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eaxyokj] 24 vxLr] 2021@02 Hkknzin] 1943

fgekpy izns'k ljdkj

LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Dated, the 23rd July, 2021

No. Shram (A) 6-2/2020 (Awards) Dharamshala.—In exercise of the powers vested

under section 17 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased

to order the publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer,

86—jkti=@2021&24&08&2021

¼2825½

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Labour Court, Dharamshala on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment

Government of Himachal Pradesh.

Sl.

No.

Ref. No.

Petitioner

Respondent

Date of

Award/Order

1.

561/16

Birbal Singh

E. E. HPPWD, Nurpur & other

10-04-2021

2.

783/16

Dharo Ram

-do-

10-04-2021

3.

818/16

Janak Singh

-do-

10-04-2021

4.

14/17

Joginder Singh

-do-

10-04-2021

5.

334/14

Kumari Sanju

D.F.O. Keylong

16-04-2021

6.

51/20

Vinod Nishad

M.D. M/s Inox Wind, Una, H.P.

17-04-2021

7.

610/15

Vijay Kumar

Chairman/M.O. RKS, Barsar

19-04-2021

8.

611/15

Kamaljeet Singh

-do-

19-04-2021

9.

232/15

Abhey Ram

M.D. Lahoul Potato Growers Manali

23-04-2021

10.

264/15

Rajan Sharama

-do-

23-04-2021

11.

660/16

Kashmir Singh

SE HPPWD, Mandi & Others

29-04-2021

12.

658/16

Munshi Ram

-do-

29-04-2021

13.

671/16

Ishwar Dass

-do-

29-04-2021

14.

661/16

Manohar Lal

-do-

29-04-2021

15.

669/16

Gulab Chand

-do-

29-04-2021

By order,

RAM SUBHAG SINGH, IAS

Addl.Chief Secretary (Lab. & Emp.).

_____________

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT HELD AT DHARAMSHALA

[Organized by Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala under Section 19, of Legal

Services Authorities Act, 1987 (Central Act)]

Applicant

: Sh. Birbal Singh s/o Sh. Chiru Ram, r/o Village Thana, P.O.

Gurchal, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

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Respondent(s)

: (i) The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division, Nurpur,

District Kangra, H.P.

(ii) The Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Jawali,

District Kangra, H.P.

Number of proceedings of the

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Dharamshala

: 561/2016

Present:—

Name of Judicial Officer

:

Sh. Yogesh Jaswal

Name of Member

:

Sh. B.S. Pathania

AWARD

The dispute between the parties having been referred for determination to the National Lok

Adalat and the parties having compromised/settled the case/matter, the following award is passed in

terms of the settlement:

In view of the separate statements of Shri Mukul Vaid, advocate for the petitioner recorded

on 30-3-2021 and today before the Bench of National Lok Adalat, which are placed on record, the

present reference/claim petition is hereby withdrawn as compromised. In view of the reference/

petition having been withdrawn, the application under Order 22 Rules 3 & 9 of the Code of Civil

Procedure becomes infructuous and which is accordingly dismissed as being infructuous. The

reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate

Government for necessary action at its end and the file after due completion be consigned to the

Record Room.

The parties are informed that the Court fee, if any paid by any of them shall be refunded.

Petitioner

: Sh. Mukul Vaid, Adv.

Respondent

: Sh. Anil Sharma, Dy. D.A.

Judicial Officer

Member

Date: 10-04-2021

___________

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT HELD AT DHARAMSHALA

[Organized by Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala under Section 19, of Legal

Services Authorities Act, 1987 (Central Act)]

Applicant

: Sh. Dharo Ram s/o Sh. Bhagat Ram, r/o Village and P.O.

Aundh, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

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Respondent(s)

: (i) The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division, Nurpur,

Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

(ii) The Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Jawali,

Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

Number of proceedings of the

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Dharamshala

: 783/2016

Present:—

Name of Judicial Officer

:

Sh. Yogesh Jaswal

Name of Member

:

Sh. B.S. Pathania

AWARD

The dispute between the parties having been referred for determination to the National Lok

Adalat and the parties having compromised/settled the case/matter, the following award is passed in

terms of the settlement:

In view of the separate statements of Shri Mukul Vaid, advocate for the petitioner recorded

on 30-3-2021 and today before the Bench of National Lok Adalat, which are placed on record, the

present reference/claim petition is hereby withdrawn as compromised. In view of the reference/

petition having been withdrawn, the application under Order 22 Rules 3 & 9 of the Code of Civil

Procedure becomes infructuous and which is accordingly dismissed as being infructuous. The

reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate

Government for necessary action at its end and the file after due completion be consigned to the

Record Room.

The parties are informed that the Court fee, if any paid by any of them shall be refunded.

Petitioner

: Sh. Mukul Vaid, Adv.

Respondent

: Sh. Anil Sharma, Dy. D.A.

Judicial Officer

Member

Date: 10-04-2021

___________

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT HELD AT DHARAMSHALA

[Organized by Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala under Section 19, of Legal

Services Authorities Act, 1987 (Central Act)]

Applicant

: Sh. Janak Singh s/o Sh. Dharam, r/o Vill and P.O. Hatli

Jamuwalan, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

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Respondent(s)

: (i)

The Executive Engineer, Nurpur Division, HPPWD,

Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

(ii)

The Executive Engineer, Jawali Division, HPPWD,

Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.

Number of proceedings of the

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Dharamshala

: 818/2016

Present:—

Name of Judicial Officer

: Sh. Yogesh Jaswal

Name of Member

: Sh. B.S. Pathania

AWARD

The dispute between the parties having been referred for determination to the National Lok

Adalat and the parties having compromised/settled the case/matter, the following award is passed in

terms of the settlement:

In view of the separate statements of Shri Mukul Vaid, advocate for the petitioner recorded

on 09-4-2021 and today before the Bench of National Lok Adalat, which are placed on record, the

present reference/claim petition is hereby withdrawn as compromised. The reference is answered in

the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for

necessary action at its end and the file after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

The parties are informed that the Court fee, if any, paid by any of them shall be refunded.

Petitioner

: Sh. Mukul Vaid, Adv.

Respondent

: Sh. Anil Sharma, Dy. D.A.

Judicial Officer

Member

Date: 10-04-2021

____________

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LOK ADALAT HELD AT DHARAMSHALA

[Organized by Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala under Section 19, of Legal

Services Authorities Act, 1987 (Central Act)]

Applicant

: Sh. Joginder Singh s/o Sh. Hari Singh, r/o Vill. Lunder, P.O.

Khel, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

Respondent(s)

: (i) The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Division, Nurpur,

District Kangra, H.P.

(ii) The Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Jawali,

District Kangra, H.P.

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Number of proceedings of the

Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Dharamshala

: 14/2017

Present:—

Name of Judicial Officer

: Sh. Yogesh Jaswal

Name of Member

: Sh. B.S. Pathania

AWARD

The dispute between the parties having been referred for determination to the National Lok

Adalat and the parties having compromised/settled the case/matter, the following award is passed in

terms of the settlement:

In view of the separate statements of Shri Mukul Vaid, advocate for the petitioner recorded

on 01-4-2021 and today before the Bench of National Lok Adalat, which are placed on record, the

present reference/claim petition is hereby withdrawn as compromised. The reference is answered in

the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for

necessary action at its end and the file after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

The parties are informed that the Court fee, if any, paid by any of them shall be refunded.

Petitioner

: Sh. Mukul Vaid, Adv.

Respondent

: Sh. Anil Sharma, Dy. D.A.

Judicial Officer

Member

Date: 10-04-2021

___________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 334/2014

Date of Institution

: 05-11-2014

Date of Decision

: 16-04-2021

Kumari Sanju d/o Sh. Neel Chand, r/o Village Chokhang, P.O. Thirot, Tehsil Udaipur,

District Lahaul & Spiti, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Divisional Forest Officer, Lahaul & Spiti at Keylong, District Lahaul & Spiti, H.P.

. .Respondent.

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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. S.K. Sharma, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Anil Sharma, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The below given reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Kumari Sanju d/o Sh. Neel Chand, r/o Village-

Chokhang, P.O. Thirot, Tehsil Udaipur, Distt. Lahaul & Spiti w.e.f. 01-8-2012 by the

Divisional Forest Officer, Lahaul & Spiti at Keylong, Distt. Lahaul & Spiti, H.P. without

complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If

not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the

above worker is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as set out in the statement of claim is that she was appointed

as a daily waged helper by the respondent in the Forest Development Agency, Keylong on

12-7-2006 and had worked as such uptil November, 2009. Thereafter, she was transferred to Forest

Development Agency, Jhalma and had worked there from December, 2009 till November, 2011.

She was again transferred back to DFO office Keylong as DDP Record Keeper and had worked as

such uptil 31-7-2012. Her services had wrongly and illegally been terminated by the respondent

w.e.f. 01-8-2012. She had completed 240 days in the preceding twelve calendar months prior to her

termination. While terminating her services, the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short) have been violated by

the respondent. No one month’s prior notice or pay in lieu thereof had ever been given to her. No

seniority list had been prepared by the respondent prior to the termination of her services. Many

juniors to her have been allowed to continue, whereas the services of the petitioner have been

terminated/retrenched. New/fresh hands have also been engaged in place of the petitioner.

Sufficient work and funds were available in the department and the petitioner had been engaged in

the work of permanent nature. The respondent has not paid wages to the petitioner from December,

2008 uptil July, 2012, amounting to Rs.1,60,483/-. The petitioner had visited the respondent’s

office time and again for her re-engagement, but without success. At the time of her termination she

was getting Rs. 5,022/- per month. She is not gainfully employed after her illegal termination.

Hence, the petition for her re-engagement along-with other consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objection

regarding lack of maintainability. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was

asserted that the petitioner was engaged as a causal labourer to facilitate the work of Forest

Development Agency (FDA) and she had worked intermittently w.e.f. December, 2006 uptil

November, 2008. After that she had worked as a casual labourer intermittently in Desert

Development Project (DDP) w.e.f. 21-11-2011 to May, 2012. It was denied that she had been

transferred to Forest Development Agency (FDA), Jahalama and that she had worked there from

December, 2009 uptil November, 2011. She had never worked with the respondent from

December, 2009 to November, 2011. It was also denied that she had worked with the respondent

uptil 31-7-2012. It was specifically denied that the services of the petitioner were illegally

dispensed with by the respondent w.e.f. 1-8-2012. Further, it was denied that she had worked

continuously w.e.f. 12-7-2006 to 31-7-2012 and had completed 240 days in each calendar year. It

was denied that juniors to her had been retained. No fresh workman had been engaged in place of

the petitioner. It was asserted that as neither any junior had been engaged nor retained by the

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respondent, so there was no violation of the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act.

The petitioner was not engaged in work of permanent nature. It was asserted that the petitioner had

worked intermittently in Forest Development Agency (FDA) which was a project funded by

“National Afforestation Programme”: A Participatory Approach To Sustainable Development of

Forests” (Central Sponsored Scheme). Since the petitioner had not worked with the respondent for

a period mentioned in para 6 of the claim petition, she is not entitled to any amount as alleged. The

petitioner was not illegally terminated by the respondent. The petitioner is gainfully employed,

being an agriculturist. Hence, it was prayed that the petition be dismissed.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the reply

and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for determination

and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 09-12-2015:

1.

Whether termination of the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 1-8-2012 by the respondent

is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

. .OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the list were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed.

7.

Arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Deputy District

Attorney for the respondent heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Negative

Issue No. 2

: Negative

Issue No. 3

: Yes

Relief.

: Petition dismissed as per the operative portion of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 and 2 :

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The petitioner, namely, Kumari Sanju examined herself as PW1 and filed her affidavit

in evidence, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A. In her affidavit she reiterated the contents of her

statement of claim. She also filed certain documents purportedly in support of her claim, which are

exhibited as Ex. PW1/B to Ex. PW1/Z4.

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In the cross-examination, she admitted that there is seasonal work in the forest department.

She also admitted that she had worked from December, 2006 uptil November, 2008 in the Forest

Development Agency. She denied that during this period she had worked intermittently.

Volunteered that, she had worked regularly. She also denied that she had worked intermittently

from November, 2011 to May, 2012 in the Desert Development Project. Self stated that she had

worked in the forest department and was being paid the salary through DDP. Further, she denied

that she was never transferred from FDA to DDP. She also denied that she had never worked after

November, 2011. She feigned ignorance that FDA and DDP were centrally sponsored schemes. She

denied that she had not completed 240 days or more. Further, she denied that no juniors to her

were engaged by the department. After July, 2021, she is working as an agriculturist.

11. Conversely, Shri Jai Ram Thakur, Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division, Keylong

(respondent) testified as RW1. In his affidavit Ex. RW1/A preferred as per Order 18 Rule 4 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, he corroborated on oath the contents of the reply filed by the respondent.

In the cross-examination, he admitted that as per Ex.RW1/G, the petitioner had worked

from July, 2006 uptil May, 2012 in the forest department. Volunteered that, she had worked in

FDA and DDP programmes. He denied that the department was giving salary to the petitioner. He

admitted that seniority list Ex.RW1/E has been issued by the department. Further, he admitted that

in the years 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2015, daily waged workers were engaged. He

admitted that all the workers are still working in the department. He also admitted that the

petitioner was kept at work as a daily wager. Volunteered that, she was kept in the project. He

further admitted that persons junior to the petitioner are still working in the department. He also

admitted that the department is having sufficient funds. Further, he admitted that the Deputy

Commissioner had directed DFO Keylong to engage the petitioner. He feigned ignore+ance that the

BDO office Keylong had refused to engage the petitioner. He specifically denied that the petitioner

had been disengaged by the department on 1-8-2012.

12. Ex. RW1/B is the copy of guidelines of “National Afforestation Programme”: A

Participatory Approach to Sustainable Development of Forests (Central Sponsored Scheme).

13. Ex.RW1/C is the copy of guidelines for Hariyali (2003).

14. Ex.RW1/D is the copy of minutes of meeting of Project Implementing Agencies

(PLA’s) of Lahul Block under Desert Development Programme (DDA) dated 6th June, 2012.

15. Ex.RW1/E is the copy of seniority list of daily wager works in Lahaul Forest Division

as on 16-5-2017.

16. Ex.RW1/F is the copy of letter dated 10-7-2012 regarding relieving of Class-IV daily

wages staff engaged under DDP by Divisional Forest Officer, Keylong.

17. Ex.RW1/G is the copy of mandays chart relating to the petitioner.

18. The first question which arises for consideration, as per the arguments, is whether the

petitioner was an employee of respondent or not. It is by now well settled that the burden of proof

is on the workman to establish the employer-employee relationship. In Workmen of Nilgiri Coop.

Maktg. Soc. Ltd. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2004) 3 SCC 514, it has been laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court that it is a well settled principle of law that the person who sets up a plea of

existence of relationship of employer and employee, the burden would be upon him. It was also

observed therein that where a person asserts that he was a workman of the company, and it is

denied by the company, it is for him to prove the fact. It is not for the company to prove that he was

not an employee of the company but of some other person.

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19. In the case on hand, it was asserted by the petitioner that she was a workman of the

respondent, being appointed on daily waged basis. The respondent denied this fact and claimed that

the petitioner had worked as a causal labourer to facilitate the work of Forest Development Agency

and Desert Development Project. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid binding precedent, the onus

lay on the petitioner to prove the employer-employee relationship in between herself and the

respondent. No document has been placed and exhibited on record by the petitioner to show that

she was appointed as a daily waged worker by the respondent. Rather, the respondent has tendered

in evidence mandays chart of the petitioner as Ex.RW1/G. It shows that the petitioner had worked

in the Forest Development Agency Project w.e.f. 12-7-2006 to November, 2008 and in the Desert

Development Project w.e.f. 21-11-2011 to May, 2012. The respondent has also tendered in

evidence copy of seniority list of daily waged workers in Lahaul Forest Division, as it stood on

16.5.2017 as Ex.RW1/E. The name of the petitioner does not figure in this seniority lists anywhere.

No reason has been assigned by the petitioner as to why her name does not figure in the seniority

list of daily paid workers maintained by the respondent. There is no grain of evidence on record to

show that any objection was ever raised by her for her name not being there in the seniority list. No

explanation is also forthcoming from her mouth as to why she did not agitate the matter at the

earliest and had challenged the seniority list. It was vociferously argued by the learned Deputy

District Attorney for the respondent that the seniority list contains the names of all the daily waged

workers working with the respondent. The petitioner clearly admitted while under cross-

examination that from September, 2006 till November, 2008 she had worked in the Forest

Development Agency. Had it been that the petitioner was a daily paid worker of the respondent, she

ought to have been engaged on the muster rolls. The petitioner has not filed any of her muster rolls

with the petition. This only goes to show that she had never been engaged on the muster roll.

Further, the payment records Ex.PW1/D to Ex.PW1/Z1, which have been proved and exhibited on

record by the petitioner herself, also nowhere reflect that the petitioner was a daily paid worker.

She had signed the documents, being the bills, which only indicate that the petitioner had worked in

the projects on bill basis in the years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2011 and 2012. Then, how it lies in the

mouth of the petitioner to say that she was appointed or engaged in the year 2006 as a daily paid

worker. In view of the admission made by the petitioner, as discussed above, and also taking into

account the aforesaid documentary evidence, it can safely be held that the petitioner has failed to

establish on record that she was engaged as a daily paid worker by the respondent.

20. Next, it was claimed by the petitioner that she had worked continuously with the

respondent from the year 2006 uptil July, 2012, without any breaks. No such record has seen the

light of the day. Be it recorded here at the risk of repetition that had the services of the petitioner

been engaged as a daily paid worker by the respondent, her name ought to have figured in the

seniority list maintained by the respondent. But, so is not the case here. Then, if the petitioner was a

daily paid worker muster rolls must have been issued in her name. No muster roll has been filed by

the petitioner, nor she had called for any such record so as to show that she indeed was a daily paid

worker. The bills, as discussed above, on the other hand belie the case of the petitioner that she had

been engaged by the respondent as a daily paid worker. For proving that the petitioner was a

‘workman’ and as such entitled for protection under the Act, it was required to be proved on her

part that as provided under Section 25-B of the Act, she had continuously worked for a period of

240 days in a calendar year. However, the number of minimum requisite days specified for the

tribal area of Lahaul Division in Lahaul & Spiti District is 160 days. Having failed to establish on

record that she had worked as a daily paid worker with the respondent and in the absence of there

being any evidence to the effect that she had continuously worked for a period of 160 days in a

calendar year, her submission in this regard is negated. In case titled as Range Forest Officer vs.

S.T. Hadimani 2002 SCC (L&S) 367, it has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the

filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his favour and it cannot be regarded as sufficient

evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to a conclusion that a workman had, infact, worked for

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240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of

appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the workman.

21. In view of the ocular and documentary evidence, as discussed above, it can safely be

concluded that the petitioner has not been able to show that she was engaged as a daily paid worker

by the respondent. No muster roll was prepared regarding her work, nor her name figured in the

seniority list of daily paid workers maintained by the respondent. It is an admitted case of the

petitioner that she had not challenged or objected to the seniority list, which did not show her name

as a daily paid worker. Faced with the situation, it was contended for the petitioner that the

respondent (RW1) has categorical admitted the petitioner to have been engaged as a daily waged

worker. This admission as per the learned counsel for the petitioner is best piece of evidence and

the fact admitted need not be proved. This cannot be accepted. The stray admission made by the

respondent will not come to the rescue of the petitioner. It is often said and rightly too that the men

may tell lies, but the documents do not. It is basic law that the documentary evidence as compared

to the oral evidence has to be given weight. At the cost of reiteration, as per the mandays chart the

petitioner is shown to have worked in the projects i.e. Forest Development Agency Project w.e.f.

12th July, 2006 to November, 2008 and Desert Development Project w.e.f. 21st November, 2011 to

May, 2012. The copies of bills indicate that the petitioner had worked in the projects on bill basis.

Therefore, the petitioner is not a daily paid worker. But, having worked on bill basis in the projects,

she is not entitled to any relief as claimed for by her.

22. The petitioner as per her pleadings and oral evidence has claimed arrear of wages w.e.f.

December, 2008 to July, 2012 amounting to Rs.1,60,483/-. However, Section 10 (4) of the Act

mandates that the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal shall confine its adjudication to the points of

dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government and the matters incidental thereto. The

Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Globe Ground India Employees Union vs. Lufthansa

German Airlines and Anr., 2019 (161) FLR 927 has held that the Industrial Court has to confine

its adjudication to the point of reference and matters incidental thereto only. No reference has been

received from the appropriate Government regarding the alleged arrears. Therefore, the said

controversy, if any, between the parties cannot be looked into by this Court being beyond the terms

of the reference.

23. Hence, both these issues are answered in the negative and decided against the

petitioner.

Issue No. 3 :

24. Taking into account my findings on issues No. 1 and 2 above, it is held that neither the

petitioner has the cause of action nor the locus standi to sue. The claim petition is not maintainable

in the present form. The same is frivolous and vexatious. The claim petition has been instituted by

the petitioner with a malafide intention to derive undue advantage(s). This issue is answered in the

affirmative and decided in favour of the respondent.

Relief :

25. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove, while recording the findings on

issues supra, the present claim petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed, with no order

as to costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to the

appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion be

consigned to the Record Room.

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Announced in the open Court today this 16th day of April, 2021.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge, Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 51/2020

Date of Institution

: 02-3-2020

Date of Decision

: 17-04-2021

S/Shri Vinod Nishad, Ashish Kumar, Amit Kumar, Rajeshwar Sharma, Vikram Singh,

Vinod Sharma, Surjit Singh, Viney Singh, Chander Shekhar, Rajesh Kumar, Om Pal and others

workers M/s Inox Wind Limited, Plot No.1, Khasra No. 264 to 267, Industrial Area, Village and

Post Office Basal, Tehsil & District Una, H.P.

. .Petitioners.

Versus

The Managing Director, M/s Inox Wind Limited, Plot No.1, Khasra No. 264 to 267,

Industrial Area, Village and Post Office Basal, Tehsil & District Una, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. Vinod Kumar (Petitioner No. 1 in person)

For the Respondent

: Sh. Surinder Sharma, Assistant Manager, (HR)

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the demand raised by S/Shri Vinod Nishad, Ashish Kumar, Amit Kumar,

Rajeshwar Sharama, Vikram Singh, Vinod Sharma, Surjit Singh, Viney Singh, Chander

Shekhar, Rajesh Kumar, Om Pal and others workers M/s Inox Wind Limited, Plot No.1,

Khasra No.264 to 267, Industrial Area, Village and Post Office Basal, Tehsil & District

Una, H.P. before the Managing Director, M/s Inox Wind Limited, Plot No.1, Khasra

No.264 to 267, Industrial Area, Village and Post Office Basal, Tehsil & District Una, H.P.

vide demand notice dated 08-05-2019 regarding stoppage of annual increment without

following the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If yes,

what amount of financial, other service benefits the above workers are entitled to as per

demand notice dated 08-05-2019 (copy enclosed) from the above employer/Management?”

2.

The case is listed for appearance of the petitioners but, however, Shri Vinod Nishad

(petitioner No.1) has made the below given statement in the Court today:—

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jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 24 vxLr] 2021@02 Hkknzin] 1943

^^C;ku fd;k fd eq>s vU; oknhx.k n~okjk vkt C;ku nsus ds fy, vf/kd`r fd;k x;k gSA gekjk

izfroknh ds lkFk le>kSrk gks x;k gSA vr% ge bl dsl dks vkxs u pykuk pkgrs gSaA bls nkf[ky n¶rj

fd;k tkosA**

RO&AC

PJ

Sd/-

Sd/-

3.

In view of the above statement, this reference is dismissed as withdrawn. Parties to

bear their own costs.

4.

The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

5.

A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for necessary action at its

end and the file after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 17th day of April, 2021.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge, Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 610/2015

Date of Institution

: 19-12-2015

Date of Decision

: 19-4-2021

Shri Vijay Kumar s/o Shri Jagdish Chand, r/o Village Dehra, P.O. Hatwar, Tehsil

Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Chairman-cum-President-cum-Medical Officer, Rogi Kalyan Samiti, Civil Hospital

Barsar, District Hamirpur, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Anil Sharma, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The below given reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

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“Whether termination of the services of Shri Vijay Kumar s/o Shri Jagdish Chand, r/o

Village Dehra, P.O. Hatwar, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. w.e.f. 11-08-2013

(as alleged by workman) by the Chairman-cum-President-cum-Medical Officer, Rogi

Kalyan Samiti, Civil Hospital Barsar, District Hamirpur, H.P., without complying with the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of

back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled

to from the above employers?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as set out in the statement of claim is that his services were

engaged on daily waged basis by the respondent w.e.f. 20-6-2012. He had worked under Senior

Medical Officer/Block Medical Officer at Civil Hospital Barsar uptil 10-8-2013. No appointment

letter had been issued nor any terms and conditions were settled. During his service, payment was

being made to him by Rogi Kalyan Samiti. His services were unlawfully terminated by the

respondent w.e.f. 11-8-2013 without prior notice. He had completed 240 days from the date of his

initial engagement till the date of his termination. His services could not have been terminated

without prior notice or payment in lieu thereof, as provided under Section 25-F of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to ‘the Act’ for short). His act and conduct was upto the

mark and to the satisfaction of the respondent. No show cause notice had been issued nor he had

ever been charge-sheeted. At the time of his engagement in Civil Hospital Barsar, he had worked

with class-IV regular workers, namely Shri Bhagwan Dass and Shri Satpal as well as with Shri

Amar Singh a daily wager. The act of the respondent was highly unjustified, arbitrary,

unconstitutional, contrary and against the mandatory provisions of the Act. Hence, the present

petition for re-engagement of the petitioner with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objection

regarding lack of maintainability. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was

asserted that Rogi Kalyan Samiti is an independent body governed by its guidelines. In the annual

meeting of the governing body of the Rogi Kalyan Samiti, Barsar on 28-4-2012 under the

Chairmanship of Sub Divisional Magistrate (Civil), Barsar, District Hamirpur, it was resolved to

carry out construction work, repair of hospital attached buildings, residences and cleanliness

of hospital premises at local level and the budget was provided under Annual Maintenance Grant,

seed money, untied funds and user charges heads. The Rogi Kalyan Samiti receives funds under

different heads from the Government under NRHM (now NHM) every year and the wages are not

to be paid from such funds. Wages are to be paid only from the user charges. The petitioner had

been engaged on 3-9-2012 and he had worked intermittently with the respondent uptil July, 2013. It

was specifically denied that the petitioner had been engaged on daily waged basis by the

respondent. His services had never been terminated on 11-8-2013 by the respondent, rather he had

worked only uptil 31-7-2013. He had never completed 240 days in the preceding twelve calendar

months and had never fulfilled the criteria of Section 25-B of the Act. There was no need to serve

him a notice under Section 25-F of the Act. Sh. Satpal had never worked with the respondent. The

workers, namely, Shri Bhagwan Dass and Shri Amar Singh (Class-IV) were senior to the petitioner.

The petitioner had not been engaged for regular work. He had been engaged on different dates for

different works and under different heads, as per annual meetings of Rogi Kalyan Samiti held on

28-4-2012 and 31-5-2013. The petitioner is gainfully employed as an agriculturist. It is, thus,

prayed that the claim petition be dismissed.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the reply

and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for determination

and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 18-10-2016:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents w.e.f. 11-08-2103

is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

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2.

If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed.

7.

Oral arguments of the learned counsel/Authorized Representative for the petitioner and

the learned Deputy District Attorney for respondent heard and records gone through. Written

arguments filed by both the parties have also been gone through by me.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Negative

Issue No. 2

: Negative

Issue No. 3

: Affirmative

Relief.

: Petition dismissed as per the operative portion of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 and 2 :

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The petitioner, namely, Shri Vijay Kumar examined himself as PW1 and filed his

affidavit in evidence, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit he reiterated the contents of

his statement of claim. He also filed certain documents purportedly in support of his claim which

are exhibited as Ex. PW1/B to Ex. PW1/D.

In the cross-examination, he feigned ignorance that Rogi Kalyan Samiti is an independent

unit, having separate guidelines. He denied that he was not engaged by the respondent on

20-6-2012. He also denied that he had not regularly worked uptil 10-8-2013. He further denied that

he was being paid the wages through user charges. He categorically denied that he was engaged on

3.9.2012 and had worked intermittently till July, 2013. Volunteered that, he had worked

continuously from June, 2012 uptil 10-8-2013. He specifically denied that Shri Satpal had never

worked. He further denied that Shri Bhagwan Dass and Shri Amar Singh were senior to him. He

admitted that he earns his livelihood by doing agricultural works.

11. Conversely, Dr. Het Ram Kalia, Block Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Barsar, District

Hamirpur, H.P. testified as RW1. In his affidavit Ex. RW1/A filed as per Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, he

corroborated on oath the contents of the reply preferred by the respondent.

In the cross-examination, he admitted that the petitioner was engaged as a daily wager by

the respondent on 20-6-2012. Volunteered that, the working details of the petitioner is Ex.RW1/B.

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He admitted that at the time of engagement, no appointment letter had been issued to the petitioner,

nor any terms and conditions had been settled. He further admitted that the petitioner had worked

under the supervision of BMO and other staff of the hospital. He also admitted that the petitioner

had worked in the government hospital. It was also admitted by him that for any recruitment the

approval of the Finance Department is a must. He specifically denied the petitioner had been

removed from work on 11-8-2013 without serving any notice. Self stated that on the completion of

work the services of the petitioner were not required.

12. Ex. RW1/B and Ex.RW1/G are copies of details of works relating to the petitioner.

13. Ex.RW1/C is the copy of letter dated 14th October, 2010 regarding financial guidelines

for utilization of Annual Maintenance Grant.

14. Ex.RW1/D is the copy of office order dated 9th September, 2010 issued by National

Rural Health Mission Health and Family Welfare Department, Himachal Pradesh.

15. Ex.RW1/E is the copy of guidelines for the Rogi Kalyan Samiti in Government Health

Institutions of Himachal Pradesh.

16. Ex.RW1/F is the copy of extract of meeting of Governing Body of Rogi Kalyan Samiti

FRU, Barsar dated 28-4-2012.

17. Ex.RW1/H and Ex.RW1/J are the copies of bills relating to Shri Bhagwan Dass.

18. Ex.RW1/K is the copy of office order dated 25th May, 2000 relating to Shri Amar

Singh and two others.

19. The first question which arises for consideration, as per the arguments, is whether the

petitioner was an employee of respondent or not. It is by now well settled that the burden of proof

is on the workman to establish the employer-employee relationship. In Workmen of Nilgiri Coop.

Maktg. Soc. Ltd. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2004) 3 SCC 514, it has been laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court that it is a well settled principle of law that the person who sets up a plea of

existence of relationship of employer and employee, the burden would be upon him. It was also

observed therein that where a person asserts that he was a workman of the company, and it is

denied by the company, it is for him to prove the fact. It is not for the company to prove that he was

not an employee of the company but of some other person.

20. In the case on hand, it was asserted by the petitioner that he was a workman of the

respondent, being appointed on daily waged basis. The respondent denied this fact and claimed that

the petitioner had been engaged on different dates to do different available works under different

heads, as per the annual meetings of the Governing Body of Rogi Kalyan Samiti held on 28-4-2012

and 3-5-2013 respectively. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid binding precedent the onus lay on

the petitioner to prove the employer-employee relationship in between himself and the respondent.

No document has been placed and exhibited on record by the petitioner to show that he was

appointed as a daily waged worker by the respondent.

21. Copy of guidelines for the Rogi Kalyan Samiti in Government Health Institutions of

Himachal Pradesh is there on the file as Ex.RW1/E. Chapter-VIII of such guidelines deals with the

staff policy. Under this Chapter recruitment of two types of employees can be made under Rogi

Kalyan Samiti, i.e. Grant-in-Aid funded and RKS own resources funded. The employees recruited

under GIA funds provided by the State Government are to be governed by draft contracts

formulated by the State Government from time to time for each category of employees and specific

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approval is to be accorded by the Government for the recruitment. The mode of selection, terms

and conditions, consolidated salary payable, eligibility criteria and other conditions of services are

also to be decided by the Government by approving the draft contract. As per the guidelines to RKS

own resources (Fresh Recruitment), the decision regarding engagement of fresh contractual

employees has to be taken with care and at the highest level i.e. Governing Body and State

Government. No fresh recruitment can be made by any RKS contrary to the principles and

guidelines set-forth by the State Government for employees under “GIA funded” and “RKS own

resources funded” respectively. There can also be no recruitment on daily wages or on contract

basis by any RKS for the services that stand outsourced. A specific scheme has been set-forth in

Chapter-VIII of the guidelines for the recruitment of the employees to be recruited under GIA

funded as well as by RKS from its own resources. It is nowhere the pleaded case of the petitioner

nor any grain of evidence has been led on record by him to the effect that after going through the

recruitment process, as detailed in Chapter–VIII of the guidelines, he had been recruited either

under GIA funds or RKS own resources and that he had ever entered into any contract agreement

with the respondent/Rogi Kalyan Samiti, Barsar. Rather, it is the own admitted case of the

petitioner that no appointment letter had ever been issued nor any terms and conditions had been

settled. This knocks the very bottom of his case set up in the claim petition, as there could not have

been any recruitment by the Rogi Kalyan Samiti, Barsar contrary to the principles and guidelines

set-forth by the State Government for employees under “GIA funded” and “RKS own resources

funded” respectively. Then, it was itself suggested to the respondent (RW1) by the petitioner that

there cannot be any recruitment except for the prior approval from the Finance Department. He

admitted the suggestion. Admission of this suggestion of the petitioner by the respondent leaves no

doubt in mind that the petitioner admitted that the recruitment could have been there only as per the

guidelines for the Rogi Kalyan Samiti.

22. Much was also argued orally and in the written arguments by the petitioner about the

admission made by the respondent (RW1) in his cross-examination that the petitioner had been

engaged as a daily wager on 20-6-2012. I have perused the so called admission made by the

respondent. To my mind, it appears to be a stray admission made by the respondent and it will be a

sheer travesty of justice if this is made the basis to accept the claim of the petitioner. Placed on

record by the respondent is the copy of annual meeting of the Governing Body of Rogi Kalyan

Samiti FRU, Barsar dated 28-4-2012 as Ex.RW1/F. It shows that the Governing Body in such

meeting had resolved that repair of the hospital, attached building and the residences be got done

and that the hospital premises be also got cleaned. As per the respondent, for the execution of such

works only the respondent had been engaged and the details of his works stand placed on record as

Ex.RW1/B (also Ex.RW1/G). A perusal of this document reveals that the petitioner had only

carried out the works regarding the cutting of bushes surrounding the hospital premises for 08 days,

15 days and 21 days respectively, for doing the paint work at USG and BMO room for 07 days and

for the construction of shelves and digging of pits etc. for about 22 days. This would also negate the

case of the petitioner that he had been engaged by the respondent as a daily wager.

23. Since, there is no cogent, convincing and reliable evidence on the file establishing the

relationship of employer and employee/workman in between the petitioner and the respondent,

therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are not attracted in this case. Even otherwise, if

it is assumed for the sake of arguments that the petitioner was a daily waged worker with the

respondent, it was required of him to have established on record that he had worked for 240 days or

more in a year preceding twelve calendar months from the date of his alleged termination.

24. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. The burden of proof is

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on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 240 days in the preceding twelve calendar months

prior to his alleged retrenchment. The law on this issue is well settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs.

Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, it has been laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given

year.

25. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it

was required of the petitioner to establish on record that he had worked continuously for a period

240 days in a block of twelve calendar months anterior to the date of his alleged termination, which

as per the reference took place on 11-8-2013. From the details of works with respect to the

petitioner, which is there on the file as Ex.RW1/B (also Ex.RW1/G), it becomes abundantly clear

that the petitioner had not completed 240 days of continuous work in a block of twelve calendar

months preceding the date of his retrenchment i.e. 11-8-2013 as envisaged under Section 25-B of

the Act. So is also gathered from the copy of register muster roll (attendance) placed on record by

the petitioner himself as Ex.PW1/D. Therefore, also the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are

not attracted in this case.

26. It is not the case of the petitioner that at the time of his termination any person junior to

him was retained in service by the respondent. It is also not his case that after his disengagement

new/fresh hands have been engaged by the respondent. Therefore, the provisions of Sections 25-G

and 25-H of the Act are not attracted in this case as well.

27. In all fairness, the learned counsel/Authorized Representative for the petitioner has

placed reliance upon cases titled as M/s Classic Bottle Caps (P) Ltd. vs. Usha Singh & Ors. 2012

LLR 738; Management of Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Madurai Division-1) Ltd.

Madurai vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai & Anr. 2016 LLR 736; Manorama Verma

(Smt) versus State of Bihar and Ors. 1995 SCC (L&S) 193; Pradhan Baijnath Tea Estate Mazdoor

Sangh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. 2019 LLR 1239; The Principal, Government I.T.I.,

Kollegal-571440 vs. R. Hema Kumar and Anr. 2016 LLR 360 and Sudarshan Rajpoot vs. U.P.

State Road Transport Corporation 2015 LLR 95. I have carefully gone through the aforesaid case

law cited by the learned counsel/Authorized Representative for the petitioner and I am of the view

that for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, the petitioner cannot derive any advantage from what

has been decided in these cases.

28. Hence, both these issues are answered in the negative and decided against the

petitioner.

Issue No. 3 :

29. Taking into account my findings on issues No. 1 and 2 above, it is held that neither the

petitioner has the cause of action nor the locus standi to sue. The claim petition is not maintainable

in the present form. The same is frivolous and vexatious. The claim petition has been instituted by

the petitioner with a malafide intention to derive undue advantage(s). This issue is answered in the

affirmative and decided in favour of the respondent.

Relief :

30. As a sequel to my findings on the various issues above, the present claim petition being

meritless, not maintainable and malafide, fails. It is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.

The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate

Government for publication in the official gazette. File after due completion be consigned to the

Record Room.

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Announced in the open Court today this 19th day of April, 2021.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge, Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 611/2015

Date of Institution

: 19-12-2015

Date of Decision

: 19-4-2021

Shri Kamaljeet Singh s/o Shri Sarwan Kumar, r/o V.P.O. Khagal, Tehsil & District

Hamirpur, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Chairman-cum-President-cum-Medical Officer, Rogi Kalyan Samiti, Civil Hospital

Barsar, District Hamirpur, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. Vijay Kaundal, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Anil Sharma, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The below given reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether termination of the services of Shri Kamaljeet Singh s/o Sh. Sarwan Kumar, r/o

V.P.O. Khagal, Tehsil & District Hamirpur, H.P. w.e.f. 11-08-2013 (as alleged by

workman) by the Chairman-cum-President-cum-Medical Officer, Rogi Kalyan Samiti, Civil

Hospital Barsar, District Hamirpur, H.P., without complying with the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages,

seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the

above employers?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as set out in the statement of claim is that his services were

engaged on daily waged basis by the respondent w.e.f. 20-6-2012. He had worked under Senior

Medical Officer/Block Medical Officer at Civil Hospital Barsar uptil 10-8-2013. No appointment

letter had been issued nor any terms and conditions were settled. During his service, payment was

being made to him by Rogi Kalyan Samiti. His services were unlawfully terminated by the

respondent w.e.f. 11-8-2013 without prior notice. He had completed 240 days from the date of his

initial engagement till the date of his termination. His services could not have been terminated

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without prior notice or payment in lieu thereof, as provided under Section 25-F of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to ‘the Act’ for short). His act and conduct was upto the

mark and to the satisfaction of the respondent. No show cause notice had been issued nor he had

ever been charge-sheeted. At the time of his engagement in Civil Hospital Barsar, he had worked

with Class-IV regular workers, namely Shri Bhagwan Dass and Shri Satpal as well as with Shri

Amar Singh a daily wager. The act of the respondent was highly unjustified, arbitrary,

unconstitutional, contrary and against the mandatory provisions of the Act. Hence, the present

petition for re-engagement of the petitioner with all consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objection

regarding lack of maintainability. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was

asserted that Rogi Kalyan Samiti is an independent body governed by its guidelines. In the annual

meeting of the governing body of the Rogi Kalyan Samiti, Barsar on 28-4-2012 under the

Chairmanship of Sub Divisional Magistrate (Civil), Barsar, District Hamirpur, it was resolved to

carry out construction work, repair of hospital attached buildings, residences and cleanliness

of hospital premises at local level and the budget was provided under Annual Maintenance Grant,

seed money, untied funds and user charges heads. The Rogi Kalyan Samiti receives funds under

different heads from the Government under NRHM (now NHM) every year and the wages are not

to be paid from such funds. Wages are to be paid only from the user charges. The petitioner had

been engaged on 3-9-2012 and he had worked intermittently with the respondent uptil July, 2013. It

was specifically denied that the petitioner had been engaged on daily waged basis by the

respondent. His services had never been terminated on 11-8-2013 by the respondent, rather he had

worked only uptil 31-7-2013. He had never completed 240 days in the preceding twelve calendar

months and had never fulfilled the criteria of Section 25-B of the Act. There was no need to serve

him a notice under Section 25-F of the Act. Sh. Satpal had never worked with the respondent. The

workers, namely, Shri Bhagwan Dass and Shri Amar Singh (Class-IV) were senior to the petitioner.

The petitioner had not been engaged for regular work. He had been engaged on different dates for

different works and under different heads, as per annual meetings of Rogi Kalyan Samiti held on

28-4-2012 and 31-5-2013. The petitioner is gainfully employed as an agriculturist. It is, thus,

prayed that the claim petition be dismissed.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the reply

and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for determination

and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 18-10-2016:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents w.e.f. 11-08-2103

is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed.

7.

Oral arguments of the learned counsel/Authorized Representative for the petitioner and

the learned Deputy District Attorney for respondent heard and records gone through. Written

arguments filed by both the parties have also been gone through by me.

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8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Negative

Issue No. 2

: Negative

Issue No. 3

: Affirmative

Relief.

: Petition dismissed as per the operative portion of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 and 2 :

9.

Both these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The petitioner, namely, Shri Kamaljeet Singh examined himself as PW1 and filed his

affidavit in evidence, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit he reiterated the contents of

his statement of claim. He also filed certain documents purportedly in support of his claim which

are exhibited as Ex. PW1/B to Ex. PW1/D.

In the cross-examination, he feigned ignorance that Rogi Kalyan Samiti is an independent

unit, having separate guidelines. He denied that he was not engaged by the respondent on

20-6-2012. He also denied that he had not regularly worked uptil 10-8-2013. He further denied that

he was being paid the wages through user charges. He categorically denied that he was engaged on

3-9-2012 and had worked intermittently till July, 2013. Volunteered that, he had worked

continuously from June, 2012 uptil 10.8.2013. He specifically denied that Shri Satpal had never

worked. He further denied that Shri Bhagwan Dass and Shri Amar Singh were senior to him. He

admitted that he earns his livelihood by doing agricultural works.

11. Conversely, Dr. Het Ram Kalia, Block Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Barsar, District

Hamirpur, H.P. testified as RW1. In his affidavit Ex. RW1/A filed as per Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, he

corroborated on oath the contents of the reply preferred by the respondent.

In the cross-examination, he admitted that the petitioner was engaged as a daily wager by

the respondent on 20-6-2012. Volunteered that, the working details of the petitioner is Ex.RW1/B.

He admitted that at the time of engagement, no appointment letter had been issued to the petitioner,

nor any terms and conditions had been settled. He further admitted that the petitioner had worked

under the supervision of BMO and other staff of the hospital. He also admitted that the petitioner

had worked in the government hospital. It was also admitted by him that for any recruitment the

approval of the Finance Department is a must. He specifically denied the petitioner had been

removed from work on 11-8-2013 without serving any notice. Self stated that on the completion of

work the services of the petitioner were not required.

12. Ex. RW1/B and Ex.RW1/G are copies of details of works relating to the petitioner.

13. Ex.RW1/C is the copy of letter dated 14th October, 2010 regarding financial guidelines

for utilization of Annual Maintenance Grant.

14. Ex.RW1/D is the copy of office order dated 9th September, 2010 issued by National

Rural Health Mission Health and Family Welfare Department, Himachal Pradesh.

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15. Ex.RW1/E is the copy of guidelines for the Rogi Kalyan Samiti in Government Health

Institutions of Himachal Pradesh.

16. Ex.RW1/F is the copy of extract of meeting of Governing Body of Rogi Kalyan Samiti

FRU, Barsar dated 28-4-2012.

17. Ex.RW1/H and Ex.RW1/J are the copies of bills relating to Shri Bhagwan Dass.

18. Ex.RW1/K is the copy of office order dated 25th May, 2000 relating to

Shri Amar Singh and two others.

19. The first question which arises for consideration, as per the arguments, is whether the

petitioner was an employee of respondent or not. It is by now well settled that the burden of proof

is on the workman to establish the employer-employee relationship. In Workmen of Nilgiri Coop.

Maktg. Soc. Ltd. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2004) 3 SCC 514, it has been laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court that it is a well settled principle of law that the person who sets up a plea of

existence of relationship of employer and employee, the burden would be upon him. It was also

observed therein that where a person asserts that he was a workman of the company, and it is

denied by the company, it is for him to prove the fact. It is not for the company to prove that he was

not an employee of the company but of some other person.

20. In the case on hand, it was asserted by the petitioner that he was a workman of the

respondent, being appointed on daily waged basis. The respondent denied this fact and claimed that

the petitioner had been engaged on different dates to do different available works under different

heads, as per the annual meetings of the Governing Body of Rogi Kalyan Samiti held on 28-4-2012

and 3-5-2013 respectively. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid binding precedent the onus lay on

the petitioner to prove the employer-employee relationship in between himself and the respondent.

No document has been placed and exhibited on record by the petitioner to show that he was

appointed as a daily waged worker by the respondent.

21. Copy of guidelines for the Rogi Kalyan Samiti in Government Health Institutions of

Himachal Pradesh is there on the file as Ex.RW1/E. Chapter-VIII of such guidelines deals with the

staff policy. Under this Chapter recruitment of two types of employees can be made under Rogi

Kalyan Samiti, i.e. Grant-in-Aid funded and RKS own resources funded. The employees recruited

under GIA funds provided by the State Government are to be governed by draft contracts

formulated by the State Government from time to time for each category of employees and specific

approval is to be accorded by the Government for the recruitment. The mode of selection, terms

and conditions, consolidated salary payable, eligibility criteria and other conditions of services are

also to be decided by the Government by approving the draft contract. As per the guidelines to RKS

own resources (Fresh Recruitment), the decision regarding engagement of fresh contractual

employees has to be taken with care and at the highest level i.e. Governing Body and State

Government. No fresh recruitment can be made by any RKS contrary to the principles and

guidelines set-forth by the State Government for employees under “GIA funded” and “RKS own

resources funded” respectively. There can also be no recruitment on daily wages or on contract

basis by any RKS for the services that stand outsourced. A specific scheme has been set-forth in

Chapter-VIII of the guidelines for the recruitment of the employees to be recruited under GIA

funded as well as by RKS from its own resources. It is nowhere the pleaded case of the petitioner

nor any grain of evidence has been led on record by him to the effect that after going through the

recruitment process, as detailed in Chapter–VIII of the guidelines, he had been recruited either

under GIA funds or RKS own resources and that he had ever entered into any contract agreement

with the respondent/Rogi Kalyan Samiti, Barsar. Rather, it is the own admitted case of the

petitioner that no appointment letter had ever been issued nor any terms and conditions had been

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settled. This knocks the very bottom of his case set up in the claim petition, as there could not have

been any recruitment by the Rogi Kalyan Samiti, Barsar contrary to the principles and guidelines

set-forth by the State Government for employees under “GIA funded” and “RKS own resources

funded” respectively. Then, it was itself suggested to the respondent (RW1) by the petitioner that

there cannot be any recruitment except for the prior approval from the Finance Department. He

admitted the suggestion. Admission of this suggestion of the petitioner by the respondent leaves no

doubt in mind that the petitioner admitted that the recruitment could have been there only as per the

guidelines for the Rogi Kalyan Samiti.

22. Much was also argued orally and in the written arguments by the petitioner about the

admission made by the respondent (RW1) in his cross-examination that the petitioner had been

engaged as a daily wager on 20-6-2012. I have perused the so called admission made by the

respondent. To my mind, it appears to be a stray admission made by the respondent and it will be a

sheer travesty of justice if this is made the basis to accept the claim of the petitioner. Placed on

record by the respondent is the copy of annual meeting of the Governing Body of Rogi Kalyan

Samiti FRU, Barsar dated 28-4-2012 as Ex.RW1/F. It shows that the Governing Body in such

meeting had resolved that repair of the hospital, attached building and the residences be got done

and that the hospital premises be also got cleaned. As per the respondent, for the execution of such

works only the respondent had been engaged and the details of his works stand placed on record as

Ex.RW1/B and Ex.RW1/G. A perusal of Ex.RW1/B reveals that the petitioner had only carried out

the works regarding the cutting of bushes surrounding the hospital premises for 08 days and 22

days respectively, for doing the work of dismantling the old building near doctors’ new residence

for 12 days, for doing the paint work at USG and BMO room for 07 days and for the construction

of shelves and digging of pits etc. for about 25 days. As per Ex.RW1/G the petitioner had carried

out the works regarding the cutting of bushes surrounding the hospital premises for 08 days, 15

days and 22 days respectively, for doing the work of dismantling the old building near the doctor’s

new residence for 12 days, for construction of boundary wall work in front of doctor’s residence for

19 days, for doing the paint work at USG and BMO room for 07 days and for the construction of

shelves and digging of pits etc. for 25 days. These documents would also negate the case of the

petitioner that he had been engaged by the respondent as a daily wager.

23. Since, there is no cogent, convincing and reliable evidence on the file establishing the

relationship of employer and employee/workman in between the petitioner and the respondent,

therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are not attracted in this case. Even otherwise, if

it is assumed for the sake of arguments that the petitioner was a daily waged worker with the

respondent, it was required of him to have established on record that he had worked for 240 days or

more in a year preceding twelve calendar months from the date of his alleged termination.

24. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. The burden of proof is

on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 240 days in the preceding twelve calendar months

prior to his alleged retrenchment. The law on this issue is well settled. In R.M. Yellatty vs.

Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, it has been laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given

year.

25. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it

was required of the petitioner to establish on record that he had worked continuously for a period

240 days in a block of twelve calendar months anterior to the date of his alleged termination,

which as per the reference took place on 11-8-2013. From the details of works with respect to the

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petitioner, which is there on the file as Ex.RW1/B (also Ex.RW1/G), it becomes abundantly clear

that the petitioner had not completed 240 days of continuous work in a block of twelve calendar

months preceding the date of his retrenchment i.e. 11-8-2013 as envisaged under Section 25-B of

the Act. So is also gathered from the copy of register muster roll (attendance) placed on record by

the petitioner himself as Ex.PW1/D. Therefore, also the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are

not attracted in this case.

26. It is not the case of the petitioner that at the time of his termination any person junior to

him was retained in service by the respondent. It is also not his case that after his disengagement

new/fresh hands have been engaged by the respondent. Therefore, the provisions of Sections 25-G

and 25-H of the Act are not attracted in this case as well.

27. In all fairness, the learned counsel/Authorized Representative for the petitioner has

placed reliance upon cases titled as M/s Classic Bottle Caps (P) Ltd. vs. Usha Singh & Ors. 2012

LLR 738; Management of Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Madurai Division-1) Ltd.

Madurai vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai & Anr. 2016 LLR 736; Manorama Verma

(Smt) versus State of Bihar and Ors. 1995 SCC (L&S) 193; Pradhan Baijnath Tea Estate Mazdoor

Sangh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. 2019 LLR 1239; The Principal, Government I.T.I.,

Kollegal-571440 vs. R. Hema Kumar and Anr. 2016 LLR 360 and Sudarshan Rajpoot vs. U.P. State

Road Transport Corporation 2015 LLR 95. I have carefully gone through the aforesaid case law

cited by the learned counsel/Authorized Representative for the petitioner and I am of the view that

for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, the petitioner cannot derive any advantage from what has

been decided in these cases.

28. Hence, both these issues are answered in the negative and decided against the

petitioner.

Issue No. 3 :

29 Taking into account my findings on issues No. 1 and 2 above, it is held that neither the

petitioner has the cause of action nor the locus standi to sue. The claim petition is not maintainable

in the present form. The same is frivolous and vexatious. The claim petition has been instituted by

the petitioner with a malafide intention to derive undue advantage(s). This issue is answered in the

affirmative and decided in favour of the respondent.

Relief :

30. As a sequel to my findings on the various issues above, the present claim petition being

meritless, not maintainable and malafide, fails. It is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.

The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate

Government for publication in the official gazette. File after due completion be consigned to the

Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 19th day of April, 2021.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge, Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 232/2015

Date of Institution

: 09-6-2015

Date of Decision

: 23-4-2021

Shri Abhey Ram s/o Shri Ishru Ram, r/o Village Bhosh, P.O. Haripur, Tehsil Manali,

District Kullu, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Managing Director, The Lahoul Potato Growers Coop-Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited, Manali, District Kullu, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N.L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Rajat Chaudhary, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Arvind Kapoor, Adv.

AWARD

The below given reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the termination of the services of Shri Abhey Ram s/o Shri Ishru Ram, r/o Village

Bhosh, P.O. Haripur, Tehsil Manali, District Kullu, H.P. by the Managing Director, The

Lahoul Potato Growers Coop-Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited, Manali, District

Kullu, H.P. vide letter dated 19-07-2013 (Copy enclosed) on the basis of domestic inquiry

and without affording adequate/sufficient opportunities in the domestic enquiry, as alleged

by the worker, is proper and justified? If not, what relief of consequential benefits, amount

of back compensation the above aggrieved worker is entitled to from the above employer?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as set out in the statement of claim is that his services were

engaged as a clerk on daily waged basis by the respondent w.e.f. 01-8-1995 against the vacant post

of clerk. He had continuously worked in the said post uptil 21-4-1999. During this period, he was

being given one or two days break after every three months. However, he had been completing 240

days during the aforesaid period. His services along-with those of nine other workmen were orally

terminated on 22-4-1999 by the management. An industrial dispute was raised against the

management by the petitioner and Reference No. 65/2007 was decided in his favour by this Court

on 29-11-2010. As per the Award passed in the aforesaid reference, the petitioner was re-engaged

by the management on 1-4-2011. He was also paid Rs. 25,000/- as compensation. Thereafter, he

had continued to work uptil 26-5-2011 to the satisfaction of the management. He was transferred by

the respondent from Manali to Karga, where he had joined his duty in the month of June, 2011.

But, he was again transferred from Karga to 15 Miles (Kullu) on 11-10-2011. He had joined the

duty there on 11-11-2011. He was again transferred back to Karga by the respondent on 5-6-2012.

He then had submitted a representation dated 7-6-2012 to the respondent with a request to cancel

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his transfer due to his family problem. His request was not accepted and an explanation of his was

called for. He responded to the explanation by filing a reply. However, on 14-6-2012 vide a letter

he was informed by the respondent that his reply was not satisfactory and he had been asked to join

at Karga within two days. But before the expiry of two days, he was suspended on 5-6-2012 by the

respondent. He thereafter was charge-sheeted on 25-6-2012. Regular employees working with the

respondent were never transferred from Manali to Karga. He had only been transferred to

victimize/harass him on account of union activities. Assistant Registrar, Coop Societies was

appointed as an inquiry officer by the respondent. He could not have been appointed as an inquiry

officer, being against the rules of the society as well as against the Model Standing Order Act,

1946. At the time of inquiry no list of witnesses were provided nor any presenting officer had

appeared on behalf of the respondent before the inquiry officer. The inquiry was held only for a day

and the report was submitted to the respondent. The charges leveled against the petitioner were not

proved. The petitioner is an office bearer of union i.e. LPS Dainik Wetan Bhogi Karamchari Sangh

and the union had already raised a general demand charter before the respondent vide demand

notice dated 11-6-2012. During the pendency of such industrial dispute before the labour

authorities, the respondent had passed the dismissal order of the petitioner on 19-7-2013. Such act

of the respondent is against the principles of natural justice. At the time of termination of the

services of the petitioner the respondent had not paid one month pay in lieu of the notice period to

the petitioner and had also not obtained permission from the labour authorities under Section

33-2(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). The act

of the respondent to time and again transfer the petitioner from one place to another amounted to

unfair labour practice. The act of the respondent to terminate the petitioner is unjustified, arbitrary,

illegal, unconstitutional and against the mandatory provisions of the Act. Hence, the present

petition for setting aside and quashing the termination order dated 19-7-2013 and for issuing

directions for the re-engagement of the petitioner along-with back wages and all other

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability, cause of action, estoppel, jurisdiction and that the petition is bad

for non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties. The contents of the petition were denied on merits.

However, the working of the petitioner with the respondent was admitted. It was specifically denied

that the petitioner had completed 240 days or more. The petitioner had not worked to the

satisfaction of the management. He was found to be guilty of misconduct and other irregularities

during his service. Only after a proper investigation as per the norms and principles of natural

justice, the petitioner had been dismissed. The petitioner had been transferred in a routine manner

and as per the requirements. The workmen are transferred in public interest due to administrative

exigencies, work load and also in the interest of the society. The personal interest of the worker is

not above the interest of the society, for which every employee, whether regular or daily wage

works. An employee cannot be allowed to serve as per his choice. The regular employees are also

transferred as per the exigency and needs of the society. Whatever action had been taken, it was

taken within the four corners of law. No objection had been raised nor any appeal/revision had been

preferred by the petitioner against any order. Full opportunities had been afforded to the petitioner

at the time of inquiry conducted against him. Whatever action was taken was as per the principles

of natural justice and as per law. The alleged union being unregistered and unrecognized, was

having no legal value. Maximum demands raised by the employees had been accepted. The

petitioner had been found guilty of willful absence from duty, misconduct, disobedience and

negligence. He had also misappropriated the money of the society. Recovery proceedings are

pending against him before the Collector. By denying the other allegations, it has been prayed by

the respondent that the petition be dismissed.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the reply

and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

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5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for determination

and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 29-3-2016:

1.

Whether termination of services of petitioner by the respondent vide letter dated 19-07-

2013 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

. .OPR.

4.

Whether claim petition is bad for mis-joinder of necessary party as alleged?

. .OPR.

5.

Whether the petitioner has no cause of action to file the present case as alleged?. .OPR.

6.

Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing claim petition by his act and conduct as

alleged. If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

7.

Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present claim as alleged?

. .OPR.

8.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the list were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed.

8.

Oral arguments of the learned counsel/Authorized Representative for the petitioner and

the learned counsel for the respondent heard and records gone through. Written arguments filed by

both the parties have also been gone through by me.

9.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Yes

Issue No. 2

: Re-engagement with seniority and continuity in service from

the date of his illegal termination with 50% back wages.

Issue No. 3

: Negative

Issue No. 4

: Negative

Issue No. 5

: Negative

Issue No. 6

: Negative

Issue No. 7

: Negative

Issue No. 8 (Relief)

: Petition allowed as per the operative part of the Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

9.

All these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

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10. It is the admitted case of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged as

a daily waged clerk and he had worked as such uptil 21-4-1999. Admittedly, the services of the

petitioner were earlier terminated by the respondent orally on dated 22-4-1999, which was set aside

by this Court vide Award dated November 29, 2010 passed in Reference No. 65/2007, titled as

Shri Abhey Ram vs. The Managing Director, M/s Lahoul Potato Growers Co-operative Marketing-

cum-Processing Society Ltd., Manali, District Kullu, H.P. and another. The operative part of the

Award of this Court is reproduced below in verbatim for ready reference:

“The termination of the petitioner is set aside and quashed. The respondents are directed to

re-engage the petitioner forthwith. He is entitled to continuity and seniority in service from the date

of his illegal termination. The petitioner is also entitled to Rs. 25,000/- as lump sum compensation

in lieu of back wages. The reference is answered in the following terms”.

11. There is no denial of the fact that pursuant to the Award dated 29-11-2010, copy of

which is placed on record as Ex.RW1/F, passed by this Court, the services of the petitioner were re-

engaged and he was also paid Rs. 25,000/- as compensation. The parties are not at variance that the

services of the petitioner again came to be terminated on 19-7-2013 vide letter dated 19-7-2013

(Ex.R20).

12. Per the respondent the action was initiated against the petitioner in pursuance to a

disciplinary inquiry ordered against the petitioner for act of misconduct. As a sequel thereto an

inquiry had been ordered against the petitioner. Per the respondent initially a show cause notice was

issued to the petitioner and thereupon an office memorandum vide Ex.R15 along-with articles of

charge had been initiated against the petitioner. A proper inquiry was initiated thereto and an

inquiry report Ex.R17 had been submitted by the Inquiry Officer. The respondent contends that due

opportunity was granted to the petitioner and he had participated in the inquiry proceedings and

consequently the Inquiry Officer had submitted his report. On examination of the available record

submitted along-with the inquiry report, it had been established that the petitioner was guilty of

misconduct.

13. On the other hand, it is the case of the petitioner that no proper inquiry had been

conducted. Only in one day the inquiry had been conducted and the Inquiry Officer had sent the

report to the respondent. The articles of charge leveled against the petitioner were not proved. It is

further the case of the petitioner that neither he was heard nor any inquiry report was supplied to

him. In support of his case, the petitioner examined himself as PW1 and filed his affidavit in

evidence, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit he reiterated the contents of his

statement of claim.

14. The respondent examined himself as RW1. Apart from deposing that the employees/

workers are transferred from one place to other in the public interest, due to administrative

exigencies, work load and in the interest of society, he deposed that the petitioner had also been

transferred as per the requirement and in a routine manner. The inquiry proceedings were initiated

against the petitioner within the four corners of law. No objection was ever raised nor any appeal

had been preferred against any order before the competent authority by the petitioner. Full

opportunities had been provided to the petitioner in the inquiry proceedings and the action had been

taken against the petitioner as per the principles of natural justice. This witness has, however,

conceded that as per the report the allegations were found to be baseless against the petitioner. He

was also categorical that the petitioner had performed his duties honestly and that he had completed

240 days in each year.

15. The case of the respondent is that due inquiry had been conducted and thereupon the

disciplinary authority had decided to terminate the services of the petitioner.

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16. I have carefully perused the inquiry report (Ex.R17). The perusal of the said report

shows that the Inquiry Officer infact had not conducted any inquiry worth the name. After the

petitioner having put in appearance and on examination of letter dated 14-6-2012 addressed to the

petitioner (Ex.R12), the Inquiry Officer finally came to the conclusion that the order dated

15.6.2012 of suspension of the petitioner was biased and not legitimate. It is a cardinal principle of

law and by now well settled that the domestic inquiry must conform to the basic requirement of

natural justice, and one of the essential requisites of a proceeding of this character is that when the

inquiry is over, the Inquiry Officer must consider the evidence and record the conclusion and

reasons thereof. The Inquiry Officer need not right a very long or an elaborate report; but, since his

findings are likely to lead to dismissal, it is his duty to record clearly and precisely his conclusion

and the reasons for reaching to such a conclusion. The reason of following such a procedure is

primarily to enable the Court to decide whether the approach adopted by the Inquiry Officer was

erroneous or not and whether his conclusion was perverse or not. No such exercise worth the name

was conducted by the Inquiry Officer. These basic principles are to be scrupulously followed and

have not even been remotely taken care of by the Inquiry Officer. Even otherwise, the Inquiry

Officer as per his report had not found the petitioner to be guilty of any misconduct. Strangely, the

disciplinary authority had found the petitioner to be guilty of misconduct. How the disciplinary

authority came to this conclusion is difficult to fathom.

17. Not only this, the disciplinary authority in its wisdom had decided to terminate the

services of the petitioner. Even on the proposed penalty, which admittedly was a major penalty, no

show cause was issued to the petitioner. It again was a total non-compliance of the basic principle

of natural justice and the statutory requirement of a domestic inquiry. The petitioner has a right to

be heard before the imposition of penalty by the disciplinary authority, which has not been

complied with by the respondent. It assumes significance because of the fact that the Inquiry

Officer has not even returned any findings against the articles of charge on which the inquiry had

been initiated. It was merely recorded in the report that the order amounted to favoritism and was

not lawful.

18. The learned counsel for the respondent further contends that even if the inquiry was

defective, the gravity of the misconduct can be gone into by this Court at this stage. There is no

dispute on the aforesaid preposition of law. A person can undoubtedly be terminated for willful

absence. However, the termination has to abide by the principles of natural justice, which are an

integral part of the procedure vis-a-vis a domestic inquiry. In the case on hand, there was in fact

no inquiry which was conducted by the Inquiry Officer nor any record had been placed before him.

The Inquiry Officer even never thought of deliberating upon the same to come to some conclusion.

The Inquiry Officer was to return findings on each article of charge framed against the petitioner.

How and under what circumstances the disciplinary authority came to a conclusion to impose a

major penalty is not decipherable either from the inquiry report as the Inquiry Officer had not even

bothered to refer to the list of documents attached with articles of charge issued to the petitioner to

hold that the petitioner was willfully absent from duty, had committed willful insubordination or

disobedience of any lawful or reasonable order of the management or of a superior and was also

negligent in performing his duty. That apart, as is clear, the said documents were not even placed

before the Inquiry Officer as is apparent from his report Ex.R17. In these circumstances how the

disciplinary authority came to these conclusions is beyond comprehension.

19. As a sequel to the discussion held hereinabove, it is to be held that no proper inquiry

was held by the respondent while terminating the services of the petitioner. In fact no inquiry had

been held by the respondent before dispensing with the services of the petitioner. No doubt,

sufficiency of evidence in proof of the findings by an Inquiry Officer is beyond the scrutiny of the

Courts, but in the present case the inquiry itself was a sham. In fact no inquiry was conducted. The

disciplinary authority came to the conclusion on the basis of its own knowledge. Such inquiry is not

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sustainable in the eyes of law. It is against all the canons of natural justice. No doubt, the

respondent has placed on record the Rules, copy of which is Ex.R1/A, to show as to what are the

rules governing the removal from service, but as per the findings arrived at by me above, the

findings of the disciplinary authority and the Inquiry Officer are illegal. The same are liable to be

quashed and set aside and it is ordered accordingly. The disengagement of the petitioner from the

services w.e.f. 19-7-2013 is thus held to be improper and unjustified.

20. In the statement of claim it has specifically been asserted by the petitioner that he is not

gainfully employed from the date of his illegal termination. In his oral statement by way of

affidavit on oath, the petitioner specifically took the stand that he was not gainfully employed since

his disengagement. This is sufficient evidence by a workman to prove his “non gainful

employment”. In this behalf support can ably be drawn from the judgment of our Hon’ble High

Court titled Pradhan Baijnath Tea Estate Majdoor Sangh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.

(2019 LLR 1239). Therefore, the burden shifted upon the respondent to contradict the statement of

the petitioner by leading cogent, ocular or documentary evidence to prove his gainful employment.

Strangely enough so has not been done by the respondent. It has neither been pleaded nor proved

on record by the respondent that the petitioner was gainfully employed during the period of

litigation after his termination. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manorma Verma (Smt.) vs. State of

Bihar & Ors., 1995 Supreme Court Cases (L&S) 193 has held that once termination is found to be

illegal consequential order of grant of back wages must follow unless there are reasons justifying a

departure from normal order. The Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Triveni Engineering and

Industries Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and Ors. 2020 LLR 944 has held that the termination of services

without holding a fair and proper inquiry is illegal attracting reinstatement with back wages.

21. Strangely, the respondent has raised a plea at the time of arguments that since the

engagement of the petitioner dehors the appointment rules and is a back door entry, he is not

entitled to any relief. Reliance was placed upon the case titled as Vijay Sood vs. Central University

of HP, Dharamshala & Connected Matter 2106 (1) Him L.R. (DB) 457. The aforesaid plea in fact

has not been raised in the reply filed by the respondent. It has also not been raised by the Managing

Director who has appeared as RW1. Even otherwise, the appointment of the petitioner was on daily

waged basis. It had been made after the concurrence of the Board of Directors. The initial

engagement, thus, also cannot be said to be in violation of any rule, as none but the Board of

Directors had agreed to appoint the petitioner. Since the respondent has failed to prove that the

appointment of the petitioner was against the recruitment rules of the society, the ratio laid down

our Hon’ble High Court in Vijay Sood’s case (supra) does not come to the rescue of the

respondent.

22. A plea was also raised by the respondent that as all the relief(s) claimed in the present

petition have already been awarded to the petitioner in an earlier Award dated 27-10-2017, the

present petition is not maintainable. This cannot be accepted. Copy of Award dated 27-10-2017

passed in Reference No.157/2017 titled as LPS Dainik Wetan Bhogi Karamchari Sangh, Manali,

District Kullu through its President vs. The Managing Director, The Lahoul Potato Growers Coop-

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited, Manali, District Kullu, H.P. has been placed on record

as Ex.R24. Its perusal reveal that the respondent therein had been directed to regularize the services

of all the twenty two daily waged workmen of claimant/petitioner/union who had completed ten

years of regular service. It was also held that after regularization of the services of the members of

claimant-petitioner they shall be entitled to revised pay scales along-with grade pay, dearness

allowance and other allowances payable to similarly situated employees of the respondent. It is not

disputed that the present petitioner is also a member of the aforesaid union. But, this is a case filed

by the petitioner for his illegal termination from service by the respondent vide letter dated 19-7-

2013. So, the relief claimed in the present petition by no stretch of imagination can be said to be

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similar to that claimed in the earlier reference. Hence, this plea raised by the respondent is also

negated.

23. In all fairness, the learned counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance upon

cases titled as Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan vs. Damodar Prasad Pandey & Ors. AIR 2004 SC

4850 and Mihir Kumar Hazara Chaoudhury vs. Life Insurance Corpn. and Anr. JT2017 (9) SC 24.

I have carefully gone through the aforesaid case law cited by the learned counsel for the respondent

and I am of the view that for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, the respondent cannot derive any

advantage from what has been decided in these cases.

24. Though, the petitioner has discharged his initial onus of proving that he was not

gainfully employed during the period of his forced idleness, but it was humbly submitted by the

learned counsel for the respondent at the time of arguments that the financial health of the society

these days is dismal. This fact was not opposed by the opposite party. So, I do not think it just and

proper to award full back wages to the petitioner. Hence, he is held to be entitled to 50% back

wages from the date of his illegal termination till the date of his reinstatement.

25. Hence, issues No. 1 and 2 are answered in the affirmative and are decided in favour of

the petitioner while issue No. 3 is answered in the negative and is decided against the respondent.

Issue No.4 :

26. Nothing has been brought to my notice as to how and why the petition is bad for mis-

joinder of parties. This issue is answered in the negative and is decided against the respondent.

Issue No. 5 :

27. In view of my finds on issues No. 1 and 2 above in the affirmative, it crystal clear that

the petitioner does have the cause of action to file and maintain the present petition. Hence, this

issue is answered in the negative and is decided against the respondent.

Issue No.6 :

28. No evidence of estoppel has been led by the respondent. Moreover, this issue was not

pressed for at the time of arguments by the learned counsel for the respondent. Hence, this issue is

answered in the negative and is decided against the respondent.

Issue No. 7 :

29. It was contended for the respondent that this Court has no jurisdiction to try and

entertain the petition, as the petitioner was a daily waged employee of the society. This cannot be

accepted. It has been laid down by our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled as The Palampur Co-

operative Marketing and Consumer Federation Limited vs. State of H.P. and Ors., Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 713, that the Industrial Tribunal has the authority, power and jurisdiction to entertain and

decide the reference made to it with respect to the employees of the Co-operative Societies. Hence,

this issue is answered in the negative and is decided against the respondent.

Relief :

30. As a sequel to my findings on issues above, the instant claim petition succeeds and is

allowed. The termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent as per office order/letter

dated 19-7-2013 is set aside and quashed. The respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner

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forthwith. He shall be entitled to seniority and continuity in service from the date of his illegal

termination. He shall also be entitled to 50% back wages from the date of his illegal termination till

the date of his reinstatement. However, it is made clear that in case the respondent decides to

proceed against the petitioner for his insubordination, willful absence, negligence and dereliction of

duty, this Award will not come in his way. In such a situation, the respondent will be entitled to

proceed with the inquiry and take appropriate action against the petitioner as per law. Parties to

bear their own costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be

sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the record room.

Announced in the open Court today this 23rd day of April, 2021.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge, Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 264/2015

Date of Institution

: 27-6-2015

Date of Decision

: 23-4-2021

Shri Rajan Sharma s/o Shri Prem Lal, r/o Village and Post Office Kalath, Tehsil Manali,

District Kullu, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

The Managing Director, The Lahoul Potato Gorwers Coop-Marketing-cum-Processing

Society Limited, Manali, District Kullu, H.P.

. .Respondent.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. N. L. Kaundal, AR

: Sh. Rajat Chaudhary, Adv.

For the Respondent

: Sh. Arvind Kapoor, Adv.

AWARD

The below given reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether the termination of the services of Shri Rajan Sharma s/o Shri Prem Lal, r/o

Village and Post Office Kalath, Tehsil Manali, District Kullu, H.P. by the Managing

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Director, The Lahoul Potato Growers Coop-Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited,

Manali, District Kullu, H.P. vide letter dated 19-07-2013 (Copy enclosed) on the basis of

domestic inquiry and without affording adequate/sufficient opportunities in the domestic

enquiry, as alleged by the worker, is proper and justified? If not, what relief of

consequential benefits, amount of back compensation the above aggrieved worker is entitled

to from the above employer?”

2.

The case of the petitioner as set out in the statement of claim is that his services were

engaged as a clerk on daily waged basis by the respondent w.e.f. 01-8-1995 against the vacant post

of clerk. He had continuously worked in the said post uptil 7-8-1999. During this period, he was

being given one or two days break after every three months. However, he had been completing 240

days during the aforesaid period. His services along-with those of nine other workmen were orally

terminated on 8-8-1999 by the management. An industrial dispute was raised against the

management by the petitioner and Reference No. 64/2007 was decided in his favour by this Court

on 29-11-2010. As per the Award passed in the aforesaid reference, the petitioner was re-engaged

by the management on 1-4-2011. He was also paid Rs.25,000/- as compensation. Thereafter, he had

continued to work uptil 26-5-2011 to the satisfaction of the management. He was transferred by the

respondent from Manali to Karga, where he had joined his duty in the month of June, 2011. But, he

was again transferred from Karga to 15 Miles (Kullu) on 11-10-2011. He had joined the duty there

on 11-11-2011. He then had submitted a representation to the respondent for reconsideration. His

request was not accepted and vide letter dated 13-6-2012 he was directed to report on duty at Karga

forthwith, failing which disciplinary action would be taken against him. On the very next day i.e.

14-6-2012 vide a letter he was informed by the respondent that he had disobeyed the orders of

office. Sufficient time was not given to the petitioner to comply the orders vide letter dated

13-6-2012 and 14-6-2012. He was then suspended vide letter dated 18-6-2012. He thereafter was

charge-sheeted on 26-6-2012. Regular employees working with the respondent were never

transferred from Manali to Karga. He had only been transferred to victimize/harass him on account

of union activities. Assistant Registrar, Coop Societies was appointed as an inquiry officer by the

respondent. He could not have been appointed as an inquiry officer, being against the rules of the

society as well as against the Model Standing Order Act, 1946. At the time of inquiry no list of

witnesses were provided nor any presenting officer had appeared on behalf of the respondent before

the inquiry officer. The inquiry was held only for a day and the report was submitted to the

respondent. The charges leveled against the petitioner were not proved. The petitioner is an office

bearer of union i.e. LPS Dainik Wetan Bhogi Karamchari Sangh and the union had already raised a

general demand charter before the respondent vide demand notice dated 11-6-2012. During the

pendency of such industrial dispute before the labour authorities, the respondent had passed the

dismissal order of the petitioner on 19-7-2013. Such act of the respondent is against the principles

of natural justice. At the time of termination of the services of the petitioner the respondent had not

paid one month pay in lieu of the notice period to the petitioner and had also not obtained

permission from the labour authorities under Section 33-2(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). The act of the respondent to time and again transfer

the petitioner from one place to another amounted to unfair labour practice. The act of the

respondent to terminate the petitioner is unjustified, arbitrary, illegal, unconstitutional and against

the mandatory provisions of the Act. Hence, the present petition for setting aside and quashing the

termination order dated 19-7-2013 and for issuing directions for the re-engagement of the petitioner

along-with back wages and all other consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondent appeared. He filed a reply taking preliminary objections

regarding lack of maintainability, cause of action, estoppel, jurisdiction and that the petition is bad

for non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties. The contents of the petition were denied on merits.

However, the working of the petitioner with the respondent was admitted. It was specifically denied

that the petitioner had completed 240 days or more. The petitioner had not worked to the

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satisfaction of the management. He was found to be guilty of misconduct and other irregularities

during his service. Only after a proper investigation as per the norms and principles of natural

justice, the petitioner had been dismissed. The petitioner had been transferred in a routine manner

and as per the requirements. The workmen are transferred in public interest due to administrative

exigencies, work load and also in the interest of the society. The personal interest of the worker is

not above the interest of the society, for which every employee, whether regular or daily wage

works. An employee cannot be allowed to serve as per his choice. The regular employees are also

transferred as per the exigency and needs of the society. Whatever action had been taken, it was

taken within the four corners of law. No objection had been raised nor any appeal/revision had been

preferred by the petitioner against any order. Full opportunities had been afforded to the petitioner

at the time of inquiry conducted against him. Whatever action was taken was as per the principles

of natural justice and as per law. The alleged union being unregistered and unrecognized, was

having no legal value. Maximum demands raised by the employees had been accepted. The

petitioner had been found guilty of willful absence from duty, misconduct, disobedience and

negligence. He had also misappropriated the money of the society. Recovery proceedings are

pending against him before the Collector. By denying the other allegations, it has been prayed by

the respondent that the petition be dismissed.

4.

While filing the rejoinder the petitioner controverted the averments made in the reply

and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for determination

and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 29-3-2016:

1.

Whether termination of services of petitioner by the respondent vide letter dated

19-07-2013 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form?

. .OPR.

4.

Whether claim petition is bad for mis-joinder of necessary party as alleged?

. .OPR.

5.

Whether the petitioner has no cause of action to file the present case as alleged?. .OPR.

6.

Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing claim petition by his act and conduct as

alleged. If so, its effect?

. .OPR.

7.

Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present claim as alleged?. .OPR.

8.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the list were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed.

7.

Oral arguments of the learned counsel/Authorized Representative for the petitioner and

the learned counsel for the respondent heard and records gone through. Written arguments filed by

both the parties have also been gone through by me.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Yes

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Issue No. 2

: Re-engagement with seniority and continuity in

service from the date of his illegal termination with

50% back wages.

Issue No. 3

: Negative

Issue No. 4

: Negative

Issue No. 5

: Negative

Issue No. 6

: Negative

Issue No. 7

: Negative

Issue No. 8 (Relief)

: Petition allowed as per the operative part of the

Award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

9.

All these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. It is the admitted case of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged as

a daily waged clerk and he had worked as such uptil 7-8-1999. Admittedly, the services of the

petitioner were earlier terminated by the respondent orally on dated 8-8-1999, which was set

aside by this Court vide Award dated November 29,2010 passed in Reference No.64/2007, titled

as Shri Rajan Sharma vs. The Managing Director, M/s Lahoul Potato Growers Co-operative

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Ltd., Manali, District Kullu, H.P. and another. The operative

part of the Award of this Court is reproduced below in verbatim for ready reference:

“The termination of the petitioner is set aside and quashed. The respondents are directed to

re-engage the petitioner forthwith. He is entitled to continuity and seniority in service from the date

of his illegal termination. The petitioner is also entitled to Rs. 25,000/- as lump sum compensation

in lieu of back wages. The reference is answered in the following terms”.

11. There is no denial of the fact that pursuant to the Award dated 29-11-2010, copy of

which is placed on record as Ex.RW1/F, passed by this Court, the services of the petitioner were re-

engaged and he was also paid Rs. 25,000/- as compensation. The parties are not at variance that the

services of the petitioner again came to be terminated on 19-7-2013 vide letter dated 19-7-2013

(Ex.R18).

12. Per the respondent the action was initiated against the petitioner in pursuance to a

disciplinary inquiry ordered against the petitioner for act of misconduct. As a sequel thereto an

inquiry had been ordered against the petitioner. Per the respondent initially a show cause notice was

issued to the petitioner and thereupon an office memorandum vide Ex.R13 along-with articles of

charge had been initiated against the petitioner. A proper inquiry was initiated thereto and an

inquiry report Ex.R15 had been submitted by the Inquiry Officer. The respondent contends that due

opportunity was granted to the petitioner and he had participated in the inquiry proceedings and

consequently the Inquiry Officer had submitted his report. On examination of the available record

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submitted along-with the inquiry report, it had been established that the petitioner was guilty of

misconduct.

13. On the other hand, it is the case of the petitioner that no proper inquiry had been

conducted. Only in one day the inquiry had been conducted and the Inquiry Officer had sent the

report to the respondent. The articles of charge leveled against the petitioner were not proved. It is

further the case of the petitioner that neither he was heard nor any inquiry report was supplied to

him. In support of his case, the petitioner examined himself as PW1 and filed his affidavit in

evidence, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit he reiterated the contents of his

statement of claim.

14. The respondent examined himself as RW1. Apart from deposing that the employees/

workers are transferred from one place to other in the public interest, due to administrative

exigencies, work load and in the interest of society, he deposed that the petitioner had also been

transferred as per the requirement and in a routine manner. The inquiry proceedings were initiated

against the petitioner within the four corners of law. No objection was ever raised nor any appeal

had been preferred against any order before the competent authority by the petitioner. Full

opportunities had been provided to the petitioner in the inquiry proceedings and the action had been

taken against the petitioner as per the principles of natural justice. This witness has, however,

conceded that as per the report the allegations were found to be baseless against the petitioner. He

was also categorical that the petitioner had performed his duties honestly and that he had completed

240 days in each year.

15. The case of the respondent is that due inquiry had been conducted and thereupon the

disciplinary authority had decided to terminate the services of the petitioner.

16. I have carefully perused the inquiry report (Ex.R15). The perusal of the said report

shows that the Inquiry Officer in fact had not conducted any inquiry worth the name. It is a cardinal

principle of law and by now well settled that the domestic inquiry must conform to the basic

requirement of natural justice, and one of the essential requisites of a proceeding of this character is

that when the inquiry is over, the Inquiry Officer must consider the evidence and record the

conclusion and reasons thereof. The Inquiry Officer need not right a very long or an elaborate

report; but, since his findings are likely to lead to dismissal, it is his duty to record clearly and

precisely his conclusion and the reasons for reaching to such a conclusion. The reason of following

such a procedure is primarily to enable the Court to decide whether the approach adopted by the

Inquiry Officer was erroneous or not and whether his conclusion was perverse or not. No such

exercise worth the name was conducted by the Inquiry Officer. These basic principles are to be

scrupulously followed and have not even been remotely taken care of by the Inquiry Officer. Even

otherwise, the Inquiry Officer as per his report had not found the petitioner to be guilty of any

misconduct. Strangely, the disciplinary authority had found the petitioner to be guilty of

misconduct. How the disciplinary authority came to this conclusion is difficult to fathom.

17. Not only this, the disciplinary authority in its wisdom had decided to terminate the

services of the petitioner. Even on the proposed penalty, which admittedly was a major penalty, no

show cause was issued to the petitioner. It again was a total non-compliance of the basic principles

of natural justice and the statutory requirement of a domestic inquiry. The petitioner has a right to

be heard before the imposition of penalty by the disciplinary authority, which has not been

complied with by the respondent. It assumes significance because of the fact that the Inquiry

Officer has not even returned any findings against the articles of charge on which the inquiry had

been initiated.

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18. The learned counsel for the respondent further contends that even if the inquiry was

defective, the gravity of the misconduct can be gone into by this Court at this stage. There is no

dispute on the aforesaid preposition of law. A person can undoubtedly be terminated for willful

absence. However, the termination has to abide by the principles of natural justice, which are an

integral part of the procedure vis-a-vis a domestic inquiry. In the case on hand, there was in fact no

inquiry which was conducted by the Inquiry Officer nor any record had been placed before him.

The Inquiry Officer even never thought of deliberating upon the same to come to some conclusion.

The Inquiry Officer was to return findings on each article of charge framed against the petitioner.

How and under what circumstances the disciplinary authority came to a conclusion to impose a

major penalty is not decipherable either from the inquiry report as the Inquiry Officer had not even

bothered to refer to the list of documents attached with articles of charge issued to the petitioner to

hold that the petitioner was willfully absent from duty, had committed willful insubordination or

disobedience of any lawful or reasonable order of the management or of a superior and was also

negligent in performing his duty. That apart, as is clear, the said documents were not even placed

before the Inquiry Officer as is apparent from his report Ex.R15. In these circumstances how the

disciplinary authority came to these conclusions is beyond comprehension.

19. As a sequel to the discussion held hereinabove, it is to be held that no proper inquiry

was held by the respondent while terminating the services of the petitioner. In fact no inquiry had

been held by the respondent before dispensing with the services of the petitioner. No doubt,

sufficiency of evidence in proof of the findings by an Inquiry Officer is beyond the scrutiny of the

Courts, but in the present case the inquiry itself was a sham. In fact no inquiry was conducted. The

disciplinary authority came to the conclusion on the basis of its own knowledge. Such inquiry is not

sustainable in the eyes of law. It is against all the canons of natural justice. No doubt, the

respondent has placed on record the Rules, copy of which is Ex.R1/A, to show as to what are the

rules governing the removal from service, but as per the findings arrived at by me above, the

findings of the disciplinary authority and the Inquiry Officer are illegal. The same are liable to be

quashed and set aside and it is ordered accordingly. The disengagement of the petitioner from the

services w.e.f. 19-7-2013 is thus held to be improper and unjustified.

20. In the statement of claim it has specifically been asserted by the petitioner that he is not

gainfully employed from the date of his illegal termination. In his oral statement by way of

affidavit on oath, the petitioner specifically took the stand that he was not gainfully employed since

his disengagement. This is sufficient evidence by a workman to prove his “non gainful

employment”. In this behalf support can ably be drawn from the judgment of our Hon’ble High

Court titled Pradhan Baijnath Tea Estate Majdoor Sangh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.

(2019 LLR 1239). Therefore, the burden shifted upon the respondent to contradict the statement of

the petitioner by leading cogent, ocular or documentary evidence to prove his gainful employment.

Strangely enough so has not been done by the respondent. It has neither been pleaded nor proved

on record by the respondent that the petitioner was gainfully employed during the period of

litigation after his termination. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manorma Verma (Smt.) vs. State of

Bihar & Ors., 1995 Supreme Court Cases (L&S) 193 has held that once termination is found to be

illegal consequential order of grant of back wages must follow unless there are reasons justifying a

departure from normal order. The Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Triveni Engineering and

Industries Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and Ors. 2020 LLR 944 has held that the termination of services

without holding a fair and proper inquiry is illegal attracting reinstatement with back wages.

21. Strangely, the respondent has raised a plea at the time of arguments that since the

engagement of the petitioner dehors the appointment rules and is a back door entry, he is not

entitled to any relief. Reliance was placed upon the case titled as Vijay Sood vs. Central University

of HP, Dharamshala & Connected Matter 2106 (1) Him L.R. (DB) 457. The aforesaid plea in fact

has not been raised in the reply filed by the respondent. It has also not been raised by the Managing

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Director who has appeared as RW1. Even otherwise, the appointment of the petitioner was on daily

waged basis. It had been made after the concurrence of the Board of Directors. The initial

engagement, thus, also cannot be said to be in violation of any rule, as none but the Board of

Directors had agreed to appoint the petitioner. Since the respondent has failed to prove that the

appointment of the petitioner was against the recruitment rules of the society, the ratio laid by our

Hon’ble High Court in Vijay Sood’s case (supra) does not come to the rescue of the respondent.

22. A plea was also raised by the respondent that as all the relief(s) claimed in the present

petition have already been awarded to the petitioner in an earlier Award dated 27-10-2017, the

present petition is not maintainable. This cannot be accepted. Copy of Award dated 27-10-2017

passed in Reference No.157/2017 titled as LPS Dainik Wetan Bhogi Karamchari Sangh, Manali,

District Kullu through its President vs. The Managing Director, The Lahoul Potato Growers Coop-

Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited, Manali, District Kullu, H.P. has been placed on record

as Ex.R23. Its perusal reveal that the respondent therein had been directed to regularize the services

of all the twenty two daily waged workmen of claimant/petitioner/union who had completed ten

years of regular service. It was also held that after regularization of the services of the members of

claimant-petitioner they shall be entitled to revised pay scales along-with grade pay, dearness

allowance and other allowances payable to similarly situated employees of the respondent. It is not

disputed that the present petitioner is also a member of the aforesaid union. But, this is a case filed

by the petitioner for his illegal termination from service by the respondent vide letter dated

19-7-2013. So, the relief claimed in the present petition by no stretch of imagination can be said to

be similar to that claimed in the earlier reference. Hence, this plea raised by the respondent is also

negated.

23. In all fairness, the learned counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance upon

cases titled as Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan vs. Damodar Prasad Pandey & Ors. AIR 2004 SC

4850 and Mihir Kumar Hazara Chaoudhury vs. Life Insurance Corpn. and Anr. JT2017 (9) SC 24.

I have carefully gone through the aforesaid case law cited by the learned counsel for the respondent

and I am of the view that for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, the respondent cannot derive any

advantage from what has been decided in these cases.

24. Though, the petitioner has discharged his initial onus of proving that he was not

gainfully employed during the period of his forced idleness, but it was humbly submitted by the

learned counsel for the respondent at the time of arguments that the financial health of the society

these days is dismal. This fact was not opposed by the opposite party. So, I do not think it just and

proper to award full back wages to the petitioner. Hence, he is held to be entitled to 50% back

wages from the date of his illegal termination till the date of his reinstatement.

25. Hence, issues No. 1 and 2 are answered in the affirmative and are decided in favour of

the petitioner while issue No. 3 is answered in the negative and is decided against the respondent.

Issue No. 4 :

26. Nothing has been brought to my notice as to how and why the petition is bad for mis-

joinder of parties. This issue is answered in the negative and is decided against the respondent.

Issue No.5 :

27. In view of my finds on issues No. 1 and 2 above in the affirmative, it crystal clear that

the petitioner does have the cause of action to file and maintain the present petition. Hence, this

issue is answered in the negative and is decided against the respondent.

Issue No.6 :

28. No evidence of estoppel has been led by the respondent. Moreover, this issue was not

pressed for at the time of arguments by the learned counsel for the respondent. Hence, this issue is

answered in the negative and is decided against the respondent.

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Issue No. 7 :

29. It was contended for the respondent that this Court has no jurisdiction to try and

entertain the petition, as the petitioner was a daily waged employee of the society. This cannot be

accepted. It has been laid down by our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled as The Palampur Co-

operative Marketing and Consumer Federation Limited vs. State of H.P. and Ors., Latest HLJ 2007

(HP) 713, that the Industrial Tribunal has the authority, power and jurisdiction to entertain and

decide the reference made to it with respect to the employees of the Co-operative Societies. Hence,

this issue is answered in the negative and is decided against the respondent.

Relief :

30. As a sequel to my findings on issues above, the instant claim petition succeeds and is

allowed. The termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent as per office order/letter

dated 19-7-2013 is set aside and quashed. The respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner

forthwith. He shall be entitled to seniority and continuity in service from the date of his illegal

termination. He shall also be entitled to 50% back wages from the date of his illegal termination till

the date of his reinstatement. However, it is made clear that in case the respondent decides to

proceed against the petitioner for his insubordination, willful absence, negligence and dereliction of

duty, this Award will not come in his way. In such a situation, the respondent will be entitled to

proceed with the inquiry and take appropriate action against the petitioner as per law. Parties to

bear their own costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be

sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the record room.

Announced in the open Court today this 23rd day of April, 2021.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge, Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 660/2016

Date of Institution

: 12-9-2016

Date of Decision

: 29-4-2021

Shri Kashmir Singh s/o Shri Jai Singh, r/o Village Karadwhan, P.O. Chowk, Tehsil

Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Superintending Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. 1st Circle, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P.

2.

The Executive Engineer, B&R Division, H.P.P.W.D. Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondents.

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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. S. S. Sippy, AR

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. Anil Sharma, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The below given reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of the services of Shri Kashmir Singh s/o Shri Jai Singh, r/o

Village Karadwhan, P.O. Chowk, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. during February,

1998 by (i) the Superintending Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. 1st Circle, District Mandi, H.P. (ii)

the Executive Engineer, B&R Division, H.P.P.W.D. Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. who

has worked as beldar on daily wages basis only for 26 and 41 days during the years 1997

and 1998 respectively and has raised his industrial dispute vide demand notice dated

10-06-2015 after delay of more than 17 years without complying with the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of working

period stated above and delay of more than 17 years in raising the industrial dispute, what

amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-

worker is entitled to from the above employers/management?”

2.

In pursuance to the reference the petitioner has averred in the statement of claim that

he had worked with respondent No. 1 as a daily waged beldar in the years 1997-1998. His services

were orally dispensed with by the respondents on the pretext of lack of funds/budget. However, he

was assured that he would be called to work, as and when funds/budget were available. But, he was

never called again thereafter. He had approached the respondents time and again for his re-

engagement, but without success. No notice had been served upon him nor any retrenchment

compensation had been paid. Persons junior to him and also new workers, namely S/Sh. Ramesh

Chand, Mehar Singh, Manohar Lal, Karam Singh, Jiwan Lal, Baldev Chand, Duni Chand, Sunil

Kumar, Roop Lal, Mast Ram, Kamlesh Kumar, Jagdish Chand, Nand Lal, Ghanshyam, Milap

Singh, Balwant Singh, Padam Nath and Tulsi Ram etc. were engaged. In addition to it 411 other

junior workers were retained. Fictional breaks were given to him so that he could not complete 240

days in a year. The action of the respondent is stated to be in violation of the provisions of Sections

25-B, 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’

for short). He is unemployed till date. Hence, the petition for his re-engagement with all

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondents appeared. They filed a joint reply taking preliminary

objections regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on account of delay

and laches. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. However, it is asserted that the

petitioner had worked intermittently as a daily waged beldar with respondent No. 2 w.e.f.

December, 1997 to February, 1998. He had only worked for 26 days in the year 1997 and for 41

days in the year 1998. The services of the petitioner had never been terminated by the respondents.

He himself had left the work of his own sweet will. It is denied that the petitioner had made oral as

well as written requests to the respondents for re-engagement. He had only raised the demand

notice in the year 2015, which was responded to by the respondents. Only those workers had been

regularized by the department who had completed the requisite criteria for regularization as per the

Government policy. It is denied that 411 junior workers had been regularized by the respondents.

No fictional breaks had ever been given to the petitioner. He had never completed 240 days in any

calendar year. So, there was no need to serve any notice upon him under Section 25-F of the Act.

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Since the petitioner had left the job of his own free volition, there is no violation of the provisions

of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act by the respondents. The petitioner is gainfully employed,

being an agriculturist. Hence, it is prayed that the claim petition be dismissed.

4.

While filing the rejoinder, the petitioner controverted the averments made in the reply

and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for determination

and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 26-6-2018:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents during February,

1998 is/was legal and justified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of

petitioner as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the list were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed.

7.

Arguments of the learned vice counsel for the petitioner and the learned Deputy

District Attorney for the respondents heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Decided accordingly

Issue No. 2

: Lump sum compensation of `25,000/-

Issue No. 3

: No

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief

: Petition is partly allowed awarding lump sum compensation

of `25,000/- per operative part of the award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1, 2 and 4 :

9.

All these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The petitioner, namely, Shri Kashmir Singh examined himself as PW1 and filed his

affidavit in evidence, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit, he reiterated the contents of

his statement of claim.

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In the cross-examination, he admitted that he had worked for 26 days in the year 1997 for

41 days in the year 1998. He also admitted that he had not worked in the department in the months

of November, 1997 and March, 1998. He denied that he had never been disengaged by the

department. He also denied that he himself had left the job of his own sweet will. He had given in

writing to the department in the years 1999, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013 to re-

engage him. He was categorical that he cannot produce any document in this regard. He also

admitted that he had raised the demand notice in the year 2015. He denied that after the year 1998

he had left the job of his own free volition. He denied that he had not worked for 240 days in any

year. However, he admitted that he cannot produce any document to show that he had worked

continuously for 240 days in a year. He owns land, which he cultivates. He denied that he was

making a phoney statement.

11. Conversely, Shri Vinod Kumar Sharma (respondent No. 2) testified as RW1. In his

affidavit Ex. RW1/A filed as per Order 18 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he corroborated

on oath the contents of the reply filed by the respondents.

In the cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner had worked as a daily wager in the

years 1997 and 1998. Volunteered that, he had only worked for 26 days in the year 1997 and for 41

days in the year 1998. He specifically denied that the petitioner had completed 240 days in a

calendar year. He also denied that fictional breaks were given to the petitioner by the department so

that he could not complete 240 days. Further he denied that the petitioner had been disengaged by

the department after February, 1998. He clearly denied that thereafter the petitioner orally as well

as in writing had requested the department to re-engage him. He admitted that the department had

prepared the seniority list of the workers, which is Ex.RW1/C on the file. He also admitted that as

per Ex.RW1/C workers, namely, Jagdish Chand, Balwant Singh, Sunil, Nand Lal, Jagdish Chand

s/o Gian Chand, Jagdish Chand s/o Bhagirath and Mahinder Singh had been engaged by the

department after the disengagement of the petitioner and that they are still working continuously

with the department and have also been regularized. Further, he admitted that Ex.RW1/B had been

issued by the department.

12. Ex.RW1/B is the copy of details of working of the petitioner in B&R Sub Divisions,

HPPWD Baldwara.

13. Ex.RW1/C is the copy of detail of working days of Class-IV daily waged workers who

have completed eight years and more service as on 31-3-2008 screened by the Screening

Committee.

14. It is an admitted fact that the services of the petitioner were engaged as a daily waged

beldar by the respondents and that he had worked with respondent No. 2. The petitioner as per his

pleadings and evidence claimed that he had worked continuously in the years 1997 and 1998.

However, the respondents have taken the stand that the petitioner had worked intermittently with

respondent No. 2 and had only worked for 26 days in the year 1997 and for 41 days in the year

1998. The details of working of the petitioner has been produced on record by the respondents as

Ex. RW1/B. It appears to have not been disputed by the petitioner, as it was merely suggested by

the petitioner to respondent No. 2 that Ex.RW1/B had been issued by the department. He admitted

the suggestion. It was nowhere suggested to respondent No. 2 that the working details above-

mentioned was not factually correct. As per the working details Ex.RW1/B, the petitioner had only

worked for 26 days in the month of December, 1997 and for 41 days in the year 1998 i.e. 18 days in

January, 1998 and 23 days in February, 1998. The claimant/petitioner has not placed or exhibited

on record any document to show that he had continuously in the years 1997 and 1998, as claimed.

15. The version of the petitioner is that his services were wrongly and illegally terminated

by the respondents in the month of February, 1998. While denying the said fact, the respondents

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have pleaded that the petitioner, who had worked intermittently, had left the job of his own accord

and free volition.

16. It is well known that abandonment has to be proved by the employer like any other

fact. Therefore, the burden of proving of abandonment is upon the respondent. It has been laid

down by our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled as Narain Singh vs. The State of Himachal

Pradesh & Ors., 2016 (3) Him L.R. 1875 that voluntarily abandonment of work by a workman is

required to be established by way of cogent and reliable evidence by the employer. Similarly, in

case titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & another vs. Shri Partap Singh, 2017 (1) Him L.R.

286, it has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court that abandonment is not to be lightly

presumed, but it has to be unequivocally proved by the employer. Simply because a workman fails

to report for duty, it cannot be presumed that he has left/abandoned the job. Mere statement of Shri

Vinod Kumar Sharma, (RW1) alleging that the workman had abandoned the services is entirely

insufficient to discharge the said onus. Admittedly, no disciplinary proceedings were initiated

against the petitioner by the respondents for his alleged willful absence from duty. Absence from

duty is a serious misconduct and the principle of natural justice did require that some sort of a fact

finding inquiry was got conducted by the respondents. In the present case as it emerges from the

evidence on record, so was not done by the respondents. Then, ‘animus’ to abandon, it is well

settled, must necessarily be shown to exist, before a case of abandonment can be said to have been

made out. No evidence of any such ‘animus’ on the part of the petitioner is forthcoming in the

present case. Thus, the plea of abandonment put forth by the respondents/employer is not

established.

17. Now the question: Whether in terminating the services of the petitioner, the

respondents are proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. The answer, to

my thinking, is in the negative in view of the material on record.

18. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. The burden of proof is

on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 240 days in the preceding twelve calendar

months prior to his alleged retrenchment. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer,

(2006) 1 SCC 106, it has been laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on

the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year.

19. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it

was required of the petitioner to establish on record that he had worked continuously for a period

240 days in a block of twelve calendar months anterior to the date of his alleged termination, which

as per the reference took place in the month of February, 1998. No mandays chart of the petitioner

is there on the file to establish that he had worked continuously for a period of 240 days in a block

of twelve calendar months prior to the date of his alleged termination, as envisaged under Section

25-B of the Act. The petitioner while under cross-examination categorically admitted that he cannot

produce any document evidencing that he had continuously worked for 240 days in a year. It is

evident from the working details of the petitioner, Ex.RW1/B that he had only worked for a total of

67 days in the years 1997 and 1998. It has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case

titled as Mohd. Ali vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors., (2019) 1 SCC (L&S) 138 that when the

workman had not worked for the required 240 days of working in the period of twelve calendar

months preceding the date of dismissal, he is not entitled to take the benefits of the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are not attracted in

this case.

20. Ex.RW1/C is a seniority list of beldar category workmen. It is an admitted document

on the part of the respondents. Shri Vinod Kumar Sharma (RW1) categorically admitted in his

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cross-examination that the department has placed the seniority list of workers on the file as

Ex.RW1/C. This seniority list of beldar category gains significance. The name of Shri Puran Chand

figures at serial No. 67 of the list. He as per this list was appointed by the respondents in B&R Sub

Division Baldwara in January, 1998. The names of workers figuring at serial No. 65, 66 and 68

were also appointed by the respondents in B&R Division Sarkaghat in the months of January and

February, 1998 respectively. This list gives the year-wise working details of the above mentioned

workers uptil the year 2007. The date of initial appointment of the petitioner as per the Ex.RW1/B

is November, 1997. This indicates that persons junior to the petitioner had been serving the

respondents/department even after the disengagement of the petitioner, which as per the reference

took place on February, 1998. To my mind, the latter have failed to adhere to the principle of ‘last

come first go’. Retaining the juniors at the cost of the senior is nothing but unfair labour practice.

21. No only this, Jagdish Chand, Balwant Singh, Sunil, Nand Lal, Jagdish Chand s/o Gian

Chand, Jagdish Chand s/o Bhagirath and Mahinder Singh etc., who all were engaged by the

department after the disengagement of the petitioner, are still continuously working with the

department and have also been regularized. It, thus, shows that new/fresh hands were engaged by

the respondents. There is nothing on the file to establish that at the time of engaging new/fresh

hands or retaining the persons junior to the petitioner, an opportunity of re-employment was

afforded to him (petitioner).

22. Such being the situation, I have no hesitation to conclude that the respondents have

contravened the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25- H of the Act. The termination of the services

of the petitioner is illegal and unjustified.

23. Faced with the situation, the learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent

contended that there being an inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the redressal

of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the

relief(s) he has prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The

question of delay and laches was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Ajayab

Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6

SCC 82, wherein it was inter-alia held:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding

under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of delay. The

plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the

real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.

24. In view of the aforesaid binding precedent, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Of course, the delay in raising the industrial dispute by a workman can

be taken into account by the Court while granting the relief(s) claimed. The observations made by

our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled as Liaq Ram vs. State of H.P. and ors., 2012 (2) Him.

L.R.(FB) 580 (majority view) will also be advantageous on this aspect of the matter.

25. In case titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another

vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant

factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service,

the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute

before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was also observed that the workman had worked for

286 days and had raised industrial dispute in the year 1992, whereas his services had been

terminated in the year 1986 and had raised industrial dispute after six years. It was held that though

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the compensation awarded by the Single Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to

be enhanced by the Division Bench, but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances was not the appropriate relief and thus a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest

@ 9% per annum had been awarded. Recently, in case titled as Deputy Executive Engineer vs.

Kuberbhai Kanjibhai 2019 (160) FLR 651, by relying upon the cases of Bharat Sanchar Nigam

Limited vs. Bhurumal (2014) 7 SCC 177 and District Development Officer & another vs. Satish

Kantilal Amerelia 2018 (156) FLR 266 (SC), it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that

where the workman had worked as a daily wager or muster roll employee hardly for a few years

and where the dispute had been raised by him almost after 15 years of his alleged termination, he

was held entitled only for lump sum monetary compensation in full and final satisfaction of his

claim of reinstatement and other consequential benefits. Similarly, in case titled as State of

Uttarakhand & Anr. vs. Raj Kumar, 2019 (160) FLR 791, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that

where a daily wager has worked for about a year and a dispute was raised by him after 25 years of

the alleged termination, he had no right to claim regularization and was only entitled to lump sum

monetary compensation in full and final satisfaction of his claim of reinstatement and consequential

benefits. In the case on hand before this Court, the factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about three months and had actually worked for 67 days as

per the details of the working of the petitioner on record and that his services were disengaged in

February, 1998, who had worked as non-skilled worker and had raised the industrial dispute by

issuance of demand notice after about more than seventeen years i.e. demand notice was given on

10-6-2015. Although, the petitioner has claimed that from time to time he had approached the

respondent for being re-engaged, but in this regard there is no document placed on the file. Taking

into consideration the factors mentioned above and the precedents laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, the petitioner is not entitled for reinstatement or for

back wages, but only for a lump sum compensation.

26. In view of the discussion and findings arrived at by me above, a lump-sum

compensation of `25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to

which the petitioner is entitled to in the facts and circumstances of the given case. It is further made

clear that the amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of

Award, failing which the petitioner would be entitled to interest @ 6% per annum from date of

Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 and 2 are answered and decided accordingly, while issue

No. 4 is decided against the respondents and in favour of the petitioner.

Issue No. 3 :

27. It has not been shown by the respondents as to how the present petition/statement of

claim is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned Deputy District

Attorney appearing for the respondents at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the

pleadings and evidence on record, it cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not

maintainable. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondents and in favour of the petitioner.

Relief :

28. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove while recording the findings on

issues supra, the respondent is hereby directed to pay a compensation of `25,000/- (Rupees twenty

five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past

service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondents to the

petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondents shall

be liable to pay interest @ 6% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till

realization/deposit of the amount. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are

left to bear their own costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award

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be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 29th day of April, 2021.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge, Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 658/2016

Date of Institution

: 12-9-2016

Date of Decision

: 29-4-2021

Shri Munshi Ram s/o Shri Netar Singh, r/o V.P.O. Balda, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi,

H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Superintending Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. 1st Circle, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P.

2.

The Executive Engineer, B&R Division, H.P.P.W.D. Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. S.S. Sippy, AR

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. Anil Sharma, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The below given reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of the services of Shri Munshi Ram s/o Shri Netar Singh, r/o

V.P.O. Balda, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. during July, 1998 by (i) the

Superintending Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. 1st Circle, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. (ii) the

Executive Engineer, B&R Division, H.P.P.W.D. Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. who has

worked as beldar on daily wages basis only for 74 and 107 days during the years 1997 and

1998 respectively and has raised his industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 10-06-2015

after delay of more than 16 years, without complying with the provisions of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of working period stated

above and delay of more than 16 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of

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back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-worker is

entitled to from the above employers/management?”

2.

In pursuance to the reference the petitioner has averred in the statement of claim that

he had worked with respondent No. 1 as a daily waged beldar in the years 1997-1998. His services

were orally dispensed with by the respondents on the pretext of lack of funds/budget. However, he

was assured that he would be called to work, as and when funds/budget were available. But, he was

never called again thereafter. He had approached the respondents time and again for his re-

engagement, but without success. No notice had been served upon him nor any retrenchment

compensation had been paid. Persons junior to him and also new workers, namely S/Sh. Ramesh

Chand, Mehar Singh, Manohar Lal, Karam Singh, Jiwan Lal, Baldev Chand, Duni Chand, Sunil

Kumar, Roop Lal, Mast Ram, Kamlesh Kumar, Jagdish Chand, Nand Lal, Ghanshyam, Milap

Singh, Balwant Singh, Padam Nath and Tulsi Ram etc. were engaged. In addition to it 411 other

junior workers were retained. Fictional breaks were given to him so that he could not complete 240

days in a year. The action of the respondent is stated to be in violation of the provisions of Sections

25-B, 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’

for short). He is unemployed till date. Hence, the petition for his re-engagement with all

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondents appeared. They filed a joint reply taking preliminary

objections regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on account of delay and

laches. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. However, it is asserted that the

petitioner had worked intermittently as a daily waged beldar with respondent No. 2 w.e.f. July,

1997 to July, 1998. He had only worked for 98 days in the year 1997 and for 107 days in the year

1998. The services of the petitioner had never been terminated by the respondents. He himself had

left the work of his own sweet will. It is denied that the petitioner had made oral as well as written

requests to the respondents for re-engagement. He had only raised the demand notice in the year

2015, which was responded to by the respondents. Only those workers had been regularized by the

department who had completed the requisite criteria for regularization as per the Government

policy. It is denied that 411 junior workers had been regularized by the respondents. No fictional

breaks had ever been given to the petitioner. He had never completed 240 days in any calendar

year. So, there was no need to serve any notice upon him under Section 25-F of the Act. Since the

petitioner had left the job of his own free volition, there is no violation of the provisions of Section

25-G and 25-H of the Act by the respondents. The petitioner is gainfully employed, being an

agriculturist. Hence, it is prayed that the claim petition be dismissed.

4.

While filing the rejoinder, the petitioner controverted the averments made in the reply

and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for determination

and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 26-6-2018:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents during July, 1998

is/was legal and justified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of

petitioner as alleged?

. .OPR.

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Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the list were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed.

7.

Arguments of the learned vice counsel for the petitioner and the learned Deputy

District Attorney for the respondents heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Decided accordingly

Issue No. 2

: Lump sum compensation of `30,000/-

Issue No. 3

: No

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding lump sum compensation

of `30,000/- per operative part of the award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1, 2 and 4 :

9.

All these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The petitioner, namely, Shri Munshi Ram examined himself as PW1 and filed his

affidavit in evidence, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit, he reiterated the contents of

his statement of claim.

In the cross-examination, he admitted that he had worked for 74 days in the year 1997 for

107 days in the year 1998. He also admitted that he had not worked in the department in the months

of June, 1997, December, 1997, March, 1998, June, 1998 and August, 1998. He denied that he had

never been disengaged by the department. He also denied that he himself had left the job of his own

sweet will. He had given in writing to the department in the years 1999, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2007,

2009, 2011 and 2013 to re-engage him. He was categorical that he cannot produce any document in

this regard. He also admitted that he had raised the demand notice in the year 2015. He denied that

after the year 1998 he had left the job of his own free volition. He denied that he had not worked

for 240 days in any year. However, he admitted that he cannot produce any document to show that

he had worked continuously for 240 days in a year. He owns land, which he cultivates. He denied

that he was making a phoney statement.

11. Conversely, Shri Vinod Kumar Sharma (respondent No.2) testified as RW1. In his

affidavit Ex. RW1/A filed as per Order 18 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he corroborated

on oath the contents of the reply filed by the respondents.

In the cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner had worked as a daily wager in the

years 1997 and 1998. Volunteered that, he had only worked for 98 days in the year 1997 and for

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107 days in the year 1998. He specifically denied that the petitioner had completed 240 days in a

calendar year. He also denied that fictional breaks were given to the petitioner by the department so

that he could not complete 240 days. Further he denied that the petitioner had been disengaged by

the department after February, 1998. He clearly denied that thereafter the petitioner orally as well

as in writing had requested the department to re- engage him. He admitted that the department had

prepared the seniority list of the workers, which is Ex.RW1/C on the file. He also admitted that as

per Ex.RW1/C workers, namely, Jagdish Chand, Balwant Singh, Sunil, Nand Lal, Jagdish Chand

s/o Gian Chand, Jagdish Chand s/o Bhagirath and Mahinder Singh had been engaged by the

department after the disengagement of the petitioner and that they are still working continuously

with the department and have also been regularized. Further, he admitted that Ex.RW1/B had been

issued by the department.

12. Ex.RW1/B is the copy of details of working of the petitioner in B&R Sub Divisions,

HPPWD Baldwara.

13. Ex.RW1/C is the copy of detail of working days of Class-IV daily waged workers who

have completed eight years and more service as on 31-3-2008 screened by the Screening

Committee.

14. It is an admitted fact that the services of the petitioner were engaged as a daily waged

beldar by the respondents and that he had worked with respondent No. 2. The petitioner as per his

pleadings and evidence claimed that he had worked continuously in the years 1997 and 1998.

However, the respondents have taken the stand that the petitioner had worked intermittently with

respondent No. 2 and had only worked for 98 days in the year 1997 and for 107 days in the year

1998. The details of working of the petitioner has been produced on record by the respondents as

Ex. RW1/B. It appears to have not been disputed by the petitioner, as it was merely suggested by

the petitioner to respondent No. 2 that Ex.RW1/B had been issued by the department. He admitted

the suggestion. It was nowhere suggested to respondent No. 2 that the working details above-

mentioned was not factually correct. As per the working details Ex.RW1/B, the petitioner had only

worked for 98 days in the year 1997 i.e. 21 days in July, 1997, 25 days in August, 1997, 28 days in

October, 1997 and 24 days in December, 1997 and for 107 days in the year 1998 i.e. 24 days in

January, 1998, 28 days in February, 1998, 26 days in May, 1998 and 29 days in July, 1998. The

claimant/petitioner has not placed or exhibited on record any document to show that he had

continuously in the years 1997 and 1998, as claimed.

15. The version of the petitioner is that his services were wrongly and illegally terminated

by the respondents in the month of February, 1998. While denying the said fact, the respondents

have pleaded that the petitioner, who had worked intermittently, had left the job of his own accord

and free volition.

16. It is well known that abandonment has to be proved by the employer like any other

fact. Therefore, the burden of proving of abandonment is upon the respondent. It has been laid

down by our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled as Narain Singh vs. The State of Himachal

Pradesh & Ors., 2016 (3) Him L.R. 1875 that voluntarily abandonment of work by a workman is

required to be established by way of cogent and reliable evidence by the employer. Similarly, in

case titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & another vs. Shri Partap Singh, 2017 (1) Him L.R. 286, it

has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court that abandonment is not to be lightly presumed, but

it has to be unequivocally proved by the employer. Simply because a workman fails to report for

duty, it cannot be presumed that he has left/abandoned the job. Mere statement of Shri Vinod

Kumar Sharma, (RW1) alleging that the workman had abandoned the services is entirely

insufficient to discharge the said onus. Admittedly, no disciplinary proceedings were initiated

against the petitioner by the respondents for his alleged willful absence from duty. Absence from

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duty is a serious misconduct and the principle of natural justice did require that some sort of a fact

finding inquiry was got conducted by the respondents. In the present case as it emerges from the

evidence on record, so was not done by the respondents. Then, ‘animus’ to abandon, it is well

settled, must necessarily be shown to exist, before a case of abandonment can be said to have been

made out. No evidence of any such ‘animus’ on the part of the petitioner is forthcoming in the

present case. Thus, the plea of abandonment put forth by the respondents/employer is not

established.

17. Now the question: Whether in terminating the services of the petitioner, the

respondents are proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. The answer, to

my thinking, is in the negative in view of the material on record.

18. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. The burden of proof is

on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 240 days in the preceding twelve calendar months

prior to his alleged retrenchment. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC

106, it has been laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the claimant to

show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year.

19. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it

was required of the petitioner to establish on record that he had worked continuously for a period

240 days in a block of twelve calendar months anterior to the date of his alleged termination,

which as per the reference took place in the month of July, 1998. No mandays chart of the

petitioner is there on the file to establish that he had worked continuously for a period of 240 days

in a block of twelve calendar months prior to the date of his alleged termination, as envisaged under

Section 25-B of the Act. The petitioner while under cross-examination categorically admitted that

he cannot produce any document evidencing that he had continuously worked for 240 days in a

year. It is evident from the working details of the petitioner, Ex.RW1/B that he had only worked for

a total of 205 days in the years 1997 and 1998. It has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in case titled as Mohd. Ali vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors., (2019) 1 SCC (L&S) 138

that when the workman had not worked for the required 240 days of working in the period of

twelve calendar months preceding the date of dismissal, he is not entitled to take the benefits of the

provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are not

attracted in this case.

20. Ex.RW1/C is a seniority list of beldar category workmen. It is an admitted document

on the part of the respondents. Shri Vinod Kumar Sharma (RW1) categorically admitted in his

cross-examination that the department has placed the seniority list of workers on the file as

Ex.RW1/C. This seniority list of beldar category gains significance. The name of Shri Puran Chand

figures at serial no. 67 of the list. He as per this list was appointed by the respondents in B&R Sub

Division Baldwara in January, 1998. The names of workers figuring at serial No. 65, 66 and 68

were also appointed by the respondents in B&R Division Sarkaghat in the months of January and

February, 1998 respectively. This list gives the year-wise working details of the above mentioned

workers uptil the year 2007. The date of initial appointment of the petitioner as per the Ex.RW1/B

is November, 1997. This indicates that persons junior to the petitioner had been serving the

respondents/department even after the disengagement of the petitioner, which as per the reference

took place on February, 1998. To my mind, the latter have failed to adhere to the principle of ‘last

come first go’. Retaining the juniors at the cost of the senior is nothing but unfair labour practice.

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21. No only this, Jagdish Chand, Balwant Singh, Sunil, Nand Lal, Jagdish Chand s/o Gian

Chand, Jagdish Chand s/o Bhagirath and Mahinder Singh etc., who all were engaged by the

department after the disengagement of the petitioner, are still continuously working with the

department and have also been regularized. It, thus, shows that new/fresh hands were engaged by

the respondents. There is nothing on the file to establish that at the time of engaging new/fresh

hands or retaining the persons junior to the petitioner, an opportunity of re-employment was

afforded to him (petitioner).

22. Such being the situation, I have no hesitation to conclude that the respondents have

contravened the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25- H of the Act. The termination of the services

of the petitioner is illegal and unjustified.

23. Faced with the situation, the learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent

contended that there being an inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the redressal

of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the

relief(s) he has prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The

question of delay and laches was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Ajayab

Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6

SCC 82, wherein it was inter-alia held:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding

under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of delay. The

plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the

real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.

24. In view of the aforesaid binding precedent, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Of course, the delay in raising the industrial dispute by a workman can

be taken into account by the Court while granting the relief(s) claimed. The observations made by

our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled as Liaq Ram vs. State of H.P. and ors., 2012 (2) Him.

L.R.(FB) 580 (majority view) will also be advantageous on this aspect of the matter.

25. In case titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another

vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant

factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service,

the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute

before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was also observed that the workman had worked for

286 days and had raised industrial dispute in the year 1992, whereas his services had been

terminated in the year 1986 and had raised industrial dispute after six years. It was held that though

the compensation awarded by the Single Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to

be enhanced by the Division Bench, but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances was not the appropriate relief and thus a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest

@ 9% per annum had been awarded. Recently, in case titled as Deputy Executive Engineer vs.

Kuberbhai Kanjibhai 2019 (160) FLR 651, by relying upon the cases of Bharat Sanchar Nigam

Limited vs. Bhurumal (2014) 7 SCC 177 and District Development Officer & another vs. Satish

Kantilal Amerelia 2018 (156) FLR 266 (SC), it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that

where the workman had worked as a daily wager or muster roll employee hardly for a few years

and where the dispute had been raised by him almost after 15 years of his alleged termination, he

was held entitled only for lump sum monetary compensation in full and final satisfaction of his

claim of reinstatement and other consequential benefits. Similarly, in case titled as State of

Uttarakhand & Anr. vs. Raj Kumar, 2019 (160) FLR 791, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held

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that where a daily wager has worked for about a year and a dispute was raised by him after 25 years

of the alleged termination, he had no right to claim regularization and was only entitled to lump

sum monetary compensation in full and final satisfaction of his claim of reinstatement and

consequential benefits. In the case on hand before this Court, the factors which have weighed are

that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about eight months and had actually worked for 205

days as per the details of the working of the petitioner on record and that his services were

disengaged in July, 1998, who had worked as non- skilled worker and had raised the industrial

dispute by issuance of demand notice after about more than sixteen years i.e. demand notice was

given on 10-6-2015. Although, the petitioner has claimed that from time to time he had approached

the respondent for being re-engaged, but in this regard there is no document placed on the file.

Taking into consideration the factors mentioned above and the precedents laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, the petitioner is not entitled for reinstatement or for

back wages, but only for a lump sum compensation.

26.

In view of the discussion and findings arrived at by me above, a lump-sum compensation of

`35,000/- (Rupees thirty five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner

is entitled to in the facts and circumstances of the given case. It is further made clear that the

amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award, failing

which the petitioner would be entitled to interest @ 6% per annum from date of Award till its

realization. Issues No. 1 and 2 are answered and decided accordingly, while issue No.4 is decided

against the respondents and in favour of the petitioner.

Issue No.3 :

It has not been shown by the respondents as to how the present petition/statement of claim

is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned Deputy District

Attorney appearing for the respondents at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the

pleadings and evidence on record, it cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not

maintainable. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondents and in favour of the petitioner.

Relief :

28. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove while recording the findings on

issues supra, the respondent is hereby directed to pay a compensation of `35,000/- (Rupees thirty

five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past

service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondents to the

petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondents shall

be liable to pay interest @ 6% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till realization/

deposit of the amount. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear

their own costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to

the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion

be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 29th day of April, 2021.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge, Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 671/2016

Date of Institution

: 17-9-2016

Date of Decision

: 29-4-2021

Shri Ishwar Dass s/o Shri Amar Singh, r/o Village Karadwhan, P.O. Chowk, Tehsil

Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Superintending Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. 1st Circle, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P.

2.

The Executive Engineer, B&R Division, H.P.P.W.D. Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. S. S. Sippy, AR

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. Anil Sharma, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The below given reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of the services of Shri Ishwar Dass s/o Shri Amar Singh, r/o

Village Karadwhan, P.O. Chowk, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. during February,

1998 by (i) the Superintending Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. 1st Circle, District Mandi, H.P. (ii)

the Executive Engineer, B&R Division, H.P.P.W.D. Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. who

has worked as beldar on daily wages basis only for 47 and 50 days during the years 1997

and 1998 respectively and has raised his industrial dispute vide demand notice dated

10-06-2015 after delay of more than 17 years without complying with the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of working

period stated above and delay of more than 17 years in raising the industrial dispute, what

amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-

worker is entitled to from the above employers/management?”

2.

In pursuance to the reference the petitioner has averred in the statement of claim that

he had worked with respondent No.1 as a daily waged beldar in the years 1997-1998. His services

were orally dispensed with by the respondents on the pretext of lack of funds/budget. However, he

was assured that he would be called to work, as and when funds/budget were available. But, he was

never called again thereafter. He had approached the respondents time and again for his re-

engagement, but without success. No notice had been served upon him nor any retrenchment

compensation had been paid. Persons junior to him and also new workers, namely S/Sh. Ramesh

Chand, Mehar Singh, Manohar Lal, Karam Singh, Jiwan Lal, Baldev Chand, Duni Chand, Sunil

Kumar, Roop Lal, Mast Ram, Kamlesh Kumar, Jagdish Chand, Nand Lal, Ghanshyam, Milap

Singh, Balwant Singh, Padam Nath and Tulsi Ram etc. were engaged. In addition to it 411 other

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junior workers were retained. Fictional breaks were given to him so that he could not complete 240

days in a year. The action of the respondent is stated to be in violation of the provisions of Sections

25-B, 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’

for short). He is unemployed till date. Hence, the petition for his re-engagement with all

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondents appeared. They filed a joint reply taking preliminary

objections regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on account of delay and

laches. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. However, it is asserted that the

petitioner had worked intermittently as a daily waged beldar with respondent No. 2 w.e.f.

November, 1997 to February, 1998. He had only worked for 47 days in the year 1997 and for 50

days in the year 1998. The services of the petitioner had never been terminated by the respondents.

He himself had left the work of his own sweet will. It is denied that the petitioner had made oral as

well as written requests to the respondents for re-engagement. He had only raised the demand

notice in the year 2015, which was responded to by the respondents. Only those workers had been

regularized by the department who had completed the requisite criteria for regularization as per the

Government policy. It is denied that 411 junior workers had been regularized by the respondents.

No fictional breaks had ever been given to the petitioner. He had never completed 240 days in any

calendar year. So, there was no need to serve any notice upon him under Section 25-F of the Act.

Since the petitioner had left the job of his own free volition, there is no violation of the provisions

of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act by the respondents. The petitioner is gainfully employed,

being an agriculturist. Hence, it is prayed that the claim petition be dismissed.

4.

While filing the rejoinder, the petitioner controverted the averments made in the reply

and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for determination

and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 26-6-2018:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents during February,

1998 is/was legal and justified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of

petitioner as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed.

7.

Arguments of the learned vice counsel for the petitioner and the learned Deputy

District Attorney for the respondents heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Decided accordingly

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Issue No. 2

: Lump sum compensation of `25,000/-

Issue No. 3

: No

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding lump sum compensation

of `25,000/- per operative part of the award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1, 2 and 4 :

9.

All these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The petitioner, namely, Shri Ishwar Dass examined himself as PW1 and filed his

affidavit in evidence, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit, he reiterated the contents of

his statement of claim.

In the cross-examination, he admitted that he had worked for 47 days in the year 1997 for

50 days in the year 1998. He also admitted that he had not worked in the department in October,

1997. He denied that he had never been disengaged by the department. He also denied that he

himself had left the job of his own sweet will. He had given in writing to the department in the

years 1999, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013 to re-engage him. He was categorical

that he cannot produce any document in this regard. He also admitted that he had raised the demand

notice in the year 2015. He denied that after the year 1998 he had left the job of his own free

volition. He denied that he had not worked for 240 days in any year. However, he admitted that he

cannot produce any document to show that he had worked continuously for 240 days in a year. He

owns land, which he cultivates. He denied that he was making a phoney statement.

11. Conversely, Shri Vinod Kumar Sharma (respondent No. 2) testified as RW1. In his

affidavit Ex. RW1/A filed as per Order 18 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he corroborated

on oath the contents of the reply filed by the respondents.

In the cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner had worked as a daily wager in the

years 1997 and 1998. Volunteered that, he had only worked for 47 days in November, 1997 and for

50 days in the year 1998. He specifically denied that the petitioner had completed 240 days in a

calendar year. He also denied that fictional breaks were given to the petitioner by the department so

that he could not complete 240 days. Further he denied that the petitioner had been disengaged by

the department after February, 1998. He clearly denied that thereafter the petitioner orally as well

as in writing had requested the department to re-engage him. He admitted that the department had

prepared the seniority list of the workers, which is Ex.RW1/C on the file. He also admitted that as

per Ex.RW1/C workers, namely, Roshan Lal, Besar Singh, Balwant, Sunil Kumar, Surender

Kumar, Jagdish Chand, Nand Lal and Balwant Singh had been engaged by the department after the

disengagement of the petitioner and that they are still working continuously with the department

and have also been regularized. Further, he admitted that Ex.RW1/B had been issued by the

department.

12. Ex.RW1/B is the copy of details of working of the petitioner in B&R Sub Divisions,

HPPWD Baldwara.

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13. Ex.RW1/C is the copy of detail of working days of Class-IV daily waged workers who

have completed eight years and more service as on 31-3-2008 screened by the Screening

Committee.

14. It is an admitted fact that the services of the petitioner were engaged as a daily waged

beldar by the respondents and that he had worked with respondent No. 2. The petitioner as per his

pleadings and evidence claimed that he had worked continuously in the years 1997 and 1998.

However, the respondents have taken the stand that the petitioner had worked intermittently with

respondent No. 2 and had only worked for 47 days in the year 1997 and for 50 days in the year

1998. The details of working of the petitioner has been produced on record by the respondents as

Ex. RW1/B. It appears to have not been disputed by the petitioner, as it was merely suggested by

the petitioner to respondent No. 2 that Ex.RW1/B had been issued by the department. He admitted

the suggestion. It was nowhere suggested to respondent No. 2 that the working details above-

mentioned was not factually correct. As per the working details Ex.RW1/B, the petitioner had only

worked for 47 days in the year 1997 i.e. 21 days in November, 1997 and 26 days in December,

1997 and for 50 days in the year 1998 i.e. 24 days in January, 1998 and 26 days in February, 1998.

The claimant/petitioner has not placed or exhibited on record any document to show that he had

continuously in the years 1997 and 1998, as claimed.

15. The version of the petitioner is that his services were wrongly and illegally terminated

by the respondents in the month of February, 1998. While denying the said fact, the respondents

have pleaded that the petitioner, who had worked intermittently, had left the job of his own accord

and free volition.

16. It is well known that abandonment has to be proved by the employer like any other

fact. Therefore, the burden of proving of abandonment is upon the respondent. It has been laid

down by our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled as Narain Singh vs. The State of Himachal

Pradesh & Ors., 2016 (3) Him L.R. 1875 that voluntarily abandonment of work by a workman is

required to be established by way of cogent and reliable evidence by the employer. Similarly, in

case titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & another vs. Shri Partap Singh, 2017 (1) Him L.R.

286, it has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court that abandonment is not to be lightly

presumed, but it has to be unequivocally proved by the employer. Simply because a workman fails

to report for duty, it cannot be presumed that he has left/abandoned the job. Mere statement of

Shri Vinod Kumar Sharma, (RW1) alleging that the workman had abandoned the services is

entirely insufficient to discharge the said onus. Admittedly, no disciplinary proceedings were

initiated against the petitioner by the respondents for his alleged willful absence from duty.

Absence from duty is a serious misconduct and the principle of natural justice did require that some

sort of a fact finding inquiry was got conducted by the respondents. In the present case as it

emerges from the evidence on record, so was not done by the respondents. Then, ‘animus’ to

abandon, it is well settled, must necessarily be shown to exist, before a case of abandonment can be

said to have been made out. No evidence of any such ‘animus’ on the part of the petitioner is

forthcoming in the present case. Thus, the plea of abandonment put forth by the

respondents/employer is not established.

17. Now the question: Whether in terminating the services of the petitioner, the

respondents are proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. The answer, to

my thinking, is in the negative in view of the material on record.

18. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. The burden of proof is

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on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 240 days in the preceding twelve calendar months

prior to his alleged retrenchment. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC

106, it has been laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the claimant to

show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year.

19. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it

was required of the petitioner to establish on record that he had worked continuously for a period

240 days in a block of twelve calendar months anterior to the date of his alleged termination, which

as per the reference took place in the month of February, 1998. No mandays chart of the petitioner

is there on the file to establish that he had worked continuously for a period of 240 days in a block

of twelve calendar months prior to the date of his alleged termination, as envisaged under Section

25-B of the Act. The petitioner while under cross-examination categorically admitted that he cannot

produce any document evidencing that he had continuously worked for 240 days in a year. It is

evident from the working details of the petitioner, Ex.RW1/B that he had only worked for a total of

97 days in the years 1997 and 1998. It has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case

titled as Mohd. Ali vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors., (2019) 1 SCC (L&S) 138 that when the

workman had not worked for the required 240 days of working in the period of twelve calendar

months preceding the date of dismissal, he is not entitled to take the benefits of the provisions of

Section 25-F of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are not attracted in

this case.

20. Ex.RW1/C is a seniority list of beldar category workmen. It is an admitted document

on the part of the respondents. Shri Vinod Kumar Sharma (RW1) categorically admitted in his

cross-examination that the department has placed the seniority list of workers on the file as

Ex.RW1/C. This seniority list of beldar category gains significance. The name of Shri Puran Chand

figures at serial No. 67 of the list. He as per this list was appointed by the respondents in B&R Sub

Division Baldwaram in January, 1998. The names of workers figuring at serial No. 65, 66 and 68

were also appointed by the respondents in B&R Division Sarkaghat in the months of January and

February, 1998 respectively. This list gives the year-wise working details of the above mentioned

workers uptil the year 2007. The date of initial appointment of the petitioner as per the Ex.RW1/B

is November, 1997. This indicates that persons junior to the petitioner had been serving the

respondents/department even after the disengagement of the petitioner, which as per the reference

took place on February, 1998. To my mind, the latter have failed to adhere to the principle of ‘last

come first go’. Retaining the juniors at the cost of the senior is nothing but unfair labour practice.

21. No only this, Shri Vinod Kumar Sharma (RW1) in his cross-examination admitted that

S/Shri Roshan Lal, Besar Singh, Balwant, Sunil Kumar, Surender Kumar, Jagdish Chand, Nand Lal

and Balwant Singh etc., who all were engaged by the department after the disengagement of the

petitioner, are still continuously working with the department and have also been regularized. It,

thus, shows that new/fresh hands were engaged by the respondents. There is nothing on the file to

establish that at the time of engaging new/fresh hands or retaining the persons junior to the

petitioner, an opportunity of re-employment was afforded to him (petitioner).

22. Such being the situation, I have no hesitation to conclude that the respondents have

contravened the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25- H of the Act. The termination of the services

of the petitioner is illegal and unjustified.

23. Faced with the situation, the learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent

contended that there being an inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the redressal

of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the

relief(s) he has prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The

question of delay and laches was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Ajayab

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Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6

SCC 82, wherein it was inter-alia held:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding

under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of delay. The

plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the

real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.

24. In view of the aforesaid binding precedent, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Of course, the delay in raising the industrial dispute by a workman can

be taken into account by the Court while granting the relief(s) claimed. The observations made by

our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled as Liaq Ram vs. State of H.P. and ors., 2012 (2) Him.

L.R.(FB) 580 (majority view) will also be advantageous on this aspect of the matter.

25. In case titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another

vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant

factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service,

the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute

before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was also observed that the workman had worked for

286 days and had raised industrial dispute in the year 1992, whereas his services had been

terminated in the year 1986 and had raised industrial dispute after six years. It was held that though

the compensation awarded by the Single Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to

be enhanced by the Division Bench, but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances was not the appropriate relief and thus a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest

@ 9% per annum had been awarded. Recently, in case titled as Deputy Executive Engineer vs.

Kuberbhai Kanjibhai 2019 (160) FLR 651, by relying upon the cases of Bharat Sanchar Nigam

Limited vs. Bhurumal (2014) 7 SCC 177 and District Development Officer & another vs. Satish

Kantilal Amerelia 2018 (156) FLR 266 (SC), it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that

where the workman had worked as a daily wager or muster roll employee hardly for a few years

and where the dispute had been raised by him almost after 15 years of his alleged termination, he

was held entitled only for lump sum monetary compensation in full and final satisfaction of his

claim of reinstatement and other consequential benefits. Similarly, in case titled as State of

Uttarakhand & Anr. vs. Raj Kumar, 2019 (160) FLR 791, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that

where a daily wager has worked for about a year and a dispute was raised by him after 25 years of

the alleged termination, he had no right to claim regularization and was only entitled to lump sum

monetary compensation in full and final satisfaction of his claim of reinstatement and consequential

benefits. In the case on hand before this Court, the factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about four months and had actually worked for 97 days as

per the details of the working of the petitioner on record and that his services were disengaged in

February, 1998, who had worked as non-skilled worker and had raised the industrial dispute by

issuance of demand notice after about more than seventeen years i.e. demand notice was given on

10-6-2015. Although, the petitioner has claimed that from time to time he had approached the

respondent for being re-engaged, but in this regard there is no document placed on the file. Taking

into consideration the factors mentioned above and the precedents laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, the petitioner is not entitled for reinstatement or for

back wages, but only for a lump sum compensation.

26. In view of the discussion and findings arrived at by me above, a lump-sum

compensation of `25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to

which the petitioner is entitled to in the facts and circumstances of the given case. It is further made

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clear that the amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of

Award, failing which the petitioner would be entitled to interest @ 6% per annum from date of

Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 and 2 are answered and decided accordingly, while issue

No.4 is decided against the respondents and in favour of the petitioner.

Issue No.3 :

27. It has not been shown by the respondents as to how the present petition/statement of

claim is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned Deputy District

Attorney appearing for the respondents at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the

pleadings and evidence on record, it cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not

maintainable. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondents and in favour of the petitioner.

Relief :

28. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove while recording the findings on

issues supra, the respondent is hereby directed to pay a compensation of `25,000/- (Rupees twenty

five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past

service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondents to the

petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondents shall

be liable to pay interest @ 6% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till realization/

deposit of the amount. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear

their own costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to

the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion

be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 29th day of April, 2021.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge, Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 661/2016

Date of Institution

: 12-9-2016

Date of Decision

: 29-4-2021

Shri Manohar Lal s/o Shri Sai Ram, r/o Village Karadwhan, P.O. Chowk, Tehsil Sarkaghat,

District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Superintending Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. 1st Circle, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P.

2.

The Executive Engineer, B&R Division, H.P.P.W.D. Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondents.

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Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. S.S. Sippy, AR

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. Anil Sharma, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The below given reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of the services of Shri Manohar Lal s/o Shri Sai Ram, r/o

Village Karadwhan, P.O. Chowk, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. during February,

1998 by (i) the Superintending Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. 1st Circle, District Mandi, H.P.

(ii) the Executive Engineer, B&R Division, H.P.P.W.D. Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

who has worked as beldar on daily wages basis only for 50 and 52 days during the years

1997 and 1998 respectively and has raised his industrial dispute vide demand notice dated

10-06-2015 after delay of more than 17 years without complying with the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of working

period stated above and delay of more than 17 years in raising the industrial dispute, what

amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex-

worker is entitled to from the above employers/management?”

2.

In pursuance to the reference the petitioner has averred in the statement of claim that

he had worked with respondent No.1 as a daily waged beldar in the years 1997-1998. His services

were orally dispensed with by the respondents on the pretext of lack of funds/budget. However, he

was assured that he would be called to work, as and when funds/budget were available. But, he was

never called again thereafter. He had approached the respondents time and again for his re-

engagement, but without success. No notice had been served upon him nor any retrenchment

compensation had been paid. Persons junior to him and also new workers, namely S/Sh. Ramesh

Chand, Mehar Singh, Manohar Lal, Karam Singh, Jiwan Lal, Baldev Chand, Duni Chand, Sunil

Kumar, Roop Lal, Mast Ram, Kamlesh Kumar, Jagdish Chand, Nand Lal, Ghanshyam, Milap

Singh, Balwant Singh, Padam Nath and Tulsi etc. were engaged. In addition to it 411 other junior

workers were retained. Fictional breaks were given to him so that he could not complete 240 days

in a year. The action of the respondent is stated to be in violation of the provisions of Sections 25-

B, 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for

short). He is unemployed till date. Hence, the petition for his re-engagement with all consequential

benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondents appeared. They filed a joint reply taking preliminary

objections regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on account of delay

and laches. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. However, it is asserted that the

petitioner had worked intermittently as a daily waged beldar with respondent No. 2 w.e.f.

November, 1997 to February, 1998. He had only worked for 50 days in the year 1997 and for 52

days in the year 1998. The services of the petitioner had never been terminated by the respondents.

He himself had left the work of his own sweet will. It is denied that the petitioner had made oral as

well as written requests to the respondents for re-engagement. He had only raised the demand

notice in the year 2015, which was responded to by the respondents. Only those workers had been

regularized by the department who had completed the requisite criteria for regularization as per the

Government policy. It is denied that 411 junior workers had been regularized by the respondents.

No fictional breaks had ever been given to the petitioner. He had never completed 240 days in any

calendar year. So, there was no need to serve any notice upon him under Section 25-F of the Act.

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Since the petitioner had left the job of his own free volition, there is no violation of the provisions

of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act by the respondents. The petitioner is gainfully employed,

being an agriculturist. Hence, it is prayed that the claim petition be dismissed.

4.

While filing the rejoinder, the petitioner controverted the averments made in the reply

and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for determination

and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 26-6-2018:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents during February,

1998 is/was legal and justified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is

entitled to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of

petitioner as alleged?

. .OPR.

Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the list were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed.

7.

Arguments of the learned vice counsel for the petitioner and the learned Deputy

District Attorney for the respondents heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Decided accordingly

Issue No. 2

: Lump sum compensation of `25,000/-

Issue No. 3

: No

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding lump sum compensation

of `25,000/- per operative part of the award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1, 2 and 4 :

9.

All these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The petitioner, namely, Shri Manohar Lal examined himself as PW1 and filed his

affidavit in evidence, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit, he reiterated the contents of

his statement of claim.

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In the cross-examination, he admitted that he had worked for 50 days in the year 1997 for

52 days in the year 1998. He also admitted that he had not worked in the department in October,

1997. He denied that he had never been disengaged by the department. He also denied that he

himself had left the job of his own sweet will. He had given in writing to the department in the

years 1999, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013 to re-engage him. He was categorical

that he cannot produce any document in this regard. He also admitted that he had raised the demand

notice in the year 2015. He denied that after the year 1998 he had left the job of his own free

volition. He denied that he had not worked for 240 days in any year. However, he admitted that he

cannot produce any document to show that he had worked continuously for 240 days in a year. He

owns land, which he cultivates. He denied that he was making a phoney statement.

11. Conversely, Shri Vinod Kumar Sharma (respondent No. 2) testified as RW1. In his

affidavit Ex. RW1/A filed as per Order 18 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he corroborated

on oath the contents of the reply filed by the respondents.

In the cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner had worked as a daily wager in the

years 1997 and 1998. Volunteered that, he had only worked for 50 days in November, 1997 and for

52 days in the year 1998. He specifically denied that the petitioner had completed 240 days in a

calendar year. He also denied that fictional breaks were given to the petitioner by the department so

that he could not complete 240 days. Further he denied that the petitioner had been disengaged by

the department after February, 1998. He clearly denied that thereafter the petitioner orally as well

as in writing had requested the department to re-engage him. He admitted that the department had

prepared the seniority list of the workers, which is Ex.RW1/C on the file. He also admitted that as

per Ex.RW1/C workers, namely Roshan Lal, Besar Singh, Balwant, Sunil Kumar, Surender Kumar,

Jagdish Chand, Nand Lal and Balwant Singh had been engaged by the department after the

disengagement of the petitioner and that they are still working continuously with the department

and have also been regularized. Further, he admitted that Ex.RW1/B had been issued by the

department.

12. Ex.RW1/B is the copy of details of working of the petitioner in B&R Sub Divisions,

HPPWD Baldwara.

13. Ex.RW1/C is the copy of detail of working days of Class-IV daily waged workers who

have completed eight years and more service as on 31-3-2008 screened by the Screening

Committee.

14. It is an admitted fact that the services of the petitioner were engaged as a daily waged

beldar by the respondents and that he had worked with respondent No. 2. The petitioner as per his

pleadings and evidence claimed that he had worked continuously in the years 1997 and 1998.

However, the respondents have taken the stand that the petitioner had worked intermittently with

respondent No. 2 and had only worked for 50 days in the year 1997 and for 52 days in the year

1998. The details of working of the petitioner has been produced on record by the respondents as

Ex. RW1/B. It appears to have not been disputed by the petitioner, as it was merely suggested by

the petitioner to respondent No. 2 that Ex.RW1/B had been issued by the department. He admitted

the suggestion. It was nowhere suggested to respondent No. 2 that the working details above-

mentioned was not factually correct. As per the working details Ex.RW1/B, the petitioner had only

worked for 50 days in the year 1997 i.e. 24 days in January, 1997 and 26 days in December, 1997

and for 52 days in the year 1998 i.e. 24 days in January, 1998 and 28 days in February, 1998. The

claimant/petitioner has not placed or exhibited on record any document to show that he had

continuously in the years 1997 and 1998, as claimed.

15. The version of the petitioner is that his services were wrongly and illegally terminated

by the respondents in the month of February, 1998. While denying the said fact, the respondents

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have pleaded that the petitioner, who had worked intermittently, had left the job of his own accord

and free volition.

16. It is well known that abandonment has to be proved by the employer like any other

fact. Therefore, the burden of proving of abandonment is upon the respondent. It has been laid

down by our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled as Narain Singh vs. The State of Himachal

Pradesh & Ors., 2016 (3) Him L.R. 1875 that voluntarily abandonment of work by a workman is

required to be established by way of cogent and reliable evidence by the employer. Similarly, in

case titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & another vs. Shri Partap Singh, 2017 (1) Him L.R.

286, it has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court that abandonment is not to be lightly

presumed, but it has to be unequivocally proved by the employer. Simply because a workman fails

to report for duty, it cannot be presumed that he has left/abandoned the job. Mere statement of Shri

Vinod Kumar Sharma, (RW1) alleging that the workman had abandoned the services is entirely

insufficient to discharge the said onus. Admittedly, no disciplinary proceedings were initiated

against the petitioner by the respondents for his alleged willful absence from duty. Absence from

duty is a serious misconduct and the principle of natural justice did require that some sort of a fact

finding inquiry was got conducted by the respondents. In the present case as it emerges from the

evidence on record, so was not done by the respondents. Then, ‘animus’ to abandon, it is well

settled, must necessarily be shown to exist, before a case of abandonment can be said to have been

made out. No evidence of any such ‘animus’ on the part of the petitioner is forthcoming in the

present case. Thus, the plea of abandonment put forth by the respondents/employer is not

established.

17. Now the question: Whether in terminating the services of the petitioner, the

respondents are proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. The answer, to

my thinking, is in the negative in view of the material on record.

18. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. The burden of proof is

on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 240 days in the preceding twelve calendar

months prior to his alleged retrenchment. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer,

(2006) 1 SCC 106, it has been laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on

the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year.

19. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it

was required of the petitioner to establish on record that he had worked continuously for a period

240 days in a block of twelve calendar months anterior to the date of his alleged termination,

which as per the reference took place in the month of February, 1998. No mandays chart of the

petitioner is there on the file to establish that he had worked continuously for a period of 240 days

in a block of twelve calendar months prior to the date of his alleged termination, as envisaged under

Section 25-B of the Act. The petitioner while under cross-examination categorically admitted that

he cannot produce any document evidencing that he had continuously worked for 240 days in a

year. It is evident from the working details of the petitioner, Ex.RW1/B that he had only worked for

a total of 102 days in the years 1997 and 1998. It has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in case titled as Mohd. Ali vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors., (2019) 1 SCC (L&S) 138

that when the workman had not worked for the required 240 days of working in the period of

twelve calendar months preceding the date of dismissal, he is not entitled to take the benefits of the

provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are not

attracted in this case.

20. Ex.RW1/C is a seniority list of beldar category workmen. It is an admitted document

on the part of the respondents. Shri Vinod Kumar Sharma (RW1) categorically admitted in his

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cross-examination that the department has placed the seniority list of workers on the file as

Ex.RW1/C. This seniority list of beldar category gains significance. The name of Shri Puran Chand

figures at serial No. 67 of the list. He as per this list was appointed by the respondents in B&R Sub

Division Baldwara in January, 1998. The names of workers figuring at serial No. 65, 66 and 68

were also appointed by the respondents in B&R Division Sarkaghat in the months of January and

February, 1998 respectively. This list gives the year-wise working details of the above mentioned

workers uptil the year 2007. The date of initial appointment of the petitioner as per the Ex.RW1/B

is November, 1997. This indicates that persons junior to the petitioner had been serving the

respondents/department even after the disengagement of the petitioner, which as per the reference

took place on February, 1998. To my mind, the latter have failed to adhere to the principle of ‘last

come first go’. Retaining the juniors at the cost of the senior is nothing but unfair labour practice.

21. No only this, Shri Vinod Kumar Sharma (RW1) in his cross-examination admitted that

S/Shri Roshan Lal, Besar Singh, Balwant, Sunil Kumar, Surender Kumar, Jagdish Chand, Nand Lal

and Balwant Singh etc., who all were engaged by the department after the disengagement of the

petitioner, are still continuously working with the department and have also been regularized. It,

thus, shows that new/fresh hands were engaged by the respondents. There is nothing on the file to

establish that at the time of engaging new/fresh hands or retaining the persons junior to the

petitioner, an opportunity of re-employment was afforded to him (petitioner).

22. Such being the situation, I have no hesitation to conclude that the respondents have

contravened the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The termination of the services

of the petitioner is illegal and unjustified.

23. Faced with the situation, the learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent

contended that there being an inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the redressal

of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the

relief(s) he has prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The

question of delay and laches was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as

Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another,

(1999) 6 SCC 82, wherein it was inter-alia held:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding

under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of delay. The

plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the

real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.

24. In view of the aforesaid binding precedent, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Of course, the delay in raising the industrial dispute by a workman can

be taken into account by the Court while granting the relief(s) claimed. The observations made by

our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled as Liaq Ram vs. State of H.P. and ors., 2012 (2) Him.

L.R.(FB) 580 (majority view) will also be advantageous on this aspect of the matter.

25. In case titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another

vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant

factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service,

the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute

before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was also observed that the workman had worked for

286 days and had raised industrial dispute in the year 1992, whereas his services had been

terminated in the year 1986 and had raised industrial dispute after six years. It was held that though

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the compensation awarded by the Single Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to

be enhanced by the Division Bench, but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances was not the appropriate relief and thus a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest

@ 9% per annum had been awarded. Recently, in case titled as Deputy Executive Engineer vs.

Kuberbhai Kanjibhai 2019 (160) FLR 651, by relying upon the cases of Bharat Sanchar Nigam

Limited vs. Bhurumal (2014) 7 SCC 177 and District Development Officer & another vs. Satish

Kantilal Amerelia 2018 (156) FLR 266 (SC), it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that

where the workman had worked as a daily wager or muster roll employee hardly for a few years

and where the dispute had been raised by him almost after 15 years of his alleged termination, he

was held entitled only for lump sum monetary compensation in full and final satisfaction of his

claim of reinstatement and other consequential benefits. Similarly, in case titled as State of

Uttarakhand & Anr. vs. Raj Kumar, 2019 (160) FLR 791, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that

where a daily wager has worked for about a year and a dispute was raised by him after 25 years of

the alleged termination, he had no right to claim regularization and was only entitled to lump sum

monetary compensation in full and final satisfaction of his claim of reinstatement and consequential

benefits. In the case on hand before this Court, the factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about four months and had actually worked for 102 days as

per the details of the working of the petitioner on record and that his services were disengaged in

February, 1998, who had worked as non-skilled worker and had raised the industrial dispute by

issuance of demand notice after about more than seventeen years i.e. demand notice was given on

10.6.2015. Although, the petitioner has claimed that from time to time he had approached the

respondent for being re-engaged, but in this regard there is no document placed on the file. Taking

into consideration the factors mentioned above and the precedents laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, the petitioner is not entitled for reinstatement or for

back wages, but only for a lump sum compensation.

26. In view of the discussion and findings arrived at by me above, a lump-sum

compensation of `25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to

which the petitioner is entitled to in the facts and circumstances of the given case. It is further made

clear that the amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of

Award, failing which the petitioner would be entitled to interest @ 6% per annum from date of

Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 and 2 are answered and decided accordingly, while issue

No. 4 is decided against the respondents and in favour of the petitioner.

Issue No. 3 :

27. It has not been shown by the respondents as to how the present petition/statement of

claim is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned Deputy District

Attorney appearing for the respondents at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the

pleadings and evidence on record, it cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not

maintainable. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondents and in favour of the petitioner.

Relief :

28.

In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove while recording the findings on issues

supra, the respondent is hereby directed to pay a compensation of `25,000/- (Rupees twenty five

thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service

benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondents to the petitioner

within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondents shall be liable

to pay interest @ 6% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till realization/ deposit

of the amount. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their

own costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award be sent to the

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appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due completion be

consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 29th day of April, 2021.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge, Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

____________

IN THE COURT OF SHRI YOGESH JASWAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-

CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No.

: 669/2016

Date of Institution

: 17-9-2016

Date of Decision

: 29-4-2021

Shri Gulab Chand s/o Shri Hardev, r/o Village Karadwhan, P.O. Chowk, Tehsil Sarkaghat,

District Mandi, H.P.

. .Petitioner.

Versus

1.

The Superintending Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. 1st Circle, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P.

2.

The Executive Engineer, B&R Division, H.P.P.W.D. Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.

. .Respondents.

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner

: Sh. S.S. Sippy, AR

For the Respondent(s)

: Sh. Anil Sharma, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The below given reference has been received from the appropriate Government for

adjudication:

“Whether alleged termination of the services of Shri Gulab Chand s/o Shri Hardev, r/o

Village Karadwhan, P.O. Chowk, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. during Februry,

1998 by (i) the Superintending Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. 1st Circle, Mandi, District Mandi,

H.P. (ii) the Executive Engineer, B&R Division, H.P.P.W.D. Sarkaghat, District Mandi,

H.P. who has worked as beldar on daily wages basis only for 49 and 52 days during the

years 1997 and 1998 respectively and has raised his industrial dispute vide demand notice

dated 10-06-2015 after delay of more than 17 years without complying with the provisions

of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of

working period stated above and delay of more than 17 years in raising the industrial

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dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the

above ex-worker is entitled to from the above employers/management?”

2.

In pursuance to the reference the petitioner has averred in the statement of claim that

he had worked with respondent no.1 as a daily waged beldar in the years 1997-1998. His services

were orally dispensed with by the respondents on the pretext of lack of funds/budget. However, he

was assured that he would be called to work, as and when funds/budget were available. But, he was

never called again thereafter. He had approached the respondents time and again for his re-

engagement, but without success. No notice had been served upon him nor any retrenchment

compensation had been paid. Persons junior to him and also new workers, namely S/Sh. Ramesh

Chand, Mehar Singh, Manohar Lal, Karam Singh, Jiwan Lal, Baldev Chand, Duni Chand, Sunil

Kumar, Roop Lal, Mast Ram, Kamlesh Kumar, Jagdish Chand, Nand Lal, Ghanshyam, Milap

Singh, Balwant Singh, Padam Nath and Tulsi etc. were engaged. In addition to it 411 other junior

workers were retained. Fictional breaks were given to him so that he could not complete 240 days

in a year. The action of the respondent is stated to be in violation of the provisions of Sections

25-B, 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’

for short). He is unemployed till date. Hence, the petition for his re-engagement with all

consequential benefits.

3.

On notice, the respondents appeared. They filed a joint reply taking preliminary

objections regarding lack of maintainability and that the petition was bad on account of delay and

laches. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. However, it is asserted that the

petitioner had worked intermittently as a daily waged beldar with respondent No. 2 w.e.f.

November, 1997 to February, 1998. He had only worked for 49 days in the year 1997 and for 52

days in the year 1998. The services of the petitioner had never been terminated by the respondents.

He himself had left the work of his own sweet will. It is denied that the petitioner had made oral as

well as written requests to the respondents for re-engagement. He had only raised the demand

notice in the year 2015, which was responded to by the respondents. Only those workers had been

regularized by the department who had completed the requisite criteria for regularization as per the

Government policy. It is denied that 411 junior workers had been regularized by the respondents.

No fictional breaks had ever been given to the petitioner. He had never completed 240 days in any

calendar year. So, there was no need to serve any notice upon him under Section 25-F of the Act.

Since the petitioner had left the job of his own free volition, there is no violation of the provisions

of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act by the respondents. The petitioner is gainfully employed,

being an agriculturist. Hence, it is prayed that the claim petition be dismissed.

4.

While filing the rejoinder, the petitioner controverted the averments made in the reply

and reiterated those in the statement of claim.

5.

Out of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled for determination

and adjudication by this Court vide order dated 26-6-2018:

1.

Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondents during February,

1998 is/was legal and justified as alleged?

. .OPP.

2.

If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled

to?

. .OPP.

3.

Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

4.

Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of

petitioner as alleged?

. .OPR.

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Relief.

6.

Thereafter, the parties to the list were directed to adduce evidence in support of the

issues so framed.

7.

Arguments of the learned vice counsel for the petitioner and the learned Deputy

District Attorney for the respondents heard and records gone through.

8.

For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the issues for

determination, my findings thereon are as under:

Issue No. 1

: Decided accordingly

Issue No. 2

: Lump sum compensation of `25,000/-

Issue No. 3

: No

Issue No. 4

: No

Relief.

: Petition is partly allowed awarding lump sum compensation

of `25,000/- per operative part of the award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1, 2 and 4 :

9.

All these issues are intrinsically connected with each other and required common

appreciation of evidence, hence are taken together for the purpose of determination and

adjudication.

10. The petitioner, namely, Shri Gulab Chand examined himself as PW1 and filed his

affidavit in evidence, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit, he reiterated the contents of

his statement of claim.

In the cross-examination, he admitted that he had worked for 49 days in the year 1997 for

52 days in the year 1998. He also admitted that he had not worked in the department in October,

1997. He denied that he had never been disengaged by the department. He also denied that he

himself had left the job of his own sweet will. He had given in writing to the department in the

years 1999, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013 to re-engage him. He was categorical

that he cannot produce any document in this regard. He also admitted that he had raised the demand

notice in the year 2015. He denied that after the year 1998 he had left the job of his own free

volition. He denied that he had not worked for 240 days in any year. However, he admitted that he

cannot produce any document to show that he had worked continuously for 240 days in a year. He

owns land, which he cultivates. He denied that he was making a phoney statement.

11. Conversely, Shri Vinod Kumar Sharma (respondent No.2) testified as RW1. In his

affidavit Ex. RW1/A filed as per Order 18 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he corroborated

on oath the contents of the reply filed by the respondents.

In the cross-examination, he denied that the petitioner had worked as a daily wager in the

years 1997 and 1998. Volunteered that, he had only worked for 49 days in November, 1997 and for

52 days in the year 1998. He specifically denied that the petitioner had completed 240 days in a

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calendar year. He also denied that fictional breaks were given to the petitioner by the department so

that he could not complete 240 days. Further he denied that the petitioner had been disengaged by

the department after February, 1998. He clearly denied that thereafter the petitioner orally as well

as in writing had requested the department to re-engage him. He admitted that the department had

prepared the seniority list of the workers, which is Ex.RW1/C on the file. He also admitted that as

per Ex.RW1/C workers, namely, S/Sh. Jagdish Chand, Balwant Singh, Sunil, Nand Lal, Jagdish

Chand s/o Gian Chand, Jagdish Chand s/o Bhagirath and Mahinder Singh had been engaged by the

department after the disengagement of the petitioner and that they are still working continuously

with the department and have also been regularized. Further, he admitted that Ex.RW1/B had been

issued by the department.

12. Ex.RW1/B is the copy of details of working of the petitioner in B&R Sub Divisions,

HPPWD Baldwara.

13. Ex.RW1/C is the copy of detail of working days of Class-IV daily waged workers who

have completed eight years and more service as on 31-3-2008 screened by the Screening

Committee.

14. It is an admitted fact that the services of the petitioner were engaged as a daily waged

beldar by the respondents and that he had worked with respondent No. 2. The petitioner as per his

pleadings and evidence claimed that he had worked continuously in the years 1997 and 1998.

However, the respondents have taken the stand that the petitioner had worked intermittently with

respondent No. 2 and had only worked for 49 days in the year 1997 and for 52 days in the year

1998. The details of working of the petitioner has been produced on record by the respondents as

Ex. RW1/B. It appears to have not been disputed by the petitioner, as it was merely suggested by

the petitioner to respondent No. 2 that Ex.RW1/B had been issued by the department. He admitted

the suggestion. It was nowhere suggested to respondent No. 2 that the working details above-

mentioned was not factually correct. As per the working details Ex.RW1/B, the petitioner had only

worked for 49 days in the year 1997 i.e. 23 days in November, 1997 and 26 days in December,

1997 and for 52 days in the year 1998 i.e. 24 days in January, 1998 and 28 days in February, 1998.

The claimant/petitioner has not placed or exhibited on record any document to show that he had

continuously in the years 1997 and 1998, as claimed.

15. The version of the petitioner is that his services were wrongly and illegally terminated

by the respondents in the month of February, 1998. While denying the said fact, the respondents

have pleaded that the petitioner, who had worked intermittently, had left the job of his own accord

and free volition.

16. It is well known that abandonment has to be proved by the employer like any other

fact. Therefore, the burden of proving of abandonment is upon the respondent. It has been laid

down by our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled as Narain Singh vs. The State of Himachal

Pradesh & Ors., 2016 (3) Him L.R. 1875 that voluntarily abandonment of work by a workman is

required to be established by way of cogent and reliable evidence by the employer. Similarly, in

case titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & another vs. Shri Partap Singh, 2017 (1) Him L.R. 286,

it has been held by our own Hon’ble High Court that abandonment is not to be lightly

presumed, but it has to be unequivocally proved by the employer. Simply because a workman fails

to report for duty, it cannot be presumed that he has left/abandoned the job. Mere statement of Shri

Vinod Kumar Sharma, (RW1) alleging that the workman had abandoned the services is entirely

insufficient to discharge the said onus. Admittedly, no disciplinary proceedings were initiated

against the petitioner by the respondents for his alleged willful absence from duty. Absence from

duty is a serious misconduct and the principle of natural justice did require that some sort of a fact

finding inquiry was got conducted by the respondents. In the present case as it emerges from the

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evidence on record, so was not done by the respondents. Then, ‘animus’ to abandon, it is well

settled, must necessarily be shown to exist, before a case of abandonment can be said to have been

made out. No evidence of any such ‘animus’ on the part of the petitioner is forthcoming in the

present case. Thus, the plea of abandonment put forth by the respondents/employer is not

established.

17. Now the question: Whether in terminating the services of the petitioner, the

respondents are proved to have violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. The answer, to

my thinking, is in the negative in view of the material on record.

18. Section 25-B of the Act defines “continuous service”. In terms of Sub Section (2) of

Section 25-B that if a workman during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with

reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer 240 days

within a period of one year, he will be deemed to be in continuous service. The burden of proof is

on the petitioner to show that he had worked for 240 days in the preceding twelve calendar

months prior to his alleged retrenchment. In R.M. Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer,

(2006) 1 SCC 106, it has been laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the burden of proof is on the

claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year.

19. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it

was required of the petitioner to establish on record that he had worked continuously for a period

240 days in a block of twelve calendar months anterior to the date of his alleged termination,

which as per the reference took place in the month of February, 1998. No mandays chart of the

petitioner is there on the file to establish that he had worked continuously for a period of 240 days

in a block of twelve calendar months prior to the date of his alleged termination, as envisaged under

Section 25-B of the Act. The petitioner while under cross-examination categorically admitted that

he cannot produce any document evidencing that he had continuously worked for 240 days in a

year. It is evident from the working details of the petitioner, Ex.RW1/B that he had only worked for

a total of 101 days in the years 1997 and 1998. It has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in case titled as Mohd. Ali vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors., (2019) 1 SCC (L&S) 138

that when the workman had not worked for the required 240 days of working in the period of

twelve calendar months preceding the date of dismissal, he is not entitled to take the benefits of the

provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act are not

attracted in this case.

20. Ex.RW1/C is a seniority list of beldar category workmen. It is an admitted document

on the part of the respondents. Shri Vinod Kumar Sharma (RW1) categorically admitted in his

cross-examination that the department has placed the seniority list of workers on the file as

Ex.RW1/C. This seniority list of beldar category gains significance. The name of Shri Puran Chand

figures at serial No. 67 of the list. He as per this list was appointed by the respondents in B&R Sub

Division Baldwara in January, 1998. The names of workers figuring at serial No. 65, 66 and 68

were also appointed by the respondents in B&R Division Sarkaghat in the months of January and

February, 1998 respectively. This list gives the year-wise working details of the above mentioned

workers uptil the year 2007. The date of initial appointment of the petitioner as per the Ex.RW1/B

is November, 1997. This indicates that persons junior to the petitioner had been serving the

respondents/department even after the disengagement of the petitioner, which as per the reference

took place on February, 1998. To my mind, the latter have failed to adhere to the principle of ‘last

come first go’. Retaining the juniors at the cost of the senior is nothing but unfair labour practice.

21. No only this, Shri Vinod Kumar Sharma (RW1) in his cross-examination admitted that

S/Sh. Jagdish Chand, Balwant Singh, Sunil, Nand Lal, Jagdish Chand s/o Gian Chand, Jagdish

Chand s/o Bhagirath and Mahinder Singh etc., who all were engaged by the department after the

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disengagement of the petitioner, are still continuously working with the department and have also

been regularized. It, thus, shows that new/fresh hands were engaged by the respondents. There is

nothing on the file to establish that at the time of engaging new/fresh hands or retaining the persons

junior to the petitioner, an opportunity of re-employment was afforded to him (petitioner).

22. Such being the situation, I have no hesitation to conclude that the respondents have

contravened the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The termination of the services

of the petitioner is illegal and unjustified.

23. Faced with the situation, the learned Deputy District Attorney for the respondent

contended that there being an inordinate delay in the steps taken by the petitioner for the redressal

of his grievance, his claim suffers from the vice of delay and laches, which disentitles him to the

relief(s) he has prayed for. This contention, to my thinking, appears to be ill conceived. The

question of delay and laches was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as

Ajayab Singh vs. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another,

(1999) 6 SCC 82, wherein it was inter-alia held:

“The provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding

under the ID Act. The relief under the ID Act cannot be denied merely on the ground of delay. The

plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the

real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be

generally questioned on the ground of delay alone”.

24. In view of the aforesaid binding precedent, it cannot be said that the petition is hit by

the vice of delay and laches. Of course, the delay in raising the industrial dispute by a workman can

be taken into account by the Court while granting the relief(s) claimed. The observations made by

our own Hon’ble High Court in case titled as Liaq Ram vs. State of H.P. and ors., 2012 (2) Him.

L.R.(FB) 580 (majority view) will also be advantageous on this aspect of the matter.

25. In case titled as Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another

vs. Geetam Singh reported in 2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC), it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant

factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service,

the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute

before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was also observed that the workman had worked for

286 days and had raised industrial dispute in the year 1992, whereas his services had been

terminated in the year 1986 and had raised industrial dispute after six years. It was held that though

the compensation awarded by the Single Judge of the Hon’ble High Court was too low and liable to

be enhanced by the Division Bench, but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and

circumstances was not the appropriate relief and thus a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest

@ 9% per annum had been awarded. Recently, in case titled as Deputy Executive Engineer vs.

Kuberbhai Kanjibhai 2019 (160) FLR 651, by relying upon the cases of Bharat Sanchar Nigam

Limited vs. Bhurumal (2014) 7 SCC 177 and District Development Officer & another vs. Satish

Kantilal Amerelia 2018 (156) FLR 266 (SC), it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that

where the workman had worked as a daily wager or muster roll employee hardly for a few years

and where the dispute had been raised by him almost after 15 years of his alleged termination, he

was held entitled only for lump sum monetary compensation in full and final satisfaction of his

claim of reinstatement and other consequential benefits. Similarly, in case titled as State of

Uttarakhand & Anr. vs. Raj Kumar, 2019 (160) FLR 791, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that

where a daily wager has worked for about a year and a dispute was raised by him after 25 years of

the alleged termination, he had no right to claim regularization and was only entitled to lump sum

2896

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monetary compensation in full and final satisfaction of his claim of reinstatement and consequential

benefits. In the case on hand before this Court, the factors which have weighed are that the

petitioner in all remained engaged for about four months and had actually worked for 101 days as

per the details of the working of the petitioner on record and that his services were disengaged in

February, 1998, who had worked as non-skilled worker and had raised the industrial dispute by

issuance of demand notice after about more than seventeen years i.e. demand notice was given on

10-6-2015. Although, the petitioner has claimed that from time to time he had approached the

respondent for being re-engaged, but in this regard there is no document placed on the file. Taking

into consideration the factors mentioned above and the precedents laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, the petitioner is not entitled for reinstatement or for

back wages, but only for a lump sum compensation.

26. In view of the discussion and findings arrived at by me above, a lump-sum

compensation of `25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to

which the petitioner is entitled to in the facts and circumstances of the given case. It is further made

clear that the amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of

Award, failing which the petitioner would be entitled to interest @ 6% per annum from date of

Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 and 2 are answered and decided accordingly, while issue

No. 4 is decided against the respondents and in favour of the petitioner.

Issue No.3 :

27. It has not been shown by the respondents as to how the present petition/statement of

claim is not maintainable. Moreover, this issue was not pressed for by the learned Deputy District

Attorney appearing for the respondents at the time of arguments. Otherwise also, from the

pleadings and evidence on record, it cannot be said that the petition/statement of claim is not

maintainable. Hence, this issue is decided against the respondents and in favour of the petitioner.

Relief :

28. In the light of what has been discussed hereinabove while recording the findings on

issues supra, the respondent is hereby directed to pay a compensation of `25,000/- (Rupees twenty

five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past

service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondents to the

petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondents shall

be liable to pay interest @ 6% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till

realization/deposit of the amount. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are

left to bear their own costs. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. A copy of this Award

be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette and the file after due

completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 29th day of April, 2021.

Sd/-

(YOGESH JASWAL),

Presiding Judge, Labour Court-cum-Industrial

Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

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xkso/kZu flag fuoklh egky iykgh] Mkd?kj ohM oxsgMk] rglhy lqtkuiqj] ftyk gehjiqj

¼fg0 iz0½ ds lEcU/k esa b'rgkj@lwpuk jkti= ¼fg0iz0½ esa izdkf'kr djus ckjsA

Jherh eydka nsoh iq=h xkso/kZu flag] fuoklh egky iykgh] Mkd?kj ohM oxsgM+k] rglhy

lqtkuiqj] ftyk gehjiqj ¼fg0 iz0½ }kjk vkosnu i= 'kiFk&i= o vU; lEcfU/kr nLrkostksa@fjdkMZ lfgr

bl dk;kZy; esa izkIr gqvk gSA ftlesa mYys[k gS fd Jherh eydka nsoh iq=h xkso/kZu flag] fuoklh egky

iykgh] Mkd?kj ohM oxsgM+k] rglhy lqtkuiqj] ftyk gehjiqj ¼fg0 iz0½ dk tUe fnukad 29&01&1954 dks

gqvk gS tks fd vKkurko'k lEcfU/kr xzke iapk;r [kukSgyh ds tUe o e`R;q jftLVj esa vkt fnu rd ntZ

ugha gqvk gS vr% izkfFkZ;k viuh tUe frfFk dh ?kVuk dk iathdj.k xzke iapk;r [kukSgyh ds fjdkMZ esa

ntZ djokuk pkgrh gSA

bl ckjs vkjafHkd Nkuohu {ks=+h; jktLo bdkbZ ls djokbZ xbZ] ftlesa Jherh eydka nsoh iq=h

xkso/kZu flag] fuoklh egky iykgh] Mkd?kj ohM oxsgMk] rglhy lqtkuiqj] ftyk gehjiqj fgekpy izns'k

dk tUe fnukad 29&01&1954 dks gksuk ik;k x;k gSA

vr% bl b'rgkj@lwpuk }kjk vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks

mDr izkfFkZ;k Jherh eydka nsoh iq=h xkso/kZu flag] fuoklh egky iykgh] Mkd?kj ohM oxsgMk] rglhy

lqtkuiqj] ftyk gehjiqj ¼fg0 iz0½ dh tUe frfFk 29&01&1954 dh ?kVuk dk iathdj.k xzke iapk;r

[kukSgyh ds fjdkMZ esa ntZ djokus ckjs dksbZ vkifÙk gks rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru fnukad

24&08&2021 dks bl vnkyr esa izkr% 11-00 cts mifLFkr gksdj viuk mtj is'k dj ldrk gSA gkftj

u vkus dh lwjr esa ,drjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tkdj mDr tUe frfFk dh ?kVuk ntZ djus ckjs

fu;ekuqlkj vkns'k ikfjr dj fn, tk,axs rFkk ckn esa fdlh Hkh izdkj dk dksbZ Hkh mtj ekU; ugha gksxkA

vkt fnukad 24&07&2021 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr ls tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh ,oa rglhynkj]

lqtkuiqj] ftyk gehjiqj ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] ikyeiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k

¼fg0 iz0½

fdLe eqdíek % tUe iathdj.k@e`R;q iathdj.k

rkjh[k is'kh % 24&08&2021

jkftUnz dqekj

cuke

2898

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 24 vxLr] 2021@02 Hkknzin] 1943

loZlk/kkj.k ,oa vke turk

izkFkZuk&i= vf/kfu;e /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-

izkFkhZ Jh jkftUnz dqekj iq= Jh eLr jke] fuoklh xkao HkVVw 'kewyk] Mk0 HkVVw 'kewyk] rglhy

ikyeiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k ¼fg0 iz0½ us bl U;k;ky; esa izkFkZuk&i= is'k fd;k gS fd izkFkhZ ds csVs xkSjo 'kekZ

dk tUe fnukad 07&09&1982 dks xkao o Mkd?kj HkVVw 'kewyk] xzke iapk;r QjsM+] rglhy ikyeiqj esa

gqvk Fkk exj vKkurko'k xzke iapk;r QjsM+ ds vfHkys[k esa tUe frfFk iathÑr u djokbZ xbZA vr%

lEcfU/kr xzke iapk;r dks tUe iathdj.k ds vkns'k ikfjr fd, tk,aA

vr% bl b'rgkj }kjk vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn bl ckjs fdlh O;fDr dks

dksbZ mtj ;k ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 24&08&2021 dks v/kksgLrk{kjh dh vnkyr esa lqcg 11-00 cts

vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj gksdj viuk i{k is'k dj ldrs gSaA ckn xqtjus fe;kn dksbZ Hkh mtj ;k

,rjkt dkfcys lek;r u gksaxs rFkk izkFkhZ ds csVs xkSjo 'kekZ dh tUe frfFk iathdj.k fnukad 07&09&1982

ds vkns'k lEcfU/kr xke iapk;r dks tkjh dj fn, tk,axsA

vkt fnukad 05&08&2021 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh]

ikyeiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr uk;c rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] ikyeiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k

¼fg0 iz0½

fdLe eqdíek % tUe iathdj.k@e`R;q iathdj.k

rkjh[k is'kh % 24&08&2021

xaxks nsoh

cuke

loZlk/kkj.k ,oa vke turk

izkFkZuk&i= vf/kfu;e /kkjk 13¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1969-

izkfFkZu Jherh xaxks nsoh iq=h Jh tfr jke] fuoklh xkao okM+h [kkl] Mk0 deysgM+] rglhy

ikyeiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k ¼fg0 iz0½ us bl U;k;ky; esa izkFkZuk&i= is'k fd;k gS fd izkfFkZu xaxks nsoh dk

tUe fnukad 01&01&1968 dks xkao okM+h [kkl] Mk0 deysgM+] rglhy ikyeiqj esa gqvk Fkk exj

vKkurko'k lEcfU/kr xzke iapk;r ds vfHkys[k esa tUe frfFk iathÑr u djokbZ xbZA vr% lEcfU/kr xzke

iapk;r dks tUe iathdj.k ds vkns'k ikfjr fd, tk,aA

vr% bl b'rgkj }kjk vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn bl ckjs fdlh O;fDr dks

dksbZ mtj ;k ,rjkt gks rks fnukad 24&08&2021 dks v/kksgLrk{kjh dh vnkyr esa lqcg 11-00 cts

vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj gksdj viuk i{k is'k dj ldrs gSaA ckn xqtjus fe;kn dksbZ Hkh mtj ;k

2899

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 24 vxLr] 2021@02 Hkknzin] 1943

,rjkt dkfcys lek;r u gksaxs rFkk izkfFkZu Jherh xaxks nsoh dh tUe frfFk iathdj.k fnukad

01&01&1968 ds vkns'k lEcfU/kr xke iapk;r dks tkjh dj fn, tk,axsA

vkt fnukad 05&08&2021 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh]

ikyeiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr uk;c rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] ikyeiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k

¼fg0 iz0½

fdLe eqdíek % uke nq#Lrh

rkjh[k is'kh % 31&08&2021

jfoUnz dqekj

cuke

loZlk/kkj.k ,oa vke turk

izkFkZuk&i= cjk, uke nq#LrhA

izkFkhZ jfoUnz dqekj iq= Jh d'kehj flag] fuoklh xkao jk[k] Mkd?kj ikyeiqj] rglhy ikyeiqj]

ftyk dkaxM+k ¼fg0 iz0½ us bl U;k;ky; esa izkFkZuk&i= is'k fd;k gS fd izkFkhZ dk uke jfoUnz dqekj gSA

ijUrq egky jk[k tekcUnh lky 2016&2017 ds jktLo fjdkMZ esa fHkUnj dqekj iq= Jh d'kehj flag ntZ

gS tksfd xyr gS blfy, eSa vius uke dh nq#Lrh djokuk pkgrk gwaA vr% lEcfU/kr jktLo vfHkys[k esa

izkFkhZ jfoUnz dqekj ds uke dh nq#Lrh ds vkns'k ikfjr fd, tk,aA

vr% bl b'rgkj }kjk vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn bl ckjs fdlh O;fDr dks

dksbZ mtj ;k ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 31&08&2021 dks v/kksgLrk{kjh dh vnkyr esa lqcg 11-00 cts

vlkyru ;k odkyru gkftj gksdj viuk i{k is'k dj ldrs gSaA ckn xqtjus fe;kn dksbZ Hkh

mtj@,rjkt dkfcys lek;r u gksaxs rFkk izkFkhZ ds uke fHkUnj dqekj ds ctk, lgh uke fHkUnj dqekj

miuke jfoUnz dqekj iq= d'kehj flag dh nq#Lrh ds vkns'k lEcfU/kr jktLo vfHkys[k esa ntZ djus ds

vkns'k tkjh dj fn, tk,axsA

vkt fnukad 05&08&2021 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh]

ikyeiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr rglhynkj ,oa lgk;d lekgrkZ] f}rh; Js.kh ikyeiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k ¼fg0 iz0½

fdLe eqdíek % bUrdky edQwn mY[kcjh

rkjh[k is'kh % 26&08&2021

Jherh xhrk nsoh iq=h Jh lkg.kw] fuoklh egky ykgyk [kkl] rglhy ikyeiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k

¼fg0 iz0½

---izkfFkZ;kA

2900

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 24 vxLr] 2021@02 Hkknzin] 1943

cuke

vke turk

bUrdky e[kQwn mY[kcjh %& Vsdks iq= lkg.kw iq= QhaMk] fuoklh egky ykgyk [kkl ds uke [kkrk ua0 33

[krkSuh ua0 71 [kljk ua0 1390] 1391] 1393] 1394 jdck rknknh 00&31&60 Hkkx tekcUnh 2012&2013

esa ntZ dkxtkr eky djus ckjsA

Jherh xhrk nsoh iq=h Jh lkg.kw] fuoklh egky ykgyk [kkl] rglhy ikyeiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k

¼fg0 iz0½ us bl U;k;ky; esa izkFkZuk&i= is'k fd;k fd mlds HkkbZ Vsdks iq= lkg.kw iq= QhMk] fuoklh

egky ykgyk [kkl] rglhy ikyeiqj] ftyk dkxM+k ¼fg0iz0½ o"kZ 1926 ls ykirk gS vkSj u gh LFkkuh;

iapk;r esa fdlh ls vkSj u gh gekjs fdlh fj'rsnkj ls] fdlh O;fDr ls mudk dksbZ lEidZ gS] blfy,

mudks e`r ?kksf"kr djds mudh lEifÙk tks fd egky ykgy [kkl esa fLFkr gS dk bUrdky mÙkjkf/kdkjh ds

uke ntZ fd;k tk,A

vr% vke turk dks bl b'rgkj }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd bl dsl ckjs fdlh dks Hkh mtj

;k ,rjkt gks rks og fnukad 26&08&2021 dks v/kksgLrk{kjh dh vnkyr esa vlkyru ;k cdkyru gkftj

gksdj is'k dj ldrs gSaA vU;Fkk xSjgkftjh dh lwjr esa ;drjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tk,xhA

vkt fnukad 05&08&2021 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh]

ikyeiqj] ftyk dkaxM+k ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh] MkMk lhck] ftyk dkaxM+k ¼fg0 iz0½

nh{kk Bkdqj iq=h Jh d`iky flag] fuoklh egky t[k/kkj] Mkd?kj fVIijh] rglhy MkMk lhck]

ftyk dkaxM+k ¼fg0 iz0½

- - izkfFkZ;kA

cuke

vke turk

- - izR;kFkhZx.kA

muoku eqdíek-&izkFkZuk&i= nq#Lrh uke dkxtkr eky egky t[k/kkj] rglhy MkMk lhck] ftyk dkaxM+k

¼fg0 iz0½A

izkfFkZ;k nh{kk Bkdqj iq=h Jh d`iky flag] fuoklh egky t[k/kkj] Mkd?kj fVIijh] rglhy MkMk

lhck] ftyk dkaxM+k ¼fg0 iz0½ us vnkyr gtk esa l'kiFk izkFkZuk&i= fn;k gS fd mldk lgh uke iapk;r

fjdkMZ] vk/kkj dkMZ o Ldwy fjdkMZ esa nh{kk Bkdqj iq=h Jh d`iky flag gS tcfd jktLo fjdkMZ egky

t[k/kkj esa mldk uke nh{kk iq=h d`iky flag iq= esgj flag ntZ gS tks lgh u gSA izkfFkZ;k us mijksDr

uke dh nq#Lrh djokus ckjs vuqjks/k fd;k gSA

vr% mijksDr uke nq#Lrh ckjs loZlk/kkj.k vke turk dks bl jkti= b'rgkj o eq'=h equknh

}kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks mDr uke nq#Lrh ckjs dksbZ mtj@,rjkt gks rks og

fnukad 27&08&2021 dks izkr% 10-00 cts bl eqdíek dh iSjoh gsrq O;fDrxr :i ls vFkok fdlh vf/kd`r

2901

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 24 vxLr] 2021@02 Hkknzin] 1943

,tSUV ds ek/;e ls ;k fdlh vf/koDrk ds ek/;e ls bl U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr vkosaA xSjgkftjh dh lwjr

esa uke dh nq#Lrh djus gsrq vkns'k ikfjr dj fn;s tk;saxsA ckn fe;kn rkjh[k is'kh dksbZ mtj@,rjkt

dkfcys xkSj u gksxkA

vkt fnukad 09&08&2021 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj U;k;ky; }kjk tkjh fd;k x;kA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh]

MkMk lhck] ftyk dkaxM+k ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&

In the Court of Sh. Manmohan Singh HPAS, Marriage Officer-cum- Sub-Divisional

Magistrate, Nichar at Bhabanagar, District Kinnaur (H.P.)

In the matter of :

1-

Sant Kumar s/o Sh. Virender Kumar, r/o Village Yulla, Sub-Tehsil Tapri, District

Kinnaur (H.P.).

2.

Monika d/o Sh. Sunder Sain, r/o Village & P.O. Rarang, Tehsil Moorang, District

Kinnaur (H.P.)

. .Applicants.

Versus

General Public

Subject.—Proclamation for the registration of marriage under section 8 (4) of the H.P. Registration

of Marriages Act, 1996.

In the above noted matter, Sant Kumar s/o Sh. Virender have filed an application on dated

06-03-2021 alongwith affidavits in the court of undersigned under section 8 (4) of the H.P.

Registration of Marriage Act, 1996 that they have solemnized their marriage on dated 10-12-2011

according to the custom & ritual of Hindu religion since from the date of marriage they are living

together as husband & wife, hence their marriage may be registered under section 8 (4) of the H.P.

Registration of Marriage Act, 1996.

Therefore, the general public & parents of the applicants are hereby informed through this

notice that any person who has any objection regarding this marriage can file the objection

personally in writing or through their legal advisor before this court on or before dated 24th

August, 2021. The objections received after 24th August, 2021 will not be entertained and marriage

will be registered accordingly.

Issued today on 24th July, 2021 under my hand and seal of this court.

Seal.

MANMOHAN SINGH (HPAS),

Marriage Officer -cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Nichar at Bhabanagar, District Kinnaur H.P.

2902

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 24 vxLr] 2021@02 Hkknzin] 1943

c vnkyr Jh jke n;ky] rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] dqYyw] ftyk dqYyw ¼fg0 iz0½

dsl ua0 % 40/BE/NT/2021

cuke

vke turk

fo"k;-&&izkFkZuk&i= vf/kfu;e /kkjk 13 ¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k] vf/kfu;e 1969 ckjsA

Jherh ';kew nsoh iq=h Jh dkyw jke] fuoklh Mqxhyx] Mkd?kj Mqxhyx] rglhy o ftyk dqYyw]

fgekpy izns'k us bl dk;kZy; esa izkFkZuk&i= e; leFk i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd bldk tUe fnukad

22&06&1973 dks gqvk gS ijUrq mldh tUe frfFk dk bUnzkt fdlh dkj.ko'k uxj ifj"kn~@xzke iapk;r

Mqxhyx + ds vfHkys[k esa ntZ u dh xbZ gSA

vr% bl b'rgkj gtk }kjk loZlk/kkj.k o lEcU/khx.kksa dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh

O;fDr fo'ks"k dks budh tUe frfFk ntZ djokus ckjs esa dksbZ vkifRr gks rks og fnukad 24&08&2021 dks

lqcg 10-00 cts ;k blls iwoZ vlkyru o odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuk mtj o ,rjkt ntZ

djok ldrk gS blds mijkUr dksbZ Hkh mtj@,rjkt lek;r u gksxk rFkk fu;ekuqlkj tUe frfFk ntZ

djokus ds vkns'k lacfU/kr uxj ifj"kn~@xzke iapk;r dks ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA

vkt fnukad 24&07&2021 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

jke n;ky]

rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]

dqYyw] ftyk dqYyw ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh jke n;ky] uk;c&rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh] dqYyw] ftyk dqYyw ¼fg0 iz0½

dsl ua0 % 41/BE/NT/2021

cuke

vke turk

fo"k;-&&izkFkZuk&i= vf/kfu;e /kkjk 13 ¼3½ tUe ,oa e`R;q iathdj.k] vf/kfu;e 1969 ckjsA

Jh 'ksj flag iq= Jh xksEcks] fuoklh lks;y] Mkd?kj djkM+lw] rglhy o ftyk dqYyw] fgekpy izns'k

us bl dk;kZy; esa izkFkZuk&i= e; leFk i= izLrqr fd;k gS fd budh iRuh dh e`R;q fnukad 10&09&19

dks gqbZ gS ijUrq mldh e`R;q frfFk dk bUnzkt fdlh dkj.ko'k uxj ifj"kn~@xzke iapk;r djkM+lw ds

vfHkys[k esa ntZ u dh xbZ gSA

vr % bl b'rgkj gtk }kjk loZlk/kkj.k o lEcU/khx.kksa dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh

O;fDr fo'ks"k dks Mksyek dh e`R;q frfFk ntZ djokus ckjs esa dksbZ vkifRr gks rks og fnukad 24&08&2021

dks lqcg 10-00 cts ;k blls iwoZ vlkyru o odkyru gkftj vnkyr vkdj viuk mtj o ,rjkt

2903

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 24 vxLr] 2021@02 Hkknzin] 1943

ntZ djok ldrk gS blds mijkUr dksbZ Hkh mtj@,rjkt lek;r u gksxk rFkk fu;ekuqlkj e`R;q frfFk

ntZ djokus ds vkns'k lacfU/kr uxj ifj"kn~@xzke iapk;r dks ikfjr dj fn, tk;saxsA

vkt fnukad 24&07&2021 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

jke n;ky]

rglhynkj ,oa dk;Zdkjh n.Mkf/kdkjh]

dqYyw] ftyk dqYyw ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&

c vnkyr Jh gqDe jke] lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh] rglhy dk;kZy; i/kj]

ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½

muoku eqdíek % 37¼2½ rkjh[k is'kh % 25&08&2021

Jh jktw jke iq= chjh flag] xkao le[ksrj] Mkd?kj o rglhy i/kj] ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½ - - izkFkhZA

cuke

vke turk

- - izR;kFkhZA

nkok % uke nq#LrhA

vkosnu i= tsj /kkjk 37¼2½ ds vUrxZr uke nq#Lr djus ckjsA

vkosnd Jh jktw jke iq= chjh flag] xkao le[ksrj] Mkd?kj o rglhy i/kj] ftyk e.Mh

¼fg0 iz0½ us bl vnkyr esa i= xqtkjk gS fd mldk uke xzke iapk;r Mykg ds fjdkMZ esa jktw jke ntZ

gS] tcfd eqgky Mykg ds reke jktLo vfHkys[k esa mldk uke jktw ntZ gqvk gS tks fd xyr ntZ gqvk

gS rFkk vkosnd us bl dk;kZy; esa bl vnkyr ls izkFkZuk dh gS fd mldk uke eqgky Mykg ds fjdkMZ esa

jktw ds LFkku ij jktw jke ntZ djus ds vkns'k fn;s tkosaA

vr% bl b'rgkj }kjk vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks mDr uke

ntZ djus ckjs dksbZ mtj@,rjkt gks rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru rkjh[k is'kh 25&08&2021 dks lqcg

10-00 cts gkftj gksdj viuk mtj is'k dj ldrk gS] clwjr xSjgkftjh ,drjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ

tkdj mfpr vkns'k ikfjr dj fn, tk,axsA

;g b'rgkj vkt fnukad 04&08&2021 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh gqvkA

gLrk{kfjr@&

eksgjA

¼gqDe jke½]

lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh]

i/kj] rglhy i/kj] ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½A

2904

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 24 vxLr] 2021@02 Hkknzin] 1943

c vnkyr Jh gqDe jke] lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh] rglhy dk;kZy; i/kj]

ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½

muoku eqdíek % 37¼2½ rkjh[k is'kh % 25&08&2021

Jh fey[kh jke iq= 'kqHkdj.k] xkao o Mkd?kj dqUuq] rglhy i/kj] ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½ - - izkFkhZA

cuke

vke turk

- - izR;kFkhZA

nkok % uke nq#LrhA

vkosnu i= tsj /kkjk 37¼2½ ds vUrxZr uke nq#Lr djus ckjsA

vkosnd Jh fey[kh jke iq= 'kqHkdj.k] xkao o Mkd?kj dqUuq] rglhy i/kj] ftyk e.Mh

¼fg0 iz0½ us bl vnkyr esa i= xqtkjk gS fd mldk uke xzke iapk;r dqUuq ds fjdkMZ esa fey[kh jke ntZ

gS] tcfd eqgky dqUuq ds reke jktLo vfHkys[k esa mldk uke fey[kh ntZ gqvk gS tks xyr ntZ gqvk gS

rFkk vkosnd us bl dk;kZy; esa bl vnkyr ls izkFkZuk dh gS fd mldk uke eqgky dqUuq ds fjdkMZ esa

fey[kh jke ntZ djus ds vkns'k fn;s tkosaA

vr% bl b'rgkj }kjk vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh O;fDr dks mDr uke

ntZ djus ckjs dksbZ mtj@,rjkt gks rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru rkjh[k is'kh 25&08&2021 dks lqcg

10-00 cts gkftj gksdj viuk mtj is'k dj ldrk gS] clwjr xSjgkftjh ,drjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ

tkdj mfpr vkns'k ikfjr dj fn, tk,axsA

;g b'rgkj vkt fnukad 04&08&2021 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj vnkyr }kjk tkjh gqvkA

gLrk{kfjr@&

eksgjA

¼gqDe jke½]

lgk;d lekgrkZ f}rh; Js.kh]

i/kj] rglhy i/kj] ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&&&

le{k es?kuk xksLokeh] rglhynkj ,oe~ lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh] yMHkM+ksy]

ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½

rkjh[k is'kh % 30&08&2021

Jh jktw iq= Jh psrq miuke psr jke] fuoklh xkao varksyk] Mkd?kj dksyax] rglhy yMHkM+ksy]

ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½

- - izkFkhZA

cuke

vke turk

- - Qjhdnks;eA

fo"k;%& jktLo fjdkMZ esa uke nq#Lrh djus ckjsA

Jh jktw iq= Jh psrq miuke psr jke] fuoklh xkao varksyk] Mkd?kj dksyax] rglhy yMHkM+ksy]

ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½ us 'kiFk i= lfgr vkosnu fd;k gS fd izkFkhZ dk okLrfod uke jktw gSA ijUrq

2905

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 24 vxLr] 2021@02 Hkknzin] 1943

jktLo vfHkys[k egky dksyax esa izkFkhZ dk uke jktey ntZ gks pqdk gSA tks fd xyr ntZ dkxtkr eky

gSA vc izkFkhZ us viuk uke jktey miuke jktw nq#Lrh ntZ djus ckjs fuosnu fd;k gSA

vr% bl b'rgkj ds ek/;e ls loZlk/kkj.k vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh

O;fDr dks jktLo vfHkys[k egky dksyax esa jktey ds LFkku ij jktey miuke jktw nq#Lr djus ckjk

dksbZ mtj@,rjkt gks rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru rkjh[k is'kh fnukad 30&08&2021 dks 10-00 cts

bl vnkyr esa gkftj gksdj viuk mtj@,rjkt is'k dj ldrs gSaA clwjr xSjgkftjh ,drjQk dk;Zokgh

vey esa ykbZ tkdj uke nq#Lrh ntZ djus ds vkns'k ikfjr dj fn, tk,axsA

;g b'rgkj vkt fnukad 26&07&2021 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr vnkyr ls tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh]

yMHkM+ksy] ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½A

&&&&&&&&&

le{k es?kuk xksLokeh] rglhynkj ,oe~ lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh] yMHkM+ksy]

ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½

rkjh[k is'kh % 30&08&2021

Jh fnus'k pkSgku iq= Jh izdk'k pUn iq= Jh iyl jke] fuoklh xkao o Mkd?kj [kíj] rglhy

yMHkM+ksy] ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½

- - izkFkhZA

cuke

vke turk

- - Qjhdnks;eA

fo"k;%& jktLo fjdkMZ esa uke nq#Lrh djus ckjsA

Jh fnus'k pkSgku iq= Jh izdk'k pUn iq= Jh iyl jke] fuoklh xkao o Mkd?kj [kíj] rglhy

yMHkM+ksy] ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½ us 'kiFk i= lfgr vkosnu fd;k gS fd izkFkhZ dk okLrfod uke fnus'k

pkSgku gSA ijUrq jktLo vfHkys[k egky [kíj esa izkFkhZ dk uke fnus'k dqekj ntZ gks pqdk gSA tks fd xyr

ntZ dkxtkr eky gSA vc izkFkhZ us viuk uke fnus'k pkSgku nq#Lrh ntZ djus ckjs fuosnu fd;k gSA

vr% bl b'rgkj ds ek/;e ls loZlk/kkj.k vke turk dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh

O;fDr dks jktLo vfHkys[k egky [kíj esa fnus'k dqekj ds LFkku ij fnus'k pkSgku nq#Lr djus ckjk dksbZ

mtj@,rjkt gks rks og vlkyru ;k odkyru rkjh[k is'kh fnukad 30&08&2021 dks 10-00 cts bl

vnkyr esa gkftj gksdj viuk mtj@,rjkt is'k dj ldrs gSaA clwjr xSjgkftjh ,drjQk dk;Zokgh

vey esa ykbZ tkdj uke nq#Lrh ntZ djus ds vkns'k ikfjr dj fn, tk,axsA

;g b'rgkj vkt fnukad 26&07&2021 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj lfgr vnkyr ls tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

lgk;d lekgrkZ izFke Js.kh]

yMHkM+ksy] ftyk e.Mh ¼fg0 iz0½A

2906

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 24 vxLr] 2021@02 Hkknzin] 1943

c vnkyr uk;c rglhynkj ,oa lgk;d lekgrkZ ¼f}rh; oxZ½ gjksyh] ftyk Åuk] fg0iz0

Jh ljou flag iq= pju nkl] oklh c<sM+k] rglhy gjksyh] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0iz0½

- - oknh A

cuke

vke turk

- - izfroknhx.kA

nj[okLr ceqjkn nq#Lrh uke jktLo vfHkys[k egky c<sM+k] tekcUnh lky 2014&15] rglhy gjksyh]

ftyk Åuk ¼fg0iz0½A

Jh ljou flag iq= pju nkl] oklh c<sM+k] rglhy gjksyh] ftyk Åuk ¼fg0iz0½ us bl U;k;ky;

esa vkosnu i= nq:Lrh uke izLrqr fd;k gS fd jktLo fjdkMZ esa izkFkhZ dk uke xyr ntZ fd;k x;k gSA

vr% izkFkhZ ljou dqekj iq= pju nkl dh ctk;s ljou flag iq= pju nkl lgh ntZ fd;k tkosA

vr% bl v[kckj@eq'=h equknh ds ek/;e ls loZlk/kkj.k dks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn fdlh

O;fDr dks uke nq#Lrh ckjs dksbZ vkifŸk gks rks og viuk mtj fyf[kr ;k ekSf[kd rkSj ij bl U;k;ky;

esa fu/kkZfjr rkjh[k is'kh ls iwoZ ;k rkjh[k is'kh fnukad 24&08&2021 dks izLrqr dj ldrk gSA fu/kkZfjr

rkjh[k is'kh rd mtj@,rjkt izkIr u gksus dh lwjr esa ,drjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tkdj uke

nq#Lrh ckjs vkns'k ikfjr dj fn;s tk,axsA fu/kkZfjr rkjh[k is'kh ds mijkUr dksbZ Hkh mtj dkfcys lek;r

u gksxk o U;k;ky; }kjk ;drjQk dk;Zokgh vey esa ykbZ tkdj bl lUnHkZ esa QSlyk lquk fn;k tk,xkA

vkt fnukad 24&07&2021 dks esjs gLrk{kj o eksgj U;k;ky; }kjk tkjh gqvkA

eksgjA

gLrk{kfjr@&

uk;c rglhynkj ,oa lgk;d lekgrkZ] f}rh; oxZ]

gjksyh] ftyk Åuk] fg0iz0A

&&&&&&&&

In the Court of Sh. Prikshit Kumar, Marriage Officer-cum-Executive Magistrate,

Sub-Tehsil Gagret at Kaloh, District Una, Himachal Pradesh

In the matter of :

1.

Shri Rajesh Kumar s/o Shri Satish Kumar, r/o Village Gagret, Sub-Tehsil Gagret at

Kaloh, District Una, Himachal Pradesh.

2. Sanjna Devi d/o Sh. Kartar Chand, r/o Village Amloh, Tehsil Dehra, District Kangra

(H.P.)

. . Applicants.

Versus

General Public

Subject .—Notice for Registration of Marriage.

Sh. Rajesh Kumar and Sanjna Devi have filed an application u/s 8(4) of Marriage Act, 1996

alongwith affidavits and supporting documents in the court of undersigned, stating therein that they

have solemnized their marriage on 07-12-2020 as per the Hindu ritual and customs. Therefore, the

general public is hereby informed through this notice that if any person having any objection

2907

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 24 vxLr] 2021@02 Hkknzin] 1943

regarding this marriage may file his/her objection personally or in writing before this court on or

before 06-09-2021. In case no obejection is received by 06-09-2021, it will be presumed that there

is no objection to the registration of the above said marriage and the same will be registered

accordingly.

Issued under my hand and seal of the court on 03-08-2021.

Seal.

Sd/-

Marriage Officer-cum-Executive Magistrate,

Sub-Tehsil Gagret at Kaloh ,

District Una (H.P.).

____________

In the Court of Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bangana, District Una,

Himachal Pradesh

In the matter of :

1.

Sh. Pankaj Rana s/o Sh. Ranjit Singh, r/o Village Narghota , P.O. Chapproh, Tehsil

Bangana, District Una (H.P.).

2.

Pooja d/o Sh. Balkishan, r/o Ward No. 23, Ram Shala Mohala, Tehsil & District

Shamli (U.P.)

. . Applicants.

Versus

General Public

Subject.—Application for the registration of Marriage under section 15 of the Special Marriage

Act, 1954 (H.P.).

Sh. Pankaj Rana s/o Sh. Ranjit Singh, r/o Village Narghota , P.O. Chapproh, Tehsil

Bangana, District Una (H.P.) and Pooja d/o Sh. Balkishan, r/o Ward No. 23, Ram Shala Mohala,

Tehsil & District Shamli (U.P.) at present w/o Sh. Pankaj Rana s/o Sh. Ranjit Singh, r/o Village

Narghota , P.O. Chapproh, Tehsil Bangana, District Una (H.P.) have filed an application alongwith

affidavits in the court of undersigned under section 15 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (H.P.) that

they have solemnized their marriage on 09-07-2021 according to Hindu rites and customs at Mata

Jamasni Devi Mandir, Sarian, Tehsil Bangana, District Una (H.P.) and they are living together as

husband and wife since then. Hence, their marriage may be registered under section 15 of the

Special Marriage Act, 1954 (H.P.). Therefore, the general public is hereby informed through this

notice that any person who has any objection regarding this marriage, can file the objection

personally or in writing before this court on or before 03-09-2021 after that no objection will be

entertained and marriage will be registered.

Issued today on 22nd July, 2021 under my hand and seal of the court.

Seal.

Sd/-

Marriage Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Bangana, District Una, Himachal Pradesh.

2908

jkti=] fgekpy izns'k] 24 vxLr] 2021@02 Hkknzin] 1943

CHANGE OF NAME

I, Shiv Charan (Ex. Army No. 3974336-N, Rank Ex. Sep.) s/o Sh. Amin Chand, Village &

Post Office Dhamandri, Tehsil Una, (H.P.) have Changed My Name to Shiv Charan Rana.

SHIV CHARAN ,

(Ex. Army No. 3974336-N, Rank Ex. Sep.),

s/o Sh. Amin Chand, V.P.O. Dhamandri,

Tehsil & Distt. Una, Himachal Pradesh.

fu;U=d] eqnz.k rFkk ys[ku lkexzh] fgekpy izns'k] f'keyk&5 }kjk eqfnzr rFkk izdkf'kr

bysDVªkWfud gLrk{kfjr jkti=] oSclkbV http://rajpatrahimachal.nic.in ij miyC/k gS ,oe~ vkWuykbu lR;kfir fd;k tk ldrk gS