The Odisha

G a z e t t e

EXTRAORDINARY

PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY

No. 1896 CUTTACK, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 2024/ASWINA 16, 1946

LABOUR & E.S.I. DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

The 3rd October 2024

S.R.O. No. 528/2024—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14

of 1947) the Award dated, 27th August 2024 passed in the ID Case No. 36 of 2021 by the Presiding

Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar to whom the industrial dispute between the Management

of M/s Balasore Alloys Limited, Balgopalpur, Balasore and Late Surendra Behera, substituted by

Legalheirs namely, (1) Malati Lata Behera, Age- 46 years, Wife of Late Surendra Behera,

(2) Diptimayee Priyadarshini Behera, Age-21 years, (3) Puspanjali Priyadarshini Behera, Age- 15

years, Daughters of Late Surendra Behera, all are presently residing At Brundabati Vihar,

P.O. Balia, P.S. Sahadebkhunta, Dist. Balasore, PIN-756001 was referred to for adjudication is

hereby published as in the schedule below :

SCHEDULE

IN THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNA, BHUBANESWAR

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE CASE NO. 36 of 2021

Dated the 27th August 2024

Present :

Shri Benudhar Patra, LL.M.,

Presiding Officer,

Industrial Tribunal,

Bhubaneswar,

Between :

The Management of

. .

First Party

M/s Balasore Alloys Limited,

Balgopalpur, Balasore.

And

Late Surendra Behera,

. .

Second Party

substituted by Legal heirs namely,

(1) Malati Lata Behera, Age- 46 years,

Wife of Late Surendra Behera,

(2) Diptimayee Priyadarshini Behera, Age- 21 years, &

(3) Puspanjali Priyadarshini Behera, Age- 15 years,

Daughters of Late Surendra Behera,

all are presently residingAt Brundabati Vihar,

P.O. Balia, P.S. Sahadebkhunta, Dist. Balasore,

PIN-756001.

Shri Subrat Mishra, Advocate

. .

For the First Party

Shri Janmejaya Ray,

. .

For the 2nd Party

Advocate & Associates.

AWARD

The Government of Odisha in the Labour & E.S.I. Department, have referred the following

schedule of dispute for adjudication by this Tribunal vide Order No. 5934—LESI-IR-ID-0006/2020-

LESI., dated the 19th July 2021.

SCHEDULE

“Whether the termination of service of Shri Surendra Behera by the management

of M/s Balasore Alloys Limited, w.e.f. 21st October 2019 is legal and or

justified ? If not, what relief Shri Behera is entitled to ?

2. The case of the second party, in short, is that initially on being selected by the management

of M/s Ispat Chrome Ltd. he was engaged as a “Trainee” and subsequently appointed as a “Junior

Officer” under it w.e.f. 1st August 1996 with assignment of Clerical nature of duties, but while

working as such his services were illegally terminated vide order dated the 16th May 2001 for

which he raised a dispute before the Conciliation Officer, Balasore which culminated into a reference

registered as I.D. Case No. 05 of 2006 before this Tribunal and as per the Award, dated the 11th

April 2008 although the management passed orders for his reinstatement vide Order No. 134-

SCL, dated the 28th June 2008 and accordingly he resumed duty w.e.f. 3rd July 2008, yet he’was

denied consequential service benefits, inasmuch as, he was not allowed notional increments for

the period from 2001 to 2008. It is stated that concerning the matter he submitted a grievance

petition to the management and so also the labour machinery and when notices in that regard

were received by the management from the Labour Authorities, his services were again terminated

by the management retrospectively w.e.f. 16th October 2019 vide Order No. 1234-BALB-HR, dated

the 21st October 2019 in sheer violation of the provisions of the law laid down under the I.D. Act as

well as Payment of Wages Act. Specifically, it is averred in the claim statement that the designation

“Junior Officer” assigned to him was for name sake only but practically he was discharging manual,

clerical and operational nature of duties under the direction, control and supervision of the Manager/

Assistant Manager of the Material Section, who used to supervise his work on day to day basis and

he was never bestowed with any managerial/supervisory powers. It has been specifically pleaded

by the second party that he having worked under the management as a permanent employee for

almost twenty-three years, his termination amounts to retrenchment of service and the same is

completely illegal owing to non-compliance of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

(for short ‘the Act’). While admitting about receipt of Rs. 91,585 from the first party soon after his

termination from service, the second party alleges that the same was a unilateral act on the part of

the first party and thus the same in no way gives a legal sanctity to the illegal termination order

dated the 21st October 2019. It is stated that while continuing under the first party he was holding

the status of a ‘workman’ having a gross wage of Rs. 25,041 per month and the first party being an

“industry”, the dispute regarding termination of his service is an ‘industrial dispute’ as defined

under the Act and as such, this Tribunal has Jurisdiction to adjudicate the present dispute.

Challenging his termination to be illegal and unjustified, the second party has taken a stand that as

he is not gainfully employed elsewhere after his termination he is entitled to be reinstated in service

with full back wages and consequential service benefits.

3. The first party management entered contest in the dispute and filed its written statement.

Challenging the maintainability of the reference, it is pleaded by the first party that the second party

being not a ‘workman’ covered under the definition of Section 2(s) of the Act, the Conciliation

Officer as well as the Government without application of mind have referred the dispute for

adjudication by the Tribunal. Further, it is pleaded by the first party that save and except the matter

of records, the allegation of the second party, that in view of his demand in terms of Award in ID.

Case No. 05 of 2006, dated the 11th April 2008 he has been illegally terminated from service, is not

at all correct. Rather, it is on record that pursuant to the Award in ID. Case No. 05 of 2006 the

second party was reinstated in job on 5th August 2008 but for his resigning and accepting full and

final dues from the previous company i.e. M/s Shakti Chrome Ltd. (a sister concern of the first

party), he was appointed as a fresh employee under the pay roll of the first party w.e.f. 1st July

2012 and while continuing under the first party as his performance was found unsatisfactory,

resorting to Clause 11 of his letter of appointment dated the 30th June 2012 he was terminated

from employment on payment of one month’s salary in advance in lieu of notice; he being employed

under it in the management cadre as a “Junior Officer” and used to receive more than Rs. 20,000

as remuneration per month. Besides, it has been pleaded that on termination of employment of

the second party the management has already made full and final settlement of his dues amounting

to Rs. 91,585 on 15th November 2019 which has also been duly accepted by the second party. In

the background as above, the first party has prayed to answer the reference in the negative as

against the second party.

4. Disputing almost all the averments of the written statement the second party has filed a

rejoinder taking a further stand that the second party was a ‘workman’ under the first party and it

being the settled principle of law that any clause in the appointment letter contrary to the statutory

rights cannot be utilised against a worker to deny him service benefits, the action of the management

will have to be tested on the anvil of fairness, propriety and bona fides irrespective of circumstances

in which it was entered into. Denying the alleged poor performance, it is pleaded by the second

party that allegations need to be established by the first party through cogent evidence, inasmuch

as, if at all the alleged poor performance amounted to a misconduct, then holding of an enquiry into

such allegations was imperative but there being no such enquiry conducted by the first party, the

action of the first party is in violation of the principles of natural justice.

5. Basing on the pleadings of the parties, the following issues emerge for consideration :-

ISSUES

(i) Is the reference maintainable?

(ii) Is Shri Surendra Behera a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the

I.D. Act ?

(iii) Is the termination of service of Shri Surendra Behera by the management

of M/s Balasore Alloys Ltd. w.e.f. 21st October 2019 legal and/or justified ?

(iv) If not, what relief the workman Shri Behera is entitled to ?

6. At the outset, it needs mention that during pendency of the dispute the second party

having died, his legal heirs have been substituted as per orders passed by this Tribunal on 8th

February 2022 and as such, the Result/Award of the instant dispute would be binding upon the first

party as well as the legal heirs of the second party.

7. To substantiate their respective assertion, while on behalf of the deceased-second party,

Malatilata Behera, the widow of the second party has examined .herself as WW 1 and relied on

documents marked Exts.1 .to 13, the first party examined its H.R./I.R. Sekh Jahed as MW 1 and

relied on documents which have been marked as Exts. A to E.

FINDINGS

8. Issue No.(i) and (ii)—The main thrust of argument of the first party on the point of

maintainability of the reference is that the nature of duties assigned to the deceased- second party

as well as the monthly remuneration attached to his post, if considered together, would preclude

him from the definition of ‘workman’ as given in Section 2(s) of the Act, inasmuch as, for his

discharging supervisory as well as administrative nature of duties and drawing more than Rs.10,000

per month as salary from the company, he cannot be regarded as a ‘workman’ and consequently

the reference of the dispute reflects the non-application of mind of the Conciliation Officer as well

as the Government and thus not maintainable in this Forum. On the other hand, the learned counsel

representing the deceased-second party submitted that it is the settled principle of law that neither

designation nor remuneration is a determinative factor to decide the status of an employee as to

whether he comes under the definition of ‘workman’ or not and the real test is to be determined

with reference to his principal nature of duties and functions and in order to prove such aspect, on

behalf of the’ deceased-second party sufficient evidence is led to come to a conclusion that the

deceased- second party was well covered within the definition of ‘workman’ while under the

employment of the first party and basing on such materials a finding is inevitable that the claim laid

on his behalf before this Hon’ble Tribunal is maintainable.

9. In view of the rival submissions, before discussing the evidence and materials available

on record, I would like to refer to the statutory meaning of ‘workman’ as assigned under Section

2(s) of the Act.

Section 2 (s),: “workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any

industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, sales promotion, operational, clerical or

supervisory or any work for promotion of sales for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment

be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an

industrial dispute, includes such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in

connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or

retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person -

(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act,

1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or

(ii) Who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee

of a prison; or

(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative

capacity ; or

(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding

ten thousand rupees per mensem or exercise, either by the nature of the

duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him,

functions mainly of a managerial nature.”

In the context, it is not out of place to mention that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

S.K. Maini vs. M/s Carona Sahu Company limited and others (1994) 3 SCC 510 considering the

legislative intention behind the definition of ‘workman’ have formulated a guiding principle to determine

the status of an employee as ‘workman’ under the Industrial Disputes Act and in the said case it

has been held as follows: -

“9. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the

case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it appears

to us that whether or not an employee is a workman under Section 2(s) of the

Industrial Disputes Act is required to be determined with reference to his principal

nature of duties and functions. Such question is required to be determined with

reference to the facts and circumstances of the case and materials on record and

it is not possible to lay down any strait-jacket formula which can decide the dispute

as to the real nature of duties and functions being performed by an employee in all

cases. When an employee is employed to do the types of work enumerated in the

definition of workman under Section 2(s), there is hardly any difficulty in treating

him as a workman under the appropriate classification but in the complexity of

industrial or commercial organizations quite a large number of employees are

often required to do more than one kind of work. In such cases, it becomes

necessary to determine under which classification the employee will fall for the

purpose of deciding whether he comes within the definition of workman or goes

out of it. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in

Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Co. of India Ltd. vs. Burmah Shell

Management Staff Assn. 1971 AIR 922.

Further it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Devinder Singh Vs.

Municipal Council, Sanaur, reported in (2011) 6 SCC 584 that the source of employment, the

method of recruitment; the terms and conditions of employment/contract of service, the quantum

of wages/pay and the mode of payment are not at all relevant for deciding whether or not a person

is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act.

Keeping in view the statutory meaning of ‘workman’ and the principle enunciated by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, now it is to be examined on the basis of materials available on record as

to whether the second party was coming within the purview of ‘workman’ or not.

10. WW1, Malatilata Behera, the widow of the deceased-second party deposing on behalf

of her husband has stated that her deceased husband had filed the claim statement in the dispute

challenging termination of his service w.e.f. 21st October 2019 with a prayer for his reinstatement

in service, full back wages and all other consequential service benefits but owing to his death

during pendency of the dispute she as well as her two daughters have been substituted in place of

her deceased husband. She stated that from the documents available on record she could know

the service history of her deceased husband and supporting the pleas advanced in the claim

statement she has stated that although her deceased husband was employed under the first patty

as a “Junior Officer’, yet he was all along discharging manual, clerical and operational nature of

duties at the instruction/direction of other superior authorities such as Manager/Assistant Manager

of Material Section and his work was being supervised by the said authorities as and when required

and he did not have any managerial or supervisory powers. She placed on record the photo copies

of documents pertaining to her deceased- husband, such as his appointment letter dated the 27th

April 1995 as a “Trainee” under M/s Ispat Chrome Ltd. (Ext. 1); Appointment letter dated 19-09-

1996 issued by M/s Ispat Chrome Ltd. (Ext. 2); the order of termination dated the 16th May 2001

issued by M/s Ispat Chrome Ltd. (Ext. 3); Award dated the 11th April 2008 passed by this Tribunal

in I.D. Case No. 05 of 2006 (Ext. 4); Letter, dated 28th June 2008 whereby her deceased-husband

was reinstated in service by M/s Shakti Chrome Ltd. pursuant to the Award passed in I.D. Case

No. 05 of 2006 (Ext. 5); grievance petition dated the 16th May 2018 of her deceased-husband

addressed to the Divisional Labour Commissioner, Balasore seeking re-fixation of his salary

consequent upon his reinstatement in service (Ext. 6); letter, dated the 7th March 2018 of the

Asst. Labour Commissioner, Balasore asking the first party for submission of views on the grievance

petition of her deceased-husband (Ext. 7); letter, dated the 30th August 2019 of the District Labour

Officer, Balasore asking the first party to attend a joint discussion on the grievance of her deceased.

husband (Ext. 8); letters, dated the 27th August 2019 and 11th October 2019 of the District Labour

Officer, Balasore asking the first party to show cause for violating the provisions of Section 17 (A)

of the I.D. Act and allowing the first party a month’s time to resolve the grievance of her deceased

husband as per the statement furnished alongwith the petition (Ext. 9) and (Ext. 10), respectively;

the order of termination dated the 21st October 2019 passed against her deceased husband by

the first party giving effect to the order of termination retrospectively w.e.f. 16th October 2019 (Ext.

11); complaint petition dated the 24th October 2019 of her deceased husband addressed to the

first party with copies to different authorities including the labour machinery (Ext. 12) and the

notice, dated the 2nd November 2019 issued on such complaint by the Assistant Labour Officer,

Balasore to the first party (Ext. 13). WW 1 was cross examined by the first party and it was elicited

from her that the termination order, the 21st October 2019 was given effect to from closing of

working hours on 22nd October 2019 and she also admitted Ext. A to be the order of termination

of her deceased husband; identified Ext. A/1 to be the short signature of her deceased husband

and as to the receipt of the same on 22nd October 2019. She also admitted that her deceased

husband was serving under the first party as a Junior Officer and was drawing a monthly Salary of

Rs. 20,000. She feigned her knowledge as to the employment and resignation of her deceased

husband and receipt of full and final settlement from M/s Shakti Chrome Ltd. Though suggested,

she could not say as to if her deceased husband was performing managerial and supervisory

nature of job and was never assigned with any manual work. She could not say as to if her deceased

husband was governed under the Model Standing Orders or the Industrial Employment Standing

Orders.

Resisting the claim advanced on behalf of the deceased second party, the management

has led evidence of Sekh Akhrjul, who is working under it in the capacity of HR/IR. He deposed that

consequent upon the Award dated the 11th April 2008 passed in ID Case & No. 05 of 2006, the first

party reinstated the deceased-disputant vide letter dated 28-06-2008 but did not allow him notional

increment from 2001 to 2008 as no such finding was there in the Award entitling the deceased-

disputant to such benefit. It is in his evidence that earlier the deceased disputant was on the pay

roll of M/s Shakti Chrome Ltd., a sister concern of the first party and on his resigning there from he

was appointed as a fresh employee under the first party w.e.f. 1st July 2012 and was designated

as ‘Junior Officer” in the management cadre and was paid more than Rs. 20,000 as his monthly

salary. He stated that predominantly the deceased-disputant was discharging duties of managerial

capacity and not assigned with any manual work. He has proved the letter of resignation dated the

1st June 2012 submitted by the deceased-disputant to the Director, M/s Shakti Chrome Ltd.,

(Ext. E), the letter of his appointment dated the 30th June 2012 issued by the first party (Ext. B).

During cross-examination, MW 1 stated that prior to joining the party organisation the deceased

was employed by M/s Ispat Alloys Ltd. in the year 1995 and while terminating his service w.e.f. 21st

October 2019 no show cause was called for from him by the first party. Though he gave out in his

cross examination that the deceased-disputant after resigning from M/s Shakti Chrome. Ltd. on

1st June 2012 had submitted an application to the first party for employment, but he could not say

as to if the said application has been filed before this Tribunal. He also stated during cross-

examination that the second party was not entrusted with any specific work but he was operating

computer and as it reveals from Ext. B, performing duties as instructed to him from time to time by

the management.

11. On an analysis of the evidence, as discussed above, what transpires is that earlier on

an Award being passed by this Tribunal in ID. Case No.05 of 2006 (Ext. 4) with a finding that the

termination from servic of the deceased-second party withe effect from the 16th May 2001 was

illegal and unjustified he was reinstated in service by M/s Shakti Chrome Ltd. (formerly known as

Ispat Chrome Ltd.) vide letter dated the 28th June 2008 (Ext. 5) but due to his non-entitlement he

was not paid any back wages. A perusal of Ext. 4, the Award of this Tribunal in ID. Case No. 05 of

2006, would reveal that despite the designation of “Junior Officer” the deceased disputant has

been held to be a ‘workman’ and the matter’ having not been challenged by the management,

rather was settled at rest by way of implementation of the Award, the management ought not to

have pressed the said issue for determination particularly when the deceased second party was

reinstated as per the Award and continued as a Junior Officer under it till the date of his alleged

termination. That apart, when the Hon’ble Apex Court have formulated a guideline to examine the

materials on record to arrive at a finding as to the principal nature of duties and functions of an

employee and moreover it has been the consistent stand of the deceased-second party that all

along he was discharging manual, clerical and operational nature of duties under the direction,

control and supervision of his superior authorities and his work was being supervised by the

Manager/Assistant Manager of Material Section and that he did not possess any managerial or

supervisory powers and moreover as deposed to by MW 1, the deceased-second party was not

entrusted with any specific work and he was operating computer and performing duties as per the

instructions of the management, the first party being custodian of all records ought to have placed

sufficient evidence to convince the Tribunal with regard to his discharging managerial nature of

duties while working under it as the “Junior Officer”. Besides, Clause 7 of the appointment letter of

the deceased-disputant (Ext. B) discloses under the heading “Obligations and Responsibilities”

that he was required to carry out the duties allotted to him from time to time to the entire satisfaction

of the Management. In absence of any evidence showing the job of the deceased second party as

“Junior Officer” was of supervisory and managerial in nature, this Tribunal is not in a position to

exclude him from the purview of ‘workman’ as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act, even though

he used to receive salary more than what has been prescribed under the Act.

12. ‘In view of the discussions held above, the deceased-second party is held to be a

‘workman’ within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act and consequently the reference of the

dispute is held to be maintainable.

13. Issue No.(iii) —This issue involves the question of legality and justifiability of the action

of the first party in terminating the services of the deceased-second party. In the context, while the

learned counsel for the first party takes the stand that the termination of service of the deceased-

second party was as a result of his poor performance and the same is justified because of the

stipulations in his letter of appointment dated the 30th June 2012 (Ext. B) and the HR Policy, the

learned counsel appearing for the second party argued that in absence of any material either

showing the poor performance of the second party or for that matter calling upon him to show

cause for such performance or making any enquiry, the arbitrary action of the management is

wholly illegal and not sustainable in the eye of law.

It reveals from Ext. A, the order of termination of employment of the deceased-second

party that by invoking Clause-11 of the Appointment order (Ext. B) the management has terminated

the services of the deceased-second party describing his services to be no longer required by it.

For better appreciation, Clause-11 of Ext. B is extracted below :—

11. TERMINATION

“On confirmation, this appointment is subject to termination by one-month

notice or payment in lieu thereof, on either side. If your service is terminated

consequent on any disciplinary action, loss of confidence, no notice period will

be required to terminate your appointment.

xx xx xx xx xx xx”

There would be no gainsaying of the fact that the deceased-second party was under the

employment of the first party for a substantial period and the termination of his service was not

preceded by any disciplinary action. Ext. A does not reflect any reason as to the cause of termination

of employment of the deceased-second party. As it seems, the first party before putting an end to

the employment of the deceased-second party had not followed the principle of audi alteram partem

and in a whimsical manner resorting to the contract of employment all of a sudden ousted him

from job and further without there being any request, unilaterally remitted Rs. 91,585 to the account

of the deceased-second party vide Ext. C. A reference in this regard may be made to the judgment

of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Case of D.K.Yadav vs. JMA Industry [1993 SCC(3) 259],

wherein it has been held that right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution would

include right to livelihood. The order of termination of the service of an employee/workman visits

with civil consequences of jeopardising not only his/her livelihood but also career and livelihood of

dependents. Therefore, before taking any action putting an end to the tenure of an employee/

workman fair play requires that a reasonable opportunity to put forth his case is given and domestic

enquiry conducted complying with the principles of natural justice. That apart, in view of the second

party’s rendering a permanent job under the first party, in the event of his termination the first party

ought to have complied with the provisions of the Act instead of resorting to the stipulation contained

in his letter of appointment ; he being a workman under it. So, viewing the case from any angle, the

termination of service of the second party is not sustainable in the eye of law.

The Issue No. (iii) is accordingly decided in favour of the deceased-second party.

14. Issue No. (iv)—Next it is to be seen as to what relief the heirs of the second party are

entitled owing to death of the deceased second party during pendency of the dispute. Obviously,

upon death of the deceased- second party an order of reinstatement is not possible, even if the

action of the first party is held to be illegal and unjustified. But, in view of the consistent stand of the

deceased-second party in his claim statement that in the event of proper implementation of the

Award of this Tribunal passed in ID. Case No. 05 of 2006, the deceased-second party would have

been entitled to re-fixation of his pay in the year 2008, an analysis on the point is found to be

necessary so as to award some monetary relief in favour of the deceased-second party. Although

the deceased-second party has taken a plea that in all he had rendered almost 24 years of service

under the first party, but as pointed out by the Iearned counsel for the management in view of clear

admission of WW 1 in cross examination that Ext. B is the copy of letter of appointment of her

deceased husband wherein Ext. B/1 is his signature and that the deceased second party had

never protested/objected to such appointment, for all purpose the date of employment of the

deceased-second party be construed as 30th June 2012 treating the same to be a fresh employment

under the management. Considering the above submission and upon delving into the circumstances

of the case, the Tribunal constrains to return a finding that with a view to avoid permanency and for

that matter the rigours of law, the management has put much emphasis on Ext. E, the letter of

resignation of the deceased-second party, though in fact after a few days it has again inducted the

deceased in its establishment claiming the same to be a fresh employment. Looking to the claim

of the deceased-second party and Ext. A, the Award in ID. Case No. 05 of 2006 which has already

attained its finality, this Tribunal is of the view that owing to the illegal termination of service of the

deceased-second party w.e.f. 21st October 2019, a compensation to the tune of Rs. 4,00,000

Printed and Published by the Director, Directorate of Printing, Stationery and Publication, Odisha, Cuttack-10

Ex. Gaz. 1136–173+9

(Rupees four lakh) only in lieu of all his claims would meet the ends of justice. It is made clear that

the awarded compensation in favour of the deceased-second party is subject to adjustment of the

amount already received by him as per Exts. C and D and the balance amount be paid to the heirs

of the deceased-second party within a period of two months of the date of publication of the

‘Award’ in the Official Gazette, or else the amount would carry a simple interest of 6% per annum

till its realisation.

Issue No. (iv) is answered accordingly.

Dictated and corrected by me.

BENUDHAR PATRA

27-08-2024

Presiding Officer

Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar

[No. 8600—LESI-IR-ID-0006/2020-LESI]

By order of the Governor

NITIRANJAN SEN

Additional Secretary to Government