
. .Respondents.
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D. A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.42 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.52 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his Authorised Representative today is indicative of the
fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference/claim petition and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action/publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
28-04-2018
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
1416
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. 507/ 2016
Sh. Pyar Singh s/o Sh. Gajjan Singh, r/o Village Dharot, P.O. Lakhnu, Tehsil Shri Naina
Deviji, District Bilaspur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Partners, M/s Universal Electric Engineers, Dalhousie Road Pathankot, Punjab
(Contractor).
2.
The Executive Engineer, Changer Area Lift Irrigation Project Division Bassi, District
Bilaspur, H.P. (Principal Employer).
. .Respondents.
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.43 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.55 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his Authorised Representative today is indicative of the
fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference/claim petition and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
1417
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action/publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
28-04-2018
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. 508/2016
Sh. Narender Kumar s/o Shri Jai Kishan, r/o Village Ghatewal, P.O. Bassi, Tehsil Shri
Naina Deviji, District Bilaspur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Partners, M/s Universal Electric Engineers, Dalhousie Road Pathankot, Punjab
(Contractor).
2.
The Executive Engineer, Changer Area Lift Irrigation Project Division Bassi, District
Bilaspur, H.P. (Principal Employer)
. .Respondents.
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.33 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
___________
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No. 1.
1418
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.43 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his Authorised Representative today is indicative of the
fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference/claim petition and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
28-04-2018
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. 492/ 2016
Sh. Bhupender Singh s/o Sh. Deena Nath, r/o V.P.O. Tobba, Tehsil Shri Naina Deviji,
District Bilaspur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Partners, M/s Universal Electric Engineers, Dalhousie Road Pathankot, Punjab
(Contractor).
2.
The Executive Engineer, Changer Area Lift Irrigation Project Division Bassi, District
Bilaspur, H.P. (Principal Employer)
. .Respondents.
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.35 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
1419
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.45 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his Authorised Representative today is indicative of the
fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference/claim petition and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action/publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
28-04-2018
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. 490/ 2016
Sh. Kuldeep Singh s/o Shri Nathu Ram, r/o V.P.O. Lehari, Tehsil Shri Naina Deviji, District
Bilaspur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Partners, M/s Universal Electric Engineers, Dalhousie Road Pathankot, Punjab
(Contractor).
2.
The Executive Engineer, Changer Area Lift Irrigation Project Division Bassi, District
Bilaspur, H.P. (Principal Employer)
. .Respondents.
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
1420
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.36 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
_____________
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.46 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his Authorised Representative today is indicative of the
fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference/claim petition and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action/publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
28-04-2018
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref. No. 491/ 2016
Sh. Gurbhajan Singh s/o Sh. Ram Asra, r/o Village Baherda, P.O. Bassi, Tehsil Shri Naina
Deviji, District Bilaspur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Partners, M/s Universal Electric Engineers, Dalhousie Road Pathankot, Punjab
(Contractor).
1421
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
2.
The Executive Engineer, Changer Area Lift Irrigation Project Division Bassi, District
Bilaspur, H.P. (Principal Employer).
. .Respondents.
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.30 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.40 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his Authorised Representative today is indicative of the
fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference/claim petition and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action/publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
28-04-2018
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-
CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
Ref: No. 493/ 2016
1422
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
Sh. Surender Kumar s/o Shri Daya Ram, r/o Village Roura Jaman, P.O. Tarsu, Tehsil Shri
Naina Deviji, District Bilaspur, H.P.
. .Petitioner.
Versus
1.
The Partners, M/s Universal Electric Engineers, Dalhousie Road Pathankot, Punjab
(Contractor) .
2.
The Executive Engineer, Changer Area Lift Irrigation Project Division Bassi, District
Bilaspur, H.P. (Principal Employer)
. .Respondents.
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due
knowledge. It is 11.32 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
____________
28-04-2018 Present: None for the petitioner.
Sh. Sunny Kaundal, Adv. vice of Sh. Manish Awasthi, Adv. Csl. for the
respondent No. 1.
Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent No. 2.
Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is
2.42 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his Authorised Representative today is indicative of the
fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference/claim petition and accordingly reference is
disposed of for non-prosecution.
Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.
Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and
further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.
Announced:
28-04-2018
Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
1423
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
RESULT OF 70th DEPARTMENTAL EXAMINATION FOR THE CIVIL JUDGE
HELD IN THE MONTH OF JANUARY, 2019
NOTE : ‘WITH CREDIT (WC)’ means passed by obtaining ¾th of the maximum marks:
‘HIGHER STANDARD(HS)’ means passed by obtaining 2/3rd of the maximum marks:
‘LOW STANDARD (LS)’ means passed in the lower standard by obtaining 50% marks.
Sr.
No.
Name of the Officer
Roll
No.
Group A-1
Criminal Law
(120 marks)
Group A-II
Civil Law
(120
marks)
Group-B
Revenue Law-I
& Revenue
Law-II (120
marks each) 240
marks
Group-C
Accounts
(160 marks)
Group-D
Constitu-
tional Law
(100 marks)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1.
Sh. Parth Jain
501
-
-
-
122 WC
-
2.
Ms. Apoorva Ran
502
Absent
Absent
Absent
Absent
Absent
3.
Ms. Swati Barwal
503
85 HS
86 HS
108
104 = 212
WC
126 WC
74 ½ HS
4.
Ms. Isha Agarwal
504
71 LS
93 WC
106
100 =206 WC
126 WC
84 WC
5.
Sh. Rahul
505
80 HS
83 HS
99
97 = 196 WC
113 HS
77 WC
6.
Sh. Raghav Gupta
506
86 HS
84 HS
97
98 = 195 WC
107 HS
72 HS
(Poonam Mahajan)
(Dr. Baldev Singh)
Addl. Registrar (O&A)/Superintendent
Registrar (Vigilance)/Secretary
Departmental Examination
Departmental Examination Committee
20-4-2019
20-4-2019
__________
c vnkyr dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] dYik] ftyk fdUukSj ¼fg0 iz0½
eqdíek uEcj
rkjh[k jtqvk
rkjh[k QSlyk
01@2019
03&04&2019
2&05&2019
Sh. Vinod Singh s/o Late Sh. Jagdev, r/o Village Kothi, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur
(H.P.).
cuke
1- vke turk xzke dksBh
2- iz/kku] xzke iapk;r dksBh] rglhy dYik] ftyk fdUukSj ¼fg0 iz0½
1424
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
fo"k;-&&izkFkhZ dh ekrk dk uke xzke iapk;r dksBh ds tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djok;s
tkus ckjs v/khu /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr tUe iathdj.k
djus ckjsA
gj [kkl o vke turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj ds ek/;e ls lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd Sh. Vinod
Singh us v/kksgLrk{kjh ds U;k;ky; esa ,d vkosnu&i= e; 'kiFk&i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mudh ekrk
Yang Sarni iRuh Lo0 Jh txnso dh e`R;q fnukad 28&01&2003 dks gqbZ Fkh rFkk vKkurko'k izkFkhZ us
mldk iathdj.k xzke iapk;r dksBh ds tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ ugha djok;k gS] vc izkFkhZ
mijksDr e`R;q frfFk xzke iapk;r dksBh ds tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djokuk pkgrk gS bl
fo"k; esa vkns'k tkjh djus dk vuqjks/k fd;k gSA
vr% xzke iapk;r dksBh] rglhy dYik] ftyk fdUukSj dh turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj ds ek/;e ls
lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn Yang Sarni iRuh Lo0 Jh txnso dh e`R;q fnukad 28&01&2003 dk
iathdj.k xzke iapk;r dksBh ds e`R;q iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djus ckjs dksbZ vkifÙk gks rks og fnukad
02&05&2019 ;k blls iwoZ vnkyr esa gkftj vkdj viuk ,rjkt is'k dj ldrk gS vU;Fkk vkosnu&i=
ij e`R;q iathdj.k vkns'k ikfjr dj lfpo] xzke iapk;r dksBh dks vkxkeh dk;kZUo;u gsrq Hkst fn;k
tk;sxkA
vkt fnukad 03&04&2019 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
dYik] ftyk fdUukSj ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] dYik] ftyk fdUukSj ¼fg0 iz0½
eqdíek uEcj
rkjh[k jtqvk
rkjh[k QSlyk
02@2019
03&04&2019
2&05&2019
Smt. Ram Sanyog w/o Vinay Singh, r/o Village Telangi, Tehsil Kalpa, District Kinnaur
(H.P.).
cuke
1- vke turk xzke rsyaxh
2- iz/kku] xzke iapk;r rsyaxh] rglhy dYik] ftyk fdUukSj ¼fg0 iz0½
fo"k;-&&izkFkhZ dh iq=h dk uke o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r [kokaxh ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ
djok;s tkus ckjs v/khu /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969 ds vUrxZr tUe
iathdj.k djus ckjsA
gj [kkl o vke turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj ds ek/;e ls lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd Smt. Ram
Sanyog us v/kksgLrk{kjh ds U;k;ky; esa ,d vkosnu&i= e; 'kiFk&i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mudh iq=h
Muskan iq=h Jh fou; flag dk tUe fnukad 05&04&2003 dks gqvk gS rFkk vKkurko'k izkFkhZ us mldk
iathdj.k xzke iapk;r rsyaxh ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ ugha djok;k gS] vc izkFkhZ mijksDr uke
o tUe frfFk xzke iapk;r rsyaxh ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djokuk pkgrh gS bl fo"k; esa vkns'k
tkjh djus dk vuqjks/k fd;k gSA
1425
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
vr% xzke iapk;r rsyaxh] rglhy dYik] ftyk fdUukSj dh turk dks ctfj;k b'rgkj ds ek/;e
ls lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn Muskan iq=h Jh fou; flag dk tUe tks fnukad 05&04&2003 dks gqvk
gS dk iathdj.k xzke iapk;r rsyaxh ds tUe iathdj.k jftLVj esa ntZ djus ckjs dksbZ vkifÙk gks rks og
fnukad 02&05&2019 ;k blls iwoZ vnkyr esa gkftj vkdj viuk ,rjkt is'k dj ldrk gS vU;Fkk
vkosnu&i= ij tUe iathdj.k vkns'k ikfjr dj lfpo] xzke iapk;r rsyaxh dks vkxkeh dk;kZUo;u gsrq
Hkst fn;k tk;sxkA
vkt fnukad 03&04&2019 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
dYik] ftyk fdUukSj ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh nkSyr jke Bkdqj] lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh] rglhy ykgkSy]
ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr ¼fg0iz0½
c eqdíek %
jktsUnz dqekj iq= Lo0 Jh uksjcw Nsfjax] xkao txnax] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr
¼fg0 iz0½A
cuke
vke turk
fo"k;-&&izkFkZuk&i= cjk, jktLo vfHkys[k esa uke nq:Lrh djus ckjsA
jktsUnz dqekj iq= Lo0 Jh uksjcw Nsfjax] xkao txnax] dksBh flLlw] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy
,oa fLifr ¼fg0 iz0½ us ,d vkosnu 'kiFk i= lfgr bl vnkyr esa izLrqr fd;k gS ftlesa mlus mYys[k
fd;k gS fd mldk uke 'kS{kf.kd izek.k&i=] vk/kkj dkMZ] ifjokj jftLVj rFkk nhxj ljdkjh dkxtkr esa
jktsUnz dqekj ntZ gSA tksfd lgh o n#Lr gS] ysfdu Hkw&jktLo vfHkys[k iVokj o`Ùk flLlw] rglhy
ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr esa jkts'k pUn ntZ gSA ftl dkj.k mUgsa Hkkjh ekufld ijs'kkuh dk lkeuk
djuk iM+ jgk gSA vc izkFkhZ jktLo vfHkys[k iVokj o`Ùk flLlw] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr
esa jkts'k pUn ds LFkku ij jkts'k pUn mQZ jktsUnz dqekj ntZ djuk pkgrk gSA
vr% bl uksfVl }kjk vke turk ,oa lEcfU/kr fj'rsnkjksa dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh
dks mijksDr jktsUnz dqekj ds uke dh nq#Lr djds jkts'k pUn mQZ jktsUnz dqekj ntZ djus esa dksbZ
mtj@,rjkt gks rks og bl vnkyr esa fnukad 03 ebZ] 2019 dks vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vkdj
viuk ,rjkt is'k dj ldrk gS] vU;Fkk eqrkfcd 'kiFk&i= o vU; nLrkostksa ds vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ dk uke
jktLo vfHkys[k iVokj o`Ùk flLlw esa jkts'k pUn mQZ jktsUnz dqekj ntZ djus ds vkns'k ikfjr dj fn,
tk;saxsA
vkt fnukad 3 vizSy] 2019 dks gekjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh]
rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr] fgekpy izns'kA
1426
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
c vnkyr Jh nkSyr jke Bkdqj] lgk;d lekgrkZ] f}rh; Js.kh] rglhy ykgkSy]
ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr ¼fg0iz0½
c eqdíek %
uksjcw iq= Jh ukokax V'kh] xkao nkjpk lwenks] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr ¼fg0 iz0½
cuke
vke turk
fo"k;-&&izkFkZuk&i= cjk, jktLo vfHkys[k esa uke nq:Lrh djus ckjsA
Jh uksjcw iq= Jh ukokax V'kh] xkao nkjpk lwenks] dksBh dksyksax] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa
fLifr ¼fg0iz0½ us ,d vkosnu 'kiFk i= lfgr bl vnkyr esa izLrqr fd;k gS ftlesa mlus mYys[k fd;k
gS fd mldk uke 'kS{kf.kd izek.k&i=] vk/kkj dkMZ] ifjokj jftLVj rFkk nhxj ljdkjh dkxtkr esa uksjcw
ntZ gS tksfd lgh o nq#Lr gS] ysfdu Hkw&jktLo vfHkys[k iVokj o`Ùk nkjpk lwenks] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk
ykgkSy ,oa fLifr esa rfUtu uksjcw ntZ gSA ftl dkj.k mUgsa Hkkjh ekufld ijs'kkuh dk lkeuk djuk iM+
jgk gSA vc izkFkhZ jktLo vfHkys[k iVokj o`Ùk nkjpk lwenks] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr esa
rfUtu uksjcw ds LFkku ij uksjcw ntZ djuk pkgrk gSA
vr% bl uksfVl }kjk vke turk ,oa lEcfU/kr fj'rsnkjksa dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh
dks mijksDr rfUtu uksjcw ds uke dh nq#Lr djds uksjcw ntZ djus esa dksbZ mtj@,rjkt gks rks og bl
vnkyr esa fnukad 03 ebZ] 2019 dks vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vkdj viuk ,rjkt is'k dj ldrk
gS] vU;Fkk eqrkfcd 'kiFk&i= o vU; nLrkostksa ds vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ dk uke jktLo vfHkys[k iVokj o`Ùk
nkjpk lwenks esa uksjcw nq#Lr djus ds vkns'k ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA
vkt fnukad 3 vizSy] 2019 dks gekjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh]
rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr] fgekpy izns'kA
&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh nkSyr jke Bkdqj] lgk;d lekgrkZ] f}rh; Js.kh] rglhy ykgkSy]
ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr ¼fg0iz0½
c eqdíek %
lksgu flag iq= Lo0 Jh lksue Mqxys] xkao txyk] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr
¼fg0 iz0½A
cuke
vke turk
fo"k;-&&izkFkZuk&i= cjk, jktLo vfHkys[k o xzke iapk;r] ifjokj jftLVj esa uke nq:Lrh djus ckjsA
lksgu flag iq= Lo0 Jh lksue Mqxys] xkao txyk] dksBh xkSU/kyk] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy
,oa fLifr ¼fg0 iz0½ us ,d vkosnu 'kiFk i= lfgr bl vnkyr esa izLrqr fd;k gS ftlesa mlus mYys[k
1427
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
fd;k gS fd mldk uke vk/kkj dkMZ o isU'ku ds dkxtkrksa nhxj ljdkjh dkxtkr esa lksgu flag ntZ gSA
tksfd lgh o nq#Lr gS] ysfdu Hkw&jktLo vfHkys[k iVokj o`Ùk xkSU/kyk o iapk;r ifjokj jftLVj] rglhy
ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr esa Nksisy ntZ gSA ftl dkj.k mUgsa Hkkjh ekufld ijs'kkuh dk lkeuk
djuk iM+ jgk gSA vc izkFkhZ jktLo vfHkys[k iVokj o`Ùk xkSU/kyk o iapk;r ifjokj jftLVj] rglhy
ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr esa Nksisy ds LFkku ij Nksisy mQZ lksgu flag ntZ djuk pkgrk gSA
vr% bl uksfVl }kjk vke turk ,oa lEcfU/kr fj'rsnkjksa dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh
dks mijksDr lksgu flag ds uke dh nq#Lr djds Nksisy mQZ lksgu flag ntZ djus esa dksbZ mtj@,rjkt
gks rks og bl vnkyr esa fnukad 03 ebZ] 2019 dks vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vkdj viuk ,rjkt
is'k dj ldrk gS] vU;Fkk eqrkfcd 'kiFk&i= o vU; nLrkostksa ds vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ dk uke jktLo
vfHkys[k iVokj o`Ùk xkSU/kyk vkSj xzke iapk;r xkSU/kyk esa Nksisy mQZ lksgu flag nq#Lr djus ds vkns'k
ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA
vkt fnukad 3 vizSy] 2019 dks gekjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh]
rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr] fgekpy izns'kA
&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh nkSyr jke Bkdqj] lgk;d lekgrkZ] f}rh; Js.kh] rglhy ykgkSy]
ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr ¼fg0iz0½
c eqdíek %
lqjs'k dqekj iq= Jh dytax] xkao xSewj] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr ¼fg0 iz0½A
cuke
vke turk
fo"k;-&&izkFkZuk&i= cjk, jktLo vfHkys[k esa uke nq:Lrh djus ckjsA
lqjs'k dqekj iq= Jh dytax] xkao xSewj] dksBh dkyksax] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr
¼fg0 iz0½ us ,d vkosnu 'kiFk i= lfgr bl vnkyr esa izLrqr fd;k gS ftlesa mlus mYys[k fd;k gS fd
mldk uke vk/kkj dkMZ] oksVj dkMZ rFkk nhxj ljdkjh dkxtkr esa lqjs'k dqekj ntZ gSA ysfdu
Hkw&jktLo vfHkys[k iVokj o`Ùk dksyksax] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr esa Nsokax lEQsy ntZ gSA
ftl dkj.k mUgsa Hkkjh ekufld ijs'kkuh dk lkeuk djuk iM+ jgk gSA vc izkFkhZ jktLo vfHkys[k iVokj
o`Ùk dksyksax] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr esa lqjs'k dqekj ds LFkku ij lqjs'k dqekj mQZ Nsokax
lEQsy ntZ djuk pkgrk gSA
vr% bl uksfVl }kjk vke turk ,oa lEcfU/kr fj'rsnkjksa dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh
dks mijksDr lqjs'k dqekj ds uke dh nq#Lr djds lqjs'k dqekj mQZ Nsokax lEQsy ntZ djus esa dksbZ
mtj@,rjkt gks rks og bl vnkyr esa fnukad 03 ebZ] 2019 dks vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vkdj
viuk ,rjkt is'k dj ldrk gS] vU;Fkk eqrkfcd 'kiFk&i= o vU; nLrkostksa ds vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ dk uke
1428
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
jktLo vfHkys[k iVokj o`Ùk dksyksax esa lqjs'k dqekj mQZ Nsokax lEQsy nq#Lr djus ds vkns'k ikfjr dj
fn, tk;saxsA
vkt fnukad 3 vizSy] 2019 dks gekjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh]
rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr] fgekpy izns'kA
&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh nkSyr jke Bkdqj] lgk;d lekgrkZ] f}rh; Js.kh] rglhy ykgkSy]
ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr ¼fg0iz0½
c eqdíek %
izse nkl iq= Jh /keZ nkl] xkao Bikd] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr ¼fg0 iz0½
cuke
vke turk
fo"k;-&&izkFkZuk&i= cjk, xzke iapk;r esa uke nq:Lrh djus ckjsA
izse nkl iq= Jh /keZ nkl] xkao Bikd] dksBh jkfudk] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr
¼fg0 iz0½ us ,d vkosnu 'kiFk i= lfgr bl vnkyr esa izLrqr fd;k gS ftlesa mlus mYys[k fd;k gS fd
mldk uke Hkw&jktLo vfHkys[k iVokj o`Ùk yksV esa izse nkl ntZ gSA tks fd lgh o nq#Lr gSA ysfdu
xzke iapk;r jkfudk] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr esa /keZ pUn ntZ gSA ftl dkj.k mUgsa Hkkjh
ekufld ijs'kkuh dk lkeuk djuk iM+ jgk gSA vc IkzkFkhZ xzke iapk;r jkfudk] rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk
ykgkSy ,oa fLifr esa /keZ pUn ds LFkku ij izse nkl ntZ djuk pkgrk gSA
vr% bl uksfVl }kjk vke turk ,oa lEcfU/kr fj'rsnkjksa dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh
dks mijksDr /keZ pUn ds uke dk nq#Lr djds izse nkl ntZ djus esa dksbZ mtj@,rjkt gks rks og bl
vnkyr esa fnukad 03 ebZ] 2019 dks vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vkdj viuk ,rjkt is'k dj ldrk
gS] vU;Fkk eqrkfcd 'kiFk&i= o vU; nLrkostksa ds vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ dk uke xzke iapk;r jkfudk esa izse
nkl nq#Lr djus ds vkns'k ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA
vkt fnukad 3 vizSy] 2019 dks gekjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh]
rglhy ykgkSy] ftyk ykgkSy ,oa fLifr] fgekpy izns'kA
1429
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
In the Court of Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Shimla (Urban)
In the matter of :
1. Sh. Sanjay Sood s/o Sh. Yash Pal Sood aged about 58 years, r/o 14 Subzi Mandi Shimla,
Tehsil & District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh .
2. Mrs. Madhuri Sood d/o Sh. Tara Chand Sood aged about 54 years, r/o 14 Subzi Mandi
Shimla, Tehsil & District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh
. . Applicant.
Versus
General Public
Subject.—Proclamation for the registration of marriage under section 15 of Special Marriage Act,
1954.
Sh. Sanjay Sood and Mrs. Madhuri Sood have filed an application alongwith affidavits
before the court of undersigned on 24-04-2019 under section 15 of Special Marriage Act, 1954 that
they had solemnized their marriage on 20th January, 1988 at Puran Mal Dharamshala, Bus Stand
Shimla, Tehsil & District Shimla and they are living as husband and wife since then. Hence their
marriage may be registered under special marriage Act, 1954.
Therefore, the general public is hereby informed through this notice that any person who
has any objection regarding this marriage can file the objection personally or in writing before this
court on or before within 30 days from the date of publication of this notice in official gazette after
that no objection will be entertained and marriage will be solemnized accordingly.
Issued today on 24th April, 2019 under my hand and seal of the court.
Seal.
NIRAJ CHANDLA (H.P.A.S.),
Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Shimla (Urban).
__________
U;k;ky; Jh ukjk;.k flag pkSgku] rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] Åuk]
ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½
nkok la[;k % @Teh. Una/M. Reg./2019
'kqHke lSuh iq= Jh nhuk ukFk lSuh] oklh okMZ ua0 4] foosd uxj Åuk] rglhy o ftyk Åuk]
¼fg0 iz0½A
cuke
vke turk
1430
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
nkok vUrxZr /kkjk 8¼4½ fookg iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1996-
mijksDr eqdíek muoku ckyk esa 'kqHke lSuh iq= Jh nhuk ukFk lSuh] oklh okMZ ua0 4] foosd uxj
Åuk] rglhy o ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ us bl U;k;ky; esa izkFkZuk&i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mldk fookg
fnukad 18&06&2017 dks :ph 'kekZ iq=h Jh lqn'kZu dqekj] oklh okMZ ua0 3] eksgYyk xyqvk Åuk] rglhy
o ftyk Åuk ds lkFk gqvk gSA ysfdu vKkurk ds dkj.k vius fookg dk bUnzkt LFkkuh; jftLVªkj fookg
iathdj.k uxjikfydk Åuk] rglhy o ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ esa ntZ u djok ldk gSA
vr% bl lUnHkZ esa vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mijksDr of.kZr izkFkhZx.k ds fookg dk
bUnzkt LFkkuh; jftLVªkj fookg iathdj.k uxjikfydk Åuk] rglhy o ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ esa ntZ
djokus ckjs fdlh dks dksbZ mtj ;k ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 03&05&2019 vFkok mlls iwoZ U;k;ky;
gtk esa mifLFkr gksdj izLrqr dj ldrk gS] vU;Fkk blds ckn mDr of.kZr fookg ds iathdj.k gsrq
vkxkeh dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tk;sxhA blds ckn dksbZ Hkh ,rjkt dkfcys lek;r u gksxkA
vkt fnukad 04&04&2019 dks esjs gLrk{kj o U;k;ky; dh eksgj }kjk tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
ukjk;.k flag pkSgku]
rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh viwoZ 'kekZ] uk;c rglhynkj ,oa lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; oxZ Åuk]
ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½
eqdíek % bUnzkt lsgr uke
is'kh % 08&05&2019
nkok la[;k % @Teh. Una/M. Reg./2019
nhid dqekj iq= Jh lwje flag] oklh vIij olky] rglhy o ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½
- - lk;yA
cuke
vke turk
fo"k;-&&n#Lrh uke fg0 iz0 jk0 vf/kfu;e] 1954 dh tsj /kkjk 37 ds rgr mi egky Bkdqj}kjk esa uke
n#Lrh ckjsA
mijksDr eqdíek ckjs izkFkhZ us bl U;k;ky; esa izkFkZuk&i= xqtkjk gS ftlesa fy[kk gS fd mldk
lgh uke nhid dqekj iq= lwje flag gS tcfd mi&egky Bkdqj}kjk ds jktLo vfHkys[k esa mldk uke
iznhi dqekj iq= lwje flag ntZ gS tks fd xyr bUnzkt gqvk gS izkFkhZ mDr uke dks n#Lr djds iznhi
dqekj miuke nhid dqekj iq= Jh lwje flag ntZ djokuk pkgrk gSA
vr% mDr izkFkZuk&i= ds lUnHkZ esa mijksDr uke dh n#Lrh ckjs fdlh dks dksbZ mtj ;k ,rjkt
gks rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru bl U;k;ky; esa fnukad 08&05&2019 dks lqcg 10-00 cts gkftj vk
1431
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
ldrk gS gkftj u vkus dh lwjr esa ,drjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tkdj vkxkeh vkns'k ikfjr dj
fn;s tk,axsA blds ckn dksbZ Hkh mtj ;k ,rjkt dkfcys lek;r u gksxkA
vkt fnukad 05&04&2019 dks esjs gLrk{kj o U;k;ky; dh eksgj }kjk tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
viwoZ 'kekZ]
uk;c rglhynkj ,oa lgk;d lekgrkZ
f}rh; oxZ Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&&&
c U;k;ky; Jh ukjk;.k flag pkSgku] rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] Åuk]
ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½
nkok la[;k % ---------@Teh. Una/B&D /2019
deys'k dqekjh iRuh Jh jke fd'kksj] oklh okMZ ua0 4] foosd uxj Åuk] rglhy o ftyk Åuk
¼fg0 iz0½A
cuke
vke turk
nj[okLr tsj /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q jftLVªhdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-
mijksDr eqdíek muoku okyk esa deys'k dqekjh iRuh Jh jke fd'kksj] oklh okMZ ua0 4] foosd
uxj Åuk] rglhy o ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ us bl U;k;ky; esa izkFkZuk&i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd mldh iq=h
T;ksrh dk tUe okMZ ua0 4] foosd uxj Åuk esa fnukad 18&02&2015 dks gqvk Fkk ysfdu vKkurk ds
dkj.k tUe dk bUnzkt LFkkuh; jftLVªkj] tUe o e`R;q iathdj.k uxjikfydk Åuk] rglhy o ftyk Åuk
¼fg0 iz0½ esa ntZ u djok ldh gSA
vr% bl lUnHkZ esa vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn mijksDr of.kZr tUe dk bUnzkt
LFkkuh; jftLVªkj] tUe o e`R;q] iathdj.k uxjikfydk Åuk] rglhy o ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ esa ntZ
djokus ckjs fdlh dks dksbZ mtj ;k ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 08&05&2019 dks vFkok mlls iwoZ
U;k;ky; gtk esa mifLFkr gksdj izLrqr dj ldrk gS vU;Fkk mlds ckn mDr of.kZr tUe ds iathdj.k
gsrq vkxkeh dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tk;sxhA blds ckn dksbZ Hkh ,rjkt dkfcys lek;r u gksxkA
vkt fnukad 08&04&2019 dks esjs gLrk{kj o U;k;ky; dh eksgj }kjk tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
ukjk;.k flag pkSgku]
rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]
Åuk] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A
1432
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
c vnkyr Jh viwoZ 'kekZ] uk;c rglhynkj ,oa lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; oxZ Åuk]
ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½
eqdíek % bUnzkt lsgr uke
is'kh % 17&05&2019
nkok la[;k % @Teh. Una/M. Reg./2019
n'kZu flag iq= Jh tqYQh jke] oklh dqfj;kyk] rglhy o ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½
- - lk;yA
cuke
vke turk
fo"k;-&&n#Lrh uke fg0 iz0 jk0 vf/kfu;e] 1954 dh tsj /kkjk 37 ds rgr egky dqfj;kyk esa uke
n#Lrh ckjsA
mijksDr eqdíek ckjs izkFkhZ us bl U;k;ky; esa izkFkZuk&i= xqtkjk gS ftlesa fy[kk gS fd mldk
lgh uke n'kZu flag iq= Jh tqYQh gS tcfd egky dqfj;kyk ds jktLo vfHkys[k esa mldk uke n'kZu
dqekj iq= Jh tqYQh ntZ gS tks fd xyr bUnzkt gqvk gS izkFkhZ mDr uke dks n#Lr djds n'kZu dqekj
miuke n'kZu flag iq= Jh tqYQh ntZ djokuk pkgrk gSA
vr% mDr izkFkZuk&i= ds lUnHkZ esa mijksDr uke dh n#Lrh ckjs fdlh dks dksbZ mtj ;k ,rjkt
gks rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru bl U;k;ky; esa fnukad 17&05&2019 dks lqcg 10-00 cts gkftj vk
ldrk gS gkftj u vkus dh fLFkfr esa ,drjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tkdj vkxkeh vkns'k ikfjr dj
fn;s tk,axsA blds ckn dksbZ Hkh mtj ;k ,rjkt dkfcys lek;r u gksxkA
vkt fnukad 17&04&2019 dks esjs gLrk{kj o U;k;ky; dh eksgj }kjk tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
viwoZ 'kekZ]
uk;c rglhynkj ,oa lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; oxZ Åuk]
ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr Jh viwoZ 'kekZ] uk;c rglhynkj ,oa lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; oxZ Åuk]
ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½
eqdíek % bUnzkt lsgr uke
is'kh % 17&05&2019
nkok la[;k % @Teh. Una/M. Reg./2019
xqjn;ky flag iq= /kfu;k] oklh ukjh fupyh] rglhy o ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½
- - lk;yA
cuke
vke turk
1433
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
fo"k;-&&n#Lrh uke fg0 iz0 jk0 vf/kfu;e] 1954 dh tsj /kkjk 37 ds rgr mi egky ukjh fupyh esa
uke n#Lrh ckjsA
mijksDr eqdíek ckjs izkFkhZ us bl U;k;ky; esa izkFkZuk&i= xqtkjk gS ftlesa fy[kk gS fd mldk
lgh uke xqjn;ky flag iq= /kfu;k gS tcfd mi&egky ukjh fupyh ds jktLo vfHkys[k esa mldk uke
xqjn;ky pUn iq= /kfu;k ntZ gS tks fd xyr bUnzkt gqvk gS izkFkhZ mDr uke dks n#Lr djds xqjn;ky
pUn miuke xqjn;ky flag iq= /kfu;k ntZ djokuk pkgrk gSA
vr% mDr izkFkZuk&i= ds lUnHkZ esa mijksDr uke dh n#Lrh ckjs fdlh dks dksbZ mtj ;k ,rjkt
gks rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru bl U;k;ky; esa fnukad 08&05&2019 dks lqcg 10-00 cts gkftj vk
ldrk gS gkftj u vkus dh fLFkfr esa ,drjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tkdj vkxkeh vkns'k ikfjr dj
fn;s tk,axsA blds ckn dksbZ Hkh mtj ;k ,rjkt dkfcys lek;r u gksxkA
vkt fnukad 17&04&2019 dks esjs gLrk{kj o U;k;ky; dh eksgj }kjk tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
viwoZ 'kekZ]
uk;c rglhynkj ,oa lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; oxZ Åuk]
ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A
&&&&&&&&&
c vnkyr rglhynkj ,oa lgk;d lekgrkZ] izFke oxZ Åuk] ftyk Åuk] fg0 iz0
b'rgkj eq'k=h equknh tsj /kkjk 23 fg0 iz0 Hkw&jktLo vf/kfu;e] 1954
nj[okLr ceqjkn n#Lrh jktLo fjdkMZ egky dksVyk dyka] yksvj rglhy o ftyk Åuk] ¼fg0iz0½
tekcUnh lky 2016&17 esa cyjkt dh ctk;s jkts'k dqekj ntZ djus ckjsA
cuke
vke turk
ctfj;k teknkj rglhy dk;kZy; Åuk
mijksDr eqdíek muoku ckyk esa izkFkhZ jkts'k dqekj iq= ve`r yky iq= Kku pn] tkr lS.kh]
oklh dksVyk dyka yksvj] rglhy o ftyk Åuk ¼fg0iz0½ us izkFkZuk&i= izLrqr djds fuosnu fd;k gS fd
mldk uke cyjkt egky dksVyk dyka yksvj dh [ksoV ua0 216] 468&70 rk 472] 474] rk 478] 483]
487] 488] 490] 492] 492 ¼673½ 493] 494] 533] 761 esa xyr pyk vk jgk gS tcfd mldk lgh uke
jkts'k dqekj gSA bl ckjs viuk vk/kkj] jk'ku] Ldwy lVhZfQdsV o 'kiFk&i= izLrqr fd;kA vr%
loZlk/kkj.k dks bl b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mä uke dh n#Lrh ckjs vxj fdlh O;fDr
dks dksbZ mtj gks rks og eqdíek dh iSjoh gsrq vlkyru ;k odkyru bl U;k;ky; esa fnukad
04&05&2019 dks izkr% 10-00 cts gkftj u vkus dh lwjr esa muds f[kykQ ,drjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa
ykbZ tkdj fu;ekuqlkj eqdíek dk fuiVkjk dj fn;k tk;sxkA
vkt fnukad 03&04&2019 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
gLrk{kfjr@&
rglhynkj ,oa lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke oxZ]
Åuk] ftyk Åuk] fg0 iz0A
1434
jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 29 vizSy] 2019@9 oS'kk[k] 1941
c vnkyr Jh lqjsUnz dqekj v=h] jftLVªs'ku ,oa eSfjt vf/kdkjh xxjsV fLFkr dyksg]
ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½
fuf[ky of'k"V
cuke
vke turk
fo"k;-&&'kknh iathdj.k izek.k&i= iznku djus ckjsA
Jh fuf[ky of'k"V iq= Jh iou of'k"V] fuoklh xkao xxjsV] Mkd?kj xxjsV] lc&rglhy xxjsV
fLFkr dyksg] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½ us ,d izkFkZuk&i= izLrqr fd;k] ftlesa mlus fy[kk gS fd mldh 'kknh
rst Lohrk iq=h Jh lqHkk"k Hkkj}kt] fuoklh xkao gkÅl ua0 1160] xyh ua0 6] Ñ".kk uxj] flfoy ykbZu
yqf/k;kuk] ftyk yqf/k;kuk ¼iatkc½ ds lkFk fnukad 27&4&2018 dks gqbZ gS dk iathdj.k fd;k tkdj mls
'kknh iathdj.k izek.k&i= fn;k tk;sA
vr% bl uksfVl ds ek/;e ls leLr turk rFkk lEcfU/kr fj'rsnkjksa dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd
;fn fdlh dks 'kknh iathdj.k ckjs dksbZ ,rjkt@vkifÙk gks rks og fnukad 05&05&2019 dks izkr% 11-00
cts vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj vnkyr gksdj is'k djsa vU;Fkk ,drjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tkdj
izkFkhZ dks 'kknh iathdj.k izek.k&i= tkjh dj fn;k tk,xk rFkk ckn esa dksbZ mtj dkfcys lek;r u
gksxkA
vkt fnukad 01&04&2019 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr ls tkjh gqvkA
eksgjA
lqjsUnz dqekj v=h]
jftLVªs'ku ,oa eSfjt vf/kdkjh]
xxjsV fLFkr dyksg] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0 iz0½A
fu;U=d] eqnz.k rFkk ys[ku lkexzh] fgekpy izns'k] f'keyk&5 }kjk eqfnzr rFkk izdkf'kr
bysDVªkWfud gLrk{kfjr jkti=] oSclkbV http://rajpatrahimachal.nic.in ij miyC/k gS ,oe~ vkWuykbu lR;kfir fd;k tk ldrk gS