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REGISTERED No. D.(D.)-72

The Gazette of India

EXTRAORDINARY

PART II—Section 3-Sub-section (ii)

PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY

No. 449] NEW DELHI, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1978/ASVINA 6, 1900

Separate paging is given to this Part in order that it may be filed as a separate compilation

282 GI/77—1.

(1127)

282 GI/77—2

282 GI/77—3

282 GI/78—4.

282 GI/77—5

appointed Shri .N. Jathal, retired Chief Engineer (Irrigation), Government of Gujarat and Shri Kali Charan, retired General Manager (Construction), Indian Railways as Assessors vide Notification No. 77/E(O)lI/l/4 dated 1st July, 1977 to assist and advise the Commission in respect of any matter connected with the inquiry.

The Commission has submitted his report. The Government have accepted the findings of the Commission that the accident was an 'Act of Ood.' The safeguards against similar accidents, as suggested by the Commission and Government's views ther> on are as under :—

Government's views

•>. Recommendation

S.N(

3

2

1

1.

Accepted, Tho bridge is being rebuilt accord ingly in consultation with tho Central -¹ ater and Power Research Station, Pune.

Bridge No. 141 gave way as a result of the impact of the heavy flood under and arou- nd it on the night of the accident. Howsoever un- anticipa'ed and unforesee- able the magnitude of the flood might have been, it should be taken into account in the reconstruction of the bridge and a complete re- view should be made of its design.

2. The flood potential of river Golandi has increased mani- fold since the construction of railway bridge No. 139 in 1955-56. The river has now a history of overflowing its banks. It is necessary therefore, to completely re- view the design of the bridge and make such changes as may be thought necessary.

Accepted. This will be done taking into account the views of Brahmaputra Flood Control Commission, Assam State Government and their plans to train and control Golandi river, as also to modify the irriga- tion headworks & road bridge downstream. Central Water & Power Research Station, Pune, will also be consulted and model stu- dies conducted if necessary.

3.

MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS

(Railway Board)

In view of the changed his- tory of river Golandi, the Golandi Irrigation Head- works should be re-designed after a thorough hydrologi- cal survey.

RESOLUTION

Now Delhi, 15th June, 1978

It is or the Assam State Government to consider and implement this recom- mendation. This has, however, already been brought to their notice and they have been requested to implement the same. The matter will ba pursued with them.

4. The desirability of providing marginal bunds on eithei side of river Golandi up- stream of tho Railway bridge No 139 should be examined.

This will be done in consulta- r tion with the State Govern- ment and Brahmaputra : Flood Control Commis- sion. Advice of Central Water and Power Research Station, Pune (who havo suggested model studies in this regard) has also boen sought.

S.O. 580(E)—In their Notification No. 77/E(O)II/l/4 dated 30th June, 1977 published in Part II sub-section (ii) of Section 3 of the Government of India Gazette Extraordinary dated 1st July, 1977, Government appointed a Commission of Inquiry consisting of Shri Gangeshwar Prasad, a retired Judge of the High Court of Allahabad as its sole Member, to make an inquiry into tha accident involving 13 Up Tezpur Express between Udal- guri and Rowta Bagan stations on Rannlya-Ranfiapara North Section of the Northeast Frontier Railway on 30-5-77, state Us findings as to the causes of the said accident and as to tho person or persons. If an>, responsible therefor and suggest safeguards against similar accidents in future. The Government also

Suggestions Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 should bo examined by the State Committee of Engineers, in close co- ordination with various concerned departments.

6.

Accepted. Bridges No. 114, 125 and 145 which suffered damage, are being re-bullt after careful review.

in reviewing the bridges and in other matters per- taining to them, attention should not be confined to bridge No. 141 which colla- psed or to bridge No. 139 below which river Golandi flows, but should cover all other bridges of the Ran- giya-Rangapara North section, three of which viz. bridges No. 114, 125 and 145 also suffered heavy damage on the night of the accident.

7.

. The rivers in the Rangiya- Rangapara North section should be considered as subject to sudden and abnormal floods. They should, therefore, be classi- fied as 'flashy' and the bridges constructed over them as 'vulnerable bridges.¹ Naturally, the system of watch obtaining In regard to bridges regarded as 'vulner- able' should be extonded to them.

8.

(c) suggest safeguards against similar accidents in future.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO

THE ACCIDENT TO 13 UP TEZPUR EXPRESS TRAIN

29/30TH MAY, 1977

THE ACCIDENT

Jn the early hours of 30th May 1977, at about 1.25 hrs.. 13 Up Tezpur Express, on its journey from Rangiya to Tczpur, met with a very serious and tragic accident at bridge No. 141, about 64 kms. from Rangiya, between Udalguri and Rowta Bagan Stations of the Rangiya-Rangapara North metre gauge single line section of Alipurduar Division on the North- east Frontier Railway.

The site of the accident is in Darrang district of Assam State and the Railway alignment here runs generally from west fo east. Bridge No. 141 is situated at a distance of 3.17 kms. from Udalguri Station and 8.98 kms. from Rowta Bagan Station. Jt is girder bridge with a 12.2m. (40) clear opening, over a small channel, locally known as Beki nala or Kahi nala, On the fateful night, the bridge and its east end approach were washed away by flood waters causing a breech of 36 metres in length. 13 Up Tczpur Express started from Rangiya, right time, at 23.45 hrs on 29th May 1977, and was running to time. It left the previous station, Udalguri, at 1.16 hrs. of 30th May 1977, after 2 minutes scheduled halt. After running barely 3,17 kms, it suddenly crashed at bridge No. 141 at 1.25 hrs., and its engine and 4 bogies immediately in the rear of the engine fell into the swollen waters of the channel below. The 5th bogie of the train become inclined, with its trailing end on the abutment of the bridge (Ranjjiya side) and its leading end submerged in water. The remaining 6 coaches were not derailed and remained standing on the track unaffected. The engine got completely submerged in water and buried under silt. As a result of the accident, 85 persons including the engine driver and two firemen lost their lives and 106 persons were injured, 84 of (he injured persons had to be hospitalised while the others, who had minor injuries, were gjven medical attention on the spot and discharged. A considerable area downstream of the channel was combed for dead bodies that might have been swept away, and several were actually recovered! A very thorough search for such dead bodies was made and the likeli- hood of any more persons having met their death in this ., disaster is very little. Out of the dead bodies recovered. 47

could not be identified.

Lt. Col. S. K, Murthy, Officer Commanding, Eastern Store Division, Sqn. Ldr, C. S. Jairath, an Alrforce doctor, and about 200 military personnel, who were travelling by that train but were occupying compartments which remained un- affected played a very heroic and magnificient part in res- cuing Ihe entrapped persons and rendering them first aid.

APPOINTMENT OF THE COMMtSSION OF INQUIRY

The Central Government, in exercise of the powers con- ferred by Section 3 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 (60 of 1952), appointed a Commission of Inquiry to inquire into Ihe causes of the accident, under the Ministry of Rail- ways (Railway Board's) Notification No. 77/E(O)II/l/4 dated 30th June 1977, which is reproduced below ;

NOTIFICATION

Whereas the Central Government is of the opinion that it is necessary to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into the causes of the acci- dent involving 13 Up Tezpur Express between Udalguri— Rowta Bagan stations on Rangiya—Rangapara North, Metre Gauge jingle line section of Alipurduar Division of the Northeast Frontier Railway on 30-5-1977.

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1952 (60 of 1952) the Central Government hereby appoints a Commission of Inquiry consisting of Shri Gangeshwar Prasad, a retired Judjic (T ihe High Court of Allahabad as its sole member.

2. Th^ said Commission shall—

fn) make an inquiry into the causes of the said accident and for that purpose take such evidence as may be necessary :

(h) state i's findings as to causes of tfie said accident and as to the person or persons,, if any, responsible therefor; and

3, The said Commission shall submit its report to the Central Government within a period of two months from the date on which it commences its inquiry.

Sd/-

B. MOHANTY.

Secretary, Railway Board,

& Ex. Officio Joint Secretary to the

Government of India."

APPOINTMENT OF ASSESSORS

F'urther, by the Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) notification No. 77/E(O)II/l/4 dated 1-7-1977, the Central Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 6 of the Commission of Inquiry (Central) Rules, 1972, appoint- ed 2 Assessors, namely, Shri M. N. Jathal, Retired Chief Engineer (Irrigation), Government of Gujarat and Shri Kali Charan, Retired General Manager (Construction), Indian Rail- ways, to assist and advise the Commission. The notifica- tion in this regard is reproduced below :

"NOTIFICATION

In exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry (Central) Rules, 1972 the Central Government hereby appoints the undermentioned persons as assessors to assist and advise the Commission appointed by the Notification of the Central Government in the Ministry of Railways No. 77/E(O)II/l/4 dated 30th June, 1977, in respect of any matter connected with the inquiry to be made by the Commission,

1, Shri M. N. Jathal, retired Chief Engineer (Irrigation),

Government of Gujarat.

2. Shri Kali Charan, retired General Manager (Construc-

tion), Indian Railways.

Sd/-

B. MOHANTY,

Secretary, Railway Board

& ex-offlcio Joint Secretary to the

Government of India."

ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION

On the 8th July, 1977, I issued a notification in pursuance of clause (b) of sub-rul'e (2) of rule 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry (Central) Rules 1972, and entered upon the Inquiry. By the said notification I asked the Railway and other depart- ments of Government and all persons, bodies or organisa- tions acquainted with any facts or circumstances relating or relevant to the purpose for which the Commission was ap- pointed to file their statement of facts setting out therein the facts known to them, on or before 16.30 hrs. on 18th July 1977 at the address specified in the notification.

It was intimated in the notification iUself that the Com- mission would in the first instance examine witnesses desired to be produced by the Railway and that the examination of witnesses would commence from 10,30 hrs. on 20th July 1977, in the Commission's Office located in the premises of the Railway Officers' Club, Maligaon. Wide publicity was given to the notification by having it published in 10 leading news- papers of Gauhati, Tezpur and Calcutta which covered 4 languages viz., English, Hindi, Bengali and Assamese. Two consecutive insertions were made in each of the 10 papers.

I reached Maligaon (Gauhati) on 17th July, 1977 morning by Tinsukia Mail. One of the Assessors, Sri M. N. Jathal, who was coming from Baroda, travelled by the same train from New Delhi to Gauhati. The other Assessor, Sri Kali Charan arrived at Gauhati by nir that very morning, and on the evening of 17th July 1*977, I held the first meeting with the Assessors,

By that time only 4 statements had been received in res- ponse to the notification issued on 8th July 1977 (including one from the Chief Engineer of the Northeast Frontier Rail- way for and on behalf of Union of India represented by the Northeast Frontier Railway). Since the last date for filing the statement was 181h July 1977, I waited till then to see if the response improved. I, however, immediately issued a corrigendum to the notification saying that the date of exami- nation of witnesses for the Railway fixed earlier as 20th July 1977 had been postponed and that the next date would be notified later, 3 more statements were received on 18th July 1977. Despite a period of 10 days given in the noti- fication for filing statements, the response was not good. I extended the period by 7 days and issued a second notifica- tion on 18th July 1977, inviting statements by 25th July 1977, and intimating that the recording of evidence would commence from 27th Ju'y 1977 at 10.30 hrs. Similar wide publicity WHS given to this latter notification as well.

By the date fixed in the second notification, i.e. 25th July 1977, statements' were received from the following 14 persons :

1. Sri P. G. Gopalan, Chief Engineer, Northest Fron- tier Railway for and on behalf of the Union of Jndia represented by Northeast Frontier Railway.

2. M-ijor S. Bhattacharyya (Retd.), Uttprpara, District

Hooflly, (West Bengal).

3. Sri P. R. Das, Zonal Secretary, All India Train Exa- miners' Association, N. F. Railway, New Bongaigaon. 4. Sri Dharmeswar Kalita, Proprietor "ASOMEE"

North Lakhimpur.

5. Sri Tarini Charan Pattanayak, Chatrapur, District

Ganjam (Orissa).

6. Sri S. I. Borbhuiyan, Gauhati-1.

7. Md. Shaukat Ali, Advocate, Gauhati-7.

8. Sri Sebcn Chandra Basumatary, Betel Shop owTter, Village Kahibari, Udalguri, District Darrang. 9. Sri Sabu Ram Basumatari, Village Purani, Hapagaon,

Udalguri, District Darrang,.

10. Sri Ramjit Murmu, Village Kathalgurl, Udalguri, Dist-

rict Darrang.

11. Sri Rajat Murmoo, Village Kuthalguri, Udalguri,

District Darrang.

12. Sri Chandan Maitra, Dispur, Gauhati.

13. Sri H. L. Patwari, Member of Parliament, New

DelhMl.

14. Sri Suphul Morandi. Ambulance Driver, St, Joseph.

Hospital, Udalguri, District Darrang.

Statements of 5 more persons were received nfter the due

dato I.e. 25th July, 1977 and their names are as follows :—

1. Sri Chabin Ch. Daimarl, Secretary, Mangaldal District

Plains Tribal Council, Assam, Mangaldai.

2. Sri Tiken Basumatari, Village Baligaon, Caraibari,

District Darrang.

3. Sri Blpin Basumatari, Village Daskshln, Kahibari,

Garaibari, District Darrang.

4. Sri Ramdhari Chauhan, Villnge Kathaiguri, Udalguri

District Darrang.

5. Sri Milson Masahary, Village Barbengera, Birali, Dis-

trict Darrang,

Although they were received beyond the time fixed in the notification, these statements too were taken into consideration by the Commission.

It wouUl be proper to mention at this very stage that on 18th July 1977 an application purporting to be on behalf of Sri Golap Borbora. Chairman of the Janata Party of Assam and accompanied by a Vakalatnama in favour of 4 counsel viz., Sri B, N, Sharma, Smt. Meern Sharma, Sri Sk. Chand Mohammad find Sri Bijoy Das, Advocates, was filed in the office of the Commission. The prayer contained in the appli- cation was that 3 weeks time be allowed for filing a statement. Th" time for filing ttatcments had already been extended till 25th July, 1977, and that was regarded by me as quite sufficient for filing a statement. I did not, therefore, grant the extension prayed for and directed that statement should be filed by the above date, If so desired. The order waa duly communicated. The Chairman of the Janata Party did not file a statement and neither he nor anyone on his behalf appeared before the Commission.

ISSUE OF NOTICES

In consultation with (he Assessors, I prepared a list of 18 persons, who, in my opinion, should have opportunity of being heard in the inquiry. Notices were, accordingly, issued to these persons under clause (a) of sub-rule 2 of rule 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry (Central) Rules 1972 asking them to furniBh to the Commission, by 4,30 p.m. of 25th July, 1977 statements relating or relevant to the purpose for which the Commission had been appointed. The statement was to be accompanied by an affidavit in support of the facts set forth In the statement, sworn by the person furnishing the statement. The persons to whom such notices were issued are mentioned below:

1. LL Col. S. K. Murthy, Officer Commanding, Eastern

Store Division.

2. Sri H. Gohain, Chairman, Brahmaputra Flood Control

Commission, Gauhati.

3. Sri D. N. Konwar, Addl. Chief Engineer, Flood Con-

trol, Gauhati.

4. Sri A. Shah, Addl. Chief Engineer, Irrigation, Gau-

hati.

5. Sri Prem Prasad Kakatl, Executive Engineer, Dhansiri

Project, Udalguri.

6. Sri Hem Bora, Section Officer, Dhansiri Project, Udal-

Eiiri.

7. Sri Shyamal Chandra Das, Khalasi, Dhansiri Project,

Udalguri.

8. Sri Safed Ali, Khalasi, Dhansiri Project, Udalguri.

9. Sri Dandadhar Bora, Khalasi, Dhansiri Project, Udal-

guri.

10. Sri Kanak Chandra Kalita, Khalasi, Dhansarl Project

Udalguri.

11. Father John Thomas, Catholic Church, Dhckiajuli.

12. Sri Suphul Morandi, Ambulance Driver, St. Joseph's

Hospital, Udalguri.

13. Sri S. P. Saxena, Meteorologist-in-chargi, Gauhati Air-

port, Gauhati.

14. Sri Chandra Mohan Chhetri, Timber Merchant, Udtil-

guri.

15. Sri B. Basumatary, MLA, Gauhati. 16. Sri B. M. Mahanta, Timber Merchant, Village Dia-

pham, Bhutan.

17. Sri Joseph Mittalhany, Bishop of Tezpur, Tezpur.

18. Sri A. V. Jacob, Additional Commissioner of Railway

Safety, North Eastern Circle, Oorakhpur.

Only Sri Suphul Morandi, out of the persons mentioned above, filed a statement. The statement of Suphul Morandi, how- ever, was not accompanied by an affidavit and may, there- fore, be treated as having been tiled in response to the noti- fication under Rule 5(2)(b) of the Commissions of Inquiry (Central) Rules 1972. Sri A. V. Jacob, Additional Commis- sioner of Railway Safety, North Eastern Circle, merely ac- knowledged the notice.

INSPECTION OF THE SITE

I, along with the Assessors, inspected the site on 18h July, 1977. We were accompanied by the General Manager, the Chief Engineer, the Chief Operating Superintendent and other officials of the Northeast Frontier Railway. We went by road from MaUgaon to Rangiya Railway Station where the Railway authorities had arranged for our inspection a special train having an observation car with window trailing. The inspection

special left Rangiya at 10.00 lirs. We could have n very good view of the Railway line and Hie surrounding area from me observation car window,

1 propose to mention here only the stilient features noted during ihe inspection, and the details will be described al the appropriate phues so that their relevance lo ihe matters under Inquiry may be properly apprecia.ed,

We saw, enroute, bridges No, 114 and 125 which had also suffered damage on the night, of 29/30m May l'J77. Both the bridges were observed as having been severely damaged, but repaired. When we passed over bridge No. 139 across river Ciolandi, the train was slowed down and we were able to have n good look of the river, which flows from north to south. We also saw the railway and road bridges across this river and the Golandi Irrigation headworks downstream of the Railway and road bridges. Golandi river and ihe Irri- gation headworks have a very important bearing on the ques- tions under inquiry, as will be discus:el later. Ji was observed that between bridge No, 139 and bridge No. 141, on the southern side of the Railway embankment, the crops had not suffered any damage, while, on the northern side, there was considerable deposit of silt and there were no crops in the immediate vicinity of the Railway line. The inspection special reached bridge No. 141 at 13,00 hrs. and we all got down from the observation car. The Rangiya end abutment of the bridge could be seen and it had the high Hood level and the danger level painted on it. The Rungnpara North end abut- ment was not to be seen and it was said to have been com- pletely washed awav and buried under sill. We saw that the road bridge on wooden piles situated downstream of bridge No. 141 over Beki nala had also been washed away.

After Inspecting bridge No. 141 I returned to the Inspection Special. The two Assessors went for a detailed inspection of the surrounding area, accompanied by the Chief Engineer, the Additional Chief Engineer (Bridges) and tho Additional Chief Engineer (Special). The details of the inspection report of the Assessors will be discussed in detail at the appropriate placo and it would suffice to mention here only a few matters. The Assessors observed that river Golandi appeared to have over- flowed its banks and its water to have rushed towards Beki nala. Two huts situated on the left bank of Golandi river, on the fringe of the village about 700 metres (2296 ft) up- stream of bridge No. 139, appeared to have been inundated, according to the observation of the Assessors. The Assessors saw that Railway bridge No. 139 on Ciolandi, the road bridge downstream of the Railway bridge and the Irrigation headworks including the left afflux bund had not suffered any damage at all.

The Assessors returned to the Inspection Special at 15.15 his. The Special came to Rangiya Station at about 17.00 hrs and I returned to Maligaon thereafter by raad. The Assessors went onwards to Tezpur to have an aerial inspection by helicopter of the upper reaches of river Golandi next day i.e. 19th July 1977. The most important and significant facts observed by them in this inspection were that upstream of river Golandi almost near the border with Bhutan, a big stream called Khaurang Nadi joins Golandi river and on the right bank of this Nadi a huge hill-slide had taken place. The hill-slide appeared to be fresh and quite a sizeable portion of the hill appeared to have come down. The Assessors re- turned to Maligaon the same evening.

It must be mentioned that I had authorised the Assessors to make the two above mentioned inspections and I had re- quested them to place their inspection notes on record which they did.

SUMMARY OF STATEMENTS RECEIVED IN RESPONSE TO THE NOTIFICATION AND NOTICES

As mentioned earlier, 19 statements were received in res- ponse to the general notifications while no statement was received in response to the individual notices served on 18 persons.

Statement of case filed by the Railway

The statement filed by the Northeast Frontier Railway on behalf of the Union of India is a lengthy document con- taining a detailed account of the case of the Railway in regard to (he accident, and which may be summarised as follows.

282 GT/77—6

It has been stated that 13 Up Tczpur Express runs between Rnngiya and Tezpur and Ihe accident took place on 30th May 1977 at 1,25 hrs at bridge No, 141 (km 64/11-12) between Udalguri and Rowta Bagan Railway stations. The Divisional headquarters for this region arc at AUpurdutiy 284 km from the sile of accident and the control office is situated at Ranga- para Norih station 60 kms from the silt; of accident. The countryside in this region is generally plain, having paddy cul- tivation and the soil is essentially alluvial, A PWD road, which is motorable, runs parallel lo the track on the south side at a distance of 40 m (131 ft) and crosses the Railway line through the level crossing No. 41 RM(C) at km 65/0-1, close to the side of the accident, The site is situated below the foot-hills of the Himalayas to the south of Bhutan and towards the north of river Brahmaputra.

The height of the Railway embankment upto formation level

at the site of the accident has been said lo be 2.45 m (8 ft) varying generally from 1,7 m (5.6 ft) to 3.26 m (10.7 ft.) within a distance of 1/2 km on either side of the place of accident. The top of the rail is 0.4m (1.4 ft,) above the for- mation level and the railway track is on a level grade for about 60 metres (200 ft.) on either side of bridge 141. At the end of the level grade, the track falls at a gradient of 1 in 200 for a length of 145 m ,'475 ft.) towards Udalguri side, and 1 in 200 for a length of 430 metres (1420 ft) towards Rowla Bagan. The bridge is, therefore, according to the Railway, higher than its approaches.

It has further been slated by the Railway that the train left Harisinga Railway station at 01.00 his. and while pro- ceeding towards Udalguri crossed bridge No, 114 (56/3-4 km at about 01.09 hr:;. and bridge No. 125 (59/10-11 km) at about 01.12 hrs. It may here be noted that both these bridges got damaged after the train had crossed them that night. The train left Udalguri sla'.ion at 1.16 lira, for Rowta Bagan station and after going about 3 kms met with the accident at bridge No. 141 (64/11-12 km), as the Rowta Bagan end abutment of the said bridge had been washed away by a sudden flash flood of a very high magnitude.

The statement describes bridge No. 141 as catering the small channel or streams which remains dry for most part of the year and has its source in the paddy fields about 2.4 km from bridge No. 141, The channel flows generally from, north to south and is known by various names such as Kahi nala, Beki nala etc. It has no bank in the sense in which the term is commonly understood, and the bed of the channel is 0.6 m to 1.2 m (2 ft to 4 ft) below the adjoining ground. The catchment area of the channel IR only 1.1 square miles, according lo the topo sheet of Survey of India (1946- 47 edition).

According to the Railway, bridge No. 141 was constructed sometime in 1932-33 as a 2x20 ft. grider bridge on wooden piles, but in 1946 it was rebuilt an 1x40 ft girder bridge on masonry substructure with concrete foundations, In 1963-64, the girders of the bridge were changed to metre gauge main line standard and the bridge was raised by 2,32 ft. to provide for vertical clearance of 2 ft. between the bottom of the girder and the highest flood level. The bridge had been provided with boulder flooring and the slopes had been pitched with, boulders. The bridge had no history of flood damage 4nd it did not require any special precautions to be taken in connection with running of trains on it during the mon- soon.

It has been further mentioned that the Permanent Way In- spector, Majbat, in whose jurisdiction the accident occurred had seen the section from Harisinga to Majbat, the next station after Rowta Bagan, by trolley on 29th May 1977. He left Udalguri station at 20.15 hrs, after taking line cFear and reached Rowta Bagan station at 21.25 hrs, While inspect- ing the bridges he noticed that the water level at bridge No. 139 was about 0:6 m and at bridge No. 141 about 1.0 m below tho danger level. The Permanent Way Inspector also inspected bridge No. 91 between Harisinga and Udal- guri and bridge No. 145 between Udalguri and Rowata Bagan, which had been giving some trouble in the past, and left instructions with 1he concerned Mates to keep watch on these two bridges.

It has been averred by the Railway that there is a detailed procedure for thorough inspection of every bridge every year by the Railway Officials. The results of the inspection are recorded in a register called the 'Bridge Inspection Kigister'

Bridge No. 141 was inspected for the year 1976-77 by the Assistant Engineer, Rangaparn Noi'th on 23rd December 1976. The entries made in this regard in the Bridge Inspec- tion Register were scrutinised by the Divisional Engineer/IIT, Alipurduar Junction, Sri A. K. Biswas, on 7th Ixbruary 1977 and also by the Additional Chief Engineer (Bridges), Sri A. R. S. Rao. The entries clearly indicate that the bridge was quite sound and that it had no history of flood damage. It is added in the statement that the Railway main- tains a list of vnlnerubl'c bridges on the basis of experience and that bridge No. 141 was not a vulnerable bridge. The entries of the Bridge Insoection Register show that ever since its construction the bridge had always b^en behaving well, and had provided satisfactory discharge of water.

It has been said that the Bishop of Tezpur, Mr. Joseph Mittathany, alon£ with Father John Thomas of Catholic Church, Dhekianili passed in their motor car at about 22.43 hrs. by the PWD road that runs almost parallel to the Railway track and crossed the level crossing at km 65/0-1, but they did not find water on any of the road bridges. The lowest point of the road is 0.19 m, (0.63 ft.) below the previous high Hood level recorded at bridge No. 141, which is 106.92 m (350.7 ft) and 2.45 m (8 ft) below the rail level' at the bridge. On this basis it has been pointed out by the Railway that even at 22.45 hrs. water had not reached the previous high flood level. The level of the flood water at bridge No. 141, on the night of 29730th May 1977. rose to 108,76 m or 1.84 m (6 ft) higher than the previous highest level.

The statement also refers to bridge No, 139 at km 63/15-16 across the river Golandi which flows generally from north to south 700 metres to the west of Beki naln. The source of river Golnndi is in the Bhutan hills and the dis- tance from the source upto bridge No. 139 is about 17 km and its catchment area is 11.6 sq. miles, as seen from the topographical map of Survey of India (1946-47 edition). This bridge wns rebuilt in 1955-56 with three girders (2X37 ft and 1X60 ft) on 40 feet deep well foundations for piers and reinforced concrete piles for the abutments protected by guide bunds lined with stone pitching. About 229 m (700 ft) downstream of bridge No. 139 are the Golandi Irrigation Scheme headworks. The Irrigation head- works have 10 sluice gales of 10 ft width opening upwards. They were constructed in 1970 and arc maintained and opera- ted by the Irrigation Department of the State of Assam. River Golandi has wefl defined banks and the height of the land adjoining the river varies from 0.6 m to 0.9 m (2 ft to 3 ft) above the silted bed level of the river, The nrevious highest flood level at bridge No. 139 was 108.46 m (355.75 ft) while the flood level reached on 29/30th May 77 was 109.25 m (358,3 ft).

The statement of case of the Railway emphasises that the flood which camo down Golandi river on the night of 29/30th May 1977 was not only unprecedented in magni- tude and fury but was also a flash flood that cfme all of " sudden without any previous warning. The heavy flood caused the river to extensively overflow its left bank, since the ground levels of the areas generally fall towards tho left i.e. towards Railway bridge No, 141. The overflow started from a point 2.5km upstream of bridge No. 139 and extended upto the bridge. The water that overflowed flooded the area between the railway track on the south and the PWD road on the east and formed a bis reservoir. Water level at bridge No. 141 exceeded the highest flood level ever recorded on this sile by 1.84 m (6 ft). The heavy flow of water through bridro No. 141 undermined the Rarn'apara and abutment of the bridge and it collapsed. In addition, 24 m of eastern approach bank was also washed av/ay causing n breach of 36 m in length.

It has also been set forth in the statement of case that the flood on that fateful night was so heavy that in addition to bridge No. 141, three other bridges in the area, nnmelv bridge No, 114 at km 56/3-4, bridge No. 125 at km 59/10-11 both between Hnrisinga and Udaijuiri stations, and bridge No. 145 at km. 65/14-15 between Udalcuri and Rowta Bagan stations suffered heavy damage. The PWD road also suffered damage and 208 m lenpth of it was breached. None of the above mentioned bridges had been classified as vulnerabfe on the basis of past records, It has been said that 13 Up Tezpur Express crossed bridges No. 114 and 125 only a few minutes earlier which indicated that the flood was very sudden and extremely heavy and it. occurred simultaneously in this entire area from bridge No. 114 to bridge No. 145 i.e. kms 56 to 66.

It has been asserted that on the morning of 30th May 1977 it was observed that river Golandi was flowing within its well defined channel and Golandi river and Beki Channel had not merged. Due to heavy rain owing to a sudden cloud burst in the hills, catastrophic flood occurred in Golandi river resulting in the water rising suddenly much above its banks. The natural slops of the ground being towards bridge No. 141, the water flowed over the banks of Goi'andi towards bridge No. 141. This created conditions under which bridge No. 141 had to c op up with nearly 7 times its discharge capacity, resulting in its collapse.

It has been further asserted that local rainfall in Ihe urea was not heavy during May, 1977 but was normal. The state- ment concludes, therefore, that the cause of breach couTd not be the local rain of the night of 29/30th May 1977.

The statement then refers to monsoon patrolling and says that the system of monsoon patrolling prevalent on the Railway has been evolved after an experience of many years. On the Northeast Frontier Raii'way the period of currency of monsoon patrol is from 1st June to 15th October. This, according to the Railway, is justified by the fact that on the north bank where this Railway line runs, there has been no incidenco of breach before Juno or outside the period 1st June to 15th October, Accordingly, the date for starting mon- soon patrolling in this area has been fixed as 1st June. This year too the monsoon broke out on 7th June. The Railway haa also a system of receiving weather warning message from tho Meterological Department, but no weather warning message was received on 29th May 1977.

Put in a nutshell, the case of the Railway is that the collaps of bridge No. 141 WM due to reasons beyond human control and not to any negligence on the part of the em- ployees of the Railway, and, to quote the words of the statement filed by the Railway is "can legitimately be said to be an Act of God."

Siatement of Sri S. Bhattacharyya :

Major S. Bhattacharyya (Rctd) has filed a statement ex- pressing doubt about the fact whether Permanent Wav Inspector had actually trollied over the section as mentioned in the newspaper reports. He has also impliedly suggested carelessness, in the inspection even if it hid actually been done.

Statement of Sri P. R, Das :

Sri P. R, Das, Zonal Secretary, All India Train Examiners' Association, N.F. Railway, has made some vague allegations against the RaiFway administration which have no relevance to the accident under inquiry.

Statement of Sri Suphul Morandi :

The Statement filed by Sri Siiphul Morandi, driver of ambulance car, St. Joseph Hospital, Udnigiiri k to the effect that on his return journey from Tezpur to T.'clnifu'i, when he reached Kahibari at 1,45 his., their was 2f"tr> 3 feet deep water on tho road ahead and he stopped there, for sometime. Meanwhile Tezpur Express came slowly and whlstFed twice and as soon ns it climbed the bridge, it fell down. At that time water was flowing o vc the railway line also, on the eastern side of the bridge. His st^cm^Tit describes further tho rescue work he rlu] thferfter. It mnv be noted that he has not given the date, but he ev;dently meant that the happenings about which he has sroken took place on tho night of 29/30th May 1977.

Statement of Sri Tarini Charan Pattanayak

Sri Tarini Charan Pattanayak has offered some general suggestions regarding safeguards to prevent recurrence of such incidents.

Statement of Md, Shaukat Ali and Sri S. I. BorbNiiyan :

Md. Shnukat Ali, Advocate, GauhatI PI,I Sri S I Borbhuiyan of Gauhati who are rerated to one another un- fortunately, lost 9 members of their family in this tragic

accident. They have filed separate statements, but have con- finscl themselves to merely stating what they did after hecring about the accident.

Statement of remaining 12 persons :

The statements of the remaining 12 persons viz., Sri H. I.. Patwari, M.P,, Sri Chandan Maitra, Private Secretary to Sri H. L. Patwari, M.P., Sri Dharmcswar Kalita, Proprietor, Asomee, Sri Chabin Chandra Daimari, Secretary, Mangal- dui District Plains Tribal Council' of Assam, Sri Bipin Bsmimatari, Sri Ramdhari Chouhan, Sri Milson Masahary, Sri Tiken Basumalari, Sri Sebcn Basumatari, Sii Sabu Ram Basumatari, Sri Ramjit murmu and Sri Rajat Murmoo can be ground together as they are in substance of a similar nature. They allege that the sluice gates of the Golandi Irrigation headworks were not fully open. They claim to have seen the gates at different points of time on 29th and 30th May 1977. Their statements differ from one another in respect of the extent to which the Rates were open or closed, but they are unanimous is asserting that the sluice gates were not fully open. They have expressed the view that Golandi river had overflowed its banks due to obstruc- tion in the free flow of the river caused by closure of the gates and they have accused the Irrigation Department of the State Government of Assam of negligence in the opera- tion of the gates.

After examination of all the statements filed before the Commission, I, in consultation with the Assessors, ptepaicd a list of 65 witnesses (including 32 witnesses produced by the Railway) whose evidence we felt it necessary or proper to record, Out of the 33 witnesses summoned by the Commission itself, 28 turned up for their evidence and the remaining 5 did not. In view of the evidence already re- corded, the Commission considered the evidence of the witnesses who had not turned up unnecessary, and accord- ingly exempted them.

2. Whether proper 'lin-e clear¹ had been obtained for the passage of this train between Udalguri and Rowta Bagan stations hetween which bridge No. 141 falls, and whether the train was running within permissible speed limits ?

3. Whether proper patrolling of track was being done by

the Railway ?

4. Whether proper inspection of the track was being

done by the Railway ?

5. Whether the bridges on the track were being properly

inspected, checked and maintained ?

6. Whether there was any satisfactory arrangement for receipt of weather warnings or weather forecasts by the Railway 7 If so. whether any such warning or forecast requiring special steps to be taken by the Railway or special watchfulness to be kept in re- gard to the running of trains had been received for 29th May, 1977 ?

7. Whether there was any such constructional defect in bridge No. 141 as could have led or contributed to its collapse and whether the bridge provided for

adequate waterway ?

8. Whether the collapse of bridge No, 141 was due only to the Hood in Bekinala or to some other reasons also ?

9. Whether there was any obstruction in the free flow of river Golandi on the night of the accident causing an abnormal rise in its water level and, consequently, in the water level of Bekinala also ?

I now propose to take up each of these matters separately

and discuss them in detail,

1. Whether the engine of 13 UP Tezpur Express of 29th

May, 1977 was in good working order ?

In view of the fact that the ultimate cause of the accident was the sudden collapse of bridge No. 141 it may not seem necessary to inquire whether the engine was in good working order during its journey from Kangiy* to Tezjiur on the night of 2.9/30th May, 1977. But, I think that in order to satisfy myself that the driver could have stopped the train near the bridge, as he naturally would have if he had seen or sensed danger, T should ascertain whether or not there was any such defect in the engine as could have disabled him from doing so or could have been an obstacle in his seeing or sensing the danger,

the time it enters the shed till leaves the shed. According to the register, an extract of which he filed, (Ex. 2), the engine entered the shed at 19.15 his. underwent repairs from 20.45 hrs. to 23,00 hrs. and left the shed at 23.15 Ins. to work 13UP Tczpur Bxpress. Sri K. D. Chakvaborty, Electrical Fitter, Rangiya Junction (W. No. 5) has stated that he checked the head light of the engine on 29th May, 1977 evening and found it in order. He obtained the signature of the driver Sri S. C. Das in the Driver signature book in token of the fact that the head light was working, The fact that the headlight of the engine was working finds support from the statement of Sri Feku, Mate of gang No. 10 (W. No. 12) who has said that "he saw the headlight of 13 UP Tezpur F.xpress" when he crossed it near bridge No. 128 while on his way to inspect bridge No. 124 a little after 00.30 hrs. on 30th May, 77. AssistHnt station Master, Udal- guri, Sri Ranjit Sarkar (W. No. 8) had also seen the head- light. He has said that he was on the platform when the train came in and "noticed the headlight of the train and found it bright." The Train stopped at Udalguri station in the nor- mal way which shows that its brakes were functioning pro- perly,

The above evidence leaves no room for doubt about the fact that the engine of 13UP Tezpur Kxpress of 29fh May, 1977 was in good working order on its run to Tczpur.

2. Whether proper 'Line clear' had been obtained for the passage of this train between Udalguri and Rowta Began stations between which bridge No. 141 falls, and whether the train was running withifi permissible speed limits ?

Sri Ranjit Sarkar, Assistant Station Master, Udalguri (W. No. 8) has stated that before any train leaves the station 'line clear' has to be obtained from the next station after tak- ing prior approval of the section controller. He has described the procedure of obtaining thc 'line clear' token and said that the token can be taken out from the block instrument at his station (Udalguri) only when the Station Master at the next station (Rowki Bagan) turns simultaneously and in a proper manner thc handle of the block instrument at his own station. According to Sri Ranjit Sarkar, 13UP Tezpur Express arrived at Udalguri station 1,14 hrs of 30th May, 1977 and he had asked for 'lino clear' from Rowta Bagan Railway station at 106 hrs, and obtained it at 1.07 hrs. Thc token number relating to the 'line clear' was 14. Entries to the above effect have been made in the 'Train register' main- tained nt thc station and an extract of it (P.*. 5) has been filed. Thc extract of the 'Train register of Rowla Bagan station filed by Sri A. K. Gungopadhya, Assistant Station Master Rowta Bajmn. (W. No. 9) corroborates the fact that 'line clear' for 13UP Tezpur Express was asked for and given. In thc timings of the 'line clear' enquiry and its reply, there is a little discrepancy. These timings have been shown as 1 15 hrs. and 1.16 hrs. respectively tis against J .06 hrs. and 1.07 hrs. recorded in the 'train register' at Udalguri station The token number, however, is the same. The small difference in the timings does not appear to be at all material.

Sri P. K. Nandi, Section Controller, Rangapara North, (W. No. 11) whoso duty, according to him, is to control the move- ment of trains over the section has stated that he was on dutv in (he Control Office from 18.00 hrs. on 29th May 77 to 06.00 hrs. of 30th May, 77 and that he charted th" movement of 13UP Tezpur Express on the 'train control chart' right Irom Rangiya Station. The train. according to the chart (Ex. No. 9), left Udalguri station at 1,16 hrs, of 30th May 77 and met with the accident before it could reach the next station Rowta Bagan.

The Guard of the train Sri P. K. Basu (W. No, 13) has testified t0 the fact that thc maximum permissible speed on this section Is 65 kmph and the train was running at a speed of 40-45 kmph at the time of the accident. There is absolu- tely no reason for not accepting the testimony of the Guard.

It is thus amply clear that 13UP Tezpur Express was run- ning with proper 'line clear' and in accordance with thc rules, and there is nothing to indicate that the condition of the track, in thc section which thc train was entering required any oaution to bo given to trig driver.

3. Whether proper patrolling of the track was being done

by the Railway ?

Sri K. Suryanarayana, Additional Chief Engineer (Trdftk) (W. No. 31) has explained in his deposition the system of monsoon patrolling obtaining on the Railway. According to him, the Northeast Frontier Railway is divided into three rain- fall zones. Zone 'A' is thc 'normal' rainfall zone' with rainfall 65 inches, zone 'B' is thc 'heavy rainfall zone' with rainfall from 65 inches to 110 inches and Zone 'C is the 'very heavy rainfall zone' with rainfall above 110 inches. The Rungiya—Rangapara North section in which the accident occured falls in zone 'B' The witness has stated that continuous monsoon patrolling during night is done from the 1st of June to 15th October, but the date of commencement of monsoon patrolling may be varied from year to year according to circumstances, that is, according or the onset of monsoon is early or delayed. The date from which patrolling is to start has, according to the witness, to b"$ determined by the Divisional Egineering 1st June is the normal date for the start of monsoon patrolling in terms of the stand- ing circular issued by thc Chief Engineer of thc Railway, but it is subject fo variation each year according to the decision of the Divisional Engineer, which he takes by the end of May. Tho witness has further stated that he did not find this year any such circumstances as called for an earlier start of monsoon patrolling.

According to Sri A. K. Biswas, Divisional Engineer, Alipur- duar Junction (W. No. 27) monsoon normally sets in over this area sometime in the first or second week of June. The mon- soon patrolling starts normally from 1st June but if the mon- soon sets in earlier, arrangements arc made for an earlier start of patrolling. In answer to the question as to how he determines the onset of monsoon, the witness has stated that he does so on the basis of actual rainfall and reports received from supervisors and Assistant Engineers regarding thc appear- ance of unusual features in their section like rain cuts, sinking of bank and slipping of earth slopes which arc associated with (he advent of monsoon.

Another witness too, Sri S. N. Sharma, Permanent Way Inspector, Majbat (W, No. 14) who is in charge of this sec- tion has said that patrolling had not been introduced as a regular measure and that as per instructions it vvns to be introduced from 1st June, 1977.

The Chief Engineer of thc Railway, Sri P, Ci. Uopalan,

(W. No. 32) has deposed that the period of monsoon patrol- ling is from 1st. June to 15th October but still the actual date of commencement for each year is decided by the Divisional Engineer. The period, 1st June to 15th October, is in accor- dance with the standing circular issued by the Chief Engineer in 1960. Prior to 1960, the period of monsoon patrolling was from 16th June to 15th October, but thc date of starting the patrolling was advanced in I960 to 1st June presumably be- cause of the changed behaviour of monsoon in the area.

T may briefly refer here to the statement of Sri S. P. Saxena Metereofogist-in-Charge, Gauhati (W, No. 41) although hia evidence will be dealt with in detail at the later' stage. He has said that monsoon advanced in Assam and adjoining states this year from 7th June, 77. His answer to the question whether Irom thc rainfall at Majbat, thc place of nearest rain gauge of the Metcreological department, as recorded by him it could be concluded that the monsoon had started at Majbat in May 77 was in the negative.

Sri K. Suryanarayana, Additional Chief Engineer (Track) (W. No. 31) whose evidence has already been dealt with above has referred to the histogram (Ex, 45) showing thc breaches on the Northeast Frontier Railway in the past and said that no breaches had occurred prior to 12th June of any year on the relevant section of the Railway. The standing instructions of the Chief Engineer issued in 1950 appear therefore, to be justified

The above mentioned witness has also explained the mothod or patrolling. As monsoon patrolling was not in force on the relevant date, it may seem out of place to advert lo the ques- tion of method of patrolling. But, a brief examination of it appears to be called for in order to find out whether the acci- dent was likely to have been averted if the patrolling had actually been in force. According to Sri Suryanarayana pat- rolmen! have a beat of 5 kilometres each and they have to walk over this distance. Patrolling starts in the evening and lie patrolmen start from a .station, go upto the end of their beat at a speed of Skm per hour and r*turn to Hie station after exchanging their patrol books with adjacent patrolment. The

eqdftnnent they carry with them comprises of two hand signal lamps, detonators, torch light, their patrol book and water proof garments like cjips, rain coats etc. He has deposed that in a heavy rainfall area as the section in question is, patrolling is done with a frequency of 4 hrs, or in other words, the track Is covered and inspected once in every 4 hours, in a 'very heavy rain- fall area', intensive patrolling is resorted to, that is, tha track is covered once in every 2 hours. In reply to the question whether more intense patrolling should be intro- duced in this section, the witness has said that the intensity of patrolling is bHsed on the intensity of rainfall, meaning thereby that a more intense patrolling in this area is not called for.

The rainfall figures for the month of May 1977 uf the rain gauges in the area in question us appearing from Exhibit No. 61 produced by Sri V. S. Jafa, District Magis- trate, Tezpur (W, No. 39) who had taken it into his custody after (he accident and Exhibit No. 67 produced by¹ Sri S. P. Saxena, Meteorologist Incharge, Gauhati (W. No. 41) are as follows:

Date

Rain fall in 24 hours

Majbat (I.M.D Recorded at 8.30 hrs.

.) Tangla (I.M.D.) Recorded at 8.30 hrs.

Golandi Irriga- tion head works Recorded at 7.30 hrs.

(Ex : 61)

(Ex : 67)

(Ex : 67)

1-5-77      3.75 mm          5.0  mm
2-5-77     14.25 mm         13.8 mm
3-5-77     10.0 mm           9,2  mm
4-5-77     Nil              Nil
5-5-77     30.0 mm           8.9  mm

91.4 mm

13.2 mm

13.0 mm

Nil

41.5 mm

6-5-77

Nil

5.0 mm 7-5-77 8-3-77 9-5-77

Nil 13.0mm Nil Nil

Nil Nil Nil 10.0 mm Nil Nil Nil Nil

Nil Nil

10-5-77 11-5-77

Nil Nil

Nil

12-5-77 Nil

Nil

13-5-77

14-5-77

1.4 mm 47.2 mm 34,8 mm 9.4 mm

15-5-77 16-5-77 17-5-77

18-5-77

7.5 mm 40.0 mm 35.0 mm 34.0 mm 2.5 mm 15.0mm 2.5 mm

Nil 44.4 mm 3.0 mm

19-5-77 20-5-77

21-5-77

Nil 32.7 mm 23.3 mm 11,1 mm 7,4 mm 14.2 mm Nil Nil Nil

22-5-77

Nil 10.0mm 10.0 mm

Nil 16.8 mm 18.8 mni

23-5-77 Nil

Meteorological department. It has examined Sri S. „ N. Sharma, Permanent Way Inspector, Majbat (W. No. 14) who has said that on receipt of weather warning messages, instructions are issued to the gangmates to undertake patrolling. It has also examined Sri S. Sikhdar, Assistant Engineer (W. No. 26) who has stated that on receipt of weather warning on 7th May '77 he alerted the Permanent Way Inspectors to keep watch over their respective sections and, to start patrolling upto 48 hours beyond the date indicated in the weather warning message if the situation so demanded. To the same effect is the statement of Sri P. G. Gopalan, Chief Engineer, N. F. Railway (W. No. 32) who has said that weather warning messages in regard to very heavy rainfall arc directly received by the Divisional Engineer and he takes immediate measures for patrolling the track in accordance with para 1702 of the Indian Railway Way and Works Manual. As stated by Sri S. Sikhdar, Assistant Engineer, (W. No. 26) Sri A. K. Biswas, Divisional Engineer (W. No, 27) and Sri K. Suryanarayana. Additional Chief Engineer (Trapk) (W. No. 31), weather warning message had not been received on 29th May '77. This fact is confirmed by the Meteorologi- cal Officer Sri S. P. Saxena (W. No. 41) from whose office the messages are issued. It may be mentioned here that despite the fact that the weather warning message had not been received, the Mate of Gang No. 10 Sri Feku (W. No. 12) who woke up around 00.30 hrs of 30th May '77 and found that it was raining went out to see bridge No. 124 because it hud given some trouble earlier. The Permanent Way Inspector of the section Sri S. N. Sharma (W. No. 14) has given evidence to the effect that while trolleying back, to his headquarters on the night of 29th May '77 at about 20.30—21.00 hrs. he inspected bridges No. 91, 139, 141 and 145 and, because it was raining, he left instructions with the Mates of Gangs No. 8 and 11 to keep watch on bridge No. 91 and bridge No. 145 in the event of heavy rain as the said bridges required watch. Pursuant to his instructions the Mate of Gang No. 11 Sri Nauman (W. No 16) directed two of his ganRmen Kali (W. No. 17) and Dhuman (W. No. 18) to go and examine the condition of bridge No. 145, and they did so.

In judging the sufficiency or otherwise of patrolling, two matters have to be kept before the mind. On the one hand, considerations of inconvenience or economy cannot bo allowed to outweigh the paramount consideration that safety of human lives is at stake. On the other hand, the measures that have to be taken to obviate risk to human safety must be within the range of reasonable practicabi- lity and have to be based on and guided by experience. As would be seen later, the bridge had for long stood the test of time, the monsoon had not set in, the flood level in the nala below the bridse had always remained far below the level reached on the fateful night within a short span of time, the heaviness and the fury of the flood were unprecedented, and there was nothing In the conditions preceding the accident to suggest any extra caution or to point to an inadequacy in the patrolling.

I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that neither the system of patrolling nor the actual patrolling was at fault.

Not available

3.8 mm

Nil Nil

24-5-77

Nil

4.8 mm 25-5-77 26-5-77

Nil Nil 27-5-77 28-5-77

2.5 mm 25.0 mm Nil Nil 32.0 mm 30.0 mm 120.0 mm

Nil Nil Nil 12.0 mm 92,2 mm 196,4 mm 77.2 mm

29-5-77 30-5-77 31-5-77 Nil

4. Whether proper inspection of the track was being

done by the Railway ?

In the first instance, it has to be seen whether the system of track inspection on the Railway is adequate having regard to considerations of safety and whether it was being followed properly.

1.2 mm

56.6 mm

39,5 mm

132.7 mm

These figures clearly establish that the rainfall in this

area in May '77 was not heavy prior to 29th May "77.

The evidence discussed above points clearly to the con- clusion that no unusual circumstances had made appearance and there was nothing in the situation prevailing this year to make earlier patrolling necessary or expedient.

The Railway h;w attempted to show that quite apart from th" regular monsoon patrolling, it nlso initiates put- rolling on receipt of weather warning messages from the Sri P. C. Gopalan, Chief Engineer (W. No. 32), has stated that the maintenance of track is in charge of Engineers of whom he is the head. The Administration has laid down a schedule of inspection going from the Inspector upwards right upto the Chief Engineer, and there is a procedure in accordance with which the Inspector's work is checked by the Assistant Engineer, whose work is in turn checked by the Divisional Engineer and the latter's by the Additional Chief Engineer and the Chief Engineer.

Sri S. N. Sharma, Permanent Way Inspector, Majbat (W. No. 14) has stated that he goes out once a week for inspection bv trolley, twice a week by foot plate of engine and twice a week by brake van of a train. He had inspected the section Udalguri—Rowta Bagan by trolley on 28th

May '77. Also, he had travelled over this section by train on 29th May '77 morning on his way to Harisinga station and had returned by trolley in the evening. As it had become dark by ilic time ue reached Udaigiri, he Had to proceed thereafter on 'line clear'. The witness had asserted lhal he did not experience any difficulty while trolleying irom Harisinga to Kowta Uagan on ^yili May 77 even- ing. It must be .stated that with reguid to the witnesses trolley movement on 29th May '77, the evidence contains certain discrepancies. The statement of Sri D. K. Guha, Assistant Station Master, Udalguri (W. No. 17) is that the Permanent Way Inspector Sri Sharma asked him for 'line clear¹ which he obtained from the next station Rowta Bagan after taking prior approval of the Section Controller Sri Nandi. Extracts from the train registers of Udalguri (Ex. 4) & Rowta Bagan (Ex. 6) stations, however, show that the timings noted for making 'line clear' enquiry, obtaining 'line clear reply', and 'train entered section' differ. These 3 timings in the 'train register' at Udalguri aro 20,30 his,, 20.31 his. and 20.40 hrs. while the- corresponding figures in the 'train register' at Rowta Bagan arc 19.35 his, 19.36 hrs and 20.15 hrs respectively. There is a discrepancy also in regard to the token number lor 'line clear'. It is noted as 26 in the register at Udalguri station but as 27 at Rowta Bagan station, although the private number noted in both the registers is the same. Sri D. K. Guha has explained the discrepancy regarding the timings by saying that after obtaining 'line clear' for tho trolley he went out to perform some shunting operations and entered the timings later "based on approximation". He has said that he might have made a mistake as he had noted the tunings later. The Assistant Station Master, Rowta Bagan, Sri A. K. Gangopadhya (W. No. 9) has in his evidence explained the discrepancy with regard to the token number by saying that he might have made a mistake in hearing as the block instrument was noisy. The movement of the Permanent Way Inspector's trolley is also recorded in the train register which is maintained at Majbat Railway sta- tation. Sri D. C. Das, Assistant Station Master, Majbat (W. No. 10) has proved the entries in the train register at his station (Ex. 7) regarding the movement of the trolley on 29th May 1977. According to the register the trolley left Rowta Bagan station at 21.30 hrs. and reached the next station, Majbat, at 22,30 hrs. Sri P. K. Nandi, Section Controller, Rangapara North (W. No. 11) has deposed, that while on duty from 18.00 hrs. on 29th May 1977 to 06 00 hri. on 30th May 1977, he charted out that movement of the Permanent Way Inspector's trolley from Udalguri Railway station. He has further said that Assistant Station Master, Udalguri sought his permission for tho movement of PWI's trolley which he gave. The discrepancies in regard to the timings of trolleying and the token number do not affect its genuineness. On the other hand, they are indicative of {fie fact that the trolleying was in fact done. If preparation of false records and been reported to by the Railway, care would naturally have been taken to see that they are in accord and such discrepancies as there are would not have been allowed to creep into them, The explanation offered for the discrepancies is, in my opinion, quite acceptable.

Advertising again to the matter of inspection of track, I find that Sri P. K. Bhattacharjee, Inspector of Works, Majbat (W. No, 19) has stated that ho goes out foi< inspection by trolley 7 days in a month on an average, Further, he does inspection by train for 12 to 13 days in a month. According to his statement, he trollied over this section from TangJa to Majhat station on 8th May 1977, Sri S. Sikhdar, Assistant Engineer, Rangapara North (W. No. 26) has said that he is required to inspect the trank, level crossings, points and crossings etc. which fall under his charge and that he inspected this section by push trolley on 8th May 1977 and by train on 26th May 1977. The Divi- sional Engineer, Sri A. K. Biswas (W. No, 27) has deposed that he inspected the section by trolley on 30th January, 1.977. Sri K. Suryanarayana, Additional Chief Engineer (Track) (W. No. 31) has stated that every 6 kilometres of track is in charge of a gang and that the gangmen work on their beat everyday except the rest day which falls once a week. The Keyman of the gang has to go over the entire section every day except the rest day and on that day the Mate docs the duties of thi Keyman. Thus, according to the evidence the track is watched and attended to bv some RaiFway staff every day. Sri P, G. Gopajan, Chief Engineer (W. No, 32) has stated thut he too goes out for inspection 6 to 8"^iays in a month and that during his inspection he examines the track and discusses all problems which the Divisional Engine- ers have.

There is, thus, ample evidence that the Railway has a well defined and eileciive system for inspection of the track at various levels and that this particular section of the track too, was bciDg inspected accordingly. The evidence of the Permanent Way Inspector isri Sharma who had inspected the section only a few hours before the mishap took place and found everything alright, is particularly important and shows that the track was in a fit condition for the passage of trains.

5, Whether the bridges on the track were being properly

inspected, checked and maintained '?

The accident took place due to wash away of a bridge and it is, theieforc, one of ihc mo.it peitinent questions to be examined.

According to the evidence of Sri A. R. S. Rao, Additional Chief Engineer (Bridges) (W. No. 29) the Railway has an elaborate system of constant watch, inspection and mainten- ance of bridges. The Permanent Way Inspector who is responsible for the safety of the track, trolleys over the section once a week and sometimes oftener, and if he finds any defect in a bridge, he brings it to the notice of the Inspector of Works for rectification. The Inspector of Works who is responsible for the safety of structures, including bridges, frequently inspects his section and if he comes across any defeat, he rectiiics it. The Assistant Engineer, who is in charge of the safety of the track and structures inspects his section at least once a month by trolley and if he notices any defect, he immediately instructs his inspectors to rectify the same. The Divisional Engineer periodically inspects the section by trolley and ho, likewise, advises tho inspectors and the Assistant Engineer to rectify any defect that he comes across. It further appears from his evidence that a detailed and thorough inspection of bridges is also made by the Assistant Engineer once a year after tho monsoon, The Assistant Engineer records the result of his inspection in the 'Bridge inspection register'. Extracts of his inspection notes are sent immediately to the Inspectors lor compliance. After completion of the bridge inspection, the Assistant Engineer sends the register to the Divisional Engineer with a certificate that he has personally examined all the bridges. The Divisional Engineer scrutinises the entries and passes orders on the points referred to him and gives a certificate at the end of the register in token of his having scrutinised all the entries. The register is then sent to the Additional Chief Engineer who also scrutinises all the entries and puts his signature in token of having done so.

It is also in the evidence of this witness that when he received the bridge register in respect of the section in which bridge No. 141 lay, he went through the inspection notes recorded by the Divisional Engineer and issued necessary instructions regarding certain bridges. Bridge No. 141 does not find H place among the bridges regarding which instru- tions were issued. Sri A. R. S. Rao has also said that he goes out for inspection for about 6 to 8 days in a month and during inspections, he inspects bridges in addition track and structures. He normally confines his inspection to bridges referred to him and sometimes makes random selection of bridges to see the quality of maintenance. He was asked as to whether he considered any change in the method of watching necessa;ry and his reply was in the negative. His attention was drawn to the inspection notes recorded against bridge No. 141 in the bridge register which showed that the pitching of floor and slope had been dis- turbed during the years 1963-64, 1964-65 and 1971-72 and he was asked whether they indicated any defect in the bridge. He replied that boulder floor pitching is a flexible apron which is liable to minor disturbances, which are attended to in normal routine maintenance.

The procedure of inspection of bridges described by Sri A. R. S, Rao has also been testified to by Sri S. Sikhdar, Assistant Engineer, Rangapara North (W. No. 26). He has stated that his main duties in regard to bridge inspec- tion are to inspect the bridges thoroughly at least once a year and enter tho inspection notes in the bridge inspection register. The inspection is done after the monsoon and

starts sometime In October. He carried out the last annual inspection of bridge No. 141 on 23rd December '76 and found everything alright except that a few hook bolts were loose and 3 sleepers No. 23, lfi and 4 were required to be renewed. In his view, these defects were not serious enough to require immediate attention although he noted them in Ihc register. The loose bolts were actually attended to shortly thereafter and he found them quite alright during his next inspection. He has described the system of follow- up action on his inspection notes and said that after record- ing the notes an extract of the defects noted is prepared and sent to the subordinates for taking necessary action. The Sectional Inspector of Works and Permanent Way Inspector carry out rectification of the defects which is ensured by the Assistant Engineer. Speaking of bridge No.y 141 in particular Sri S. Sikhdar has said that he passed over it on 8th May '77 by trolley and again on 26th May '77 by train and on neither of these occasions he noticed anything unusual about the bridge. It may not be out of place to mention here that Sri Sikhdar inspected bridee No. 139 also which is over river Golandi, on 10th November '76 and noted some def- ects which were rectified by 30th April '77.

The evidence of Sri A. K. Biswas, Divisional Engineer (W. No. 27) too, is important in this context. He has said that on receiving the bridge inspection register he scrutinises the remarks of the Assistant Engineer thoroughly, and where the Assistant Engineer suggest¹? inspection by the Divisional Engineer, he does so. In addition, he also inspects some of the bridges to find out if the inspection carried out by the Assistant Engineer has been thorough. At the end of each bridge register, he certifies that he has personally scru- tinised the register and issued orders regarding essential points requiring a decision by him, and forwards the regis- ters to the Additional Chief Engineer (Bridges).

He has stated that he trollied over the section Udalguri- Rowta Bagan on 30th January '77 and found nothing un- usual with any of the bridges in that section. He inspected bridge No. 139 on 31st January '77 and noticed that the apron crates on the left guide bund had been disturbed and water was attacking the right guide bund mole head. He gave instructions that the action suggested by the Assistant Engineer be carried out,

As stated at an earlier stage also, Sri P, C, Gopalan, Chief Engineer (W. No. 32) has deposed that as head of the organisation in overall charge of maintenance of track, bridges and other structures, he does inspections 6 to 8 days in a month and holds frequent discussions with his Divisional Engineers to find solutions to the various problems which they might have.

The evidence discussed above clearly shows that the ins- pection of bridges was effective, the elaborate system nf inspection wa? beini; nctunllv followed, and it served the purpose for which it is intended.

Railways Way and Works Manual, He has admitted that if the weather forecast had been received for 29th May, 1977, the chances of the accident might have been minimised but he has said that this catinot be said with any certainty. The evidence of Sri S. Sikhdar, Assistant Engineer (W. No. 26), is that he receives weather warning messages from the Meteorological Department, Gauhati, but no such message was received on 29th and 30th May. According to the witness, the last weather warning message was received on 7th May, 1977. Sri A. K. Biswas, Divisional Engineer (W. No. 27) too has stated that the Railway gets warnings from the Meteorological Department for heavy rain but on 29th/30th May, 1977, there was no such warning. The last warning received, according to him, was on 14th May '77. Sri S. N. Sharrna, Permanent Way Inspector (W. No. 14) has said that on receipt of weather warning instructions are- issued to gangmates to undertake patrolling but no warn- ing was received on 29th/30th May, 1977, and that the last warning had been received on 12th April, 1977.

the abutment and on the side slopes of the bank near the bridge there was boulder pitching. This pitching extended upwards upto very near the bottom of the girder, which was 2' A" above the highest flood level (HFL) reached at this bridge during its entire life till then, and the HFL had been marked on the abutment of the bridge. The track on either side of Ihe bridge was level for a distance of about 61 m. (1200 fl.) and thereafter falling at a gradient of 1 in 200 towards both Udalguri and Rowta Bagan stations. The bridge was, therefore, higher lhan its approaches. The average height of ihe embankment at the bridge site was 2.45 m. (8 ft), The previous nnd the new high flood levels (HFL) were as under :

HFL prior to 30-5-77 107.10 m. 351.38 ft)

HFL on 30-5-77 108.94 m (357.43 ft)

These facts regarding the bridge may be gathered from the statements of Sri A. R. S. Rao, Additional Chief Engineer (Bridges) (W. No. 29) ; Sri K. Suryanarayana, Additional Chief Engineer (Track) (W. No. 31) and Sri P. G. Gopalan, Chief Engineer (W. No. 32).

It is in the evidence of Sri A. R. S. Rao, (W. No. 29) that the bridge was constructed as per standards laid down in the Indian Railway Standard Codes of Practice. The minimum depth for an open type foundation, as this bridge had, is Code as 4 feet, The depth of foundation provided for this bridge was 4-1/2 feet and it was, therefore, in order. Hia evidence also shows that the bearing pressure on the soil was within safe limits. The boulder flooring and the slope pitch- ing provided at this bridge could enable water to pass through it at a velocity of 12 feet per second without causing scour. The bridge inspection register shows that prior to 29th May, 1977 there had never been any damage to the structure of the bridge in its life of 30 years except that there was some disturbance of boulder flooring and pitching which was set right everytime it occurred. Such disturbance, according to Sri A. R. S. Rao, is a normal feature regarding bridges.

It would be relevant to give also a short history of the bridge since ita construction, The 'History of Indian Rail- ways', corrected upto 31st March 1961 shows that Tangla— Majbat section was opened to traffic on 1st December 1932. It may, therefore, be inferred that bridge No, 141 falling in this section must have been constructed prior to that date and sometime nearabout. The bridge was constructed origi- nally as a 2 x 19' 8" girder bridge, on pile foundations, as can bo seen from the completion drawing of the original bridge. Plan No. 33937 (Ex. 25). It has been alleged by the Railway that the bridge was reconstructed in 1946. There is no direct evidence to prove this fact, but there is sufficient material pointing towards it. A diversion plan No. 11213 LMH (Ex. 34) has been produced showing that a diversion track was designed to be laid near the site of the bridge. This could have been necessitated only on account of reconstruction of the bridge, in order to keep the traffic moving during the period of reconstruction. Another plan, No, REN/PNO/ B/58/57 (Ex, 22), has been produced by the Railway which was prepared in 1957 in connection with the change of the girder of this bridge. The plan shows the substrucrural details of the bridge as existing in 1957. These details are different from those shown in the completion plan (Ex. 25) of the bridge originally constructed and establish that reconstruction of the bridge had actually been done.

Sri A, R, S. Rao, Additional Chief Engineer (Bridges) (W. No. 29) has stated in his evidence that the work as proposed in Plan No. REN/PNO/B/5K/57 (Ex. 22) was not carried out finally. There is a plan of 1963, viz. Plan No. B/43/63 (Ex. 23), in which it was proposed to change the girder of bridge on the date of the accident was noted to be lower than suggests that the height of the bridge was raised by 2,32 feet to provide a clearance of 2 ft. above the HFL and below the bottom of the girder.

It should be pointed out here lhat the rail level at the bridge on the date of the accident was noted to be lower than the rail level shown on this plan and this may suggest in inference that the height of the bridae had not been actually raised, but this inference is sufficiently rebutted by three im- portant facts, Two of them' are claimed to have been noticed by Sri A. R, S. Rao, Additional Chief Engineer (Bridges) (W. No. 29). The first was that the breached cross section of the bridge approach bore marks of two different layers, and the second lhat there are signs of new masonry work on the Rangiya end abutment which is still existing. These two facts were observed by Sri P. G. Gopalan, Chief Engineer (W. No. 32) also. There is no reason to doubt the correct- ness of the ittatement made by Sri A. S, R. Rao, or question the inference drawn by him, The third fact finds mention in the General Manager's Annual Report to the Railway Board for the year 1962-63 (Volume I) where it has been clearly mentioned that the work of re-girdering bridge No. 141 was in progress, This leads to the inference that the work had been taken in hand and naturally, therefore, it was completed also. It may also be reasonably presumed that in the execu- tion of the work there was no substantial departure from the plan prepared for it, Having considered all the material on this matter, I have, no hesitation In arriving at the conclusion that the height of the bridge had been raised,

I should not omit to notice that the completion plnn res- pecting the reconstruction of bridge No. 141 has not been produced by the Railway. The Railway has, however, given satisfactory evidence of the fact that thorough search had been made for it both in the Divisional Office and the Headquarters Office, but it was not traceable. In view of what has been said above, the absence of the completion plan loses its signi- ficance.

Structuaral soundless or otherwise of a bridge is always relative to its capacity for passing the 'design discharge', i.e. the maximum discharge of water which is expected to pass through it, 1 shall now deal with this feature of brfdoe No. 141.

It is common place lhat the capacity of a bridge to dischar- ge water depends on its opening or waterway Bridge No, 141 was a single span of 40 ft. opening and was across a small nala which has ita origin about 2.4 kms upstream of the bridge in the local paddy fields, The catchment of the nala upto (he bridge has been given by the Railway as 1,1 square miles as per the feet unit topo sheets of 1912-13, (reprinted in 1946- 47) and 0.34 square miles as per the new metric topo sheets of 1961 and 1972. The calculations made by the Railway Engineers are, however, based on the larger area of 1.1 square miles.

Calculations in regard to the maximum expected discharge from the catchment area, discharge capacity upto the previous HFL, and the discharge capacity upto the bottom of the girder have been made, firstly, by Sri A. R. S. Rao, Addition- al Chief Engineer (Bridges) (W. No. 29) and Sri K. Suryanara- yana, Additional Chief Engineer (Track) (W. No. 31), second- ly, by Sri H, Gohain, Chairman, Brahmaputra Flood Control Commission (W. No. 50), a witness called by the Commission, and thirdly, by the learned Assessors. The calculations differ, and the differences will be appreciated by a reference to the following table.

Discharge that would pa9S upto the old HFL mark

Discharge capacity upto the • bottom of girder

Design Discharge calculated from catchment area (in cusecs) (in cusecs) (In cusecs)

4500 5000 4611 2500

1300 1300 2150 1000

2600 2900 2670 1600

Sri A.R.S. Rao Sri K. Suryanarayana Sri H. Gohain Assessors

. ... >—.—.

Sri A. R. S. Rao, Sri K, Suryanarayana as also Sri H. Oohain have indicated the basis of all their calculations, but the exact basis of the calculations done by the learned Assessors in respect of the 'design discharge' is not noted in their report. The relevant portion of their report is reproduced below :

"On the basis of the available data in respect of catch- ment area of Beki, calculations regarding the expected discbarge were made. These calculations indicate that

discharge from Beki nala cannot under any circum- stances exceed about 1000 cusecs. On the strength of the same it can be definitely concluded that the waterway, the protection works anJ the foundations of bridge No. 141 were quite adequate to safely pass the expected discharge from Beki catchment. That it could also safely pass an additional discharge i.e. a total discharge of 2500 cusecs which, provided sufficient margin of safety is cleaily and definitely indicated."

It is not necessary to resolve the differences in the result of these calculations because they do not seem _ to be very material for the purpose of answering the question that Is being dealt with. The outs'anding and the indisputable fact is that the discharge capacity of the bridge was greater than the 'design discharge' i.e. the maximum discharge expected from the catchment of Beki nala, and also more than (he discharge which passed through the bridge at the old HFL.

It would be relevant to mention here that bridge No. 141 had never been regarded by the Railway as a vulnerable bridge and never classified as such in ihe list of vulnerable bridges (Ex. 20) maintained by the Rai'way. The importance of classification lies in ihe fact that the system of watch in regard to vulnerable bridges differs from that meant for non-vulnerable bridges. While vulnerable bridges are watched continuously during the monsoon period by posting special watchmen at the bridge site round the clock, non-vulnerable bridges are watched only by the regular rronsoon patrolmen. The record of bridge No. 141, as noted in the 'B'idge Ins- pection Register', clearly points to the fact that it had no history and had not shown any liability to damage during floods in the past. It would not, therefore, have been neces- sary to arrange for any special watch even if Ihe monsoon had commenced. It is to be noted that Sn A. K. Biswas, Divi- sional Engineer (W. No. 27) has stated that any bridge liable to damage during monsoon is brought under the list of vul- nerable bridges even if it was not originally vulnerable, and change of classification is done as and when necessoiy. It is, therefore, clear that the classification has no risidity about it and it may be varied according to circumstances.

The facts discussed above amply bear out that bridge No. 141 had no such structural defects as could contribute to its collapse and it was quite sound and safe. Further, it had pro- vision for adequate waterway.

8. Whether the collapse of bridge No. !41 was due only to

the flood in Beki nala or to some o'her reasons nlso ?

As mentioned in the preceding paia, the catchment of Beki nala bridge No. 141, is only 1.1 square m;!s°, The nala does not have its origin in any hill or lake but only in the local paddy fields, 2.4 kms upstream of the bridge, and it is, there- fore, abundantly clear that it has no perennial source. The nafa only drains the water from the adjoining fields and thus remains dry for most of the year. Evidence in support of this fact has been given by Sri Nasir Ali (W. No. 6) and Sri V. S. Jafa, District Magistrate, Darran.e (W. No. 39), a witness called by the Commission. Sri Feku, Mate of Gang No. 10 (W. No. 12) has stated that this nala had never had any flood since 1944 and that the maximum depth of water that has ever flowed through it was 3 to 4 ft. Topo Sheet (Ex. 55/1) indicates that the nala has only one small tributary and that too rises similarly in the paddy fields and has no perennial source. As stated by Sri K. Bangarayya, Senior Engineer (FCW) (W. No. 28), the bed of tbe nala is only 0.6 m to 1.2 m (2 ft to 4 ft) below the adjoining ground and this indicates that it has not much of a depth. Its width too has been stated by this witness to be only 1.5 m to 3.0 m (5 ft to 10 ft.).

A number of witnesses have deposed that on 29'h May 1977 the local rainfall in that area was not heavy. Sri S. N. Shi'rmr!, Permanent Way Inspector (W. No. 14) troll ied over the sec- tion between 20.15 hrs and 21.25 hrs and according to him it was raining intermittently, "sometimes heavily and sometimes lightly". At 22.30 hrs, Father John Thomas of Catholic Church, Dhekiaiuli (W. No. 60), a witness called by the Com- mission, passed that way by car and he has stated that it was raining "quite ordinarily". Lt. Col. S. K. Murthy fW. No. 40), one of the occupants of the ilf-fatcd train and a witness called by the Commission, has said that at the time of the accident. i.e. at 1.25 hrs. it was only "drizzling rather heavily". It is apparent that even if the local rainfall was heavy at times it

?82GI/77—7

was not such as could have caused an enormously heavy flow in Beki nala.

The question naturally arises as to how the volume of water that flowed through Beki nala on the night in question assumed such proportions ? The evidence and the circum- stances which would be set forth heieafter positively show that the extraordinary rise in ihe wafer of Beki nala was due to the wholly unpiecedented action of liver Golandi. Sri K. Bangarayya, Senior Engineer (FCW) (W. No. 28) has produced a plan No. CE/SK/37/ (Ex: 27) prepared by him after a detailed survey of the complele r na indicating deposit of heavy silt in the area between Golan.'i liver and Beki nala, starting from a poi..t about 2.5 kn;s upstream of bridge No. 139 He has also pioduced another plan, No. CE/SK/31/77 (Ex: 26). in whkh the contours of she ground level between Golandi river and Beki nala and for some area on either side have been shown Sri K. Bangarayya has also stated that the ground slopes ^eneuilly from the left bank of river Golandi towards bridge No. 141 and the latter plan mentioned above also shows the same state of things. The natural conclusion is that there was an on-rush of water on the night of 29/30di May, 1977, from river Golandi towards bridge No. 141. The extent of the on-rush may be gathered from the evidence detailed below.

Sri Biindaban Mandal, resident of Bekigaon (W. No. 24) has stated that his house is situated on the left bank of Golandi river about 50-60 feet from it and nearly 1-1/2 fur- longs upstream of Jhe Railway bridge. On (he night in ques- tion, he was sleeping in his hut on the floor and between 12 O' Clock and 1 O' Clock in the night he was awakened by the water entering his house. The water was so huge in quantity that it washed away his house, which was made of mud. He has further stated that he could not go out anywhere in the night as "there was water everywhere".

The evidence of Sri Tulsi Ram Sharma, resident .of village Thana Udalguri (W. No. 45), a witness called by the Com- mission, is that he had been, r;si<.':-m in Udalgmi for about 30 years and had seen neither such heavy rain nor such Hood as he saw on the night of 29/30th May. 1977. Further, his entire land (by which he probably meant crop) of 45 bighas was ruined that night by the silt deposited by the water of river Golandi.

Sri Seben Chandra Basumatary, resident of village Kahibari (\V. No. 48), a ",'itness called t>> the Commission, who has his shop about 200 feet from the sits of the accident, has deposed that on the night of 29/53th May, 1977, the flood water spilled over and flowed into Beki nala and damaged bridge No. 141. He has also deposed that house situated on the left bank of Golandi at a point one mile upstream of it was washed away and the material of the house was car- ried away by water. According to the witness, such a flood had never been seen in his life-time.

Sri Suphul Morandi, Ambulance Car Driver, St. Joseph Hospital, Udalguri (W. No. 51), a witness cailed by the Commission, has said that on a return journey from Tezpur to Udalguri, when he reached Kahibari village at about 1.45 a.m. on 30th May, 1977, he found the road shead covered with water and breached. He saw 13 Up Tezpur Express coming and the engine foiling into the water ?t bridge No. 341, and wanted to go over for rescue work, but could not do so "as there was water all round".

Sri K. Bangarayya, Senior Engineer (FCW) (W. No. 28) whose evidence has been referred to above, has stated that during the course of the survey, he saw on ihe walls of some of the huts signs of flood water having reached upto 2 feet above the floor level. The signs were clearly visible on that portion of the wall which had been submerged under water. His statement has been corroborated by Sri A. R. S. Rao Additional Chief Engineer (Bridges) (W. No. 29) and Shri p! G. Gopalan, Chief Engineer (W. No. 32) and also bv the local inspection of the learned Assessors on the 18th July, 1977, who. too, saw these flood marks in the huts. The learned Assessors also saw extensive deposit of silt in the area left by the over- flowed water of river Golandi.

The evidence makes it quite clear thnt there was a massive flood in river Golandi on the night in question and its water spilled over the left bank extensively. How bridge No. 141 came to be affected has now to be seen. The flood was of a magnitude that far exceeded the capacity of discharge

of bridges No. 139 and 141 and, therefore, the water headed up in the area covered upto the railway track on the south and Ihe PWD road on the cast, thus getting impounded in Ihc shape of a big reservoir. The depth of the water in the reservoir kept increasing until a breach took place at bridge No. 141, which released the impounded water. The maximum level reached by the water in the reservoir has been recorded as 108.94 m in the report (Ex. 96) of Sri P. G. Gopalan, Chief Engineer (W. No. 32) prepared by him after having the re-levelling of the area done on 3rd August, 1977 at the direction of the Commission. The discharge that would have passed at this level through bridge No, 141 prior to the breach has been calculated by Sri A. R. S. Rao, Additional Chief Engineer (Bridges) (W. No. 29) ns 5800 cusecs (Ex. 37), by Sri K, Suryanarayana, Additional Chief Engineer (Track) (W. No. 31) as 6280 cusecs (Ex. 44) and by the learned As- <-rfors as 4000 cusecs. The learned Assessors have given their j: isong for the differences in the figures of the Railway En- gineers and their own. Much significance does not, however, attach to the differences in view of the fncl th;it every one of these 3 calculations ultimately leads to the conclusion that the maximum discharge canacity of the bridge was greatly exceeded. The immediate effect of the abnormal rise in the level and velocity of the water was scouring of the bridge structure. On what specific portion the scouring took place and what course the water took for effecting the scour is a matter of difference of opinion between the Engineers of the Railway and the learned Assessor¹?. The tenor of ihe evidence of Sri P, G. Gopalan, Chief Engineer (W. No. 32) is that in hii opinion, the scouring took place on account of the impact of water coming from Golnndi side and rushing past the Rowta Bfigan end abutment. His suggestion was that the scour developed on the front side of the abutment (i.e. towards the opening). As opposed to this, the opinion of the fearied Assessors is as follows :—

" Since the flow waB highly oblique and since the unprotected railway bank, adjacent to the abutment was under attack by a massive soil! from river Golandi, which suddenly developed into a channel in H matter of hours, the bank could not withstand the the heavy attack and gave way. Thereafter, due to high velocity a deep scour develoDed at the back. of ihe abutment, which was much below the bottom of foundations. When measured in silted condition this scour was 7 feet below (ho bottom of founda- tion* ".

With due respect to the learned Assessors and to the En- gineers, it appears to me that the matter is lankly one of speculation and what is really important is the fact of scour- ing and not the process or angle of attack adopted by the water which brought it about-

The extent of the havoc wrought by the flood in Beki ntla whatever causes might have led or contributed to it. may be visualised with the help of the photographs (Ex: 39, 100/1 and 100/2) of the site of the accident taken just a few days after the accident,

Chief Photographer (W. No. 23). The evidence of Sri B.

Some very important features about the upper reaches of Golandi have still to be noted. A river called Khaurang meets river Golandi near the Indian border. This had not been shown in the old topo sheet prepared in 1912-13 (reprinted in 1946-47), Khaurang has undergone a change, since then, as indicated in the new topo sheets prepared in 1961 and 1972 (Surveyed in 1959-60 and 1967-68) and now meets Golandi. Originally, only a small offshoot of Khnurang join- ed Golandi but now that offshoot has become considerably widened and it contributes substantially to the water of Golandi. The present width of the offshoot of Khaurang has been spoken to by Sri J. R. Reddy, Executive Engineer (W. No. 20) and was also observed by the learned Assessors at the time of their aerial inspection on 19th July 1977, It is quite probable that it was only on account of heavy and unprecedented rainfall that this widening of Khaurang took place, although it must be admitted that there is no positive evidence regarding the time of widening. Apart from this there was a hillslidc on the right bank of Khaurang which was noticed by Sri J. R. Reddy (W. No. 20) during his sur- vey and by the learned Assessors at the time of their aerial inspection on 19th July, 1977. Sri .f. R. Reddy and the Asses- tors alike observed marks of freshness in the hillslidc.

Mandal, resident of Rekigaon (W. No. 24) who was awaken- ed by the flood waters entering his house between 12 O' Clock and 1 O' Clock in the night points in the same direction.

The timings regarding the passage of train from Harislnga to Udalguri Railway Station on the night in question also abundantly prove the suddenness of the flood. The train pas- sed Harisinga Railway Station at 1.00 hrs. and reached Udalguri at 1.14 hrs. crossing bridges No. 114 (km 56|3-4) and 125 (km 56] 10-11) cnroule at about 1.09 hrs. avid 1.12 hrs. respectively. The bridges were sound and safe whea the train crossed them but immediately thereafter, they suffered heavy damage. Bridge No. 141 collapsed before 1.25 hrs. and it is, therefore, obvious that all these 3 bridges were- damaged within a very short interval of time on account of the extreme suddenness of the flood.

The evidence of Father John Thomas of Catholic Church, Dhckiajull (W. No. 60), a witness called by the Commis- sion, has an important bearing in this connection. He han stated that he left Udalguri on his return journc> to Tezpur at 22.30 hrs. of 29th May, 1977 and, proceeding along the PWD road, passed the site of the accident, a little while later. At that time he noticed watei on the road only at one place which was about one kilometre from the bridge i.e. bridge No. 139, towards Udalguri. From this it may easily be inferred that there was no water on the road nearabout, the site of the accident at that time. The lowest point of the road nearabout this location is about 8 feet below the rail level of bridge No. 141 as appears from the evidence of Sri A.R.S. Rao, Additional Chief Engineer (Bridges) (W. No. 29). It has been stated by Sri Rao that the water rose ulti- mately to a level of 1-4" below the rail level. In other words, there was a rkc of 6 feet 8 inches in a brief span of 2 hrs, and the rise was clearly, therefore, of a high order and com- pressed within an exceedingly short interval.

It is to bo noticed that river Khaga flowing under bridge No. 114 which was damaged on the night of the accident also has its source in Bhutan hills and there was an excessive rise in the water level of that river also on the night in ques- tion. The devastation caused by the excessive rain in Bhutan was evidently extensive.

The irrcsistable conclusion from the evidence discussed above is that the collapse of bridge No. 141 was not due only to the flood in Beki nala but, also and mainly to the flood in and spill over of the water of river Golandi.

9. Whether there was any obstruction in the free flow of river Golandi on the night of the accident causing an abnormal rise in its water level and consequent- ly, in the water level of Beki nala also ?

The Irrigation Headworks on river Golandi to the south of bridge No. 139, loomed very large in the course of hear- ing, and, indeed, they have a very important bearing in the determination of the cause or causes that might have led or contributed to the collapse of bridge No. 141. Naturally, I have to discuss this question at some length.

The Golandi Ini.cfiation Scheme headworks are situated 229 metres (751 ft) downstream of bridge No 139 aero 3 river Golandi. The headworks have 10 sluice gates, each 10 feet wide and 8,5 ft. high. The afflux bunds on either side Mtend upto the PWD road upstream, the length being 600 feet on the left side and 700 feet on the right aide. The top wMth (if the afflax bunds is about 12 feet and the size siopet are 1-112 : 1. A gauge is fitted in the river 500 feet upstream of the headworks for measuring the daily water levels. Two irrigation canals take off from the headworks, one towards east and the other towards west. The headworks Jwe been constructed in accordance with the plan (Ex. 59) and are designed for a discharge of 7000 cusecs. These facts regard- ing the headworks are clear from the statement of Sri Prem Prasad Kakfifi, Executive Engineer (Irrigation) (W. No. 34) and Sri p, G. Gopalan, Chief Engineer, N. F. Railway (W. No. 32),

It is now to be ascertained whether tho sluice gates were open partly open or closed prior to the accident, on the night in question. All the witnesses relating to this mnt- ter were called by (he Commission itself, and they fnil into 3 categories. Tn the first category fall the employees of the Irrigation Department of the Government of Asjam who were posted at the headwords, and they were Sri Hem Kanta Bora. Section Officer, Sri S. C. Das Khalasi and Sri Safed Ali, Khalasi. These witnesses may be said, to be naturally interested in trying to prove thai the sluice gates were open, and there was no obstruction whatsoever in tho free flow 01 the water of river Golandi. In the second category fall 4 witnesses, viz., Lt. Col. S. K. Murthy, Sri Tulsi Sharma, Shri Rameswar Boro and Father John Thomas, who arc in no manner connected with the Irrigation Department but whose evidence lends to support its case. In the third category fall Sri Chandan Maitra, Sri Ramjit Murmoo, Sri Sabu Ram Basumatari, Sri Suphul Morandi, Sri Swarna Basumatari, Sri Tiken Basumatari, Sri Bipin Basumatari and Sri Ramdhari Chauhan, all resident of the locality excepting Sri Chandan Maitra. These witnesses have deposed to a state of things contrary to what has been deposed by the winesses of tn" first two categories.

Sri Hem Kanta Bora, Section Officer, Golandi Irrigation Headworks (W. No. 36) has stated that on 27th May '77, flow of water in river Golandi increased and that sluice gates were then completely opened and further that they remained so till the time of accident. He has also stated that he was in- formed that from the afternoon of 26th May, 1977, cultiva- tors would not be requiring water and the canal gates were, accordingly, closed and the main sluice gates opened.

Shri Shymal Chandra Das, and Sri Safed Ali, Khalasis. Golandi Irrigation headworks (W. No. 37 and 38) have stated that they were on duty at the headworks from the evening of 29th May, 1977, and that all the sluice gates were com- pletely open and the canal gates were closed.

Sri Tulsi Ram Sharma, a resident of village Thana Udal- guri (W. No. 45) has deposed that on 29th May 1977, while he was returning home from Ganiimuri village at about 3.30 p.ffL, he saw an the gates open. He could not say whether the gates were partially open or completely open, but was certain that water was flowing from, below the gates.

Siri Rameswar Boro, a resident of village Kathalguri (W, No, 46) has stated that he saw tho sluice gates at about 6,30 p.m. on 29th May, 1977, while returning home from Udalguri, and found them open. He could not give any idea of the number of gates open, but asserted that they were open. On the morning of 30th May, 1977, at about 4 a.m. he found that a lot of water had collected near his house, and he thereafter went to the gates again to ascertain if tha guide bunds of the Golandi Irrigation Scheme had collapsed. He, however, found that "all the gates were completely open and water flowing".

The gates were also seen by Father John Thomas of Catholic Church, Dhekiajnli (\V. No. 60) who has stated that about 6 p.m. on 29th May 1977 while he was going by car to Udalguri with Bishop Joseph Mittathany of Tezpur, the Bishop drew his attention to the gates and he saw that they were open. He could not say whether all of them were open, but he was sure that most of them wtre. The reason why Bishop Joseph Mittathany asked him to look towards the gates was that, according to what the Bishop told him, "usually gates were closed, but that day they were open".

Sri Ramjit Munnoo, a resident of village Kathalguri (W. No. 47) has stated that he used to go past the sluice gates everyday on his way to Udalguri, and that on 29th May 1977 he saw the gates at about 3,30 p.m. He found that 3 gates were half open and the rest were completely closed. He has further stated that out of the two canal's, the one on tha western side was flowing, but the one on the eastern side was not noticed by him. He had occasion to go to tho headworks again on the morning of 30th May 1977 and he saw that the western canal was closed and the sluice gates were open. According to him, one of the banks of the c;,nal on tho western side had collapsed.

The evidence of Sri Sabu Ram Basumatari. a resident of village Purani Happagaon (W. No. 49) is almost to the same effect. He hns stated that he saw the gates at about K p.m. on 29th May 1977 and found that 3 of them were half or<:ri and the rest were completely closed. The canal on the western side was flowing, whilo the one on the eastern side was closed.

Sri Suphul Morandi. Ambulance Car Driver, St. Joseph Hospital, Udalguri IW. Mo. 51), has deposed that on 29th May 1977, tit ubout mid-day, while going from Udal- guri to Tczpur, he saw the sluice gates clearly and found that some c! them were closed while others were either fully open or half open.

Sri Swarna Basumatari, a resident of village Kathalguri (W No. 53) has stated that he had occasion to go to the sluice gates on 29th May, 1977, and that 9 gates were completely closed and one was partly open. He lii'.s further stated that no water was flowing in the canal.

Sri Tiken Basuraatari, a resident of village Biligaon (W. No 55) has stated that he returned home from Udalgun at 9 p.m. on 29th May, 1977, and saw on the way, the sluice gates. 9 of which were completely closed and one was open by about half a foot.

Sri Bipin Chandra Basumatari, a resident of village Dakshin Kahiban lias stated that he saw the sluice gates at 6.30 p.m. in the evening of 29th May, 1977, while he wns going to meet Sri Lalji, Chowkidar of the Irrigation headworks, and observed that 8 of them were closed and 3 were open to the extent of 1-1 j feet from the bottom.

Sri Ramdhari Chauhan, a resident of village Kathaiguri (W. No. 58) has deposed that he had gone to the Irrigation headworks between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m. on 29th May, 1977, and ho saw 2 gates partially open and the rest completely closed. He found a little water flowing from below the partial- ly open gates. According to him, the eastern canal gates were closed "as usual", while the western canal was flowing.

Two occupants of the ill-fated train, viz. Lt. Col. S. K. Murthy, Officer Commanding, Eastern Store Division (W. No. 40) and Sri Chandan Maitra (W. No. 43) have also made statements relating to the matter under consideration. Lt. Col. S. K. Murthy has stated that he saw the sluice gates shortly after 3.15 a.m. on 30th May, 1977, and it "struck" him that "some of the gates were fully open and some were partially open and there was none absolutely closed". He was pointedly asked as to whether he was quite sure in his mind about having seen all the gates either completely or partially open and he emphatically answered that he was, adding however, lhat the extent to which the sluice gates were open was not uniform. It may be mentioned here that this evidence relates to a point of time after the accident.

Sri Chandan Maitra (W. No. 43), the other passenger, has stated that, after the accident, while he was on his way to Udalgun, sometime between 3.30 a.m. and 4 a.m., he saw the sluice gates to the south of river Golandi and noticed that all of them were closed. He stood near the bridgo for about 10 minutes and during that period he heard the sound of "sudden lush of water" through the bridge. He noticed that the level of the gates had been raised in the interval even though they were still touching the water.

I have left out of account, in this connection, the state- ments of Sri P. P. Kakati. Executive Engineer (Irrigation) (W. No. 34); Sri S. F. Zamnn. Sub Divisional Officer (Irri- gation) (W. No. 33) and Sri Damodur Boro (W. No, 52) who, according to their statements, had seen the gates late in the morning of 30th May, 1977, because of the state of things might easily have changed by that time.

For judging the reliability of the statements of witnesses mentioned above, it is necessary to note the conditions pre- vailing at the sluice gates and the afflux bunds after the accident, the evidence regarding which appears to be clear and incontrovertible. It is also at the same time necessary lo assess how much water flowed, through the sluice gates on the night in question.

Sri P. P. Kakati, Executive Engineer (Irrigation) (W. No. 34) has testified to the facts that he went to Golandi Irriga- tion hcadworks on the morning of 30th May, 1977, and found that no damage had occurred to any part of the head- works, i.e., to the wing walls, abutments, piers etc. or to the canal. Sri S. F. Zaman, Sub Divisional Officer (Irrigation) (W. No. 35) and Sri Hem Kanta Bora, Sectional Officer, Golandi Irrigation headworks (W. No, 36) have also corro- borated the statement of Sri P. P. Kakati. Sri V. S. Jafa, District Magistrate, Tezpur (W. No. 39) has stated that he had inspected the embankment of the headworks, after the accident, on 30th May, 1977, and had found no silting on them, nor did he find any signs of the water having overtop- ped the embankments or any damage or breaches having occurred. He has further slated that he did not see any such maik on the top of the sluice gates as might have been indicative of water having been blocked. The conditions of the headworks and the afflux bunds had also been seen after the accident, by several Engineers of the Railway, Sri P <"•• Gopalan, Chief Engineer (W. No. 32); Sri K. Surya- naJ.vnna, Additional Chief Engineer (Track) (W. No. 31) and i>ri S. R. Choudhury, P.A, to Chief Engineer (W. No. 25), have stated that there was no damage to the afflux bunds, Sri Suryanarayana has further stated that there was no damage even to the structure of the sluice gates. The facts observed by the witnesses were also observed by the learned Assessors during their local inspection on 18th luly, 1977, and are found mentioned in their report.

Now, as to the quantity of water that may be estimated to have flowed through the sluice gates on the night of the accident. The learned Assessors have calculated the discharge through the sluice gates on the night of 29/30th May, 1977, as 6500 cusecs. They have appended the details of their cal- culations regarding it as Annexure to their 'opinion'. The learned Assessors have further calculated that for this dis- charge of 6500 cusecs through the gates, the depth of water just upstream of the gates should have been 7 feet. The maximum depth of flow for a discharge of 7000 cusecs for which the hcadworks have been designed woul'd, according to the learned Assessors, have been 8 feet. Their ultimate con- clusion following from the above facts may be staled in their own words :

"This would indicate that all the gates were open at least by 7 feet if not to the furl height of 8'-6", Had they been substantially closed, the discharge passing through the gates and the Railway bridgo upstream would have been correspondingly less and so also the water levef upstream of the bridge for identical level at the gauge. Considering the factual position after the heavy Hoods, namely, no damage to afflux bunds, no damage to sluice gates and no damage to protection works, one cannot but con- clude that the gates were almqst fully open."

The learned Assessors are experts of repute and there ia no reason far not accepting the correctness of their calcula- tions and the results • arrived therefrom, particularly when there is no expert opinion in opposition.

On an examination of the evidence T find that the state- ments of the witnesses belonging to the first two categories are clear and consistent, and they do not suffer from any improbability. They are also in accord with the condition! prevailing at the sluice gates and the afflux bunds after the accident as also with the inspection report and 'Opinion' of the learned Assessors. On the other hand most of the wit- nesses of the third category contradict one another and their cvidence runs counter to what must, in my opinion, be ac- cepted as the correct situation of things at the sluice rates and the afflux bunds after the accident. The contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses of the third category may easily be seen from the substance of their statements given above. Tt is, however, not merely on account of such con- tradictions that their evidence has to be regarded as untrust- worthy or unacceptable, but essentially on account of the improbabilities - and other unsatisfactory features about it and, further, on account of its inconsistency with the observ- ed and almost incontrovertible facts,

Sri Ramjit Murmii (W. No. 47) has said that he sent a statement to the Commission about the condition of sluice gates on the night of 29th May 1977, and that the state- ment had been read out to him before ho affixed his thumb impression on it. He was, however, unable to say as to who wrote out the statement, and read it out to him This casts a substantial doubt on the fact whether the statement really emanated from him,

Sri Sabu Ram Basumatari (W. No. 49) has said that he had sent a statement to the Commission written by somebody else, but he too like Sri Ramjit Murmu (W No. 47) did not know who had written it out. He has also said that the state- ment was not read out to him and that onfy his signature was taken thereon. His answer to the question as to whether h" knew the contents of the statement was clearly in the nena-

ZrttfASSoS?statement of thls witness caMot *

As stated at an earlier stage of the discussion of evidence Sri Sabu Ram Basumatari claimed to have seen the sluice gates at about 8.00 p m. on 29th May 1977, while returning home from Udalguri. He has, however, admitted that at that time, "it was very dark and raining heavily". The manner in which he claims to have looked at the gates appears to be very unnatural and artificial. He stated that he and his com- panions examined each of the 10 gates as they passed along them by focussing their torch-li^ht at every gate, I find myself unable to place reliance on his evidence or to accept it in preference to the evidence of the v.itnestes in the fir=t and the second category.

The evidence of Sri Sw..rna Basumatari (W. No. 53) is that he had gone to th; sluice gates between 5.30 p.m. and 6.00. p.m. on 29th May 1977, for catching fish. Strange.'y enough, he never went there, according to his statement, for fishing except on that date. That mates his visit to the sluice gates very doubtful and unconvincing.

Sri Tiken Basumatari (W. No, 55) claims, to have seen the gates while he was returning home at about 9.00 p.m. on 29th May 1977, after seeing a cinema bhow. He admits that it was raining very heavily <:.' that time and his stay at the gates was only for 5 minutes. When questioned as to how- he managed to notice the sluice gates in the J^r'^ness, his ans- wer was that there was a momentary flash of lightening that enabled him to do so. I need only say that I do not find this evidence worthy of reliance.

The evidence of Sri Bipin Chandia Basumatari (W. No. 56) has only to be read to be rejected. He has stated th it he saw the sluice gates at about 6.30 p.m. on 29th May, 1977, when he went to Sri Lalji, Chowkidar of the sluice gate^ for borrowing some money, Rs. 5—10, for purchasing some quantity of rice for domestic iss as his stock of rice had fallen short of his need. He could not, however, meet Sri Lalji, as the latter was not present at Ms residence and he returned home straightaway. He admitted that he did not then, actually borrow money from Sri Lalji. His initial statement was that he wanted to purchase some sundry articles with the money borrowed from Sri Lalji, but he made the statement definite later by saying that he wanted to purchase rice. He has admitted that there are about lf>0— 200 inhabitants in his village, but it is strange tht,t he did not borrow the money in the village although, according to his statement, he had been doing so in the past, and went to Sri Lalji at the si'uicc gates for doing so. What make the story of thL witness absolutely unacceptable is the fact that he was not able to give the name of the village in which Sri Lalji resides or its distance from his own village.

The evidence of Sri Ramdhari Chauhan (W. No. 58) is that very shoitfy after the accident, while he was proceeding towards bridge No. 141 he saw from the road bridge on river Golandi that 5-6 men were "engaged in opening the sluice gates". He wants to make out that the sluice, gates were opened after the accident. It has to be remembered that the distance between the road and the sluice gates is 178.40 metres as appeals from the plan (Ex. 17). It is not possible to believe that he could have seen the sluice gates being opened or the number of men engaged in opening them in the darkness pervading at that time. He has a'so stated that the opening of the sluice gates was being done by "babus" and further that there are no Khafosis at all at the sluice gates. This makes his statement unworthy of credit. It clearly appears from the evidence of Sri P. P. Kakati, Executive Engineer (Irrigation) (W. No. 34) and the mujter- rolls produced by him that there are 7 Khalasis posted at the Irrigation headworks and it cannot be accepted that these Khalasis took no part at all in the opening of the sluice gates and only "babus" were manipulating it at the alleged time. The witness has gone to* the length of saying that there were signs of water having flowed on the top of the embankment on the night of the accident and some twigs were lying on the bund. This statement is obviously belied by the inspection notes of -the learned Assessors, apart from being contrary to the evidence of Sri P. P. Kakati, Executive Engineer (Irrigation) (W. No. 34), Sri S. F. Zanian, SDO (Irrigation) (W. No. 35), Sri V. S. lafa, District Magistrate, Tezpur (W. No. 38), Sri P. G. Gopalan, Chief Engineer (W. No. 32), Sri K. Suryanarayana, Additional ChLf Engi- neer (Track) (W. No. 31) and Sri S. R. Choudhury, PA to Chief Engineer (W. No. 25). I have no hesitation in dis- carding the evidence of this witness.

Sri Chandan Moitra (W. No. 43), one of the occupants of the train which met with the accident in question had filed a statement before the Commission in response to the general notification issued by it. He had stated therein thai he had seen the sluice gates at about 3.30 a.m. on 30th May 1977, ana had found them closed. In his evidence bsfoic the Commission, however, he kept on vacillating in nis mind aua changing his statement fioni time to time and ills statement has only to be read for appreciating how difficult he found to stick to any clear and consistent posi- tion. '$ he position that he finally took may be gathered fiOiii a few qu;sli3ns and their answers towards the end of his statement and they are being reproduced below :

"Q. Is it possible that you are mistaken and all the gates were partially ciosed or some of them were completely open when you first saw them ?

Aiih. There was no possibility of mistake because I had been towards the front of water. I am not sure whether the gates were open or ciosed. I drew my inference on the basis of the flow of water.

Q. Was the water still flowing ?

Anb. X'he water wa" still flowing.

ij. in your siatcment iiled before the Commission you said that you saw the sluice gates were closed when you saw them'at 3.30 a.m. on 30th May 1977. Now you say that you inferred this from the flow of water. Which state- ment is correct ?

Ans. What I said today is correct, li appears to me that the man who typed my statement for filing before the Com- mhsicn had done it wrongly or might have translated incor- rectly. I dictated in Bengali language to the person who typed iny statement in English. I know English. I also understand English. The statement might have been wrongly typed by the person who typed it. "It was typed by Sri Baiehand (Marwari Chap)." Evidently his statement cannot be safely made the basis for any finding.

The last witness in the third category is Sri Suphul Moiandi (W. No. 51). He claims to have seen the gates at about mid-day on 29th May, 1977 from the PWD road to the south oi bridge No. 139, while he was driving the ambulance car of St. Joseph's Hospital, and to have noticed that some of them were fully closed tuid some were in luily open or haii opsn condition. Obviously, he could hays had only a fleeting glimpse and that too was much before the accident. His statement, therefore, does not appear to me to be helpful in determining the question luider controversy.

The evidence relating to the question with which I have been presently dealing may now be summed up. A number of witneFiej have come and clearly deposed that the sluice gates wers open. Their statements do not disclose any infirmly or any ground for holding that they are not worthy of reliance. The statements of all the witnesses who have tried to establish that the sluice gates were closed have been shown to be improbable and the accounts given by them unnatural and unconvincing. Further, the condition of the Golandi Irrigation headworks and the afflux bunds <

I nvist state that the employees of the Irrigation depart- ment, despite being speciPcaliy questioned to that effect, could not assign any reason why the witnesses of the third category -.vere insisting on saying that the sluice gates were either partially or wholly closed. No such reason "was forth- comine from any other quarter as well. Tn view of the fact that fi" evidence of the witness of this categorv is inherently upsatisfacfoiy ;>nd untrustworthy, and is opposed to the facts ocfnaUv observed at the sluice gates by trustworthy witnesses, an

CONCLUSION