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Sentence arbitral du Travail
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Award of the Labour Court .. 324
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Notifications du Gouvernement .. 338
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Annonces
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Announcements
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La Gazette de L' État de Poudouchéry
The Gazette of Puducherry
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Publiée par Autorité
Published by Authority
Registered with the Registrar
of Newspapers for India
under No. 10410
Registered No. PY/44/2021-23
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18 {
No.
16
Poudouchéry
Mardi
18
Avril
2023 (28 Chaitra 1945)
No.
Puducherry
Tuesday
18th
April
2023
324
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
[18 April 2023
GOVERNMENT OF PUDUCHERRY
LABOUR DEPARTMENT
(G.O. Rt. No. 18/AIL/Lab./T/2023,
Puducherry, dated 16th February 2023)
NOTIFICATION
Whereas, an Award in I.D (L) No. 09/2018, dated
20-12-2022 of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour
Court, Puducherry, in respect of Dispute between the
Tmt. G. Rathika, wife of S. Vengadessaperumal, Puducherry,
against the management of M/s. Pondicherry Institute
of Medical Sciences (PIMS), Ganapathichettikulam,
Puducherry over non-employment has been received.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred
by sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act XIV of 1947), read with
the notification issued in Labour Department’s G.O. Ms.
No. 20/9/Lab./L, dated 23-05-1991, it is hereby directed
by the Secretary to Government (Labour) that the said
Award shall be published in the Official Gazette,
Puducherry.
(By order)
P. RAGINI,
Under Secretary to Government (Labour).
————
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-
LABOUR COURT AT PUDUCHERRY
Present :Tmt. V. Sofana Devi, M.L.
Presiding Officer.
Tuesday, the 20th day of December, 2022.
I.D. (L) No. 09/2018
C.N.R. No. PYPY06-000110-2018
Rathika,
W/o. Vengadessaperumal,
No. 1, Kuppam South Street,
Ganapathichettikulam,
Puducherry.
. . Petitioner
Vs.
The Personal Manager,
M/s. Pndicherry Institute of Medical
Sciences (PIMS),
Ganapathichettikulam,
Village No. 20, Kalapet,
Puducherry.
. . Respondent
This industrial dispute coming on 06-12-2022 before
me for final hearing in the presence of Thiruvalargal
G. Krishnan and R. Rajavelu, Counsel for Petitioner,
Thiruvalargal L. Sathish, S. Ulaganathan, T. Pravin,
S. Velmurugan, V. Veeraragavan and E. Karthick, Counsel
for Respondent and after hearing the both sides and
perusing the case records, this Court delivered the
following:
A W A R D
This Industrial Dispute arises out of the reference
made by the Government of Puducherry vide G.O. Rt.
No. 20/AIL/Lab./T/2018, dated 13-02-2018 of the Labour
Department, Puducherry to resolve the following dispute
between the Petitioner and the Respondent, viz.
(a) Whether the dispute raised by the Petitioner
Tmt. G. Rathika, wife of S. Vengadessaperumal,
residing
at
No. 1,
Kuppam
South
Street,
Ganapathichettikulam, Puducherry, against the
Management of M/s. Pondicherry Institute of
Medical Sciences (PIMS), Ganapathichettikulam,
Puducherry, over non-employment is justified or not?
If justified, what relief the Petitioner is entitled to?
(b) To compute the relief if any, awarded in terms
of money if, it can be so computed?
2. Brief facts of the case of the Petitioner averred in
the claim petition:
The Petitioner, a weaker party amongst the two
contracting parties, was appointed as Ward Secretary
in Department of Pediatrics (OPD) in the Respondent
Institution vide Appointment Order, dated 21-01-2013
for a period of two years with entitlement for grant of
probationary status and subsequently for confirmation
as provided under the Appointment Order. The post
for which the Petitioner was appointed is of permanent
nature and the said post is still in existence and
appointment on contract basis instead of appointing
on ad hoc and regular basis is illegal and is carried
on with an attempt to defeat her rights under the law.
The Respondent Management as adopted the policy
of hire and fire which is deprecated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in a number of judgments and it
amounts to exploiting the service of unemployed
youth.
(ii) Clause 3 of the Appointment Order provides for
monitoring of Petitioner’s performance regularly and
there was no adverse remarks in the petitioner’s
service records and she had discharged her duties
without any blemish and became entitled to
continuance in service and for confirmation/
regularization, but, the Respondent Management by
Order, dated 19-01-2015 discontinued Petitioner’s
service w.e.f. from 20-01-2015 on the ground of
non-satisfactory performance of service. The service
325
18 April 2023]
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
records of the Petitioner reveals that the Respondent
Institution was fully satisfied about her work and
conduct and in spite of such satisfactory performance
the Respondent has chosen to terminate her services
on account of active participation of Petitioner’s
husband in lawful association activities which irked
the Respondent. Further, the Respondent has also
pressurized the Petitioner to advise her husband to
disassociate himself from the association activities
unpleasant to the Management which she didn’t heed.
(iii) The termination of the Petitioner’s services was
not bona fide, but, was a colourable exercise of the
power reserved to the Management under the
Appointment order. It is a well established proposition
in Industrial law that even if the Management has
power under the contract of employment or under the
Service Rules to terminate the services of an employee
that power can be exercised only for the purpose for
which it was conferred and cannot be exercised to
victimize the employee and bona fides in the exercise
of the power is absolutely essential, even if, the power
is unfettered by the terms of the contract and the form
of the order in such a case is not conclusive and the
Tribunal can go behind the order to find the reasons
which held to the order, and then consider for itself
whether the termination was a colourable exercise of
the power.
(iv) The order of termination was admittedly not
made on non-renewal of contract but based on the
alleged non-satisfactory performance of the Petitioner
without hearing her and therefore the said order
having been passed in violation of principles of
natural justice is unsustainable. The clause 6 of the
appointment order states that the Petitioner will
suo moto not entitled for continuation of employment
after the two years contract period and only in case
of requirement her case for probation will be
considered. The post held by the Petitioner is
permanent in nature and in spite of requirement she
was not considered for probation.
(v) The Respondent after passing the impugned
order, dated 19-01-2015 has shown the Petitioner as
an employee on the role in the application submitted
to the Pondicherry University for extension of
provisional affiliation for the UG & PG courses for the
academic year 2015-2016. The clause 10 of the
Appointment Order states that the Petitioner will be
governed by the Institute’s Service Rules relating to
attendance, leave, conduct and other conditions for
employment by which the terms and conditions in the
Appointment Order have been superseded by the
Service Rules of the Respondent Institution and
therefore, the appointment of the Petitioner on
contract in a permanent post and subsequent
termination are in gross violation of the Service Rules.
(vi) The Order, dated 19-01-2015 is also bad in law
being arbitrary, mala fide, unjust, improper, unlawful
and against principles of natural justice and settled
principles of law and in violation of the terms of
Appointment Order and Service Rules of the
Respondent Institution. The Petitioner prayed to set
aside the order, dated 19-01-2015 and to reinstate the
Petitioner in the Respondent Institution with full back
wages, continuity of service and other consequential
benefits. Hence the petition.
3. The brief averments of the counter filed by the
respondents are as follows:
Respondent Institution is a Multi-Speciality
Hospital and Trauma Care Centre, providing plethora
of Medical facilities and treatments to people in and
around Puducherry region. It also runs a reputed
Medical College and Nursing College. Respondent has
qualified and efficient Doctors, Nurses, Staffs,
Administrators, Faculty Members, Latest equipments,
Medical Gadgets, Best machineries, well furnished
laboratories and all the other required facilities to
facilitate best possible treatment to patients and best
education to students. Respondent has assumed
strategic importance for people of Pondicherry in
providing quality medical care in complicated fields
of medicine.
(ii) The Petitioner was appointed by Respondent
as Ward Secretary vide letter of Appointment, dated
21-01-2013 for a period of two years. But, it is
absolutely false to claim that.
(i) The Petitioner is a weaker party amongst the
two contracting parties.
(ii) The post for which Petitioner was appointed
is of permanent nature and the said post is still in
existence and appointment on contract basis
instead of appointing an ad hoc and regular basis
is illegal and is carried on with an attempt to defeat
Petitioner’s rights under the law.
(iii) The Respondent has adopted the policy of
hire and fire.
(iv) There were no adverse remarks in
Petitioner’s service records and she had discharged
her duties without any blemish and became entitled
to continuance in service and for confirmation/
regularisation.
326
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
[18 April 2023
(v) Service records of Petitioner reveals that
Respondent institution was fully satisfied about her
work and conduct and in spite of such satisfactory
performance, Respondent has chosen to terminate
her service on account of active participation of
Petitioner’s husband in lawful association activities
which irked the Respondent.
(vi) Respondent has also pressurized Petitioner
to advise her husband to disassociate himself from
association activities unpleasant to management,
which she didn’t heed.
(vii) Petitioner was victimized and her
termination was not bona fide, but, was a
colourable exercise of the power reserved to the
Management under the appointment Order.
(viii) The Order of termination was admittedly
not made on non-renewal of contract, but, based
on the alleged non-satisfactory performance of the
Petitioner without hearing her and therefore, the
said Order having been passed in violation of
principles of natural justice is unsustainable.
(ix) The post held by the Petitioner is permanent
in nature and in spite of requirement she was not
considered for probation.
(x) Respondent after passing the impugned
Order, dated 19-01-2015 showed the Petitioner as
an employee on the role in the application
submitted to the Pondicherry University for
extension of provisional affiliation for the UG & PG
courses for the Academic Year 2015-2016.
(xi) The terms and conditions in the
Appointment Order have been superseded by the
Service Rules of the Respondent Institution and
therefore, the appointment of the Petitioner on
contract in a permanent post and subsequent
termination are in gross violation of the Service
Rules.
(xii) The Order, dated 19-01-2015 is also bad in
law being arbitrary, mala fide, unjust, improper,
unlawful and against principles of natural justice
and settled principles of law and in violation of the
terms of Appointment Order and Service Rules of
the Respondent Institution.
(iii) The Petitioner was admittedly engaged as Ward
Secretary. The role of an Office Secretary need not be
overemphasized as it is a common knowledge that
Secretaries must have multi-tasking abilities and must
be able to perform various clerical and non-clerical
works associated with the Chair with astuteness and
deftness. Secretaries are required to be proficient in
communication and must have interpersonal skills. He
or she must have knowledge of computers and its
applications, must have cognitive skills. Thus,
Secretary’s work is multi-dimensional and more so in
a hospital of Respondent’s magnitude where the
Secretaries are required to be affable and accommodative
to patients and their attendants. They act as a
bridging gap between the doctors, the administrative
departments of the institution, the patients, their
attenders and to other outsiders, who come in contact
with the Department through such Secretaries. Hence,
appointment of Secretaries in an institution is very
crucial and such appointment can be done only after
the candidate is throughly appraised. Respondent was
and is statutorily entitled to engage Secretaries on
probation or on fixed term contract basis to assess
their skill levels and appraise their performance during
the period of contract or probation and based on their
performance, take a considered decision regarding
continuance of their service. Therefore, though the
post of Office Secretary (in this case Ward Secretary)
is not necessarily peripheral or temporary in nature,
their engagement on contract basis for limited period
is legally and morally justified and such appointment
cannot be challenged by claiming that such jobs are
perennial in nature.
(iv) The Industrial Disputes Act too permits
Management to employ workers on fixed term basis
and there is absolutely no mandate that only jobs of
peripheral nature or temporary nature are reserved for
fixed term contracts. Hence, the thrust of the Petitioner
that her engagement as fixed term employee for a
period of two years because the job is perennial is
illegal is wholly unfounded and baseless.
(v) The Petitioner’s offer letter makes abundantly
clear in no uncertain terms that she was employed
only for a fixed term for 2 years. Clause No. 6 of the
said Appointment Order reads “You (Petitioner) will
suo moto not be entitled for continuation of
employment after the two years contract period and
only in case of requirement your case for probation
will be considered”.
7. Clause No. 3 of Petitioner’s appointment order
also mentions that “Your (Petitioner) conduct and
performance are required to be excellent ordinarily.
We (Respondent) suggest that you co-operate with
our monitoring of your performance regularly and
after a period of six months you will be evaluated
and in case of any lapses in your performance the
institutional rules will apply for your assessment
and discontinuation of our service”.
327
18 April 2023]
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
(vi) Thus, the appointment order of Petitioner made
it abundantly clear that she has no right to seek
continuation of employment on completion of 2 years
of contract, irrespective of her performance or
appraisal and the discretion of continuing with
contract beyond 2 years was solely at the discretion
of Respondent. Petitioner had every option to refuse
to take up employment for fixed term of 2 years. But,
she accepted the offer of employment with full
knowledge, consent and with her eyes, ears and mind
fully open. Having accepted the terms and conditions
of her appointment and having worked for 2 years as
per terms of said appointment, she has no legal or
moral right to challenge the said contract on any
ground of unfairness or illegality.
(vii) The contention that Petitioner was a weaker
party amongst the two contracting parties is incredible
to say the least. Petitioner was well educated as she
claimed to have completed her Bachelor’s Degree in
Computer Science and MBA in Human Resource
Management. She had also claimed to have completed
few Diploma Courses and had past experience of
working in another company. It, therefore, does not
suit her to play the card of being weaker party
amongst the two contracting parties. She was under
compulsion or pressure to accept such fixed term
employment.
(viii) The Petitioner’s performance was assessed
during the period of contract and she was periodically
advised by the Respondent to improve her performance.
But, her performance was found to be below par by
the immediate superiors of Petitioner, giving her only
average score of 51.21% on 1st appraisal and 47.57%.
In fact, the superior of Petitioner has clearly observed
that Petitioner’s Secretarial skills were found to be
wanting, though she was found to be co-operative.
Thus, though there were no allegations of misconduct
against Petitioner, her performance as Secretary was
not appreciable. Hence, the Respondent was well
within its right to decide against renewing the contract
of employment on expiry of her fixed term contract,
dated 20-01-2015.
(ix) The Negative appraisal of Petitioner cannot be
termed as allegations of misconduct or stigmatic. Once
no allegations of misconduct is levelled against the
Petitioner, there is no scope for her to seek a hearing
before the decision on non-renewal of her Fixed Term
Contract is taken. Thus, the contention that Respondent
was fully satisfied about the work of Petitioner in spite
of such satisfactory performance she was terminated
on account of her husband’s Union activities is
untrue.
(x) Petitioner, by claiming that she is victimized for
her husband’s Trade Union activities is merely
attempting to twist the issue and give another
dimension. It is not out of context to mention that
Petitioner has not disclosed the name of the Union to
which her husband is member, his designation in the
said Union. She has not been able to pinpoint any
specific instances when Respondent and Petitioner’s
husband were at logger heads. There is no nexus
between non-renewal of employment contract of the
Petitioner and Union activities of her husband. In fact,
Petitioner’s husband M. Vengadesaperoumal joined
Respondent's Institution on 02-04-2022 and continues
to be employed as on date with all perks and benefits.
There are as many as 10 Unions in Respondent’s
Institution and each Union has at least a dozen officer
bearers who are active trade Union activists. It is
impish for Petitioner to claim that she has been
handpicked by Respondent to victimize her for her
husband’s trade Union activities, without there bing
any further substantiation. It is gain said that
allegation of manner. Petitioner is required to plead and
prove specific instance that makes her believe that she
was victimized and place strong and unimpeachable
evidence to prove the same. Thus, the claim of
victimization and colourable exercise of power by
Respondent is baseless.
(xi) The claim of Petitioner that after issuing a letter
of non-renewal of contract, dated 19-01-2015,
Respondent showed petitioner as an on-roll employee
in the application submitted by it to Pondicherry
University for extension of provisional affiliation for
Under Graduate and Postg Praduate courses for
Academic Year 2015 and 2016. In fact Petitioner lodged
multiple complaints to various authorities such as, The
Vice Chancellor of Pondicherry University, The
Inspector General of Police, The Senior Superintendent
of Police (Law and Order), Superintendent of Police
(North), Superintendent of Police (CID) and Kalapet
University, calling for multiple action against
Respondent. The Pondicherry University had also
sought for an explanation from Respondent by
forwarding complaint of Petitioner, dated 23-10-2015.
Respondent gave a befitting reply to Pondicherry
University on 09-11-2015 explaining in clear terms that
it submitted application to Pondicherry University on
06-01-2015 and the contract of employment with
Petitioner expired on 20-01-2015. Therefore, as on the
date of application submitted to the University on
06-01-2015, Petitioner was very much in employment
with Respondent and hence, there was no false
information given to the University. The University
was fully satisfied with the response of Respondent
and closed the complaint of the Petitioner.
328
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
[18 April 2023
(xii) Respondent reiterates that it was legally and
morally right in offering fixed term contract of
employment to Petitioner which was accepted by her
without any demur and her services were discontinued
and not terminated on completion of the fixed term
contract. It was neither stigmatic termination nor
retrenchment as is being projected by the Petitioner.
(xiii) There is absolutely no industrial dispute worth
adjudication between Petitioner and Respondent as
there was only cessation of employer-employee
relationship between the Petitioner and Respondent
as on 21-01-2015 when contract of employment, dated
21-01-2013 with Petitioner expired by efflux of time.
Hence prayed for dismissal of the claim petition.
4. Point for determination:
Whether the Petitioner is entitled for an order of
reinstatement and other attendant charges, perks and
allowances as claimed in the claim petition?
5. On Point:
Petitioner herself examined as PW1 and Ex.Pl to P10
were marked. Ex.Rl is marked during cross examination
of PW1. On the Respondent side Mr. Madhusudhanan,
Senior Manager (Personnel & Administration) of the
Respondent Institution is examined as RW1. Ex.R2 to
R4 were marked.
6. On the point:
Industrial Dispute raised by the Petitioner herein
against the Respondent Management challenging an
order, dated 19-01-2015 (Ex.P3) whereby, her services
have been terminated by discontinuance of her
Contract (Ex.P1) on the ground of unsatisfactory
performance upto the level required during probation
period from the post of Secretary in the Respondent
Hospital. Thus, the Reference has been made by the
Government of Puducherry over her non-employment.
7. According to the Petitioner, she was appointed as
Ward Secretary in Department of Pediatrics (OPD) in the
Respondent Institution vide Appointment Order, dated
21-01-2013 for a period of two years with probationary
status and subsequently with the entitlement for
confirmation as provided under the Appointment Order
(Ex.Pl). The said post is of permanent nature and still
in-existence and appointment of such posts on contract
basis instead of appointed on ad hoc and regular basis
is not legal. There was no adverse remarks in the
Petitioner’s service records. But, the Respondent
Management discontinued Petitioner’s service by an
Order, dated 19-01-2015 (Ex.P3) w.e.f. 20-01-2015 on the
ground of non-satisfactory performance of her service.
8. Further, it is contended that though as per clause 6
of the Appointment Order (Ex.Pl), the Petitioner is not
entitled for continuation of employment after the two
years contract period suo moto but, in case of
requirement her service for probation will be consider.
The post held by the Petitioner is permanent in nature
and in spite of requirement she was not considered for
probation.
9. It is also added on the Petitioner side after passing
the Termination Order (Ex.P3), dated 19-01-2015, this
Petitioner was shown by the Respondent Institution as
an employee on the roll in the application submitted to
the Pondicherry University for extension of Provisional
affiliation for the UG and PG Courses for the Academic
Year 2015-2016. Further, as per clause 10 of the
Appointment Order Ex.Pl, the Petitioner will be governed
by the Institute’s service rules relating to attendance,
leave, conduct and other conditions of employment by
which the terms and conditions in the Appointment Order
have been superseded by the service rules of the
Respondent Institution. Therefore, the Appointment of
the Petitioner on contract in a Permanent post and
subsequent termination are in gross violation of service
rules.
10. The serious and strong contentions raised by the
Petitioner are that the nature of the job was perennial,
the Petitioner’s appointment was against a permanent
post, fixed term employment was a colourable exercise
of power to escape the beneficial labour legislation, the
contractual appointment for short term was employed by
the Management with malafied intentions, an unfair
labour practice in employing the Petitioner on a fixed term
contract, Management by adopting the methodology of
fixed term employment as a conductor mechanism to
frustrate the Petitioner’s rights so on and so forth. Also
claimed that there was necessity of complying with
section 25-F of ID Act since the Petitioner has completed
240 days of employment.
11. On the other hand, it is urged on the side of the
Respondent Institution that Appointment of Secretaries
in Institution like hospitals is very crucial and such
appointment can be done only after the candidate is
throughly appraised. Respondent was and is statutorily
entitled to engage Secretaries on probation or on fixed
term contract basis to assess their skill levels and
appraise their performance during the contract period or
probation period and based on their performance, take a
considered decision regarding convenience of their
service. Therefore, though the post of Office Secretary
is not necessarily peripheral or temporary in nature, their
engagement on contract basis for limited period is legally
justified and such appointment cannot be challenged by
claiming the such jobs are perennial in nature.
329
18 April 2023]
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
12. It is also strongly objected on the side of the
Respondent that when the statute under section 2(oo)
(bb) of ID Act specifically permits such contracts without
laying any conditions, Petitioner cannot rewrite the
statute and introduce non-existent terms and conditions
in such statute governing contract for specific term
employment. No necessity for compliance of section 25 F
of ID Act as the non-extension of the contract of
employment after expiry of the tenure of contract does
not amount to retrenchment as per section 2(oo) (bb) of
ID Act. The employment on contract for fixed period is
very much legal and the Petitioner admitted specifically
in unconditional terms that she was employed only for a
fixed term of two years and her contract was not renewed
after the expiry of the period of contract. In this
Connection, following case-laws referred and relied upon
on Respondent side;
1. CDJ 2002 S 402
Para 12: Therefore, that if the case of termination
of the workman comes within any of the exceptions
enumerated in the section then the said termination
will not to be a case of ‘retrenchment’ within the
meaning section 2(oo).
Para 13: If such contract of employment contained
a stipulation for termination of service and the services
of the workman are terminated in accordance with that
stipulation, such termination, according to clause (bb)
would also not amount to ‘retrenchment’.
Para l4: The position was reiterated in Harmohinder
Singh v. Kharga Canteen, Ambala Cantt, (2001) 5 SCC
540.
Para 15: In such a case the question of complying
with the conditions precedent to retrenchment of
workman provided in section 25(f) of the Act will not
arise.
Since, there exists a contract of service with the terms
and conditions as noted earlier, the position is inescapable
that the case of disengagement/termination of the
workman concerned did not amount to retrenchment.
2. CDJ 2016 HC 717
Para 11. The question as to whether Chapter VA of
the Act will apply or not would be dependent on the
issue as to whether an order of retrenchment comes
within the purview of section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Act
or not. If the termination of service in view of the
exception contained in clauses (bb) of section 2 (oo)
of the Act is not a ‘retrenchment’, the question of
applicability of Chapter V-A thereof would not arise.
Para 28. It is not the law that on completion of 240
days of continuous service in a year, the concerned
employee becomes entitled to for regularisation of his
services and/or permanent status. The concept of 240
days in a year was introduced in the industrial law for
a definite purpose. Under the Industrial Disputes Act,
the concept of 240 days was introduced so as to
fasten a statutory liabilities upon the employer to pay
compensation to be computed in the manner specified
in Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
before he is retrenched from services and not for any
purpose. In the event a violation of the said provision
takes place, termination of services of the employee
may be found to be illegal, but only on that account,
his services cannot be directed to be regularized.
Direction to reinstate the workman would mean that
he gets back the same status.
Para 19. It could be seen from the aforesaid
observations that once the services of the employee
engaged on a contractual basis for a fixed period come
to an end on account of completion of the period of
contract, the same would come within the purview of
section 2 (oo)(bb) of the ID act. It has been further
held that once the period of contract was fixed and
the same was done keeping in view the nature of job,
it cannot be said that the act of the employer in
terminating the services of the appellant was actuated
by any malice. It has been further held that merely on
completion of 240 days of continuous service in a year,
the employee concerned does not become entitled for
regularisation of his services and/or permanent status.
Their Lordships have held that under the Industrial
Disputes Act, the concept of 240 days was introduced
so as to fasten statutory liabilities upon the employer
to pay compensation to be computed in the manner
specified in section 25F of the ID Act, before he is
retrenched from services and not for any other
purpose. It has been further held that in the extent of
violation of the said provision takes place, termination
of services of the employee may be found to be illegal,
but, only on that account, his services cannot be
directed to be regularised.
Para 21. It could thus be seen that while construing
the provisions of section 2(oo) (bb) read with Chapter
V-A of the ID Act, Their Lordships have consistently
held that if the contract of employment is for a fixed
period and the appointment is terminable at the end
of the period of contract, then in view of provisions
of section 2(oo) (bb) of the ID Act are applicable, the
provisions of Chapter V-A of the ID Act would not be
applicable. It has been further held that what is
important is substance of the contract and not the
form.
330
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
[18 April 2023
13. I heard the learned Counsel for the parties at a
considerable length and given my thoughtful consideration
to the arguments advanced by them.
14. The said Ex.Pl offer of appointment letter, dated
21-01-2013 clearly envisaged the probation period of two
years on contract and clause 6 of Ex.P1 further provides
for the condition that petitioner is suo moto not be
entitled for continuation of employment after the two
year contract period and only in case of requirement the
case for probation will be considered. It is further in
clause 5 mentioned that the services of the Petitioner
were liable to be terminated during the probationary
period by giving one month's notice or one month’s pay
in lieu of notice by either side.
15. After traversing the entire gamut of facts and
hearing the learned Counsels for the parties, in my view,
at the heart of the dispute is the applicability of above
stated clause 6 of the offer letter of appointment, dated
21-01-2013. Reading the contents of the aforesaid
clauses in Ex.P1 make it palpably clear that it prescribed
a probation period of two years and confirmation will be
subject to Petitioner’s proficiency in the mentioned fields
and not suo moto entitled for continuance of employment
beyond two years and only in case of requirement the
case for probation will be considered.
16. The prime contention of the Petitioner that the
clause 6 itself was invalid and not applicable. The
contention is premised on the ground that the post for
which the Petitioner was appointed in of permanent
nature and the said post is still in existence and an
appointment on contract basis instead of appointing on
ad hoc and regular basis is illegal. The service
recruitment rules and service rules of the Respondent
Institution not prescribed probation and thus it is invalid.
17. There can be no manner of doubt that the
employer is entitled to engage the services of a person
on probation. During the period of probation, the
suitability of the recruit/appointee has to be seen. If, his
or her services are not satisfactory which means that he
is not suitable for the job than the employer has a right
to terminate the services as a reason thereof. Therefore,
normally services of an employee on probation would be
terminated, when he/she is found not to be suitable for
the job for which he was engaged, without assigning any
reason. The probationer is on test and if the services are
found not to be satisfactory, the employer has, in terms
of the letter of appointment, the right to terminate the
services.
18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in A.P. Public
Service Commission vs. B. Sarat Chandra, (1990) 2 SCC
669 and K. Manjusree vs. State of A.P., (2008) 3 SCC 512
laid the proposition that rules of the game cannot be
changed in the midst of the game.
19. The Respondent Institution has offered appointment
to the Petitioner enumerating the service conditions in
terms of Pay Scale, tenure of service, place of posting,
etc., including clauses 3, 5, 6 and 8 specifying the
condition with respect to probationary period. Petitioner
was required to acknowledge the receipt of the letter and
acceptance of all the terms mentioned in the letter. Thus,
it cannot be said that the terms specified in the letter
were imposed on the Petitioner as a weaker party amongst
the two contracting parties and being an offer, it was
open to the Petitioner to accept or not to accept
appointment on such terms. Petitioner admittedly
accepted the offer, on the terms and conditions specified
in the offer letter, without any demur, protest or
reservation. In fact as pointed out by Respondent, in
Ex.P1. at page 2 the last two lines run thus, “please
signify your acceptance of the above terms and
conditions by signing on duplicate copy of this letter and
returning it to the Personal Manager”.
20. The Petitioner suo moto not entitled for continuation
of employment after two years period and only in case
of requirement petitioner case of probation will be
considered was in the terms of clause 6 of the offer of
appointment letter Ex.P1, dated 21-03-2013, which was
accepted by the Petitioner without any protest. The letter
was never challenged in any Court of law prior to the
order of termination impugned herein and only because
his services have been terminated, Petitioner is laying a
challenge to its validity, as an after-thought.
21. In this view of the matter, it is not open to the
Petitioner to even contend that Clauses of the offer of
appointment letter would not govern the terms and
conditions of his service or the appointment of the
Petitioner on contract in a permanent post and
subsequent termination are in gross violation of the
Service Rules.
22. Even otherwise, this contention cannot be
sustained. The Recruitment Rules are admittedly silent
on the probation period. As far as the offer of
appointment Ex.P1 is concerned, while it did mention that
period of probation would be two years but, it was
conspicuously silent on the issue of extension of the
period and did not provide that two years would be the
maximum period of probation and that the probationer
would stand automatically confirmed on expiry of the
probation period of two years. Thus, the stipulation in
the appointment letter is neither contrary to nor in
conflict with the Recruitment Rules and at the cost of
repetition, once the appointment letter was accepted by
the Petitioner without a demur and not challenged until
her services were terminated, this Court is unable to
uphold this contention of the Petitioner.
331
18 April 2023]
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
23. Next point urges on the side of the Petitioner is
that there was necessity of complying with section 25-F
of ID Act since the Petitioner has completed 240 days of
employment. For which it is necessary to reproduce the
relevant provisions hereunder for better understanding;
“Section 2 (oo) of Industrial Disputes Act -
‘retrenchment’ means the termination by the employer
of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever,
otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of
disciplinary action, but, does not include.
(bb) Termination of the service of the workman as
a result of the non-renewal of the contract of
employment between the employer and the workman
concerned on its expiry or of such contract being
terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained
therein”.
24. As per section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes
Act provides for an exception that the termination of the
service of the workman will not be a retrenchment as a
result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment
between the employer and the workman concerned on its
expiry or of such contract being terminated under a
stipulation in that behalf contained therein, the said
section squarely applicable to this situation. In this case
in hand the Termination of the service of the workman
as a result of the Non-renewal of the contract of
employment between the Respondent herein and the
Petitioner on its expiry would come within the purview
of Section 2 (oo)(bb) of the ID Act. The learned Counsel
for the Respondent also has referred during his
arguments the following case law reported in CDJ 1992
SC 118.
Constitution of India, Article 16 - Regularisation of
services - Ad hoc appointment on a consolidated
compensation on contract basis for a limited period-
By expiry of contractual period, the right to remain in
post comes to an end- Services of respondent being
continued from time to time on ‘ad hoc’ basis for more
than a year, does not entitle her to regularisation.
25. Based on Ex.Pl Contract on Probation, the
petitioner was engaged in the Respondent Hospital in
the post of Secretary. On expiry of the contract on
probation Ex.Pl, the Petitioner was relieved from her
services from the Respondent Institution. She clearly
admitted the same during her cross examination as PW1
before this Court as, PW1 deposed during cross-
examination that “Ex.P1-[√Ω ®™m √>s ÔVÈD
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2 gı|Ô^ √Ë ÿƒFº>[ ®[≈V_ g\VD”.
26. In Purshotam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of India AIR
1958 SC 36, it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court as
follows:
“The period of probation may in some cases be for
a fixed period, e.g., for six months or for one year or it
may be expressed simply as ‘on probation’ without
any specification of any period. Such an employment
on probation, under the ordinary law of master and
servant, comes to an end if during or at the end of
the probation the servant so appointed on trial is
found unsuitable and his service is terminated by a
notice. An appointment to officiate in a permanent post
is usually made when the incumbent substantively
holding that post is on leave or when the permanent
post is vacant and no substantive appointment has
yet been made to that post. Such an officiating
appointment comes to an end on the return of the
incumbent substantively holding the post from leave
in the former case or on a substantive appointment
being made to that permanent post in the latter case
or on the service of a notice of termination as agreed
upon or as may be reasonable under the ordinary law.
It is, therefore, quite clear that appointment to a
permanent post in Government service, either on
probation, or on an officiating basis, is, from the very
nature of such employment, itself of a transitory
character and, in the absence of any special contract
or specific rule regulating the conditions of the
service, the implied term of such appointment, under
the ordinary law of master and servant, is that it is
terminable at any time. In short, in the case of an
appointment to a permanent post in a Government
service on probation or on an officiating basis, the
servant so appointed does not acquire any
substantive right to the post and consequently cannot
complain, any more than a private servant employed
on probation or on an officiating basis can do, if his
service is terminated at any time”.
27. Thus, it is amply clear that during the period of
probation, an employee may be removed without holding
any disciplinary proceeding. The period of probation is,
truly speaking, a period of one’s trial. During this period
332
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
[18 April 2023
the employee does not acquire any substantive right to
the post and consequently cannot complain anymore
than an employed on probation.
28. The next issue that arises for determination before
this Court is whether the services of an employee on
probation can be terminated without holding any
disciplinary proceeding and whether the termination of
services of an employee on probation on the ground of
non-satisfaction would ipso facto amount to termination
by way of punishment or whether the same can be held
to be termination ‘simpliciter’, with no stigma attached
to it.
29. It is the case of the Petitioner that though the
Respondent Institution was fully satisfied about her work
and conduct, it has chosen to terminate her services on
account of active participation of Petitioner’s husband
in lawful association activities.
30. Further it is contended on the side of the Petitioner
that the Order of Termination was admittedly not made
on non-renewal of contract but based on the alleged non-
satisfactory performance of the Petitioner without hearing
her and therefore, the said order passed in violation of
Principles of Natural Justice and thus, not sustainable.
31. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent,
contended that services of the petitioner were terminated
on expiry of the period of her probation on account of
her unsatisfactory performance and such a termination
cannot be held to be stigmatic. By way of reply, the
learned counsel for the Respondent argued that as per
clause 3 of the Appointment Order (Ex.P1), Petitioner’s
performance was assessed during the period of contract
and she was periodically advised by the Respondent to
include her performance. But, her performance was found
to be below par by the immediate superiors of the
Petitioner, giving her only average score of 51.21% of first
appraisal and 47.57%. The Superior of the Petitioner has
clearly observed Petitioner’s Secretarial skills were found
to be wanting, though she was found to be Co-operative.
There was no allegations of misconduct against the
Petitioner. But, her performance of Secretary was not
appreciable hence, the Respondent has every right to
decide against renewing the contract on expiry of her
fixed term contract, dated 20-01-2015.
32. Further, it is argued that negative appraisal of
Petitioner cannot be termed as allegations of misconduct
or stigmatic. Therefore, there is no scope for her to seek
hearing before the decision on non-renewal of her fixed
term contract is taken.
33. Further, it is contended that the claim of
victimization and colourable excise of power by the
Respondent Institution against the Petitioner is baseless.
Petitioner’s husband joined Respondent's Institution on
02-04-2002 and continues to be employed as on date with
all perks and benefits. There are 10 Unions in the
Respondent’s Institution and allegation that Respondent
Institution chosen her to victimize for her husband’s
Trade Union activities, is not acceptable without any
further substantial pleadings and proofs.
34. Further, he added with regard to the application
submitted by the Respondent Institution before the
Pondicherry University that, on 06-01-2015, the Petitioner
was very much in employment with Respondent. She was
terminated only on expiry of the contract on 20-01-2015.
Hence there was no false information given to the
University. Having accepted the fixed term contract of
employment when it was offered by the Respondent
Institution, the Petitioner has no right to challenge her
termination subsequently. It was neither stigmatic
termination nor retrenchment.
35. The learned Counsel for Respondent at the outset,
argues that the present petition cannot be entertained
as it is a settled law that an assessment of an employee
based on his performance during probation cannot be
reviewed in judicial proceedings and only procedural
violations or decision-making process is subject to
judicial scrutiny. An independent Evaluation of the
respondent Management has assessed the performance
of the Petitioner during probation on various parameters
and found her unsuitable for continuation of contract nor
for confirmation and this assessment cannot be
questioned and/or reassessed in Industrial Dispute,
which is what the Petitioner is calling upon this Court to
do.
36. On this point, Respondent side has relied upon
the some case laws mentioned hereunder in support of
his contentions:
(i) CDJ 2020 SC 381
Probationers have no indefeasible right to continue
in employment until confirmed, and they can be
relieved by the competent authority, if found unsuitable.
Its only in a very limited category of cases that such
probationers can seek protection under the principles
of natural justice, say when they are ‘removed’ in a
manner which prejudices their future prospects in
alternate fields or casts aspersions on their character
or violates their constitutional rights. In such cases
of ‘stigmatic’ removal only that a reasonable
opportunity of hearing is sine qua non.
In Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of India (AIR
1958 SC 36, a Constitution Bench opined that in short,
if, the termination of services is founded on the right
333
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LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
flowing from contract or the service rules, then, prima
facie, the termination is not a punishment and carried
with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not
attracted.
(ii) CDJ 2010 SC 058
PARA 16. It is no longer res Integra that even if
an order of termination refers to unsatisfactory
service of the person concerned, the same cannot be
said to be stigmatic. In this connection, we make a
reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in
Abhijit Gupta vs. S.N.B. National Centre, Basic
Sciences (supra), wherein, also a similar letter was
issued to the concerned employee intimating him that
his performance was unsatisfactory and therefore, he
is not suitable for confirmation.
PARA 17. In Mathew P. Thomas vs. Kerala State
Civil Supply Corporation Limited (supra) also the
concerned employee was kept on probation for a
period of two years. During the course of his
employment, he was also informed that despite being
told to improve his performance time and again there
is no such improvement. His shortfalls were brought
to his notice and consequently by order, dated
16-01-1997 his services were terminated, wherein, also
a reference was made to his unsatisfactory service. In
the said decision, the Supreme Court has held that on
the basis of long line of decisions it appears that
whether an order of termination is simpliciter or
punitive has ultimately to be decided having due
regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.
PARA 18. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay
Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences, (2002) 1 SCC 520; this
Court had the occasion to determine as to whether the
impugned order therein was a letter of termination of
services simpliciter or stigmatic termination. After
considering various earlier decisions of this Court in
paragraph 21 of the aforesaid decision it was stated
by this Court thus:
PARA 21. One of the judicially evolved tests to
determine whether in substance an order of termination
is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination
there was (a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into
allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct
which (c) culminate in a finding a guilty. If, all three
factors are present the termination has been held to
be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination
order. Conversely if, any one of the three factors is
missing, the termination has been upheld’.
(iii) CDJ 1998 SC 178
It, however, held that it was necessary for the
appellant to produce material to show that
respondent’s performance was not satisfactory and as
no such material was produced the order of
termination was bad. We find, as disclosed by the
Award of the Labour Court, that the appellant had
examined two witnesses, Satish Dudeja and Om
Prakash to prove that his work was not satisfactory.
It was, therefore, no correct to say that no evidence
as led by the appellant to prove that the work of the
respondent was not satisfactory. Both the witnesses
had clearly stated that he was found negligent in his
work and because of his negligence he had met with
an accident in the factory premises. It was not the
case of the respondent that the action of the employer
was mala fide. The Labour Court had also not held
that the satisfactory of the Management was vitiated
by mala fides. It had struck down the order of
termination on the ground that it was stigmatic and,
therefore, it could not have been passed without
holding a domestic inquiry. The High Court rightly did
not accept that finding. What the High Court failed
to appreciate was that it was not open to sit in appeal
over the assessment made by the employer of the
performance of the employee. Once it was found that
the assessment made by the employer. The High Court
was also wrong in holding that in order to support its
satisfaction it was necessary for the appellant to
produce some reports or communication or other
evidence to show that performance of the respondent
was below the expected norms. We find that the whole
approach of the High Court was wrong and, therefore,
the order passed by it will have to set aside.
37. I may reproduce the contents of the appointment
letter, dated 20-01-2013 for better appreciation of the
controversy, as under:
“With reference to your application and subsequent
discussion we had with you, we are pleased to offer
you the post of Secretary in Pondicherry Institute of
Medical Sciences for two years on contract on the
following terms and conditions”.
38. On the expiry of the contract of the said probation
period of two years, her services were terminated by an
order, dated 19-01-2015 passed by the respondents and
the relevant portion of the said letter, dated 19-01-2015
is reproduced hereby in verbatim: “On assessment of her
performance during the period of contract, it has been
found that her performance rating has not been
satisfactory up to the level required and hence, it has
been decided by the Management to discontinue her
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LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
[18 April 2023
contract of service on completion with effort from
20-01-2015 as per the terms and conditions of her
contract”.
39. In the said termination of Probationary order, the
respondents did not attribute any specific misconduct,
negligence, inefficiency or dereliction of duty, on the part
of the petitioner, before taking the said decision of
terminating his probation period. The only reason given
by the respondent in the termination order is that the
services of the petitioner have not been found to be
satisfactory by the Respondent Management.
40. As per the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the
termination of the petitioner was not termination
‘simpliciter’ but, was ‘stigmatic’ in nature. Order Ex.P3
discontinuance of the contract issued without hearing
her and therefore, the said order passed in violation of
principles of natural justice and thus, not sustainable.
41. Before going into this above point for discussion,
it is important for us to understand when and how, the
concept of probation was devised. In the matter of Ajit
Singh vs. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 21, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court while explaining this position held that
“With the advent of security in public service when
termination or removal became more and more difficult
and order of termination or removal from service became
a subject-matter of judicial review, the concept of
probation came to acquire a certain connotation. If, a
servant could not be removed by way of punishment from
service unless he is given an opportunity to meet the
allegations if any, against him which necessitates his
removal from service, rules of natural justice postulate
an enquiry into the allegations and proof thereof this
developing master-servant relationship put the master on
guard. In order that an incompetent or inefficient servant
is not foisted upon him because, the charge of
incompetence or inefficiency is easy to make but, difficult
to prove, concept of probation was devised. To guard
against errors of human judgment in selecting suitable
personnel for service, the new recruit is put on test for a
period before he is absorbed in service or acquires a right
to the post. Period of probation gave a sort of locus
poenitentiae to the employer to observe the work, ability,
efficiency, sincerity and competence of the servant and
if, he is found not suitable for the post, the master
reserved a right to dispense with his service without
anything more during or at the end of the prescribed
period which is styled as period of probation. This
judgment has also been reiterated in the matter of State
Bank of India and Ors. vs. Palak Modi and Anr. etc., (2013)
3 SCC 607”.
42. Thus, it may well be seen that the concept of
probation has been devised only to give an opportunity
to the employer to observe the work and efficiency of
the employee for the job. In light of this, let us examine
the first issue i.e., whether an employee on probation
can be terminated without holding any disciplinary
proceeding. The position of law in this context has been
eloquently explained in the matter of Samsher Singh vs.
State of Punjab (1975) 1 SCR 814, wherein, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that, “before a probationer is
confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation
to consider whether the work of the probationer is
satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the
absence of any Rules governing a probationer in this
respect, the authority may come to the conclusion that
on account of inadequacy for the job or for any
temperamental or other object not involving moral
turpitude, the probationer is unsuitable for the job and
hence, must be discharged. No punishment is involved,
in this. The authority may in some cases be of the view
that the conduct of the probationer may result in
dismissal or removal on an inquiry. But, in those cases
the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply
discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a
chance to make good in other walks of life without a
stigma at the time of termination of probation”. Thus, it
is amply clear that during the period of probation, an
employee may be removed without holding any
disciplinary proceeding.
43. Coming to the second issue, whether the
termination of services of an employee on probation, on
the ground of non-satisfaction would ipso facto amount
to termination by way of punishment.
In Krishnadevaraya Education Trust vs. L.A.
Balakrishna (2001) 9 SCC 319, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court observed that, “There can be no manner of
doubt that the employer is entitled to engage the
services of a person on probation. During the period
of probation, the suitability of the recruit/appointee
has to be seen. If, his services are not satisfactory
which means that he is not suitable for the job, then
the employer has a right to terminate the services as
a reason thereof. If, the termination during
probationary period is without any reason, perhaps
such an order would be sought to be challenged on
the ground of being arbitrary. Therefore, naturally
services of an employee on probation would be
terminated, when he is found not to be suitable for
the job for which he was engaged, without assigning
any reason. If, the order on the face of it states that
his services are being terminated because his
performance is not satisfactory, the employer runs
the risk of the allegation being made that the order
itself casts a stigma. We do not say that such a
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18 April 2023]
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
contention will succeed. Normally, therefore, it is
preferred that the order itself does not mention the
reason why the services are being terminated. If,
such an order is challenged, the employer will have
to indicate the grounds on which the services of a
probationer were terminated. Mere fact that in
response to the challenge, the employer states that
the services were not satisfactory would not ipso
facto mean that the services of the probationer were
being terminated by way of punishment. The
probationer is on test and if, the services are found
not to be satisfactory, the employer has in terms of
the letter of appointment, the right to terminate the
services. In the instant case, the second order which
was passed terminating the services of the
respondent was innocuously worded. Even if, we
take into consideration, the first order which was
passed which mentioned that a Committee which had
been constituted came to the conclusion that the job
proficiency of the respondent was not up to the
mark, that would be a valid reason for terminating the
services of the respondent. That reason cannot be
cited and relied upon by contending that the
termination was by way of punishment”.
44. Similarly, in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Abhijit Gupta v. S.N.B. National
Centre, Basic Sciences, (2006) 4 SCC 469, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held as follows:
The period of probation therefore furnishes a
valuable opportunity to the master to closely observe
the work of the probationer and by the time the period
of probation expires to make up his mind whether to
retain the servant by absorbing him in regular service
or dispense with his service. Period of probation may
vary from post to post or master to master and it is
not obligatory on the master to prescribe a period of
probation, it is always open to the employer to employ
a person without putting him on probation. Power to
put the employee on probation for watching his
performance and the period during which the
performance is to be observed is the prerogative of
the employer. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that the order of termination due to unsatisfactory
performance is a termination ‘simpliciter’ and not
‘punitive’ in nature.
45. Also, in Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay
Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences (2002) 1 SCC 520, the
Hon’ble Apex Court held that, “ in order to amount to a
stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes
something over and above mere unsuitability for the
job”.
46. Again in Progressive Education Society vs. Rajendra
(2008) 3 SCC 310, the Hon’ble Apex Court upheld that,
“The law with regard to termination of the services of a
probationer is well established and it has been repeatedly
held that such a power lies with the appointing authority
which is at liberty to terminate the services of a
probationer if, it finds the performance of the probationer
to be unsatisfactory during the period of probation. The
assessment has to be made by the appointing authority
itself and the satisfaction is that of the appointing
authority as well. Unless a stigma is attached to the
termination or the probationer is called upon to show
cause for any shortcoming which may subsequently be
the cause for termination of the probationer’s service, the
management or the appointing authority is not required
to give any explanation or reason for terminating the
services except informing him that his services have been
found to be unsatisfactory”.
47. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid legal position,
it can be concluded that this issue is no more res integra
that an order of termination due to unsatisfactory
performance of the probationer, cannot be ipso facto
termed as ‘stigmatic’ or ‘punitive’ in nature. During the
probation period, an employee has to be extra careful and
diligent while discharging his assigned duties, so that
he can successfully complete his/her probation period
to get confirmation against the post he/she has been
selected for and he/she does not give any chance or
reason to his/her superiors to terminate his services. Any
kind of insufficiency, negligence, indiscipline or
misconduct can prove fatal to an employee on probation.
Before the probationer is confirmed, the authority
concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the
work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is
suitable for the post. If, during the period of probation,
the performance of a probationer is not found
satisfactory or suitable for a particular job, as per the
assessment of the employer, he may be terminated from
the service and such termination would be termed as
termination ‘simpliciter’ and cannot be held to be
‘punitive’ in nature.
48. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Oswal
Pressure Die Casting Industry, Faridabad vs. Presiding
Officer and Anr. (1998) 3 SCC 225, while allowing an
appeal against the judgement of the High Court, against
an Award of the Labour Court, held that, “it was not open
to the High Court to sit in appeal over the assessment
made by employer of the performance of the employee.
It was further held that once it was found that the
assessment made by the employer was supported by
some material and was not mala fide, it was not proper
for the High Court to interfere and substitute its
satisfaction with the satisfaction of the employer”.
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LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
[18 April 2023
49. Adverting back to the facts of present case. In the
case in hand, two evaluation points have been mentioned
in the counter statement at paragraph 10, which reflect
that the Petitioner was neither diligent nor was performing
her duties satisfactorily. The same has been deposed by
the Management Witness as RW1 before this Court. On
careful perusal of the cross-examination made by the
petitioner Counsel on RW1, I could not able to find a
single question or even a suggestion made on behalf of
the petitioner that there were no such evaluation of
performance or the evaluation points mentioned in the
counter as 51.21% on 1st appraisal and 47.57% as not
correct.
50. Moreover, PW1 has admitted in her cross-
examination about the evaluation process on the
performance made by the Respondent Institution that,
“PW1
deposed
during
cross-examination
that
“ÿ√VmkVÔºk
®∫Ô^
WÆk™›]_
ºkÁÈ
ÿƒF√kÏÔ”¬z, ®∫Ô”Á¶B Performance-n \]©¨|
ÿƒFm Internal appraisal report >BVÏ ÿƒFkVÏÔ^ ®[≈V_
g\VD. ÂV[ report ÿƒF•D HOD-•D ÷m ƒD\Õ>\V™
>[ ÔÚ›Á> √]° ÿƒFm, ∂>[ ∂Ω©√Á¶lKD Appraisal
report >BVÏ ÿƒFB©√‚¶m ®[≈V_ g\VD. ÷ÀkV≈VÔ 6
\V>›]uz ŒÚ xÁ≈ Appraisal ÿƒFkVÏÔ^ ®[≈V_
®™¬z ÿ>ˆBVm. Internal appraisal report ®[√m
confidential-È™ report ®[≈V_ g\VD”.
51. Rw1 deposed during cross-examination that
“ŒÀÿkVÚ ªaBÁ´•D WBt¬zDº√Vº> z§©∏‚¶
ÔVÈD ∂kÏÔ”¬z √ˬÔVÈ\VÔ ÔVı∏¬Ô©√|D,
∂Õ>
√ˬÔVÈD
֮]l_
∂Õ>
ªaBˆ[
Performance Evaluate ÿƒFB©√‚|, ∂m ]Ú©]Ô´\VÔ
÷_ÈV>√‚ƒ›]_,
∂kÁ´
√ËloÚÕm
s|s›ms|ºkVD. √Ë ]Ú©]Ô´\VÔ ÷Ú¬zD
√‚ƒ›]_, ∂kÏÔ”¬z √Ë º�ÿÔVı| ÿ>V¶´
∂–\]¬Ô©√‚|, ∂>uºÔu≈ √Ë WB\™ c›>´°
kw∫Ô©√|D ®[Æ ƒV‚E √]Èπ¬˛≈VÏ. √Ë ÔVÈD
֮]l_>V[,
∂kˆ[
Performance
\]©¨|
ÿƒFB©√|D. √Ë ÔVÈD xøkmD, Performance-n
ÿ√VÆ›m Monitor ÿƒFB©√|D. Ex.P1-M_ ŒÀÿkVÚ
6 \V>›]uz, Performance \]©¨| ÿƒFB©√|D ®[Æ
c^·m
®[≈V_
g\VD.
∂m>V[
Monitor
ÿƒFB©√|D
®[Æ
ÿƒV[º™[.
√Ë
]Ú©]
∂π¬ÔV>√‚ƒ›]_, º�√Ω ƒD\Õ>©√‚¶ ªaBÚ¬z
kVFÿ\VaBVÔ √Ë ]Ú©] ∂π¬Ôs_ÁÈ ®[ÆD
improve ÿƒFB ºkı|D ®[ÆD ∂§°Æ›>©√|D”.
52. It amply demonstrates that the Respondent
Institution has a system of performance monitoring
periodically and on such monitoring process, the
Petitioner's secretarial skill were found to be
unsatisfactory. It is also mentioned in the counter that
Petitioner’s secretarial skills were found to be wanting,
though she was found to be co-operative. The same fact
has also been elucidated during cross-examinations of
PW1 and RW1, the Management side witness, which are
as follows;
PW1 deposed during cross-examination that
“Ex.P2-®[–Á¶B √Ë s|©A c›>´°. Ex.P2-s_
®[ *m ®Õ>s> zÁ≈Ôº·V, ∂k#º´V z§©∏‚|,
√ËloÕm
s|s¬Ôs_ÁÈ
®[≈V_
g\VD.
Ex.P2-s_
®[–Á¶B
√Ë
WÏkVÔ›]uz
]Ú©]Ô´\VÔ ÷_ÁÈ ®[Æ z§©∏¶©√‚|^·m
®[≈V_ g\VD. º�√Ω Ex.P2-s_ ®[–Á¶B √Ë
WÏkVÔ›]uz
]Ú©]Ô´\VÔ
÷_ÁÈ
®[Æ
ÿƒV_o•^·m, ®[ *m zÁ≈BVÔºkV, ®[ *m
zu≈flƒV‚¶VÔºkV
∂_Èm
∂k#´VÔºkV
®|›m¬ÿÔV^· xΩBVm ®[Æ ÿƒV[™V_ g\VD”.
RW1 deposed during the cross-examination that
“Probation and Confirmation Clause ÔVð©√‚¶VKD,
∂kÚÁ¶B WÏðBD ÿƒFB©√‚¶ √ˬÔVÈ xΩs_
\]©¨| ÿƒF•Dº√Vm ∂kÚÁ¶B Performance
]Ú©]Ô´\VÔ ÷_ÈV>>V_, ∂kÁ´ *ı|D √ËÁB
ÿ>V¶´
∂–\]¬Ô
xΩBs_ÁÈ
®[Æ
ƒV‚E
√]Èπ¬˛≈VÏ”.
53. Hence, there was no allegations of misconduct
against the Petitioner, it is only her performance as
Secretary was not appreciable and had failed to improve
despite many periodical advise. The reasons disclosed
in the speaking order Ex.P3 were sufficient for the
respondent to have taken a decision to discontinue the
services of the Petitioner. If, the contentions raised by
the learned Counsel for the Petitioner are accepted, then
in every case of unsatisfactory performance or lack of
interest in the discharge of duties by a probationer,
setting up of an enquiry would be required, which will
defeat the very purpose and the concept of probation
as the period of probation furnishes a valuable
opportunity to the employer to closely observe and
monitor the work and efficiency of the probationer for
the job.
54. In the light of the legal position and factual matrix
discussed above, I do not find any merit in the
contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the
petitioner that without hearing the petitioner, the order
of termination Ex.P3 passed and there was a violation of
principles of natural justice. The services of an employee
on probation can be terminated without holding any
disciplinary proceeding when there is no allegation of
misconduct mentioned in the said termination order.
When there is no formal enquiry prior to the termination,
when there is no allegations attributed against the
petitioner involving moral turpitude or misconduct and
337
18 April 2023]
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
which culminate in a finding a guilty. In the present case
admittedly, the termination of services of an employee
on probation was on the ground of non satisfaction,
which is not amount to termination by way of
punishment. The same can be held to be termination
‘simpliciter’, with no stigma attached to it. Therefore, the
point for determination is decided accordingly to the
effect that Petitioner is not entitled for any relief as
claimed in the claim petition.
55. In the result, the reference is decided as unjustified
and the industrial dispute is dismissed. No costs.
Dictated to the Stenographer, directly typed by
him, corrected and pronounced by me in open Court
on this the 20th day of December, 2022.
V. SOFANA DEVI,
Presiding Officer,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Puducherry.
List of petitioner’s witness:
PW1
— 20-12-2021
Tmt. Rathika
List of petitioner’s exhibits:
Ex.Pl
— 21-01-2013
Photocopy of the Appointment
Order issued to the Petitioner.
Ex.P2
— 21-01-2013
Photocopy of the Order
issued by the Respondent
Institution.
Ex.P3
— 19-01-2015
Photocopy of the Order
issued by the Respondent
Institution to discontinue
Petitioner’s service.
Ex.P4
— 15-07-2015
Photocopy of the information
provided to the petitioner by
the
Affiliation
Wing,
Pondicherry University under
the RTI Act.
Ex.P5
— —
Photocopy of the Dispatch
Register issued by the
Affiliation Wing, Pondicherry
University under the RTI
Act.
Ex.P6
— —
Photocopy of the Minutes
of the Inspection Committee
(Medical Colleges) issued
by the Affiliation Wing,
Pondicherry
University
under the RTI Act.
Ex.P7
— —
Photocopy
of
the
Non-Teaching Staff particulars
of the Respondent Institute
issued by the Affiliation
Wing, Pondicherry University
under the RTI Act.
Ex.P8
— 19-10-2015
Photocopy of the Complaint
sent by the Petitioner to the
Inspector-General of Police,
Puducherry.
Ex.P9
— 20-10-2015
P h o t o c o p y
o f
t h e
Acknowledgment made by
t h e
O f f i c e
o f
t h e
Inspector-General of Police,
Puducherry.
Ex.P10 — 23-10-2015
Photocopy of the Complaint
submitted by the Petitioner
to the Vice-Chancellor,
Pondicherry University.
List of respondent’s witness:
RW1
— 25-08-2022
R. Madhusudhanan, Senior
Manager
(Personal
and
Administration)
List of Respondents’s Exhibits:
Ex.R1
— —
Photocopy
of
the
Curriculum Vitae of the
Petitioner.
Ex.R2
— 29-10-2015
Photocopy of the letter
forwarded by Pondicherry
University, Affiliation Wing
College
Development
Council to Respondent.
Ex.R3
— 09-11-2015
Photocopy of the reply given
by the Respondent to the
Dean, College Development
Council.
Ex.R4
— 09-03-2017
Photocopy of the reply
given by the Respondent
Institution to Labour Officer
(Conciliation).
V. SOFANA DEVI,
Presiding Officer,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, Puducherry.
338
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
[18 April 2023
GOVERNMENT OF PUDUCHERRY
LABOUR DEPARTMENT
(G.O. Rt. No. 43/Lab./AIL/T/2023,
Puducherry, dated 28th March 2023)
NOTIFICATION
Whereas, the Government is of the opinion that an
industrial dispute has arisen between the management
of M/s. Vinayaka Mission’s Medical College, Karaikal
and the Union workmen represented by the Union for
all Staff in Vinayaka Missions Medical College and
Hospital, P.K. Salai, Karaikal, over grant of promotion
to Tmt. C. Sasikala, Attender, to the post of Clerk with
effect from the date of promotion granted to her
immediate junior Thiru S. Santhosh Kumar, in respect
of the matter mentioned in the Annexure to this order;
And whereas, in the opinion of the Government, it is
necessary to refer the said dispute for adjudication;
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority delegated
vide G.O. Ms. No. 20/9/Lab./L, dated 23-5-1991 of the
Labour Department, Puducherry, to exercise the powers
conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 10
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act XIV
of 1947), it is hereby directed by the Secretary to
Government (Labour) that the said dispute be referred
to the Industrial Tribunal, Puducherry, for adjudication.
The Industrial Tribunal, Puducherry, shall submit the
Award within 3 months from the date of issue of
reference as stipulated under sub-section (2-A) of
section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and in
accordance with rule 10-B of the Industrial Disputes
(Central) Rules, 1957. The party raising the dispute shall
file a statement of claim complete with relevant documents,
list of reliance and witnesses to the Industrial Tribunal,
Puducherry, within 15 days of the receipt of the order
of reference and also forward a copy of such statement
to each one of the opposite parties involved in the
dispute.
ANNEXURE
(i) Whether the industrial dispute raised by the
Union workmen represented by Union for all Staff
Vinayaka Mission’s Medical College and Hosptial,
Karaikal, against the management of M/s. Vinayaka
Mission’s Medical College, Karaikal, to grant
promotion to Tmt. C. Sasikala, Attender to the post
of Clerk with effect from the date of promotion
granted to her immediate junior Thiru S. Santhosh
Kumar with all monetary benefits is justified or not?
(ii) If justified, what relief Tmt. C. Sasikala is
entitled to?
(iii) To compute the relief if any, awarded in terms
of money if, it can be so computed.
(By order)
P. RAGINI,
Under Secretary to Government (Labour).
GOVERNMENT OF PUDUCHERRY
LABOUR DEPARTMENT
(G.O. Rt. No. 44/Lab./AIL/T/2023,
Puducherry, dated 28th March 2023)
NOTIFICATION
Whereas, the Government is of the opinion that an
industrial dispute has arisen between the management
of M/s. Vinayaka Mission’s Medical College, Karaikal
and G. Manimaran, represented by the Union for all Staff
in Vinayaka Mission’s Medical College and Hospital,
Karaikal, over promotion, in respect of the matter
mentioned in the Annexure to this order;
And whereas, in the opinion of the Government, it is
necessary to refer the said dispute for adjudication;
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority delegated
vide G.O. Ms. No. 20/9/Lab./L, dated 23-5-1991 of the
Labour Department, Puducherry, to exercise the powers
conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 10
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act XIV
of 1947), it is hereby directed by the Secretary to
Government (Labour) that the said dispute be referred
to the Industrial Tribunal, Puducherry, for adjudication.
The Industrial Tribunal, Puducherry, shall submit the
Award within 3 months from the date of issue of
reference as stipulated under sub-section (2-A) of
section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and in
accordance with rule 10-B of the Industrial Disputes
(Central) Rules, 1957. The party raising the dispute shall
file a statement of claim complete with relevant documents,
list of reliance and witnesses to the Industrial Tribunal,
Puducherry, within 15 days of the receipt of the order
of reference and also forward a copy of such statement
to each one of the opposite parties involved in the
dispute.
ANNEXURE
(i) Whether the industrial dispute raised by the
Union workmen, represented by Union for all Staff
Vinayaka Mission’s Medical College and Hosptial,
Karaikal, against the management of M/s. Vinayaka
Mission’s Medical College, Karaikal, over grant of
promotion to Thiru G. Manimaran, Attender to the
post of Clerk with arrears is justified or not?
(ii) If justified, what relief Thiru G. Manimaran is
entitled to?
(iii) To compute the relief in terms of money if, it
can be so computed.
(By order)
P. RAGINI,
Under Secretary to Government (Labour).
339
18 April 2023]
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
GOVERNMENT OF PUDUCHERRY
LABOUR DEPARTMENT
(G.O. Rt. No. 45/Lab./AIL/T/2023,
Puducherry, dated 28th March 2023)
NOTIFICATION
Whereas, the Government is of the opinion that an
industrial dispute has arisen between the management
of M/s. Vinayaka Mission’s Medical College and
Hospital, Karaikal and the Union for all Staff in
Vinayaka Mission’s Medical College and Hospital,
Karaikal, over wage revision of Thiru G. Swaminathan
on par with his junior Thiru Michael Anthony, with
arrears, in respect of the matter mentioned in the
Annexure to this order;
And whereas, in the opinion of the Government, it is
necessary to refer the said dispute for adjudication;
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority delegated
vide G.O. Ms. No. 20/9/Lab./L, dated 23-5-1991 of the
Labour Department, Puducherry, to exercise the powers
conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 10
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act XIV
of 1947), it is hereby directed by the Secretary to
Government (Labour) that the said dispute be referred
to the Industrial Tribunal, Puducherry, for adjudication.
The Industrial Tribunal, Puducherry, shall submit the
Award within 3 months from the date of issue of
reference as stipulated under sub-section (2-A) of
section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and in
accordance with rule 10-B of the Industrial Disputes
(Central) Rules, 1957. The party raising the dispute shall
file a statement of claim complete with relevant documents,
list of reliance and witnesses to the Industrial Tribunal,
Puducherry, within 15 days of the receipt of the order
of reference and also forward a copy of such statement
to each one of the opposite parties involved in the
dispute.
ANNEXURE
(i) Whether the industrial dispute raised by the
Union workmen, represented by Union for all Staff
in Vinayaka Mission’s Medical College and Hosptial,
Karaikal, against the management of M/s. Vinayaka
Mission’s Medical College, Karaikal, over wage
revision of Thiru G. Swaminathan on par with his
junior Thiru Michael Anthony with arrears is justified
or not?
(ii) If justified, what relief Thiru G. Swaminathan
is entitled to?
(iii) To compute the relief in terms of money if, it
can be so computed.
(By order)
P. RAGINI,
Under Secretary to Government (Labour).
GOVERNMENT OF PUDUCHERRY
DIRECTORATE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
(G.O. Ms. No. 2/DIT/2023,
Puducherry, dated 5th April 2023)
ORDER
The Secretary, Department of Telecommunications,
Ministry of Communications, Government of India,
New Delhi vide letter No. 18-39 / 2022-ERU, dated
17-02-2023 from Department of Telecommunications,
Ministry of Communications, Government of India,
New Delhi, has requested the Union territory of
Puducherry to constitute Inter-Departmental Coordination
Committee (IDCC) to review the progress on Digital
Communication Readiness Index (DCRI) and recommend
Policy Reforms by the State.
2. Accordingly, the Government of Puducherry is
pleased to constitute the “Inter-Departmental Coordination
Committee” for Union territory of Puducherry, as stated
below:
Sl.
Member detail
Role
No.
(1)
(2)
(3)
1
Chief Secretary to Government,
. . Chairman
Puducherry.
2
The Development Commissioner,
. . Vice-
Puducherry.
Chairman.
3
Secretary to Government,
. . Member
(Revenue), Puducherry.
4
Secretary to Government,
. . Member
(Works), Puducherry.
5
Secretary to Government,
. . Member
(Industries), Puducherry.
6
Secretary to Government,
. . Member
(Local Bodies), Puducherry.
7
Secretary to Government,
. . Member
(Power), Puducherry.
8
Secretary to Government,
. . Member
(Education), Puducherry.
9
Secretary to Government,
. . Member
(Housing), Puducherry.
10
Secretary to Government,
. . Member
(Health), Puducherry.
11
Secretary to Government,
. . Member
(Forest), Puducherry.
12
Secretary to Government,
. . Member
(Urban/Rural Development),
Puducherry.
340
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
[18 April 2023
13
Secretary to Government,
. . Member
(Information Technology),
Puducherry.
14
Representative,
. . Member
Department of Telecommunications.
15
Director of Information Technology,
. . Member-
Puducherry.
Secretary.
3. The Committee shall meet quarterly to review the
progress on Digital Communication Readiness Index
(DCRI) and recommend Policy Reforms by the State.
4. The Chairman of the Committee is also authorised
to co-opt any experts/officials as necessiated.
(By order)
D. MOHAN KUMAR,
Director,
(Information Technology).
AFFIDAVIT
I, V. Muthu, s. x›m, son of Venkatesa Mudaliar,
Hindu aged about 77 years, residing at No. 58, Chellan
Nagar, Puducherry-605 011, do hereby solemnly and
sincerely affirm and state on oath as follows:
That I am the deponent herein.
I state that I was born on 15-06-1945 to my
parents namely, Venkatesa Mudaliar and Mannamal,
in my Declaration Form, my name has been entered
as ‘V. Muthu’, dated 16-06-1960, issued by the
Patchaippa’s College School, Madras vide Registration
No. 376/1960.
My name is mentioned as ‘V. Muthu’ in my
Aadhaar Card bearing No. XXXX XXXX 2166, issued
by Unique Identification Authority of India.
My name is mentioned as ‘Muthu’ in my Voter’s
Identity Card bearing No. KVY0666933, issued by
Election Commission of India.
My name is entered as ‘x›m’ in my Family Ration
Card bearing No. 092949, issued by the Department
of Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs, Government
of Puducherry.
My name is entered as ‘s.x›m’ in the Vazhthu
Madal bearing No. 4842/Ô√má]3/2015, issued by the
Department of Art and Culture, Government of
Puducherry.
My name is entered as ‘s.x›m’ in my Certificate,
dated 16-12-2015, issued by the Department of Art
and Culture, Government of Puducherry.
My name is entered as ‘s.x›m’ in my Certificate,
dated 17-10-2010, issued by Puducherry Tamizh
Sangam, Puducherry.
My name is entered as ‘s.x›m’ in my Certificate,
dated 12-02-2017, issued by the Election Committee,
Puducherry Tamizh Sangam, Puducherry.
My name is entered as ‘s.x›m’ in Puduvai
Tamizh Sangam Letter Pad, Registered as No. 1/1968,
issued by Puducherry Tamizh Sangam, Puducherry.
Hence, I do hereby declare that the above-mentioned
names viz., ‘V. Muthu’, ‘x›m’, ‘s.x›m’ and ‘Muthu’
are referring one and the same person i.e., myself only.
Solemnly affirmed and signed before the Notary Public
at Puducherry, on this 04th day of April 2023.
562288
s.
s.
s.
s.
s. x›m
x›m
x›m
x›m
x›m.
————
AFFIDAVIT
I, Thiripurasundari, wife of V. Ganesan, Hindu, aged
about 52 years and residing at No. 23, Eswaran Koil
Street, Agaram, Puducherry-605 502, do hereby solemnly
and sincerely affirm and state on oath as follows:
That I am the deponent herein and made this
affidavit on behalf of me.
I state that my name is entered as ‘Thripurasundary’
in my Husband’s Pension Payment Order No. CRPF/
09/5.54/RP/PA.7, issued by the Office of the MHA/
CRPF/105 BN RAF CCS (Pension rule) 1972,
New Delhi. PPO No. 23903-09-4851-8.
I state that my name is entered as ‘Thiripurasundari’
in my Aadhaar Card issued by the Unique Identification
Authority of India bearing No. XXXX XXXX 4813.
I state that my name is entered as ‘Thiripurasundari’
in my PAN Card, issued by the Income-tax Department,
Government of India bearing No. APIPT0955L, dated
18-02-2012.
I state that my name is entered as ‘Thiripurasundari’
in my Elector’s Photo Identity Card, issued by the
Election Commission of India bearing No.
MVM01 88979, dated 07-08-2020.
I state that my name is entered as ‘Thiripurasundari’
in my Joint Bank Passbook, issued by the State Bank
of India, Thattanchavady Branch (Branch Code-6842),
Puducherry, bearing Account No. XXXXXXX6409,
dated 21-07-2009.
(1)
(2)
(3)
341
18 April 2023]
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
I state that my name is entered as ‘]ˆA´∑Õ>ˆ’ in
our Family Ration Card, issued by the Department of
Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs, Government of
Puducherry, bearing No. 140270.
Hence, I declare that my correct name is
‘Thiripurasundari’ only.
The above statement in the foregoing paragraphs
is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Solemnly affirmed and signed before the Notary Public
at Puducherry, on this 31st day of March 2023.
562290
G. THIRIPURASUNDARI.
————
AFFIDAVIT
I, Mouttayen son of Kunjithapatham, Hindu, aged
about 74 years, business, permanently residing at No. 46,
Main Road, Chellan Nagar, Puducherry-605 011, do hereby
solemnly and sincerely affirm and state on oath as follows:
I state that as per the Order passed in C.M.P.
No. 264/2016, dated 17-11-2016 by Hon'ble Principal
District Munsif, Puducherry. I have been known by the
names ‘Muthaiyan alias Chithanantham’, ‘Sithanantham’,
‘Sithanandam’ and ‘Mouttayen’ and they referring one
and the same person i.e., myself only.
I declare that in order to avoid confusion using my
name and spelling, I do affirm that I shall hereinafter
be known only as ‘Mouttayen’ for all purposes and
records.
I declare that the abovesaid facts are true to the best
of my knowledge, belief and information.
Solemnly affirmed and signed before the Notary Public
at Puducherry, on this 3rd day of April 2023.
562291
K. MOUTTAYEN.
————
AFFIDAVIT
I, Oudhayakoumarane son of Poongavanam, aged
about 61 years, residing at No. 23, Perambai Road,
Moolakulam, Puducherry, do hereby solemnly and
sincerely affirm and state as follows:
That I am the deponent herein and well known the
facts of the affidavit.
I state that according to my Birth Certificate,
bearing No. O/1962/508 and Extrait Du Registre Des
Actes De, issued by the Oulgaret Municipality,
Puducherry,
my
name
is
mentioned
as
‘Oudhayakoumarane’.
Further, I state that my Certificate of Marriage
bearing S.M. No. 220521797, issued by Oulgaret
Municipality, Puducherry, in my daughter’s Birth
Certificate vide Registration No. OM/0/1998/006207,
issued by the Oulgaret Municipality, Puducherry, in
my Aadhaar Card bearing No. XXXX XXXX 1597,
issued by the Unique Identification Authority of
India, in my daughter’s Aadhaar Card bearing No.
XXXX XXXX 6476, issued by the Unique
Identification Authority of India, my name is
mentioned as ‘Oudhayakoumarane’.
Whereas, in my Family Ration Card vide Serial No.
381040, issued by the Department of Civil Supplies
and Consumer Affairs, Government of Puducherry,
my name is mentioned as ‘Oudhayakoumarane
(c>Bz\´[)’.
Further, I state that in my Elector’s Photo Identity
Card No. UEB0153833, my name is mentioned as
‘Udayakumar’.
Further, I state that in my daughter’s Elector’s
Photo Identity Card No. UEB0122929, my name is
mentioned as ‘Udhayakumar’.
Further, I state that in my wife’s Elector’s Photo
Identity Card No. UEB0153890, my name is mentioned
as ‘Udayakumar’.
I do hereby declare that all the abovesaid names
‘Oudhayakoumarane’, ‘Udayakumar’, ‘Udhayakumar’
and ‘c>Bz\´[’ are denoting one and same person
that is referring myself only.
Hereinafter, my correct name is ‘Oudhayakoumarane
(c>Bz\V´[)’ only.
Solemnly affirmed and signed before the Notary Public
at Puducherry, on this 05th day of April 2023.
562292
P. OUDHAYAKOUMARANE.
————
AFFIDAVIT
I, S. Preethi, wife of Nagadeep. O, aged 30 years and
residing at No. 50, Thirukanchi Street, 1st Plot, Pudhu
Nagar, Villianur, Kanuvapet, Puducherry State-605 110, do
hereby solemnly and sincerely affirm and state on oath
as follows:
Taht I am the deponent herein and made this
affidavit on behalf of my minor daughter ‘Gayathri
Oruganti’.
342
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
[18 April 2023
I state that my minor daughter’s name is entered
as ‘Gayathri @ Grahathi Oruganti’ in her Birth Certificate,
bearing Registration No. PM/P2020/001656 issued by
Registrar of Births and Deaths, Pondicherry
Municipality, Government of Puducherry.
I state that my minor daughter’s name is very lengthy,
so, I cut short her name as ‘Gayathri Oruganti’.
I declare that hereafter my minor daughter will be
called and known only as ‘Gayathri Oruganti’.
That the above deposition is true and correct to
the best of my knowledge and belief.
Solemnly affirmed and signed before the Notary Public
at Puducherry, on this 4th day of April 2023.
562293
S. PREETHI.
————
AFFIDAVIT
I, Suganya, daughter of John Thambusamy and wife
of Iyappan, Indian inhabitant, aged about 30 years,
present by residing at the house bearing Door No. 22,
Vinayakar Koil Street, Kudiyiruppupalayam, Seliamedu,
Puducherry-607 402, do hereby solemnly and sincerely
affirm and state on oath as follows:
That I am the deponent herein.
I state that my name has been mentioned as
‘J. ∑Ô[BV’ in my Transfer Certificate Sl.No. 2538,
Admission No. 1949.
I state that my name has been mentioned as
‘Suganya’ in my Aadhaar Card (No. XXXX XXXX
8780), Elector’s Photo Identity Card (No. YBP0061622),
Marriage Certificate (Sl.No. 303/2013), issued by the
Marriage Registrar, Bahour, Puducherry and also in
the Birth Certificate of my daughter Sarvika, issued
by Oulgaret Municipality, Puducherry, under
Registration No. E/2018/01400, dated 20-03-2018.
I state that my name has been mentioned as
‘I. Suganya’ in my Savings Account Passbook (Account
No. XXXXXX5385), issued by Indian Bank, Seliamedu
Branch, Puducherry.
I state that I am also known in my residence by
the home-calling name as ‘ÿ«È[’ and the same was
mentioned in my Family Ration Card (No. 204875).
I state that before marriage, I used my father’s
name John Thambusamy as my inital. After marriage,
I have changed my initial as ‘I.Suganya’, i.e., my
husband’s name Iyappan.
I hereby declare that all my abovesaid names viz.,
‘J.∑Ô[BV’, ‘Suganya’, ‘I.Suganya’ and ‘ÿ«È[’ are
denoting one and the same that is referring myself
only.
Hence, I state that I am always using to write and
sign my name as ‘Suganya’ in all records, deeds,
writings and in all proceedings, dealings and
transactions.
The above deposition is true and correct to the
best of my knowledge and belief, and nothing material
has been concealed thereon.
Solemnly affirmed, and signed before the Notary Public
at Puducherry, on this 03rd day of April 2023.
562295
I. ∑Ô[BV
∑Ô[BV
∑Ô[BV
∑Ô[BV
∑Ô[BV.
————
AFFIDAVIT
I, Abdul Azeez, presently transgender, previously
son of Mohamed Rajabdheen and Abida Bagadadsaib
Marecar, at present residing at the house bearing Door
No. 3, New Street, Thirumalairayanpattinam, Karaikal,
Puducherry-609 606, do hereby solemnly and sincerely
affirm to whomsoever it may concern as follows:
That I am the deponent herein. I state that I was
born as a male, as such in my Certificate of Birth,
under Registration No. K/2002/02716, registered with
Karaikal Municipality, Karaikal and in my School
Transfer Certificate under Admission No. 4673-
2014-15, my name has been mentioned as ‘Abdul
Azeez’.
Further, I state that later I have transformed myself
to third gender through proper surgery and became
a transgender, as such in the Discharge Summary,
issued by the E.S. Hospital, Villupuram, Tamil Nadu,
my name has been mentioned as ‘Magima’.
Accordingly, in my Aadhaar Card, under No. XXXX
XXXX 4333 and in my Elector’s Photo Identity Card
under No. NPX0227140, my name has been mentioned
as ‘Mahima (\N\V)’.
In the Family Ration Card, under No. 465250, my
name has been mentioned as ‘\˛\V’.
Therefore, I do hereby declare that all the
abovesaid names are referred, identified and relate
to one and the same person that is me, the deponent
herein. I state that henceforth, I shall be known and
identified only by the name ‘Mahima (\N\V) for all
purposes.
343
18 April 2023]
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
I state that what are all stated in the above
paragraphs is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge, belief and information.
Solemnly affirmed and signed before the Notary Public
at Puducherry, on this 06th day of April 2023.
562296
M. ABDUL AZEEZ.
————
AFFIDAVIT
I, Rajendiran, son of Pazhaniyappan also called as
Palanisamy, Hindu, aged about 49 years, residing at
No. 29, Rohini Nagar, 2nd Cross, Thavalakuppam,
Puducherry-605 007, do hereby solemnly affirm and
sincerely state as follows:
1. I state that my name is entered as ‘Rajendiran’
in my Elector’s Photo Identity Card bearing
No. KTY0179952, issued by Election Commission of
India.
2. I state that my name is entered as ‘P Rajendiran’
in my Aadhaar Card bearing No. XXXX XXXX 8301,
issued by the Unique Identification Authority of
India.
3. I state that my name is entered as ‘Rajendiran P’
in my Bank Passbook, issued by Indian Overseas
Bank, Thavalakuppam Branch, Puducherry-605 007,
bearing
Savings
Bank
Account
No:
XXXXXXXXXXX0822.
4. I state that my name is entered as ‘´Vº¤Õ]´[’
in my Family Ration Card bearing No. 369817, issued
by Department of Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs,
Government of Puducherry.
5. I state that my name is entered as ‘P. ´V∑ (®)
´Vº¤Õ]´[’ in my Marriage Invitation pertaining to
my marriage with ‘M. ∂Ⱥ\K’ held on 10-09-1998
at Narasingamangalam, Tanjore District, Tamil Nadu.
6. I state that my name is entered as ‘P. Rasu’ as
per my calling name in my LIC Bond by name New
Janaraksha Plan with profits (with accident benefit)
bearing Policy No. 763530915, dated 28-04-2003,
issued by Life Insurance Corporation of India,
Gopichettipalayam Branch, Coimbalore, Tamil Nadu.
Further, I declare that the abovesaid names viz.,
‘Rajendiran’, ‘P Rajendiran’, ‘Rajendiran P’,
‘´Vº¤Õ]´[’, ‘P. ´V∑ (®) ´Vº¤Õ]´[’ and ‘P. Rasu’
as per my calling name, since I am called so by my
family members and relatives, all the abovesaid
names are referred one and the same person that is
myself and not any other person and I declare that
henceforth, I shall be known and called as ‘P.Rajendiran’
and further I declare that what are all stated above
is true to the best of my knowledge and belief, and
nothing material is concealed hereinabove.
Solemnly affirmed and signed before the Notary Public
at Puducherry, on this 03rd day of April 2023.
562297
P. ´Vº¤Õ]´[.
´Vº¤Õ]´[.
´Vº¤Õ]´[.
´Vº¤Õ]´[.
´Vº¤Õ]´[.
————
AFFIDAVIT
I, Bakkiyalakshmi, daughter of Janakiraman and wife
of Kumar, Indian, inhabitant, aged 42 years and residing
at the house situated at Main Gate Street, Ariyur,
Puducherry-605 102, do hereby solemnly and sincerely
affirm, to whomsoever it may concern as follows;
That I am the deponent herein. I state that in my
Transfer Certificate, under Admission No. 1002, my
name has been mentioned as ‘¤V. √V¬˛BÈ‚∑t’.
In my Marriage Invitation, my name has been
mentioned as ‘J.√V¬˛BÈit’.
In my Elector’s Photo Identity Card, under No.
MVM0240101 and in my my Aadhaar Card, under No.
xxxx xxxx 2064, my name has been mentioned as
‘Bakkiyalakshmi (√V¬˛BÈ‚∑t)’.
In the Family Ration Card under No.445014, my
name has been mentioned as ‘ƒ´·V’.
In the Passbook, issued by the Indian Bank,
Ariyoor Branch, my name has been mentioned as
‘Sarala @ Bhagyalakshmi’.
Therefore, I do hereby state that all the abovesaid
name are referred, identified and relate to one and
the same person, that is me, the deponent herein.
Hence, I declare that hereafter, I shall be known
and identified only by the name ‘Bakkiyalakshmi
(√V¬˛BÈ‚∑t)’, for all purposes.
I state that what are all stated in the above
paragraphs is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge, belief and information.
Solemnly and sincerely affirmed and signed before
the Notary Public at Puducherry, on this the 10th day
of April 2023.
562298
K. √V¬˛BÈ‚∑t
√V¬˛BÈ‚∑t
√V¬˛BÈ‚∑t
√V¬˛BÈ‚∑t
√V¬˛BÈ‚∑t.
344
LA GAZETTE DE L’ETAT
[18 April 2023
online publication at “https://styandptg.py.gov.in”
Published by the Director, Government Press, Puducherry.
No legal responsibility is accepted for the publication of advertisement regarding change of names and other private
notifications in the Gazette. Persons notifying the same will remain solely responsible for the legal consequences and
also for any other misrepresentations, etc.
AFFIDAVIT
I, Mari, wife of Mani, aged 38 years, residing at
No. 72, Erikarai Street, Korkadu and Post, Villianur via,
Puducherry, do hereby solemnly and sincerely affirm and
state on oath as follows:
That I am the deponent herein and made this
affidavit on behalf of myself.
I state that my name is entered as ‘Mari’ in my
Aadhaar Card, issued by the Unique Identification
Authority of India, bearing No. XXXX XXXX 4080.
I state that my name is entered as ‘Mariammal’
in my Elector’s Photo Identity Card, issued by
the Election Commission of India, bearing
No. YBP0054056.
I state that my name is entered as ‘\VˆBD\V^’
in my Family Ration Card, issued by the Department
of Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs, Puducherry,
bearing No. 430823.
I state that my name is entered as ‘º\V.\Vˆ’ in
my Record Sheet, issued by the Thiyagarajar Aided
Elementary School, Thiruvambaganallur.
I state that my name is entered as ‘Mari’ in my
son Sivasakthi M’ Provisional Certificate, issued by
State Board of School Examinations (Sec.), Tamil
Nadu, Register No. XM21R1222946948.
Hence, I declare that my name is entered as ‘Mari’
in my son Sivasakthi M’ Transfer Certificate issued
by the Government Higher Secondary School,
Korkadu, Puducherry, vide No. P21TC54243.
I submit that the names described in the above
records as ‘Mari’, ‘Mariammal’, ‘\VˆBD\V^’ and
‘º\V.\Vˆ’ are referred one and the same person i.e.,
myself only.
And finally, I declare that my correct name is
‘Mari’.
The above statements in the foregoing paragraphs
are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Solemnly affirmed and signed before the Notary Public
at Puducherry, on this 10th day of April 2023.
562301
M. \Vˆ
\Vˆ
\Vˆ
\Vˆ
\Vˆ.
AFFIDAVIT
I, Jourdain Sinnaraja, son of Jourdain Seziyan (late),
residing at No. 59, Madathu Street, Oulgaret, Puducherry-
605 010, do hereby solemnly affirm and state on oath
as follows:
That I am the deponent herein and made this
affidavit on behalf of me.
I state that my name is entered as ‘Sinnaraja’ in my
Birth Certificate, issued by the Pondicherry Municipality,
Puducherry bearing Registration No. O/1988/02108,
dated 08-08-1988.
I state that my name is entered as ‘S Zuhrdan
Sinnaraja’ in my Aadhaar Card, issued by the Unique
Identification Authority of India bearing No. XXXX
XXXX 7229.
I state that my name is entered as ‘Sinnaraja’
in my Electoral Identity Card, issued by the Election
Commission of India bearing No. JQW0406637.
I state that my name is entered as ‘øÏ>[ E[™´V¤V’
in my Family Ration Card, issued by the Department
of Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs, Puducherry
bearing No. 380634, on July 2005.
I state that my name is entered as ‘Jourdain Sinnaraja’
in my son Jourdain Lefwyne Sean’s Birth Certificate,
issued by Oulgaret Municipality, Puducherry bearing
Registration No. OM/J/2022/06118, dated 01-07-2022.
I submit that the names described in the above
records as ‘Sinnaraja’, ‘S Zuhrdan Sinnaraja’, ‘øÏ>[
E[™´V¤V’ and ‘Jourdain Sinnaraja’ are referring one
and the same person, they denoting myself only.
Finally, I declare that my correct name is ‘Jourdain
Sinnaraja’ only. Further, I will not insist any
correction in future.
The above statements in the foregoing paragraphs
are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Solemnly affirmed and signed before the Notary Public
at Puducherry, on this 13th day of April 2023.
562305
JOURDAIN SINNARAJA.