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La Gazette de L' État de Poudouchéry

The Gazette of Puducherry

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SOMMAIRES

CONTENTS

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Page

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204

Sentence arbitral du travail

.. 204

Award of the Labour Court

.. 204

de tribunal.

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217

Notifications du Gouvernement

.. 217

Government Notifications

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221

Avis d’ appel d’ offres

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Tender Notices

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224

Annonces

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Announcements

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Registered with the Registrar

of Newspapers for India

under No. 10410

Registered No. PY/44/2018-20

WPP No. TN/PMG(CCR)/WPP-88/2018-20

Dated : 17-3-2020

Price : ` 17-00

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17 {

No.

11 Poudouchéry

Mardi

Mars

2020 (27 Phalguna 1941)

No.

Puducherry

Tuesday

17th

March

2020

204

LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT

[17 March 2020

GOVERNMENT OF PUDUCHERRY

LABOUR DEPARTMENT

(G.O. Rt. No. 27/Lab./AIL/T/2020,

Puducherry, dated 26th February 2020)

NOTIFICATION

Whereas, an Award in I.D (L) No. 33/2015, dated

12-11-2019 of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,

Puducherry in respect of the industrial dispute between

the management of M/s. Dinamalar Newspaper,

Thattanchavady, Puducherry and Thiru V.S. Murugan,

Mudaliarpet, Puducherry, over non-employment has

been received;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred

by sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act XIV of 1947), read with

the notification issued in Labour Department’s G.O. Ms.

No. 20/91/Lab./L., dated 23-5-1991, it is hereby directed

by the Secretary to Government (Labour) that the said

Award shall be published in the Official Gazette,

Puducherry.

(By order)

S. MOUTTOULINGAM,

Under Secretary to Government (Labour).

————

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL -CUM-

LABOUR COURT AT PUDUCHERRY

Present:Thiru V. PANDIARAJ, B.SC.,L.L.M.,

Presiding Officer.

Tuesday, the 12th day of November 2019.

I.D. (L) No. 33/2015

V.S. Murugan,

S/o. Selvaraj,

No. 5, Swaminathapillai Veethi,

Mudaliarpet,

Puducherry.

. . Petitioner

Versus

The Managing Director,

M/s. Dinamalar News Paper,

Industrial Estate, Thattanchavady,

Puducherry.

. . Respondent

This industrial dispute coming on 30-10-2019 before

me for final hearing in the presence of Thiru Sai Raja

Gopal, Counsel for the petitioner Thiru K. Babu,

Counsel for the respondent, upon hearing, upon

perusing the case records, after having stood over for

consideration till this day, this Court passed the

following:

AWARD

1. This Industrial Disputes arises out of the reference

made by the Government of Puducherry, vide G.O. Rt.

No. 57/AIL/Lab./T/2015, dated 18-06-2015 of the Labour

Department, Puducherry to resolve the following

dispute between the petitioner and the respondent, viz.,

(i) Whether the dispute raised by Thiru V.S. Murugan,

against the management of M/s. Dinamalar

Newspaper, Puducherry, over his non-employment is

justified or not? If justified, what relief he is entitled

to?

(ii) To compute the relief if any, awarded in terms

of money if, it can be so computed?

2. The averment in the claim statement of the

petitioner, in brief, are as follows:

The petitioner was employed in the respondent

establishment as Proof Reader for the past nine

years and his employment was confirmed by the

respondent management. This petitioner performed

his duty till 12-02-2014 sincerely up to the satisfaction

of the management and he was never charged for any

disciplinary actions. The petitioner was very

punctual in his job and he was an amiable person

towards others, such as staffs, superiors, co-workers

and juniors. He had friendly approach with his

colleagues also. The respondent management acted

in a biased manner in respect of providing incentives

to its employees and no uniformity was followed by

the management in this regard. The petitioner was

coordinating with all other workers and he involved

in labour friendly activities in getting the proper

incentives to all his colleagues in an unbiased

manner. Further, he joined together with other

colleagues for getting better salary benefits under

the law from the management, which resulted in, the

management to get aggrieved over this petitioner.

It has involved in unfair labour practice against this

petitioner. Towards this end the respondent

management threatened the co-workers and created

panic among the employees and intended to divide

them. The respondent management has forced this

petitioner to work beyond the permitted working

hours, gavs heavy work, but, denied any extra

allowance or increased salary for his additional work

and overtime work, and thereby it has caused mental

agony to this petitioner. On 12-02-2014 the

respondent management threatened this petitioner

and directed him to file a resignation letter.

Before, that it has told that such a letter is only a

formality to appease the top brass of the management

and it has assured that he would be replaced in the

same position within two days with better salary

benefits. The petitioner has no other go except to accept

205

17 March 2020]

LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT

the direction given by the management. As dictated

by the staff of the respondent management, this

petitioner has filed the resignation letter. However,

the respondent management failed to replace him in

the same position and refuse to give employment to

this petitioner as promised by them. The respondent

management has told that they could not reinstate

as this petitioner has voluntarily resigned his job.

This petitioner has no intention to resign his job in

which he had nine years past service, even against

all odds. The respondent management has adopted

tactics and it had maneuvered to extract the alleged

letter of resignation from this petitioner under

coercion and under false promise. The respondent

management has performed this unfair labour practice

as this petitioner had involved in labour friendly

activities with his colleagues. Since, the letter of

resignation was not filed in volition and as it has

obtained by force and coercion by the management

this petition has to be allowed and the petitioner has

to reinstate in his job and all other monetary benefits,

which has to be given by the respondent

management to this petitioner. Hence, the petitioner

prayed to allow this petition.

3. The brief averments in the counter filed by the

respondent are as follows:

This petition is not maintainable either in law or

on facts. The entire averments in the petition is

denied as false in total and the petitioner has to

strictly prove each and every facts with records and

evidences. The petitioner has given his letter of

resignation on 12-02-2014 on his own volition and

without any coercion or undue influence and he has

stated his reasons for his resignation also. There is

no relationship of employee and employer between

this petitioner and the respondent from 13-02-2014

and hence, he cannot file this application before this

forum. This petitioner has no locus standi to file this

application as he was no more an employee from

13-02-2014. The resignation letter, dated 12-02-2014

was acted upon and he has received his monetary

benefits also. This petition has been filed with

afterthoughts inventions in a delayed manner on

08-05-2014. This petitioner never ever approached

the respondent management from 13-02-2014 for

reinstatement or any other benefits. Further, this

petitioner has not approached the management and

he has not attempted to withdraw his resignation

letter from the management. Since, the petitioner has

voluntarily resigned his job on his own accord and

without any coercion or undue influence, this

petition has to be dismissed with cost.

4. In the course of enquiry, the petitioner has

examined three witnesses on his side and he has marked

EX.Pl to EX.P7 as his side documents. The respondent

management has examined RW.l and it has marked Ex.Rl

to R8 on its side.

5. The point for consideration is:

Whether the petitioner is entitled for reinstatement

and all other monetary benefits? is the point for

consideration.

6. The petitioner side Counsel argued this petitioner

was threatened and forced to give his resignation letter

on 12-02-2014. It is further, argued that there is no

previous charges against this petitioner and he has not

been subjected to any disciplinary action so far. It is

further argued that since, the petitioner has involved

in labour friendly activities, he has been victimized by

the respondent management and it has threatened this

petitioner and also by false promise it has obtained the

resignation letter from this petitioner and therefore, he

has to be reinstated with all monetary benefits.

7. The respondent side Counsel argued that the

petitioner has filed his resignation letter on his own

volition and no coercion or undue influence was

adopted by the respondent management. It is further

argued that as this petitioner has voluntarily resigned

his job, he cannot seek any remedy before, this Court

and hence, he prayed for dismissal of this application.

8. On the point:

The pleadings of the parties and the evidences

adduced on both sides were carefully considered.

The petitioner has deposed that as he has involved

in labour friendly activities against the management,

he has been forced under threat to write a letter of

resignation as dictated by them on 12-02-2014. He

has further, deposed that the management has

enticed him to write the same and no other go except

to give his resignation letter. On the contrary, the

respondent side witness, RW.1 has deposed that the

resignation letter was given by this petitioner on his

own accord and allegation of threat, false promise

and enticement was false. Now, the Court has to

consider whether the resignation was obtained under

coercion or under threat or under false promise. In

this regard, the evidence of PWl was carefully

considered by this Court. The Petitioner/PW1 has

deposed that on 12-02-2014 he was threatened by the

respondent management. But, he has not deposed

that who has threatened him, and he has not stated

anything about the place of threatening. Futhermore,

he has not stated time of threatening. Further, PW1

has failed to depose who were present at the time of

threatening. Therefore, it seems that the evidence of

PWl regarding the threatening was not a genuine one

and it seems to be a false one. If, this petitioner was

really threatened, definitely he could deposed the

name of the person who cause threatening, the place,

the time and the witnesses who were present at the

time of threatening. Furthermore, PW2 and PW3 also

206

LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT

[17 March 2020

failed to state anything regarding the time, place,

name of the persons present at the time of

threatening. Hence, the lack of evidences in this

aspect in the deposition of PW2 and PW3 also, create

suspicion in the evidence of PWl. Furthermore, PW2

is the wife of PWl and PW3 is the brother-in-law of

PWl. Since the PW2 and PW3 are the interested

witnesses their testimonials cannot be accepted as

trustworthy. Since the evidences of PWl to PW3 was

lack of all these aspects, this Court come to the

conclusion that the allegation of threat and coercion

is nothing but, bald allegation without any support

and hence, this Court not inclined to accept the

evidences reliable one.

9. Furthermore, PWl has deposed that the

management had threatened him and enticed him to

write the resignation letter. This Court is unable to

accept this evidence as threatening and enticement are

diagonally opposite to each other. Once, if, the

management adopted threatening activities as alleged

by this petitioner, then the management will not entice

this petitioner to get such a resignation letter as it is

totally and diagonally opposite to that of threatening,

Hence, on that score also this Court considers that the

evidence of PW.1 is nothing but, the false and bald

allegation against the management.

10. Further, PW.1 has deposed that the respondent

management has told that such a resignation letter is

required as a formality to appease the top brass of the

management. Further, he has deposed that he has

written the resignation letter as dictated by the staff of

the respondent management. But, the petitioner has not

deposed the name of the top brass who has to be

appeased, and the name of the staff who dictated him

to write the letter in his evidence. The lack of these

aspects would goes to shows that the evidence of PW.1

is unreliable and trustworthy, in respect of the allegation

enticing by the management.

11. At this juncture the respondent side Counsel filed

the Judgment reported in 1989 2 LLJ 443. It was

rendered the Hon’ble Patna High Court in Tata Robins

Fraser Company Ltd. and the Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd.

Vs.

Presiding Officer, Labour Court

Wherein, 19th and 20th para runs as follows:

It is true that there is no provision similar to Order

6 Rule 4 of the Code in the Shops Act. When an

employee who has resigned wants to bring his case

within ‘otherwise terminated’ to show that it was not

given voluntarily although prima facie, it is a case

of resignation, Court shall be required to ‘tear the

veil’ for this, the employee must give the particulars

in the complaint to enable the other side to know

what case he is to meet to ‘prevent surprise’, as is

generally said, during trial. Order 6 Rule 4 is meant

to prevent such a situation. On the ground of public

policy, as was done by the Supreme Court in Sarguja

Transport V/s. State Transport Appellate Tribunal.

I am of the opinion that unless that particulars of

undue influence, misrepresentation, fraud or the like

are stated to show that the resignation was not

voluntary, the complainant cannot be allowed to lead

evidence on those.

12. I have quoted above in extensor the relevant

paragraphs of the complaints and the reply thereto made

in the show cause. Nothing has been stated in either

of the complaints that Singh requested Hasan or Rao

requested Dr. Singh to allow them time to think over the

matter. Neither of them stated that they tried to come

out of the office of Hasan and Dr. Singh, but, they were

physically restrained. Neither stated that they had

protested to Hasan or Dr. Singh about their conduct.

Merely saying that signature was obtained by undue

influence or coercion will not be enough unless these

and similar particulars are pleaded and proved, so that

in law an inference that employment was ‘otherwise

terminated’ may be drawn. The findings recorded by the

Labour Court that their resignation was obtained by

inducement, or undue influence or under duress are mere

conjectures. The company therefore, in both the cases

must succeed.

13. As held in the abovesaid paragraph if, there is

any real threat and coercion, this petitioner could very

well establish the same by deposing the name, time,

place and the manner of threat and everything.

But, here in this case this petitioner failed to give

evidence regarding, name, time, place and the manner

of threatening. As held in the abovesaid paragraph,

merely saying that the signature was obtained by

undue influence or coercion will not be enough

unless these particulars are pleaded and proved.

Here, in this case also this petitioner failed to prove

the abovesaid aspects. Furthermore, in the abovesaid

Judgment paragraph 13 runs as follows: ‘It is

sub mitted that if, there was any grievance about the

manner in which the complainants resignation was

procured and accepted against his will, he could

have immediately made report about it to any higher

authority but, first representation that the complainant

made to the company was after lapse of 93 days’.

14. As per the abovesaid paragraph if, the petitioner

was really subjected to threatening he could have

immediately made report about it to any higher

authority, but, here in this case, this petitioner has not

attempted to make any complaint before the higher

authorities of the respondent management. Furthermore,

207

17 March 2020]

LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT

if, the petitioner was really threatened and not permitted

to work from 13-02-2014 he could very well immediately

approach the Conciliation Officer, but, here in this case,

this petitioner has approached the Conciliation Officer

after the lapse of 85 days only. There is no explanation

offered by this petitioner for such delay. Furthermore,

this petitioner has not taken any steps to withdraw the

so called regignation letter by mentioning the

circumstances under which it was drawn. Hence, on that

score also the plea of threat, undue influence and

enticement becomes unbelievable and untrustworthy.

Thus, though this petitioner pleads coercion, undue

influence, threat and false promise, he has failed to

prove the same by clear and cogent evidences and

documents. At this juncture, the respondent side

Counsel argued that this petitioner has the qualification

of M.A., M.Phil., and Ph.D., it was not denied by the

petitioner Counsel. It shows that he was not an ordinary

man like that of an uneducated person. So, this Court

come to the conclusion, that the resignation letter could

be given by this petitioner on his own accord and

volition and it was not given under threat or coercion

or under enticement and hence, he was not entitled for

reinstatement and other monetary benefits.

15. In the result, this industrial dispute raised by this

petitioner, over his reinstatement is found unjustified

and this petition is dismissed. No cost.

Dictated to the Stenographer, transcribed by him,

corrected and pronounced by me in the open Court on

this the 12th day of November, 2019.

V. PANDIARAJ,

Presiding Officer,

Industrial Tribunal-cum-

Labour Court, Puducherry.

List of petitioner’s witnesses:

PW.l — 02-05-2017

V.S. Murugan

PW.2 — 1l-10-2017

Subbulakshmi

PW.3 — 16-1l-2017

Kalidass

List of petitioner’s exhibits:

Ex.Pl — 2l-04-2008

Attested copy of the Family

Ration Card of the petitioner.

Ex.P2 — 16-05-2014

Attested copy of notice of

Enquiry/Conciliation.

Ex.P3 — 02-02-2009

Attested copy of Certificate

of respondent for obtaining

gas connection.

Ex.P4 —

Attested copy of ESI Card of

the petitioner.

Ex.P5 — 30-03-2008

Attested copy of Insurance

Card of the petitioner (2 Nos.).

Ex.P6

—

Attested copy of Bank

Passbook

(Karur

Vysia

Bank) of the petitioner.

Ex.P7 — 07-09-2012

Attested copy of Bank

Passbook (State Bank of

India) of the petitioner.

List of respondent’s witness:

RW.1 — 09-02-2018

Suresh

List of petitioner’s exhibits:

Ex.R1 — 27-02-2018

Apology Letter.

Ex.R2 — 12-02-2014

Signature found in the

resignation letter.

Ex.R3 — 19-01-2014

Letter of authorization.

Ex.R4 — 12-02-2014

Resignation letter of petitioner.

Ex.R5 — 14-02-2014

Settlement of account and

due certificate.

Ex.R6 — 08-05-2014

Notice sent to the respondent

by the petitioner.

Ex.R7 —

Reply notice of the respondent.

Ex.R8 — 12-05-2015

Copy of report on failure of

conciliation.

V. PANDIARAJ,

Presiding Officer,

Industrial Tribunal-cum-

Labour Court, Puducherry.

————

GOVERNMENT OF PUDUCHERRY

LABOUR DEPARTMENT

(G.O. Rt. No. 28/AIL/Lab./T/2020,

Puducherry, dated 26th February 2020)

NOTIFICATION

Whereas, an Award in I.D (T) No. 34/2015, dated

13-12-2019 of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,

Puducherry in respect of the industrial dispute between

the management of M/s. UCAL Fuel Systems Limited,

Puducherry and Thiru Govindarajalu, Thilarshpet,

Puducherry, over non-employment has been received;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred

by sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act XIV of 1947), read with

the notification issued in Labour Department’s G.O. Ms.

No. 20/91/Lab./L, dated 23-05-1991, it is hereby directed

by the Secretary to Government (Labour) that the said

Award shall be published in the Official Gazette,

Puducherry.

(By order)

S. MOUTTOULINGAM,

Under Secretary to Government (Labour).

208

LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT

[17 March 2020

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-

LABOUR COURT AT PUDUCHERRY

Present : Thiru V. PANDIARAJ, B.SC., L.L.M.,

Presiding Officer.

Friday, the 13th day of December 2019.

I.D. (L) No. 34/2015

Govindarajalu,

No. 199, First Floor,

Vazhudavur Road,

Thilarshpet, Puducherry.

. . Petitioner

Versus

The Managing Director,

M/s. UCAL Fuel Systems Limited,

No. A-98, PIPDIC Industrial Estate,

Mettupalayam, Puducherry.

. . Respondent

This Industrial Dispute coming on 26-11-2019 before

me for final hearing in the presence of Thiruvalargal

L. Sathish, T. Pravin, S. Velmurugan, V. Veeraragavan

and E. Karthick, Counsels for the petitioner and

Thiru M. Vaikunth, Counsel for the respondent, upon

hearing, upon perusing the case records, after having

stood over for consideration till this day, this Court

passed the following:

AWARD

1. This Industrial Dispute has been referred by the

Government of Puducherry as per the G.O. Rt. No. 58/AIL/

Lab./T/2015, dated 18-06-2015 for adjudicating the

following:-

(a) Whether

t h e

d i s p u t e

r a i s e d

b y

Thiru N. Govindarajalu against the management

of M/s. UCAL Fuel Systems Limited, No. A-98,

Mettupalayam Estate, Puducherry, over his

non-employment is justified or not? If justified, what

relief he is entitled to?

(b) To compute the relief, if any, awarded in terms

of money, if it can be so computed?

2. The brief averment of the petition filed by the

petitioner:-

(i) The petitioner hails from a poor family and he

has completed his ITI course in Government ITI at

T.R. Pattinam and he had under gone apprenticeship

training at Puducherry Engineering College,

Puducherry for one year and he has received

completion certificate through Employment Exchange

and he has attended the interview called for by this

respondent on 24-12-2012 and on being satisfied with

his performance, the respondent has employed this

petitioner in Quality Department in Dye Casting

section as “Machine Operation for carburetor and

Quality Maintenance”. Though this petitioner was

employed in the regular vacancy as a workman, the

respondent designated him as an apprentice, which

was not known to this petitioner as he being 19 years

old and it is being his first employment. Though he

was designated as apprenticeship, the petitioner was

never given any training in any field and none of the

requirement of Apprenticeship Act was followed by

the respondent. Thus, he was engaged as a regular

employee only and hence, he is entitled for all the

benefits and protections of Labour Welfare

Legislations.

(ii) On 10-08-2013 he worked in the 2nd shift

(Saturday night shift) and he was asked to work on

Sunday i.e., on 11-08-2013 in the 2nd shift. The

petitioner was asked to work in two shifts without

giving any rest. Already this petitioner has worked

in the factory without any break for more than a week

at the relevant point of time and thereby the

respondent has failed to follow the statutory

procedures. While he was in 2nd shift duty on

11-08-2013 at about 08.30 p.m he was tired and

exhausted. At that time the conveyor belt of the

machine had slipped out and this petitioner was

instructed to put the belt by his supervisor, inspite

of the fact that it was the Technician’s duty. The

respondent management failed to supply the safety

equipments and did not complied the safety

standards and it has violated the essential safety

measures under the provisions of the Factories Act.

When the petitioner attempted to put the belt with

his hands, it got struck between the wheel and the

belt. The petitioner’s right hand thumb was totally

severed and he suffered multiple injuries in his left

hand also. He has taken to the ESI hospital as he

was a regular employee and treatment was given to

him in the ESI hospital and thereafter he has been

referred to higher institution for specialized treatment.

The petitioner suffered a total disability of 30% and

he got the Fitness Certificate on 08-04-2014. This

petitioner approached the respondent management

on 08-04-2014 for the duty. The respondent has

obtained signatures from this petitioner in some

papers and requested him to come back upon being

called by the respondent. The respondent failed to

call him back and therefore, this petitioner has given

repeated reminders to the respondent.

(iii) During July 2014 the respondent has sent a

registered post in courier wherein, it has stated that

this petitioner has voluntarily resigned his job.

Further, it has sent the Apprenticeship Training

Completion Certificate also. The petitioner has never

ever given his voluntarily resignation letter to the

respondent. The respondent has created such false

document as an after thought for the purpose of

209

17 March 2020]

LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT

denying employment to this petitioner. This

petitioner has approached the Conciliation Officer

and the respondent has filed its reply on 14-10-2014

before the Conciliation Officer, wherein, the

respondent has stated that this petitioner has given

a letter of voluntary resignation through his father

on 08-04-2014. It has further stated that this

petitioner has filed the written request for apprentice

training, at the time of filing his Bio-data. It has

further stated that this petitioner failed to take the

help of supervisor at the time of operating the

machine. Though the abovesaid documents were

called for by the Conciliation Officer, the management

has failed to produce the same before the Conciliation

Officer, even after its direction. This petitioner has

issued a notice, dated 30-04-2015 to the respondent

to produce the following documents before the

Conciliation Officer.

1. All the letter and instruments alleged to have

been signed and produce by this petitioner at the

time of his appointment on 24-12-2012.

2. All the communications sent by this

petitioner by this respondent to this petitioner.

3. All documents and deeds that were executed

and generated by the respondent management it

compliance

requirements

under

the

Apprenticeship Act 1961.

4. All the documents and letters alleged to

have been signed and executed by this petitioner

or his father on 08-04-2014 and any dates

subsequent thereto.

5. Certified standing order of the company.

(iv) Even then, the respondent failed to produce

the same before the Conciliation Officer and due to

its adamant attitude, the conciliation proceedings

ended in vain. The act of the respondent amounts

to violation of section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes

Act. The removal of this petitioner with employment

injury will amounts to contravention of ESI Act and

other labour legislations. This petitioner sustained

injury only because of the utter negligence on the

part of the respondent in extracting Human Labour

from this petitioner for long hours without giving him

adequate rest and safety equipments. Further more,

the respondent has clandestinely removed this

petitioner from the employment. Hence, this petition

has to be allowed and the respondent has to be

directed to reinstate this petitioner with full back

wages and all other monetary benefits.

3. The brief averment of the counter filed by the

respondent:-

(i) All the allegations except those are specifically

admitted by this respondent is denied as false. The

petitioner has completed ITI course at T.R. Pattinam.

He has not shown any document regarding his

completion of Apprenticeship Training at Pondicherry

Engineering College, Puducherry and therefore,

it was not known to this respondent. The petitioner

has stated in his letter, dated 12-12-2012, that he has

completed his ITI Course and he was a fresher having

no experience and requested for apprenticeship

training in the respondent company to enable him to

seek employment in some other industry in future.

Based on humanitarian ground the respondent has

issued an order on 24-12-2012, whereby the

respondent permitted this petitioner to have

Apprenticeship Training Programme in its factory.

The respondent has given all the safety measures to

his employees and it has insured its employees under

the ESI Scheme, which is a ipso fact proving the

safety measures taken by the management. The

petitioner never obeyed the instructions of the

Supervisor or Superior Officer and he is a rule breaker,

while he was under training programme. The

petitioner failed to follow the instructions given by

the supervisors and he has acted in a negligent

manner which resulted in his loss of right hand

thumb.

(ii) On 08-04-2014 this petitioner has voluntarily

filed his resignation letter through his father and

requested the respondent to give the training

completion certificate. The petitioner suppressed this

fact for his convenient. Further, this petitioner has

no locus standi to ask any documents from the

respondent company as he was an apprentice only.

Furthermore, the documents sought for by him was

already available with him alone. Furthermore, this

petitioner has sent the notice with an intention to

improve his case only and this respondent is not

under obligation to produce the same either before

the Conciliation Officer or to this petitioner. The

respondent never ever appointed this petitioner as

regular employee and he was never treated as regular

employee. He has discharged his duty as apprentice

only and the termination will not amounts to violation

of section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

(iii) This petitioner had sustained injury only

because of his utter negligence and not due to the

management side. The respondent never ever

extracted more work from its employees for long

hours without giving any rest and these allegations

are raised for the purpose of unlawful gain. The

curiosity and reckless attitude are the reasons for his

injury. He has mishandled the machine without

wearing the safety devices and equipments in the

absence of the Supervisor, for which this respondent

is no way responsible. The responded has not

allotted any work to this petitioner, to handle with

the machines. Therefore, this petition has to be

dismissed with cost.

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[17 March 2020

4. On the side of the petitioner only witness was

examined and Ex.P1 to Ex.P24 were marked. On the side

of the respondent only one witness was examined and

Ex.Rl and Ex.R2 were marked.

5. The petitioner side Counsel argued that though

he was employed as apprentice he has been directed to

work as a regular employee. He has been allotted with

shift work as a regular employee. The management failed

to follow the requirements of Apprentices Act 1961. The

respondent management has never ever given any

training to this petitioner as he was not at all engaged

as apprentice under training. It is further, argued that

the respondent management has not produced any

documents to show that there was a contract of

apprenticeship under section 4 of the Apprenticeship

Act, 1961 and it has not registered the same. It is further,

argued that the respondent management has violated

the provisions of Apprenticeship Act, 1961 and

therefore, this petitioner was entitle for the benefits of

regular employee. It is further, argued that the

management has adopted unfair labour practice by

engaging the apprentices in the regular vacancy and

thereby violated the provisions of Apprenticeship Act,

1961. It is argued by the petitioner counsel that Ex.PI is

a document created and issued with deceitful intention,

to deny the employment to this petitioner. It is further,

argued that without any trainer in the respondent

management it cannot issue Apprenticeship Training

Completion Certificate. The petitioner side Counsel

argued that this petitioner was given salary periodically

and therefore, he cannot be termed as apprentice as he

has never ever given stipend. It is argued that as he

has been engaged and utilized as a regular employee,

the mere nomenclature as an apprentice would not

disentitle this petitioner to claim the benefits like that

of a regular employee. It is further argued that the non

production of the documents called for by this petitioner

would goes to show that this petitioner was never ever

engaged as apprentice. He has further argued that the

respondent has failed to produce the apprentice

documents with respect to this petitioner and hence, he

prayed to allow this application.

6. The respondent side Counsel has not appeared

before this Court to putforth his oral argument even

after sufficient time was given by this Court. Therefore,

this Court/Tribunal taken it as heard and it has decided

to proceed further.

7. Points for consideration:

Whether this petitioner was employed as an

apprentice or as a regular employee? and whether his

non-employment was justified or not? is the point to

be decided by this Tribunal. If, it is decided in favour

of the petitioner, what is the relief that he was entitle

to? is also to be decided in this case.

8. On the Point:

The petitioner was an employee in the respondent

company and he has been removed from his service

by the management are all admitted facts. Further

more he has a total disability of 30% due to industrial

accident, is also admitted on both sides.

9. As per the pleading and as per the argument

putforth by the petitioner side Counsel this petitioner

was not an apprentice and he was a regular employee

only. Per contra, as per the pleading raised in the

counter, the respondent management alleges that he was

an apprentice only. To analyse these aspects this

Tribunal inclined to go through the evidences and

documents produced on both sides.

10. The petitioner has deposed that he has

completed his ITI Court at T.R. Pattinam. It was not

denied by the respondent. The petitioner has deposed

that he had undergone apprenticeship training at

Pondicherry Engineering College, Puducherry for one

year and he has obtained the Apprenticeship Training

Completion Certificate from the Pondicherry Engineering

College, Puducherry. Whereas, the respondent has

deposed that it was not known to their management.

From this evidence it seems that the management has

not denied the plea of completion apprenticeship

training by the petitioner before he joined in the

respondent company. Furthermore, this petitioner has

produced the document Ex.P22 which is the document

of his Apprenticeship Training Completion Certificate,

dated 08-12-2012, wherein, it is clearry stated that this

petitioner has already undergone one year apprenticeship

training in Pondicherry Engineering College, Puducherry

from 09-12-2011 to 08-12-2012. Therefore, the plea of

completion of apprenticeship training by this petitioner

at Pondicherry Engineering College, Puducherry found

to be proved by Ex.P22. Further, on perusal of Ex.P22,

it is found that already this petitioner has filed Form-I,

Form-II (Declaration), Resume, Provisional Certificate,

Filled up application issued by the management and

Transfer Certificate along with his Apprenticeship

Training Completion Certificate to the respondent.

Further, RW1 himself admitted in his cross-examination

that the respondent company has received the

Apprenticeship Training Completion Certificate from

this petitioner with his resume and application form on

24-12-2012. Therefore, it is clear that this petitioner has

already filed his Apprenticeship Training Completion

Certificate on 24-12-2012 before the respondent

management along with other certificates and therefore,

this Court come to the conclusion that the evidence of

RW.1 in this aspect is nothing but, an utter lie adduced

with the indention to defeat the claim of this petitioner.

11. Furthermore, the RW1 has deposed that this

petitioner requested the management vide his letter

24-12-2012 by stating that he has completed ITI and

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mentioning him as a fresher having no experience and

requested to provide Apprentice Training Programme

in the respondent company. To prove this aspect, the

respondent company has not produced the so called

requisition letter, dated 24-12-2012 given by this

petitioner. Therefore, this tribunal found that the

evidence of RW1 that, the petitioner was a fresher and

he requested the management to give Apprentice

Training Programme became false one. Further, RW1 has

deposed that it has employed this petitioner as

apprentice in their company and it has issued an order

on 24-12-2012 and thereby it has permitted this

petitioner to undergo Apprenticeship Training

Programme in its company. In order to substantiate this

evidence, the respondent has not produced document,

dated 24-12-2012, which alone can speak about the

nature of appointment given to this petitioner. The non-

production of order, dated 24-12-2012 has probablised

the case of petitioner alone.

12. The petitioner has deposed that the respondent

has offered the employment as a regular employee and

it has extracted all kinds of work from this petitioner

just like that of a regular employee. He has deposed that

he was never ever given any training in any field as

required under the Apprenticeship Act, 1961 as pleaded

by the respondent. Furthermore, during his cross-

examination PW1 has strongly denied the suggestions

made in this regard. At this juncture, this Court/Tribunal

inclined to reproduce the admitted evidence of RWI in

this regard in his cross-examination. RWI has deposed

that they have not made any publication for want of

apprentice in their company. Further, he has admitted

in his cross-examination that the company has not

produced any document regarding the appointment of

this petitioner as apprentice, period of training of

apprenticeship and details of stipend given to this

petitioner. In addition to this, the respondent has

deposed that apprentices were also directed to do all

the works as Casual Labour. He has deposed that the

apprentices were engaged in shop floor work also. He

has further deposed that the apprentices were engaged

in night shift also. Further, he has deposed that no

training programme was given to the apprentices in their

company. He has further deposed that no stipend was

granted to the apprentices whereas, it has granted salary

to them. He has deposed that Ex.P23 is such a kind of

document showing the salary given to the petitioner.

He has deposed that attendance register and

employment number also given to this petitioner as per

Ex.P24. Further, he has deposed that they have not

mentioned anything in their counter regarding the field

in which this petitioner was given apprenticeship

training. He has further, deposed that there is no

difference between the apprentices and the permanent

employees in their company and both of them were

engaged in same kind of work in their company. All these

evidences of RW.1 would goes to shows that this

petitioner was engaged as regular employee only. For

the sake of argument, if, we consider this petitioner as

an apprentice, the abovesaid evidences would goes to

shows that the appointment of this petitioner as

apprentice is not at all true in real sense and it is for

nomenclature purpose only, i.e., in true sense, he has

been engaged as regular employee and work has been

extracted from him just like that of a regular employee.

13. Further, RW.l has deposed that they have issued

the Apprenticeship Training Completion Certificate

Ex.P1 on 08-04-2014. As per the Ex.P1, the respondent

management has stated that this petitioner joined as

apprentice on 24-12-2012 and the date of leaving as

23-12-2013. If, this is true then definitely it would have

issued the training completion certificate on 23-12-2013

itself or within a short span of time. But, it has issued

the certificate only on 08-04-2014. The respondent

management has not adduced any explanation for the

delay of issue of such certificate. It shows that the

issuance of training completion certificate on 08-04-2014

is nothing but, a created document for the purpose of

denial of work to the petitioner in the company after

the production of the fitness certificate by this

petitioner on 08-04-2014. Therefore, this Tribunal found

that this petitioner was not at all engaged as apprentice,

whereas, he has been actually engaged as regular

employee only.

14. The petitioner has deposed that he or his father

never ever given voluntary resignation letter to the

company on 08-04-2014. Whereas, RW.l has deposed

that this petitioner has requested the company to issue

a training competition certificate and he has submitted

his letter of voluntary resignation to the company, but,

the letter, dated 08-04-2014 has not contain anything

regarding voluntary resignation. Hence, the evidence of

RW.l in this regard also becomes untrustworthy.

Furthermore, the respondent has not produced the

document, dated 08-04-2014 before the Conciliation

Officer even after direction during the conciliation

proceeding. Further, the respondent management has

failed to furnish the same to this petitioner even after

issuance of legal notice, dated 30-04-2014. There was

no explanation offered by this respondent either before

the Conciliation Officer or before this Court, for such

non- production of the certificate, dated 08-04-2014.

Therefore, the genueinity of Ex.Rl also becomes

doubtful again. Furthermore, the respondent has not

pleaded anything regarding his voluntary resignation,

dated 08-04-2014 in their letter, dated 30-07-2014 (Ex.P15)

and in their letter, dated 14-10-2014 (Ex.P16). It shows

that the story of voluntary resignation given by this

petitioner as alleged by this respondent is nothing but,

an utter lie.

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15. Now, this Court inclined to go through the

relevancy of the citations filed on the side of the

petitioner in connection with this case. The petitioner

side Counsel has filed a citation reported in –

CDJ 2005 MHC 815

wherein, it is opined that “if, the apprentice was not

subjected to training then he has to be considered as

an employee doing full time work in the establishment

and not undergoing training”. Here, in this case also

though the respondent has alleged this petitioner as an

apprentice, it has given full time work to this petitioner

and extracted work from this petitioner like that of a

regular employee by directed him to work in the night

shift and also in the other shift without any break or

interval. Hence, if, we applied the observation of the

abovesaid citation in this case this petitioner would

clearly comes under the category of regular employee

only. Furthermore, in the abovesaid citation it is opined

that “Industrial Law recognizes that the workers are in

a weaker position than the employers who have

financial resources, management skills, connection, etc.,

Hence, the whole object of industrial law is to help the

weaker sections in the society (the workman) and give

them protection from exploitation. In our opinion, there

can be no estoppel against a person who accept his

designation as an apprentice, but, later on raises a plea

that in fact he was not an apprentice but, was doing

the work of a workman. It is the actual work which a

person is doing which must be seen and not the

designation. As per the abovesaid observation even the

person who was appointed as apprentice can later on

raises a plea that he was not an apprentice, if, he was

subjected to regular work just like that of a regular

employee. Here, in this case, the management has

extracted all sorts of work from this petitioner just like

that of a regular employee. Therefore, even if, the plea

of apprenticeship by the respondent is taken as true,

this Court can very well come to the conclusion that

he was not an apprentice as he was subjected to all sorts

of work by the respondent just like that of a regular

employee.

16. Furthermore, as per the citation reported in 1994

(2) LLJ 1153 SC, the designation of an employee is not

much importance and what is important is the nature of

duty that he performed. The same view was also

adopted in the following judgments:

1. 1969 (2) LLJ (370 - Anandha Bazaar Patrikai Vs.

Its workmen.

2. 1966 (2) LLJ 194 - Sydicate Bank Ltd. Vs. Its

workman.

3. 1961 (2) LLJ 94 - May and Baker Ltd. Vs. Its

workman.

17. Here, in this case also this petitioner has been

directed and asked to do work like that of a regular

employee and not like that of an apprentice. Hence, the

benefit, the abovesaid citations have to be given to this

petitioner necessarily and without fail.

18. Further, the petitioner side Counsel filed a

citation reported in –

AIR 2003 SC 3329

wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “even

if, the petitioner failed to produce the appointment order

then it could not be concluded in favour of the

management and it has clearly held that the version of

the management cannot be held as true”. Here, in this

case also this petitioner failed to file the appointment

order, dated 24-12-2014. At the same time, he has

deposed that he has worked as regular employee in the

abovesaid company. The respondent side witnesses

also admitted that he has been engaged in the work just

like that of a regular employee. Further, the respondent

has failed to produce the Apprenticeship Training

Order, dated 24-12-2012. Hence, from the abovesaid

citation also, this Tribunal was unable to come to the

conclusion that this petitioner was appointed as

apprenticeship in the respondent company. Further, the

abovesaid citation it is observed as follows “if, there

were trainees, there should have been trainers too. The

management evidently came forward with a false plea

dubbing the employee/workman as trainees so as to

resort to summary termination and deny the legitimate

benefits”. Here, in this case, the management has

pleaded that this petitioner was engaged as apprentice

trainee only. But, to substantiate its plea it has not

produced the list of trainers and the nature of the

training given to this petitioner. Therefore, as per the

judgment, the stand/plea taken by the respondent

cannot be considered, due to its failure to produce the

relevant document of apprenticeship training. Further,

it seems that the respondent management has resorted

to such plea in order to terminate and to deny the

legitimate benefits to this petitioner.

19. The petitioner side Counsel filed the citation

reported in –

CDJ1994SC 1065

wherein, it is clearly held that “if, the person was made

to work against a regular vacancy then he can be treated

as regular employee”. Here, in this case RW.1 has stated

that apprentices were asked to work in the place of

casual employers and also with permanent employees

and they were provided with salary only and no stipend

was given to them. Further, he has clearly deposed that

they will go for engagement of apprentice in

probationate to the orders received by them from their

clients. Furthermore, he has deposed that this petitioner

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met with industrial injury while he has engaged as

Machine Operator in the factory during the 2nd shift.

Furthermore, he has clearly deposed that though he was

engaged as apprentice, they have extracted the work

from this petitioner just like that of a regular employee.

If, we look the abovesaid evidence of RW.l in parallel

with the abovesaid citation, this Court can very well

come to the conclusion that this petitioner was not

employed as an apprentice whereas, he has been

employed as regular employee to fill up the vacant place

in their company, in order to meet out their orders

canvassed.

20. Furthermore, the petitioner side Counsel filed a

citation reported in –

CDJ 2009 SC 1970

wherein, the HSC has clearly held that “if, the

management has failed to produce the muster role then

it can take adverse inference against the management”.

Here, in this case also the management has failed to

produce the documents related to apprenticeship

training programme. Hence, this Court takes adverse

inference against the management. Furthermore, in the

abovesaid judgment the 15th paragraph runs as follows:

“Applying the principles laid down in the above

case by this Court, the evidence produced, by the

appellant has not been consistent. The appellants

claim that the respondent did not work for 240 days.

The respondent was a workman hired on a daily wage

basis. So, it is obvious, as this Court pointed out in

the above case that he would have difficult in having

access to all the official documents, muster rolls, etc.,

in connection with his service. He has come forward

and deposed, so, in our opinion, the burden of proof

shifts to the employee/appellants to prove that he

did not complete 240 days of service in the requisite

period to constitute continuous service. It is the

contention of the appellant that the services of the

respondent were terminated in 1988, The witness

produced by the appellant stated that the respondent

stopped coming to work from February, 1988. The

documentary evidence produced by the appellant in

contradictory to this fact as it shows that the

respondent was working during February, 1989 also.

It has also been observed by the High Court that the

muster roll for 1986-87 was not completely produced.

The appellants have inexplicably failed to produce

the complete records and muster rolls from 1985 to

1991, inspite of the direction issued by the Labour

Court to produce the same. In fact, there has been

practically no challenge to the deposition of the

respondent during cross-examination. In this regard,

it would be pertinent to mention the observation of

three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of

Municipal Corporation, Faridabad Vs. Siri Niwas

[(2004) 8 SCC 195], where it is observed".

“A Court of Law even in as case where provisions

of the Indian Evidence Act apply, may presume or

may not presume that if, a party despite possession

of the best evidence had not produce the same, it

would have gone against this contentions. The

matter, however, would be different where despite

direction by a Court the evidence is withheld”.

21. Here, in this case also the petitioner has worked

for more than 240 days including ESI leave and

therefore, this Court ought to have given benefit of the

abovesaid citation. The petitioner side Counsel filed the

citation reported in CDJ 2003 GHC 182, wherein, the 7th

and 8th paragraphs run as follows.

“Learned Advocate Ms. Mandavia has relied upon

decision of this Court in case of ballkhan Doshan Joya

V. Gujarat Electricity Board reported 2002 Ell LLN 1090.

Wherein, the Division Bench of this Court has

considered in detail this question. The relevant

observations made the Division Bench of this Court in

para-6, 7 and 8 of the decision referred to above are

quoted below:

After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties

and perusing the judgment of the learned Single

Judge, we have formed opinion that this appeal

deserves to be allowed. It is not in dispute that the

employee was given second opportunity to serve in

the board only by appointing him as an apprentice.

After issuing the appointment order as an apprentice,

the contract of apprentice was sent to the

apprentices adviser. S.3 of the Apprentices Act states

that:

“a person shall not be qualified for being engaged

as an apprentice to undergo apprentice training in

any designated trade unless he is fourteen years of

age and satisfied such standards of education and

physical fitness as may be prescribed,”.

22. In the apprentices rules as per the schedule

appended to them, for appointment to the post of

lineman, the prescribed qualification is that the

candidate must have passed 8th standard examination

of the new course. The 8th standard examination of new

course 10 + 2 + 3 is not equivalent to 8th standard

examination of old course. The apprenticeship contract

was, therefore, not registered only on the ground that

the 8th standard examination pass of the old course is

not equivalent to 8th standard examination pass of the

new course. Section 18 of the Apprentices Act states

that “every apprentice undergoing apprenticeship

training in a designated trade in an establishment shall

he a trainee and not a worker and the provisions of any

law with respect to labour shall not apply to or in

relation to such apprentice, “the provisions of S.18, as

held by the learned Single Judge are not attracted in

the case of the present appellant, because, for want of

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[17 March 2020

registration of his apprenticeship contract, he cannot

be treated to be an “apprentice” undergoing apprenticeship

training, “apprentice” has been defined under S. 2 (aa)

to mean “person who is undergoing apprenticeship

training in pursuance of a contract of apprenticeship.”

23. The other question that arises is that if, the

provisions of S-18 are not attracted to the employment

of the appellant, as he was not undergoing an

apprenticeship training pursuant to an apprenticeship

contract, whether, the provisions of other labour laws

would be applicable to such employment. In the above

respect the learned Single Judge, has also noticed the

definition of “workman” contained in S. 2 (s) of the I.D.

Act. The definition Cl. (a) of S.2 of the I.D. Act expressly

includes an Apprentice”. Section 2 (s) reads as under:

24. Definitions: In this Act, unless there is anything

repugnant in the subject or context-(s) “workman”

means any person (including any apprentice) employed

in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled,

technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for

hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be

expressed or implied, and for the purpose of any

proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial

dispute, includes any such person who has been

dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with,

or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose

dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that

dispute, but, does not include any such person-(i) who

is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (xlv of 1950) or the

Army Act, 1950 (xlvi of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 LXII

of 1957, or (ii) who is employed in the Police Service or

as Officer or the other employee of a prison; or (iii) who

is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative

capacity: or (iv) who being employed in a supervisory

capacity, draw wages exceeding one thousand six

hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the

nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason

of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a

managerial nature, “(emphasis supplied) the definition

of “workman” in I.D. Act, as its stands, who introduced

by amendment on 21 August, 1984 and at that time the

Apprentices Act, 1961, containing S. 18 in its

provisions, was in existence. The central legislature was

therefore, fully alive to the situation that an apprentice,

undergoing an apprenticeship training under an

apprenticeship contract duly registered would be only

a “trainee” and not a “workman” to which other laws in

respect of labour shall not apply. Therefore, in

including, in the definition of “workman” “apprentice”

as well, the legislative intention appears to be obvious

that such apprentices, who are not undergoing

apprenticeship training under a duly registered

apprenticeship contact, envisaged by the Apprentices

Act, and to who provisions of S. 18 of the said Act are

not applicable, would, nonetheless, be included in the

definition of “workman” under the I.D. Act and would

get all the protection of labour laws. The learned Single

Judge may be right in his reasoning that even after non-

registration of the contract of apprenticeship the

appellant would only be a “trainee”, or an “apprentice”,

as intended by the parties and he would not be an

“employee” or a “workman”, within the meaning of the

Apprentices Act Even if, as stated by the learned single

Judge, the appellant, as a result of non registration of

contract of apprenticeship is deemed to be a “trainee”

or an “apprentice”, he would, nonetheless, be covered

within the definition of “workman” under S.2 (s) of the

I.D. Act.

25. "in considering the claim of the workman for

reinstatement against illegal termination of his services,

it is not merely the label given to the employment which

is decisive, but, what is to be ascertained is the actual

nature of work and contract of employment. The Labour

Court, which recorded the evidence, has come to a

finding of fact that, in the first phase of his employment,

the appellant worked as helper on work charge basis

and after his induction as apprentice lineman, he

continued to work on the same post with the same

duties. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the

Board argued that there is no difference between the

nature of work of lineman and helper. It may be so, but,

status of an employee, appointed as a lineman, with

requisite qualifications and expertise is different from

employee, who is just helping him. The facts revealed

before the Labour Court were that between the period

19th February, 1981 and 27th November, 1981, the

appellant, virtually, served as helper and not as an

apprentice. It is not in dispute that by service between

19th February 1981 and 27th November 1981, the

employee had completed more than 240 days of

continues service. The provisions of sec. 25-F require that

the services of a workman, who has completed 240 days

continues service can be terminated only after service

of one month’s notice in writing or payment in lieu of

notice and also only on payment of retrenchment

compensation. Non-observance of mandatory condition

precedent in S. 25f of the I.D, Act makes the termination

of service or retrenchment of the workman illegal.”

26. In view of observations made by the division

Bench of this Court and considering the fact that the

workman was appointed on 23rd May, 1989 and his

services came to be terminated on 23rd May, 1990 under

the provisions of the Apprentices Act, 1961, but,

agreement of apprentice has not been registered under

the provisions of the Apprentices Act and since no

examination was given to the workman under the

Apprentices Act and as such, no training was given to

the workman under the Apprentices Act, this being the

lapse on the part of the petitioner and considering the

definition under section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act, the

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respondent who is considered to be workman under the

provisions of the I.D. Act and though the workman has

undisputedly completed 240 days continuos service and

at the time of termination of service, section 25-F of the

I.D. Act has not been complied with, then the order of

termination becomes ab initio void and therefore, as

held by the Apex Court in case of Mohanlal Vs.

Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics limited reported

in IR1981 SC 1253, in such situation, the order of

termination becomes ab initio void, the workman is

deemed to be continue in service for all purposes.

Therefore, considering the decision of the Division-

Bench of this Court while dealing with identical facts

before this Court, according to my opinion, the Labour

Court has rightly considered-the oral and documentary

evidence which was led before the Labour Court and

rightly come to the conclusion that the workman is

entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service with

full back wages of the interim period as the petitioner

has not proved gainful employment of the respondent

workman before the Labour Court. Therefore, in my

view, the Labour Court has not committed any error

while passing such Award and as such, there seems no

procedural irregularity committed by the Labour Court

and even in case, if, two views are possible, then also,

this Court having limited powers to interfere with Award

passed by the Labour Court or the Tribunal”.

27. In the abovesaid citation, the Hon’ble HC clearly

discussed the meaning and the interpretation of the

word “workman” and “Apprentice” under various

legislations and it has held that “the apprentice who

are not undergoing apprenticeship training under a duty

registered apprenticeship contract, envisaged by the

Apprentices Act, and to whom the provisions of

section 18 of the Act are not applicable would,

nonetheless, be included in the definition of workman

under the I.D. Act and would get all the protections of

Labour Laws”. As per the abovesaid citation, if, the

management failed to produce the apprenticeship

contract register under section 4 of the Act then the

person who was alleged as apprentice can be treated

as regular employee/workman under the ID Act. Here,

in this case also the respondent management has failed

to produce the appointment letter of this petitioner as

apprentice and the registered apprentice contract.

Therefore, even as per the abovesaid judgment also,

this petitioner has to be necessarily be considered as a

regular employee only. Furthermore, in the abovesaid

citation it is observed that “in considering the claim of

the workman for reinstatement against illegal

termination of his service, it is not merely the label given

to the employment which is decisive, but, what is to be

ascertained is the actual nature of work and contract of

employment”. The very same view was also taken by

Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case reported in CDJ

2005 Bombay High Court 976, Here, in this case also

the petitioner has been directed to perform all sorts of

work of a regular employee and the management has

failed to produce the apprenticeship contract as

envisaged under section 4 of the Apprenticeship Act,

1961. Therefore, this Court considered this petitioner as

a regular employee on the basis of the abovesaid

citation.

29. Thus, on analysing all these aspects, the

evidences and the documents, produced on both sides,

this Tribunal come to the conclusion that this petitioner

was not at all an apprentice and he was a regular

employee in the company. The respondent has not

denied the accident that took place on 11-08-2013, while

he attempted to put the belt in the machine in course

of his duty and whereby, he lost his right hand thumb.

Further, the respondent has not denied the multiple

injuries sustained by this petitioner in the same

accident. Further, the respondent has not denied that

this petitioner suffered a total disability of 30% due to

that accident. This petitioner was terminated from his

service without any enquiry or far any proven

misconduct. Therefore, the termination of this petitioner

from the company by the respondent is nothing but, the

clear violation of labour legislations and therefore, this

petitioner is entitled to get reinstatement with full back

wages and continuity of service with all other monetary

benefits as he claimed in his claim statement.

30. In the result, the order of dismissal by the

management is decided as unjustified and the industrial

dispute raised by the petitioner against the management

is decided as justified and hence, this ID is allowed. No

cost.

Dictated to Stenographer, transcribed by him,

corrected and pronounced by me in the Open Court on

this 13th day of December, 2019.

V. PANDIARAJ,

Presiding Officer,

Industrial Tribunal-cum-

Labour Court, Puducherry.

List of petitioner’s witness:

PW.1

— 22-02-2017

— Govindarajalu

List of petitioner’s exhibits:

Ex.P1 — 24-12-2012

Copy of Training Certificate

issued by respondent to

petitioner.

Ex.P2 — July 2013

Copy of Salary Slip of the

petitioner.

Ex.P3 — 17-08-2013

Copy of discharge summary

issued the by PIMS Hospital

to petitioner.

216

LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT

[17 March 2020

Ex.P4 — 12-08-2013

Copy of FIR registered by

Mettupalayam P.S., vide FIR

No.70/2013

against

the

respondent’s staff, namely,

Raman and Palanivelu.

Ex.P5 — 13-08-2013

Copy of Eligibility Certificate

issued by

Ex.P6 — 19-08-2013

Copies of Certificate, OPD

slips and Examination reports

08-04-2014

issued by the ESI Dispensary

Puducherry to petitioner

depicting

his

health

conditions (25 Nos).

Ex.P7 — 13-11-2013

Copies of Medical Certificate

30-12-2013

issued by the Chettinadu

Super Specialty Hospital in

favor of petitioner.

Ex.P8 —

Copy of Fitness Certificate

given by Chettinadu Super

Specialty Hospital in favor

of petitioner. (2 Nos).

Ex.P9 — 10-10-2013

Copy of letter issued by ESI

Corporation Puducherry to

Orthopedic Specialist, ESIC

Hospital, Chennai requesting,

get

opinion

petitioner’s treatment.

Ex.P10 — 05-11-2013

Copy of the Referral Form

(permission letter) issued by

ESI Hospital, Puducherry to

Chettinad Hospital/Diagnostic

Centre, Chennai along with

Temporary Identity Certificate

issued by respondent in

favor of the petitioner.

Ex.P11 — 11-04-2014

Copy of letter sent by

petitioner to respondent

requesting

employment

along with postal slip.

Ex.P12 — 07-05-2014

Copy of reminder letter send

the

petitioner

respondent requesting the

respondent for employment

along with postal slip.

Ex.P13 — 23-05-2014

Copy of reply given by

respondent to petitioner’s

letter, dated 11-04-2014 and

07-05-2014.

Ex.P14 — 18-06-2014

Copy of the representations

07-08-2014

given by the petitioner to the

22-09-2014

Labour Officer (Conciliation)

Puducherry raising industrial

dispute (3 Nos).

Ex.P15 — 30-07-2014

Copy of reply given by the

respondent to Labour Officer

(Conciliation) Puducherry

for the ID raised by petitioner.

Ex.P16 — 14-10-2014

Copy of reply given by the

respondent to Labour Officer

(Conciliation) Puducherry

for the ID raised by petitioner.

Ex.P17 — 04-08-2014

Copy of letter sent by ESI

Corporation, Puducherry to

petitioner

regarding

its

decision

permanent

disablement

along

with

disability Certificate (Form

B13) issued by its Board.

Ex.P18 — 16-10-2014

Copy of the letter sent by ESI

Corporation, Puducherry to

petitioner, calling him for an

enquiry regarding his earning

capacity.

Ex.P19 — 30-04-2015

Copy of the legal notice send

by the petitioner to respondent.

Ex.P20 — 15-05-2015

Original reply notice sent by

respondent.

Ex.P21 — 14-05-2015

Copy of Failure Report

forwarded by Labour Officer

(Conciliation), Puducherry

to Government of Puducherry

in petitioner’s case.

Ex.P22 — 24-12-2012

Copy of Application with

Testimonials of the petitioner.

Ex.P23 —

Copy of Salary Slips (9 series)

of the petitioner.

Ex.P24 —

Copy of Attendance Register

of the petitioner.

List of respondent’s witness:

RW1 — 05-03-2013

S. Gobu

List of respondent’s exhibits:

Ex.Rl — 08-04-2014

Copy of the letter from

N. Govindarajalu.

Ex.R2 — 04-08-2014

Copy of the letter from ESI

Corporation.

V. PANDIARAJ,

Presiding Officer,

Industrial Tribunal-cum-

Labour Court, Puducherry.