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LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Dharamshala, the 03rd December, 2019

No. Shram(A) 6-2/2014 (Awards).—In exercise of the powers vested under section 17

(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order the

publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court

214&jkti=@2021&08&02&2021

¼7247½

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Dharamshala on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment Government of

Himachal Pradesh:—

Sl.

No.

Ref. No.

Petitioner

Respondent

Date of

Award/Order

1.

47/17

Bhim Sen

Secy. M/s Dholpur Krishi Sewa

02-09-2019

2.

889/16

Suta Ram

E.E.HPPWD, Nurpur & other

02-09-2019

3.

880/16

Amar Singh

E.E.HPPWD, Nurpur & other

03-09-2019

4.

771/16

Nasib Singh

E.E.HPPWD, Nurpur & other

03-09-2019

5.

26/18

Jotu Ram

M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project

05-09-2019

6.

31/18

Aaso Ram

M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project

05-09-2019

7.

24/18

Kishori Lal

M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project

05-09-2019

8.

29/18

Gianu

M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project

05-09-2019

9.

30/18

Karmo

M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project

05-09-2019

10.

28/18

Sato Ram

M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project

05-09-2019

11.

32/18

Angrejo

M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project

05-09-2019

12.

27/18

Chhanga Ram

M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project

05-09-2019

13.

35/18

Rasilu

M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project

05-09-2019

14.

25/18

Man Singh

M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project

06-09-2019

15.

221/16

Hari Singh

E.E. HPPWD, Division Killar

06-09-2019

16.

631/16

Sato Devi

-do-

06-09-2019

17.

51/17

Devi Chand

-do-

06-09-2019

18

332/15

Soni Ram

-do-

06-09-2019

19.

417/15

Chandro Devi

-do-

06-09-2019

20.

428/16

Anita Kumari

-do-

06-09-2019

21.

375/16

Neel Dei

-do-

06-09-2019

22.

485/16

Ved Viyas

-do-

06-09-2019

23.

297/16

Dev Singh

-do-

06-09-2019

24.

448/16

Jeet Singh

-do-

06-09-2019

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25.

242/16

Khem Raj

-do-

06-09-2019

26.

196/15

Girdhari Lal

E.E. I&PH Mandi

09-09-2019

27.

336/14

Shyam Lal

Secy.

Bilaspur

Distt.

Co-opt.

Federation

11-09-2019

28.

349/14

Arun Kumar

Secy.

Bilaspur

Distt.

Co-opt.

Federation

11-09-2019

29.

348/14

Kamal Kumar

Secy.

Bilaspur

Distt.

Co-opt.

Federation

11-09-2019

30.

202/17

Baljeet Singh

M.D., M/s Hotel Centre Point

14-09-2019

31.

648/16

Bhari Devi

Employer,

M/S

Baijnath

Tea

Estate Co.

14-09-2019

32.

650/16

Sandhi Devi

-do-

14-09-2019

33.

647/16

Pawna Devi

-do-

14-09-2019

34.

649/16

Feek Devi

-do-

14-09-2019

35.

229/14

Gen.Secy. Baijnath

-do-

14-09-2019

36.

15/18

Lekh Raj

E.E. HPPWD, Jawali

16-09-2019

37.

13/18

Shyam Lal

E.E. HPPWD, Jawali

16-09-2019

38.

389/15

Reeta Sharma

Principal Govt.Sr.Sec. Sch.Soldha

17-09-2019

39.

24/19

Onkar Singh

M/s Divya Himachal Prakashan

23-09-2019

40.

25/19

Lekh Raj

M/s Divya Himachal Prakashan

23-09-2019

41.

714/16

Rajiv Goswami

M/s Jagran Prakashan Ltd.

23-09-2019

42.

272/16

Vikas

Incharge Regional Mountaineering 23-09-2019

43.

16/18

Dharam Chand

E.E. HPPWD, Jawali

23-09-2019

44.

07/18

Bir Singh

E.E. HPPWD, Jawali

23-09-2019

45.

200/17

Balvinder Singh

M.D. M/s Sunshine Hydro Ltd.,

Nali.

23-09-2019

46.

355/16

Jai Chand

The D.F.O. Suket

26-09-2019

By order,

NISHA SINGH, IAS

Addl.Chief Secretary (Lab. & Emp.).

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR

COURT- CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No.

: 47/2017

Date of Institution

: 24.01.2017

Date of decision

: 02.9.2018

Shri Bhim Sen s/o Shri Mulk Raj, r/o V.P.O. Tatwali, Tehsil Fatehpur, District Kangra,

H.P. through his legal representatives:

(i)

Smt. Shashi Kanta (wife)

(ii) Shri Amit Kumar (son)

. .Petitioners.

Versus

The Secretary, M/s the Dholpur Krishi Sewa Sahkari Sabha Managing Committee, P.O.

Tatwali, Tehsil Fatehpur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. Rajat Chaudhary, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Respondent already ex parte

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of services of Shri Bhim Sen s/o Shri Mulk Raj, r/o V.P.O.

Tatwali, Tehsil Fatehpur, District Kangra, H.P. w.e.f. 30-09-2015 by the Secretary, M/s the

Dholpur Krishi Sewa Sahkari Sabha Managing Committee, P.O. Tatwali, Tehsil Fatehpur,

District Kangra, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above

employer/managing committee?”

2.

The case of the workman (deceased Bhim Sen) as it emerges from the statement of

claim is that he was appointed as a watchman on 26th July, 2011 at Dholpur Krishi Sewa

Sahkari Sabha, Fatehpur, District Kangra, H.P. by the managing committee through proper

channel on monthly salary of Rs. 1800/. He had been discharging his duties honestly and

diligently. He had never been given any breaks in service and had worked continuously and

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uninterruptedly with the respondent. As per the policy of Government, the workman was

eligible for regularization as a watchman. The act and conduct of workman was found

satisfactory and there was no complaint against him during his service period. On August, 2015

the workman had received a letter to the effect that his services had been shifted from night duty

to day duty. Another letter dated 30.9.2015 had also been sent by the respondent to him, vide

which his service had been terminated as per the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the ‘Act’ for short). No inquiry was conducted by the

respondent nor the workman had ever been associated in the preliminary report/resolution. The

retrenchment of the workman was illegal, unjust and contrary to law. The provisions of Section

25-F of the Act had been violated by the respondent, as no notice in writing had been given to

the workman, nor any reason had been assigned for his retrenchment. The act of the respondent

amounted to unfair labour practice as envisaged under Section 2(ra) of the Act. The principle of

natural justice had also been violated. The wrokman was entitled to equal pay for equal work as

provided under Article 39 (d) of the Constitution. The workman had completed more than 240

days in each calendar year. He, thus, was entitled for regularization. Therefore, the workman

prays for his re-engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

The respondent despite being properly served had failed to put in appearance

before this Court on 19.9.2017, hence was proceeded against ex parte.

4.

Thereafter, the workman was directed to adduce ex parte evidence. He examined

himself as PW1 and tendered in evidence post cards Ex.PW1/B and Ex.PW1/B and copy of

complaint as Ex.PW1/C. Be it noted that during the pendency of the proceedings Shri Bhim Sen,

the workman expired and his legal representatives were brought on record by order dated

14.9.2018. Thereafter, the legal representatives, namely, Smt. Shashi Kanta and Shri Amit Kumar

also examined themselves as PW2 and PW3 and tendered in evidence their statements by way of

affidavits Ex.PW2/A and Ex.PW3/A respectively.

5.

PW1 Shri Bhim Sen (now deceased) in his chief-examination reiterated the stand

taken by him in his statement of claim. His legal representatives, namely, Smt. Shashi Kanta and

Shri Amit Kumar have also duly endorsed and supported his case. Ex.PW1/A is the post card

sent by the respondent to Shri Bhim Sen to the effect that vide resolution no. 9 dated 10.8.2015, it

had been resolved that the workman shall perform day duty instead of night duty. Ex.PW1/B is

another post card, which shows that vide resolution no. 2 dated 27.9.2015, he had been relieved

of the duty of chowkidar since 30.9.2015.

6.

The aforesaid evidence of the workman and his legal representatives has remained

unrebutted on record, as the respondent has not come forward to contest the statement of claim

or to cross-examine the workman and his legal representatives. It, thus, stands proved from the

ocular evidence on record that the workman Shri Bhim Sen was appointed by the respondent as a

watchman on 26.7.2011 and he had worked as such uptil 30.9.2015. It is also evident from the

evidence on record that the workman had not been allowed to join his duties after his termination

by the respondent. Evidence also stands led to the effect that the services of the workman had

been terminated illegally by the respondent. The non appearance of the respondent is suggestive

of the fact that he has nothing to say in the matter. The unrebutted evidence of the workman and

his legal representatives clearly establishes on record that the workman had worked for more

than 240 days preceding twelve calendar months from the date of his termination. It is also

apparent from the evidence that no notice had been issued to the workman prior to the

termination of his services, nor any compensation had been paid to him. No inquiry had ever

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been conducted against the workman before terminating his services. As regards the salary, it

stands clearly stated by the workman and his legal representatives that the workman had been

drawing a salary of Rs.1800/- per month on the date of his termination.

7.

No doubt, it has also been alleged that the principle of ‘last come first go’ had not

been adhered to by the respondent, but neither any seniority list has seen the light of the day, nor

in the ocular evidence there is a mention of the names of the persons junior to the workman, who

had been retained in service, after his services had been terminated. So, it cannot be said that the

respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act.

8.

Oral evidence has also been led on record to the effect that the workman was not

gainfully employed during his forced idleness. Therefore, this Court, in the absence of any

rebuttal to it, has no option but to hold that after the disengagement/termination of the workman,

he had remained unemployed. The unrebutted evidence of the workman and his legal

representatives on record clearly establishes the violation of Section 25-F of the Act by the

respondent.

9.

In view of the foregoing discussion and findings arrived at by me above, the

termination of the services of the workman Shri Bhim Sen (deceased) by the respondent on

30.9.2015 is hereby set aside and quashed. Since, the termination of the workman has been found

to be illegal, Smt. Shashi Kanta (one of the petitioners), who is his legal representative, being his

wife, is entitled to seek reinstatement and with continuity in service till the workman was alive.

As to back wages, both the petitioners are held to be entitled to 50% back wages from the

respondent from the date of illegal termination of the workman till the reinstatement of

Smt. Shashi Kanta, one of the legal representatives, by the respondent. Consequently, the petition

is allowed to the extent above. There shall be no costs.

10. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

11. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 2nd day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref No.

: 889/2016

Date of Institution

: 24.12.2016

Date of Decision

: 02.09.2019

Shri Suta Ram s/o Shri Dikti Ram, r/o Village Khajjan Basa, P.O. Sadwan, Tehsil

Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Nurpur, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra,

H.P.

2.

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. Mukul Vaid, Adv. Vice

For the Respondents

: Sh. B. C. Katoch, ADA

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the alleged termination of services of Shri Suta Ram s/o Shri Dikti Ram, r/o

Village Khajjan Basa, P.O. Sadwan, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. during

December, 1986 by (i) the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Division Nurpur, District

Kangra, H.P., (ii) the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Division Jawali, District Kangra,

H.P., who had worked on daily wages as beldar and has raised his industrial dispute

after more than 24 years vide demand notice dated nil received in the Labour Office

Kangra at Dharamshala on 13-06-2011, without complying the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view delay of more

than 24 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority,

past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the

above employers/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner, as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

engaged by Himachal Pradesh Public Works Department on daily basis during the year 1985 in

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HPPWD Sub Divisions-I and II, Nurpur and had worked as such uptil the year 1990. He had

completed 240 days in twelve calendar months from the date of his retrenchment and many

juniors were retained. HPPWD Division Nurpur was involved in the construction and

maintenance of roads, building and bridges, besides the repair and maintenance of tools and

plants etc. and the patch work of metalled roads. The petitioner had worked for the preparation of

roads with many juniors, retained by the employer and also with the reengaged employees as

detailed in para No. 3 of the petition. The mates of the petitioner were Shri Prakash and

Shri Kishan Bahadur. More than 1000 workers were engaged for a number of years by

HPPWD Division Nurpur and in the year 1990 a pick and choose policy was adopted and the

petitioner alongwith some other daily waged workers were retrenched on the false assurance

that they would be retained after some time, declaring them surplus. Respondent No. 1 had

illegally terminated/retrenched the services of the petitioner in the year 1990 and the juniors

mentioned in para 3 of the petition were reengaged on 25.5.2010. After his oral termination,

many verbal requests were made by the petitioner to the department and he was being given the

assurance that he would be engaged after three or four months. When nothing was heard from

the side of the department, the petitioner had communicated in writing for his reengagement

on daily wage basis, but without success. The action of the employer in orally terminating the

services of the petitioner is violative of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). No notice was served upon

him. The provisions of Sections 25-G, 25-H and 25-N of the Act have also been violated. The

petitioner is having no source of income and is unemployed since his disengagement, hence he

is entitled to full back wages, as his termination/retrenchment is illegal and arbitrary. The

petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondents appeared. They filed a joint reply taking preliminary

objections, regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on the grounds of

delay and laches. On merits, it is denied that the services of the petitioner had been engaged as

beldar in the year 1985 in HPPWD Division, Nurpur. It is also denied that the petitioner was

disengaged by the respondents in the year 1990. It is asserted that he was engaged as a daily

wager by HPPWD Sub Division Suliali, Division Jassur and had worked intermittently w.e.f.

December, 1986. He had not completed 240 days in every calendar year. The petitioner thereafter

had left the work of his own sweet will and had never approached the department. It is claimed

that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted/re-named as HPPWD Division Jawali vide HP

Government Notification No. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July, 1994. It is denied

thatrespondent No. 1 had reengaged workers on 25.5.2010. Infact workers were reengaged by

the respondents as per the orders of the Hon’ble High Court. It is admitted that HPPWD

Divisions Nurpur and Jawali are involved in the construction and maintenance of roads,

buildings and bridges, repair and maintenance of tools and plants etc. It is denied that a pick and

choose policy had been adopted by the respondents. Neither any junior had been retained nor

engaged by the respondent, so there was no violation of the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H

of the Act. It is denied that the petitioner had made various requests and that assurances had been

given to him by the respondents. After leaving the work in December, 1986, the petitioner had

never approached the respondents and had raised the demand notice only in the year 2011, i.e.

after about 25 years. The respondents, thus, pray for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

In the rejoinder, the petitioner has reiterated the contents of the petition/statement of

claim and refuted the objections put forth by the respondents.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 7.7.2018:

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1.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondents during

December, 1986 is/was legal and justified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. . OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on the ground of delay and laches as

alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. The petitioner, namely, Shri Suta Ram examined himself as PW1 and also

examined Shri Sukar Deen (PW2) and Shri Gian Chand (PW3) as his witnesses. Besides this the

petitioner tendered in evidence his statement by way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A, copy of letter dated

19.8.1998 as Ex. PW1/B, copy of letter dated 18.12.1999 as Ex. PW1/C, copy of notice dated

4.5.2002 as Ex. PW1/D, copy of resolution dated 18.7.2002 as Ex. PW1/E, copy of UPC and

registered postal receipts as Ex. PW1/F & G and copy of letter dated 18.1.2000 as Ex. PW1/H.

The respondents examined one Shri Dinesh Kumar Dhiman as RW1, who tendered his statement

by way of affidavit Ex. RW1/A and placed on the file copy of notification dated 21st July, 1994 as

Ex. RW1/B, copy of office order dated 23.7.1994 as Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated

29.11.2010 as Ex. RW1/D, copy of letter dated 19.8.1998 as Ex. RW1/E, copy of application

dated 18.12.1999 filed by Smt. Kusum Lata as Ex. RW1/F, copy of letter dated 18.1.2000 as Ex.

RW1/G, copy of mandays chart of the petitioner as Ex. RW1/H and copies of working days chart

of Smt. Kusum Lata as Ex. RW1/I & Ex. RW1/J.

7.

Arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant

District Attorney for the respondents heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Yes

Issue No. 2

: Negative

Issue No. 3

: Yes

Issue No. 4

: Not pressed

Relief

: Claim petition dismissed vide operative portion of the Award.

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REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issue No. 1 and 2 :

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. Shri Suta Ram (petitioner) stepped into the witness box as PW1. In his affidavit

Ex.PW1/A submitted under Order 18 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he reiterated on

oath the contents of the petition/statement of claim in its entirety.

11. In the cross-examination, he admitted that before the year 1994, HPPWD Division

was at Jassur. He also admitted that HPPWD Division Jawali was established on 21st July, 1994

vide government notification No.PBW-(A)-A(1)17/94. He denied that he had not worked with

the respondents. Volunteered that, he had worked regularly from the year 1985 uptil the year 1990.

He denied that he had not worked from the year 1985 uptil November, 1986 and from February,

1987 upto the year 1990. He also denied that he had only worked for 06 days in December, 1986.

He further denied that no breaks had been given by the department. He also denied that he was

never disengaged by the respondents/department. It was also denied by him that no juniors to him

had been kept. He feigned ignorance that Smt. Kusum Lata was appointed as a daily waged beldar

in HPPWD Division Dalhousie in the year 1983. He denied that he had never worked for 240

days and above in any year. However, he admitted that he owns land, which he cultivates. He

also admitted that he is doing days’ drudgery privately. Self stated that, as and when the work is

available.

12. Ex. PW1/B is the copy of letter dated 19.8.1998 regarding the posting of

Smt. Kusum Sharma as a daily waged Store Clerk.

13. Ex. PW1/C is the copy of letter dated 18.12.1999 to the Chief Executive Engineer,

HPPWD, US Club, Shimla by Smt. Kusum Lata.

14. Ex. PW1/D is the copy of letter dated 4.5.2002 regarding notice under Section 80 of

CPC to The Secretary, HP Public Works Department, Government of Himachal Pradesh,

Shimla.

15. Ex. PW1/E is the copy of letter dated 18.7.2002 regarding issuance of muster rolls to

the daily waged beldars from President, Him Shakti P.W.D. Karamchari Sangh, Nurpur,

District Kangra, H.P. to the Finance Secretary, Government of Himachal Pradesh.

16. Ex. PW1/F is the copy of letter/UPC dated 18.7.2002 regarding issuance of muster

rolls to the daily waged beldars from President, Him Shakti P.W.D. Karamchari Sangh, Nurpur,

District Kangra, H.P. to the Finance Secretary, Government of Himachal Pradesh and others.

17. Ex. PW1/G is the copy of postal receipts.

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18. Ex. PW1/H is the copy of letter dated 18.1.2000 from Chief Engineer, HPPWD,

Shimla to Executive Engineer, HPPWD, 9th Circle, HPPWD, Nurpur.

19. PW2 Shri Sukar Deen testified that he had worked as beldar from the year 1986

uptil the year 2016 in HPPWD Division, Nurpur. He knows the petitioner, who had also been

working with them in the department. He denied in the cross-examination that the petitioner had

never worked in the department.

20. PW3 Shri Gian Chand stated that he was engaged in the year 1986 as a Mate in

HPPWD Division, Nurpur. He was removed by the department in the year 1990, when he had

obtained a stay from the H.P. Administrative Tribunal. Thereafter, he was again kept at work. He

knows the petitioner, who had also worked with them in the department. He was also a member

of their union. In the cross-examination, he was categorical that the petitioner had never worked

with him. Volunteered that, he had worked in the other section.

21. Conversely, Shri Dinesh Kumar Dhiman, Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division

Nurpur (respondent) testified as RW1. In his affidavit Ex. RW1/A preferred as per Order 18 Rule 4

of the Code of Civil Procedure, he corroborated on oath the contents of the reply filed by the

respondents.

22. In the cross-examination, he admitted that when the workers had been removed

from HPPWD Division, Nurpur in the year 1990, he was not working in any capacity in this

Division. He also admitted that in HPPWD Nurpur the works of road repair, maintenance, patch

work and widening are done continuously. He admitted that the work increases during the

monsoons. He further admitted that the persons named in para 3 of the claim petition, in para 2

of the affidavit of the petitioner and as shown in Ex. RW1/D are still working with HPPWD

Division, Nurpur. He cannot say that when 24 workers were removed, any notice under Section

25-F was issued or not. Self stated that, they had left the work of their own. No other worker had

been kept at work after 29.11.2010, except for those shown in Ex. RW1/D. He denied that wrong

mandays of the petitioner has been given.

23. Ex. RW1/B is the copy of notification dated 21st July, 1994 with regard to shifting of

HPPWD Division Jassur to Jawali along-with sanctioned strength and staff.

24. Ex. RW1/C is the copy of Office Order dated 23.7.1994 regarding the closure of

HPPWD Jassur Division at Nurpur and its functioning at Jawali, HPPWD Jawali Division.

25. Ex. RW1/D is the copy of another Office Order dated 29.11.2010 with regard to

implementation of the award of this Court dated 22.12.2007.

26. Ex. RW1/E is the copy of letter dated 19.8.1998 regarding posting of Smt. Kusum

Sharma as daily waged store clerk.

27. Ex. RW1/F is the copy of letter dated 18.12.1999 regarding representation of

Smt. Kusum Lata.

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28. Ex. RW1/G is the copy of letter dated 18.1.2000 written by the Engineer-in-Chief

HPPWD Shimla to The Superintending Engineer, 9th Circle, HP HPPWD, Nurpur relating to the

engagement of Store Clerk on daily waged basis.

29. Ex. RW1/H is the copy of mandays chart pertaining to the petitioner.

30. Ex. RW1/I is the copy of working days chart of Smt. Kusum Lata working under

Banikhet Sub Division HPPWD Banikhet.

31. Ex. RW1/J is the copy of working days chart of Smt. Kusum Lata working under

Suliali Sub Division HPPWD Suliali.

32. The version of the petitioner is that his services were engaged as a daily waged

beldar by the respondents in the year 1985 and that he had worked as such uptil the year 1990.

The respondents took the stand that the petitioner had been engaged as a daily waged beldar in

HPPWD Sub Division Suliali w.e.f. December, 1986 intermittently. The petitioner denied this

case of the respondents. He while under cross-examination categorically denied that he had not

worked with the department from the year 1985 uptil November, 1986 and from February, 1987

uptil the year 1990. However, the respondents have place and proved on record the mandays

chart pertaining to the petitioner as Ex. RW1/H. Its perusal discloses that the services of the

petitioner were engaged by respondent No. 2 in the month of December, 1986, for the first time as

a daily waged beldar and he had worked only for six days. The claimant/petitioner has not placed

and exhibited on record any document to show that he had regularly worked with the

respondents from the year 1985 uptil the year 1990.

33. A plea was taken by the respondents that the petitioner had abandoned the work

himself. It is well known that the abandonment has to be proved like any other fact by the

respondent/employer. In Eagle Hunter Solutions Ltd. vs. Sh. Prem Chand reported in [2019

(160) FLR 16], it has been held by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court that burden of proving of

abandonment is upon the management. Simply because a workman fails to report for duty, it

cannot be presumed that he/she has left/abandoned the job. There is nothing on the record to

show that a notice was served upon the petitioner by the respondents calling upon him to resume

the duties. Absence from duty is a serious misconduct. Admittedly, no disciplinary proceedings

were initiated against the petitioner by the respondents for his alleged willful absence from duty.

Thus, the plea of abandonment put forth by the respondents/employers is not established.

34. No mandays chart of the petitioner is there on the file to establish that he had

worked continuously for a period of 240 days in a block of 12 calendar months anterior to the

date of his alleged termination, as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. As per the mandays

chart Ex. RW1/H, the petitioner had only worked for 06 days in the month of December, 1986.

Thus, in his total service for a period of about one month in December, 1986 he had only worked

for 06 days. Therefore, the provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-N of the Act are not attracted in

this case.

35. It is claimed by the petitioner that at the time of termination of his services,

persons junior to him were retained in service by the respondents. A detail of such persons has

been given in para 3 of the statement of claim. Shri Suta Ram (PW1) also named such persons to

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be junior to him in his chief-examination, being in the shape of affidavit Ex. PW1/A. The

respondents, and in particular respondent No. 1, refuted such allegations and claimed that no

person junior to the petitioner had ever been retained in service by the respondents after his

alleged termination. Significantly, no seniority list has been placed and exhibited on record or

any other witness examined so as to show that the persons named in the statement of claim and

in his affidavit by the petitioner were junior to him and who had been retained by the respondents

at the time of the termination of his services. The statements of the witnesses examined by

the petitioner as Shri Sukar Deen (PW2) and Shri Gian Chand (PW3) are silent in this regard.

There is also no whisper in their testimonies that persons junior to the petitioner are still in

service. Both these witnesses claimed that their services were engaged by respondent No. 1 in the

year 1986. However, they both have not mentioned the dates and months of their initial

engagements in their substantive evidence. It is also not made out from their sworn testimonies

that they were junior to the petitioner. It is apparent from the record that the services of the

petitioner as a daily waged beldar for the first time were engaged by respondent No. 2 in the

month of December, 1986. So, the testimonies of the aforesaid witnesses are of no help to the

petitioner to establish on record that the principle of ‘last come first go’ had not been adhered to by

the respondents. Then, no prayer had ever been made by the petitioner for the production of the

seniority list from the respondents during the pendency of this case.

36. Faced with the situation, by referring to the copy of mandays chart pertaining to

Smt. Kusum Lata which has been placed on record by respondent No. 1 as Ex. RW1/J, it was

contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that she is certainly junior to the petitioner,

as she is shown to have been engaged in service in Suliali Sub Division, HPPWD Suliali in

February, 2000. This cannot be accepted. Placed on record by respondent No. 1 is another copy of

mandays chart pertaining to said Smt. Kusum Lata as Ex. RW1/I. As per this document Smt.

Kusum Lata had initially been engaged in the month of November, 1983 in Sub Division No.1

HPPWD, Banikhet and that she had continued to work as such there uptil November, 1988.

Placed on record is also her representation to the Engineer-in-Chief, HPPWD Shimla, copy of

which is Ex. RW1/F. On her representation, it is evident that she stood transferred and posted as a

daily waged Store Clerk from 7th Circle HPPWD Dalhousie to 9th Circle HPPWD Nurpur.

Reference in this regard can be made to the copy of letter dated 18.1.2000 of Engineer-in-Chief,

HPPWD Shimla, Ex. RW1/G. On allotment of one post of Store Clerk in 9th Circle, HPPWD

Nurpur, vide the aforesaid letter, Smt. Kusum Lata was adjusted as such there, where she has

been working regularly from the year 2000 uptil January, 2009, as is evident from the copy of

her mandays days chart, Ex. RW1/J. So, she can also not be termed as a junior to the petitioner.

There is nothing on record to show that the services of said Smt. Kusum Lala had ever been

disengaged at any point of time. Rather she appears to have been working with the HPPWD

Division Nurpur. Her joining in the 9th Circle HPPWD Nurpur, on her request in the month of

February, 2000 cannot make her junior to the petitioner, particularly when her year of joining is

much prior to that of the petitioner in the HPPWD department i.e. she was engaged in the year

1983, whereas the petitioner, as discussed above, had initially been engaged in December, 1986.

So, it cannot be said that Smt. Kusum Lata being a junior to the petitioner had been retained in

service by the respondents. Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondents had violated the

principle of ‘last come first go’, as envisaged in Section 25-G of the Act.

37. It is not the case of the petitioner that after his alleged disengagement, new/fresh

hands have been engaged by the respondents. That being so, the provisions of Section 25-H of

the Act are also not attracted in this case.

38. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, the petitioner is held to be not

entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in favour of

the respondents.

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Issue No. 3 :

39. Taking into account my findings on issues No. 1 and 2 above, it is held that neither the

petitioner has the cause of action nor the locus standi to sue. The claim petition is not

maintainable in the present form. The same is frivolous and vexatious. The claim petition has

been instituted by the petitioner with a malafide intention to derive undue advantage(s). This

issue is decided in favour of the respondents and against the petitioner.

Issue No. 4 :

40. Not pressed.

Relief :

41. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

order as to costs. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this Award be sent to the

appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion

be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 2nd day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref No.

: 880/2016

Date of Institution

: 07.12.2016

Date of Decision

: 03.09.2019

Shri Amar Singh s/o Shri Diwan Chand, r/o Village Bariara, P.O. Khel, Tehsil Nurpur,

District Kangra, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division, Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

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2.

The Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. Mukul Vaid, Adv. Vice

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. B.C. Katoch, A.D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the alleged termination of services of Shri Amar Singh s/o Shri Diwan Chand,

r/o Village Bariara, P.O. Khel, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. during year 1990 by

(i) the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Division Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P., (ii) the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Division Jawali, District Kangra, H.P., who had

worked on daily wages as beldar and has raised his industrial dispute after about 21

years vide demand notice dated nil received in the Labour Office Kangra at Dharamshala

on 13-06-2011, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,

is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view delay of about 21 years in raising the

industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employers/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner, as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

engaged by Himachal Pradesh Public Works Department on daily basis in the year 1979 in

HPPWD Sub Divisions-I and II, Nurpur and had worked as such till the year 1990. HPPWD

Division Nurpur was involved in the construction and maintenance of roads, building and bridges,

besides the repair and maintenance of tools and plants etc. and the patch work of metalled

roads. The petitioner had worked for the preparation of roads with many juniors, retained by

the employer and also with the reengaged employees as detailed in para No. 3 of the petition.

The mate of the petitioner was Shri Sahib Singh. More than 1000 workers were engaged for a

number of years by HPPWD Division Nurpur and in the year 1990 a pick and choose policy was

adopted and the petitioner alongwith some other daily waged workers were retrenched on the

false assurance that they would be retained after some time, declaring them surplus. Respondent

No. 1 had illegally terminated/retrenched the services of the petitioner in the year 1990 and the

juniors mentioned in para 3 of the petition were reengaged on 25.5.2010. After his oral

termination, many verbal requests were made by the petitioner to the department and he was being

given the assurance that he would be engaged after three or four months. When nothing was

heard from the side of the department, the petitioner had communicated in writing for his

reengagement on daily wage basis, but without success. The action of the employer in orally

terminating the services of the petitioner is violative of the provisions of Section 25-F of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). No notice was

served upon him. The provisions of Sections 25-G, 25-H and 25-N of the Act have also been

violated. The petitioner is having no source of income and is unemployed since his

disengagement, hence he is entitled to full back wages, as his termination/retrenchment is illegal

and arbitrary. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all consequential benefits.

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3.

On notice, the respondents appeared. They filed a joint reply taking preliminary

objections regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on the ground of delay

and laches. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It is admitted that HPPWD

Division Jassur was shifted/re-named as HPPWD Division Jawali vide H.P. Government

Notification no. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July, 1994. It was denied that the petitioner

had worked with the department from the year 1979 uptil the year 1990. It was asserted that the

petitioner had never been engaged by the respondent so the question of completing 240 days and

retrenchment of the petitioner did not arise. It is admitted that HPPWD Division Nurpur was

involved in the construction and maintenance of roads, buildings and bridges, repair and

maintenance of tools and plants etc. Since, the petitioner had never been engaged by the

respondents, so the question of violation of the provisions of Section 25-B does not arise. It was

denied that juniors to the petitioner had been engaged by the respondents. However, claimed that

when some workers had been engaged by the respondents as per the directions of the Hon’ble

High Court only then the demand notice was issued by the petitioner in the year 2011, i.e. after

about 21 years. The respondents, thus, pray for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

In the rejoinder, the petitioner has reiterated the contents of the petition/statement of

claim and refuted the objections put forth by the respondents.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 24.3.2018:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents during year,

1990 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form? . .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on the ground of delay and laches as alleged.

If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. The petitioner, namely, Shri Amar Singh examined himself as PW1 and also

examined Shri Sukar Deen (PW2) and Shri Harnam Singh (PW3) as his witnesses. Besides this

the petitioner tendered in evidence his statement by way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A, copy of letter

dated 19.8.1998 as Ex. PW1/B, copy of letter dated 18.12.1999 as Ex. PW1/C, copy of notice

dated 4.5.2002 as Ex. PW1/D, copy of resolution dated 18.7.2002 as Ex. PW1/E, copy of UPC

and registered postal receipts as Ex. PW1/F & G and copy of letter dated 18.1.2000. The

respondents examined one Shri Dinesh Kumar Dhiman as RW1, who tendered his statement by

way of affidavit Ex. RW1/A and placed on the file copy of notification dated 21st July, 1994 as

Ex. RW1/B, copy of office order dated 23.7.1994 as Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated

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29.11.2010 as Ex. RW1/D, copy of letter dated 19.8.1998 as Ex. RW1/E, copy of application

dated 18.12.1999 filed by Smt. Kusum Lata as Ex. RW1/F, copy of letter dated 18.1.2000

as Ex. RW1/G, copy of mandays chart of the petitioner as Ex. RW1/H and copies of working

days chart of Smt. Kusum Lata as Ex. RW1/I & Ex. RW1/J.

7.

Arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant

District Attorney for the respondents heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Negative

Issue No. 2

: Negative

Issue No. 3

: Affirmative

Issue No. 4

: Not pressed/redundant

Relief

: Claim petition dismissed as per the operative portion of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issue No.1 and 2 :

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The petitioner, namely, Shri Amar Singh examined himself as PW1 and filed his

affidavit in evidence, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit, he reiterated the

contents of his statement of claim. He also filed certain documents purportedly in support of his

claim, which are exhibited as Ex. PW1/B to Ex. PW1/H.

11. In the cross-examination, he admitted that before 1994, HPPWD Division was at

Jassur. He admitted that HPPWD Division Jawali was established on 21st July, 1994 vide

government notification no.PBW-(A)-A(1)17/94. He admitted that he had never worked in Jawali

Division. Volunteered that, he had worked in Nurpur Division. He denied that he had not worked

in Nurpur Division. He also denied that he had never worked with the respondents. Self stated

that, he had worked regularly from the year 1979 uptil the year 1990. He denied that he had

never worked for the period from the year 1979 uptil the year 1990. He further denied that he

was never disengaged by the respondents/department. It was also denied by him that no

juniors to him had been kept. He feigned ignorance that Smt. Kusum Lata was appointed as a

daily waged beldar in HPPWD Division Dalhousie in the year 1983. He denied that he had never

worked for 240 days and above in any year. However, he admitted that he owns land, which he

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cultivates. He also admitted that he is doing the days’ drudgery privately. Self stated that, as and

when the work is available.

12. Ex. PW1/B is the copy of letter dated 19.8.1998 regarding posting of Smt. Kusum

Sharma as a daily waged Store Clerk.

13. Ex. PW1/C is the copy of letter dated 18.12.1999 to the Chief Executive Engineer,

HPPWD, US Club, Shimla by Smt. Kusum Lata.

14. Ex. PW1/D is the copy of letter dated 4.5.2002 regarding notice under Section 80 of

CPC to The Secretary, HP Public Works Department, Government of Himachal Pradesh,

Shimla.

15. Ex. PW1/E is the copy of letter dated 18.7.2002 regarding issuance of muster rolls to

the daily waged beldars from the President, Him Shakti P.W.D. Karamchari Sangh, Nurpur,

District Kangra, H.P. to the Finance Secretary, Government of Himachal Pradesh.

16. Ex. PW1/F is the copy of letter/UPC dated 18.7.2002 regarding issuance of muster

rolls to the daily waged beldars from the President, Him Shakti P.W.D. Karamchari Sangh,

Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. to the Finance Secretary, Government of Himachal Pradesh and

others.

17. Ex. PW1/G is the copy of postal receipts.

18. Ex. PW1/H is the copy of letter dated 18.1.2000 from Chief Engineer, HPPWD,

Shimla to Executive Engineer, HPPWD, 9th Circle, HPPWD, Nurpur.

19. PW2 Shri Sukar Deen testified that he had worked as beldar from the year 1986

uptil the year 2016 in HPPWD Division, Nurpur. He knows the petitioner, who had also been

working with them in the department. He denied in the cross-examination that the petitioner had

never worked in the department.

20. PW3 Shri Harnam Singh stated that he was engaged in the year 1986 as a Mate in

HPPWD Division, Nurpur. He was removed by the department in the year 1990, when he had

obtained a stay from the H.P. Administrative Tribunal. Thereafter, he was again kept at work. He

knows the petitioner, who had also worked with them in the department. He was also a member

of their union. In the cross-examination, he was categorical that the petitioner had never worked

with him. Volunteered that, he had worked in the other section.

21. Conversely, Shri Dinesh Kumar Dhiman, Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division

Nurpur (respondent No.1) testified as RW1. In his affidavit Ex. RW1/A preferred as per Order 18

Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he corroborated on oath the contents of the reply filed by

him.

22. In the cross-examination, he admitted that when the workers had been removed

from HPPWD Division, Nurpur in the year 1990, he was not working in any capacity in this

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Division. He also admitted that in HPPWD Nurpur the works of road repair, maintenance, patch

work and widening are done continuously. He admitted that the work increases during the

monsoons. He further admitted that the persons named in para 3 of the claim petition, in para 2

of the affidavit of the petitioner and as shown in Ex. RW1/D are still working with HPPWD

Division, Nurpur. He cannot say that when 24 workers were removed, any notice under Section

25-F was issued or not. Self stated that, they had left the work of their own. No other worker had

been kept at work after 29.11.2010, except for those shown in Ex. RW1/D. He denied that wrong

mandays of the petitioner has been given.

23. Ex. RW1/B is the copy of notification dated 21st July, 1994 with regard to the

shifting of HPPWD Division Jassur to Jawali along-with sanctioned strength and staff.

24. Ex. RW1/C is the copy of Office Order dated 23.7.1994 regarding the closure of

HPPWD Jassur Division at Nurpur and its functioning at Jawali, HPPWD Jawali Division.

25. Ex. RW1/D is the copy of another Office Order dated 29.11.2010 with regard to

implementation of the award of this Court dated 22.12.2007.

26. Ex. RW1/E is the copy of letter dated 19.8.1998 regarding posting of Smt. Kusum

Sharma as daily waged store clerk.

27. Ex. RW1/F is the copy of letter dated 18.12.1999 regarding representation of

Smt. Kusum Lata.

28. Ex. RW1/G is the copy of letter dated 18.1.2000 written by the Engineer-in-Chief

HPPWD Shimla to The Superintending Engineer, 9th Circle, HPPWD, Nurpur relating to the

engagement of Store Clerk on daily waged basis.

29. Ex. RW1/H is the copy of mandays chart pertaining to the petitioner.

30. Ex. RW1/I is the copy of working days chart of Smt. Kusum Lata working under

Banikhet Sub Division HPPWD Banikhet.

31. Ex. RW1/J is the copy of working days chart of Smt. Kusum Lata working under

Suliali Sub Division HPPWD Suliali.

32. The version of the petitioner is that his services were engaged as a daily waged

beldar by respondent No. 1 in the year 1979 and that he had worked as such uptil the year 1990. It

was the stand taken by the respondents that the petitioner had never been engaged by the

department. Although, the petitioner (PW1) in his cross-examination denied the fact that he had

never been engaged as a daily waged beldar in the year 1979 by the respondents and that he had

not worked as such uptil the year 1990, but, however, respondent No.1 has proved on record the

mandays chart pertaining to the petitioner as Ex. RW1/H. This mandays chart pertains to HPPWD

Division Jawali. Its perusal reveals that the petitioner had not worked with respondent No. 2 even

for a single day from the year 1986 uptil the year 1990. The petitioner in his substantive evidence

also clearly admitted that he never worked in Jawali Division. No mandays chart has been

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proved on record by the petitioner showing him to have ever worked with respondent No.1.

In view of this fact, I am at a loss to understand as to how and on what basis it lies in the mouth

of the petitioner to say that there existed a relationship of employer and employee/workman

in between the parties. Significantly, the petitioner neither in his pleadings, nor in his ocular

evidence has stated the date on which he was engaged by respondent No.1. There is also no

pleading or evidence to the effect as to on which specific date his services stood terminated by this

respondent. Only the years of joining and termination of the petitioner stand specified in the

statement of claim and his statement by way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A. Although, witnesses,

namely, Shri Sukar Deen (PW2) and Shri Harnam Singh (PW3), were examined by the

petitioner in support of his case, but I find that their statements are of no help to him, as their

service records were not brought on the file to show that they had ever been engaged by the

department. Then, it is nowhere the case of the petitioner that he had ever marked his attendance

in all those twelve years, the period for which he claims to have worked with respondent No.1.

Had there been any attendance register in which the petitioner had appended his signatures, he

ought to have placed and exhibited on record the same so as to show that his services had been

engaged by the respondents from the year 1979 uptil the year 1990. But, so is not the case here.

No such attendance register has seen the light of the day, nor any prayer had been made by the

petitioner for the production of the same from the respondents during the pendency of this case.

Further, he could have easily proved the muster rolls for the period for which he had worked.

But, no such muster roll has been produced. Even no appointment letter to show that the services

of the petitioner had been engaged by the respondents, has been placed on record by him.

33. From the ocular and documentary evidence of the respondents available on record, it

can be gathered that the petitioner had never been appointed in any capacity at any point of

time by the respondents.

34. Since, there is no cogent, convincing and reliable evidence on the file establishing the

relationship of employer and employee/workman in between the petitioner and the respondents,

therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are not attracted in this case. The

respondents can also not be held to have violated the provisions of Sections 25-G, 25-H and 25-N

of the Act, as the relationship of the petitioner and the respondents being that of a

workman and employer stands not established on record.

35. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, it appears to me that the avarice of

the petitioner to grab government job and money had forced him to file a totally false and

baseless claim. He is not entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the

petitioner and in favour of the respondents.

Issue No. 3 :

36. Taking into account my findings on issues No. 1 and 2 above, it is held that

neither the petitioner has the cause of action nor the locus standi to sue. The claim petition is not

maintainable in the present form. The same is frivolous and vexatious. The claim petition has

been instituted by the petitioner with a malafide intention to derive undue advantage(s). This

issue is decided in favour of the respondents and against the petitioner.

Issue No. 4 :

37. Not pressed. Even otherwise, the plea of delay and laches would have been

relevant had the petitioner been able to prove the demand notice as well as the fact of he being a

workman under the respondents for the alleged period. Hence, this issue becomes redundant.

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Relief :

38. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

order as to costs. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this Award be sent to the

appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion be

consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 771/2016

Date of Institution

: 19.11.2016

Date of Decision

: 03.09.2019

Shri Nasib Singh s/o Shri Labh Singh, r/o Village and Post Office Mastgarh, Tehsil

Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Division, Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

2.

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.

. .Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. Mukul Vaid, Adv vice.

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. B.C. Katoch, A.D.A.

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AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Nasib Singh s/o Shri Labh Singh, r/o

Village and Post Office Mastgarh, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. during year,

1990 by (1) The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Nurpur, Tehsil Nurpur,

District Kangra, H.P. (2) The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Jawali, Tehsil

Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P., who had worked on daily wages and has raised his

industrial dispute after more than 21 years vide demand notice dated-nil-received on

29.11.2012, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as

alleged by the workman, is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of delay of more

than 21 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority,

past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the

above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner, as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

engaged by Himachal Pradesh Public Works Department on daily basis during the year 1980 in

HPPWD Sub Divisions-I and II, Nurpur and had worked as such till the year 1990. HPPWD

Division Nurpur was involved in the construction and maintenance of roads, building and bridges,

besides the repair and maintenance of tools and plants etc. and the patch work of metalled

roads. The petitioner had worked for the preparation of roads with many juniors retained by the

employer and also with the reengaged employees as detailed in para No. 3 of the petition. The

mates of the petitioner were S/Shri Kushal Singh, Dhian Chand and Pritam Singh. More than

1000 workers were engaged for a number of years by HPPWD Division Nurpur and in the year

1990 a pick and choose policy was adopted and the petitioner alongwith some other daily waged

workers were retrenched on the false assurance that they would be retained after some time,

declaring them surplus. Respondent No. 1 had illegally terminated/retrenched the services of

the petitioner in the year 1990 and the juniors mentioned in para 3 of the petition were

reengaged on 25.5.2010. After his oral termination, many verbal requests were made by the

petitioner to the department and he was being given the assurance that he would be engaged after

three or four months. When nothing was heard from the side of the department, the petitioner had

communicated in writing for his reengagement on daily wage basis, but without success. The

action of the employer in orally terminating the services of the petitioner is violative of the

provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the

Act’ for short). No notice was served upon him. The provisions of Sections 25-G, 25-H and 25-N

of the Act have also been violated. The petitioner is having no source of income and is

unemployed since his disengagement, hence he is entitled to full back wages, as his

termination/retrenchment is illegal and arbitrary. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-

engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondents appeared. They filed a joint reply taking preliminary

objections regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on the ground of delay

and laches. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It is admitted that HPPWD

Division Jassur was shifted/re-named as HPPWD Division Jawali vide HP Government

Notification no. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July, 1994. It was denied that the petitioner

had worked with the department from the year 1980 uptil the year 1990. It was asserted that the

petitioner had never been engaged by the respondents so the question of completing 240 days

and retrenchment of the petitioner did not arise. It is admitted that HPPWD Division Nurpur was

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involved in the construction and maintenance of roads, buildings and bridges, repair and

maintenance of tools and plants etc. Since, the petitioner had never been engaged by the

respondents, so the question of violation of the provisions of Section 25-B does not arise. It was

denied that juniors to the petitioner had been engaged by the respondents. However, claimed that

when some workers had been engaged by the respondents as per the directions of the Hon’ble

High Court only then the demand notice was issued by the petitioner in the year 2011, i.e. after

about 21 years. The respondents, thus, pray for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

In the rejoinder, the petitioner has reiterated the contents of the petition/statement of

claim and refuted the objections put forth by the respondents.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 15.9.2018:

1.

Whether termination of the service of the petitioner by the respondents during year,

1990 is/was legal and justified as alleged?

. . OPP.

2.

If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. . OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on ground of delay and laches as alleged? . . OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. The petitioner, namely, Shri Nasib Singh examined himself as PW1 and also

examined Shri Jagat Ram (PW2) as his witness. Besides this the petitioner tendered in evidence

his statement by way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A, copy of letter dated 19.8.1998 as Ex. PW1/B, copy

of letter dated 18.12.1999 as Ex. PW1/C, copy of notice dated 4.5.2002 as Ex. PW1/D, copy of

resolution dated 18.7.2002 as Ex. PW1/E, copy of UPC and registered postal receipts as Ex.

PW1/F & G and copy of letter dated 18.1.2000 as Ex. PW1/H. The respondents examined one

Shri Dinesh Kumar Dhiman as RW1, who tendered his statement by way of affidavit Ex. RW1/A

and placed on the file copy of notification dated 21st July, 1994 as Ex. RW1/B, copy of office

order dated 23.7.1994 as Ex. RW1/C, copy of office order dated 29.11.2010 as Ex. RW1/D, copy

of letter dated 19.8.1998 as Ex. RW1/E, copy of application dated 18.12.1999 filed by Smt.

Kusum Lata as Ex. RW1/F, copy of letter dated 18.1.2000 as Ex. RW1/G, copy of mandays chart

of the petitioner as Ex. RW1/H and copies of working days charts of Smt. Kusum Lata as Ex.

RW1/I & Ex. RW1/J.

7.

Arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Deputy

District Attorney for the respondents heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Yes

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Issue No. 2

: Negative

Issue No. 3

: Yes

Issue No.4

: Not pressed/redundant

Relief

: Claim petition dismissed as per the operative portion of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issue No.1 and 2 :

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The petitioner, namely, Shri Nasib Singh examined himself as PW1 and filed his

affidavit in evidence, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit, he reiterated the contents

of his statement of claim.

In the cross-examination, he admitted that before 1994, HPPWD Division was at Jassur.

He admitted that HPPWD Division Jawali was established on 21st July, 1994 vide government

notification No.PBW-(A)-A(1)17/94. He admitted that he had never worked in Jawali Division.

Volunteered that, he had worked in Nurpur Division. He denied that he had not worked in Nurpur

Division. He also denied that he had never worked with the respondents. Self stated that, he had

worked regularly from the year 1980 uptil the year 1990. He denied that he was never

disengaged by the respondents/department. It was also denied by him that no juniors to him had

been kept. He feigned ignorance that Smt. Kusum Lata was appointed as a daily waged beldar

in HPPWD Division Dalhousie in the year 1983. He denied that he had never worked for 240

days and above in any year. However, he admitted that he owns land, which he cultivates. He

also admitted that he is doing the days’ drudgery privately. Self stated that, as and when the work

is available.

11. Ex. PW1/B is the copy of letter dated 19.8.1998 regarding the posting of Smt.

Kusum Sharma as a daily waged Store Clerk.

12. Ex. PW1/C is the copy of letter dated 18.12.1999 to the Chief Executive Engineer,

HPPWD, US Club, Shimla by Smt. Kusum Lata.

13. Ex. PW1/D is the copy of letter dated 4.5.2002 regarding notice under Section 80 of

CPC to The Secretary, HP Public Works Department, Government of Himachal Pradesh,

Shimla.

14. Ex. PW1/E is the copy of letter dated 18.7.2002 regarding issuance of muster rolls to

the daily waged beldars from the President, Him Shakti P.W.D. Karamchari Sangh, Nurpur,

District Kangra, H.P. to the Finance Secretary, Government of Himachal Pradesh.

15. Ex. PW1/F is the copy of letter/UPC dated 18.7.2002 regarding issuance of muster

rolls to the daily waged beldars from the President, Him Shakti P.W.D. Karamchari Sangh,

Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. to the Finance Secretary, Government of Himachal Pradesh and

others.

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16. Ex. PW1/G is the copy of postal receipts.

17. Ex. PW1/H is the copy of letter dated 18.1.2000 from Chief Engineer, HPPWD,

Shimla to Executive Engineer, HPPWD, 9th Circle, HPPWD, Nurpur.

18. PW2 Shri Jagat Ram testified that he was engaged as a beldar in the year 1986 in

HPPWD Division, Nurpur. The petitioner had also worked with him in the department in the

year 1986. In the year 1990 the petitioner had been removed, whereas he had superannuated in

June, 2012. He admitted in the cross-examination that the presence of a workman is marked by

the department. He also admitted that the record of the workman is maintained by the

department. He specifically denied that the petitioner had never worked in the department.

19. Conversely, Shri Dinesh Kumar Dhiman, Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division

Nurpur (respondent No.1) testified as RW1. In his affidavit Ex. RW1/A preferred as per Order 18

Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he corroborated on oath the contents of the reply filed by

him.

In the cross-examination, he admitted that when the workers had been removed from

HPPWD Division, Nurpur in the year 1990, he was not working in any capacity in this

Division. He also admitted that in HPPWD Nurpur the works of road repair, maintenance, patch

work and widening are done continuously. He admitted that the work increases during the

monsoons. He further admitted that the persons named in para 3 of the claim petition, in para 2

of the affidavit of the petitioner and as shown in Ex. RW1/D are still working with HPPWD

Division, Nurpur. He cannot say that when 24 workers were removed, any notice under Section

25-F was issued or not. Self stated that, they had left the work of their own. No other worker had

been kept at work after 29.11.2010, except for those shown in Ex. RW1/D. He denied that wrong

mandays of the petitioner has been given.

20. Ex. RW1/B is the copy of notification dated 21st July, 1994 with regard to shifting of

HPPWD Division Jassur to Jawali along-with sanctioned strength and staff.

21. Ex. RW1/C is the copy of Office Order dated 23.7.1994 regarding the closure of

HPPWD Jassur Division at Nurpur and its functioning at Jawali, HPPWD Jawali Division.

22. Ex. RW1/D is the copy of another Office Order dated 29.11.2010 with regard to

implementation of the award of this Court dated 22.12.2007.

23. Ex. RW1/E is the copy of letter dated 19.8.1998 regarding posting of Smt. Kusum

Sharma as daily waged store clerk.

24. Ex. RW1/F is the copy of letter dated 18.12.1999 regarding representation of Smt.

Kusum Lata.

25. Ex. RW1/G is the copy of letter dated 18.1.2000 written by the Engineer-in-Chief

HPPWD Shimla to The Superintending Engineer, 9th Circle, HP HPPWD, Nurpur relating to the

engagement of Store Clerk on daily waged basis.

26. Ex. RW1/H is the copy of mandays chart pertaining to the petitioner.

27. Ex. RW1/I is the copy of working days chart of Smt. Kusum Lata working under

Banikhet Sub Division HPPWD Banikhet.

28. Ex. RW1/J is the copy of working days chart of Smt. Kusum Lata working under

Suliali Sub Division HPPWD Suliali.

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29. The version of the petitioner is that his services were engaged as a daily waged

beldar by respondent No. 1 in the year 1980 and that he had worked as such uptil the year 1990. It

was the stand taken by the respondents that the petitioner had never been engaged by the

department. Although, the petitioner (PW1) in his cross-examination denied the fact that he had

never been engaged as a daily waged beldar in the year 1980 by the respondents and that he had

not worked as such uptil the year 1990, but, however, respondent No. 1 has proved on record the

mandays chart pertaining to the petitioner as Ex. RW1/H. This mandays chart pertains to HPPWD

Division Jawali. Its perusal reveals that the petitioner had not worked with respondent No. 2 even

for a single day from the year 1980 uptil the year 1990. The petitioner in his substantive evidence

also clearly admitted that he never worked in Jawali Division. No mandays chart has been

proved on record by the petitioner showing him to have ever worked with respondent no.1.

In view of this fact, I am at a loss to understand as to how and on what basis it lies in the mouth

of the petitioner to say that there existed a relationship of employer and employee/workman

in between the parties. Although, witness, namely, Shri Jagat Ram (PW2), was examined by the

petitioner in support of his case, but I find that his statement is of no help to him, as his service

record was not brought on the file to show that he had ever been engaged by the department.

Then, it is nowhere the case of the petitioner that he had ever marked his attendance in all

those eleven years, the period for which he claims to have worked with respondent No.1. Had

there been any attendance register in which the petitioner had appended his signatures, he ought

to have placed and exhibited on record the same so as to show that his services had been

engaged by the respondents from the year 1980 uptil the year 1990. But, so is not the case here.

No such attendance register has seen the light of the day, nor any prayer had been made by the

petitioner for the production of the same from the respondents during the pendency of this

case. Further, he could have easily proved the muster-rolls for the period for which he had

worked. But, no such muster roll has been produced. Even no appointment letter to show that the

services of the petitioner had been engaged by the respondents, has been placed on record by him.

30. From the ocular and documentary evidence of the respondent available on record, it

can be gathered that the petitioner had never been appointed in any capacity at any point of

time by the respondents.

31. Since, there is no cogent, convincing and reliable evidence on the file establishing the

relationship of employer and employee/workman in between the petitioner and the respondents,

therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are not attracted in this case. The

respondents can also not be held to have violated the provisions of Sections 25-G, 25-H and 25-N

of the Act, as the relationship of the petitioner and the respondents being that of a

workman and employer stands not established on record.

32. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, it appears to me that the avarice of

the petitioner to grab government job and money had forced him to file a totally false and

baseless claim. He is not entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the

petitioner and in favour of the respondents.

Issue No. 3 :

33. Taking in to account my findings on issues No. 1 and 2 above, it is held that

neither the petitioner has the cause of action nor the locus standi to sue. The claim petition is not

maintainable in the present form. The same is frivolous and vexatious. The claim petition has

been instituted by the petitioner with a malafide intention to derive undue advantage(s). This

issue is decided in favour of the respondents and against the petitioner.

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Issue No. 4 :

34. Not pressed. Even otherwise, the plea of delay and laches would have been

relevant had the petitioner been able to prove the demand notice as well as the fact of he being a

workman under the respondents for the alleged period. Hence, this issue becomes redundant.

Relief :

35. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

order as to costs. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this Award be sent to the

appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion be

consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 3rd day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 26/2018

Date of Institution

: 28.3.2018

Date of Decision

: 05.09.2019

Shri Jotu Ram s/o Shri Hoshiyara, r/o Village Banotu, P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The General Manager, M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village Kurtha, P.O. Saho,

Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: None for the petitioner

For the Respondent

: Shri Dharam Malhotra, Adv.

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AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Jotu Ram s/o Shri Hoshiyara, r/o Village

Banotu, P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P. during February, 2016 (as alleged

by the workman) by the General Manager, M/S Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village

Kurtha, P.O. Saho, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount

of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is

entitled to from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

initially engaged as a daily waged labourer on muster-roll basis by the respondent without any

appointment letter in the year 2012. He thereafter had worked continuously with the respondent

for many years. It was undertaken by the respondent that the company would provide a job for

forty years to the petitioner, as his land was used in the construction of the hydro project.

However, during February, 2016 his services were orally terminated by the respondent. He being a

poor man, having no source of income, had approached the respondent many times to re-

engage him, but without success. No one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for

retrenchment had been given to him, nor any retrenchment compensation was paid. The

respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). While terminating his services, the respondent had

also not followed the principle of ‘last come first go’, as person junior to him were retained in

service continuously without any breaks and they have also been regularized. No opportunity of

re-employment was ever given to him. Provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act were

also violated by the respondent. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability, locus standi, non-joinder and misjoinder of parties, suppression

of material facts and cause of action. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was

asserted that the petitioner had never been engaged as a labourer by the respondent. No land of

his had ever been acquired or purchased by the respondent. So, providing him a job for forty

years did not arise. Only those families were provided the job, whose lands had been

acquired/purchased by the respondent. Since, the petitioner had never been engaged by the

respondent, the question of termination of his services did not arise. It was denied that the

respondent had not complied with the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act.

The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent heard and records gone

through.

5.

The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent during February, 2016 by violating

the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis on muster-roll as a labourer in the year 2012. It was also his

claim that he had completed 240 days in each calendar year. A plea was also taken to the effect

that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first go’, as persons junior to

the petitioner were retained and that fresh hands had also been engaged. It was also asserted that

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no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required

to be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

6.

However, when the case was listed for filing of rejoinder and documents by the

petitioner for 05.9.2019, neither he nor his counsel had put in appearance before this Tribunal,

despite the case being called several times since morning. Hence, despite due notice of the date

of hearing, the petitioner had remained ex parte.

7.

It will be apt at this stage to take note of the relevant provisions of the Act.

Section 2 (b) of the Act defines the Award as under:—

“(b) “award” means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any

question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial

Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10A;”.

8.

Sub-Section (1) of Section 11 of the Act provides that subject to any rules that may

be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National

Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think it

fit. The Central Government has framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,

1957.” Rule 10-B (9) reads thus:—

“10-B (9) In case any party defaults or fails to appear at any stage the Labour Court,

Tribunal, or National Tribunal, as the case may be, may proceed with the reference ex-

parte and decide the reference application in the absence of the defaulting party.”

9.

Rule 22 reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.—If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

10. The State of Himachal Pradesh has also framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes

Rules, 1974.” Rule 25 thereof reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.— If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

11. Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 and Rule 25 of the

Industrial Disputes Rules, 1974 authorize the adjudicating authority to proceed in the absence of a

party. It creates a fiction which enables the Tribunal to presume that all the parties are present

before it although, in fact, it is not true, and thus make an ex parte award. This Tribunal in these

circumstances has to imagine that the absentee workman is present and having done so, can give

full effect to its imagination and carry it to its logical end. Under Rule 25, this Tribunal, thus, has

to imagine that the workman is present, he is unwilling to adduce evidence or argue his case.

12. In the instant case, neither the petitioner nor his counsel had put in appearance

before this Tribunal on 5.9.2019. In these circumstances, the Tribunal can proceed and pass ex

parte award on its merits.

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13. Since, it is disputed by the respondent that the services of the petitioner had been

engaged on daily wage basis, so firstly it was required of the petitioner to prove on record that he

had been engaged by the respondent on daily waged basis and then to establish on record, as per

the reference, that the termination of his services in the year 2016 by the respondent was

without complying with the provisions of the Act and, thus, illegal and unjustified. Though, a

statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner, but his allegations therein have remained a

mere saying on record, as no evidence in support thereof has been led by him. At the risk of

repetition, the petitioner had not put in appearance before this Tribunal. In this view of the

matter, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief, as claimed for in the statement of claim.

14. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, the present claim petition

merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs. The reference is

answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for

publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion be consigned to the Record

Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 5th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 31/2018

Date of Institution

: 28.3.2018

Date of Decision

: 05.09.2019

Shri Aaso Ram s/o Shri Prahlad, r/o Village Banotu, P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The General Manager, M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village Kurtha, P.O. Saho,

Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: None for the petitioner

For the Respondent

: Shri Dharam Malhotra, Adv.

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AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Aaso Ram s/o Shri Prahlad, r/o Village

Banotu, P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P. during February, 2016 (as alleged

by the workman) by the General Manager, M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village

Kurtha, P.O. Saho, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what

amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above

worker is entitled to from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

initially engaged as a daily waged labourer on muster roll basis by the respondent without any

appointment letter in the year 2012. He thereafter had worked continuously with the respondent

for many years. It was undertaken by the respondent that the company would provide a job for

forty years to the petitioner, as his land was used in the construction of the hydro project.

However, during February, 2016 his services were orally terminated by the respondent. He being a

poor man, having no source of income, had approached the respondent many a times to re-

engage him, but without success. No one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for

retrenchment had been given to him, nor any retrenchment compensation was paid. The

respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). While terminating his services, the respondent had

also not followed the principle of ‘last come first go’, as person junior to him were retained in

service continuously without any breaks and they have also been regularized. No opportunity of

re-employment was ever given to him. Provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act were

also violated by the respondent. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability, locus standi, non-joinder and misjoinder of parties, suppression

of material facts and cause of action. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was

asserted that the petitioner had never been engaged as a labourer by the respondent. No land of

his had ever been acquired or purchased by the respondent. So, providing him a job for forty

years did not arise. Only those families were provided the job, whose lands had been

acquired/purchased by the respondent. Since, the petitioner had never been engaged by the

respondent, the question of termination of his services did not arise. It was denied that the

respondent had not complied with the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act.

The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent heard and records gone

through.

5.

The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent during February, 2016 by violating

the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis on muster roll as a labourer in the year 2012. It was also his

claim that he had completed 240 days in each calendar year. A plea was also taken to the effect

that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first go’, as persons junior to

the petitioner were retained and that fresh hands had also been engaged. It was also asserted that

no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required

to be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

7278

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

6.

However, when the case was listed for filing of rejoinder and documents by the

petitioner for 05.9.2019, neither he nor his counsel had put in appearance before this Tribunal,

despite the case being called several times since morning. Hence, despite due notice of the date

of hearing, the petitioner had remained ex parte.

7.

It will be apt at this stage to take note of the relevant provisions of the Act.

Section 2 (b) of the Act defines the Award as under:—

“(b) “award” means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of

any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National

Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10A;”.

8.

Sub-Section (1) of Section 11 of the Act provides that subject to any rules that

may be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National

Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think it

fit. The Central Government has framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,

1957.” Rule 10-B (9) reads thus:—

“10-B (9) In case any party defaults or fails to appear at any stage the Labour Court,

Tribunal, or National Tribunal, as the case may be, may proceed with the reference ex-

parte and decide the reference application in the absence of the defaulting party.”

9.

Rule 22 reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.—If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

10. The State of Himachal Pradesh has also framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes

Rules, 1974.” Rule 25 thereof reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.—If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

11. Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 and Rule 25 of the

Industrial Disputes Rules, 1974 authorize the adjudicating authority to proceed in the absence of a

party. It creates a fiction which enables the Tribunal to presume that all the parties are present

before it although, in fact, it is not true, and thus make an ex parte award. This Tribunal in these

circumstances has to imagine that the absentee workman is present and having done so, can give

full effect to its imagination and carry it to its logical end. Under Rule 25, this Tribunal, thus, has

to imagine that the workman is present, he is unwilling to adduce evidence or argue his case.

12. In the instant case, neither the petitioner nor his counsel had put in appearance

before this Tribunal on 5.9.2019. In these circumstances, the Tribunal can proceed and pass ex

parte award on its merits.

13. Since, it is disputed by the respondent that the services of the petitioner had been

engaged on daily wage basis, so firstly it was required of the petitioner to prove on record that he

7279

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

had been engaged by the respondent on daily waged basis and then to establish on record, as per

the reference, that the termination of his services in the year 2016 by the respondent was

without complying with the provisions of the Act and, thus, illegal and unjustified. Though, a

statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner, but his allegations therein have remained a

mere saying on record, as no evidence in support thereof has been led by him. At the risk of

repetition, the petitioner had not put in appearance before this Tribunal. In this view of the

matter, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief, as claimed for in the statement of claim.

14. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, the present claim petition

merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs. The reference is

answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for

publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion be consigned to the Record

Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 5th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 24/2018

Date of Institution

: 28.3.2018

Date of Decision

: 05.09.2019

Shri Kishori Lal s/o Shri Prabhu Ram, r/o Village Banotu, P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil &

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The General Manager, M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village Kurtha, P.O. Saho,

Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: None for the petitioner

For the Respondent

: Shri Dharam Malhotra, Adv.

7280

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Kishori Lal s/o Shri Prabhu Ram, r/o

Village Banotu, P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P. during February, 2016 (as

alleged by the workman) by the General Manager, M/S Sahoo Hydro Power Project,

Village Kurtha, P.O. Saho, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount

of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is

entitled to from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

initially engaged as a daily waged labourer on muster roll basis by the respondent without any

appointment letter in the year 2012. He thereafter had worked continuously with the respondent

for many years. It was undertaken by the respondent that the company would provide a job for

forty years to the petitioner, as his land was used in the construction of the hydro project.

However, during February, 2016 his services were orally terminated by the respondent. He being a

poor man, having no source of income, had approached the respondent many a times to re-

engage him, but without success. No one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for

retrenchment had been given to him, nor any retrenchment compensation was paid. The

respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). While terminating his services, the respondent had

also not followed the principle of ‘last come first go’, as person junior to him were retained in

service continuously without any breaks and they have also been regularized. No opportunity of

re-employment was ever given to him. Provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act were

also violated by the respondent. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability, locus standi, non-joinder and misjoinder of parties, suppression

of material facts and cause of action. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was

asserted that the petitioner had never been engaged as a labourer by the respondent. No land of

his had ever been acquired or purchased by the respondent. So, providing him a job for forty

years did not arise. Only those families were provided the job, whose lands had been

acquired/purchased by the respondent. Since, the petitioner had never been engaged by the

respondent, the question of termination of his services did not arise. It was denied that the

respondent had not complied with the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act.

The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent heard and records gone

through.

5.

The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent during February, 2016 by violating

the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis on muster roll as a labourer in the year 2012. It was also his

claim that he had completed 240 days in each calendar year. A plea was also taken to the effect

that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first go’, as persons junior to

the petitioner were retained and that fresh hands had also been engaged. It was also asserted that

no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required

to be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

7281

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

6.

However, when the case was listed for filing of rejoinder and documents by the

petitioner for 05.9.2019, neither he nor his counsel had put in appearance before this Tribunal,

despite the case being called several times since morning. Hence, despite due notice of the date

of hearing, the petitioner had remained ex parte.

7.

It will be apt at this stage to take note of the relevant provisions of the Act.

Section 2 (b) of the Act defines the Award as under:—

“(b) “award” means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any

question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial

Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10A;”.

8.

Sub-Section (1) of Section 11 of the Act provides that subject to any rules that may

be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National

Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think it

fit. The Central Government has framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,

1957.” Rule 10-B (9) reads thus:—

“10-B (9) In case any party defaults or fails to appear at any stage the Labour Court,

Tribunal, or National Tribunal, as the case may be, may proceed with the reference ex-

parte and decide the reference application in the absence of the defaulting party.”

9.

Rule 22 reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.- If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

10. The State of Himachal Pradesh has also framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes

Rules, 1974.” Rule 25 thereof reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.— If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

11. Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 and Rule 25 of the

Industrial Disputes Rules, 1974 authorize the adjudicating authority to proceed in the absence of a

party. It creates a fiction which enables the Tribunal to presume that all the parties are present

before it although, in fact, it is not true, and thus make an ex parte award. This Tribunal in these

circumstances has to imagine that the absentee workman is present and having done so, can give

full effect to its imagination and carry it to its logical end. Under Rule 25, this Tribunal, thus, has

to imagine that the workman is present, he is unwilling to adduce evidence or argue his case.

12. In the instant case, neither the petitioner nor his counsel had put in appearance

before this Tribunal on 5.9.2019. In these circumstances, the Tribunal can proceed and pass ex

parte award on its merits.

13. Since, it is disputed by the respondent that the services of the petitioner had been

engaged on daily wage basis, so firstly it was required of the petitioner to prove on record that he

7282

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

had been engaged by the respondent on daily waged basis and then to establish on record, as per

the reference, that the termination of his services in the year 2016 by the respondent was

without complying with the provisions of the Act and, thus, illegal and unjustified. Though, a

statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner, but his allegations therein have remained a

mere saying on record, as no evidence in support thereof has been led by him. At the risk of

repetition, the petitioner had not put in appearance before this Tribunal. In this view of the

matter, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief, as claimed for in the statement of claim.

14. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, the present claim petition

merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs. The reference is

answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for

publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion be consigned to the Record

Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 5th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 29/2018

Date of Institution : 28.3.2018

Date of Decision

: 05.09.2019

Shri Gianu s/o Shri Mohan, r/o Village Banotu, P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The General Manager, M/S Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village Kurtha, P.O. Saho,

Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: None for the petitioner

For the Respondent

: Shri Dharam Malhotra, Adv.

7283

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Gianu s/o Shri Mohan, r/o Village Banotu,

P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P. during February, 2016 (as alleged by the

workman) by the General Manager, M/S Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village Kurtha, P.O.

Saho, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from

the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

initially engaged as a daily waged labourer on muster-roll basis by the respondent without any

appointment letter in the year 2012. He thereafter had worked continuously with the respondent

for many years. It was undertaken by the respondent that the company would provide a job for

forty years to the petitioner, as his land was used in the construction of the hydro project.

However, during February, 2016 his services were orally terminated by the respondent. He being a

poor man, having no source of income, had approached the respondent many a times to re-

engage him, but without success. No one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for

retrenchment had been given to him, nor any retrenchment compensation was paid. The

respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). While terminating his services, the respondent had

also not followed the principle of ‘last come first go’, as person junior to him were retained in

service continuously without any breaks and they have also been regularized. No opportunity of

re-employment was ever given to him. Provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act were

also violated by the respondent. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability, locus standi, non-joinder and misjoinder of parties, suppression of

material facts and cause of action. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was

asserted that the petitioner had never been engaged as a labourer by the respondent. No land of

his had ever been acquired or purchased by the respondent. So, providing him a job for forty

years did not arise. Only those families were provided the job, whose lands had been acquired/

purchased by the respondent. Since, the petitioner had never been engaged by the

respondent, the question of termination of his services did not arise. It was denied that the

respondent had not complied with the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act.

The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent heard and records gone

through.

5.

The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent during February, 2016 by violating

the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis on muster-roll as a labourer in the year 2012. It was also his

claim that he had completed 240 days in each calendar year. A plea was also taken to the effect

that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first go’, as persons junior to

the petitioner were retained and that fresh hands had also been engaged. It was also asserted that

no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required

to be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

7284

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

6.

However, when the case was listed for filing of rejoinder and documents by the

petitioner for 05.9.2019, neither he nor his counsel had put in appearance before this Tribunal,

despite the case being called several times since morning. Hence, despite due notice of the date

of hearing, the petitioner had remained ex parte.

7.

It will be apt at this stage to take note of the relevant provisions of the Act.

Section 2 (b) of the Act defines the Award as under:—

“(b) “award” means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any

question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial

Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10A;”.

8.

Sub-Section (1) of Section 11 of the Act provides that subject to any rules that may

be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National

Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think it

fit. The Central Government has framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,

1957.” Rule 10-B (9) reads thus:—

“10-B (9) In case any party defaults or fails to appear at any stage the Labour Court,

Tribunal, or National Tribunal, as the case may be, may proceed with the reference ex-

parte and decide the reference application in the absence of the defaulting party.”

9.

Rule 22 reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.—If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

10. The State of Himachal Pradesh has also framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes

Rules, 1974.” Rule 25 thereof reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.- If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

11. Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 and Rule 25 of the

Industrial Disputes Rules, 1974 authorize the adjudicating authority to proceed in the absence of a

party. It creates a fiction which enables the Tribunal to presume that all the parties are present

before it although, in fact, it is not true, and thus make an ex parte award. This Tribunal in these

circumstances has to imagine that the absentee workman is present and having done so, can give

full effect to its imagination and carry it to its logical end. Under Rule 25, this Tribunal, thus, has

to imagine that the workman is present, he is unwilling to adduce evidence or argue his case.

12. In the instant case, neither the petitioner nor his counsel had put in appearance

before this Tribunal on 5.9.2019. In these circumstances, the Tribunal can proceed and pass ex

parte award on its merits.

13. Since, it is disputed by the respondent that the services of the petitioner had been

engaged on daily wage basis, so firstly it was required of the petitioner to prove on record that he

7285

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

had been engaged by the respondent on daily waged basis and then to establish on record, as per

the reference, that the termination of his services in the year 2016 by the respondent was

without complying with the provisions of the Act and, thus, illegal and unjustified. Though, a

statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner, but his allegations therein have remained a

mere saying on record, as no evidence in support thereof has been led by him. At the risk of

repetition, the petitioner had not put in appearance before this Tribunal. In this view of the

matter, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief, as claimed for in the statement of claim.

14. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, the present claim petition

merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs. The reference is

answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for

publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion be consigned to the Record

Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 5th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 30/2018

Date of Institution

: 28.3.2018

Date of Decision

: 05.09.2019

Shri Karmo s/o Shri Sidar, r/o Village Banotu, P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The General Manager, M/S Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village Kurtha, P.O. Saho,

Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: None for the petitioner

For the Respondent

: Shri Dharam Malhotra, Adv.

7286

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Karmo s/o Shri Sidar, r/o Village Banotu,

P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P. during February, 2016 (as alleged by the

workman) by the General Manager, M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village Kurtha, P.O.

Saho, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from

the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

initially engaged as a daily waged labourer on muster roll basis by the respondent without any

appointment letter in the year 2012. He thereafter had worked continuously with the respondent

for many years. It was undertaken by the respondent that the company would provide a job for

forty years to the petitioner, as his land was used in the construction of the hydro project.

However, during February, 2016 his services were orally terminated by the respondent. He being a

poor man, having no source of income, had approached the respondent many a times to re-

engage him, but without success. No one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for

retrenchment had been given to him, nor any retrenchment compensation was paid. The

respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). While terminating his services, the respondent had

also not followed the principle of ‘last come first go’, as person junior to him were retained in

service continuously without any breaks and they have also been regularized. No opportunity of

re-employment was ever given to him. Provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act were

also violated by the respondent. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability, locus standi, non-joinder and misjoinder of parties, suppression

of material facts and cause of action. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was

asserted that the petitioner had never been engaged as a labourer by the respondent. No land of

his had ever been acquired or purchased by the respondent. So, providing him a job for forty

years did not arise. Only those families were provided the job, whose lands had been

acquired/purchased by the respondent. Since, the petitioner had never been engaged by the

respondent, the question of termination of his services did not arise. It was denied that the

respondent had not complied with the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act.

The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent heard and records gone

through.

5.

The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent during February, 2016 by violating

the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis on muster roll as a labourer in the year 2012. It was also his

claim that he had completed 240 days in each calendar year. A plea was also taken to the effect

that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first go’, as persons junior to

the petitioner were retained and that fresh hands had also been engaged. It was also asserted that

no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required

to be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

7287

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

6.

However, when the case was listed for filing of rejoinder and documents by the

petitioner for 05.9.2019, neither he nor his counsel had put in appearance before this Tribunal,

despite the case being called several times since morning. Hence, despite due notice of the date

of hearing, the petitioner had remained ex parte.

7.

It will be apt at this stage to take note of the relevant provisions of the Act.

Section 2 (b) of the Act defines the Award as under:—

“(b) “award” means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of

any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National

Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10A;”.

8.

Sub-Section (1) of Section 11 of the Act provides that subject to any rules that may

be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National

Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think it

fit. The Central Government has framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,

1957.” Rule 10-B (9) reads thus:—

“10-B (9) In case any party defaults or fails to appear at any stage the Labour Court,

Tribunal, or National Tribunal, as the case may be, may proceed with the reference ex-

parte and decide the reference application in the absence of the defaulting party.”

9.

Rule 22 reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.- If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

10. The State of Himachal Pradesh has also framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes

Rules, 1974” Rule 25 thereof reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.—If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

11. Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 and Rule 25 of the

Industrial Disputes Rules, 1974 authorize the adjudicating authority to proceed in the absence of a

party. It creates a fiction which enables the Tribunal to presume that all the parties are present

before it although, in fact, it is not true, and thus make an ex parte award. This Tribunal in these

circumstances has to imagine that the absentee workman is present and having done so, can give

full effect to its imagination and carry it to its logical end. Under Rule 25, this Tribunal, thus, has

to imagine that the workman is present, he is unwilling to adduce evidence or argue his case.

12. In the instant case, neither the petitioner nor his counsel had put in appearance

before this Tribunal on 5.9.2019. In these circumstances, the Tribunal can proceed and pass ex

parte award on its merits.

13. Since, it is disputed by the respondent that the services of the petitioner had been

engaged on daily wage basis, so firstly it was required of the petitioner to prove on record that he

7288

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

had been engaged by the respondent on daily waged basis and then to establish on record, as per

the reference, that the termination of his services in the year 2016 by the respondent was

without complying with the provisions of the Act and, thus, illegal and unjustified. Though, a

statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner, but his allegations therein have remained a

mere saying on record, as no evidence in support thereof has been led by him. At the risk of

repetition, the petitioner had not put in appearance before this Tribunal. In this view of the

matter, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief, as claimed for in the statement of claim.

14. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, the present claim petition

merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs. The reference is

answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for

publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion be consigned to the Record

Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 5th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 28/2018

Date of Institution

: 28.3.2018

Date of Decision

: 05.09.2019

Shri Sato Ram s/o Shri Hans Raj, r/o Village Banotu, P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The General Manager, M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village Kurtha, P.O. Saho,

Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: None for the petitioner

For the Respondent

: Shri Dharam Malhotra, Adv.

7289

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Sato Ram s/o Shri Hans Raj, r/o Village

Banotu, P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P. during February, 2016 (as alleged

by the workman) by the General Manager, M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village

Kurtha, P.O. Saho, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount

of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is

entitled to from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner, as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

initially engaged by the respondent on daily waged basis on muster roll as a labourer without any

appointment letter during the year 2012. The petitioner had been worked with the respondent

continuously for many years. The respondent had undertaken that the company will provide job

for a period of forty years to the petitioner/workman, as the land of the petitioner was given for

construction of the project. During February, 2016 the services of the petitioner had been

terminated by the respondent. The petitioner is a very poor man and as such he has no source of

income. After termination of his services, he had approached the respondent, but without success.

The services of the petitioner had orally been terminated by the respondent. The respondent had

not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter

referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). The petitioner had worked with the respondent uptil February,

2016, when his services were disengaged by the respondent illegally and wrongly without issuing

any prior notice to him, as required under Section 25-F of the Act. While terminating the services

of the petitioner, the respondent had not followed the principle of ‘last come first go’. The

respondent had not followed the mandatory provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the

Act. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability, misjoinder of necessary parties, suppression of material facts

and cause of action. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was asserted that the

answering respondent had never engaged the petitioner as a labourer. No land of the petitioner

had ever been acquired or purchased by the respondent, so the question of providing forty years

job to him does not arise. The petitioner was never engaged by the respondent so the question of

termination of his service did not arise. It was denied that the respondent had not complied with

the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The respondent, thus, pray for the

dismissal of the claim.

4.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent heard and records gone

through.

5.

The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent during February, 2016 by violating

the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis on muster roll as a labourer in the year 2012. It was also his

claim that he had completed 240 days in each calendar year. A plea was also taken to the effect

that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first go’, as persons junior to

the petitioner were retained and that fresh hands had also been engaged. It was also asserted that

no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required

to be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

7290

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

6.

However, when the case was listed for filing of the rejoinder and documents for

05.9.2019, neither he nor his counsel had put in appearance before this Tribunal, despite the case

being called several times since morning. Hence, despite due notice of the date of hearing, the

petitioner had remained ex parte.

7.

It will be apt at this stage to take note of the relevant provisions of the Act.

Section 2 (b) of the Act defines the Award as under:—

“(b) “award” means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any

question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial

Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10A;”.

8.

Sub-Section (1) of Section 11 of the Act provides that subject to any rules that may

be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National

Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think it

fit. The Central Government has framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,

1957.” Rule 10-B (9) reads thus:—

“10-B (9) In case any party defaults or fails to appear at any stage the Labour Court,

Tribunal, or National Tribunal, as the case may be, may proceed with the reference ex-

parte and decide the reference application in the absence of the defaulting party.”

9.

Rule 22 reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.- If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

10. The State of Himachal Pradesh has also framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes

Rules, 1974.” Rule 25 thereof reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.— If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

11. Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 and Rule 25 of the

Industrial Disputes Rules, 1974 authorize the adjudicating authority to proceed in the absence of a

party. It creates a fiction which enables the Tribunal to presume that all the parties are present

before it although, in fact, it is not true, and thus make an ex parte award. This Tribunal in these

circumstances has to imagine that the absentee workman is present and having done so, can give

full effect to its imagination and carry it to its logical end. Under Rule 25, this Tribunal, thus, has

to imagine that the workman is present, they are unwilling to adduce evidence or argue their

case.

12. In the instant case, neither the petitioner nor his counsel had put in appearance

before this Tribunal on 5.9.2019. In these circumstances, the Tribunal can proceed and pass ex

parte award on its merits.

7291

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

13. Announced in the Open Court today this 5th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL)

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 32/2018

Date of Institution

: 28.3.2018

Date of Decision

: 05.09.2019

Shri Angrejo s/o Shri Basu, r/o Village Banotu, P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The General Manager, M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village Kurtha, P.O. Saho,

Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: None for the petitioner

For the Respondent

: Shri Dharam Malhotra, Adv.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Angrejo s/o Shri Basu, r/o Village Banotu,

P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P. during February, 2016 (as alleged by the

workman) by the General Manager, M/S Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village Kurtha, P.O.

Saho, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from

the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

initially engaged as a daily waged labourer on muster roll basis by the respondent without any

appointment letter in the year 2012. He thereafter had worked continuously with the respondent

for many years. It was undertaken by the respondent that the company would provide a job for

7292

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

forty years to the petitioner, as his land was used in the construction of the hydro project.

However, during February, 2016 his services were orally terminated by the respondent. He being a

poor man, having no source of income, had approached the respondent many a times to re-

engage him, but without success. No one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for

retrenchment had been given to him, nor any retrenchment compensation was paid. The

respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). While terminating his services, the respondent had

also not followed the principle of ‘last come first go’, as person junior to him were retained in

service continuously without any breaks and they have also been regularized. No opportunity of

re-employment was ever given to him. Provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act were

also violated by the respondent. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability, locus standi, non-joinder and misjoinder of parties, suppression

of material facts and cause of action. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was

asserted that the petitioner had never been engaged as a labourer by the respondent. No land of

his had ever been acquired or purchased by the respondent. So, providing him a job for forty

years did not arise. Only those families were provided the job, whose lands had been

acquired/purchased by the respondent. Since, the petitioner had never been engaged by the

respondent, the question of termination of his services did not arise. It was denied that the

respondent had not complied with the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act.

The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent heard and records gone

through.

5.

The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent during February, 2016 by violating

the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis on muster roll as a labourer in the year 2012. It was also his

claim that he had completed 240 days in each calendar year. A plea was also taken to the effect

that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first go’, as persons junior to

the petitioner were retained and that fresh hands had also been engaged. It was also asserted that

no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required

to be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

6.

However, when the case was listed for filing of rejoinder and documents by the

petitioner for 05.9.2019, neither he nor his counsel had put in appearance before this Tribunal,

despite the case being called several times since morning. Hence, despite due notice of the date

of hearing, the petitioner had remained ex parte.

7.

It will be apt at this stage to take note of the relevant provisions of the Act.

Section 2 (b) of the Act defines the Award as under:—

“(b) “award” means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any

question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial

Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10A;”.

8.

Sub-Section (1) of Section 11 of the Act provides that subject to any rules that may

be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National

Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think it

7293

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

fit. The Central Government has framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,

1957.” Rule 10-B (9) reads thus:—

“10-B (9) In case any party defaults or fails to appear at any stage the Labour Court,

Tribunal, or National Tribunal, as the case may be, may proceed with the reference ex-

parte and decide the reference application in the absence of the defaulting party.”

9.

Rule 22 reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.— If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

10. The State of Himachal Pradesh has also framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes

Rules, 1974.” Rule 25 thereof reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.— If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

11. Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 and Rule 25 of the

Industrial Disputes Rules, 1974 authorize the adjudicating authority to proceed in the absence of a

party. It creates a fiction which enables the Tribunal to presume that all the parties are present

before it although, in fact, it is not true, and thus make an ex parte award. This Tribunal in these

circumstances has to imagine that the absentee workman is present and having done so, can give

full effect to its imagination and carry it to its logical end. Under Rule 25, this Tribunal, thus, has

to imagine that the workman is present, he is unwilling to adduce evidence or argue his case.

12. In the instant case, neither the petitioner nor his counsel had put in appearance

before this Tribunal on 5.9.2019. In these circumstances, the Tribunal can proceed and pass ex

parte award on its merits.

13. Since, it is disputed by the respondent that the services of the petitioner had been

engaged on daily wage basis, so firstly it was required of the petitioner to prove on record that he

had been engaged by the respondent on daily waged basis and then to establish on record, as per

the reference, that the termination of his services in the year 2016 by the respondent was

without complying with the provisions of the Act and, thus, illegal and unjustified. Though, a

statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner, but his allegations therein have remained a

mere saying on record, as no evidence in support thereof has been led by him. At the risk of

repetition, the petitioner had not put in appearance before this Tribunal. In this view of the

matter, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief, as claimed for in the statement of claim.

14. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, the present claim petition

merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs. The reference is

answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for

publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion be consigned to the Record

Room.

7294

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

Announced in the open Court today this 5th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 27/2018

Date of Institution

: 28.3.2018

Date of Decision

: 05.09.2019

Shri Chhanga Ram s/o Shri Chaudhary Ram, r/o Village Banotu, P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil &

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The General Manager, M/S Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village Kurtha, P.O. Saho,

Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: None for the petitioner

For the Respondent

: Shri Dharam Malhotra, Adv.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Chhanga Ram s/o Shri Chaudhary Ram, r/o

Village Banotu, P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P. during February, 2016 (as

alleged by the workman) by the General Manager, M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project,

Village Kurtha, P.O. Saho, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount

of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is

entitled to from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

initially engaged as a daily waged labourer on muster roll basis by the respondent without any

7295

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

appointment letter in the year 2012. He thereafter had worked continuously with the respondent

for many years. It was undertaken by the respondent that the company would provide a job for

forty years to the petitioner, as his land was used in the construction of the hydro project.

However, during February, 2016 his services were orally terminated by the respondent. He being a

poor man, having no source of income, had approached the respondent many a times to re-

engage him, but without success. No one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for

retrenchment had been given to him, nor any retrenchment compensation was paid. The

respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). While terminating his services, the respondent had

also not followed the principle of ‘last come first go’, as person junior to him were retained in

service continuously without any breaks and they have also been regularized. No opportunity of

re-employment was ever given to him. Provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act were

also violated by the respondent. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability, locus standi, non-joinder and misjoinder of parties, suppression

of material facts and cause of action. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was

asserted that the petitioner had never been engaged as a labourer by the respondent. No land of

his had ever been acquired or purchased by the respondent. So, providing him a job for forty

years did not arise. Only those families were provided the job, whose lands had been

acquired/purchased by the respondent. Since, the petitioner had never been engaged by the

respondent, the question of termination of his services did not arise. It was denied that the

respondent had not complied with the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act.

The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent heard and records gone

through.

5.

The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent during February, 2016 by violating

the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis on muster roll as a labourer in the year 2012. It was also his

claim that he had completed 240 days in each calendar year. A plea was also taken to the effect

that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first go’, as persons junior to

the petitioner were retained and that fresh hands had also been engaged. It was also asserted that

no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required

to be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

6.

However, when the case was listed for filing of rejoinder and documents by the

petitioner for 05.9.2019, neither he nor his counsel had put in appearance before this Tribunal,

despite the case being called several times since morning. Hence, despite due notice of the date

of hearing, the petitioner had remained ex parte.

7.

It will be apt at this stage to take note of the relevant provisions of the Act.

Section 2 (b) of the Act defines the Award as under:—

“(b) “award” means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any

question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial

Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10A;”.

8.

Sub-Section (1) of Section 11 of the Act provides that subject to any rules that may

be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National

7296

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think it

fit. The Central Government has framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,

1957.” Rule 10-B (9) reads thus:—

“10-B (9) In case any party defaults or fails to appear at any stage the Labour Court,

Tribunal, or National Tribunal, as the case may be, may proceed with the reference ex-

parte and decide the reference application in the absence of the defaulting party.”

9.

Rule 22 reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.—If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

10. The State of Himachal Pradesh has also framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes

Rules, 1974.” Rule 25 thereof reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.—If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

11. Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 and Rule 25 of the

Industrial Disputes Rules, 1974 authorize the adjudicating authority to proceed in the absence of a

party. It creates a fiction which enables the Tribunal to presume that all the parties are present

before it although, in fact, it is not true, and thus make an ex parte award. This Tribunal in these

circumstances has to imagine that the absentee workman is present and having done so, can give

full effect to its imagination and carry it to its logical end. Under Rule 25, this Tribunal, thus, has

to imagine that the workman is present, he is unwilling to adduce evidence or argue his case.

12. In the instant case, neither the petitioner nor his counsel had put in appearance

before this Tribunal on 5.9.2019. In these circumstances, the Tribunal can proceed and pass ex

parte award on its merits.

13. Since, it is disputed by the respondent that the services of the petitioner had been

engaged on daily wage basis, so firstly it was required of the petitioner to prove on record that he

had been engaged by the respondent on daily waged basis and then to establish on record, as per

the reference, that the termination of his services in the year 2016 by the respondent was

without complying with the provisions of the Act and, thus, illegal and unjustified. Though, a

statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner, but his allegations therein have remained a

mere saying on record, as no evidence in support thereof has been led by him. At the risk of

repetition, the petitioner had not put in appearance before this Tribunal. In this view of the

matter, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief, as claimed for in the statement of claim.

14. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, the present claim petition

merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs. The reference is

answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for

publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion be consigned to the Record

Room.

7297

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

Announced in the open Court today this 5th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 35/2018

Date of Institution

: 19.4.2018

Date of Decision

: 05.09.2019

Shri Rasilu s/o Shri Nudhu, r/o Village Banotu, P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The General Manager, M/S Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village Kurtha, P.O. Sahoo,

Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: None for the petitioner

For the Respondent

: Shri Dharam Malhotra, Adv.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Rasilu s/o Shri Nudhu, r/o Village Banotu,

P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P. during February, 2016 (as alleged by the

workman) by the General Manager, M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village Kurtha, P.O.

Saho, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from

the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

initially engaged as a daily waged labourer on muster roll basis by the respondent without any

appointment letter in the year 2012. He thereafter had worked continuously with the respondent

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for many years. It was undertaken by the respondent that the company would provide a job for

forty years to the petitioner, as his land was used in the construction of the hydro project.

However, during February, 2016 his services were orally terminated by the respondent. He being a

poor man, having no source of income, had approached the respondent many a times to re-

engage him, but without success. No one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for

retrenchment had been given to him, nor any retrenchment compensation was paid. The

respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). While terminating his services, the respondent had

also not followed the principle of ‘last come first go’, as person junior to him were retained in

service continuously without any breaks and they have also been regularized. No opportunity of

re-employment was ever given to him. Provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act were

also violated by the respondent. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability, locus standi, non-joinder and misjoinder of parties, suppression

of material facts and cause of action. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was

asserted that the petitioner had never been engaged as a labourer by the respondent. No land of

his had ever been acquired or purchased by the respondent. So, providing him a job for forty

years did not arise. Only those families were provided the job, whose lands had been acquired/

purchased by the respondent. Since, the petitioner had never been engaged by the

respondent, the question of termination of his services did not arise. It was denied that the

respondent had not complied with the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act.

The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent heard and records gone

through.

5.

The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent during February, 2016 by violating

the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis on muster-roll as a labourer in the year 2012. It was also his

claim that he had completed 240 days in each calendar year. A plea was also taken to the effect

that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first go’, as persons junior to

the petitioner were retained and that fresh hands had also been engaged. It was also asserted that

no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required

to be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

6.

However, when the case was listed for filing of rejoinder and documents by the

petitioner for 05.9.2019, neither he nor his counsel had put in appearance before this Tribunal,

despite the case being called several times since morning. Hence, despite due notice of the date

of hearing, the petitioner had remained ex parte.

7.

It will be apt at this stage to take note of the relevant provisions of the Act.

Section 2 (b) of the Act defines the Award as under:—

“(b) “award” means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of

any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National

Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10A;”.

8.

Sub-Section (1) of Section 11 of the Act provides that subject to any rules that

may be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National

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Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think it

fit. The Central Government has framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,

1957.” Rule 10-B (9) reads thus:—

“10-B (9) In case any party defaults or fails to appear at any stage the Labour Court,

Tribunal, or National Tribunal, as the case may be, may proceed with the reference ex-

parte and decide the reference application in the absence of the defaulting party.”

9.

Rule 22 reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.— If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

10. The State of Himachal Pradesh has also framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes

Rules, 1974.” Rule 25 thereof reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.—If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

11. Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 and Rule 25 of the

Industrial Disputes Rules, 1974 authorize the adjudicating authority to proceed in the absence of a

party. It creates a fiction which enables the Tribunal to presume that all the parties are present

before it although, in fact, it is not true, and thus make an ex parte award. This Tribunal in these

circumstances has to imagine that the absentee workman is present and having done so, can give

full effect to its imagination and carry it to its logical end. Under Rule 25, this Tribunal, thus, has

to imagine that the workman is present, he is unwilling to adduce evidence or argue his case.

12. In the instant case, neither the petitioner nor his counsel had put in appearance

before this Tribunal on 5.9.2019. In these circumstances, the Tribunal can proceed and pass ex

parte award on its merits.

13. Since, it is disputed by the respondent that the services of the petitioner had been

engaged on daily wage basis, so firstly it was required of the petitioner to prove on record that he

had been engaged by the respondent on daily waged basis and then to establish on record, as per

the reference, that the termination of his services in the year 2016 by the respondent was

without complying with the provisions of the Act and, thus, illegal and unjustified. Though, a

statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner, but his allegations therein have remained a

mere saying on record, as no evidence in support thereof has been led by him. At the risk of

repetition, the petitioner had not put in appearance before this Tribunal. In this view of the

matter, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief, as claimed for in the statement of claim.

14. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, the present claim petition

merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs. The reference is

answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for

publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion be consigned to the Record

Room.

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Announced in the open Court today this 5th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 25/2018

Date of Institution

: 28.3.2018

Date of Decision

: 06.09.2019

Shri Man Singh s/o Shri Jaram Singh, r/o Village Banotu, P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The General Manager, M/s Sahoo Hydro Power Project, Village Kurtha, P.O. Saho,

Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: None for the petitioner

For the Respondent

: Shri Dharam Malhotra, Adv.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Man Singh s/o Shri Jaram Singh, r/o

Village Banotu, P.O. Sahoo, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P. during February, 2016 (as

alleged by the workman) by the General Manager, M/S Sahoo Hydro Power Project,

Village Kurtha, P.O. Saho, Tehsil & District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount

of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is

entitled to from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

initially engaged as a daily waged labourer on muster roll basis by the respondent without any

appointment letter in the year 2012. He thereafter had worked continuously with the respondent

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for many years. It was undertaken by the respondent that the company would provide a job for

forty years to the petitioner, as his land was used in the construction of the hydro project.

However, during October, 2015 his services were orally terminated by the respondent. He being a

poor man, having no source of income, had approached the respondent many a times to re-

engage him, but without success. No one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for

retrenchment had been given to him, nor any retrenchment compensation was paid. The

respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). While terminating his services, the respondent had

also not followed the principle of ‘last come first go’, as person junior to him were retained in

service continuously without any breaks and they have also been regularized. No opportunity of

re-employment was ever given to him. Provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act were

also violated by the respondent. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability, locus standi, non-joinder and misjoinder of parties, suppression

of material facts and cause of action. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was

asserted that the petitioner had never been engaged as a labourer by the respondent. No land of

his had ever been acquired or purchased by the respondent. So, providing him a job for forty

years did not arise. Only those families were provided the job, whose lands had been acquired/

purchased by the respondent. Since, the petitioner had never been engaged by the

respondent, the question of termination of his services did not arise. It was denied that the

respondent had not complied with the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act.

The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent heard and records gone

through.

6.

The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent during October, 2015 by violating

the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis on muster roll as a labourer in the year 2012. It was also his

claim that he had completed 240 days in each calendar year. A plea was also taken to the effect

that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first go’, as persons junior to

the petitioner were retained and that fresh hands had also been engaged. It was also asserted that

no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required

to be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

7.

However, when the case was listed for filing of the documents and for settlement of

issues for 05.9.2019, neither the petitioner nor his counsel had put in appearance before this

Tribunal, despite the case being called several times since morning. Hence, despite due notice of

the date of hearing, the petitioner had remained ex parte.

8.

It will be apt at this stage to take note of the relevant provisions of the Act.

Section 2 (b) of the Act defines the Award as under:—

“(b) “award” means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any

question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial

Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10A;”.

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9.

Sub-Section (1) of Section 11 of the Act provides that subject to any rules that may

be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National

Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think it

fit. The Central Government has framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,

1957.” Rule 10-B (9) reads thus:—

“10-B (9) In case any party defaults or fails to appear at any stage the Labour Court,

Tribunal, or National Tribunal, as the case may be, may proceed with the reference ex-

parte and decide the reference application in the absence of the defaulting party.”

10. Rule 22 reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.—If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

11. The State of Himachal Pradesh has also framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes

Rules, 1974.” Rule 25 thereof reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.—If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

12. Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 and Rule 25 of the

Industrial Disputes Rules, 1974 authorize the adjudicating authority to proceed in the absence of a

party. It creates a fiction which enables the Tribunal to presume that all the parties are present

before it although, in fact, it is not true, and thus make an ex parte award. This Tribunal in these

circumstances has to imagine that the absentee workman is present and having done so, can give

full effect to its imagination and carry it to its logical end. Under Rule 25, this Tribunal, thus, has

to imagine that the workman is present, he is unwilling to adduce evidence or argue his case.

13. In the instant case, neither the petitioner nor his counsel had put in appearance

before this Tribunal on 6.9.2019. In these circumstances, the Tribunal can proceed and pass ex

parte award on its merits.

14. Since, it is disputed by the respondent that the services of the petitioner had been

engaged on daily wage basis, so firstly it was required of the petitioner to prove on record that he

had been engaged by the respondent on daily waged basis and then to establish on record, as per

the reference, that the termination of his services in the year 2015 by the respondent was

without complying with the provisions of the Act and, thus, illegal and unjustified. Though, a

statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner, but his allegations therein have remained a

mere saying on record, as no evidence in support thereof has been led by him. At the risk of

repetition, the petitioner had not put in appearance before this Tribunal. In this view of the

matter, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief, as claimed for in the statement of claim.

15. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, the present claim petition

merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs. The reference is

answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for

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publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion be consigned to the Record

Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 6th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref No.

: 221/2016

Date of Institution

: 11.4.2016

Date of Decision

: 06.09.2019

Shri Hari Singh s/o Shri Gian Chand, r/o Village and Post Officce Kothi, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. Rajeev Dharmani, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Uday Singh, DDA

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Hari Singh s/o Shri Gian Chand, r/o

Village and Post Office Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2005

by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P., who had worked as beldar on daily wages and has raised his industrial dispute after

more than 6 years vide demand notice dated-nil-received on 31.10.2011, without

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complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not,

keeping in view of delay of more than 6 years in raising the industrial dispute, what

amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-

worker is entitled to from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner, as it emerges from the statement of claim, is that he was

appointed as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis, without any appointment letter, in the year

1997. He continuously worked with intermittent breaks uptil October, 2005 with the respondent.

Fictional breaks were given from time to time so that 160 days could not be completed in

each calendar year. It is also an averment that the respondent had not maintained the seniority

and persons junior to the petitioner have been allowed to continue as beldars. The respondent

had violated the principle of ‘first come last go’. For the tribal area, the State of Himachal

Pradesh had framed a policy for regularization of daily waged workers who had worked for

160 days in each calendar year. It is further the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had

been retrenched without giving notice of retrenchment and compensation in lieu thereof. The

breaks were to be counted as continuous service for the purpose of calculation of 160 days, as

provided under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as

‘the Act’ for short). At the time of his termination, the persons junior to him were retained in

service by the respondent. The names of the juniors, who were retained in service by the

respondent are S/Shri Suraj Ram, Chunku, Budhi Ram and Dev Raj. He was not given an

opportunity of reemployment. From the date of his disengagement, he is unemployed. He had

approached the respondent time and again to re-engage his services, but in vain. He is entitled to

regularization after completion of eight years of service with all consequential benefits. He has

been discriminated. The act and conduct of the respondent is illegal and unjustified. It is also

violative of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-

engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on account of delay and laches. It

was asserted that the petitioner was engaged as a daily waged beldar in the year 1998 and who

remained engaged till the year 2005. He had worked intermittently with the department and had

left the job of his own sweet will, and had been coming to work at his own convenience. No

fictional breaks had ever been given to him by the respondent. He had not completed 160 days in

any calendar year, as required for the tribal area of Pangi Tehsil, as is evident from the mandays

chart. It was also asserted that the services of the petitioner had never been terminated by the

respondent. He had never approached the respondent and had left the work of his own sweet will

and volition. Regarding the allegation of engagement of persons junior to the petitioner, it was

asserted that they were appointed as per the orders of the Labour Court. No other workmen

junior to the petitioner had ever been retained in service by the respondent. Since, the petitioner

had left the job of his own, there was no need of serving a notice upon him or to pay one month

wages in lieu thereof. The respondent had not violated the principle of ‘last come first go’. If the

petitioner had been terminated in the year 2005, he certainly would have raised an industrial

dispute, but the same was raised by him before the Labour Officer only in the year 2012, i.e.

after about 07 years, hence the same is bad due to delay and laches. Since the services of the

petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, the question of issuance of notice or wages

in lieu thereof did not arise and there was also no necessity to charge-sheet or issue any notice to

him after his termination. It was specifically asserted that the petitioner was an agriculturist and

was gainfully employed, hence was not entitled for back wages. The respondent, thus, prays for

the dismissal of the claim.

4.

In the rejoinder, the petitioner has reiterated the contents of the petition/statement of

claim and refuted the objections put forth by the respondent.

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5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Tribunal vide order dated 14.6.2018:

1.

Whether termination of service of petitioner by the respondent during

October, 2005 is/was legal and justified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?.

. OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches as alleged?. . OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. No evidence was led by the petitioner and his evidence stood closed under the

orders of the Court, as despite being afforded ample and last opportunities, he had failed to lead

his evidence. Since, no evidence was led on record by the petitioner, the learned Deputy District

Attorney, as per his statement made at bar, did not want to lead any evidence on behalf of the

respondent.

7.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Deputy District

Attorney for the respondent heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Yes

Issue No. 2

: Negative

Issue No. 3

: No

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief

: Claim petition dismissed vide operative portion of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No. 1 and 2 :

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent in October, 2005 by violating the

provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged as a daily waged beldar in the year 1997 and had continuously worked as such till

the year 2005. It was also his claim that fictional breaks were given to him by the department so

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that he could not complete 160 days, as specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division of

Chamba District, instead of 240 days as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. A plea was

also taken by the petitioner that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first

go’, as persons junior to him were allowed to continuously work without any breaks and who

had completed 160 days from the dates of their initial engagement. It was also asserted that no

opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required to

be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

11. It is an admitted case of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged

as a daily waged beldar.

12. It was contended by the learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent that the

petitioner had not worked for 160 days during the preceding twelve months on daily wages and,

therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Act. The case

of the petitioner is that he had completed working for more than 160 days in a year, the

purported order of retrenchment is illegal, as conditions precedent as contained in Section 25-F

of the Act were not complied with.

13. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date

with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer

240 days within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. However, the

number of minimum requisite days specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division in

Chamba District is 160 days. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that he had

worked for 160 days in preceding twelve calendar months prior to his alleged retrenchment. The

law on this issue is well settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1

SCC 106, it has been laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the

claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year.

14. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, it was required of the petitioner to establish on record that he had worked continuously for a

period 160 days in a block of twelve calendar months anterior to the date of his alleged

termination, which as per the reference took place in the month of October, 2005. No mandays

chart of the petitioner is there on the file to establish that he had worked continuously for a

period of 160 days in a block of twelve calendar months prior to the date of his alleged

termination, as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F

of the Act are not attracted in this case.

15. The principle of “last come first go” is envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The

said Section provides:

“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment,

who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of

workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer

and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who

was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the

employer retrenches any other workman”.

16. The petitioner in paragraph 10 of the statement of claim maintained that at the

time his services were terminated, the workmen, namely, S/Shri Suraj Ram, Chuku Ram, Budhi

Ram and Dev Raj, who were junior to him, were retained in service by the respondent. This

averment has not been established, as no seniority list of beldar category has been placed and

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exhibited on record by the petitioner to show that persons junior to him were still serving the

respondent/department. Therefore, it cannot be held that the respondent had violated the

provisions of Section 25-G of the Act.

17. It is not the case of the petitioner that after his alleged disengagement, new/fresh

hands had been engaged by the respondent. That being so, the provisions of Section 25-H of the

Act are also not attracted in this case.

18. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, the petitioner is held to be not

entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in favour of

the respondent.

Issue No. 3 :

19. It has not been shown by the respondent as to how the present petition/statement of

claim is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned Deputy

District Attorney appearing for the respondent at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the

pleadings, it cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not maintainable. Hence, this

issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

Issue No. 4 :

20. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society

Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the

proceeding under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the

ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as

a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence.

No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay

alone”.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 631/2016

Date of Institution

: 01.9.2016

Date of Decision

: 06.09.2019

Smt. Sato Devi w/o Shri Inder Singh, r/o Village Bishthow, P.O. Luj, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

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Versus

The Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. Rajeev Dharmani, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Uday Singh, DDA

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Smt. Sato Devi w/o Shri Inder Singh, r/o

Village Bishthow, P.O. Luj, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September,

2004 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P., who had worked as beldar on daily wages and has raised her industrial

dispute after more than 7 years vide demand notice dated 21.12.2011, without

complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not,

keeping in view of delay of more than 7 years in raising the industrial dispute, what

amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-

worker is entitled to from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

initially engaged as a daily waged labourer on muster roll basis by the respondent without any

appointment letter in the year 2012. He thereafter had worked continuously with the respondent

for many years. It was undertaken by the respondent that the company would provide a job for

forty years to the petitioner, as his land was used in the construction of the hydro project.

However, during February, 2016 his services were orally terminated by the respondent. He being a

poor man, having no source of income, had approached the respondent many a times to re-

engage him, but without success. No one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for

retrenchment had been given to him, nor any retrenchment compensation was paid. The

respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). While terminating his services, the respondent had

also not followed the principle of ‘last come first go’, as person junior to him were retained in

service continuously without any breaks and they have also been regularized. No opportunity of

re-employment was ever given to him. Provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act were

also violated by the respondent. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability, locus standi, non-joinder and misjoinder of parties, suppression

of material facts and cause of action. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was

asserted that the petitioner had never been engaged as a labourer by the respondent. No land of

his had ever been acquired or purchased by the respondent. So, providing him a job for forty

years did not arise. Only those families were provided the job, whose lands had been acquired/

purchased by the respondent. Since, the petitioner had never been engaged by the

respondent, the question of termination of his services did not arise. It was denied that the

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respondent had not complied with the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act.

The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent heard and records gone

through.

5.

The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent during February, 2016 by violating

the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis on muster-roll as a labourer in the year 2012. It was also his

claim that he had completed 240 days in each calendar year. A plea was also taken to the effect

that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first go’, as persons junior to

the petitioner were retained and that fresh hands had also been engaged. It was also asserted that

no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required

to be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

6.

However, when the case was listed for filing of rejoinder and documents by the

petitioner for 05.9.2019, neither he nor his counsel had put in appearance before this Tribunal,

despite the case being called several times since morning. Hence, despite due notice of the date

of hearing, the petitioner had remained ex parte.

7.

It will be apt at this stage to take note of the relevant provisions of the Act.

Section 2 (b) of the Act defines the Award as under:—

“(b) “award” means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any

question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial

Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10A;”.

8.

Sub-Section (1) of Section 11 of the Act provides that subject to any rules that may

be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National

Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think it

fit. The Central Government has framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,

1957.” Rule 10-B (9) reads thus:—

“10-B (9) In case any party defaults or fails to appear at any stage the Labour Court,

Tribunal, or National Tribunal, as the case may be, may proceed with the reference ex-

parte and decide the reference application in the absence of the defaulting party.”

9.

Rule 22 reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.—If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

10. The State of Himachal Pradesh has also framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes

Rules, 1974.” Rule 25 thereof reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-

parte.— If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a

Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend

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or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.”

11. Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 and Rule 25 of the

Industrial Disputes Rules, 1974 authorize the adjudicating authority to proceed in the absence of a

party. It creates a fiction which enables the Tribunal to presume that all the parties are present

before it although, in fact, it is not true, and thus make an ex parte award. This Tribunal in these

circumstances has to imagine that the absentee workman is present and having done so, can give

full effect to its imagination and carry it to its logical end. Under Rule 25, this Tribunal, thus, has

to imagine that the workman is present, he is unwilling to adduce evidence or argue his case.

12. In the instant case, neither the petitioner nor his counsel had put in appearance

before this Tribunal on 8.8.2019. In these circumstances, the Tribunal can proceed and pass ex

parte award on its merits.

13. Since, it is disputed by the respondent that the services of the petitioner had been

engaged on daily wage basis, so firstly it was required of the petitioner to prove on record that he

had been engaged by the respondent on daily waged basis and then to establish on record, as per

the reference, that the termination of his services in the year 2016 by the respondent was

without complying with the provisions of the Act and, thus, illegal and unjustified. Though, a

statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner, but his allegations therein have remained a

mere saying on record, as no evidence in support thereof has been led by him. At the risk of

repetition, the petitioner had not put in appearance before this Tribunal. In this view of the

matter, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief, as claimed for in the statement of claim.

14. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, the present claim petition

merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs. The reference is

answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for

publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion be consigned to the Record

Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 5th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 51/2017

Date of Institution

: 24.1.2017

Date of Decision

: 06.09.2019

Shri Devi Chand s/o Shri Duni Chand, r/o Village Kulal, P.O. Mindhal, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

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Versus

The Executive Engineer, IPH Division Pangi at Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. O. P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Uday Singh, DDA

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Sh. Devi Chand s/o Sh. Duni Chand, Village

Kulal, P.O. Mindhal, Tehsil Pangi, Distt. Chamba, H.P. during the year 2004, by the

Executive Engineer, IPH & HPPWD Division, Pangi at Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. who had worked as beldar on daily wages basis during the year 1999 and

thereafter during the year 2001 to 2004 only for 220 days and has raised his industrial

dispute vide demand notice dated 26/10/2015 after more than 10 years, allegedly without

complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and

justified? If not, keeping in view of working period as mentioned above and delay of

more than 10 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to

from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner, as it emerges from the statement of claim, is that he was

appointed as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis, without any appointment letter, in the year

1996. He continuously worked with intermittent breaks uptil October, 2005 with the respondent.

Fictional breaks were given from time to time so that 160 days could not be completed in

each calendar year. It is also an averment that the respondent had not maintained the seniority

and persons junior to the petitioner have been allowed to continue as beldars. The respondent

had violated the principle of ‘first come last go’. For the tribal area, the State of Himachal

Pradesh had framed a policy for regularization of daily waged workers who had worked for

160 days in each calendar year. It is further the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had

been retrenched without giving notice of retrenchment and compensation in lieu thereof. The

breaks were to be counted as continuous service for the purpose of calculation of 160 days, as

provided under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as

‘the Act’ for short). At the time of his termination, the persons junior to him were retained in

service by the respondent. The names of the juniors, who were retained in service by the

respondent are S/Shri/Smt. Tek Chand, Bhag Dei, Ram Dei, Dev Raj and Bameshwar Dutt. He

was not given an opportunity of reemployment. From the date of his disengagement, he is

unemployed. He had approached the respondent time and again to re-engage his services, but in

vain. He is entitled to regularization after completion of eight years of service with all

consequential benefits. He has been discriminated. The act and conduct of the respondent is

illegal and unjustified. It is also violative of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The

petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all consequential benefits.

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3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on account of delay and laches.

The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was asserted that the petitioner was

engaged as a daily waged beldar in the year 1999 and who remained engaged till the year 2004.

He had worked intermittently with the department and had left the job of his own sweet will, and

had been coming to work at his own convenience. No fictional breaks had ever been given to

him by the respondent. He had not completed 160 days in any calendar year, as required for the

tribal area of Pangi Tehsil, as is evident from the mandays chart. It was also asserted that the

services of the petitioner had never been terminated by the respondent. He had never approached

the respondent and had left the work of his own sweet will and volition. Regarding the allegation

of engagement of persons junior to the petitioner, it was asserted that they were appointed as

per orders of the Labour Court. No other workmen junior to the petitioner had ever been retained

in service by the respondent. Since, the petitioner had left the job of his own, there was no need

of serving a notice upon him or to pay one month wages in lieu thereof. The respondent had

not violated the principle of ‘last come first go’. If the petitioner had been terminated in the

year 2004, he certainly would have raised an industrial dispute, but the same was raised by him

before the Labour Officer only in the year 2015, i.e. after about 11 years, hence the same is

bad due to delay and laches. Since the services of the petitioner had not been terminated by the

respondent, the question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and there

was also no necessity to charge-sheet or issue any notice to him after his termination. It was

specifically asserted that the petitioner was an agriculturist and was gainfully employed, hence

was not entitled for back wages. The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

In the rejoinder, the petitioner has reiterated the contents of the petition/statement of

claim and refuted the objections put forth by the respondent.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Tribunal vide order dated 6.3.2018:

1.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent during year,

2004 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches as alleged?. . OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. No evidence was led by the petitioner and his evidence stood closed under the

orders of the Court, as despite being afforded ample and last opportunities, he had failed to lead

his evidence. Since, no evidence was led on record by the petitioner, the learned Deputy District

Attorney, as per his statement made at bar, did not want to lead any evidence on behalf of the

respondent.

7.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Deputy District

Attorney for the respondent heard and records gone through.

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8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: No

Issue No. 2

: Negative

Issue No. 3

: No

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief

: Claim petition dismissed vide operative portion of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 and 2 :

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent in October, 2005 by violating the

provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged as a daily waged beldar in the year 1996 and had continuously worked as such till

the year 2005. It was also his claim that fictional breaks were given to him by the department so

that he could not complete 160 days, as specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division of

Chamba District, instead of 240 days as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. A plea was

also taken by the petitioner that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first

go’, as persons junior to him were allowed to continuously work without any breaks and who

had completed 160 days from the dates of their initial engagement. It was also asserted that no

opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required to

be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

11. It is an admitted case of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged

as a daily waged beldar.

12. It was contended by the learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent that the

petitioner had not worked for 160 days during the preceding twelve months on daily wages and,

therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Act. The case

of the petitioner is that he had completed working for more than 160 days in a year, the

purported order of retrenchment is illegal, as conditions precedent as contained in Section 25-F

of the Act were not complied with.

13. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date

with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer

240 days within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. However, the

number of minimum requisite days specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division in

Chamba District is 160 days. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that he had

worked for 160 days in preceding twelve calendar months prior to his alleged retrenchment. The

law on this issue is well settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1

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SCC 106, it has been laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the

claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year.

14. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, it was required of the petitioner to establish on record that he had worked continuously for a

period 160 days in a block of twelve calendar months anterior to the date of his alleged

termination, which as per the reference took place in the year 2004. No mandays chart of the

petitioner is there on the file to establish that he had worked continuously for a period of 160

days in a block of twelve calendar months prior to the date of his alleged termination, as

envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act

are not attracted in this case.

15. The principle of “last come first go” is envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The

said Section provides:

“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.— Where any workman in an industrial establishment,

who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of

workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer

and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who

was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the

employer retrenches any other workman”.

16. The petitioner in paragraph 10 of the statement of claim maintained that at the

time his services were terminated, the workmen, namely, S/Shri/Smt. Tek Chand, Bhag Dei,

Ram Dei, Dev Raj and Bameshwar Dutt, who were junior to him, were retained in service by the

respondent. This averment has not been established, as no seniority list of beldar category has

been placed and exhibited on record by the petitioner to show that persons junior to him were

still serving the respondent/department. Therefore, it cannot be held that the respondent had

violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act.

17. It is not the case of the petitioner that after his alleged disengagement, new/fresh

hands had been engaged by the respondent. That being so, the provisions of Section 25-H of the

Act are also not attracted in this case.

18. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, the petitioner is held to be not

entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in favour of

the respondent.

Issue No. 3 :

19. It has not been shown by the respondent as to how the present petition/statement of

claim is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned Deputy

District Attorney appearing for the respondent at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the

pleadings, it cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not maintainable. Hence, this

issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

Issue No. 4 :

20. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society

Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that:

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“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the

proceeding under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the

ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as

a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence.

No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay

alone”.

21. In view of the trite laid down in this ruling, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent.

Relief :

22. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

order as to costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to

the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 6th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref No.

: 332/2015

Date of Institution

: 05.8.2015

Date of Decision

: 06.09.2019

Shri Soni Ram s/o Shri Chanew, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

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For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Uday Singh, DDA

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Soni Ram s/o Shri Chanew,

r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

vide demand notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service

during October, 2003 suffers from delay and laches? If not, whether termination of the

services of Shri Soni Ram s/o Shri Chanew, r/o Village and Post Office Rei, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2003 without complying the provisions of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back

wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is

entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

The case of the petitioner, as it emerges from the statement of claim, is that he was

appointed as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in May, 1994. He continuously worked with

intermittent breaks uptil October, 2003 with the respondent. Fictional breaks were given from

time to time so that 160 days could not be completed in each calendar year. It is also an

averment that the respondent had not maintained the seniority and persons junior to the petitioner

have been allowed to continue as beldars. The respondent had violated the principle of ‘last come

first go’. For the tribal area, the State of Himachal Pradesh had framed a policy for regularization

of daily waged workers who had worked for 160 days in each calendar year. It is further the case

of the petitioner that the petitioner had been retrenched without giving notice of retrenchment

and compensation in lieu thereof. The breaks were to be counted as continuous service for the

purpose of calculation of 160 days, as provided under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). At the time of his termination, the

persons junior to him were retained in service by the respondent. The names of the juniors, who

were retained in service by the respondent are Shri Hukkam Chand and twenty six others. He

was not given an opportunity of reemployment. From the date of his disengagement, he is

unemployed. He had approached the respondent time and again to re-engage his services, but in

vain. He is entitled to regularization after completion of eight years of service with all

consequential benefits. He has been discriminated. The act and conduct of the respondent is

illegal and unjustified. It is also violative of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act and

Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement

with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on account of delay and laches.

The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was asserted that the petitioner was

engaged as a daily waged beldar in the year 1994 and who had worked intermittently with the

department uptil the year 2003 and had left the job of his own sweet will, and had been coming to

work at his own convenience. No fictional breaks had ever been given to him by the

respondent. He had not completed 160 days in any calendar year, as required for the tribal area

of Pangi Tehsil, as is evident from the mandays chart. It was also asserted that the services of the

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petitioner had never been terminated by the respondent. He had never approached the respondent

and had left the work of his own sweet will and volition. Regarding the allegation of engagement

of persons junior to the petitioner mentioned at serial Nos. 1 to 25 in para No. 4 of the claim

petition were appointed as per order of the Labour Court and at serial Nos. 26 & 27 as harness

case. No other workmen junior to the petitioner had ever been retained in service by the

respondent. Since, the petitioner had left the job of his own, there was no need of serving a

notice upon him or to pay one month wages in lieu thereof. The respondent had not violated the

principle of ‘last come first go’. If the petitioner had been terminated in the year 2003, he

certainly would have raised an industrial dispute, but the same was raised by him before the

Labour Officer only in the year 2011, i.e. after about 09 years, hence the same is bad due to

delay and laches. Since the services of the petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent,

the question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and there was also no

necessity to charge-sheet or issue any notice to him after his termination. It was specifically

asserted that the petitioner was an agriculturist and was gainfully employed, hence was not

entitled for back wages. The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Tribunal vide order dated 17.12.2015:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

02-02-2012 qua his laches as alleged? If so, its effect?

.OP

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

October, 2003 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue No. 1 or issue No. 2 or both are proved in affirmative, to what service

benefits the petitioner is entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. . OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. No evidence was led by the petitioner and his evidence stood closed under the

orders of the Court, as despite being afforded ample and last opportunities, he had failed to lead

his evidence. Since, no evidence was led on record by the petitioner, the learned Deputy District

Attorney, as per his statement made at bar, did not want to lead any evidence on behalf of the

respondent.

7.

Arguments of the learned Authorized Representative for the petitioner and the

learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: No

Issue No. 2

: No

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Issue No. 3

: Negative

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief

: Claim petition dismissed vide operative portion of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issue No. 2 and 3 :

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent in October, 2003 by violating the

provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis in May, 1994 and had continuously worked as such till

October, 2003. It was also his claim that fictional breaks were given to him by the department so

that he could not complete 160 days, as specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division of

Chamba District, instead of 240 days as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. A plea was

also taken by the petitioner that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first

go’, as persons junior to him were allowed to continuously work without any breaks and who

had completed 160 days from the dates of their initial engagement. It was also asserted that no

opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required to

be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

11. It is an admitted case of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged

as a daily waged beldar.

12. It was contended by the learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent that the

petitioner had not worked for 160 days during the preceding twelve months on daily wages and,

therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Act. The case

of the petitioner is that he had worked for more than 160 days in a year, the purported order of

retrenchment is illegal, as conditions precedent as contained in Section 25-F of the Act were not

complied with.

13. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. However, the

number of minimum requisite days specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division in Chamba

District is 160 days. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 160

days in preceding twelve calendar months prior to his alleged retrenchment. The law on this

issue is well settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, it has

been laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that

he had worked for 240 days in a given year.

14. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, it was required of the petitioner to establish on record that he had worked continuously for a

period 160 days in a block of twelve calendar months anterior to the date of his alleged

termination, which as per the reference took place in October, 2003. No mandays chart of the

7319

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petitioner is there on the file to establish that he had worked continuously for a period of 160

days in a block of twelve calendar months prior to the date of his alleged termination, as

envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act

are not attracted in this case.

15. The principle of “last come first go” is envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The

said Section provides:

“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment,

who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of

workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer

and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who

was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the

employer retrenches any other workman”.

16. The petitioner in paragraph 3 of the statement of claim maintained that at the time his

services were terminated, the workmen, namely, Shri Hukkam Chand and twenty six others who

were junior to him, were retained in service by the respondent. This averment has not been

established, as no seniority list of beldar category has been placed and exhibited on record by the

petitioner to show that persons junior to him were still serving the respondent/department.

Therefore, it cannot be held that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-G of

the Act.

17. It is not the case of the petitioner that after his alleged disengagement, new/fresh

hands had been engaged by the respondent. That being so, the provisions of Section 25-H of the

Act are also not attracted in this case.

18. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, the petitioner is held to be not

entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in favour of

the respondent.

Issue No. 4 :

19. It has not been shown by the respondent as to how the present petition/statement of

claim is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned Deputy

District Attorney appearing for the respondent at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the

pleadings, it cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not maintainable. Hence, this

issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

Issue No. 1 :

20. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society

Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the

proceeding under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the

ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as

a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence.

No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay

alone”.

21. In view of the trite laid down in this ruling, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent.

7320

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Relief :

22. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

order as to costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 6th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 417/2015

Date of Institution

: 10.9.2015

Date of Decision

: 06.09.2019

Ms. Chandro Devi d/o Shri Kewal Ram, r/o Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Uday Singh, DDA

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Ms. Chandro Devi D/O Shri

Kewal Ram, R/O Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

before the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. vide demand notice dated 27.08.2012 regarding her alleged illegal

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termination of services during October, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not,

Whether termination of services of Ms. Chandro Devi D/O Shri Kewal Ram, R/O

Village Shoon, P.O. Udeen, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive

Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during

October, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as

alleged by the worker, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is

entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

The case of the petitioner, as it emerges from the statement of claim, is that she was

appointed as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in May, 1997. She continuously

worked with intermittent breaks uptil October, 2004 with the respondent. Fictional breaks were

given from time to time so that 160 days could not be completed in each calendar year. It is also

an averment that the respondent had not maintained the seniority and persons junior to the

petitioner have been allowed to continue as beldars. The respondent had violated the principle of

‘last come first go’. For the tribal area, the State of Himachal Pradesh had framed a policy for

regularization of daily waged workers who had worked for 160 days in each calendar year. It is

further the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had been retrenched without giving notice of

retrenchment and compensation in lieu thereof. The breaks were to be counted as continuous

service for the purpose of calculation of 160 days, as provided under Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). At the time of her

termination, the persons junior to her were retained in service by the respondent. The names of

the juniors, who were retained in service by the respondent are Shri Hukkam Chand and twenty

six others. She was not given an opportunity of reemployment. From the date of her

disengagement, she is unemployed. She had approached the respondent time and again to re-

engage her services, but in vain. She is entitled to regularization after completion of eight years

of service with all consequential benefits. She has been discriminated. The act and conduct of the

respondent is illegal and unjustified. It is also violative of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the

Act and Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India. The petitioner, thus, prays for her re-

engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on account of delay and laches.

The contents of the petitioner were denied on merits. It has been denied that the services of the

petitioner were engaged by the respondent as a daily waged beldar on muster roll basis during

May, 1997 and that she had continuously worked with intermittent breaks uptil October, 2004. It

was asserted that the petitioner had never been engaged by the respondent to do any work. The

respondent, thus, pray for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Tribunal vide order dated 17.5.2016:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated

27-08-2012 qua her termination of service during October, 2004 by respondent

suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? ..OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during

October, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

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3.

If issue no.2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? .

. OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. No evidence was led by the petitioner and her evidence stood closed under the

orders of the Court, as despite being afforded ample and last opportunities, she had failed to lead

her evidence. Since, no evidence was led on record by the petitioner, the learned Deputy District

Attorney, as per his statement made at bar, did not want to lead any evidence on behalf of the

respondent.

7.

Arguments of the learned Authorized Representative for the petitioner and the

learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No.1

: No

Issue No.2

: No

Issue No.3

: Negative

Issue No.4

: No

Relief

: Claim petition dismissed vide operative portion of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issue No. 2 and 3 :

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that her services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent in October, 2004 by violating the

provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis in May, 1997 and had continuously worked as such till

October, 2004. It was also her claim that fictional breaks were given to her by the department so

that she could not complete 160 days, as specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division of

Chamba District, instead of 240 days as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. A plea was

also taken by the petitioner that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first

go’, as persons junior to her were allowed to continuously work without any breaks and who had

completed 160 days from the dates of their initial engagement. It was also asserted that no

opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required to

be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

7323

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11. It was contended by the learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent that the

petitioner had never been engaged by the respondent so the question of completing 160 days did

not arise, therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Act.

The case of the petitioner is that she had completed working for more than 160 days in a year,

the purported order of retrenchment is illegal, as conditions precedent as contained in Section

25-F of the Act were not complied with.

12. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, she will be deemed to be in continuous service. However, the

number of minimum requisite days specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division in Chamba

District is 160 days. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that she had worked for

160 days in preceding twelve calendar months prior to her alleged retrenchment. The law on this

issue is well settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, it has

been laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that

he had worked for 240 days in a given year.

13. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, it was required of the petitioner to establish on record that she had worked continuously

for a period 160 days in a block of twelve calendar months anterior to the date of her alleged

termination, which as per the reference took place in October, 2004. No mandays chart of the

petitioner is there on the file to establish that she had worked continuously for a period of 160

days in a block of twelve calendar months prior to the date of her alleged termination, as

envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act

are not attracted in this case.

14. The principle of “last come first go” is envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The

said Section provides:

“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment,

who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and she belongs to a particular category of

workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer

and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who

was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the

employer retrenches any other workman”.

15. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of the statement of claim maintained that at the time her

services were terminated, the workmen, namely, Shri Hukkam Chand and twenty six others who

were junior to her, were retained in service by the respondent. This averment has not been

established, as no seniority list of beldar category has been placed and exhibited on record by the

petitioner to show that persons junior to her were still serving the respondent/department.

Therefore, it cannot be held that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-G of

the Act.

16. It is not the case of the petitioner that after her alleged disengagement, new/fresh

hands had been engaged by the respondent. That being so, the provisions of Section 25-H of the

Act are also not attracted in this case.

17. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, the petitioner is held to be not

entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in favour of

the respondent.

7324

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Issue No. 4 :

18. It has not been shown by the respondent as to how the present petition/statement of

claim is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned Deputy

District Attorney appearing for the respondent at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the

pleadings, it cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not maintainable. Hence, this

issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

Issue No. 1 :

19. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society

Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the

proceeding under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the

ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as

a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence.

No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay

alone”.

20. In view of the trite laid down in this ruling, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent.

Relief :

21. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

order as to costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 6th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 428/2016

Date of Institution

: 19.8.2016

Date of Decision

: 06.09.2019

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Smt. Anita Kumari w/o Shri Ramesh Kumar, r/o Village Hillour, P.O. Sahali, Tehsil

Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Uday Singh, DDA

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of between Smt. Anita Kumari, w/o Shri

Ramesh Kumar, r/o Village Hillour, P.O. Sahali, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

during year, 2004 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Killar Division (Pangi)

District Chamba, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 as alleged by the workman, is legal and justified; whereas she has

raised the industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 27/08/2012 after lapse of more than

8 years. If not, keeping in view delay of more than 8 years in raising the industrial

dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation

the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner, as it emerges from the statement of claim, is that she was

appointed as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the year, 1996. She continuously

worked with intermittent breaks uptil the year 2004 with the respondent. Fictional breaks were

given from time to time so that 160 days could not be completed in each calendar year. It is also

an averment that the respondent had not maintained the seniority and persons junior to the

petitioner have been allowed to continue as beldars. The respondent had violated the principle of

‘last come first go’. For the tribal area, the State of Himachal Pradesh had framed a policy for

regularization of daily waged workers who had worked for 160 days in each calendar year. It is

further the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had been retrenched without giving notice of

retrenchment and compensation in lieu thereof. The breaks were to be counted as continuous

service for the purpose of calculation of 160 days, as provided under Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). At the time of her

termination, the persons junior to her were retained in service by the respondent. The names of

the juniors, who were retained in service by the respondent are Shri Hukkam Chand and twenty

seven others. She was not given an opportunity of reemployment. From the date of her

disengagement, she is unemployed. She had approached the respondent time and again to re-

engage her services, but in vain. She is entitled to regularization after completion of eight years

of service with all consequential benefits. She has been discriminated. The act and conduct of the

7326

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respondent is illegal and unjustified. It is also violative of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the

Act and Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India. The petitioner, thus, prays for her re-

engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on account of delay and laches.

The contents of the petitioner were denied on merits. It has been denied that the services of the

petitioner were engaged by the respondent as a daily waged beldar on muster-roll basis during

the year 1996 and that she had continuously worked with intermittent breaks uptil the year 2004. It

was asserted that the petitioner had never been engaged by the respondent to do any work. The

respondent, thus, pray for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Tribunal vide order dated 23.5.2018:

1.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent during year,

2004 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of

petitioner as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. No evidence was led by the petitioner and her evidence stood closed under the

orders of the Court, as despite being afforded ample and last opportunities, she had failed to lead

her evidence. Since, no evidence was led on record by the petitioner, the learned Deputy District

Attorney, as per his statement made at bar, did not want to lead any evidence on behalf of the

respondent.

7.

Arguments of the learned Authorized Representative for the petitioner and the

learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: No

Issue No. 2

: Negative

Issue No. 3

: No

Issue No. 4

: No

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Relief

: Claim petition dismissed vide operative portion of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issue No. 1 and 2 :

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that her services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent in the year 2004 by violating the

provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis in the year 1996 and had continuously worked as such till the

year 2004. It was also her claim that fictional breaks were given to her by the department so that

she could not complete 160 days, as specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division of

Chamba District, instead of 240 days as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. A plea was

also taken by the petitioner that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first

go’, as persons junior to her were allowed to continuously work without any breaks and who had

completed 160 days from the dates of their initial engagement. It was also asserted that no

opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required to

be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

11. It was contended by the learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent that the

petitioner had never been engaged by the respondent so the question of completing 160 days did

not arise, therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Act.

The case of the petitioner is that she had completed working for more than 160 days in a year,

the purported order of retrenchment is illegal, as conditions precedent as contained in Section

25-F of the Act were not complied with.

12. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, she will be deemed to be in continuous service. However, the

number of minimum requisite days specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division in Chamba

District is 160 days. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that she had worked for

160 days in preceding twelve calendar months prior to her alleged retrenchment. The law on this

issue is well settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, it has

been laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that

he had worked for 240 days in a given year.

13. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, it was required of the petitioner to establish on record that she had worked continuously

for a period 160 days in a block of twelve calendar months anterior to the date of her alleged

termination, which as per the reference took place in the year 2004. No mandays chart of the

petitioner is there on the file to establish that she had worked continuously for a period of 160

days in a block of twelve calendar months prior to the date of her alleged termination, as

envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act

are not attracted in this case.

14. The principle of “last come first go” is envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The

said Section provides:

7328

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment,

who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and she belongs to a particular category of

workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer

and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who

was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the

employer retrenches any other workman”.

15. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of the statement of claim maintained that at the time her

services were terminated, the workmen, namely, Shri Hukkam Chand and twenty seven others

who were junior to her, were retained in service by the respondent. This averment has not been

established, as no seniority list of beldar category has been placed and exhibited on record by the

petitioner to show that persons junior to her were still serving the respondent/department.

Therefore, it cannot be held that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-G of

the Act.

16. It is not the case of the petitioner that after her alleged disengagement, new/fresh

hands had been engaged by the respondent. That being so, the provisions of Section 25-H of the

Act are also not attracted in this case.

17. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, the petitioner is held to be not

entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in favour of

the respondent.

Issue No. 3 :

18. It has not been shown by the respondent as to how the present petition/statement of

claim is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned Deputy

District Attorney appearing for the respondent at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the

pleadings, it cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not maintainable. Hence, this

issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

Issue No. 4 :

19. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society

Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the

proceeding under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the

ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as

a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence.

No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay

alone”.

20. In view of the trite laid down in this ruling, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent.

Relief :

21. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

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order as to costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 6th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 375/2016

Date of Institution

: 02.6.2016

Date of Decision

: 06.09.2019

Smt. Neel Dei w/o Shri Shiv Charan, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, I.& P.H. Division Pangi at Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Uday Singh, DDA

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Smt. Neel Dei w/o Sh. Shiv Charan, Village

Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, Distt. Chamba, H.P. during 9/2004 by the Executive

Engineer, I &PH Division, Pangi Killar (Pangi), Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

who had worked as beldar on daily wages basis only for 616 days during the year 1997

to 2004 and has raised her industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 27/8/2012 after

about 8 years, allegedly without complying with the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of working period during

the year 1997 to 2004 and delay of more than 8 years in raising the industrial dispute,

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what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above

ex-worker is entitled to from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner, as it emerges from the statement of claim, is that she was

appointed as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the year, 1997. She continuously

worked with intermittent breaks uptil September, 2004 with the respondent. Fictional breaks

were given from time to time so that 160 days could not be completed in each calendar year. It is

also an averment that the respondent had not maintained the seniority and persons junior to the

petitioner have been allowed to continue as beldars. The respondent had violated the principle of

‘last come first go’. For the tribal area, the State of Himachal Pradesh had framed a policy for

regularization of daily waged workers who had worked for 160 days in each calendar year. It is

further the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had been retrenched without giving notice of

retrenchment and compensation in lieu thereof. The breaks were to be counted as continuous

service for the purpose of calculation of 160 days, as provided under Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). At the time of her

termination, the persons junior to her were retained in service by the respondent. The names of

the juniors, who were retained in service by the respondent are Shri Hukkam Chand and twenty

seven others. She was not given an opportunity of reemployment. From the date of her

disengagement, she is unemployed. She had approached the respondent time and again to re-

engage her services, but in vain. She is entitled to regularization after completion of eight years

of service with all consequential benefits. She has been discriminated. The act and conduct of the

respondent is illegal and unjustified. It is also violative of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the

Act and Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India. The petitioner, thus, prays for her re-

engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on account of delay and laches.

The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was asserted that the petitioner was

engaged as a daily waged beldar in the year 1997 and who had worked intermittently with the

department uptil the year 2004 and had left the job of her own sweet will, and had been coming to

work at her own convenience. No fictional breaks had ever been given to her by the

respondent. She had not completed 160 days in any calendar year, as required for the tribal area

of Pangi Tehsil, as is evident from the mandays chart. It was also asserted that the services of the

petitioner had never been terminated by the respondent. She had never approached the

respondent and had left the work of her own sweet will and volition. Regarding the allegation of

engagement of persons junior to the petitioner mentioned at serial Nos. 1 to 24, 26 & 28 in para

No. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of the Labour Court and at serial Nos. 25

& 27 as harness case. No other workmen junior to the petitioner had ever been retained in

service by the respondent. Since, the petitioner had left the job of her own, there was no need of

serving a notice upon her or to pay one month wages in lieu thereof. The respondent had not

violated the principle of ‘last come first go’. If the petitioner had been terminated in the year

2004, she certainly would have raised an industrial dispute, but the same was raised by her

before the Labour Officer only in the year 2012, i.e. after about 08 years, hence the same is bad

due to delay and laches. Since the services of the petitioner had not been terminated by the

respondent, the question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and there was

also no necessity to charge-sheet or issue any notice to her after her termination. It was

specifically asserted that the petitioner was an agriculturist and was gainfully employed, hence

was not entitled for back wages. The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

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5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Tribunal vide order dated 07.3.2018:

1.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent during Sept.,

2004 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches as alleged? .

. OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. No evidence was led by the petitioner and her evidence stood closed under the

orders of the Court, as despite being afforded ample and last opportunities, she had failed to lead

her evidence. Since, no evidence was led on record by the petitioner, the learned Deputy District

Attorney, as per his statement made at bar, did not want to lead any evidence on behalf of the

respondent.

7.

Arguments of the learned Authorized Representative for the petitioner and the

learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: No

Issue No. 2

: Negative

Issue No. 3

: No

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief

: Claim petition dismissed vide operative portion of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issue No.1 and 2 :

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that her services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent in the year 2004 by violating the

provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis in the year 1997 and had continuously worked as such till the

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year 2004. It was also her claim that fictional breaks were given to her by the department so that

she could not complete 160 days, as specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division of

Chamba District, instead of 240 days as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. A plea was

also taken by the petitioner that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first

go’, as persons junior to her were allowed to continuously work without any breaks and who had

completed 160 days from the dates of their initial engagement. It was also asserted that no

opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required to

be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

11. It is an admitted case of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged

as a daily waged beldar.

12. It was contended by the learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent that the

petitioner had not worked for 160 days during the preceding twelve months on daily wages and,

therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Act. The case

of the petitioner is that she had worked for more than 160 days in a year, the purported order of

retrenchment is illegal, as conditions precedent as contained in Section 25-F of the Act were not

complied with.

13. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, she will be deemed to be in continuous service. However, the

number of minimum requisite days specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division in Chamba

District is 160 days. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that she had worked for

160 days in preceding twelve calendar months prior to her alleged retrenchment. The law on this

issue is well settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, it has

been laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that

he had worked for 240 days in a given year.

14. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, it was required of the petitioner to establish on record that she had worked continuously

for a period 160 days in a block of twelve calendar months anterior to the date of her alleged

termination, which as per the reference took place in the year 2004. No mandays chart of the

petitioner is there on the file to establish that she had worked continuously for a period of 160

days in a block of twelve calendar months prior to the date of her alleged termination, as

envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act

are not attracted in this case.

15. The principle of “last come first go” is envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The

said Section provides:

“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment,

who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and she belongs to a particular category of

workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer

and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who

was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the

employer retrenches any other workman”.

16. The petitioner in paragraph 3 of the statement of claim maintained that at the time her

services were terminated, the workmen, namely, Shri Hukkam Chand and twenty seven others

who were junior to her, were retained in service by the respondent. This averment has not been

7333

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established, as no seniority list of beldar category has been placed and exhibited on record by the

petitioner to show that persons junior to her were still serving the respondent/department.

Therefore, it cannot be held that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-G of

the Act.

17. It is not the case of the petitioner that after her alleged disengagement, new/fresh

hands had been engaged by the respondent. That being so, the provisions of Section 25-H of the

Act are also not attracted in this case.

18. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, the petitioner is held to be not

entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in favour of

the respondent.

Issue No. 3 :

19. It has not been shown by the respondent as to how the present petition/statement of

claim is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned Deputy

District Attorney appearing for the respondent at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the

pleadings, it cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not maintainable. Hence, this

issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

Issue No. 4 :

20. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society

Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the

proceeding under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the

ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as

a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence.

No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay

alone”.

21. In view of the trite laid down in this ruling, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent.

Relief :

22. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

order as to costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 6th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 485/2016

Date of Institution

: 22.8.2016

Date of Decision

: 06.09.2019

Shri Ved Viyas s/o Shri Uday Chand, r/o V.P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar (Pangi) District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Uday Singh, DDA

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Ved Viyas s/o Shri Uday Chand, r/o

V.P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during 1999 by the Executive Engineer,

HP.PWD Division, Killar, District Chamba, H.P., who has worked as beldar on daily

wages basis and has raised his industrial dispute after more than 13 years, allegedly

without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and

justified? If not, keeping in view of working period of 147, 88 and 26 days during years

1997, 1998 and 1999 respectively and delay of more than 13 years in raising the

industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner, as it emerges from the statement of claim, is that he was

appointed as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1994. He continuously

worked with intermittent breaks uptil October, 2004 with the respondent. Fictional breaks were

given from time to time so that 160 days could not be completed in each calendar year. It is also

an averment that the respondent had not maintained the seniority and persons junior to the

petitioner have been allowed to continue as beldars. The respondent had violated the principle of

‘last come first go’. For the tribal area, the State of Himachal Pradesh had framed a policy for

regularization of daily waged workers who had worked for 160 days in each calendar year. It is

further the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had been retrenched without giving notice of

7335

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 08 Qjojh] 2021@19 ek?k] 1942

retrenchment and compensation in lieu thereof. The breaks were to be counted as continuous

service for the purpose of calculation of 160 days, as provided under Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). At the time of his

termination, the persons junior to him were retained in service by the respondent. The names of

the juniors, who were retained in service by the respondent are Shri Jai Dass and twenty two

others. He was not given an opportunity of reemployment. From the date of his disengagement, he

is unemployed. He had approached the respondent time and again to re-engage his services, but

in vain. He is entitled to regularization after completion of eight years of service with all

consequential benefits. He has been discriminated. The act and conduct of the respondent is

illegal and unjustified. It is also violative of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act and

Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement

with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on account of delay and laches.

The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was asserted that the petitioner was

engaged as a daily waged beldar in the year 1997 and who had worked intermittently with the

department uptil the year 1999 and had left the job of his own sweet will, and had been coming to

work at his own convenience. No fictional breaks had ever been given to him by the

respondent. He had not completed 160 days in any calendar year, as required for the tribal area

of Pangi Tehsil, as is evident from the mandays chart. It was also asserted that the services of the

petitioner had never been terminated by the respondent. He had never approached the respondent

and had left the work of his own sweet will and volition. Regarding the allegation of engagement

of persons junior to the petitioner mentioned at serial Nos. 1 to 19 and 21 & 23 in para No. 4 of

the claim petition were appointed as per order of the Labour Court and at serial Nos. 20 & 22 as

harness case. No other workmen junior to the petitioner had ever been retained in service by the

respondent. Since, the petitioner had left the job of his own, there was no need of serving a notice

upon him or to pay one month wages in lieu thereof. The respondent had not violated the

principle of ‘last come first go’. If the petitioner had been terminated in the year 1999, he

certainly would have raised an industrial dispute, but the same was raised by him before the Labour

Officer only in the year 2013, i.e. after about 14 years, hence the same is bad due to delay and

laches. Since the services of the petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, the question

of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and there was also no necessity to

charge-sheet or issue any notice to him after his termination. It was specifically asserted that

the petitioner was an agriculturist and was gainfully employed, hence was not entitled for

back wages. The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Tribunal vide order dated 12.6.2018:

1.

Whether termination of services of petitioner by the respondent during year, 1999

is/was legal and justified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. . OPR.

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4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches as alleged?

. . OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. No evidence was led by the petitioner and his evidence stood closed under the

orders of the Court, as despite being afforded ample and last opportunities, he had failed to lead

his evidence. Since, no evidence was led on record by the petitioner, the learned Deputy District

Attorney, as per his statement made at bar, did not want to lead any evidence on behalf of the

respondent.

7.

Arguments of the learned Authorized Representative for the petitioner and the

learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Yes

Issue No. 2

: Negative

Issue No. 3

: No

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief

: Claim petition dismissed vide operative portion of the

Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issue No. 1 and 2 :

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent in October, 2004 by violating the

provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis in the year 1994 and had continuously worked as such till

October, 2004. It was also his claim that fictional breaks were given to him by the department so

that he could not complete 160 days, as specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division of

Chamba District, instead of 240 days as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. A plea was

also taken by the petitioner that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first

go’, as persons junior to him were allowed to continuously work without any breaks and who

had completed 160 days from the dates of their initial engagement. It was also asserted that no

opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required to

be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

11. It is an admitted case of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged

as a daily waged beldar.

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12. It was contended by the learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent that the

petitioner had not worked for 160 days during the preceding twelve months on daily wages and,

therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Act. The case

of the petitioner is that he had worked for more than 160 days in a year, the purported order of

retrenchment is illegal, as conditions precedent as contained in Section 25-F of the Act were not

complied with.

13. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. However, the

number of minimum requisite days specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division in Chamba

District is 160 days. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 160

days in preceding twelve calendar months prior to his alleged retrenchment. The law on this

issue is well settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, it has

been laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that

he had worked for 240 days in a given year.

14. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, it was required of the petitioner to establish on record that he had worked continuously for a

period 160 days in a block of twelve calendar months anterior to the date of his alleged

termination, which as per the reference took place in the year 1999. No mandays chart of the

petitioner is there on the file to establish that he had worked continuously for a period of 160

days in a block of twelve calendar months prior to the date of his alleged termination, as

envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act

are not attracted in this case.

15. The principle of “last come first go” is envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The

said Section provides:

“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment,

who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of

workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer

and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who

was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the

employer retrenches any other workman”.

16. The petitioner in paragraph 4 of the statement of claim maintained that at the time his

services were terminated, the workmen, namely, Shri Jai Dass and twenty two others who were

junior to him, were retained in service by the respondent. This averment has not been

established, as no seniority list of beldar category has been placed and exhibited on record by the

petitioner to show that persons junior to him were still serving the respondent/department.

Therefore, it cannot be held that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-G of

the Act.

17. It is not the case of the petitioner that after his alleged disengagement, new/fresh

hands had been engaged by the respondent. That being so, the provisions of Section 25-H of the

Act are also not attracted in this case.

18. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, the petitioner is held to be not

entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in favour of

the respondent.

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Issue No. 3 :

19. It has not been shown by the respondent as to how the present petition/statement of

claim is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned Deputy

District Attorney appearing for the respondent at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the

pleadings, it cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not maintainable. Hence, this

issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

Issue No. 4 :

20. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society

Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the

proceeding under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the

ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as

a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence.

No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay

alone”.

21. In view of the trite laid down in this ruling, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent.

Relief :

22. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

order as to costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 6th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 297/2016

Date of Institution

: 12.5.2016

Date of Decision

: 06.09.2019

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Shri Dev Singh s/o Shri Hari Saran, r/o Village Kothi, P.O. Kothi Kironi, Tehsil Pangi,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent

: Sh. Uday Singh, DDA

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Sh. Dev Singh s/o Sh. Hari Saran, Village

Kothi, P.O. Kothi Kironi, Tehsil Pangi, Distt. Chamba, H.P. from 1999 by the Executive

Engineer HPPWD Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. who had

worked as beldar on daily wages basis only for 128 days from 1997 to 1999 and has

raised his industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 2/6/2012 after more than 11 years,

allegedly without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is

legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of working period mentioned as above and

delay of more than 11 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to

from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner, as it emerges from the statement of claim, is that he was

appointed as daily waged beldar on muster- roll basis in the year 1994. He continuously

worked with intermittent breaks uptil September, 2003 with the respondent. Fictional breaks

were given from time to time so that 160 days could not be completed in each calendar year. It is

also an averment that the respondent had not maintained the seniority and persons junior to the

petitioner have been allowed to continue as beldars. The respondent had violated the principle of

‘last come first go’. For the tribal area, the State of Himachal Pradesh had framed a policy for

regularization of daily waged workers who had worked for 160 days in each calendar year. It is

further the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had been retrenched without giving notice of

retrenchment and compensation in lieu thereof. The breaks were to be counted as continuous

service for the purpose of calculation of 160 days, as provided under Section 25-B of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). At the time of his

termination, the persons junior to him were retained in service by the respondent. The names of

the juniors, who were retained in service by the respondent are Shri Hukkam Chand and twenty

seven others. He was not given an opportunity of reemployment. From the date of his

disengagement, he is unemployed. He had approached the respondent time and again to re-

engage his services, but in vain. He is entitled to regularization after completion of eight years of

service with all consequential benefits. He has been discriminated. The act and conduct of the

respondent is illegal and unjustified. It is also violative of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the

Act and Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-

engagement with all consequential benefits.

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3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on account of delay and laches.

The contents of the petitioner were denied on merits. It was asserted that the petitioner was

engaged as a daily waged beldar in the year 1997 and who had worked intermittently with the

department uptil the year 2003 and had left the job of his own sweet will, and had been coming to

work at his own convenience. No fictional breaks had ever been given to him by the

respondent. He had not completed 160 days in any calendar year, as required for the tribal area

of Pangi Tehsil, as is evident from the mandays chart. It was also asserted that the services of the

petitioner had never been terminated by the respondent. He had never approached the respondent

and had left the work of his own sweet will and volition. Regarding the allegation of engagement

of persons junior to the petitioner mentioned at serial Nos. 1 to 24 and 26 & 28 in para No. 4 of

the claim petition were appointed as per order of the Labour Court and at serial Nos. 25 & 27 as

harness case. No other workmen junior to the petitioner had ever been retained in service by the

respondent. Since, the petitioner had left the job of his own, there was no need of serving a notice

upon him or to pay one month wages in lieu thereof. The respondent had not violated the

principle of ‘last come first go’. If the petitioner had been terminated in the year 2003, he

certainly would have raised an industrial dispute, but the same was raised by him before the Labour

Officer only in the year 2013, i.e. after about 10 years, hence the same is bad due to delay and

laches. Since the services of the petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, the question

of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and there was also no necessity to

charge-sheet or issue any notice to him after his termination. It was specifically asserted that

the petitioner was an agriculturist and was gainfully employed, hence was not entitled for

back wages. The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

In the rejoinder, the petitioner has reiterated the contents of the petition/statement of

claim and refuted the objections put forth by the respondent.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Tribunal vide order dated 04.10.2017:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent from 1999 is/was

improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form? . .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of the

petitioner as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. No evidence was led by the petitioner and his evidence stood closed under the

orders of the Court, as despite being afforded ample and last opportunities, he had failed to lead

his evidence. Since, no evidence was led on record by the petitioner, the learned Deputy District

Attorney, as per his statement made at bar, did not want to lead any evidence on behalf of the

respondent.

7.

Arguments of the learned Authorized Representative for the petitioner and the

learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent heard and records gone through.

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8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: No

Issue No. 2

: Negative

Issue No. 3

: No

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief

: Claim petition dismissed vide operative portion of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issue No.1 and 2 :

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent in September, 2003 by violating the

provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged on daily wage basis in the year 1994 and had continuously worked as such till

September, 2003. It was also his claim that fictional breaks were given to him by the department

so that he could not complete 160 days, as specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division of

Chamba District, instead of 240 days as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. A plea was

also taken by the petitioner that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first

go’, as persons junior to him were allowed to continuously work without any breaks and who

had completed 160 days from the dates of their initial engagement. It was also asserted that no

opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required to

be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

11. It is an admitted case of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged

as a daily waged beldar.

12. It was contended by the learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent that the

petitioner had not worked for 160 days during the preceding twelve months on daily wages and,

therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Act. The case

of the petitioner is that he had worked for more than 160 days in a year, the purported order of

retrenchment is illegal, as conditions precedent as contained in Section 25-F of the Act were not

complied with.

13. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. However, the

number of minimum requisite days specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division in Chamba

District is 160 days. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 160

days in preceding twelve calendar months prior to his alleged retrenchment. The law on this

issue is well settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, it has

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been laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that

he had worked for 240 days in a given year.

14. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, it was required of the petitioner to establish on record that he had worked continuously for a

period 160 days in a block of twelve calendar months anterior to the date of his alleged

termination, which as per the reference took place in the year 1999. No mandays chart of the

petitioner is there on the file to establish that he had worked continuously for a period of 160

days in a block of twelve calendar months prior to the date of his alleged termination, as

envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act

are not attracted in this case.

15. The principle of “last come first go” is envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The

said Section provides:

“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment,

who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of

workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer

and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who

was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the

employer retrenches any other workman”.

16. The petitioner in paragraph 3 of the statement of claim maintained that at the time his

services were terminated, the workmen, namely, Shri Hukkam Chand and twenty seven

others who were junior to him, were retained in service by the respondent. This averment has not

been established, as no seniority list of beldar category has been placed and exhibited on record

by the petitioner to show that persons junior to him were still serving the respondent/department.

Therefore, it cannot be held that the respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-G of

the Act.

17. It is not the case of the petitioner that after his alleged disengagement, new/fresh

hands had been engaged by the respondent. That being so, the provisions of Section 25-H of the

Act are also not attracted in this case.

18. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, the petitioner is held to be not

entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in favour of

the respondent.

Issue No. 3 :

19. It has not been shown by the respondent as to how the present petition/statement of

claim is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned Deputy

District Attorney appearing for the respondent at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the

pleadings, it cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not maintainable. Hence, this

issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

Issue No. 4 :

20. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society

Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the

proceeding under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the

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ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as

a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence.

No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay

alone”.

21. In view of the trite laid down in this ruling, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent.

Relief :

22. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

order as to costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 6th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 448/2016

Date of Institution

: 20.8.2016

Date of Decision

: 06.09.2019

Shri Jeet Singh s/o Shri Jai Dayal, r/o Village Gudes, P.O. Khushnagri, Tehsil Churah,

District Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, HPPWD Killar Division, (Pangi), Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba,

H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. Dharam Malhotra, Adv.

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For the Respondent

: Sh. Uday Singh, DDA

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Jeet Singh s/o Shri Ram Dayal, r/o

Village Gudes, P.O. Kushinagri, Tehsil Churah, District Chamba, H.P. During year 2005

by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Killar Division (Pangi), Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P. without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 as alleged by the workman, is legal and justified; whereas he has raised the dispute

vide demand notice dated 05/03/2013 after lapse of 7 years. If not, keeping in view delay

of more than 7 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to

from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner, as it emerges from the statement of claim, is that he was

appointed/engaged as a beldar w.e.f. August, 2001. He continuously worked without breaks. His

services had been disengaged without issuing any notice or reason on 1st November, 2004,

despite availability of work and funds. The respondent had engaged person juniors to him from

the year 2005 to 2014 without engaging the petitioner despite repeated request. The names of the

juniors, who were retained in service by the respondent are Sh. Gautam Singh, Shri Dev Raj and

Shri Sham Lal. The respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H

of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). The petitioner

had raised his demand notice on 21.4.2015 before the Labour Officer, but without success. The

petitioner has completed more than 160 days preceding twelve calendar months. The petitioner,

thus, prays for his re-engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on account of delay and laches.

The contents of the petitioner were denied on merits. It has been denied that the services of the

petitioner were engaged by the respondent as a daily waged beldar on muster roll basis during

August, 2001 and that he had continuously worked with the respondent uptil 1st November,

2004. It was asserted that the petitioner had never been engaged by the respondent to do any

work. The respondent, thus, pray for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Tribunal vide order dated 04.10.2018:

1.

Whether termination of service of petitioner by the respondent during year, 2005

is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

. .OPR.

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4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of

petitioner as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. No evidence was led by the petitioner and his evidence stood closed under the

orders of the Court, as despite being afforded ample and last opportunities, he had failed to lead

his evidence. Since, no evidence was led on record by the petitioner, the learned Deputy District

Attorney, as per his statement made at bar did not want to lead any evidence on behalf of the

respondent.

7.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Deputy District

Attorney for the respondent heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: No

Issue No. 2

: Negative

Issue No. 3

: No

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief

: Claim petition dismissed vide operative portion of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 and 2 :

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner claiming that his services

were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the respondent on 1st November, 2004 by violating

the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act. It was asserted that the petitioner had

been engaged as a daily waged beldar in August, 2001 and had continuously worked as such till

the year 2004. It was also his claim that fictional breaks were given to him by the department so

that he could not complete 160 days, as specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division of

Chamba District, instead of 240 days as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. A plea was

also taken by the petitioner that the respondent had not adhered to the principle of ‘last come first

go’, as persons junior to him were allowed to continuously work without any breaks and who

had completed 160 days from the dates of their initial engagement. It was also asserted that no

opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for re-engagement. These averments were required to

be established on record by the petitioner by way of ocular and/or documentary evidence.

11. It was contended by the learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent that the

petitioner had never been engaged by the respondent so the question of completing 160 days did

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not arise, therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Act.

The case of the petitioner is that he had completed working for more than 160 days in a year,

the purported order of retrenchment is illegal, as conditions precedent as contained in Section

25-F of the Act were not complied with.

12. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. However, the

number of minimum requisite days specified for the tribal area of Pangi Sub-Division in Chamba

District is 160 days. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 160

days in preceding twelve calendar months prior to his alleged retrenchment. The law on this

issue is well settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, it has

been laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that

he had worked for 240 days in a given year.

13. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, it was required of the petitioner to establish on record that he had worked continuously for a

period 160 days in a block of twelve calendar months anterior to the date of his alleged

termination, which as per the reference took place in the year 2005. No mandays chart of the

petitioner is there on the file to establish that he had worked continuously for a period of 160

days in a block of twelve calendar months prior to the date of his alleged termination, as

envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act

are not attracted in this case.

14. The principle of “last come first go” is envisaged under Section 25G of the Act. The

said Section provides:

“25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial

establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a

particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any

agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall

ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that

category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other

workman”.

15. The petitioner in paragraph 3 of the statement of claim maintained that at the time his

services were terminated, the workmen, namely, Shri Gautam Singh, Shri Dev Raj and Shri

Sham Lal, who were junior to him were retained in service by the respondent. This averment has

not been established, as no seniority list of beldar category has been placed and exhibited on

record by the petitioner to show that persons junior to him were still serving the respondent/

department. Therefore, it cannot be held that the respondent had violated the provisions of

Section 25-G of the Act.

16. It is not the case of the petitioner that after his alleged disengagement, new/fresh

hands had been engaged by the respondent. That being so, the provisions of Section 25-H of the

Act are also not attracted in this case.

17. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, the petitioner is held to be not

entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in favour of

the respondent.

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Issue No. 3 :

18. It has not been shown by the respondent as to how the present petition/statement of

claim is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned Deputy

District Attorney appearing for the respondent at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the

pleadings, it cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not maintainable. Hence, this

issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

Issue No. 4 :

19. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society

Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the

proceeding under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on

the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be

proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely

hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned

on the ground of delay alone”.

20. In view of the trite laid down in this ruling, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent.

Relief :

21. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

order as to costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 6th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 242/2016

Date of Institution

: 21.4.2016

Date of Decision

: 06.09.2019

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Shri Khem Raj s/o Shri Tej Lal, r/o Village Ganwas, P.O. Sural, Tehsil Pangi, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Pangi at Killar, Tehsil Panig, District

Chamba, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: None for the petitioner

For the Respondent

: Shri Uday Singh Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of services of Sh. Khem Raj s/o Sh. Tej Lal, Village

Ganwas, P.O. Sural, Tehsil Pangi, Distt. Chamba, H.P. during 9/2004 by the

Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Pangi at Killar Tehsil Pangi District Chamba,

H.P. who had worked as beldar on daily wages basis only for 1221 days during the

year 1990 to 2004 and has raised his industrial dispute vide demand notice dated

26/12/2011 after more than 7 years, allegedly without complying with the provisions

of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of

working period from 1990 to 2004 and delay of more than 7 years in raising the

industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and

compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employer/

management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner, as it emerges from the statement of claim, is that he was

appointed as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis, without any appointment letter, in the year

1990. He continuously worked with intermittent breaks uptil October, 2004 with the respondent.

Fictional breaks were given from time to time so that 160 days could not be completed in

each calendar year. It is also an averment that the respondent had not maintained the seniority

and persons junior to the petitioner have been allowed to continue as beldars. The respondent

had violated the principle of ‘first come last go’. For the tribal area, the State of Himachal

Pradesh had framed a policy for regularization of daily waged workers who had worked for

160 days in each calendar year. It is further the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had

been retrenched without giving notice of retrenchment and compensation in lieu thereof. The

breaks were to be counted as continuous service for the purpose of calculation of 160 days, as

provided under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as

‘the Act’ for short). At the time of his termination, the persons junior to him were retained in

service by the respondent. The names of the juniors, who were retained in service by the

respondent are S/Shri/Smt. Tek Chand, Baldev, Trilok Chand, Hari Ram, Dev Raj, Sher

Singh, Raj Kumar and Bameshwar Dutt. He was not given an opportunity of reemployment.

From the date of his disengagement, he is unemployed. He had approached the respondent time

and again to re-engage his services, but in vain. He is entitled to regularization after completion

of eight years of service with all consequential benefits. He has been discriminated. The act and

conduct of the respondent is illegal and unjustified. It is also violative of Sections 25-F, 25-G and

25-H of the Act. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all consequential benefits.

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3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on account of delay and laches.

The contents of the petitioner were denied on merits. It has been denied that the services of the

petitioner were engaged by the respondent as a daily waged beldar on muster roll basis during

the year 1990 and that he had continuously worked with intermittent breaks uptil October, 2004. It

was asserted that the petitioner had never been engaged by the respondent to do any work. The

respondent, thus, pray for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Tribunal vide order dated 26.4.2019:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent during

September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified, as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable, as alleged?

. .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches, as alleged?. . OPR.

Relief.

6.

Arguments of the learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent heard and

records gone through.

7.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Negative

Issue No. 2

: Negative

Issue No. 3

: No

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief.

: Claim petition dismissed vide operative portion of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 and 2 :

8.

Both these issues are inter-related and inter-connected, hence jointly taken for

adjudication.

9.

The case was listed for evidence of the petitioner for today but, however, neither the

petitioner nor his counsel had put in appearance before this Tribunal, despite the case being

called several times since morning. Hence, despite due notice of the date of hearing, the

workman/petitioner had remained ex parte.

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10. It will be apt at this stage to take note of the relevant provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity sake). Section 2 (b) of the Act

defines the Award as under:—

“(b) “award” means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or

of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National

Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10A;”.

11. Sub-Section (1) of Section 11 of the Act provides that subject to any rules that may

be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National

Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other authority concerned may think it

fit. The Central Government has framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,

1957.” Rule 10-B (9) reads thus:—

“10-B (9) In case any party defaults or fails to appear at any stage the Labour

Court, Tribunal, or National Tribunal, as the case may be, may proceed with the

reference ex-parte and decide the reference application in the absence of the defaulting

party.”

12. Rule 22 reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may

proceed ex-parte.—If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the

proceeding before a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court,

Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly

attended or had been represented.”

13. The State of Himachal Pradesh has also framed rules called “The Industrial Disputes

Rules, 1974.” Rule 25 thereof reads thus:—

“Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may

proceed ex-parte.—If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the

proceeding before a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or

Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court,

Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly

attended or had been represented.”

14. Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 and Rule 25 of the

Industrial Disputes Rules, 1974 authorize the adjudicating authority to proceed in the absence of a

party. It creates a fiction which enables the Tribunal to presume that all the parties are present

before it although, in fact, it is not true, and thus make an ex parte award. This Tribunal in these

circumstances has to imagine that the absentee workman is present and having done so, can give

full effect to its imagination and carry it to its logical end. Under Rule 25, this Tribunal, thus, has

to imagine that the workman is present, he is unwilling to adduce evidence or argue his case.

15. In the instant case, neither the workman nor his counsel has put in appearance

before this Tribunal today. In these circumstances, the Tribunal can proceed and pass ex parte

award on its merits.

16. As per the pleadings, it was firstly required of the petitioner to establish on record that

he had been engaged as a daily waged beldar on muster roll basis by the respondent, as the same

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has been disputed in the reply by the respondent. Then, it was for the petitioner to prove on

record that the termination of his services during September, 2004 by the respondent was

without complying with the provisions of the Act and, thus, illegal and unjustified. Though, a

statement of claim has been filed by the petitioner, but his allegations therein have remained a

mere saying on record, as no evidence in support thereof was led by him. At the risk of

repetition the petitioner/workman had not put in appearance before this Tribunal.

17. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, the petitioner is held to be not

entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in favour of

the respondent.

Issue No.3 :

18. No evidence to prove this issue in the affirmative has been led by the respondent.

Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned Deputy District Attorney appearing for

the respondent at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the pleadings, it cannot be said

that the petition/statement of claim is not maintainable. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of

the petitioner and against the respondent.

Issue No. 4 :

19. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society

Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the

proceeding under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on

the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be

proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely

hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned

on the ground of delay alone”.

20 In view of the trite laid down in this ruling, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent.

Relief :

21. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

order as to costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 6th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 196/2015

Date of Institution

: 04.05.2015

Date of Decision

: 09.09.2019

Shri Girdhari Lal s/o Shri Mangtu Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Reur, Tehsil Sadar,

District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

Executive Engineer, I.& P.H. Division, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. B.C. Sharma, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Smt. Navina Rahi, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Girdhari Lal s/o Shri Mangtu

Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Reur, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, H.P. before the

Executive Engineer, I. & P.H. Division, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. vide demand notice

dated 06.04.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during December,

1985 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri

Girdhari Lal s/o Shri Mangtu Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Reur, Tehsil Sadar,

District Mandi, H.P. during December, 1985 without complying the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is

entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

After the receipt of the aforestated reference, a corrigendum dated 9th March,

2018 was received from the appropriate Government which reads as under:

“Whereas, a reference has been made to the Ld. Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. vide notification of even No. dated

21-04-2015 for its legal adjudication. However, inadvertently the correct facts could

not be mentioned about the date of termination in the said notification. Therefore, the

same may be read as “December, 1987” instead of “December, 1985”.

3.

The case of the petitioner, as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

engaged on daily waged basis as a beldar in IPH Sub Divisions No. II, Mandi, H.P. under

Division Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. January, 1985 and had worked uptil 20.12.1987 continuously with a

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minimum of 240 days in each calendar year. Notional breaks had been given to the petitioner by

the respondent on the pretext that work for the petitioner was not available in the department, but

as and when the work would be available, he would be re-engaged. The petitioner had visited

many a times the office of the respondent regarding his re-engagement, but to no avail. New

workmen, namely, Shri Uttam Chand and Shri Sita Ram were engaged by the respondent/

department as beldars but the petitioner was ignored without following the proper procedure of

law. After his disengagement the petitioner had made many representations but without

success. The respondent/department had violated the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). No notice was given to the petitioner and

the principle of ‘last come first go’ had not been adhered to by the respondent. The names of the

juniors who were similarly situated are S/Sh. Roop Lal, Krishan Chand, Roshan Lal, Uttam

Chand and Sita Ram. The disengagement of the petitioner was wrong, illegal and

unconstitutional and against the mandatory provisions of the Act. The petitioner, thus, prays for

his re-engagement with all consequential benefits.

4.

On notice, the respondent appeared. Reply was filed taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition is bad on the ground of delay and laches.

The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was asserted that the petitioner had worked

intermittently w.e.f. May, 1985 to December, 1985 with the respondent and thereafter he had left

the job of his own sweet will. It was denied that the petitioner had worked with the respondent

w.e.f. January, 1985 uptil 20.12.1987. He has not completed 240 days in any calendar year. He

had never visited the office of the respondent with regard to his re-engagement. It was admitted

that the petitioner was engaged as a daily waged beldar in Lift Water Supply Scheme Chowki

Chandrahan and had worked intermittently uptil December, 1985. The petitioner had been

informed by the concerned Junior Engineer to work at the Store in IPH Section Ratti. But despite

that information the petitioner had left the job of his own sweet will. No junior to the petitioner

had been engaged by the respondent after issuance of letter dated 10.7.1996. No provision of the

Act has been violated by the respondent. Since the petitioner was not a continuous workman with

240 days as required under Section 25-B of the Act, no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was

required to be issued to him. The petitioner was never disengaged by the respondent. The

respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

5.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

6.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 21.3.2018:

1.

Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner vide demand notice dated 06-04-

2010 qua his termination of service during December, 1987 by respondent suffers

from the vice of delay and latches as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during

December, 1987 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

3.

If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

4.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?.

. OPR.

Relief.

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7.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. The petitioner, namely, Shri Girdhari Lal appeared as PW1 and tendered in

evidence his statement by way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A, copy of letter dated nil as Ex.PW1/B,

copy of mandays chart as Ex.PW1/C and copy of letter dated 10.7.1996 as Ex.PW1/D. The

petitioner also examined one Shri Kanku Ram as PW2, who tendered in evidence his affidavit

Ex.PW2/A. Shri Arun Sharma (respondent) appeared as RW1, who tendered his statement by

way of affidavit Ex. RW1/A, copy of mandays chart as Ex.RW1/B, copy of year-wise mandays

of the workers as Ex.RW1/C and copy of letter dated 17.12.1987 as Ex.RW1/D.

8.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Deputy District

Attorney for the respondent heard and records gone through.

9.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Negative

Issue No. 2

: Partly yes

Issue No. 3

: Lump sum compensation of ` 25,000/-

Issue No. 4

: Not pressed

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding lump sum compensation of ` 25,000/- as per

the operative part of the award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1, 2 and 4 :

10. All these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

11. Shri Girdhari Lal (petitioner) stepped into the witness box as PW1. In his affidavit

Ex.PW1/A submitted under Order 18 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he reiterated on

oath the contents of the petition/statement of claim in its entirety.

In the cross-examination, he stated that he had been engaged by the department in October,

1985. He denied that he had worked intermittently from May, 1985 uptil December, 1985. He

further denied that thereafter he had left the job. He also denied that from January, 1985 to

December, 1987 he had not worked. Further, he denied that he had never been removed nor given

breaks by the department. It was also denied by him that he had not worked for 240 days or

more in any year. He owns one bigha of land, which he cultivates.

12. PW2 Shri Kanku Ram in his affidavit Ex.PW1/A submitted under Order 18 Rule 4 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, has endorsed and supported the case of the petitioner.

In the cross-examination, he admitted that the petitioner had worked from May, 1985 till

December, 1985. Thereafter stated that he had worked uptil December, 1987. He

categorically denied that the petitioner had not worked after December, 1985. He also denied that

no junior to the petitioner had been kept at work by the department.

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13. Ex. PW1/B is the copy of letter relating to removal from service issued by the

Assistant Engineer, I&PH Division Rati to the petitioner.

14. Ex. PW1/C is the copy of working details of the petitioner.

15. Ex.PW1/D is the copy of letter dated 10.7.1996 regarding removal from service.

16. Conversely, Shri Arun Sharma, Executive Engineer, I& PH Division Mandi

(respondent) testified as RW1. In his affidavit Ex. RW1/A preferred as per Order 18 Rule 4 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, he corroborated on oath the contents of the reply filed by the

respondent.

In the cross-examination, he admitted that Ex.PW1/C has been issued by their

department. He also admitted that as per Ex.PW1/B the petitioner had only worked uptil

December, 1985. He further admitted that as per Ex.PW1/C work had been done by the petitioner

in the years 1986-87. Ex.PW1/C bears the signatures of Assistant Engineer. Further, he admitted

that in the year 1986 Shri Roop Lal, in the year 1994 Shri Sita Ram and in the year 1995 Shri

Uttam Chand had been engaged as beldars by the department. It was also admitted by him that no

notice had been issued by the department to the petitioner that he had left the work and that he

should report back. He specifically denied that the petitioner had intentionally been given breaks

and also removed from work.

17. Ex.RW1/B is the copy of mandays chart pertaining to the petitioner.

18. Ex.RW1/C is the copy of year-wise mandays of daily waged workers relating to Shri

Krishan Chand and five others.

19. Ex.RW1/D is the copy of letter relating to removal from service issued by the

Assistant Engineer, I&PH Division Rati to the petitioner (which corresponds to Ex.PW1/B).

20. The engagement of the petitioner as a daily waged beldar is not in dispute. The

respondent as per his pleadings and ocular evidence clearly admitted that the petitioner had been

engaged as a daily waged beldar. It was claimed by the petitioner that he had been initially

engaged in May, 1985 and that he had worked as such uptil December, 1987. However, the

respondent claimed that the petitioner had worked intermittently w.e.f. May, 1985 to December,

1985. Placed on record by the respondent is the copy of mandays chart as Ex.RW1/B relating to

the petitioner. Its perusal reveals that the petitioner had been engaged by the respondent in the

month of May, 1985 for the first time as a daily waged beldar and that he had worked as such

uptil December, 1985. However, the petitioner has produced on record a copy of detail of his

working days as Ex.PW1/C. This document is not disputed by the respondent. RW1 Shri Arun

Sharma (respondent) in his substantive evidence clearly admitted that Ex.PW1/C has been

issued by their department and which bears the signatures of the Assistant Engineer. Its perusal

discloses that the petitioner had also worked with the department in the years 1986 and 1987.

RW1 Shri Arun Sharma also clearly admitted that as per Ex.PW1/C the petitioner had also

worked in the years 1986-87. Now, the first and foremost point which comes to the fore for

determination is whether the petitioner had been disengaged from service or he himself had

abandoned the job, as it is claimed by the petitioner that he had been disengaged by the

respondent on the pretext that there was no work available for him in the department, whereas

the stand taken by the respondent is that after December, 1985, the petitioner had left the job of

his own.

21. It is well known that the plea of abandonment has to be proved like any other fact by

the respondent/employer. The burden of proving of abandonment is upon the respondent.

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Simply because a workman fails to report for duty, it cannot be presumed that he has left/

abandoned the job. Mere statement of Shri Arun Sharma (RW1) alleging that the workman had

abandoned the services is entirely insufficient to discharge the said onus. Then, the admission of

the document Ex.PW1/C on the part of RW1 Shri Arun Sharma knocks the very bottom of the

stand taken by the respondent that the petitioner had abandoned the job in December, 1985. Be it

recorded here at the risk of repetition that as per the document Ex.PW1/C, the petitioner is shown

to have worked in the department in the years 1986 and 1987 also. Further, no notice has

been placed and exhibited on record by the respondent to show that the petitioner had been

called upon by the respondent to resume the duties after he allegedly left the same. Admittedly, no

disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner by the respondent for his alleged

willful absence from duty. Shri Arun Sharma (RW1) clearly admitted that no notice had been

served upon the petitioner by the department of his leaving the job and to resume his duties.

Faced with the situation, it was contended by the learned Deputy District Attorney for the

respondent that it was not required of the respondent to proceed against the workman by way

of a domestic inquiry. True it is that the petitioner, a daily wager, was not amenable to the

provisions of CCS, (CCA) Rules and as such a domestic inquiry as stipulated therein was not

strictly required to be initiated. Nonetheless, absence from duty is a serious misconduct and

the principle of natural justice did require that some sort of a fact finding inquiry was got

conducted by the respondent. In the present case as it emerges from the evidence on record, so

was not done by the respondent. Then, ‘animus’ to abandon, it is well settled, must necessarily

be shown to exist, before a case of abandonment can be said to have been made out. No evidence,

of any such ‘animus’ on the part of the petitioner, is forthcoming in the present case. Thus, the

plea of abandonment put forth by the respondent/employer is not established. So, the claim of the

petitioner that his services were orally terminated by the respondent w.e.f. December, 1987

has to be accepted as correct on the balance of probability.

22. No mandays chart of the petitioner is there on the file to establish that he had

worked continuously for a period of 240 days in a block of 12 calendar months anterior to the

date of his alleged termination, as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. As per the copy of

detail of working days Ex. PW1/C, the petitioner had only worked for a total of 16 days from

21.5.1987 to 20.12.1987. Earlier to it from 21.1.1986 to 20.12.1986, the petitioner had worked

for a total of 93 days. Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are not attracted in

this case.

23. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers category relating to Shri

Shri Krishan Chand and five others. It reveals that Shri Roop Lal was appointed by the

respondent in the year 1986 and had become regular on 1st January, 1997. Not only this Shri

Arun Sharma (RW1) in his cross-examination admitted that the department had engaged Shri

Roop Lal as a beldar in the year 1986. At the cost of reiteration, I will like to add that the month

of initial appointment of the petitioner as per Ex.RW1/B is May, 1985 and that the month of

termination of his services, as per the reference is December, 1987. There is nothing on record to

show that Shri Roop Lal was senior to the petitioner. This indicates that a person junior to the

petitioner is still serving the respondent/department. The latter has failed to adhere to the principle

of ‘last come first go’. Retaining the junior at the cost of senior is nothing but unfair labour

practice.

24. Again, looking to Ex.RW1/C, it reveals that Shri Sita Ram was appointed by the

respondent in the year 1994, whereas the services of Shri Uttam Chand were engaged in the year

1995. RW1 Shri Arun Sharma in the cross-examination also admitted this fact. The services of

both the aforenamed persons, as per Ex.RW1/C, have been regularized by the department from

4.1.2007 and 31.3.2008 respectively. It, thus, shows that new/fresh hands were engaged by the

respondent. If the services of the petitioner were disengaged, as no work was available (as

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alleged by the respondent) then, why new/fresh hands were employed? The reasons to that effect

being obscure go to show that the respondent is not speaking the truth. There is nothing on the

file to establish that at the time of engaging new/fresh hands or retaining the person junior to the

petitioner, an opportunity of re-employment was afforded to him (petitioner).

25. Such being the situation, I have no hesitation to conclude that the respondent has

contravened the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The termination of the services

of the petitioner is illegal and unjustified.

26. While testifying in the Court as PW1, the petitioner has given his age as 55 years. It is

well known that a person like the petitioner will not sit at home during the period he is/was out of

the service. Otherwise too, during his cross-examination, the petitioner admitted that he owns

land, which he cultivates. The petitioner has failed to discharge the initial onus that during the

period of his forced idleness, he is/was not gainfully employed, so he is not entitled to the back

wages.

27. The learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent contended that there

being an inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the redressal of his grievance,

his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the relief(s) he has

prayed for. The claim as such is not maintainable. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be

ill conceived. The question of delay and laches was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

case titled as Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society

Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, wherein it was inter-alia held:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the

proceeding under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on

the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be

proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely

hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned

on the ground of delay alone”.

28. In view of the aforesaid binding precedent, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Of course, the delay in raising the industrial dispute by a

workman can be taken into account by the Court while granting the relief(s) claimed. The

observations made by our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled as Liaq Ram vs. State of H.P.

and ors., 2012 (2) Him. L.R.(FB) 580 (majority view) will also be advantageous on this aspect

of the matter.

29. In case titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and

another vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), it was held by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view

all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment,

length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising

industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was also observed that the

workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in the year 1992, whereas

his services had been terminated in the year 1986 and had raised industrial dispute after six

years. It was held that though the compensation awarded by the Single Judge of the Hon’ble

High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench, but surely

reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances was not the appropriate relief and

thus a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum had been awarded. Recently, in

case titled as Deputy Executive Engineer vs. Kuberbhai Kanjibhai 2019 (160) FLR 651, by

relying upon the cases of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs. Bhurumal (2014) 7 SCC 177 and

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District Development Officer & another vs. Satish Kantilal Amerelia 2018 (156) FLR 266 (SC), it

has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that where the workman had worked as a daily

wager or muster roll employee hardly for a few years and where the dispute had been raised by

him almost after 15 years of his alleged termination, he was held entitled only for lump sum

monetary compensation in full and final satisfaction of his claim of reinstatement and other

consequential benefits. Similarly, in case titled as State of Uttarakhand & Anr. vs. Raj Kumar,

2019 (160) FLR 791, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that where a daily wager has worked

for about a year and a dispute was raised by him after 25 years of the alleged termination, he had

no right to claim regularization and was only entitled to lump sum monetary compensation in full

and final satisfaction of his claim of reinstatement and consequential benefits. In the case on

hand before this Court, the factors which have weighed are that the petitioner had worked with

the respondents only for 312½ days as a non-skilled worker and had not completed 240 days in

any year. His services, as per the reference were disengaged in December, 1987 and had raised

the industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after more than twenty three years i.e.

demand notice was given on 6.4.2010. Taking into consideration the factors mentioned above

and the precedents laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, the

petitioner is not entitled for reinstatement or for back wages, but only for a lump sum

compensation.

30. In view of the discussion and findings arrived at by me above, a lump-sum

compensation of `25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to

which the petitioner is entitled to in the facts and circumstances of the given case. It is further

made clear that the amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of

receipt of Award, failing which the petitioner would be entitled to interest @ 9% per annum from

date of Award till its realization. Issue No. 1 is answered in the negative and decided against the

respondent, while issues No. 2 and 3 are answered partly in the affirmative and accordingly

decided in favour of the petitioner.

Issue No. 4 :

31. Not pressed.

Relief :

32. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove while recording the findings on

issues supra, the respondent is hereby directed to pay a compensation of `25,000/- (Rupees

twenty five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority

and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to

the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent

shall be liable to pay interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till

realization/deposit of the amount. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties

are left to bear their own costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this

Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file

after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 9th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref. No.

: 336/2014

Date of Institution

: 19.11.2014

Date of Decision

: 11.9.2019

Shri Shyam Lal s/o Shri Ram Pal, r/o Village Sungal, P.O. Binola, Tehsil Sadar, District

Bilaspur, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Secretary, The Bilaspur District Co-operative Federatioin, Main Market Bilaspur,

District Bilaspur, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. S.S. Sippy, AR

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. N.L. Thakur, Adv.

AWARD

The below given reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of services of Shri Shyam Lal s/o Shri Ram Pal, r/o Village

Sungal, P.O. Binola, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P. by the Secretary, The

Bilaspur District Co-operative Federation, Main Market Bilaspur, District Bilaspur,

H.P. w.e.f. 01.01.2013 without following the provisions of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority,

past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-worker is entitled to from the

above employer?”

2.

In furtherance to the reference, it is averred by the petitioner in the statement of

claim that he was engaged as a daily waged Assistant by the respondent w.e.f. 1.11.2011 and had

worked as such continuously uptil 31.12.2012. His services had orally been terminated on

1.1.2013 without assigning any reason or notice. Before terminating the services of the

petitioner, the respondent had not obtained the permission form the higher authorities, which

amounts to unfailr labour practice. His name was entered in the muster roll register. In the

beginning his salary was Rs. 3500/- and lastly he was getting Rs. 5000/- per month. The

respondent had engaged simultaneously four workers, namely, S/Sh. Kamal Kumar, Arun Kumar,

Shyam Lal (petitioner) and Ashok Kumar. Shri Ashok Kumar was not removed from service,

but the services of the petitioner and Shri Kamal Kumar and Shri Arun Kumar had been

terminated. No seniority list has been prepared by the respondent. Junior workers have been

retained. The principle of ‘last come first go’ was no adhered to by the respondent. The provisions

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of Sections 25-B, 25-F (a) and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 have been violated by

the respondent. The petitioner is unemployed. He, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and jurisdiction. The contents of the petition were denied on

merits. It was asserted that the petitioner had been appointed on temporary basis till there was

transportation work with the federation. The respondent is a federation working under the

Registrar, Co-operative Societies. A proper resolution has been passed to terminate the petitioner

in the meeting of Board of Directors of the federation. The respondent had not violated any rules

and regulations of the Industrial Disputes Act. The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the

claim petition.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 8.10.2015: —

1.

Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

01.01.2013 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner

is entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

. .OPR.

4.

Whether this court has no jurisdiction to file the present case as alleged? . . OPR.

Relief.

6.

Arguments of the learned Authorized Representative for the petitioner and the

learned counsel for the respondent heard and records gone through.

7.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Decided accordingly

Issue No. 2

: Decided accordingly

Issue No. 3

: Negative

Issue No. 4

: Negative

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed as per the operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issue No. 4 :

8.

This issue is taken up by me first for discussion as my findings on the same will

impinge the outcome of the other issues.

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9.

While taking me through the provisions of Sections 72 and 73 of the H.P. Co-

operative Societies Act, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that since the

respondent society is a co-operative society and its employees are governed by the provisions of

the H.P. Co-operative Societies Act and the Rules framed there under, the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act are not applicable. Only the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies is

competent to decide the controversy.

10. Per contra, the learned authorized representative for the petitioner urged that the

provisions of Sections 72 and 73 of the H.P. Co-operative Societies Act are not attracted in this

case. According to him, the respondent society was engaged in a purely commercial venture and

was an industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. His client being a “workman”

and the respondent being an “industry”, this Court has the jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

11. To my mind, the contention of the learned authorized representative for the petitioner

holds the force and is sustainable. The dispute raised by the petitioner, who was an employee

of the respondent society, does not touch the constitution, management or the business of the co-

operative society. It is an admitted fact that the services of the petitioner stood terminated by the

respondent, though it is claimed by the petitioner that the same were terminated on 1.1.2013,

whereas the respondent claims that so was done on 31.12.2012.

12. Strictly speaking, a dispute between a co-operative society and its workman does not

relate to the actual business of the co-operative society and, therefore, does not touch its

business. A dispute as to the dismissal and claim of reinstatement is not a dispute falling within

the jurisdiction of the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies functioning under the H.P. State

Co-operative Societies Act. The power that can be exercised by an Industrial Tribunal or Labour

Court under the Act cannot be exercised by the Registrar. Consequently, a dispute as regards the

dismissal from service cannot be determined by the Registrar. The Registrar of the Co-operative

Societies has no power to order the re-instatement of a workman, if he finds the

retrenchment/dismissal of the workman to be unjust.

13. In fact, this question is no longer res integra. In Bangalore Water Supply and

Sewerage Board vs. A Rajappa, 1978 LIC 467 (SC), it has been laid down that the co-operative

societies are the industries.

14. Our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled as The Palampur Co-operative Marketing

and Consumer Federation Ltd. vs. State of H.P. & others, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 713 and The

Dehra Friends Co-operative Transport Society vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, CWP

No.781/2005 decided in May, 2007 has laid down that the Industrial Tribunal has the authority,

power and jurisdiction to entertain and decide the reference made to it with respect to the

employees of the co-operative societies.

15. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent, on the decision

of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as R.C. Tiwari vs. M.P. State Co-operative Marketing

Federation Ltd. & others (1997) 5 SCC 125 . The ratio of this case was considered by our own

Hon’ble High Court in The Palampur Co-operative Marketing and Consumer Federation

Ltd. case (supra) and it was held that this judgment has no application to the facts and

circumstances of the case since the employee straight away had approached the Labour Court

and had not approached any authority under the Co-operative Societies Act. Similar is the case

here. The petitioner in the present case, being an employee of the respondent, had approached

this Tribunal and had not approached any other authority under the Co-operative Societies Act.

16. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on another

decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi and Ors. Vs.

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The State of Bihar and Ors. decided on 26th March, 1997. In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court held that where persons have not been appointed to the post in accordance with the rules

but were engaged on the basis of need of the work, they being temporary employees, their

disengagement from service could not be construed to be a retrenchment under the Act. In the

case on hand, as per the own admission made by RW1 Shri Mohinder Singh (respondent), the

petitioner had been appointed and was being paid the salary by the respondent. Although, he

volunteered to state that the petitioner had been engaged temporarily but, however, RW2

Shri H.B. Kaushal, the Ex-Secretary of the respondent was categorical in his substantive evidence

that the petitioner had worked continuously from 1st November, 2011 to 31st December, 2012.

So, in view of the aforesaid admissions, it cannot be said that the petitioner was a temporary

employee, who had been engaged on the basis of need of the work. Hence, the aforesaid judgment

also has no application to the facts and circumstances of this case.

17. Reliance was further placed on case titled as Hanuman Sahakari Pani Pruvatha

Sanstha Maryadit and Ors. vs. Ramchandra Bapuso Khade and Ors. 2016 NCJ 523 (NC) ,

wherein it has been held by the Hon’ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission that a

dispute related to co-operative society can only be entertained under the Co-operative Societies

Act and the Consumer Fora has no jurisdiction to decide the complaint. In the present case a

reference has been received by this Tribunal from the appropriate Government, so in my

considered view this judgment has also no application to the facts and circumstances of the case.

18. Lastly, reliance was also placed upon the case titled as U.P. Co-operative Spinning

Mills vs. Ram Magan, decided on 24th May, 2007 by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court. In

this case, the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held that the Labour Court had committed

an error in holding that the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act was applicable upon

an employee of a Co-operative Society, including the workman in question, so the impugned

award was quashed. However, in view of the binding precedents laid down by our own Hon’ble

High Court in the cases referred to above, wherein it has specifically been held that the Industrial

Tribunal has the power and authority to decide the reference and the disputes like the one in

question, this judgment, being persuasive in nature cannot be taken note of.

19. It is thus, concluded that this Court has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the

case/reference.

20. This issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

Issues No.1 and 2:

21. Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

22. The short and simple case of the petitioner is that the respondent had terminated his

services without complying with the provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Act.

23. In this behalf, the petitioner has examined himself as PW1. He has deposed that the

respondent had employed him on 1.11.2011 and that he had continuously worked till 31.12.2012,

when his services were orally terminated on 1.1.2013, without any reason or notice. Workers

junior to him have been kept and the principle of ‘last come first go’ has not been followed.

24. The respondent on the other hand has examined the Secretary, Shri Mohinder

Singh as RW1. He filed certain documents purportedly in support of the case of the respondent,

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which are exhibited as Ex. RW1/B to Ex. RW1/O. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that

no notice of retrenchment had been given to the petitioner. Volunteered that, the petitioner was

removed as per the directions of Board of Directors.

25. RW2 Shri H.B. Kaushal, Ex. Secretary of the respondent was also examined in

support of the case. However, he while under cross-examination categorically admitted that the

petitioner had continuously worked from 1.11.2011 to 31.12.2012.

26. It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner had not

worked for 240 days during the preceding twelve months on daily wages and, therefore, the

petitioner cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Act. The case of the petitioner

is that he had continuously worked with the respondent for more than a year.

27. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. In para 1 of the

statement of claim, the petitioner has categorically pleaded that he was employed on 1.11.2011

and his services had been retrenched on 1.1.2013 and during this period he had worked

continuously. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 240 days

in preceding twelve calendar months prior to his alleged retrenchment. The law on this issue is

well settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, it has been

laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he

had worked for 240 days in a given year.

28. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, the evidence produced has to be looked into. The respondent claimed that the petitioner

did not work for 240 days. The petitioner was a workman hired on a daily waged basis. So, it is

obvious that he would have difficulty in having access to all the official documents, muster rolls

etc. in connection with his service.

In his chief-examination, the petitioner has claimed that he had rendered continuous

service to the respondent from 1.11.2011 till 31.12.2012. This fact has not been challenged by

the respondent at the time of cross-examination. It is the basic law that if a fact goes un-rebutted

and unchallenged during the cross-examination, the same is to be taken as admitted by the other

side. Even otherwise, RW2 Shri H.B. Kaushal was categorical in his cross-examination that

the petitioner had continuously worked from 1.11.2011 to 31.12.2012. Meaning thereby that

the petitioner had completed 240 days of work in a block of twelve calendar months preceding

the date of his termination i.e. 1.1.2013 (as per the reference).

2.

Section 25-F of the Act postulates as under:-

“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in

any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer

shall be retrenched by that employer until—

(a) the workman has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons

for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been

paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:

(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall

be equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous

service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and

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(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such

authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the

Official Gazette.”

30. There is not even an iota of evidence on record to show that one month’s notice in

writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment of the petitioner/workman had been given and

that he had been paid the compensation at the time of his retrenchment, as envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. RW1 Shri Mohinder Singh clearly admitted in his substantive evidence

that no notice of retrenchment had been given to the petitioner. RW2 Shri H.B. Kaushal

specifically admitted in his cross-examination that no retrenchment compensation had been paid

to the petitioner. For these reasons, the final termination of the services of the petitioner by the

respondent w.e.f. 1.1.2013 is patently wrong and incorrect.

31. It was also claimed by the petitioner that juniors had been retained by the respondent.

Except for his self serving and oral testimony, there is no other oral or documentary, cogent,

convincing and reliable evidence on the file to show that the employer had retained any person

junior to the petitioner at the time of his termination. That being so, the provisions of Section

25-G of the Act are not attracted in this case.

32. While testifying in the Court as PW1, the petitioner has given his age as 32 years. It is

well known that a person like the petitioner will not sit at home during the period he is/was out of

the job. The petitioner has failed to discharge the initial onus that during the period of his forced

idleness, he is/was not gainfully employed. For these reasons, he is not entitled for the back

wages.

33. Such being the situation, I have no hesitation to conclude that the termination of the

services of the petitioner by the respondent is bad in the eyes of law.

34. These issues are decided accordingly.

Issue No. 3:

35. It has not been shown by the respondent as to how the present petition/statement of

claim is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned counsel

appearing for the respondent at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the pleadings, it

cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not maintainable. Hence, this issue is

decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief:

36. As a sequel to my findings on the issues above, the instant claim petition succeeds in

part and the same is partly allowed. The final termination of the services of the petitioner by the

respondent w.e.f. 1.1.2013 is set aside and quashed. The respondent is directed to reinstate the

petitioner forthwith. He shall be entitled to seniority and continuity in service from the date of

his illegal termination i.e. 1st January, 2013, except back wages. It is clarified that the services of

the petitioner will be re-engaged by the respondent within a period of three months from today

failing which the petitioner shall be entitled to the wages from the date of his termination to the

date of his reinstatement. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to

bear their own costs. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this Award be sent to the

appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion

be consigned to the Record Room.

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Announced in the open Court today this 11th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref No.

: 349/2014

Date of Institution

: 16.12.2014

Date of Decision

: 11.9.2019

Shri Arun Kumar s/o Shri Prakash Chand, r/o Village Samleta, P.O. Rishikesh, Tehsil

Jhandutha, District Bilaspur, H.P.

..Petitioner.

Versus

The Secretary, The Bilaspur District Co-operative Federation, Main Market Bilaspur,

District Bilaspur, H.P.

..Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. S.S. Sippy, AR

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. N.L. Thakur, Adv.

AWARD

The below given reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:—

“Whether termination of services of Shri Arun Kumar s/o Shri Prakash Chand, r/o

Village Samleta, P.O. Rishikesh, Tehsil Jhandutha, District Bilaspur, H.P. by the

Secretary, The Bilaspur District Co-operative Federation, Main Market Bilaspur, District

Bilaspur, H.P. w.e.f. 01.0.12013 without following the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority,

past service benefits and compensation the above Ex-worker is entitled to from the above

employer?”

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2.

In furtherance to the reference, it is averred by the petitioner in the statement of

claim that he was engaged as a daily waged Assistant by the respondent w.e.f. 20.01.2011 and

had worked as such continuously uptil 31.12.2012. His services had orally been terminated on

1.1.2013 without assigning any reason or notice. Before terminating the services of the

petitioner, the respondent had not obtained the permission form the higher authorities, which

amounts to unfailr labour practice. His name was entered in the muster roll register. In the

beginning his salary was Rs. 5,000/- and lastly he was getting Rs. 6000/- per month. The

respondent had engaged simultaneously four workers, namely, S/Sh. Kamal Kumar, Shyam Lal,

Ashok Kumar and me. Shri Ashok Kumar was not removed from service, but the services of the

petitioner and Shri Kamal Kumar and Shri Arun Kumar had been terminated. No seniority list

has been prepared by the respondent. Junior workers have been retained. The principle of ‘last

come first go’ was no adhered to by the respondent. The provisions of Sections 25-B, 25-F (a)

and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 have been violated by the respondent. The

petitioner is unemployed. He, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and jurisdiction. The contents of the petition were denied on

merits. It was asserted that the petitioner had been appointed on temporary basis till there was

transportation work with the federation. The respondent is a federation working under the

Registrar, Co-operative Societies. A proper resolution has been passed to terminate the petitioner in

the meeting of Board of Directors of the federation. The respondent had not violated any rules and

regulations of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim petition.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 8.10.2015:—

1.

Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

01.01.2013 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

..OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

..OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

.. OPR.

4.

Whether this court has no jurisdiction to file the present case as alleged? . . OPR.

Relief.

6.

Arguments of the learned Authorized Representative for the petitioner and the

learned counsel for the respondent heard and records gone through.

7.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:—

Issue No.1

: Decided accordingly

Issue No.2

: Decided accordingly

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Issue No.3

: Negative

Issue No.4

: Negative

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed as per the operative part of the

Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issue No. 4:

8.

This issue is taken up by me first for discussion as my findings on the same will

impinge the outcome of the other issues.

9.

While taking me through the provisions of Sections 72 and 73 of the H.P. Co-

operative Societies Act, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that since the

respondent society is a co-operative society and its employees are governed by the provisions of

the H.P. Co-operative Societies Act and the Rules framed there under, the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act are not applicable. Only the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies is

competent to decide the controversy.

10. Per contra, the learned authorized representative for the petitioner urged that the

provisions of Sections 72 and 73 of the H.P. Co-operative Societies Act are not attracted in this

case. According to him, the respondent society was engaged in a purely commercial venture and

was an industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. His client being a “workman”

and the respondent being an “industry”, this Court has the jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

11. To my mind, the contention of the learned authorized representative for the petitioner

holds the force and is sustainable. The dispute raised by the petitioner, who was an employee

of the respondent society, does not touch the constitution, management or the business of the co-

operative society. It is an admitted fact that the services of the petitioner stood terminated by the

respondent, though it is claimed by the petitioner that the same were terminated on 1.1.2013,

whereas the respondent claims that so was done on 31.12.2012.

12. Strictly speaking, a dispute between a co-operative society and its workman does not

relate to the actual business of the co-operative society and, therefore, does not touch its

business. A dispute as to the dismissal and claim of reinstatement is not a dispute falling within

the jurisdiction of the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies functioning under the H.P. State

Co-operative Societies Act. The power that can be exercised by an Industrial Tribunal or Labour

Court under the Act cannot be exercised by the Registrar. Consequently, a dispute as regards the

dismissal from service cannot be determined by the Registrar. The Registrar of the Co-operative

Societies has no power to order the re-instatement of a workman, if he finds the retrenchment/

dismissal of the workman to be unjust.

13. In fact, this question is no longer res integra. In Bangalore Water Supply and

Sewerage Board vs. A Rajappa, 1978 LIC 467 (SC), it has been laid down that the co-operative

societies are the industries.

14. Our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled as The Palampur Co-operative Marketing

and Consumer Federation Ltd. vs. State of H.P. & others, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 713 and The

Dehra Friends Co-operative Transport Society vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, CWP

No.781/2005 decided in May, 2007 has laid down that the Industrial Tribunal has the authority,

7368

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power and jurisdiction to entertain and decide the reference made to it with respect to the

employees of the co-operative societies.

15. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent, on the decision

of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as R.C. Tiwari vs. M.P. State Co-operative Marketing

Federation Ltd. & others (1997) 5 SCC 125 . The ratio of this case was considered by our own

Hon’ble High Court in The Palampur Co-operative Marketing and Consumer Federation

Ltd. case (supra) and it was held that this judgment has no application to the facts and

circumstances of the case since the employee straight away had approached the Labour Court

and had not approached any authority under the Co-operative Societies Act. Similar is the case

here. The petitioner in the present case, being an employee of the respondent, had approached

this Tribunal and had not approached any other authority under the Co-operative Societies Act.

16. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on another

decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi and Ors. Vs.

The State of Bihar and Ors. decided on 26th March, 1997. In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court held that where persons have not been appointed to the post in accordance with the rules

but were engaged on the basis of need of the work, they being temporary employees, their

disengagement from service could not be construed to be a retrenchment under the Act. In the

case on hand, as per the own admission made by RW1 Shri Mohinder Singh (respondent), the

petitioner had been appointed and was being paid the salary by the respondent. Although, he

volunteered to state that the petitioner had been engaged temporarily but, however, RW2 Shri

H.B. Kaushal, the Ex-Secretary of the respondent was categorical in his substantive evidence that

the petitioner had worked continuously from 20th January, 2011 to 31st December, 2012. So, in

view of the aforesaid admissions, it cannot be said that the petitioner was a temporary employee,

who had been engaged on the basis of need of the work. Hence, the aforesaid judgment also has

no application to the facts and circumstances of this case.

17. Reliance was further placed on case titled as Hanuman Sahakari Pani Pruvatha

Sanstha Maryadit and Ors. vs. Ramchandra Bapuso Khade and Ors. 2016 NCJ 523 (NC) ,

wherein it has been held by the Hon’ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission that a

dispute related to co-operative society can only be entertained under the Co-operative Societies

Act and the Consumer Fora has no jurisdiction to decide the complaint. In the present case a

reference has been received by this Tribunal from the appropriate Government, so in my

considered view this judgment has also no application to the facts and circumstances of the case.

18. Lastly, reliance was also placed upon the case titled as U.P. Co-operative Spinning

Mills vs. Ram Magan, decided on 24th May, 2007 by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court. In

this case, the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held that the Labour Court had committed

an error in holding that the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act was applicable upon

an employee of a Co-operative Society, including the workman in question, so the impugned

award was quashed. However, in view of the binding precedents laid down by our own Hon’ble

High Court in the cases referred to above, wherein it has specifically been held that the Industrial

Tribunal has the power and authority to decide the reference and the disputes like the one in

question, this judgment, being persuasive in nature cannot be taken note of.

19. It is thus, concluded that this Court has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the

case/reference.

20. This issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

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Issues No.1 and 2:

21. Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

22. The short and simple case of the petitioner is that the respondent had terminated his

services without complying with the provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Act.

23. In this behalf, the petitioner has examined himself as PW1. He has deposed that the

respondent had employed him on 20.1.2011 and that he had continuously worked till 31.12.2012,

when his services were orally terminated on 1.1.2013, without any reason or notice. Workers

junior to him have been kept and the principle of ‘last come first go’ has not been followed.

24. The respondent on the other hand has examined the Secretary, Shri Mohinder

Singh as RW1. He filed certain documents purportedly in support of the case of the respondent,

which are exhibited as Ex. RW1/B to Ex. RW1/N. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that

no notice of retrenchment had been given to the petitioner. Volunteered that, the petitioner was

removed as per the directions of Board of Directors.

25. RW2 Shri H.B. Kaushal, Ex. Secretary of the respondent was also examined in

support of the case. However, he while under cross-examination categorically admitted that the

petitioner had continuously worked from 20.1.2011 to 31.12.2012.

26. It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner had not

worked for 240 days during the preceding twelve months on daily wages and, therefore, the

petitioner cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Act. The case of the petitioner

is that he had continuously worked with the respondent for more than a year.

27. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. In para 1 of the

statement of claim, the petitioner has categorically pleaded that he was employed on 20.01.2011

and his services had been retrenched on 1.1.2013 and during this period he had worked

continuously. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 240 days

in preceding twelve calendar months prior to his alleged retrenchment. The law on this issue is

well settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, it has been

laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he

had worked for 240 days in a given year.

28. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, the evidence produced has to be looked into. The respondent claimed that the petitioner

did not work for 240 days. The petitioner was a workman hired on a daily waged basis. So, it is

obvious that he would have difficulty in having access to all the official documents, muster rolls

etc. in connection with his service.

In his chief-examination, the petitioner has claimed that he had rendered continuous

service to the respondent from 20.01.2011 till 31.12.2012. This fact has not been challenged by

the respondent at the time of cross-examination. It is the basic law that if a fact goes un-rebutted

and unchallenged during the cross-examination, the same is to be taken as admitted by the other

side. Even otherwise, RW2 Shri H.B. Kaushal was categorical in his cross-examination that

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the petitioner had continuously worked from 20.01.2011 to 31.12.2012. Meaning thereby that

the petitioner had completed 240 days of work in a block of twelve calendar months preceding

the date of his termination i.e. 1.1.2013 (as per the reference).

29. Section 25-F of the Act postulates as under:—

“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in

any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an

employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—

(a) the workman has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons

for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been

paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:

(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall

be equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous

service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and

(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such

authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the

Official Gazette.”

30. There is not even an iota of evidence on record to show that one month’s notice in

writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment of the petitioner/workman had been given and

that he had been paid the compensation at the time of his retrenchment, as envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. RW1 Shri Mohinder Singh clearly admitted in his substantive evidence

that no notice of retrenchment had been given to the petitioner. RW2 Shri H.B. Kaushal

specifically admitted in his cross-examination that no retrenchment compensation had been paid

to the petitioner. For these reasons, the final termination of the services of the petitioner by the

respondent w.e.f. 1.1.2013 is patently wrong and incorrect.

31. It was also claimed by the petitioner that juniors had been retained by the respondent.

Except for his self serving and oral testimony, there is no other oral or documentary, cogent,

convincing and reliable evidence on the file to show that the employer had retained any person

junior to the petitioner at the time of his termination. That being so, the provisions of Section

25-G of the Act are not attracted in this case.

32. While testifying in the Court as PW1, the petitioner has given his age as 46 years. It is

well known that a person like the petitioner will not sit at home during the period he is/was out of

the job. The petitioner has failed to discharge the initial onus that during the period of his forced

idleness, he is/was not gainfully employed. For these reasons, he is not entitled for the back

wages.

33. Such being the situation, I have no hesitation to conclude that the termination of the

services of the petitioner by the respondent is bad in the eyes of law.

34. These issues are decided accordingly.

Issue No. 3:

35. It has not been shown by the respondent as to how the present petition/statement of

claim is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned counsel

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appearing for the respondent at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the pleadings, it

cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not maintainable. Hence, this issue is

decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief:

36. As a sequel to my findings on the issues above, the instant claim petition succeeds in

part and the same is partly allowed. The final termination of the services of the petitioner by the

respondent w.e.f. 1.1.2013 is set aside and quashed. The respondent is directed to reinstate the

petitioner forthwith. He shall be entitled to seniority and continuity in service from the date of

his illegal termination i.e. 1st January, 2013, except back wages. It is clarified that the services of

the petitioner will be re-engaged by the respondent within a period of three months from today

failing which the petitioner shall be entitled to the wages from the date of his termination to the

date of his reinstatement. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left

to bear their own costs. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this Award be sent to

the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 11th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

(CAMP AT CHAMBA)

Ref No.

: 348/2014

Date of Institution

: 16.12.2014

Date of Decision

: 11.9.2019

Shri Kamal Kumar s/o Shri Paras Ram, r/o Village Nali Panol, P.O. Rishikesh, Tehsil

Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P.

..Petitioner.

Versus

The Secretary, The Bilaspur District Co-operative Federatioin, Main Market Bilaspur,

District Bilaspur, H.P.

..Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. S.S. Sippy, AR

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For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. N.L. Thakur, Adv.

AWARD

The below given reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:—

“Whether termination of services of Shri Kamal Kumar s/o Shri Paras Ram, r/o Village

Nali Panol, P.O. Rishikesh, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P. by the Secretary, The

Bilaspur District Co-operative Federation, Main Market Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P.

w.e.f. 01.01.2013 without following the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is

legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority list, past service benefits

and compensation the above Ex-worker is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

In furtherance to the reference, it is averred by the petitioner in the statement of

claim that he was engaged as a daily waged Assistant by the respondent w.e.f. 16.8.2010 and had

worked as such continuously uptil 31.12.2012. His services had orally been terminated on

1.1.2013 without assigning any reason or notice. Before terminating the services of the

petitioner, the respondent had not obtained the permission form the higher authorities, which

amounts to unfailr labour practice. His name was entered in the muster roll register. In the

beginning his salary was Rs. 4500/- and lastly he was getting Rs. 5000/- per month. The

respondent had engaged simultaneously four workers, namely, S/Sh. Arun Kumar, Shyam Lal,

Ashok Kumar and me. Shri Ashok Kumar was not removed from service, but the services of the

petitioner and Shri Kamal Kumar and Shri Arun Kumar had been terminated. No seniority list

has been prepared by the respondent. Junior workers have been retained. The principle of ‘last

come first go’ was no adhered to by the respondent. The provisions of Sections 25-B, 25-F (a)

and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 have been violated by the respondent. The

petitioner is unemployed. He, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and jurisdiction. The contents of the petition were denied on

merits. It was asserted that the petitioner had been appointed on temporary basis till there was

transportation work with the federation. The respondent is a federation working under the

Registrar, Co-operative Societies. A proper resolution has been passed to terminate the petitioner

in the meeting of Board of Directors of the federation. The respondent had not violated any rules

and regulations of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim petition.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 8.10.2015:—

1.

Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f.

01.01.2013 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged?

..OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

..OPP.

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3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

..OPR.

4.

Whether this court has no jurisdiction to file the present case as alleged? . . OPR.

Relief

6.

Arguments of the learned Authorized Representative for the petitioner and the

learned counsel for the respondent heard and records gone through.

7.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:—

Issue No.1

: Decided accordingly

Issue No.2

: Decided accordingly

Issue No.3

: Negative

Issue No.4

: Negative

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed as per the operative part of the

Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issue No. 4:

8.

This issue is taken up by me first for discussion as my findings on the same will

impinge the outcome of the other issues.

9.

While taking me through the provisions of Sections 72 and 73 of the H.P. Co-

operative Societies Act, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that since the

respondent society is a co-operative society and its employees are governed by the provisions of

the H.P. Co-operative Societies Act and the Rules framed there under, the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act are not applicable. Only the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies is

competent to decide the controversy.

10. Per contra, the learned authorized representative for the petitioner urged that the

provisions of Sections 72 and 73 of the H.P. Co-operative Societies Act are not attracted in this

case. According to him, the respondent society was engaged in a purely commercial venture and

was an industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. His client being a “workman”

and the respondent being an “industry”, this Court has the jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

11. To my mind, the contention of the learned authorized representative for the petitioner

holds the force and is sustainable. The dispute raised by the petitioner, who was an employee

of the respondent society, does not touch the constitution, management or the business of the co-

operative society. It is an admitted fact that the services of the petitioner stood terminated by the

respondent, though it is claimed by the petitioner that the same were terminated on 1.1.2013,

whereas the respondent claims that so was done on 31.12.2012.

12. Strictly speaking, a dispute between a co-operative society and its workman does not

relate to the actual business of the co-operative society and, therefore, does not touch its

business. A dispute as to the dismissal and claim of reinstatement is not a dispute falling within

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the jurisdiction of the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies functioning under the H.P. State

Co-operative Societies Act. The power that can be exercised by an Industrial Tribunal or Labour

Court under the Act cannot be exercised by the Registrar. Consequently, a dispute as regards the

dismissal from service cannot be determined by the Registrar. The Registrar of the Co-operative

Societies has no power to order the re-instatement of a workman, if he finds the

retrenchment/dismissal of the workman to be unjust.

13. In fact, this question is no longer res integra. In Bangalore Water Supply and

Sewerage Board vs. A Rajappa, 1978 LIC 467 (SC), it has been laid down that the co-operative

societies are the industries.

14. Our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled as The Palampur Co-operative Marketing

and Consumer Federation Ltd. vs. State of H.P. & others, Latest HLJ 2007 (2) (HP) 713

and The Dehra Friends Co-operative Transport Society vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour

Court, CWP No.781/20015 decided in May, 2007 has laid down that the Industrial Tribunal

has the authority, power and jurisdiction to entertain and decide the reference made to it with

respect to the employees of the co-operative societies.

15. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent, on the decision

of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as R.C. Tiwari vs. M.P. State Co-operative Marketing

Federation Ltd. & others (1997) 5 SCC 125 . The ratio of this case was considered by our own

Hon’ble High Court in The Palampur Co-operative Marketing and Consumer Federation

Ltd. case (supra) and it was held that this judgment has no application to the facts and

circumstances of the case since the employee straight away had approached the Labour Court

and had not approached any authority under the Co-operative Societies Act. Similar is the case

here. The petitioner in the present case, being an employee of the respondent, had approached

this Tribunal and had not approached any other authority under the Co-operative Societies Act.

16. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on another

decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi and Ors. Vs.

The State of Bihar and Ors. decided on 26th March, 1997. In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court held that where persons have not been appointed to the post in accordance with the rules

but were engaged on the basis of need of the work, they being temporary employees, their

disengagement from service could not be construed to be a retrenchment under the Act. In the

case on hand, as per the own admission made by RW1 Shri Mohinder Singh (respondent), the

petitioner had been appointed and was being paid the salary by the respondent. Although, he

volunteered to state that the petitioner had been engaged temporarily but, however, RW2 Shri

H.B. Kaushal, the Ex-Secretary of the respondent was categorical in his substantive evidence that

the petitioner had worked continuously from 16th August, 2010 to 31st December, 2012. So, in

view of the aforesaid admissions, it cannot be said that the petitioner was a temporary employee,

who had been engaged on the basis of need of the work. Hence, the aforesaid judgment also has

no application to the facts and circumstances of this case.

17. Reliance was further placed on case titled as Hanuman Sahakari Pani Pruvatha

Sanstha Maryadit and Ors. vs. Ramchandra Bapuso Khade and Ors. 2016 NCJ 523 (NC) ,

wherein it has been held by the Hon’ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission that a

dispute related to co-operative society can only be entertained under the Co-operative Societies

Act and the Consumer Fora has no jurisdiction to decide the complaint. In the present case a

reference has been received by this Tribunal from the appropriate Government, so in my

considered view this judgment has also no application to the facts and circumstances of the case.

18. Lastly, reliance was also placed upon the case titled as U.P. Co-operative Spinning

Mills vs. Ram Magan, decided on 24th May, 2007 by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court. In

this case, the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has held that the Labour Court had committed

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an error in holding that the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act was applicable upon

an employee of a Co-operative Society, including the workman in question, so the impugned

award was quashed. However, in view of the binding precedents laid down by our own Hon’ble

High Court in the cases referred to above, wherein it has specifically been held that the Industrial

Tribunal has the power and authority to decide the reference and the disputes like the one in

question, this judgment, being persuasive in nature cannot be taken note of.

19. It is thus, concluded that this Court has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the

case/reference.

20. This issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

Issues No.1 and 2:

21. Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

22. The short and simple case of the petitioner is that the respondent had terminated his

services without complying with the provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Act.

23. In this behalf, the petitioner has examined himself as PW1. He has deposed that the

respondent had employed him on 16.8.2010 and that he had continuously worked till 31.12.2012,

when his services were orally terminated on 1.1.2013, without any reason or notice. Workers

junior to him have been kept and the principle of ‘last come first go’ has not been followed.

24. The respondent on the other hand has examined the Secretary, Shri Mohinder

Singh as RW1. He filed certain documents purportedly in support of the case of the respondent,

which are exhibited as Ex. RW1/B to Ex. RW1/N. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that

no notice of retrenchment had been given to the petitioner. Volunteered that, the petitioner was

removed as per the directions of Board of Directors.

25. RW2 Shri H.B. Kaushal, Ex. Secretary of the respondent was also examined in

support of the case. However, he while under cross-examination categorically admitted that the

petitioner had continuously worked from 16.8.2010 to 31.12.2012.

26. It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner had not

worked for 240 days during the preceding twelve months on daily wages and, therefore, the

petitioner cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Act. The case of the petitioner

is that he had continuously worked with the respondent for more than two years.

27. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. In para 1 of the

statement of claim, the petitioner has categorically pleaded that he was employed on 16.8.2010

and his services had been retrenched on 1.1.2013 and during this period he had worked

continuously. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 240 days

in preceding twelve calendar months prior to his alleged retrenchment. The law on this issue is

well settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, it has been

laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he

had worked for 240 days in a given year.

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28. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, the evidence produced has to be looked into. The respondent claimed that the petitioner

did not work for 240 days. The petitioner was a workman hired on a daily waged basis. So, it is

obvious that he would have difficulty in having access to all the official documents, muster rolls

etc. in connection with his service.

In his chief-examination, the petitioner has claimed that he had rendered continuous service to

the respondent from 16.8.2010 till 31.12.2012. This fact has not been challenged by the

respondent at the time of cross-examination. It is the basic law that if a fact goes un-rebutted and

unchallenged during the cross-examination, the same is to be taken as admitted by the other side.

Even otherwise, RW2 Shri H.B. Kaushal was categorical in his cross-examination that the

petitioner had continuously worked from 16.8.2010 to 31.12.2012. Meaning thereby that the

petitioner had completed 240 days of work in a block of twelve calendar months preceding the

date of his termination i.e. 1.1.2013 (as per the reference).

29. Section 25-F of the Act postulates as under:—

“25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-—No workman

employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one

year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—

(a) the workman has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons

for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been

paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice:

(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall

be equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous

service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and

(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such

authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the

Official Gazette.”

30. There is not even an iota of evidence on record to show that one month’s notice in

writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment of the petitioner/workman had been given and

that he had been paid the compensation at the time of his retrenchment, as envisaged under

Section 25-F of the Act. RW1 Shri Mohinder Singh clearly admitted in his substantive evidence

that no notice of retrenchment had been given to the petitioner. RW2 Shri H.B. Kaushal

specifically admitted in his cross-examination that no retrenchment compensation had been paid

to the petitioner. For these reasons, the final termination of the services of the petitioner by the

respondent w.e.f. 1.1.2013 is patently wrong and incorrect.

31. It was also claimed by the petitioner that juniors had been retained by the respondent.

Except for his self serving and oral testimony, there is no other oral or documentary, cogent,

convincing and reliable evidence on the file to show that the employer had retained any person

junior to the petitioner at the time of his termination. That being so, the provisions of Section

25-G of the Act are not attracted in this case.

32. While testifying in the Court as PW1, the petitioner has given his age as 35 years. It is

well known that a person like the petitioner will not sit at home during the period he is/was out of

the job. The petitioner has failed to discharge the initial onus that during the period of his forced

idleness, he is/was not gainfully employed. For these reasons, he is not entitled for the back

wages.

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33. Such being the situation, I have no hesitation to conclude that the termination of the

services of the petitioner by the respondent is bad in the eyes of law.

34. These issues are decided accordingly.

Issue No. 3:

35. It has not been shown by the respondent as to how the present petition/statement of

claim is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned counsel

appearing for the respondent at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the pleadings, it

cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not maintainable. Hence, this issue is

decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief:

36. As a sequel to my findings on the issues above, the instant claim petition succeeds in

part and the same is partly allowed. The final termination of the services of the petitioner by the

respondent w.e.f. 1.1.2013 is set aside and quashed. The respondent is directed to reinstate the

petitioner forthwith. He shall be entitled to seniority and continuity in service from the date of

his illegal termination i.e. 1st January, 2013, except back wages. It is clarified that the services of

the petitioner will be re-engaged by the respondent within a period of three months from today

failing which the petitioner shall be entitled to the wages from the date of his termination to the

date of his reinstatement. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to

bear their own costs. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this Award be sent to the

appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion

be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 11th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT HELD AT DHARAMSHALA

[Organized by Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala under Section 19, of Legal

Services Authorities Act, 1987 (Central Act)]

Applicant : Sh. Baljeet Singh s/o Shri Shambhu Ram, r/o Village Sakri, P.O. Sakri, Tehsil

Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P.

Respondent : Employer/Manager, M/s Hotel Centre Point, Civil Lines, Dharamshala, District

Kangra, H.P.

Number of proceedings of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala : 202/2017

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Present:-

Name of Judicial Officer

: Sh. Yogesh Jaswal

Name of Member

: Sh. B.S. Pathania

AWARD

The dispute between the parties having been referred for determination to the National

Lok Adalat and the parties having compromised/settled the case/matter, the following award is

passed in terms of the settlement:

2.

The parties who were present in person in the Court on 29.8.2019 stated that the inter

se dispute between the parties given rise to the filing of the statement of claim under Section 10 of

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has since been settled vide compromise deed filed in the Court

which was taken on record as Ex.C-1. Statements of the parties were recorded separately, which

also go to support the compromise Ex.C-1.

3.

Pursuant to the compromise deed Ex.C-1, the learned authorized representative for

the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent who are present before the Bench

of National Lok Adalat today state that Rs. 1,25,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty five thousand

only), has been paid by the respondent and received by the petitioner vide cheque no. 515559

dated 14.9.2019 drawn on ICICI Bank Branch Dharamshala. Statement of the learned

authorized representative for the petitioner and that of the learned counsel for the respondent

recorded separately also go to support this fact.

4.

Accordingly, in view of the compromise between the parties as reflected vide

compromise deed Ex.C-1, the reference is disposed of as compromised, on payment of Rs.

1,25,000/- to the petitioner by the respondent.

5.

The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Order/Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

The parties are informed that the Court fee, if any, paid by any of them shall be refunded.

Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

Respondent

: Sh. Rohit Dutta, Adv.

Judicial Officer Member

Date : 14.9.2019

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT HELD AT DHARAMSHALA

[Organized by Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala under Section 19, of Legal

Services Authorities Act, 1987 (Central Act)]

Applicant : Smt. Bhari Devi w/o Shri Bazir Chand, r/o Village Har Chakol, P.O. Nohra,

Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P.

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Respondent : Employer/Manager, M/S Baijnath Tea Estate Company Private Limited, Village, P.O.

& Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P.

Number of proceedings of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala : 648/2016

Present:

Name of Judicial Officer

:

Sh. Yogesh Jaswal

Name of Member

: Sh. B.S. Pathania

AWARD

The dispute between the parties having been referred for determination to the National

Lok Adalat and the parties having compromised/settled the case/matter, the following award is

passed in terms of the settlement:

2.

The petitioner who was present in person and the learned counsel for the respondent

in the Court on 3.9.2019 stated that the inter se dispute between the parties given rise to the

filing of the statement of claim under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has since

been settled vide compromise deed filed in the Court which was taken on record as Ex.C-1.

Statement of the petitioner and that of the learned counsel for the respondent were recorded

separately, which also go to support the compromise Ex.C-1.

3.

Pursuant to the compromise deed Ex.C-1, the parties who are present in person

before the Bench of National Lok Adalat today state that Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty

thousand only), has been paid by the respondent and received by the petitioner vide cheque no.

000220 dated 14.9.2019 drawn on Kotak Mahindra Bank. Statements of the parties recorded

separately also go to support this fact.

4.

Accordingly, in view of the compromise between the parties as reflected vide

compromise deed Ex.C-1, the reference is disposed of as compromised, on payment of

Rs . 1,50,000/- to the petitioner by the respondent, being the full and final settlement in the case.

5.

The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Order/Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

The parties are informed that the Court fee, if any, paid by any of them shall be refunded.

Petitioner

: Smt. Bhari Devi in person with Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

Respondent

: Sh. Ashwani Kumar Kaushal, Manager with Sh. Rajinder

Chaudhary, Adv.

Judicial Officer

Member

Date: 14.9.2019

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT HELD AT DHARAMSHALA

[Organized by Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala under Section 19, of Legal

Services Authorities Act, 1987 (Central Act)]

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Applicant : Smt. Sandhi Devi w/o Shri Nand Lal, r/o Village Dhanag, P.O. Dhanag

Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P.

Respondent: Employer/Manager, M/S Baijnath Tea Estate Company Private Limited,

Village, P.O. & Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. Number of

proceedings of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala:

650/2016

Present:

Name of Judicial Officer :

Sh. Yogesh Jaswal

Name of Member

: Sh. B.S. Pathania

AWARD

The dispute between the parties having been referred for determination to the National

Lok Adalat and the parties having compromised/settled the case/matter, the following award is

passed in terms of the settlement:

2.

The petitioner who was present in person and the learned counsel for the respondent

in the Court on 3.9.2019 stated that the inter se dispute between the parties given rise to the

filing of the statement of claim under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has since

been settled vide compromise deed filed in the Court which was taken on record as Ex.C-1.

Statement of the petitioner and that of the learned counsel for the respondent were recorded

separately, which also go to support the compromise Ex.C-1.

3.

Pursuant to the compromise deed Ex.C-1, the parties who are present in person

before the Bench of National Lok Adalat today state that Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty

thousand only), has been paid by the respondent and received by the petitioner vide cheque no.

000221 dated 14.9.2019 drawn on Kotak Mahindra Bank. Statements of the parties recorded

separately also go to support this fact.

4.

Accordingly, in view of the compromise between the parties as reflected vide

compromise deed Ex.C-1, the reference is disposed of as compromised, on payment of

Rs. 1,50,000/- to the petitioner by the respondent, being the full and final settlement in the case.

5.

The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Order/Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

The parties are informed that the Court fee, if any, paid by any of them shall be refunded.

Petitioner

: Smt. Sandhi Devi in person with Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

Respondent

: Sh. Ashwani Kumar Kaushal, Manager with Sh. Rajinder

Chaudhary, Adv.

Judicial Officer

Member

Date: 14.9.2019

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT HELD AT DHARAMSHALA

[Organized by Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala under Section 19, of Legal

Services Authorities Act, 1987 (Central Act)]

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Applicant : Smt. Pawna Devi w/o Shri Balak Ram, r/o Village Har Chakol, P.O.

Mahalpatt, Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P.

Respondent : Employer/Manager, M/S Baijnath Tea Estate Company Private Limited,

Village, P.O. & Tehsil Bainnath, Dsitrict Kangra, H.P. Number of

proceedings of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala

647/2016

Present:-

Name of Judicial Officer

:

Sh. Yogesh Jaswal

AWARD

The dispute between the parties having been referred for determination to the National

Lok Adalat and the parties having compromised/settled the case/matter, the following award is

passed in terms of the settlement:

2.

The petitioner who was present in person and the learned counsel for the respondent

in the Court on 3.9.2019 stated that the inter se dispute between the parties given rise to the

filing of the statement of claim under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has since

been settled vide compromise deed filed in the Court which was taken on record as Ex.C-1.

Statement of the petitioner and that of the learned counsel for the respondent were recorded

separately, which also go to support the compromise Ex.C-1.

3.

Pursuant to the compromise deed Ex.C-1, the parties who are present in person

before the Bench of National Lok Adalat today state that Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs

only), has been paid by the respondent and received by the petitioner vide cheque no. 000219

dated 14.9.2019 drawn on Kotak Mahindra Bank. Statements of the parties recorded separately also

go to support this fact.

4.

Accordingly, in view of the compromise between the parties as reflected vide

compromise deed Ex.C-1, the reference is disposed of as compromised, on payment of

Rs. 2,00,000/- to the petitioner by the respondent, being the full and final settlement in the case.

5.

The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Order/Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

The parties are informed that the Court fee, if any, paid by any of them shall be refunded.

Petitioner

: Smt. Pawna Devi in person with Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

Respondent : Sh. Ashwani Kumar Kaushal, Manager with Sh. Rajinder Chaudhary, Adv.

Judicial Officer

Member

Date: 14.9.2019

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT HELD AT DHARAMSHALA

[Organized by Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala under Section 19, of Legal

Services Authorities Act, 1987 (Central Act)]

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Applicant

: Smt. Feek Devi w/o Shri Fingru Ram, r/o Village Har Chakol, P.O. Mahalpatt

Tehsil Baijnath, Dsitrict Kangra, H.P.

Respondent : Employer/Manager, M/S Baijnath Tea Estate Company Private Limited, Village, P.O.

& Tehsil Bainnath, Dsitrict Kangra, H.P.

Number of proceedings of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala : 649/2016

Present:

Name of Judicial Officer

:

Sh. Yogesh Jaswal

Name of Member

: Sh. B.S. Pathania

AWARD

The dispute between the parties having been referred for determination to the National

Lok Adalat and the parties having compromised/settled the case/matter, the following award is

passed in terms of the settlement:

2.

The petitioner who was present in person and the learned counsel for the respondent

in the Court on 3.9.2019 stated that the inter se dispute between the parties given rise to the

filing of the statement of claim under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has since

been settled vide compromise deed filed in the Court which was taken on record as Ex.C-1.

Statement of the petitioner and that of the learned counsel for the respondent were recorded

separately, which also go to support the compromise Ex.C-1.

3.

Pursuant to the compromise deed Ex.C-1, the parties who are present in person

before the Bench of National Lok Adalat today state that Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs

only), has been paid by the respondent and received by the petitioner vide cheque no. 000218

dated 14.9.2019 drawn on Kotak Mahindra Bank. Statements of the parties recorded separately

also go to support this fact.

4.

Accordingly, in view of the compromise between the parties as reflected vide

compromise deed Ex.C-1, the reference is disposed of as compromised, on payment of

Rs.2,00,000/- to the petitioner by the respondent, being the full and final settlement in the case.

5.

The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Order/Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

The parties are informed that the Court fee, if any, paid by any of them shall be refunded.

Petitioner

: Smt. Feek Devi in person with Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

Respondent : Sh. Ashwani Kumar Kaushal, Manager with Sh. Rajinder Chaudhary, Adv.

Judicial Officer

Member

Date: 14.9.2019

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT HELD AT DHARAMSHALA

[Organized by Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala under Section 19, of Legal

Services Authorities Act, 1987 (Central Act)]

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Applicant

: The President/General Secretary, Baijnath Tea Estate Mazdoor Sangh, No.915,

Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P.

Respondent : The Employer/Manager, Baijnath Tea Estate Company Pvt. Ltd., Baijnath, District

Kangra, H.P.

Number of proceedings of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala : 229/2014

Present:

Name of Judicial Officer

:

Sh. Yogesh Jaswal

Name of Member

:

Sh. B.S. Pathania

AWARD

The dispute between the parties having been referred for determination to the National

Lok Adalat and the parties having compromised/settled the case/matter, the following award is

passed in terms of the settlement:

In view of the separate statement of Shri N.L. Kaundal, authorized representative for the

petitioner recorded on 03.9.2019 and which is placed on record, the present reference under

Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is hereby dismissed as withdrawn. File after due

completion be consigned to the record room.

The parties are informed that the Court fee, if any, paid by any of them shall be refunded.

Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

Respondent : Sh. Ashwani Kumar Kaushal, Manager with Sh. Rajinder Chaudhary, Adv.

Judicial Officer

Member

Date:14.9.2019

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref No.

: 15/2018

Date of Institution

: 28.3.2018

Date of Decision

: 16.09.2019

Shri Lekh Raj s/o Shri Prem Chand, r/o Village Dev Bharari, P.O. Sulyali, Tehsil

Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

..Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P. ..Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. Pankaj Bhardwaj, Adv.

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For the Respondent

: Sh. B.C. Katoch, A.D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:—

“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Lekh Raj s/o Shri Prem Chand, r/o

Village Dev Bharari, P.O. Sulyali, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. during August, 1988 by

the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division Jawali, District Kangra, H.P., who had worked on

daily wages as beldar and has raised his industrial dispute after nearly 23 years vide demand

notice dated 23.07.2011, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,

is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of delay of nearly 23 years in raising the

industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation

the above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

initially engaged as a beldar on daily waged basis in May, 1986 in HPPWD Division Jassur

(Nurpur), H.P. (now HPPWD Jawali) on various construction sites, like Bodh to Chaki Dhar

Road, Suliali to Dev Bhrari etc. However, his services were disengaged w.e.f. June, 1990 in

violation of the law. The petitioner had completed 240 days in each calendar year. The respondent

under a mistaken notion and ignorance of law had terminated the services of the petitioner in

June, 1990. He thereafter had made oral requests to the respondent and his subordinates to re-

engage him. Although, he was assured to be re-engaged after three or four months, but nothing

was heard thereafter from the department. A letter in writing had also been sent by him to the

department for his re-engagement on daily waged basis, but without success. Smt. Kusum Lata,

junior to him was retained by the department and she at present is working in HPPWD Division

Nurpur. Twenty four other juniors were also re-appointed by the department in the year 2010, as

per the directions of the Hon’ble High Court. The principle of ‘last come first go’ was not

adhered to by the respondent. No one month’s notice, nor any retrenchment compensation had

been paid to the petitioner. The provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short) had been violated by the respondent.

New/fresh hands had also been engaged and no opportunity was ever given to the petitioner for his

re-engagement, thereby, violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. The petitioner is

not gainfully employed since the time of his illegal and unjustified termination by the

respondent. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared and filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on the ground of delay and laches.

The contents of the petition were denied on merits. However, it was admitted by the respondent

that the petitioner had been engaged as a daily wager in the year 1986. However, it was

specifically denied that he had been disengaged in June, 1990. It was asserted that the petitioner

worked intermittently w.e.f. May, 1986 to August, 1988 and thereafter had left the job of his own

sweet will. It is denied that the petitioner had completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is

claimed that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted/re-named as HPPWD Division Jawali vide HP

Government Notification no. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July, 1994. It is admitted that

HPPWD Division Jawali is involved in the construction and maintenance of roads, buildings and

bridges, repair and maintenance of tools and plants etc. Neither any junior had been retained nor

engaged by the respondent, so there was no violation of any of the provisions of the Act. It is

denied that a pick and choose policy had been adopted by the respondent. The persons mentioned

at serial no.1 to 24 were engaged as per the directions of the Court. After leaving the work the

petitioner had never approached the respondent and had raised the demand notice only in the

year 2011. Only those workers had been regularized who had worked continuously and fulfilled

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the requisite criteria of regularization as per the Government policy. The respondent, thus, prays

for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 02.11.2018:

1.

Whether termination of the service of petitioner by the respondent during August,

1988 is/was legal and justified as alleged?

..OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

..OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . . OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches as alleged? . . OPR.

Relief

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. The petitioner, namely, Shri Lekh Raj examined himself as PW1 and tendered in

evidence his statement by way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A. Shri Jagtar Singh Thakur (respondent)

appeared as RW1and tendered his statement by way of affidavit Ex. RW1/A. He also placed on

the file copy of mandays chart of the petitioner as Ex.RW1/B, copy of notification dated

21.7.1994 as Ex.RW1/C and copy of letter dated 18.8.1994 as Ex.RW1/D.

7.

Arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant

District Attorney for the respondent heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Negative

Issue No.3

: Yes

Issue No.4

: No

Relief

: Claim petition dismissed as per the operative portion of the

Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issue No. 1 and 2:

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The petitioner, namely, Shri Lekh Raj examined himself as PW1 and filed his

affidavit in evidence, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit, he reiterated the contents

of his statement of claim.

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11. In the cross-examination, he admitted that before 1994, HPPWD Division was at

Jassur. He also admitted that HPPWD Division Jawali was established on 21st July, 1994 vide

government notification no.PBW-(A)-A(1)17/94. He denied that he had never worked in Jawali

Division. He also denied that he had worked intermittently w.e.f. May, 1986 uptil August, 1988 in

the department. He further denied that he had left the work of his own. Volunteered that, from

May, 1986 uptil June, 1990 he had worked continuously. He specifically denied that he had

never worked in the department continuously, nor he had ever been given breaks by the

department. He feigned ignorance that the workers mentioned in the petition and the affidavit

were kept at work in HPPWD Division Nurpur as per the orders of the Court. He specifically

denied that the respondent had adhered to the principle of ‘last come first go’. He also denied

that he had never worked for 240 days and above in any year. He further denied that only those

workers had been regularized who had fulfilled the conditions of the policy of the Government

for regularization. He admitted that he owns land, which he cultivates. He also admitted that he is

doing the days’ drudgery privately. Self stated that, as and when the work is available. He

denied that he is making a phoney statement.

12. Conversely, Shri Jagtar Singh Thakur, Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division

Jawali (respondent) testified as RW1. In his affidavit Ex. RW1/A preferred as per Order 18, Rule

4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he corroborated on oath the contents of the reply filed by him.

13. In the cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner had worked from May,

1986 till June, 1990 regularly and had completed 240 days. Volunteered that, as per their record,

the petitioner had only worked for 216 days. He denied that the petitioner had been removed

without any notice and that junior beldars/workers were retained. He admitted that no notice had

been given to the petitioner to report for work. Self stated that he had left the job of his own. He

further admitted that Ex.RW1/D contains the names of only those persons, who have been

working in the department since the year 1994. Further, he denied that the petitioner had been

given the assurance by the department that as and when the work would be available, he would

be called. Further, he denied that intentionally incomplete muster rolls and other record

pertaining to the petitioner had been filed.

14. Ex.RW1/B is the copy of the mandays chart relating to the petitioner.

15. Ex. RW1/C is the copy of notification dated 21st July, 1994 with regard to the

shifting of HPPWD Division Jassur to Jawali along-with sanctioned strength and staff.

16. Ex. RW1/D is the copy of Office Order dated 18.8.1994 regarding the transfer of

work-charged staff to HPPWD Division Nurpur, on the closure of HPPWD Jassur and its

opening at Jawali.

17. It is an admitted fact of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged as a

daily waged beldar. Although, the petitioner claimed that he had worked as a beldar from May,

1986 uptil June, 1990 but, however, the respondent has produced on record the mandays chart of

the petitioner, copy of which is Ex.RW1/B. Its perusal discloses that the services of the petitioner

were engaged by the respondent in the month of May, 1986 for the first time as a daily waged

beldar and he had worked as such uptil August, 1988. The claimant/petitioner has not placed

and exhibited on record any document to show that he had regularly worked with the

respondent from May, 1986 uptil June, 1990.

18. The first and foremost point which comes to the fore for determination is whether the

petitioner had been disengaged from service or he himself had abandoned the job, as it is

claimed by the petitioner that his services had orally been terminated by the respondent, whereas

the stand taken by the respondent is that after August, 1988 the petitioner had left the work of his

own.

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19. It is well known that the abandonment has to be proved like any other fact by the

respondent/employer. The burden of proving of abandonment is upon the respondent. Simply

because a workman fails to report for duty, it cannot be presumed that he has left/abandoned the

job. Mere statement of Shri Jagtar Singh Thakur, (RW1) alleging that the workman has

abandoned the services is entirely insufficient to discharge the said onus. Admittedly, no

disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner by the respondent for his alleged

willful absence from duty. Absence from duty is a serious misconduct and the principle of

natural justice did require that some sort of a fact finding inquiry was got conducted by the

respondent. In the present case as it emerges from the evidence on record, so was not done by

the respondent. Then, ‘animus’ to abandon, it is well settled, must necessarily be shown to exist,

before a case of abandonment can be said to have been made out. No evidence of any such

‘animus’ on the part of the petitioner is forthcoming in the present case. Thus, the plea of

abandonment put forth by the respondent/employer is not established.

20. As per the reference received from the appropriate Government, the services of the

petitioner stood finally terminated during August, 1988. Section 10 (4) of the Act mandates that

the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal shall confine its adjudication to the points of dispute

referred to it by the appropriate Government and the matters incidental thereto. No reference has

been received from the appropriate Government regarding the alleged final termination of the

services of the petitioner by the respondent in June, 1990. However, looking to the statement of

claim and the sworn testimony of the petitioner, it is apparent that he has claimed that his

services had been finally terminated by the respondent in the month of June, 1990. Such

pleadings and evidence of the petitioner cannot be looked into by this Court, being beyond the

terms of the reference. Since, it has not been pleaded nor stated by the petitioner that his services

stood terminated by the respondent in August, 1988, therefore, the question of final termination

of his services by the respondent (as per the reference) does not arise. Rather, the same has

become insignificant.

21. Even otherwise, Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of

Sub Section (2) of Section 25-B, if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months

preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under

the employer 240 days within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous

service. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 240 days in the

preceding twelve calendar months prior to his alleged retrenchment. The law on this issue is well

settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, it has been laid by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had

worked for 240 days in a given year.

22. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, the evidence produced has to be looked into. Although, in his chief-examination the

petitioner claimed that he had worked with the respondent as a beldar continuously from May,

1986 uptil June, 1990, but no mandays chart of the petitioner is there on the file to establish that

he had worked continuously for a period of 240 days in a block of twelve calendar months

anterior to the date of his alleged termination, as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. It has

been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Mohd. Ali vs. State of Himachal

Pradesh and Ors., (2019) 1 SCC (L&S) 138 that when the workman had not worked for the

required 240 days of working in the period of twelve calendar months preceding the date of

dismissal, he is not entitled to take the benefits of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are not attracted in this case.

23. It is claimed by the petitioner that at the time of termination of his services,

persons junior to him were retained in service by the respondent. A detail of such persons has

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been given in para 8 of the statement of claim. The respondent had refuted such allegations and

claimed that no person junior to the petitioner had ever been retained in service by the

department. Significantly, no seniority list has been placed and exhibited on record or any other

witness examined so as to show that the persons named in the statement of claim and in his

affidavit by the petitioner were junior to him and who had been retained by the respondent at the

time of the termination of his services. Then, no prayer had ever been made by the petitioner for

the production of the seniority list from the respondent during the pendency of this case.

Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent had violated the principle of ‘last come first go’,

as envisaged in Section 25-G of the Act.

24. It was also claimed by the petitioner that new appointments had been made by the

respondent. Except for his self serving and oral testimony, there is no other oral or documentary,

cogent, convincing and reliable evidence on the file to show that the employer had offered any

fresh appointment to any person to fill any vacancy in their set up. That being so, the provisions

of Section 25-H of the Act are also not attracted in this case.

25. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, the petitioner is held to be not

entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in favour of

the respondents.

ISSUE NO. 3:

26. Taking into account my findings on issues no. 1 and 2 above, it is held that neither the

petitioner has the cause of action nor the locus standi to sue and that the instant claim petition is

not maintainable in the present form.

27. This issue is decided against the petitioner and in favour of the respondent.

Issue No. 4:

28. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society

Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that:—

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the

proceeding under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the

ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as

a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence.

No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay

alone”.

29. In view of the trite laid down in this ruling, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent.

Relief:

30. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

order as to costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

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Announced in the open Court today this 16th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref No.

: 13/2018

Date of Institution

: 28.3.2018

Date of Decision

: 16.09.2019

Shri Shyam Lal s/o Shri Punnu Ram, r/o Village Dev Bharari, P.O. Suliyali, Tehsil

Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

..Petitioner.

Versu

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P. ..Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. Pankaj Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. B.C. Katoch, A.D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:—

“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Shyam Lal s/o Shri Punnu Ram, r/o

Village Dev Bharari, P.O. Suliyali, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. during October,

1987 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.,

who had worked on daily wages as beldar and has raised his industrial dispute after

nearly 24 years vide demand notice dated 23.07.2011, without complying the provisions

of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view the

delay of nearly 24 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to

from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

initially engaged as a beldar on daily waged basis in May, 1986 in HPPWD Division Jassur

(Nurpur), H.P. (now HPPWD Jawali) on various construction sites, like Bodh to Chaki Dhar

Road, Suliali to Dev Bhrari etc. However, his services were disengaged w.e.f. June, 1990 in

violation of the law. The petitioner had completed 240 days in each calendar year. The respondent

under a mistaken notion and ignorance of law had terminated the services of the petitioner in

June, 1990. He thereafter had made oral requests to the respondent and his subordinates to re-

engage him. Although, he was assured to be re-engaged after three or four months, but nothing

was heard thereafter from the department. A letter in writing had also been sent by him to the

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department for his re-engagement on daily waged basis, but without success. Smt. Kusum Lata,

junior to him was retained by the department and she at present is working in HPPWD Division

Nurpur. Twenty four other juniors were also re-appointed by the department in the year 2010, as

per the directions of the Hon’ble High Court. The principle of ‘last come first go’ was not

adhered to by the respondent. No one month’s notice, nor any retrenchment compensation had

been paid to the petitioner. The provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short) had been violated by the respondent.

New/fresh hands had also been engaged and no opportunity was ever given to the petitioner for his

re-engagement, thereby, violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. The petitioner is

not gainfully employed since the time of his illegal and unjustified termination by the

respondent. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared and filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on the ground of delay and laches.

The contents of the petition were denied on merits. However, it was admitted by the respondent

that the petitioner had been engaged as a daily wager in the year 1986. However, it was

specifically denied that he had been disengaged in June, 1990. It was asserted that the petitioner

worked intermittently w.e.f. May, 1986 to October, 1987 and thereafter had left the job of his

own sweet will. It is denied that the petitioner had completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is

claimed that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted/re-named as HPPWD Division Jawali vide H.P.

Government Notification no. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July, 1994. It is admitted that

HPPWD Division Jawali is involved in the construction and maintenance of roads, buildings and

bridges, repair and maintenance of tools and plants etc. Neither any junior had been retained nor

engaged by the respondent, so there was no violation of any of the provisions of the Act. It is

denied that a pick and choose policy had been adopted by the respondent. The persons mentioned

at serial no.1 to 24 were engaged as per the directions of the Court. After leaving the work the

petitioner had never approached the respondent and had raised the demand notice only in the

year 2011. Only those workers had been regularized who had worked continuously and fulfilled

the requisite criteria of regularization as per the Government policy. The respondent, thus, prays

for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 02.11.2018:

1.

Whether termination of the service of petitioner by the respondent during

October, 1987 is/was legal and justified as alleged?

..OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

..OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. . OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches as alleged? . . OPR.

Relief

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. The petitioner, namely, Shri Shyam Lal examined himself as PW1 and tendered

in evidence his statement by way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A. Shri Jagtar Singh Thakur (respondent)

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appeared as RW1and tendered his statement by way of affidavit Ex. RW1/A. He also placed on

the file copy of mandays chart of the petitioner as Ex.RW1/B, copy of notification dated

21.7.1994 as Ex.RW1/C and copy of letter dated 18.8.1994 as Ex.RW1/D.

7.

Arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant

District Attorney for the respondent heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Negative

Issue No.3

: Yes

Issue No.4

: No

Relief

: Claim petition dismissed as per the operative portion of

the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issue No. 1 and 2:

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The petitioner, namely, Shri Shyam Lal examined himself as PW1 and filed his

affidavit in evidence, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit, he reiterated the contents

of his statement of claim.

11. In the cross-examination, he admitted that before 1994, HPPWD Division was at

Jassur. He also admitted that HPPWD Division Jawali was established on 21st July, 1994 vide

government notification no.PBW-(A)-A(1)17/94. He denied that he had never worked in Jawali

Division. He also denied that he had worked intermittently w.e.f. January, 1986 uptil October,

1987 in the department. He further denied that he had left the work of his own. Volunteered that,

from May, 1986 uptil June, 1990 he had worked continuously. He specifically denied that he had

never worked in the department continuously, nor he had ever been given breaks by the

department. He feigned ignorance that the workers mentioned in the petition and the affidavit

were kept at work in HPPWD Division Nurpur as per the orders of the Court. He specifically

denied that the respondent had adhered to the principle of ‘last come first go’. He also denied

that he had never worked for 240 days and above in any year. He further denied that only those

workers had been regularized who had fulfilled the conditions of the policy of the Government

for regularization. He admitted that he owns land, which he cultivates. He also admitted that he is

doing the days’ drudgery privately. Self stated that, as and when the work is available. He

denied that he is making a phoney statement.

12. Conversely, Shri Jagtar Singh Thakur, Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division

Jawali (respondent) testified as RW1. In his affidavit Ex. RW1/A preferred as per Order 18, Rule

4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he corroborated on oath the contents of the reply filed by him.

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13. In the cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner had worked from May,

1986 till June, 1990 regularly and had completed 240 days. Volunteered that, as per their record,

the petitioner had only worked for 183 days. He denied that the petitioner had been removed

without any notice and that junior beldars/workers were retained. He admitted that no notice had

been given to the petitioner to report for work. Self stated that he had left the job of his own. He

further admitted that Ex.RW1/D contains the names of only those persons, who have been

working in the department since the year 1994. Further, he denied that the petitioner had been

given the assurance by the department that as and when the work would be available, he would

be called. Further, he denied that intentionally incomplete muster rolls and other record

pertaining to the petitioner had been filed.

14. Ex.RW1/B is the copy of the mandays chart relating to the petitioner.

15. Ex. RW1/C is the copy of notification dated 21st July, 1994 with regard to the

shifting of HPPWD Division Jassur to Jawali along-with sanctioned strength and staff.

16. Ex. RW1/D is the copy of Office Order dated 18.8.1994 regarding the transfer of

work-charged staff to HPPWD Division Nurpur, on the closure of HPPWD Jassur and its

opening at Jawali.

17. It is an admitted fact of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged as a

daily waged beldar. Although, the petitioner claimed that he had worked as a beldar from May,

1986 uptil June, 1990 but, however, the respondent has produced on record the mandays chart of

the petitioner, copy of which is Ex.RW1/B. Its perusal discloses that the services of the petitioner

were engaged by the respondent in the month of January, 1986 for the first time as a daily

waged beldar and he had worked as such uptil October, 1987. The claimant/petitioner has not

placed and exhibited on record any document to show that he had regularly worked with the

respondent from May, 1986 uptil June, 1990.

18. The first and foremost point which comes to the fore for determination is whether the

petitioner had been disengaged from service or he himself had abandoned the job, as it is

claimed by the petitioner that his services had orally been terminated by the respondent, whereas

the stand taken by the respondent is that after October, 1987 the petitioner had left the work of

his own.

19. It is well known that the abandonment has to be proved like any other fact by the

respondent/employer. The burden of proving of abandonment is upon the respondent. Simply

because a workman fails to report for duty, it cannot be presumed that he has left/abandoned the

job. Mere statement of Shri Jagtar Singh Thakur, (RW1) alleging that the workman had

abandoned the services is entirely insufficient to discharge the said onus. Admittedly, no

disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner by the respondent for his alleged

willful absence from duty. Absence from duty is a serious misconduct and the principle of

natural justice did require that some sort of a fact finding inquiry was got conducted by the

respondent. In the present case as it emerges from the evidence on record, so was not done by

the respondent. Then, ‘animus’ to abandon, it is well settled, must necessarily be shown to exist,

before a case of abandonment can be said to have been made out. No evidence of any such

‘animus’ on the part of the petitioner is forthcoming in the present case. Thus, the plea of

abandonment put forth by the respondent/employer is not established.

20. As per the reference received from the appropriate Government, the services of the

petitioner stood finally terminated during October, 1987. Section 10 (4) of the Act mandates that

the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal shall confine its adjudication to the points of dispute

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referred to it by the appropriate Government and the matters incidental thereto. No reference has

been received from the appropriate Government regarding the alleged final termination of the

services of the petitioner by the respondent in June, 1990. However, looking to the statement of

claim and the sworn testimony of the petitioner, it is apparent that he has claimed that his

services had been finally terminated by the respondent in the month of June, 1990. Such

pleadings and evidence of the petitioner cannot be looked into by this Court, being beyond the

terms of the reference. Since, it has not been pleaded nor stated by the petitioner that his services

stood terminated by the respondent in October, 1987, therefore, the question of final termination

of his services by the respondent (as per the reference) does not arise. Rather, the same has

become insignificant.

21. Even otherwise, Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub

Section (2) of Section 25-B, if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months

preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under

the employer 240 days within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous

service. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 240 days in the

preceding twelve calendar months prior to his alleged retrenchment. The law on this issue is well

settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, it has been laid by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had

worked for 240 days in a given year.

22. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, the evidence produced has to be looked into. Although, in his chief-examination the

petitioner claimed that he had worked with the respondent as a beldar continuously from January,

1986 uptil June, 1990, but no mandays chart of the petitioner is there on the file to establish

that he had worked continuously for a period of 240 days in a block of twelve calendar months

anterior to the date of his alleged termination, as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. It

has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Mohd. Ali vs. State of

Himachal Pradesh and Ors., (2019) 1 SCC (L&S) 138 that when the workman had not worked

for the required 240 days of working in the period of twelve calendar months preceding the date

of dismissal, he is not entitled to take the benefits of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are not attracted in this case.

23. It is claimed by the petitioner that at the time of termination of his services,

persons junior to him were retained in service by the respondent. A detail of such persons has

been given in para 8 of the statement of claim. The respondent had refuted such allegations and

claimed that no person junior to the petitioner had ever been retained in service by the

department. Significantly, no seniority list has been placed and exhibited on record or any other

witness examined so as to show that the persons named in the statement of claim and in his

affidavit by the petitioner were junior to him and who had been retained by the respondent at the

time of the termination of his services. Then, no prayer had ever been made by the petitioner for

the production of the seniority list from the respondent during the pendency of this case.

Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent had violated the principle of ‘last come first go’,

as envisaged in Section 25-G of the Act.

24. It was also claimed by the petitioner that new appointments had been made by the

respondent. Except for his self serving and oral testimony, there is no other oral or documentary,

cogent, convincing and reliable evidence on the file to show that the employer had offered any

fresh appointment to any person to fill any vacancy in their set up. That being so, the provisions

of Section 25-H of the Act are also not attracted in this case.

25. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, the petitioner is held to be not

entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in favour of

the respondents.

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Issue No. 3:

26. Taking into account my findings on issues no. 1 and 2 above, it is held that neither the

petitioner has the cause of action nor the locus standi to sue and that the instant claim petition is

not maintainable in the present form.

27. This issue is decided against the petitioner and in favour of the respondent.

Issue No. 4:

28. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society

Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that:—

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the

proceeding under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the

ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as

a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence.

No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay

alone”.

29. In view of the trite laid down in this ruling, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent.

Relief:

30. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

order as to costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 16th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref No.

: 389/2015

Date of Institution

: 25.8.2015

Date of Decision

: 17.9.2019

Smt. Reeta Sharma w/o Shri Ratan Lal Sharma, r/o Village and Post Office Soldha, Tehsil

Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P.

..Petitioner.

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Versus

1.

The Principal, Government Senior Secondary School, Soldha, District Bilaspur, H.P.

2.

The Chairman, School Development & Management Committee, Government Senior

Secondary School, Soldha, District Bilaspur, H.P.

..Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. S.S. Sippy, AR

For the Respondent(s)

: Smt. Navina Rahi, DDA

AWARD

The below given reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:—

“Whether termination of the services of Smt. Reeta Sharma w/o Shri Rattan Lal

Sharma, r/o V.P.O. Soldha, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P. w.e.f. 08-10-2013 by (i)

the Principal, Government Senior Secondary School Soldha, District Bilaspur, H.P., (ii)

the Chairman, School Development & Management Committee, Government Senior

Secondary School Soldha, District Bilaspur, H.P., without complying with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what

amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker

is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

In furtherance to the reference, it is averred by the petitioner in the statement of

claim that she was initially engaged on daily waged basis as a mid day meal worker on 7.7.2008.

She had worked as such continuously uptil 2.12.2009. Thereafter, without any reason and notice,

her services were orally terminated on 3.12.2009. She issued demand notice. The appropriate

Government after the receipt of the failure report from the Conciliation Officer, made a reference

to this Court, which was allowed on 20.5.2013. She had again joined the services with the

respondent on 1.6.2013. However, her services were again illegally terminated by the

respondents on 8.10.2013. Her seniority has been disturbed and a junior to her named Smt. Rita

Devi has been engaged. The principle of ‘last come first go’ was not adhered to by the

respondent. No prior permission had been obtained from the higher authorities by the

respondents before terminating her services. The respondents have violated the provisions of

Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the

Act’ for short). She is unemployed. The petitioner, thus, prays for her re-engagement with all

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondents appeared. They filed a joint reply taking preliminary

objection regarding lack of maintainability. The contents of the petition were denied on merits.

However, it was admitted that the petitioner had been engaged as a mid day meal worker, but by

the School Management Committee vide resolution no. 3 dated 7.7.2008. She had again been

engaged on 3.6.2013, as per the Award dated 25.5.2013 passed by the Court. She had worked as a

mid day meal worker from 3.6.2013 uptil 4.10.2013. Thereafter, she did not attend the school. On

9.10.2013, the petitioner had been ordered to attend her duties vide a letter. She neither

reported back on duty, nor had given any information. She was again informed about her

absence from duty vide a letter. Through a special messenger, letter dated 14.10.2013 had also

been sent to her house regarding her absence from duty. It was informed by her husband that she

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had been arrested by the police and had not come back home since 5.10.2013. On inquiry, it

transpired that the petitioner had been arrested in case FIR no.170/2013 dated 4.10.2013 by the

police of Police Station Barmana. Thereafter, the School Management Committee had

terminated the services of the petitioner vide resolution no.2 dated 19.10.2013, as per Rule 19 of

the guidelines for hiring of services of Cook-cum-Helper under Mid Day Meal Scheme framed

by the department of Elementary Education, Government of Himachal Pradesh, which provides

that continuous absence beyond three days from the school without approval of member

secretary/competent authority shall automatically lead to the termination of the services of the

Cook-cum-Helper and that he/she would not entitled to any wages/remuneration for the period of

absence. There are three posts of Mid Day Meal Worker in the school. When Shri Chuni Lal had

resigned in the month of May, 2014, to fill up the requirement of third Mid Day Meal Worker,

Smt. Reeta Devi had been engaged on 17.6.2013 after observing all codal formalities. It is denied

that the respondents had indulged in unfair labour practice and that the seniority of the petitioner

had been ignored. The services of the petitioner had been terminated on account of her own act

and conduct. There is no need to obtain any sanction for terminating the Mid Day Meal Worker

from the higher authorities. There has been no violation of any of the provisions of the Act by

the respondents. The petitioner is gainfully employed, as she is running a shop. The respondents,

thus, pray for the dismissal of the reference.

4.

While filing the rejoinder, the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 14.12.2016

1.

Whether the termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondents w.e.f.

08-10-2013 is/was improper and unjustified as alleged? . . OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

..OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form? ..OPR.

Relief

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. The petitioner, namely, Smt. Reeta Sharma appeared as PW1 and tendered in

evidence her statement by way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A, copy of judgment dated 4.8.2016 as

Ex.PW1/B and copy of Award dated 20.5.2013 passed in Reference no.1/2011 as Ex.PW1/C The

respondent examined one Shri Om Prakash Parmar as RW1, who tendered his statement by way

of affidavit Ex. RW1/A and copy of guidelines as Mark-RA.

7… Arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Deputy District

Attorney for the respondent heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:—

Issue No.1

: No

Issue No.2

: Negative

Issue No.3

: Yes

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Relief

: Petition is dismissed as per the operative portion of the

Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES No. 1 and 2:

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The petitioner Smt. Reeta Sharma stepped into the witness box as PW1. In her

affidavit Ex.PW1/A submitted under Order 18, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, she

reiterated on oath the contents of the petition/statement of claim in its entirety.

11. In the cross-examination, she admitted that she was engaged as a Mid Day Meal

Worker in the school. She further admitted that Mid Day Meal Worker is engaged as per the

resolution passed by the School Management Committee. Further, she admitted that she had

been engaged in accordance with resolution no. 3 dated 7.7.2008. She denied that thereafter she

had left the work. She admitted that in the year 2011 she had raised a dispute before this Court.

She further admitted that the said case was decided in her favour in the year 2013 and thereafter

she was kept at work. She admitted that FIR no. 170/2013 dated 4.10.2013 was lodged against

her. Volunteered that, she has been acquitted. She feigned ignorance that when the department

came to know of the police case registered against her and that she had remained in police

custody, as per the guidelines of the Mid Day Scheme, on 19.10.2013 she was disengaged by the

department. She had remained in custody for 26-27 days. She admitted that there were three

posts of Mid Day Meal Workers. She works as an agriculturist and under MANREGA. She

denied that the she has given a phoney statement.

12. Ex. PW1/B is the copy of judgment dated passed in Sessions Trial No.19/7 of

2013 dated 4.8.2016 by the Special Judge, Bilaspur.

13. Ex.PW1/C is the copy of Award dated 20.5.2013 passed by this Court relating to the

petitioner.

14. Mark-PA is the leave application of the petitioner. It unfolds that the petitioner had

prayed for two days leave for 7th and 8th October, 2013 from respondent no.1.

15. Conversely, Shri Om Prakash Parmar (respondent no.1) testified as RW1. In his

affidavit Ex. RW1/A preferred as per Order 18, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he

corroborated on oath the contents of the reply filed by the respondents.

16. In the cross-examination, he admitted that that the petitioner had been re-engaged as

per the orders of the Court. He feigned ignorance that after termination of the services of the

petitioner Smt. Reeta Devi was kept at work. Volunteered that, these days Smt. Krishni Devi has

been kept at work. After being acquitted by the Court, the petitioner has not been again kept at

work. He admitted that notice had been given to the petitioner. He denied that the department

had illegally removed the petitioner.

17. Mark-RA is the copy of guidelines for hiring of services of Cook-cum-Helper

under MID DAY MEAL Scheme by the School Management Committee in Himachal Pradesh.

18. Mark-A is the copy of letter dated 9.10.2013 issued to the petitioner by the

Member Secretary/Pradhan of School Management Committee, Government Senior Secondary

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School, Soldha. It unfolds that the School Management Committee had directed the petitioner to

resume her duties forthwith in the school, as she was absenting herself since 5.10.2013.

19. Mark-B is the copy of letter/notice dated 11.10.2013 issued to the petitioner by the

Member Secretary/Pradhan of the School Management Committee, Government Senior Secondary

School, Soldha, as per which the petitioner had again been asked by the School Management

Committee to report back on duty, lest proceedings of indiscipline would be initiated against her.

20. Mark-C and Mark-D are the copies of letters/notices dated 14.10.2013 issued to the

petitioner by the Member Secretary/Pradhan of the School Management Committee,

Government Senior Secondary School, Soldha. It reveals that the petitioner had again been asked

by the School Management Committee to resume her duties within two days, otherwise her

services would be terminated.

21. It is an admitted fact of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged as a

Mid Day Meal Worker. There is no denial of the fact that she had initially been engaged on

7.7.2008. It is not disputed that she had worked as such till 2.12.2009. The parties are not at

variance that an industrial dispute thereafter had been raised by the petitioner and that reference

was decided in her favour by this Court on 20.5.2013. Reference in this regard can be made to

the copy of Award as Ex.PW1/C. It is an admitted fact on the part of the respondents that in

compliance of the Award, the petitioner had been re-engaged. According to the petitioner she

had again worked as a Mid Day Meal Worker with the respondents till 7.10.2013 and on

8.10.2013 her services had been illegally terminated by the respondents. It was the stand taken

by the respondents that as the petitioner had remained absent from duty beyond three days

without any approval from the member secretary/competent authority, her services stood

terminated by the School Management Committee on 19.10.2013, as per the guidelines (norms)

for engaging Cook-cum-Helper under Mid Day Meal Scheme.

22. Section 10 (4) of the Act mandates that the Labour Court/Tribunal shall confine its

adjudication to the points of dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government and the

matters incidental thereto. As per the reference received from the appropriate Government, this

Court is required to decide:—

(i)

Whether the final termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondents on

8.10.2013 is legal and justified?

23. Although, looking to the statement of claim and the sworn testimony of the

petitioner, it apparent that she has claimed that her services had been finally terminated by the

respondents on 8th October, 2013 but, however, placed on record by the respondents are

photocopies of letters/notices issued to the petitioner as Mark-A to Mark-D. These letters/notices

go to show that on 9th, 11th and 14th October, 2013, the petitioner had been asked by respondent

no.2 to resume her duties, lest proceedings of indiscipline would be initiated against her and her

services could also be terminated. Meaning thereby that the services of the petitioner had not

been terminated by the respondents on 8.10.2013. At this stage, I will like to highlight that there

are certain unmarked/un-exhibited documents on record. Copy of resolution passed by the School

Management Committee, Soldha on 19.10.2013 shows that when despite notice being issued,

the petitioner had failed to report back on duty and had also not sent any information in writing,

the committee had resolved to terminate the services of the petitioner. Notice of termination of

services of the even date was also sent to the petitioner and a copy of thereof had also been

addressed to Deputy Director, Elementary Education Bilaspur. In view of the aforesaid documents,

the question of final termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondents (as per the

reference on 8.10.2013) does not arise. Rather, the same has become insignificant, as the final

termination per these documents had taken place on 19.10.2013.

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24. Even otherwise, there is no denial of the fact that the Government has framed

guidelines for hiring of services of Cook-cum-Helper under Mid Day Meal Scheme by the

School Management Committee in Himachal Pradesh. Copy thereof has been placed on record

by the respondents as Mark-RA. Rule 19 (b) reads thus:-

“Continuous absence beyond three days from the school without approval of member

secretary/competent authority shall automatically lead to the termination of the services

of the Cook-cum-Helper. The Cook-cum-Helper will not be entitled for any

wages/remuneration for the period of absence”.

25. Admittedly, FIR no.170/2013 dated 4.2.2013 stood registered at Police Station

Barmana against the petitioner. It stands categorically admitted in her substantive evidence by

the petitioner that she had remained in custody for about 26-27 days. Except for the application

Mark-PA for grant of two days leave for 7th and 8th October, 2013, nothing has been brought on

record by the petitioner to show that thereafter till 19th October, 2013 she had sought the

approval of member secretary/competent authority for her continuous absence from the school.

Admittedly, the services of the petitioner were retrenched by the School Management Committee

Soldha under the above noted rule per resolution dated 19.10.2013, copy of which is there on the

file. The retrenchment notice reveals that despite being asked time and again in writing, when the

petitioner had neither reported back on duty, nor had given anything in writing, the School

Management Committee had resolved to discharge the services of the petitioner w.e.f.

19.10.2013 for her continuous absence from school, as per Rule 19 of the guidelines for hiring of

services of Cook-cum-Helper under Mid Day Meal Scheme.

26. Since, the petitioner remained continuously absent beyond three days from school,

as she categorically admitted in her substantive evidence that she had remained in custody

for about 26-27 days; and as there is nothing on record to show that she had sought any approval

of the member secretary/competent authority for this period of absence of her’s, it cannot be

said that her services were wrongly and illegally terminated by the respondents. Ex.PW1/B,

the copy of judgment rendered by the learned Special Judge, Bilaspur in Sessions Trial No.19/7

of 2013 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Sanjeev Kumar & Anr. decided on 4.8.2016,

though shows that the petitioner (accused no.2 in that case) was acquitted, but in the absence of

any approval of the member secretary/competent authority for her continuous absence beyond

three days from the school, the petitioner cannot derive any advantage from this document to

prove her case.

27. In view of the discussion and findings arrived at by me above, the petitioner is held

to be not entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in

favour of the respondents.

Issue No. 3:

28. Taking into account my findings on issues no. 1 and 2 above, it is held that neither the

petitioner has the cause of action nor the locus standi to sue and that the instant claim petition is

not maintainable in the present form.

29. This issue is also decided against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents.

Relief:

30. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

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order as to costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 17th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref No.

: 24/2019

Date of Institution

: 20.3.2019

Date of Decision

: 23.9.2019

Shri Onkar Singh s/o Shri Labhu Ram, r/o Village Barai, P.O. Sunehar, Tehsil Nagrota

Bagwan, District Kangra, H.P.

..Petitioner.

Versus

M/s Divya Himachal Prakashan Pvt. Ltd. & Samarpan Printers Old Matour, Pathankot-

Kangra Marg, Tehsil & District Kangra, H.P.

..Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Ravinder Aggarwal, AR.

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

: Sh. Rajat Chaudhary, Adv.

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudiction:—

1.

Whether applicant/claimant is entitled to the amount of Rs.32,10,124/- as claimed by

him from the management above named under the Majithia Wage Board?”

2.

Whether applicant/claimant is entitled to the amount of Rs.32,10,124/- as claimed by

him from the management above named under the Majithia Wage Board?”

2.

The case is listed for filing of rejoinders to the replies and settlement of issues but,

however, Shri Ravinder Aggarwal, Authorized Representative for the petitioner has made the

below given statement in the Court today:—

“Stated that I do not want to proceed with this reference (Ref. No.24/19) due to some

technical ground and withdraw the same on behalf of the petitioner with liberty to file

a fresh case before appropriate authority”.

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3.

In view of the above statement, this reference/claim petition is dismissed as

withdrawn. Parties to bear their own costs.

4.

The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

5.

A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate government for further

necessary action at its end.

6.

File after due completion be consigned to the records.

Announced in the open Court today this 23 rd day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref No.

: 25/2019

Date of Institution

: 20.3.2019

Date of Decision

: 23.9.2019

Shri Lekh Raj s/o Shri Roshan Lal, r/o V.P.O. Dadh, Tehsil Palamur, District Kangra, H.P.

..Petitioner.

Versus

M/s Divya Himachal Prakashan Pvt. Ltd. & Samarpan Printers Old Matour, Pathankot-

Kangra Marg, Tehsil & District Kangra, H.P.

..Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Ravinder Aggarwal, AR.

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

: Sh. Rajat Chaudhary, Adv.

AWARD/ORDER

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudiction:—

1.

Whether applicant/claimant had opted for para 20 (j) of the Majithia Wage Board as

claimed/alleged by the management of M/s Divya Himachal Prakashan Pvt. Ltd.?” If No.

2.

Whether applicant/claimant is entitled to the amount of Rs. 22,03,147/- as claimed by

him from the management above named under the Majithia Wage Board?”

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2.

The case is listed for filing of rejoinder and settlement of issues but, however, Shri

Ravinder Aggarwal, Authorized Representative for the petitioner has made the below given

statement in the Court today:—

“Stated that I do not want to proceed with this reference (Ref. No.25/19) due to some

technical ground and withdraw the same on behalf of the petitioner with liberty to file

a fresh case before appropriate authority”.

3.

In view of the above statement, this reference/claim petition is dismissed as

withdrawn. Parties to bear their own costs.

4.

The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

5.

A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate government for further

necessary action at its end.

6.

File after due completion be consigned to the records.

Announced in the open Court today this 23rd day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref No.

: 714/2016

Date of Institution

: 03.10.2016

Date of Decision

: 23.9.2019

Shri Rajiv Goswami s/o Shri Des Raj Goswami, r/o Village Sukead, P.O. Nalsuha, Tehsil

Dehra, District Kangra, H.P.

..Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Managing Director, M/S Jagran Prakashan, Jagran Building, Sarvodyanagar,

Kanpur, U.P.

2.

The Chief Executive Officer, M/S Jagran Prakashan Limited, Plot No.210, Sector-63,

Noida, U.P.

3.

The General Manager, M/S Jagran Prakashan Limited, Village Banoi, P.O. Bandi,

Tehsil Shahpur, District Kangra, H.P.

..Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Petitioner in person with Sh. Umesh Nath Dhiman, Adv.

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For the Respondent(s) : Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

: Sh. Rajat Chaudhary, Adv.

AWARD/ORDER

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:—

“Whether termination of services Shri Rajiv Goswami s/o Shri Des Raj Goswami, r/o

Village Sukead, P.O. Nalsuha, Tehsil Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. during February,

2016 by (i) the Managing Director, M/S Jagran Prakashan, Jagran Building,

Sarvodyanagar, Kanpur, U.P., (ii) the Chief Executive Officer, M/S Jagran Prakashan

Limited, Plot No.210, Sector -63, Noida, U.P., (iii) the General Manager, M/S Jagran

Prakashan Limited, Village Banoi, P.O. Bandi, Tehsil Shahpur, District Kangra, H.P.

who has worked with the above employer as Working Journalist, without complying

with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not,

what relief including reinstatement, amount of back wages, seniority, past service

benefits and compensation the above worker is

entitled to from the above

employers/Management?”

“Whether the action of the employers i.e. (i) the Managing Director, M/S Jagran

Prakashan, Jagran Building, Sarvodyanagar, Kanpur, U.P. (ii) the Chief Executive

Officer, M/S Jagran Prakashan Limited, Plot No.210, Sector -63, Noida, U.P. (iii) the

General Manager, M/S Jagran Prakashan Limited, Village Banoi, P.O. Bandi, Tehsil

Shahpur, District Kangra, H.P. not to pay arrear of wages amounting to Rs.47,27,262/- to

Shri Rajiv Goswami S/O Shri Des Raj Goswami, R/O Village Sukead, P.O. Nalsuha,

Tehsil Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. as difference of wages actually drawn and due as

per recommendations of the Majithia Wage Boards (copy of claim enclosed) constituted

under Section 9 & 13 (C) of the Working Journalist and Other News Paper Employees

(Conditions of Services) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 is legal and justified? If

not, what amount of relief/arrear, alongwith interest the aggrieved workman is entitled to

from the above employers/Management?”

2.

The case is listed for arguments on application under Section 13-A Sub Section (1)

read with Section 13 D of the Working and News Papers Employees (Conditions of Service) and

Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 but, however, Shri Rajiv Goswami (petitioner) has made

the below given statement in the Court today:—

“Stated that I do not want to proceed with this reference (Ref. No.714/16) due to some

technical ground and withdraw the same with liberty to file a fresh case before appropriate

authority”.

3.

In view of the above statement, this reference/claim petition is dismissed as

withdrawn. Parties to bear their own costs.

4.

The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

5.

A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate government for further

necessary action at its end.

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6.

File after due completion be consigned to the records.

Announced in the open Court today this 23rd day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref No.

: 272/2016

Date of Institution

: 04.5.2016

Date of Decision

: 23.09.2019

Shri Vikas s/o late Shri Ved Prakash, r/o VPO Samirpur, Tehsil & District Kangra, H.P.

..Petitioner.

Versus

The Incharge, Regional Mountaineering Centre Mcleodganj,Tehsil Dharamshala,

District Kangra, H.P.

..Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. Madan Thakur, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Gaurav Awasthi, Adv.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:—

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Vikas s/o Late Shri Ved Prakash, r/o

V.P.O. Samirpur, Tehsil & District Kangra, H.P. during November, 2013 by the

Incharge, Regional Mountaineering Centre Mcleodganj, Tehsil Dharamshala, District

Kangra, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past

service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above

employer?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

engaged as a porter on daily waged basis by the respondent in the month of December, 2008. He

had served the respondent sincerely and faithfully and had completed 240 days in each calendar

year. But, his services were terminated by the respondent w.e.f. 1.12.2013 without serving any

prior notice. Although, the petitioner had been engaged as a porter, but he was made to discharge

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the duties of a clerk. He was provided wages on the lower side, that of the porter. There was

violation of the principle of equal pay for equal work. The Regional Mountaineering Centre,

Mcleodganj, Dharamshala is involved in the activities of adventure sports, mountaineering and

trekking etc., which are of permanent nature. The services of the petitioner would always be

required by the respondent to carry out the aforementioned activities. However, the respondent

by acting contrary to the factual position had terminated his services. After oral termination of

the services of the petitioner, he had approached the respondent many a times to re-engage him,

but without success. The respondent had not followed the principle of ‘last come first go’ as

persons junior to him were retained. New/fresh hands have also been engaged by the respondent

in the same capacity of a porter. The respondent has violated the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-

G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short).

The petitioner is unemployed. The act of the respondent is claimed to be illegal, arbitrary,

unconstitutional and unjustified as well as contrary to the provisions of law and the Act. The

petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability, estoppel, cause of action and suppression of material facts. The

contents of the petition were denied on merits. However, it was admitted that the petitioner was

engaged as a porter. It is denied that he was engaged in the month of December, 2008. It was

claimed that he had been engaged on 1.5.2011. The petitioner had not completed 240 days in any

calendar year. Since, the petitioner had been engaged as a porter on daily wages, there was no

question of his performing the duties of a clerk. The respondent had never terminated the

services of the petitioner. He himself had left the office/premises of the Mountaineering Centre

without any rhyme or reason. He had never visited the office of the respondent for his re-

engagement. He had been pressurizing the respondent to appoint him as a permanent employee. It

is admitted that Regional Mountainering Centre Mcleodgang, Dharamshala is involved in

adventure sports, mountaineering and trekking activities. However, it is asserted that all these

activities are not permanent, rather they are demand based. Fresh appointees are being engaged

by the respondent as per the demand and the requirement of time, after the leaving of job by the

petitioner without intimation. The respondent has not violated any of the provisions of the Act.

The respondent, thus, prays for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 26.5.2018:—

1.

Whether termination of services of the claimant/petitioner by the respondent during

November, 2013 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

...OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

.. OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

.. OPR.

4.

Whether the petitioner has suppressed and concealed the true and material facts

from the Court as alleged?

.. OPR.

5.

Whether the petitioner has no cause of action to file the present case asalleged?

..OPR.

Relief

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. The petitioner, namely, Shri Vikas appeared as PW1 and tendered in evidence

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his statement by way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A, copy of demand notice as Ex.PW1/B, copy of

reply to the demand notice as Ex.PW1/C and copy of certificate as Ex.PW1/D. Mrs. Anuja

Awasthi (respondent) appeared as RW1 and tendered in evidence her statement by way of

affidavit as Ex. RW1/A, copy of mandays chart of the workers as Ex.RW1/B and copy of muster

rolls as Ex.RW1/C. By way of additional evidence, the respondent had tendered in evidence the

muster roll of the petitioner for the year 2011 to 2013 as Ex.RX.

7.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the parties heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:—

Issue No.1

: No

Issue No.2

: Negative

Issue No.3

: Yes

Issue No.4

: Not pressed

Issue No.5

: Yes

Relief

: Petition is dismissed as per the operative portion of the

Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No. 1 and 2:

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. Shri Vikas (petitioner) stepped into the witness box as PW1. In his affidavit

Ex.PW1/A submitted under Order 18 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he reiterated on

oath the contents of the petition/statement of claim in its entirety.

In the cross-examination, he admitted that he was appointed as a porter in the

Mountaineering Centre. He denied that he was appointed by the respondent on 1.5.2011. He

admitted that he had worked on daily waged basis. He further admitted that RMC organizes

trekking adventurous schemes. It was also admitted by him that the work of trekking is on the

basis of requirement and as per the demand. He also admitted that the duration of trekking tours is

from 10 to 30 days. He further admitted that a new/fresh hand is appointed in RMC Dharamshala

on demand basis. Further, he admitted that the appointments are not permanent. It was also

admitted by him that he was not on permanent job. Volunteered that, he had been working

continuously since long. He specifically denied that he had left the job of his own. He also

denied that he had not completed 240 days in any year. He further denied that in the year 2011

he had worked only for 93 days in RMC Dharamshala. He denied that he is making a phoney

statement.

11. Ex. PW1/B is the copy of demand notice dated 23.7.2014 relating to the petitioner.

12. Ex. PW1/C is the copy of reply to the demand notice dated 9th January, 2015.

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13. Ex.PW1/D is the copy of certificate pertaining to the petitioner.

14. Conversely, Mrs. Anuja Awasthi, Incharge, Mountaineering Centre, Mcleodganj,

Dharamshala (respondent) testified as RW1. In her affidavit Ex. RW1/A preferred as per Order

18 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, she corroborated on oath the contents of the reply filed

by the respondent.

In the cross-examination, she denied that the petitioner had been engaged as a daily

waged porter in December, 2008. Volunteered that, he was kept on 1.5.2011. She denied that

the petitioner was made to work as a clerk. She admitted that Ex.PW1/D, which is on the letter

head of Regional Mountaineering Centre, Mcleodganj, was issued to the petitioner. Self stated

that such certificate is not in their record. The Deputy Director had retired on 31.5.2011.

He thereafter had worked as OSD in Regional Mountaineering Centre, Mcleodganj for about

two years and had retired on 30.6.2013. Ex.PW1/D has been signed by the Deputy

Director/OSD. She admitted that Ex.PW1/D reflects the petitioner to have worked since the

year 2008. Self stated that it is not correct as per the record. It was also admitted by her that she

was aware of Ex.PW1/D since October, 2016. She further admitted that no action had been taken

against the OSD who had issued it. Volunteered that, higher authorities have been informed. At

present she cannot produce any such intimation to the higher authorities. She specifically

denied that no action has been taken against the OSD, as Ex.PW1/D is correct. She clearly

admitted that as per Ex.RW1/B the petitioner had worked both as a porter and a clerk. She denied

that the petitioner was made to work as a clerk, but was paid the wages of a porter. She also denied

that the posts of porter and clerk are of permanent nature. It was also denied by her that the

services of the petitioner were required throughout. She specifically denied that the services of

the petitioner had been terminated on 1.12.2013. She admitted that no compensation had been

paid. She also admitted that after the year 2013, from time to time new porters had been kept,

self stated that casual workers were kept. She denied that the petitioner had approached her many

a times for re- engagement, but she had refused to keep him.

15. Ex. RW1/B is the copy of detail of working days relating to the petitioner.

16. Ex. RW1/C is the copy of muster roll for the month of May, 2011 relating to the

petitioner and others.

17. It is the admitted case of the parties that the services of the petitioner were

engaged as a daily waged porter. Copy of details of working days Ex.RW1/B was produced by

the respondent. Its perusal discloses that the services of the petitioner were initially engaged in

the month of May, 2011 by the respondent. However, the petitioner claimed that he had been

engaged as a daily waged porter by the respondent in December, 2008. To buttress his such case,

he has placed on record copy of certificate issued by the OSD, Regional Mountaineering Centre,

Mcleodganj, Dharamshala, H.P. as Ex.PW1/D. It reveals that the petitioner had been working in

the centre since the year 2008. Although, it was claimed by the respondent that this certificate is

not factually correct but, however, Mrs. Anuja Awasthi (RW1) was categorical while under

cross-examination that she was in the know of Ex.PW1/D, which bears the signatures of Deputy

Director/OSD, since October, 2016. She also clearly admitted that no action had ever been taken

against the OSD who had issued the same. Though, she claimed that the higher authorities had

been informed, but no such document has seen the light of the day. Since, it is not disputed by

the respondent that the certificate Ex.PW1/D is on the letter head of the Regional Mountaineering

Centre, Mcleodganj, and it bears the signatures of the then OSD of the Centre, and as it was not

challenged since October, 2016, nor any action had been taken against the OSD concerned, it can

be safely be inferred that its contents were accepted to be correct by the respondent.

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18. Now the point which comes to the fore for determination is whether the petitioner had

been disengaged from service or he himself had abandoned the job, as it is claimed by the

petitioner that his services had orally been terminated by the respondent, whereas the stand taken

by the respondent is that the petitioner himself had left the job.

19. It is well known that abandonment has to be proved like any other fact by the

respondent/employer. The burden of proving of abandonment is upon the respondent. Simply

because a workman fails to report for duty, it cannot be presumed that he has left/abandoned the

job. Mere statement of Mrs. Anuja Awasthi (RW1) alleging that the workman had abandoned the

services is entirely insufficient to discharge the said onus. Admittedly, no disciplinary

proceedings were initiated against the petitioner by the respondent for his alleged willful absence

from duty. Absence from duty is a serious misconduct and the principle of natural justice did

require that some sort of a fact finding inquiry was got conducted by the respondent. In the

present case so was not done by the respondent. Then, ‘animus’ to abandon, it is well settled,

must necessarily be shown to exist, before a case of abandonment can be said to have been made

out. No evidence of any such ‘animus’ on the part of the petitioner is forthcoming in the present

case. Thus, the plea of abandonment put forth by the respondent/employer is not established.

20. Now comes the question as to whether in the month of November, 2013, the

services

of

the

petitioner

were

finally

terminated

by

the

respondent

or

not?

21. As per the reference received from the appropriate Government, the services of the

petitioner stood finally terminated during November, 2013. Placed on record by the petitioner is the

copy of demand notice as Ex.PW1/B. It also discloses that the petitioner had been disengaged by

the respondent in the month of November, 2013. Section 10 (4) of the Act mandates that the

Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal shall confine its adjudication to the points of dispute referred to

it by the appropriate Government and the matters incidental thereto. No reference has been

received from the appropriate Government regarding the alleged final termination of the services

of the petitioner by the respondent on1st December, 2013. However, looking to the statement of

claim and the sworn testimony of the petitioner, it is apparent that he has claimed that his services

had been finally terminated by the respondent on 1.12.2013. Such pleadings and evidence of the

petitioner cannot be looked into by this Court, being beyond the terms of the reference. Then, as

per the mandays chart Ex.RW1/B (also Ex.RX), the petitioner is shown to have worked for a

period of 30 days in the month of November, 2013. Since, it has not been pleaded nor stated by

the petitioner that his services stood terminated by the respondent in the month of November,

2013, therefore, the question of final termination of his services by the respondent (as per the

reference) does not arise. Rather, the same has become insignificant.

22. For the discussion and findings arrived at by me above, the allegations of the

petitioner that the principle of ‘last come first go’ had not been adhered to and that new/fresh

hands were appointed by the respondent after his termination pale into insignificance.

23. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, the petitioner is held to be not

entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in favour of

the respondent.

Issues No. 3 and 5:

24. Taking in to account my findings on issues no. 1 and 2 above, it is held that

neither the petitioner has the cause of action nor the locus standi to sue. The claim petition is not

maintainable in the present form. These issues are decided in favour of the respondent and

against the petitioner.

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Issues No. 4:

25. Not pressed.

Relief:

26. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

order as to costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 23rd day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref No.

: 16/2018

Date of Institution

: 28.3.2018

Date of Decision

: 23.09.2019

Shri Dharam Chand s/o Shri Kikar Singh, r/o Village Dev Bharari, P.O. Sulyali, Tehsil

Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

..Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P. ..Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. Pankaj Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. B.C. Katoch, A.D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:—

“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Dharam Chand s/o Shri Kikar Singh, r/o

Village Dev Bharari, P.O. Sulyali, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. during October,

1988 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.,

who had worked on daily wages as beldar and has raised his industrial dispute after

nearly 23 years vide demand notice dated 23.07.2011, without complying the provisions

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of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of

delay of nearly 23 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to

from the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

initially engaged as a beldar on daily waged basis in May, 1986 in HPPWD Division Jassur

(Nurpur), H.P. (now HPPWD Jawali) on various construction sites, like Bodh to Chaki Dhar

Road, Suliali to Dev Bhrari etc. However, his services were disengaged w.e.f. June, 1990 in

violation of the law. The petitioner had completed 240 days in each calendar year. The respondent

under a mistaken notion and ignorance of law had terminated the services of the petitioner in

June, 1990. He thereafter had made oral requests to the respondent and his subordinates to re-

engage him. Although, he was assured to be re-engaged after three or four months, but nothing

was heard thereafter from the department. A letter in writing had also been sent by him to the

department for his re-engagement on daily waged basis, but without success. Smt. Kusum Lata,

junior to him was retained by the department and she at present is working in HPPWD Division

Nurpur. Twenty four other juniors were also re-appointed by the department in the year 2010, as

per the directions of the Hon’ble High Court. The principle of ‘last come first go’ was not

adhered to by the respondent. No one month’s notice, nor any retrenchment compensation had

been paid to the petitioner. The provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short) had been violated by the respondent.

New/fresh hands had also been engaged and no opportunity was ever given to the petitioner for his

re-engagement, thereby, violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. The petitioner is

not gainfully employed since the time of his illegal and unjustified termination by the

respondent. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared and filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on the ground of delay and laches.

The contents of the petition were denied on merits. However, it was admitted by the respondent

that the petitioner had been engaged as a daily wager in the year 1986. It was specifically denied

that he had been disengaged in June, 1990. It was asserted that the petitioner worked

intermittently w.e.f. February, 1987 to October, 1988 and thereafter had left the job of his own

sweet will. It is denied that the petitioner had completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is

claimed that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted/re-named as HPPWD Division Jawali vide HP

Government Notification no. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July, 1994. It is admitted that

HPPWD Division Jawali is involved in the construction and maintenance of roads, buildings and

bridges, repair and maintenance of tools and plants etc. Neither any junior had been retained nor

engaged by the respondent, so there was no violation of any of the provisions of the Act. It is

denied that a pick and choose policy had been adopted by the respondent. The persons mentioned

at serial no.1 to 24 were engaged as per the directions of the Court. After leaving the work the

petitioner had never approached the respondent and had raised the demand notice only in the

year 2011. Only those workers had been regularized who had worked continuously and fulfilled

the requisite criteria of regularization as per the Government policy. The respondent, thus, prays

for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 02.11.2018:—

1.

Whether termination of the service of petitioner by the respondent during

October, 1988 is/was legal and justified as alleged?

..OPP.

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2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

..OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. . OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches as alleged? . . OPR.

Relief

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. The petitioner, namely, Shri Dharam Chand examined himself as PW1 and

tendered in evidence his statement by way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A. Shri Jagtar Singh Thakur

(respondent) appeared as RW1and tendered his statement by way of affidavit Ex. RW1/A. He also

placed on the file copy of mandays chart of the petitioner as Ex.RW1/B, copy of notification dated

21.7.1994 as Ex.RW1/C and copy of letter dated 18.8.1994 as Ex.RW1/D.

7.

Arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant

District Attorney for the respondent heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Negative

Issue No.3

: Yes

Issue No.4

: No

Relief

: Claim petition dismissed as per the operative portion of

the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issue No. 1 and 2:

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The petitioner, namely, Shri Dharam Chand examined himself as PW1 and filed his

affidavit in evidence, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit, he reiterated the

contents of his statement of claim.

11. In the cross-examination, he admitted that before 1994, HPPWD Division was at

Jassur. He also admitted that HPPWD Division Jawali was established on 21st July, 1994 vide

government notification no.PBW-(A)-A(1)17/94. He denied that he had never worked in Jawali

Division. He also denied that he had worked intermittently w.e.f. February, 1987 uptil October,

1988 in the department. He further denied that he had left the work of his own. Volunteered that,

from May, 1986 uptil June, 1990 he had worked continuously. He specifically denied that he had

never worked in the department continuously, nor he had ever been given breaks by the

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department. He feigned ignorance that the workers mentioned in the petition and the affidavit

were kept at work in HPPWD Division Nurpur as per the orders of the Court. He specifically

denied that the respondent had adhered to the principle of ‘last come first go’. He also denied

that he had never worked for 240 days and above in any year. He further denied that only those

workers had been regularized who had fulfilled the conditions of the policy of the Government

for regularization. He admitted that he owns land, which he cultivates. He also admitted that he is

doing the days’ drudgery privately. Self stated that, as and when the work is available. He

denied that he is making a phoney statement.

12. Conversely, Shri Jagtar Singh Thakur, Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division

Jawali (respondent) testified as RW1. In his affidavit Ex. RW1/A preferred as per Order 18 Rule 4

of the Code of Civil Procedure, he corroborated on oath the contents of the reply filed by him.

13. In the cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner had worked from May,

1986 till June, 1990 regularly and had completed 240 days. Volunteered that, as per their record,

the petitioner had only worked for 289½ days. He denied that the petitioner had been removed

without any notice and that junior beldars/workers were retained. He admitted that no notice had

been given to the petitioner to report for work. Self stated that he had left the job of his own. He

further admitted that Ex.RW1/D contains the names of only those persons, who have been

working in the department since the year 1994. Further, he denied that the petitioner had been

given the assurance by the department that as and when the work would be available, he would

be called. Further, he denied that intentionally incomplete muster rolls and other record

pertaining to the petitioner had been filed.

14. Ex.RW1/B is the copy of the mandays chart relating to the petitioner.

15. Ex. RW1/C is the copy of notification dated 21st July, 1994 with regard to the

shifting of HPPWD Division Jassur to Jawali along-with sanctioned strength and staff.

16. Ex. RW1/D is the copy of Office Order dated 18.8.1994 regarding the transfer of

work-charged staff to HPPWD Division Nurpur, on the closure of HPPWD Jassur and its

opening at Jawali.

17. It is an admitted fact of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged as a

daily waged beldar. Although, the petitioner claimed that he had worked as a beldar from May,

1986 uptil June, 1990 but, however, the respondent has produced on record the mandays chart of

the petitioner, copy of which is Ex.RW1/B. Its perusal discloses that the services of the petitioner

were engaged by the respondent in the month of February, 1987 for the first time as a daily

waged beldar and he had worked as such uptil October, 1988. The claimant/petitioner has not

placed and exhibited on record any document to show that he had regularly worked with the

respondent from May, 1986 uptil June, 1990.

18. The first and foremost point which comes to the fore for determination is whether the

petitioner had been disengaged from service or he himself had abandoned the job, as it is

claimed by the petitioner that his services had orally been terminated by the respondent, whereas

the stand taken by the respondent is that after October, 1988 the petitioner had left the work of

his own.

19. It is well known that the abandonment has to be proved like any other fact by the

respondent/employer. The burden of proving of abandonment is upon the respondent. Simply

because a workman fails to report for duty, it cannot be presumed that he has left/abandoned the

job. Mere statement of Shri Jagtar Singh Thakur, (RW1) alleging that the workman ha

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abandoned the services is entirely insufficient to discharge the said onus. Admittedly, no

disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner by the respondent for his alleged

willful absence from duty. Absence from duty is a serious misconduct and the principle of

natural justice did require that some sort of a fact finding inquiry was got conducted by the

respondent. In the present case as it emerges from the evidence on record, so was not done by

the respondent. Then, ‘animus’ to abandon, it is well settled, must necessarily be shown to exist,

before a case of abandonment can be said to have been made out. No evidence of any such

‘animus’ on the part of the petitioner is forthcoming in the present case. Thus, the plea of

abandonment put forth by the respondent/employer is not established.

20. As per the reference received from the appropriate Government, the services of the

petitioner stood finally terminated during October, 1988. Section 10 (4) of the Act mandates that

the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal shall confine its adjudication to the points of dispute

referred to it by the appropriate Government and the matters incidental thereto. No reference has

been received from the appropriate Government regarding the alleged final termination of the

services of the petitioner by the respondent in June, 1990. However, looking to the statement of

claim and the sworn testimony of the petitioner, it is apparent that he has claimed that his

services had been finally terminated by the respondent in the month of June, 1990. Such

pleadings and evidence of the petitioner cannot be looked into by this Court, being beyond the

terms of the reference. Since, it has not been pleaded nor stated by the petitioner that his services

stood terminated by the respondent in October, 1988, therefore, the question of final termination

of his services by the respondent (as per the reference) does not arise. Rather, the same has

become insignificant.

21. Even otherwise, Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub

Section (2) of Section 25-B, if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months

preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under

the employer 240 days within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous

service. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 240 days in the

preceding twelve calendar months prior to his alleged retrenchment. The law on this issue is well

settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, it has been laid by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had

worked for 240 days in a given year.

22. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, the evidence produced has to be looked into. Although, in his chief-examination the

petitioner claimed that he had worked with the respondent as a beldar continuously from May,

1986 uptil June, 1990, but no mandays chart of the petitioner is there on the file to establish that

he had worked continuously for a period of 240 days in a block of twelve calendar months

anterior to the date of his alleged termination, as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. It has

been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Mohd. Ali vs. State of Himachal

Pradesh and Ors., (2019) 1 SCC (L&S) 138 that when the workman had not worked for the

required 240 days of working in the period of twelve calendar months preceding the date of

dismissal, he is not entitled to take the benefits of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are not attracted in this case.

23. It is claimed by the petitioner that at the time of termination of his services,

persons junior to him were retained in service by the respondent. A detail of such persons has

been given in para 8 of the statement of claim. The respondent had refuted such allegations and

claimed that no person junior to the petitioner had ever been retained in service by the

department. Significantly, no seniority list has been placed and exhibited on record or any other

witness examined so as to show that the persons named in the statement of claim and in his

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affidavit by the petitioner were junior to him and who had been retained by the respondent at the

time of the termination of his services. Then, no prayer had ever been made by the petitioner for

the production of the seniority list from the respondent during the pendency of this case.

Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent had violated the principle of ‘last come first go’,

as envisaged in Section 25-G of the Act.

24. It was also claimed by the petitioner that new appointments had been made by the

respondent. Except for his self serving and oral testimony, there is no other oral or documentary,

cogent, convincing and reliable evidence on the file to show that the employer had offered any

fresh appointment to any person to fill any vacancy in their set up. That being so, the provisions

of Section 25-H of the Act are also not attracted in this case.

25. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, the petitioner is held to be not

entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in favour of

the respondents.

Issue No. 3:

26. Taking into account my findings on issues no. 1 and 2 above, it is held that neither the

petitioner has the cause of action nor the locus standi to sue and that the instant claim petition is

not maintainable in the present form.

27. This issue is decided against the petitioner and in favour of the respondent.

Issue No. 4:

28. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society

Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that:—

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the

proceeding under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the

ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as

a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence.

No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay

alone”.

29. In view of the trite laid down in this ruling, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent.

Relief:

30. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

order as to costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 23rd day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref No.

: 07/2018

Date of Institution

: 28.3.2018

Date of Decision

: 23.09.2019

Shri Bir Singh s/o Shri Kishan Chand, r/o Village Dev Bharari, P.O. Sulyali, Tehsil

Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

..Petitioner.

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P. ..Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. Pankaj Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. B.C. Katoch, A.D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:—

“Whether alleged termination of services of Shri Bir Singh s/o Shri Kishan Chand, r/o

Village Dev Bharari, P.O. Sulyali, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. during

November, 1988 by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Jawali, District

Kangra, H.P., who had worked on daily wages as beldar and has raised his industrial

dispute after 23 years vide demand notice dated 23.07.2011, without complying the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, keeping in

view of delay of 23 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is entitled to from

the above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

initially engaged as a beldar on daily waged basis in May, 1986 in HPPWD Division Jassur

(Nurpur), H.P. (now HPPWD Jawali) on various construction sites, like Bodh to Chaki Dhar

Road, Suliali to Dev Bhrari etc. However, his services were disengaged w.e.f. June, 1990 in

violation of the law. The petitioner had completed 240 days in each calendar year. The respondent

under a mistaken notion and ignorance of law had terminated the services of the petitioner in

June, 1990. He thereafter had made oral requests to the respondent and his subordinates to re-

engage him. Although, he was assured to be re-engaged after three or four months, but nothing

was heard thereafter from the department. A letter in writing had also been sent by him to the

department for his re-engagement on daily waged basis, but without success. Smt. Kusum Lata,

junior to him was retained by the department and she at present is working in HPPWD Division

Nurpur. Twenty four other juniors were also re-appointed by the department in the year 2010, as

per the directions of the Hon’ble High Court. The principle of ‘last come first go’ was not

adhered to by the respondent. No one month’s notice, nor any retrenchment compensation had

been paid to the petitioner. The provisions of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short) had been violated by the respondent.

New/fresh hands had also been engaged and no opportunity was ever given to the petitioner for his

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re-engagement, thereby, violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. The petitioner is

not gainfully employed since the time of his illegal and unjustified termination by the

respondent. The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared and filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on the ground of delay and laches.

The contents of the petition were denied on merits. However, it was admitted by the respondent

that the petitioner had been engaged as a daily wager in the year 1986. It was specifically denied

that he had been disengaged in June, 1990. It was asserted that the petitioner worked

intermittently w.e.f. January, 1987 to November, 1988 and thereafter had left the job of his own

sweet will. It is denied that the petitioner had completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is

claimed that HPPWD Division Jassur was shifted/re-named as HPPWD Division Jawali vide HP

Government Notification no. PBW-(A)-A (I) 17/1994 dated 21st July, 1994. It is admitted that

HPPWD Division Jawali is involved in the construction and maintenance of roads, buildings and

bridges, repair and maintenance of tools and plants etc. Neither any junior had been retained nor

engaged by the respondent, so there was no violation of any of the provisions of the Act. It is

denied that a pick and choose policy had been adopted by the respondent. The persons mentioned

at serial no.1 to 24 were engaged as per the directions of the Court. After leaving the work the

petitioner had never approached the respondent and had raised the demand notice only in the

year 2011. Only those workers had been regularized who had worked continuously and fulfilled

the requisite criteria of regularization as per the Government policy. The respondent, thus, prays

for the dismissal of the claim.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the

reply and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for

determination and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 02.11.2018:—

1.

Whether termination of the service of petitioner by the respondent during

November, 1988 is/was legal and justified as alleged?

..OPP.

2.

If issue no.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

..OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged?

. . OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches as alleged? . . OPR.

Relief

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed. The petitioner, namely, Shri Bir Singh examined himself as PW1 and tendered

in evidence his statement by way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A. Shri Jagtar Singh Thakur (respondent)

appeared as RW1and tendered his statement by way of affidavit Ex. RW1/A. He also placed on

the file copy of mandays chart of the petitioner as Ex.RW1/B, copy of notification dated

21.7.1994 as Ex.RW1/C and copy of letter dated 18.8.1994 as Ex.RW1/D.

7.

Arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant

District Attorney for the respondent heard and records gone through.

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8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:—

Issue No.1

: Yes

Issue No.2

: Negative

Issue No.3

: Yes

Issue No.4

: No

Relief

: Claim petition dismissed as per the operative portion of

` the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issue No. 1 and 2:

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The petitioner, namely, Shri Bir Singh examined himself as PW1 and filed his

affidavit in evidence, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit, he reiterated the contents

of his statement of claim.

11. In the cross-examination, he admitted that before 1994, HPPWD Division was at

Jassur. He also admitted that HPPWD Division Jawali was established on 21st July, 1994 vide

government notification no.PBW-(A)-A(1)17/94. He denied that he had never worked in Jawali

Division. He also denied that he had worked intermittently w.e.f. January, 1986 uptil November,

1988 in the department. He further denied that he had left the work of his own. Volunteered that,

from May, 1986 uptil June, 1990 he had worked continuously. He specifically denied that he had

never worked in the department continuously, nor he had ever been given breaks by the

department. He feigned ignorance that the workers mentioned in the petition and the affidavit

were kept at work in HPPWD Division Nurpur as per the orders of the Court. He specifically

denied that the respondent had adhered to the principle of ‘last come first go’. He also denied

that he had never worked for 240 days and above in any year. He further denied that only those

workers had been regularized who had fulfilled the conditions of the policy of the Government

for regularization. He admitted that he owns land, which he cultivates. He also admitted that he is

doing the days’ drudgery privately. Self stated that, as and when the work is available. He

denied that he is making a phoney statement.

12. Conversely, Shri Jagtar Singh Thakur, Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division

Jawali (respondent) testified as RW1. In his affidavit Ex. RW1/A preferred as per Order 18, Rule

4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he corroborated on oath the contents of the reply filed by him.

13. In the cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner had worked from May,

1986 till June, 1990 regularly and had completed 240 days. Volunteered that, as per their record,

the petitioner had only worked for 582½ days. He denied that the petitioner had been removed

without any notice and that junior beldars/workers were retained. He admitted that no notice had

been given to the petitioner to report for work. Self stated that he had left the job of his own.

Hefurther admitted that Ex.RW1/D contains the names of only those persons, who have been

working in the department since the year 1994. Further, he denied that the petitioner had been

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given the assurance by the department that as and when the work would be available, he would

be called. Further, he denied that intentionally incomplete muster rolls and other record

pertaining to the petitioner had been filed.

14. Ex.RW1/B is the copy of the mandays chart relating to the petitioner.

15. Ex. RW1/C is the copy of notification dated 21stJuly, 1994 with regard to the

shifting of HPPWD Division Jassur to Jawali along-with sanctioned strength and staff.

16. Ex. RW1/D is the copy of Office Order dated 18.8.1994 regarding the transfer of

work-charged staff to HPPWD Division Nurpur, on the closure of HPPWD Jassur and its

opening at Jawali.

17. It is an admitted fact of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged as a

daily waged beldar. Although, the petitioner claimed that he had worked as a beldar from May,

1986 uptil June, 1990 but, however, the respondent has produced on record the mandays chart of

the petitioner, copy of which is Ex.RW1/B. Its perusal discloses that the services of the petitioner

were engaged by the respondent in the month of January, 1987 for the first time as a daily

waged beldar and he had worked as such uptil November, 1988. The claimant/petitioner has not

placed and exhibited on record any document to show that he had regularly worked with the

respondent from May, 1986 uptil June, 1990.

18. The first and foremost point which comes to the fore for determination is whether the

petitioner had been disengaged from service or he himself had abandoned the job, as it is

claimed by the petitioner that his services had orally been terminated by the respondent, whereas

the stand taken by the respondent is that after November, 1988 the petitioner had left the work of

his own.

19. It is well known that the abandonment has to be proved like any other fact by the

respondent/employer. The burden of proving of abandonment is upon the respondent. Simply

because a workman fails to report for duty, it cannot be presumed that he has left/abandoned the

job. Mere statement of Shri Jagtar Singh Thakur, (RW1) alleging that the workman had

abandoned the services is entirely insufficient to discharge the said onus. Admittedly, no

disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner by the respondent for his alleged

willful absence from duty. Absence from duty is a serious misconduct and the principle of

natural justice did require that some sort of a fact finding inquiry was got conducted by the

respondent. In the present case as it emerges from the evidence on record, so was not done by

the respondent. Then, ‘animus’ to abandon, it is well settled, must necessarily be shown to exist,

before a case of abandonment can be said to have been made out. No evidence of any such

‘animus’ on the part of the petitioner is forthcoming in the present case. Thus, the plea of

abandonment put forth by the respondent/employer is not established.

20. As per the reference received from the appropriate Government, the services of the

petitioner stood finally terminated during November, 1988. Section 10 (4) of the Act mandates that

the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal shall confine its adjudication to the points of dispute referred

to it by the appropriate Government and the matters incidental thereto. No reference has been

received from the appropriate Government regarding the alleged final termination of the services

of the petitioner by the respondent in June, 1990. However, looking to the statement of claim

and the sworn testimony of the petitioner, it is apparent that he has claimed that his services

had been finally terminated by the respondent in the month of June, 1990. Such pleadings and

evidence of the petitioner cannot be looked into by this Court, being beyond the terms of the

reference. Since, it has not been pleaded nor stated by the petitioner that his services stood

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terminated by the respondent in November, 1988, therefore, the question of final termination of

his services by the respondent (as per the reference) does not arise. Rather, the same has become

insignificant.

21. Even otherwise, Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub

Section (2) of Section 25-B, if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months

preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under

the employer 240 days within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous

service. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 240 days in the

preceding twelve calendar months prior to his alleged retrenchment. The law on this issue is well

settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, it has been laid by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had

worked for 240 days in a given year.

22. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, the evidence produced has to be looked into. Although, in his chief-examination the

petitioner claimed that he had worked with the respondent as a beldar continuously from May,

1986 uptil June, 1990, but no mandays chart of the petitioner is there on the file to establish that

he had worked continuously for a period of 240 days in a block of twelve calendar months

anterior to the date of his alleged termination, as envisaged under Section 25-B of the Act. It has

been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Mohd. Ali vs. State of Himachal

Pradesh and Ors., (2019) 1 SCC (L&S) 138 that when the workman had not worked for the

required 240 days of working in the period of twelve calendar months preceding the date of

dismissal, he is not entitled to take the benefits of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are not attracted in this case.

23. It is claimed by the petitioner that at the time of termination of his services,

persons junior to him were retained in service by the respondent. A detail of such persons has

been given in para 8 of the statement of claim. The respondent had refuted such allegations and

claimed that no person junior to the petitioner had ever been retained in service by the

department. Significantly, no seniority list has been placed and exhibited on record or any other

witness examined so as to show that the persons named in the statement of claim and in his

affidavit by the petitioner were junior to him and who had been retained by the respondent at the

time of the termination of his services. Then, no prayer had ever been made by the petitioner for

the production of the seniority list from the respondent during the pendency of this case.

Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent had violated the principle of ‘last come first go’,

as envisaged in Section 25-G of the Act.

24. It was also claimed by the petitioner that new appointments had been made by the

respondent. Except for his self serving and oral testimony, there is no other oral or documentary,

cogent, convincing and reliable evidence on the file to show that the employer had offered any

fresh appointment to any person to fill any vacancy in their set up. That being so, the provisions

of Section 25-H of the Act are also not attracted in this case.

25. In view of the discussion and findings aforesaid, the petitioner is held to be not

entitled to any relief. Hence, both these issues are decided against the petitioner and in favour of

the respondents.

Issue No. 3:

26. Taking into account my findings on issues no. 1 and 2 above, it is held that neither the

petitioner has the cause of action nor the locus standi to sue and that the instant claim petition is

not maintainable in the present form.

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27. This issue is decided against the petitioner and in favour of the respondent.

Issue No. 4:

28. In Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society

Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that:—

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the

proceeding under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the

ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as

a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence.

No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay

alone”.

29. In view of the trite laid down in this ruling, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondent.

Relief:

30. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no

order as to costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent

to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 23rdday of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref No.

: 200/2017

Date of Institution

: 10.10.2017

Date of decision

: 23.9.2018

Sh. Balvinder Singh s/o Shri Maghar Singh, r/o V.P.O. Chowari, Tehsil Bhatiyat,

District Chamba, H.P.

..Petitioner.

Versus

Employer/Managing Director, M/s Sunshine Hydro Power Limited, Village Nali, P.O.

Baneth, Tehsil Bhatiyat, District Chamba, H.P.

.Respondent.

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Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Miss Kannu, Adv. Vice

For the Respondent : Respondent already ex parte

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:—

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Balvinder Singh s/o Shri Maghar Singh,

r/o V.P.O. Chowari, Tehsil Bhatiyat, District Chamba, H.P. w.e.f. 31-08-2016 by the

Employer/Managing Director, M/S Sunshine Hydro Power Limited, Village Nali, P.O.

Baneth, Tehsil Bhatiyat, District Chamba, H.P., without complying the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the

above employer/management?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as it emerges from the statement of claim is that he was

engaged as a technician (electrical) at site i.e. Kalam Hydro Project at Vilalge Nail, P.O. Banet,

Bhattiyat, District Chamba w.e.f. 1.7.2011 uptil 30.8.2016 and had drawn salary of Rs. 7,700/-

per month. He had performed the duties to the best of his ability and with sincerity and devotion.

The project manager and the superiors were satisfied with his work. There was not complaint

with regard to his work. He had continuously worked from 1.7.2011 uptil 30.8.2016, but on

31.8.2016, the respondent had terminated his services vide a notice. However, neither any one

months’ prior notice of termination in writing, nor any inquiry was conducted against him. He

had also not been paid any retrenchment compensation at the time of the termination of his

services, which is in violation of the provisions of Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). Sufficient work was available in the project

and the termination of the services of the petitioner was illegal and malafide. After the termination

of the services of the petitioner, he had approached the respondent many a times, but without

success. No appointment letter, identity card and wages slip were ever issued to the petitioner

at the time of his initial appointment. EPF slips were also not provided to the petitioner for the last

sixteen months. He is not gainfully employed anywhere from the date of his unlawful termination.

The petitioner, thus, prays for his re-engagement with all consequential benefits.

3.

The respondent despite being properly served had failed to put in appearance

before this Court on 04.1.2019, hence was proceeded against ex parte.

4.

Thereafter, the petitioner was directed to adduce ex parte evidence. He examined

himself as PW1 and tendered in evidence his affidavit Ex.PW1/A, copy of failure report dated

13.6.2019 as Ex.PW1/B and copy of certificate dated 24.7.2015 as Ex.PW1/C.

5.

PW1 Shri Balvinder Singh in his chief-examination reiterated the stand taken by him

in his statement of claim.

6.

The aforesaid evidence of the petitioner has remained unrebutted on record, as the

respondent has not come forward to contest the statement of claim or to cross-examine the

petitioner. It, thus, stands proved from the ocular evidence on record that the petitioner Shri

Balvinder Singh was appointed by the respondent as a technician (electrical) on 01.7.2011 and he

had worked as such uptil 30.8.2016. Evidence also stands led to the effect that the services of the

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petitioner had been terminated illegally by the respondent. The non appearance of the respondent is

suggestive of the fact that he has nothing to say in the matter. The unrebutted evidence of the

petitioner clearly establishes on record that the petitioner had worked for more than 240 days

preceding twelve calendar months from the date of his termination. It is also apparent from the

evidence that no notice had been issued to the petitioner prior to the termination of his services,

nor any compensation had been paid to him. No inquiry had ever been conducted against the

petitioner before terminating his services. As regards the salary, it stands clearly stated by the

petitioner that at the time of his termination, he was drawing a salary of Rs.7,700/- per month.

7.

No doubt, it has also been alleged that the principle of ‘last come first go’ had not

been adhered to by the respondent, but neither any seniority list has seen the light of the day, nor

in the ocular evidence there is a mention of the names of the persons junior to the workman, who

had been retained in service, after his services had been terminated. So, it cannot be said that the

respondent had violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act.

8.

Oral evidence has also been led on record to the effect that the petitioner was not

gainfully employed during his forced idleness. Therefore, this Court, in the absence of any

rebuttal to it, has no option but to hold that after the disengagement/termination of the workman,

he had remained unemployed. The unrebutted evidence of the petitioner on record clearly

establishes the violation of Section 25-F of the Act by the respondent.

9.

In view of the foregoing discussion and findings arrived at by me above, the

termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent on 30.9.2015 is hereby set aside

and quashed. Since, the termination of the petitioner has been found to be illegal, he is entitled to

reinstatement with continuity in service from the date of his illegal termination. As regards the

back wages, the petitioner is held to be entitled to 50% back wages from the respondent from the

date of his illegal termination till his reinstatement. Consequently, the petition is allowed to the

extent above. There shall be no order as to costs.

10. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

11. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 23rd day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref No.

: 355/2016

Date of Institution

: 27.5.2016

Date of Decision

: 26.9.2019

Shri Jai Chand s/o Shri Adam Ram, r/o VPO Balag, District Mandi, H.P. ..Petitioner.

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Versus

The Divisional Forest Officer, Suket Forest Division, Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.

..Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. Deepak Azad, Adv.

For the Respondent : Smt. Navina Rahi, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:—

"Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Jai Chand s/o Shri Adam Ram

r/o V.P.O. Balag, District Mandi, H.P. w.e.f. 21-11-1998 to year, 2010 by the Divisional

Forest Officer, Suket Forest Division, Sunder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P., without

complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified?

If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation

the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

The case is listed for appearance of the petitioner but, however, Shri Jai Chand

(petitioner) has made the below given statement in the Court today:—

"C;ku fd;k fd esjk izfroknh ds lkFk le>kSrk gks x;k gSA vr% eSa ;g case (Ref. No. 355/16)

okfil ysrk gwWaA nkf[ky nIrj fd;k tkosA**

3.

In view of the above statement, this reference/claim petition is dismissed as

withdrawn. Parties to bear their own costs.

4.

The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

5.

A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the

official gazette and the file after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 26th day of September, 2019.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge,

Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,

Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

_____________

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